lawfull is a seditious opinion IV. That those who have the supreme power are subject to the civill Lawes is a seditious opinion V. That the supreme power may be divided is a seditious opinion VI. That faith and sanctity are not acquired by study and reason but alwayes supernaturally infused and inspired is aâ— seditious opinion VII That each subject hath a propriety or absolute Dominion of his owne goods is a seditious opinion VIII Not to understand the difference between the People and the Multitude prepares toward sedition IX Too great a Taxe of monies though never so just and necessary prepares toward sedition X. Ambition disposeth us to sedition XI So dâ—th the hope of successe XII Elâ—quence alone without wisdom is the only faculty needfull to raise seditions XIII How the folly of the common people and the eloquntion of ambitious men concur to the destruction of a Common-weale I. HItherto hath been spoken by what causes and Pacts Common-weals are constituted and what the Rights of Princes are over their subjects Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them or the reasons of seditions Now as in the motion of naturall bodies three things are to be considered namely internall disposition that they be susceptible of the motion to be produced the externall Agent whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced and the action it selfe So also in a Common-weale where the subjects begin to raise tumults three things present themselves to our regard First the Doctrines and the Passions contrary to Peace wherewith the mindes of men are â—itted and disposed next their quality and condition who sollicite assemble and direct them already thus disposed to take up armes and quit their allegiance Lastly the manner how this is done or the faction it selfe But one and the first which disposeth them to sedition is this That the knowledge of good and â—vili belongs to â—ach single man In the state of nature indeed where every man lives by equall Right and have not by any mutuall Pacts submitted to the command of others we have granted this to be true nay in the first Chapter Article 9. that the civill Lawes were the Rules of good and evill just and unjust honest and dishonest that therefore what the Legislator commands must be held for good and what he forbids for evill and the Legislator is ever that Person who hath the supreme power in the Common-weale that is to say the Monarch in a Monarchy We have confirmed the same truth in the eleventh Chapter Article 2. out of the words of Solomon for if private men may pursue that as good and â—…n that as evill which appears to them to be so to what end serve those words of his Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy People that I may discern between good and evill Since therefore it belongs to Kings to discerne betweene good and evill wicked are those though usuall sayings that be onely is a King who does righteously and that Kings must not be obeyed unlesse they command us just things and many other such like Before there was any government just and unjust had no being their nature onely being relative to some coÌ„mand and every action in its own nature is indifferent that it becomes just or unjust proceeds from the right of the Magistrate Legitimate Kings therefore make the things they command just by commanding them and those which they forbid unjust by forbidding them but private men while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evill desire to be even as Kings which cannot be with the safety of the Common weale The most ancient of all Gods commands is Gen. 2. 15. Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evill and the most ancient of all diabolicall tentations Chap. 3. vers 5. Yee shall be as Gods knowing good and evill and Gods first expostulation with man vers 11. Who told thee that thou wert naked Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I coÌ„manded thee that thou shouldest not â—at As if he had said how comest thou to judge that nakedness wherein it seemed good to me to create thee to be shamefull except thou have arrogated to thy selfe the knowledge of good and evill II. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience is a sinne for he who doth so contemns the Law But we must distinguish That is my sinne indeed which committing I doe beleeve to be my sinne but what I beleeve to be another mans sin I may sometimes doe that without any sin of mine for if I be commanded to doe that which is a sin in him who commands me if I doe it and he that commands me be by Right Lord over me I sinne not for if I wage warre at the Commandement of my Prince conceiving the warre to be unjustly undertaken I doe not therefore doe unjustly but rather if I refuse to doe it arrogating to my selfe the knowledge of what is just and unjust which pertains onely to my Prince They who observe not this distinction will fall into a necessity of sinning as oft as any thing is commanded them which either is or seems to be unlawfull to them for if they obey they sin against their conscience and if they obey not against Right If they sin against their conscience they declare that they fear not the paines of the world to come if they sinne against Right they doe as much as in them lyes abolish humane society and the civill life of the present world Their opinion therefore who teach that subjects sinne when they obey their Princes commands which to them seem unjust is both erroneous and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civill obedience and it depends upon that originall errour which we have observed above in the foregoing Article for by our taking upon us to judge of good and evill we are the occasion that as well our obedience as disobedience becomes sin unto us III. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root That a Tyrannicide is lawfull Nay at this day it is by many Divines and of old it was by all the Philosophers Plato Aristoâ—ls Cicero Seneca Plutarch and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and Roman Anarchies held not only unlawfull but even worthy of the greatest contempt And under the title of Tyrants they mean not onely Monarchs but all those who bear the chief rule in any Government whatsoever for not Pisistratus onely at Athens but those thirty also who succeeded him and ruled together were all called Tyrants But he whom men require to be put to death as being a Tyrant commands either by Right or without Right if without Right he is an enemy and by Right to be put to death but then this must not be called the killing a Tyrant but an enemy if by Right then the divine interrogation takes place Who hath told thee that
