Principes which are the foundation of al demonstration so in Practics and Morals there is an objective Law or Light of Nature containing certain practic Principes which are the Rule of Conversation Thus also we are to understand the Stoics if we wil make a right use of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of which Diog. Laâ—rt in Zeno The Stoics say that to live according to nature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to do nothing that the commun Law prohibits which is right Reason diffusing it self throughout althings Where it deserves a remarque That they make the commun Law of Nature the same with right Reason Which cannot rightly be understood of subjective right Reason but of objective it may Again they say This right Reason diffuseth it self throughout althings Which cannot be understood of any subjective reason which is confined to individuals but must be applied to the commun objective Light and Law of Nature which is diffused throughout the whole Creation according to the various conditions of things Thus Hierocles in Pythagor Carm. pag. 106. saith That the vices of the mind are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aversions and Errata from right Reason And pag. 209. he addes This right Reason is the great Legislatrix and Judge of al human affairs c. And Stobaeus de Virt. Serm. 1. pag. 9. also informes us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is a Syntaxe or orderly contexture according to right Reason but Vice a Transgression against right Reason Where by right Reason we must necessarily understand the commun objective Light or Law of Nature not that darke subjective Light in the minds of blind Mankind Thus also we must understand Parker Amyraldus and other Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the unic Criterion or Rule of moral Virtue Though I denie not but that the Stoics generally and perhaps Aristotle as many of his Followers among the Schole-men by right Reason understand the subjective Light of Nature in mens minds yet I am very apt to persuade my self that Socrates and Plato who seem to be the first Promulgators of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 meant thereby no other than the objective Light and Law of Nature whereof some more commun Precepts were conveighed down by the posteritie of Noah but those irradiant and bright notices thereof which shone among them they received by oriental Tradition from the sacred Books of Moses wherein Plato was not a little versed and which by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 royal Law he seems to allude unto 5. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule Prop. That Divine Law which is the adequate perfect Rule and Measure of moral Bonitie is no where to be found but in the sacred Philosophie or Scriptures Here and here only is extant Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This sacred Rule whereof he had great notices he sometimes cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine Word Here also Aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commun Law of Nature in its perfection is alone to be found Hence likewise it was that Pythagoras Lycurgus Solon Minos and Plato borrowed the principal heads of their best Laws as we have at large proved Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. The sum of the Law of Nature and al divine Precepts is conteined in the Decalogue or Moral Law delivered by Moses which is thence stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the matrices of the Law and its roots And indeed what are the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law but a Transumt Compend Abstract or rather extended Copie of the Law of Nature given to man in the beginning from that first original Exemplar the eternal Law Is not the formal reason of al Equitie prescribed and expressed in the moral Law Ought not this then to be the terme measure and scope of al Laws To clear which we are to remember that the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law must not be taken literally as ten Words but in a more ample extensive notion as Christian Pandects or commun heads of al moral Duties towards God and man to be explicated and extended accordingly to the Illustrations and Commentaries of the Prophets our great Lord and his Apostles Though the Decalogue doth not mention each particular Dutie in the Gospel yet it doth command obedience to al that are or shal be specified and expresseth every particular Dutie generically or synecdochically and although it were not a Dutie from the general Precept til it was specified in the Gospel yet when it is once a Dutie the neglect of it is a sin against the Decalogue Indeed are there not almost in al the Precepts manifest Synecdoches Is it not then ridiculous for men to restrain the most ample sense of the moral Law to the narrow confines of its words Doth not the great Legislator take the blackest sins as Murder Adultery Theft c. and place them as so many commun Heads in the Decalogue that so by these we may be instructed how black and odiose al those other sins reducible to those heads are Wherefore to penetrate and dive into the nature and contents of the Ten Commandments we must in a particular manner inquire 1 What in every Command is treated of 2 The end for which it was given 3 What therein is displeasing or pleasing to God And after al we shal find that the moral Law is spiritual holy just and good as Rom. 7.12 14. reaching al the motions and dispositions of the heart And indeed how absurd is it to conceit that he who made the heart and knows al the diverticules or turnings and windings of it should make a Law to reach only the outward acts and not the inward principes and motions May we not then conclude that the Decalogue and moral Law of the supreme Legislator extends its Precepts to the whole Soul and al its Principes Powers Inclinations Thoughts Affections and Operations interne and externe directing the same to their right objects and ends affecting them with their inseparable Accidents and Modifications clothing them with their immutable circumstances in such sort that the action good by this Law can never be made evil that which is evil by this Law can never be made good that which is good or evil by this Law can never be made indifferent Hence Plato brings in Pindar speaking thus of the regal Power as I take it of the Law of Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Law is King over al both mortals and immortals And Aristot. Pol. l. 4. c. 4. affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Law ought to command al. Which is most proper and peculiar to the moral Law that lively Idea and Image of the Divine Sanctitie and Wil the original and universal Exemplar of moral Bonitie that great bond of union by conformitie whereto mans Wil becomes one with the Divine Wil yea man himself one with God Whence as Tyndal pag. 83. wel observes Mans
by others to these three Heads Monarchie Aristocratie and Democratie Monarchie Aristocratie Democratie Of these he treats distinctly in his Politicus pag. 291. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Monarchie is one forme of politic Gubernations Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And after Monarchie we may place the Governement of a few i. e. Aristocratie Lastly he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The third forme of Governement is it not that of the people called Democratie These three formes of Administration he distinctly explicates according to their legitime constitutions excesses and comparations each with other The excesse of Monarchie he makes to be Tyrannie when Princes governe without or contrary to Law and the excesse of Aristocratie he makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Oligarchie when a few usurpe the sole Administration of politic Affaires the excesse of Democratie is Anarchie or popular confusion when there is no distinction between Governors and Governed As for the comparation of these three Formes among themselves he affirmes that Monarchie or the Administration of One is to be preferred so far as it is moderated and bounded by good Laws together with a good Moderator and interpreter of those Laws but on the contrary if it degenerate into Tyrannie it is then of al the worst His own words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Monarchie bounded by good Laws is of al best but if it be lawlesse it is of al the most difficult and intolerable Thence Definit Plat. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a King is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince that governes according to Laws whereby he is opposed to a Tyrant who is said to be one that governes only according to his wil as hereafter In Aristocratie there must be one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chief among the Senators who ought to direct and order affaires The Athenian Politie mixed of Aristocratie and Democratie yea in Democratie there is something of Aristocratie from the peoples consent Thence Plato in his Menexenus pag. 238. treating of the Athenian Republic its original state as also that it then enjoyed he saith It was an Aristocratie mixed with Democratie His words are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. For there was the same forme of Politie then as now namely Aristocratie under which now we live and have kept the same for a long time Some would cal it Democratie others by another name But to speak truth it is the Gubernation of the best men with the peoples consent For we had in times past Kings and these truly sometimes came to the Governement by enheritance sometimes by the suffrage of the people But now sithat the power is in the people they commit the Administration to some most excellent and virtuose persons neither is any laid aside by reason of infirmitie or povertie or low degree of parentage neither if the contrary conditions are found is he therefore promoted as in other Cities but there is one Rule of determining al Offices namely he that is judged the wisest and best man he is called to public Administration and Office And the cause of this Administration among us is our equalitie and paritie as to origine For other Cities being composed of persons different and inequal they have inequal and different formes of Administration namely Tyrannie and Oligarchie also some are Slaves others Lords but we being borne al of one Mother judge it not equal that some be Lords and some Vassals but that equalitie of stock hath made us to find out this equalitie of Politie that none precede the other but in the estime of Wisdome and Virtue Wherefore their parents and ours having been educate in al kind of libertie many noble deeds for the commun utilitie of Mankind have been performed having always judged it necessary for libertie to fight against the Grecians for the Grecians and against the Barbarians for the Grecians Thus Plato of the Athenian Politie wherein he shews that Democratie doth not require that al Administrations be transacted by the people but that the supreme Power be in the people and that they be their free suffrage elect such as they judge to excel in Wisdome and Virtue as Administrators or Magistrates of public Affaires This he exemplifies by the Athenian Republic which was a Democratie in which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme Power was in the Communitie yet so as that the Administrationof that Power was by the peoples suffrage committed to such as they judged most eminent for Wisdome and Virtue So that this Politie was indeed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Aristocratie with the peoples consent i. e. mixed with Democratie Plato here joins Democratie with Aristocratie Monarchie mixed with Democratie so in his Leg. 3. pag. 693. he joins Monarchie and Democratie as the two constitutive parts of a good Politie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. There are as it were two Mothers of public Administrations or Polities out of which he that shal say other formes of Gubernation resulted speaks the truth the one of these is called Monarchie the other Democratie the former is most eminently in use among the Persians the later among us And almost al other kinds of Polities are variously composed out of these And it 's necessary that a Citie which would enjoy her libertie and amitie with prudence participate of both of these which indeed our commun speech signifies when we say that a Citie destitute of these cannot be rightly administrated and governed In which he demonstrates that Regal Monarchie contempered with popular Democratie is the most equal and best of Dominations provided that it be wel confined and bounded by Laws for such a mixed Politie comes nearest to paterne Autoritie which is most natural By comparing these Philosophemes of Plato it is evident that according to his mind Mixed Politie its use a mixed Politie or Gubernation of Monarchie Aristocratie and Democratie if wel limited and bounded by Laws is generally useful Thus the Stoics also held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the best Politie or Regiment is that which is mixed of Democratie the Regal Power and Aristocratie as Laertius in Zeno. And the reasons hereof are these Monarchie has an unitive efficace for the rpeventing Division Dissolution and Ruine which usually ariseth out of Factions unto which Democratie and Aristocratie is obnoxious Democratie hath a diffusive facultie as it takes in the concernes and interest of each individual Aristocratie has a collective virtue as it gathers up the interest of the whole Communitie into a systeme of the wisest and best Administrators As al these three kinds of Polities have their virtues and efficaces so also they have their excesses Monarchie with facilitie degenerates into Tyrannie Aristocratie into Oligarchie and Democratie into Anarchie as Plato Repub. 8. pag. 563. hath wel observed Whence for the preventing the excesse of each some great Politicians as also Theologues have judged a complexe or mixed constitution of al