Now where the Right and exercise are severed there the government of the Common-weale is like the ordinary government of the world in which God the mover of all things produceth naturall effects by the means of secondary causes but where he to whom the Right of ruling doth belong is himselfe present in all judicatures consultations and publique actions there the administration is such as if God beyond the ordinary course of nature should immediately apply himself unto all matters we will therefore in this Chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat concerning their duties who exercise authority whether by their own or others Right Nor is it my purpose to descend into those things which being divers from others some Princes may doe for this is to be left to the Politicall Practices of each Common-weale II. Now all the duties of Rulers are contained in this one sentence The safety of the people is the supreme Law for although they who among men obtain the chiefest Dominion cannot be subject to Lawes properly so called that is to say to the will of men because to be chief and subject are contradictories yet is it their duty in all things as much as possibly they can to yeeld obedience unto right reason which is the naturall morall and divine Law But because dominions were constituted for Peaces sake and Peace was sought after for safeties sake he who being placed in authority shall use his power otherwise then to the safety of the people will act against the reasons of Peace that is to say against the Lawes of nature Now as the safety of the People dictates a Law by which Princes know their duty so doth it also teach them an art how to procure themselves a benefit for the power of the Citizens is the power of the City that is to say his that bears the chief Rule in any state III. By the people in this place we understand not one civill Person namely the City it selfe which governs but the multitude of subjects which are governed for the City was not instituted for its own but for the subjects fake and yet a particular care is not required of this or that man for the Ruler as such provides no otherwise for the safety of his people then by his Lawes which are universall and therefore he hath fully discharged himselfe if he have throughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions to establish the welfare of the most part and made it as lasting as may be and that no man suffer ill but by his own default or by some chance which could not be prevented but it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part that wicked men doe suffer IV. But by safety must be understood not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever but in order to its happines For to this end did men freely assemble themselves and institute a government that they might as much as their humane condition would afford live delightfully They therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kinde of government would sinne against the Law of nature because against their trust who had committed that power unto them if they should not study as much as by good Laws could be effected to furnish their subjects abundantly not only with the good things belonging to life but also with those which advance to delectation They who have acquired Dominion by arms doe all desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind that they may serve them the better wherefore if they should not endeavour to provide them not only with such things whereby they may live but also with such whereby they may grow strong and lusty they would act against their own scope and end V. And first of all Princes doe beleeve that it mainly concerns eternall salvation what opinions are held of the Deity and what manner of worship he is to be adored with which being supposed it may be demanded whether chief Rulers and whosoever they be whether one or more who exercise supreme authority sin not against the Law of nature if they cause not such a doctrine and worship to be taught and practised or permit a contrary to be taught and practised as they beleeve necessarily conduceth to the eternall salvation of their subjects It is manifest that they act against their conscience and that they will as much as in them lies the eternall perdition of their subjects for if they willed it not I see no reason why they should suffer when being supreme they cannot be compelled such things to be taught and done for which they beleeve them to be in a damnable state But we will leave this difficulty in suspence VI. The benefits of subjects respecting this life only may be distributed into foure kindes 1. That they be defended against forraign enemies 2. That Peace be preserved at home 3. That they be enrich't as much as may consist with publique security 4. That they enjoy a harmelesse liberty For supreme Commanders can conferre no more to their civill happinesse then that being preserved from forraign and civill warres they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own iâ—dustry VII There are two things necessary for the Peoples defence To be warned and to be forearmed for the state of Common-wealths considered in themselves is natural that is to say hostile neither if they cease from fighting is it therefore to be called Peace but rather a breathing time in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other values his security nâ—t according to the Pacts but the forces and counsels of his adversary And this by naturall Right as hath been shewed in the second Chapter 10. Artic. from this that contracts are invalid in the state of nature as oft as any just fear doth intervene It is therefore necessary to the defence of the City First that there be some who may as near as may be search into and discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it for discoverers to Ministers of State are like the beames of the Sunne to the humane soule and we may more truly say in vision politicall then naturall that the sensible and intelligible Species of outward things not well considered by others are by the ayre transported to the soule that is to say to them who have the Supreme Authority and therefore are they no lesse necessary to the preservation of the State then the rayes of the light are to the conservation of man or if they be compared to Spiders webs which extended on all sides by the finest threds doe warn them keeping in their small holds of all outward motions They who bear Rule can no more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of their Subjects without Spies then those Spiders can when they shall goe forth and whether they shall repair without the motion of those threds VIII Farthermore