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
Reason is cried up by some as the only Rule of Moralitie Thus Seneca would needs persuade us That we have this merit of Nature that virtue doth premit its light into the minds of al yea those that wil not follow yet see it And not only some vulgar capacities now a-days but also the Stoics of old generally cried up the Light within them as the Rule of Moralitie The Schole-men also in imitation of Aristotle their Oracle generally proclaim right Reason to be the formal Rule of moral Good But that Aristotle and Plato by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason understood the objective Law either of Nature or Moses I no way dout but hereafter to demonstrate Indeed al our subjective Light by Nature is no other than a nocturne dreaming tenebrous knowlege as Plato stiles it 2 That no human Law or Laws is the perfect measure of moral Bonitie No human Laws a perfect Rule of moral Good is also evident because al human Laws are extreme defective in their extension and prescripts as to al the Causes and Principes of moral Goodnesse how deficient are they both as to the Mater and Manner of moral Good What Restrictions Emendations and Alterations do they need What an infinite number of particular cases are there which no human Law can reach Wel therefore doth Androcles in Aristotle Reth l. 2. c. 25. informe us That al human Laws need another Law to correct them as fishes need salt to preserve them from putrefaction This corrective Law they terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Equitie which indeed is no other than the Law of Nature as hereafter cap. 5. § 5. 4. The Divine Law the Rule of moral Good Prop. The adequate perfect rule and measure of moral Bonitie is the Divine Law This Hypothesis being the main wil require more ample explication and demonstration 1 The Divine Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first essentially just and holy Being and therefore the first essential rule or measure of al Justice and Sanctitie 2 But the Divine Essence being too remote and distant from the Creature he hath therefore given us a divine Law as the Miroir and Idea of his essential Sanctitie to be the rule of al moral Bonitie as to us 3 This Divine Law given us as the Rule of moral Bonitie was concreate and connatural as to Adam it being impressed and engraven on his nature and so needed not any further promulgation 4 Hence the objective and subjective Law or Light of Nature was to Adam in his innocent state one and the same he having a perfect understanding and comprehension of the whole Dutie of man and so became a Law unto himself 5 But lapsed man having lost his subjective Law and Light of Nature as to supernaturals and very far as to naturals and civils retaining only some fragments or broken notices our most benigne Lord out of his great clemence and pitie to lapsed man gave a new Edition of that natural Law and therein fresh notices of his soverain wil and pleasure touching mans dutie So that the World was never without an objective Law and Light of Nature albeit the subjective was lost in Adam Yea some Divines of great note conceive that those very commun natural Notions communly called the Fragments or Remains of the Image of God lost by Adam are vouchsafed to us by the Covenant of Grace in and by the Mediation of Christ Thus they interpret Joh. 1.9 of Christ's illightening every man Joh. 1.9 i. e. not only supernatural light vouchsafed to the Elect but even the natural notices or Light of Nature vouchsafed to the lapsed Sons of Adam is the effect of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation And the reason seems demonstrative because our very Beings and al the comforts of our Beings having been forfeited by the breach of the first Covenant whatever good we enjoy on this side Hel is but the overflowing of the Grace of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation by which the whole World stands So far are we from any real claim to a subjective Light of Nature by virtue of the first Covenant as that both subjective and objective Light is from Christ The objective Light or Law of Nature is stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and its Offices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the knowen Duties i.e. by nature to which they opposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine namely Institutes or positive Commands of God For Jus naturale the natural Law is not opposed to supernatural but to positive Laws as Grotius hath wel observed Right Reason the objective Law of Nature 6 This objective Law of Nature in its second Edition as conteined in divine Revelations of moral Bonitie was not altogether unknowen to the wiser of the Heathen and that Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason was but an Imitamen hereof we now undertake to demonstrate He discourseth hereof professedly in Minos pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is Right is the Royal Law 1 That by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he means the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to me unquestionable and I think it wil clearly appear so to others by what follows 2 He saith this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law which is the stile the Hebrews gave their moral Law as Jam. 2.8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jam. 2.8 And why doth he terme it the Royal Law but because it was the supreme Law of God the King of Kings Thence Socrates addes We therefore rightly granted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that this Law was the invention of Being it self or of the first independent Being For this generally he understands by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thence Defin. Plat. pag. 416. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an operation against right Reason i. e. the objective Law and Light of Nature Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 2. art 6. pag. 76. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And truly this to act according to right Reason is commun to al and let it be fixed as a Canon So again Eth. l. 3. c. 8. pag. 153. he saith Virtues are mediocrities freely undertaken 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so as right Reason shal prescribe This right Reason he elsewhere termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal commun Law which al by nature are subject to So Rhet. l. 1. c. 14. art 3. pag. 69. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I say Law is either proper or commun proper or private Law is that written Law which belongs to particular Nations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The commun Law I cal that which is according to nature for there is a certain commun Just and unjust which al consent unto albeit there should be no societie or confederation of men This commun Law of Nature is the same with his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For look as in speculative Sciences there are certain first
the Soul and in regard of man nothing else but constant regard towards God and continual dependence on him As the excellence of the Angelic nature could not preserve them when self-dependent so the impotence of Human nature cannot prejudice us so long as we are dependent on the first Cause True moral Virtue is a celestial Plant fed by some invisible root in the celestial World from which it derives its influences Members and branches live no life but the life of their head and root al divine and moral Respirations toward the celestial world are from sweet Inspirations of divine Concurse We cannot actively draw down divine influences but we may enlarge our passive receptive capacitie by actual dependence thereon Al moral Beings even the Angels themselves as they have new services to do for God daily so they are dependent for new assistances and herein consistes a main part of their moral Libertie Those who are strongest in self dependence are soonest foiled as Peter 4. Another Exercice of moral Libertie consistes in actual conformitie unto God and imitation of him both by obedience to his preceptive Conformitie to the Divine preceptive Wil. and submission to his providential Wil. 1 It 's a great essential part of moral Libertie to conforme to the preceptive Wil of God God being the prime Exemplar and Measure of al Libertie it necessarily follows that the more we imitate and follow God the more freedome we obtein and who imitate and follow God more than they who conforme most to his Divine preceptive Wil Nothing more commun in sacred Philosophie than this That Adherence Conformitie and Subjection to the Divine Law is the top of moral Libertie Thus Psal 119.45 Psal 119.45 I wil always walk at libertie because I seek thy precepts 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in amplitude i. e. I wil walk in al manner of Amplitude and Libertie both of heart and ways because my heart adheres inviolably to thy royal Law of Libertie The Law of God written on the heart is no other than the very Image of God a bond or cord of Love whereby the heart is knit to God and so made free for the fruition of him Delight in and conformitie to the Divine Law by al manner of virtuose exercices is the highest libertie O! what a regal gloriose libertie is this to be always found in ways of obedience to the divine Wil What a practic contradiction is it to expect moral Libertie in ways of sin When the Spirit of God takes the Law of God and transcribes it on the heart and thereby makes it free to performe actual conformitie to the externe Law Rom. 8.2 what a soverain Libertie is this Thus Rom. 8.2 For the law of the Spirit of life i. e. engraven on the heart as 2 Cor. 3.3 hath made me free from the law of sin and death i. e. enabled me freely and chearfully to conforme to the Divine Law c. Thus also Jam. 1.25 Jam. 1.25 But whose looketh into the persect law of libertie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 denotes 1 an accurate inspection or prying into a thing as they who bring their eye close to an object in order to a more distinct perception thereof 2 A dwelling on an object as some curiose persons who spend much time in dressing themselves do as it were let their eye dwel on their glasse just so the eye of the mind should dwel on the Divine Law which is the glasse wherein we contemplate the Divine Wil Image and Sanctitie Thence follows the object the perfect Law of Libertie 1 The Divine Law is called perfect as it is an absolute perfect Miroir or Glasse wherein we contemplate the Image and Wil of God and whereby the mind is perfected 2 It is termed a Law of Libertie 1 As evangelised and sweetned by evangelic Grace 2 As it makes those free that conforme to it So far as the heart is made conformable to divine Commands so far its actings in conformitie thereto and free and chearful Hence a godly man is said to be a Law unto himself i. e. if there were no Law extant yet he would do the same virtuose acts from that inward Law engraven on his heart Whence Jam. 2.8 it 's stiled the Royal Law and v. 12. The Law of Libertie because conformitie thereto from an inward principe of Virtue is the highest Libertie according to Divine estimation And as sacred Philosophie so Platonic placeth much of moral Libertie in actual conformitie to the divine Law Plato Repub. 9. pag. 592. assures us that in Heaven there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a perfect Exemplar for him that wil behold it and by beholding be conformed thereto Meaning God the original essential Exemplar of al Sanctitie whose sacred Wil is the grand Patterne of our Conformitie And leg 4. pag. 716. he largely demonstrates That by how much the more conformable the Soul is to the Divine Wil by so much the more perfect and free it is It is most evident saith he that every man ought mostly to attend this how he may be of the number of those that follow God What action therefore is it that is most beloved by God and most consentaneous to his Wil Truly but one according to the old Proverbe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because like is beloved by lie whereunto it is conformable c. Wherein he shews that moral Libertie consistes chiefly in following God which is performed by actual conformitie unto his Wil. Thence Philo Judaeus that great Platonist in his Book That every virtuose man is free demonstrates at large That to be free is to follow God by conformitie to his divine Wil. And indeed what is Libertie as to exercice but adhering unto God and who adhere to God but they who conforme to his divine Wil and Law Doth not moral Libertie arise from subjection to God And are not they most subject to God who conforme most to his Law It was a great Saying of Pythagoras 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Follow God Thus also Epictetus in Arrian lib. 1. cap. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The end of Philosophie is to follow God i.e. to conforme to his divine Law And the ancient Philosophers specially Pythagoras Socrates and Plato made Assimilation to and Imitation of God the main end of al Philosophie 2 This actual Conformitie unto God implies subjection and submission to his providential Wil both Afflictive and Diretive Conformitie to Gods providential Wil. And herein also much of moral Libertie doth consiste Is not that mind most noble great and free which can bear great crosses with equanimitie and patience Doth not this give more libertie and enlargement than any temporal affliction can deprive us of O! what a sweet thing is it to have a free generose mind under a straitned consined condition How facile are burdens made hereby A virtuose Spirit that follows God in afflictive providences becomes a King over his crosses his losses
with greater dexteritie facilitie and alacritie in acting than virtuose Principes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Alacrite is defined Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A manifestation of practic election and who manifest more free practic election than such as act virtuosely Frequence of exercices both in Nature and Virtue give a great facilitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Customes are defined by Galen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superadded Natures and Arist Rhet. l. 1. c. 11. pag. 57. saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome is akin to Nature whence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Custome makes every thing sweet Now virtuose exercices frequently repeted breed a divine spiritual custome which is attended with divine suavitie and delight The frequent repetition of the same exercice makes it more facile dexterous and sweet Experience teacheth us that whatever is long customary turnes into our natures even diseases and poisons How much more then spiritually natural and sweet are divine customes and habits attending virtuose acts Thence Heb. 5.14 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Heb. 5.14 Virtuose customes and habits make the exercices of spiritual senses most familiar pleasant and sweet and therefore most free for the freedome of an act is much to be measured by the delight and pleasure that attends it And what acts of the Soul have more of true pleasure and delight attending of them than virtuose exercices O! what sweet inspirations what divine suavities are infused into the Soul upon virtuose actings Frequence of acts makes bitter things sweet and is not the bitter crosse sweetened by virtuose exercices are not the most difficult services made facile hereby Doth not every act of Virtue carry some degree of pleasure and therefore of libertie in it And by how much the more pure and spiritual any virtuose act is by so much the more pure is that joy which attends it For al joy and pleasure is the effect of some operation and the more raised and spiritual the operation is the more refined and strong the pleasure and joy is The purest and strongest pleasures are such as attend the Souls actual adhesion to its first cause and last end for the nearer things come to their first Principes the more joyful and free they are and what brings the Soul nearer its first Principe than virtuose Acts Is not then a virtuose life the sweetest and most free Do not acts of Virtue bring with them the most judicious real solid pure spiritual strong self-sufficient and permanent pleasures and delights as Psal 119.14 16 20 35 3. The Libertie of moral Acts consistes much in their Vitalitie Virtuose Exercices most lively The more excellent and noble the life is the more free the acts are and the more virtuose the acts are the more of the divine life they carry in them Thus Plato Charmid pag. 171. Sin being banisht from the Soul and Rectitude presiding in every act it 's necessary that those who are thus disposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do act wel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and that those who act wel do live happily The same pag. 173. But rather let us endeavor discretely to lead our lives and act that so we may live blessedly Whereby he intimates that virtuose Acts are always blessed and free no man that acts virtuosely can live miserably Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To live wel is to act wel The life of every living Creature exerts and manifests it self most in that operation which is most proper to it and unto which it is most naturally inclined and are not virtuose Acts most proper and natural to man considered in his best state What is life but the Actuositie of the Soul informing the bodie And what more promotes this Actuositie than exercice Is not also the life and Actuositie of the Soul morally considered improved by virtuose exercices Where there is natural life there wil be some pulse and motion of the Spirits So where there is a moral life of Virtue there wil be exercice Quantò perfectiùs quis à se movetur tantò perfectior est modus vivendi Aquin. By how much the more perfectly any thing is moved by it self by so much the more perfect it mode of living is and are not those who act virtuosely most perfectly moved by themselves Plato tels us Phaedr pag. 245. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 By which he shews That it is proper to life to move it self by it self And when doth the Soul most freely move it self by it self but when it acts virtuosely And as al life consistes in action even the life of God in a pure Act of understanding and willing so in like manner the divine moral life in virtuose actions A virtuose Soul as it has Principes of life above Nature so also actings for by how much the more noble and excellent the life is by so much the more excellent is the operation The life and motion of virtuose hearts is upward like that of fire which is of al the most noble active and free life Thence in facred Philosophie Life is frequently put for a noble comfortable free blessed condition of life Psal 34.12 13. consisting in virtuose exercices So Psal 34.12 What man is he that desireth life i. e. a blessed free sweet life And how may such a life be acquired That he tels you vers 13 14. Depart from evil and do good c. The like Psal 22.26 69.33 Psal 119.77 Eccles 6.8 1 Pet. 3.10 And Augustine gives us the true reason of this facred Phraseologie namely because there is no true life but what is virtuose blessed and free So that as there is no moral libertie without a divine life so there is no divine life without virtuose exercices Whence by how much the nearer the Soul comes to God by virtuose Acts by so much the more divine and free its life is 4. Virtuose Exercices most ample The moral Libertie of human Acts may be much measured by their Amplitude and Magnitude And are not virtuose Acts of al most ample and great Actual adhesion to God and his divine Law importes not only subjection but also enlargement and libertie Thence Psal 119.96 the divine Law is said to be exceeding broad or ample and why because it is the expression and Character of the divine Sanctitie and Wil which is most ample Whence the Soul by actual adherence to the divine Law rejoiceth in the divine Amplitude and Libertie Thus Psal 119.165 Great peace have they who love thy law Or Psal 119.165 ample peace with libertie as to walking Thence it follows and nothing shal offend them Or they shal have no stumbling block ie They shal walke in the Kings high-way according to the royal Law of Libertie with al manner of libertie and boldnesse Liber ab infinito ad infinitum super infnitum
Factes 2 A Civil Magistrate must have not only knowledge of Law both natural and municipal but also a particular comprehension of Factes and Cases that may occur A Magistrates prudence consistes not only in the knowlege of the Law but also in the application of it to maters of Fact and particular Cases that may occur For there are no human general precepts so universal but such circumstances may occur as may cause much variation in mater of Justice It 's a good observation of the Philosopher That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prudence is about things singular which are much varied by circumstances of Time Place Persons c. Therefore the prudence of Magistrates ought to inquire not only what is lawful but also what is expedient in this or that case Much of politic prudence consistes not so much in understanding the Rule as in applying it to the Case ruled It 's a good observation of Padre Paul that great Venetian Politician That it is proper to the Prince alone to know what is expedient None knoweth how to governe a Territorie but the Prince himself who alone knoweth al the necessities of it I shal conclude this Character touching the Wisdome of a Magistrate with what Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus observes touching his Prudence Men saith he communly disdain those that are not wise in commanding so that the faithful obedience of the Subjects dependeth much on the sufficient Command of the wise Prince for he that directeth wel must needs be wel obeyed For look as the art of a good Rider is to make his horse gentle and ready at command even so the chiefest point belonging unto a Prince is to teach his Subjects to obey Wherefore the Lacedemonians procured that not only other people did willingly obey them but also desired to be ruled by them 3 A Civil Magistrate must have also some knowlege of the Divine Law Thus Deut. 17.18 3. Knowlege of divine Laws Deut. 17.18 19 20. And it shal be when he sits upon the Throne i. e. as King that he shal write for himself the copie of this law in a book out of that which is before the Priests and Levites The original Book of the Law was kept in the Sanctuarie as Deut. 31.26 and ot of that was the Kings Copie to be written with his own hand for his instructiion how to governe Thence it follows v. 19. And it shal be with him i. e. in al places whither he went he was to carry this Copie of the Law with him and why that follows that he may learne to fear Jehova his God c. The fear of Jehova includes not only interne Affection and Reverence but also the externe Worship and Service of God yea al Religion Thence follows another end v. 20. That his heart be not lift up above his brethren c. Because the Dignitie of a King is so august and great therefore he is to be much versed in the Divine Law to keep him humble as David was Psal 131.1 2. 2 Another essential Character of Qualitie of a Civil Magistrate is Virtue 2. Virtue There is a twofold Virtue requisite to the right constitution of a Magistrate the one natural the other moral 1 A Magistrate ought to have a natural Virtue which consistes in an heroic Spirit and natural Grace as to his externe presence Natural whereby he sweetly and yet with Majestie draws his Subjects to obey him Those whom divine Gubernation intends for Empire he oft indues with a great and heroic natural Spirit Thus Plutarch mentions of Lycurgus in his Life pag. 47. As for Lycurgus the Spartans thought of him thus that he was a man borne to rule to command and to give order as having in him a certain antural Grace and power to draw men naturally to obey him But yet 2 the main Virtue requisite for the qualification of a Magistrate is moral Moral Thus Plato Leg. 12. p. 966. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It shal not be permitted Virtus praecellens in Rege praecipua causa est regnandi civiliter Wicles that any take on him a public Office but he who with much labor and firme faith hath embraced a pious sentiment of God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must endeavor that the Censors of manners be divine men Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore the Censors ought to be most illustrious for a manner of Virtue Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That none ought to be chosen a Keeper of the Laws but he that is divine So Bacon in the Life of Henry VII pag. 26. saith That it is incongruous that they should give Laws to others who are themselves lawlesse Whence Plato Repub. 3. pag. 416. saith That a Magistrate should have his gold not in his purse but in his mind meaning Virtue as in what immediately follows 3 Plato requires of a Civil Magistrate 3. Public spirited and against self-seeking that he be of a public Spirit not avaricious or confined to his private interest Thus Plato Minos pag. 321. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Those therefore of the Ancients were the best Legislators and Pastors of the people as Homer cals a good Imperator the Pastor of the people Now a Pastor specially of men implies a public Spirit free from self-interest Thence he addes Repub. 1. pag. 347. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore good man affect Empire not for lucre's sake nor yet for honor for they are not ambâ—ttose Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For if the Citie consisted of good men the Citizens would strive to avoid the office of a Magistrate as now they contend for it Thence it is apparent that a genuine Magistrate is so spirited as not to seek his own private interest but the public good of those subject to him This Theme Plato more fully prosecutes A Magistrates Diet and Richesses Repub. 3. pag. 416. where he shews That Magistrates ought so far only to be furnished with Richesses and other necessaries 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. as that they may not cease to approve themselves the best Conservators i. e. lest being made drunken with too much prosperitie they waxe insolent and worse to the public detriment of the Citizens Consider therefore whether it be not better that they be so furnished with necessaries as to life and habitation that they possesse nothing as proper but what urgent necessitie requires Moreover that they have neither house nor Buterie but what is open for al. But as to their provision and Diet that they have so great plenty as temperate Soldiers need and that they receive such a salarie for the discharge of their Office from the Citizens as that they may neither want nor have what is superfluous But this must be inculcated on their spirits 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that they ever have gold and silver and that truely divine and august in their Soul so that they need not mens gold and silver 4 For the
fully laid down in the N. T. The powers that be are ordained by God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. are ordained by the constitution and commission of God 2 As for the human Facultie 2. Human. Commission and Autoritie of the Magistrate Plato derives it from the peoples Election and Consent So Repub. lib. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thus Leg. 6. treating of the Election of Magistrates he saith Such should be chosen as are most eminent for prudence and probitie and best qualified for the Offices they are elected unto as also wil attend the same with fidelitie and industry The termes used to expresse this Election and Creation by are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3 Touching the Autoritie of Civil Magistrates Plato makes it to be not Absolute 3. Magistrates Conservators of the Law but Subordinate to the Law For his great Character of a Magistrate is that he be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Conservator and Minister of the Law He layeth down this for a fundamental Principe That a Magistrate may not do what he list but what he ought Thus Alcibiad 1. pag. 134. where Socrates instructes young Alcibiades in this manner 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore remember that Power and Empire is not to be acquired that thou mayest rule over thy self or the Citie as thou list but according to justice and wisdome Thence in his Politicus pag. 276. he distributes civil Government into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tyrannic and Voluntary Tyrannic Governement he makes to be violent when Subjects are forced against Law but voluntary when men are governed by their own Laws and this kind of Administration he saith becomes most 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that is truely a King and Civil Magistrate So pag. 305. he makes a Civil Magistrate to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Conservator or Keeper of Laws Hence he cites a great Saying of Pindar 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pindar saith the Law is King over al both mortals and immortals Whence that Latin Effate Lex est Rex The Law is King The subordination of the Civil Magistrate to Law Plato more fully expresseth Leg. 4. pag. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I have stiled Magistrates Ministers of the Law not from an affectation of novitie but because I am persuaded that the safety of a Republic consistes herein but the peste and ruine in the contrary And he subjoins the reason of this his persuasion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For I behold ruine prepared for and present to that Citie in which Laws are not superior to the Magistrates but Magistrates to the Laws but on the contrary safetie to that Citie where the Law rules over Magistrates and Magistrates are Servants of the Law i. e. they subject themselves to the Law and obey the same For I apprehend al manner of good things which God usually confers on Cities to attend this Citie So prosperous is the condition of that Citie wherein the Magistrates Administration and Jurisdiction is bounded and circumscribed by as also subordinate to the Law which is to speak in Pindars phrase the King both of Magistrates and People Whence Leg. 6. pag. 761. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But let no Judge or Magistrate be exemted and free from rendring accounts but let him render the account of his discharge of his Office to the Citizens only those excepted unto whom the last Appeal is made according to the exemple of the Regal power Whence pag. 767. he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But in public crimes it 's in the first place necessary that the affaire be brought to the communitie or multitude for when the Citie is affected with an injurie it belongs to al to take cognizance thereof therefore the people may justly take it il if the cognizance of such affaires should be wrested from them Therefore the beginning and end of this controversie ought to be brought to the people but the examen and dijudication to the three chief Magistrates Thence Definit Platon pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Autoritie is defined the Tuition of the Law 4. The Magistrates Exercice of his Office Next to the Facultie and Autoritie of the Civil Magistrate we are to consider him in the actual Administration or Exercice of his Office which ought to be performed with the greatest exactitude and fidelitie It 's a good observation of Aristotle Rhet. l. 2. c. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dignitie makes great men more conspicuous and illustrious wherefore such act with greater moderation and exactitude Whence also that great Aphorisme of Pittachus mentioned by Laertius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magistratie or Governement discovers what the man is If there be an irregular principe or passion in a Magistrate it usually appears in the exercice of his Office Therefore Plato Leg. 12. requires That a Magistrate be most eminent for al manner of Virtues as before Now the main Virtues which ought to appear most illustriously in a Magistrates exercice of his Office are such as these Justice Temperance Moderation as to passions Clemence Self-denial Courage Industrie and Fidelitie of which we find many and great Philosophemes in Plato 1 The Magistrates Administration of his Office must be with Justice 1. Justice and against Briberie without Briberie Partialitie and al Respect of persons Hence Plato Leg. 12. requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That a Judge be sworne before he come to judge And that he may passe a righteous Sentence he also ordaines Demodocus pag. 383. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither judge any cause before thou hast heard both parties And against Briberie he speakes expressely Leg. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That a Magistrate ought to administer Justice without Gifts Yea the 12 Tables determine That a Judge convicted of Briberie shalt be punisht with death Briberie in Courts of Judicature is like judicial Astrologie which as Tacitus observes is always forbidden and yet always retained But sacred Philosophie doth strictly oblige Magistrates to the exercice of Justice and against al Briberie in their Administrations So Psal 82.1 Psal 82.1 2. God standeth in the congregation of the mighty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 standeth i. e. as President and supreme Judge teaching others how they are to judge and punishing them if peccant So it follows he judgeth among the Gods i. e. rewarding those that are faithful but punishing the unfaithful and unjust Thence v. 2. How long wil ye judge unjustly and accept the persons of the wicked Selah As if he had said Dare ye be so unjust and partial when as God sits President in the midst of you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and accept the face or person of the wicked as Lev. 19.15 Ezra renders it lift up the faces of the wicked i. e. by your favour exhilarate and make glad the wicked Thence he procedes v. 3 4. to exhort the Judges to the execution of justice And v. 5. he shews the ruines that follow on unjust Administrations v.
Divine Gubernation Doth not every one keep its ranke and slation performe its office and move most regularly according to that Law which Divine Ordination has appointed it Thence it follows And calleth them al by name i. e. has an accurate knowlege of and command over al as a wise General that can cal al his Souldiers by name whose beck and nod every one obeys Such is the admirable Dexteritie and Domination of Divine Gubernation But whence springs al this that follows By the greatnesse of his might The magnitude of Divine Power is the cause of his admirable fixed Gubernation because he is omnipotent therefore it is impossible that he should fail in his Gubernation Thus it follows For that he is strong in power not one faileth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 faileth or is deprived i. e. of that fixed order and station which Divine Gubernation has allotted to it there is not one that detractes its office but al subserve the Divine order Thus Plato in his Phado p. 97. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is the eternal Mind that disposeth althings in the best order and is the cause of al And thus I determined with my self if it be so that this gubernative dispositive Mind doth thus dispose althings then althings are placed in that station and ranke where they may be most rightly constituted The Stoics also as Laertius in Zeno assures us held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the world was governed and ordered by the Divine Mind and Providence which disposeth althings in the best manner This gubernative Providence as it includes a fixed order and series of causes and effects they called Fate which they made to be a connexe series of things or reason whereby the world was governed So Chrysippus said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That Fate was a natural Syntaxe or regular connexion of althings mutually following each other from al eternitie by an immutable and inviolable complication Whereby indeed they seem to understand no other than the series and order of Divine Gubernation decreed by God from al eternitie So Stobaeus in his Physics explicates their mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The reason of those things which are governed in the world by Providence And that this was the original import of the Stoic Fate we are assured by Seneca Minutins Faelix Lud. Vives and others Thus Robert Grosseteste that great Philosopher as wel as Divine in his Tractate de Libero Arbitrio to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie We must know saith he that Fate may be taken for Providence according to Boetius Lib. Consol Philos 4. who saith that Fate is the same with Providence yet they may admit different considerations because Providence is that Divine Reason in the Soverain of althings which disposeth althings but Fate is the disposition inherent in things mobile by which Providence knits them together in their proper orders In what follows he proves out of Cicero Boetius and others that Fate is really the same with Providence of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 1. c. 3. § 5. Hence 4. None can avoid Divine Order and Gubernation Prop. No second cause can totally decline the order prefixed by Divine Gubernation And the reason is evident because this Gubernation of God intrinsecally includes not only a prudent provision of the best means but an efficacious execution of them so as they shal infallibly reach their end It 's true wicked men oft do substract and withdraw their neck from the obediential yoke of Gods preceptive Gubernation but yet they cannot totally withdraw themselves from the order of Gods providential Gubernation whiles they violate the moral and sacred order of Divine precepts do they not fal into the penal order of Divine punishments Yea oft do not those very means which they use to violate the Divine order Gen. 11.4 promove the same Thus Gen. 11.4 And they said Go to let us build us a citie and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven and let us make us a name lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth You see their designe in building the Tower of Babel was to prevent the judgements of God or to secure themselves against a dispersion and scattering and yet lo the wise Gubernation of God made this very Tower of Babel v. 8. which they intended as a means to prevent their dispersion the cause thereof as v. 8. So the Lord scattered them abroad c. And yet out of this very dispersion which they feared and felt Divine Gubernation brought another sacred order even for the peopling the whole Earth Thus the most unnatural confusions are ordered by Divine Gubernation the order of Divine Providence is frequently advanced by that which may seem to obstruct or pul it down whiles men endeavor to escape one order of Divine Gubernation they fal into another 5. The Order of Gods Gubernation a Law Prop. The order of Divine Gubernation whereby althings are appointed and reduced to their end has the force and efficace of a Law Thence Plato termes this Order of Divine Gubernation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Adrastie i. e. Gods fixed Order So Pindar 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Regal Law of althings i. e. that Order which the Eternal Law of Divine Decrees has constituted for the Gubernation of althings This Law whereby Divine Gubernation orders and disposeth things as it refers to things inanimate and Brutes comprehendes in it al those Natural Instinctes Instigations Inclinations and Propensions whereby they are conducted to their proper ends and usages Do not things Natural which are not invested with rational notices or spontaneitie certainly observe some Laws and Dictates of Nature which you may assoon banish them from their Natures as divest them of Are not the several kinds of their Operations constantly framed and determined according to this Order or Law of their Natures And do they not hereby follow Divine Gubernation towards their end albeit they know not what they do nor why Doth not the silly Bird curiosely frame its neast and the simple Bee its cel always after the same forme and figure and so in al other natural operations and productions of mere Brutes what a fixed Order is there agreable to the Law of their Beings And whence comes al this but from the infinite Wisdome and Gubernation of the Divine Mind who conductes things most irrational in the most intelligent prudent manner to their ends May we not then conclude that the Natural Generations and Operations of althings procede from that Universal Law engraven on their Beings whereby they are by the wise Conduct of Divine Gubernation directed to their respective Ends In sum this Natural Law of Divine Gubernation consistes 1 In the Natural Principes of things 2 In their Natural Inclinations 3 In al Natural Instinctes and Impulses of Nature 4 In their Obediential Capacities or Powers whereby they are ready to receive any