takes its current so subjects if they might doe nothing without the commands of the Law would grow dull and unwildly if all they would be disperst and the more is left undetermined by the Lawes the more liberty they enjoy Both extremes are faulty for Lawes were not invented to take away but to direct mens actions even as nature ordained the banks not to stay but to guide the course of the streame The measure of this liberty is to be taken from the subjects and the Cities good wherefore in the first place it is against the charge of those who command and have the authority of making lawes that there should be more lawes then necessarily serve for good of the Magistrate and his Subjects for since men are wont commonly to debate what to do or not to do by naturall reason rather then any knowledge of the Lawes where there are more Lawes then can easily be remembred and whereby such things are forbidden as reason of it selfe prohibites not of necessity they must through ignorance without the least evill iâ—tention fall within the compasse of Lawes as gins laid to entrap their harmelesse liberty which supreme Commanders are bound to preserve for their subjects by the Lawes of nature XVI It is a great part of that liberty which is harmlesse to civill government and necessary for each subject to live happily that there be no penalties dreaded but what they may both foresee and look for and this is done where there are either no punishments at all defined by the Lawes or greater not required then are defined where there are none defined there he that hath first broken the Law expects an in definite or arbitrary punishment and his feare is supposed boundlesse because it relates to an unbounded evill now the Law of nature commands them who are nâ—t subject to any civill Lawes by what we have said in the third Chapter Artic. 11. and therefore supreme Commanders that in taking revenge and punishing they must not so much regard the past evill as the future good and they sin if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment then the publique benefit but where the punishment is defined either by a Law prescribed as when it is set down in plain words that he thâ—t shall doe thus or thus shall suffer so and so or by practice as when the penalty not by any Law prescribed but arbitrary from the beginning is afterward determined by the punishment of the first delinquent for naturall equity commands that equall transgressors be equally punished there to impose a greater penalty then is defined by the Law is against the Law of nature For the end of punishment is not to compell the will of man but to fashion it make it such as he would have it who hath set the penalty And deliberation is nothing else but a weiging as it were in scales the conveniencies and inconveniencies of the fact we are attempting where that which is more weighty doth necessarily according to its inclination prevaile with us If therefore the Legislator doth set a lesse penalty on a crime then will make our feare more considerable with us then our lust that excesse of lust above the feare of punishment whereby sinne is committed is to be attributed to the Legislator that is to say to the supreme and therefore if he inflict a greater punishment then himselfe hath determined in his Lawes he punisheth that in another which he sinned himselfe XVII It pertaines therefore to the harmlesse and necessary liberty of subjects that every man may without feare enjoy the rights which are allowed him by the Lawes for it is in vain to have our own distinguisht by the Lawes from anothers if by wrong judgement robbery theft they may bee again confounded but it falls out so that these doe happen where Judges are corrupted for the fear whereby men are deterred from doing evill ariseth not from hence namely because penalties are set but because they are executed for we esteeme the future by what is past seldome expecting what seldome happens If therefore Judges corrupted either by Gifts Favour or even by pitty it self do often forbear the execution of the Penalties due by the Law and by that meanes put wicked men in hope to passe unpunisht honest Subjects encompast with murtherers theeves and knaves will not have the liberty to converse freely with each other nor scarce to stirre abroad without hazard nay the City it self is dissolved and every mans right of protecting himself at his own will returnes to him The Law of Nature therefore gives this precept to Supreme Commanders that they not onely doe righteousnesse themselves but that they also by penalties cause the Judges by them appointed to doe the same that is to say that they hearken to the complaints of their Subjects and as oft as need requires make choice of some extraordinary Judges who may hear the matter debated concerning the ordinary ones CHAP. XIV Of Lawes and Trespasses I. How Law differs from Counsell II. How from Covenant III. How from Right IV. Division of Lawes into Divine and Humane the Divine into Naturall and Positive and the Naturall into the Lawes of single-men and of Nations V. The Division of humane that is to say of Civil Lawes into Sacred and Secular VI. Into Distributive and Vindicative VII That Distributive and Vindicative are not species but parts of the Lawes VIII All Law is supposed to have a penalty annexâ— to it IX The precepts of the Decalogue of honouring Parents of murther adultery theft falsewitnesse are Civill Lawes X. It s impossible to command ought by the Civil Law contrary to the Law of Nature XI It s essential to a Law both that it self and also the Lawgiver be known XII Whence the Law-giver comes to be known XIII Publishing and Interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a Law XIV The Division of the Civill Law into written and unwritten XV. The Naturall Lawes are not written Lawes neither are the wiâ—e Sentences of Lawyers nor Custome Lawes of themselves but by the consent of the Supreme Power XVI What the word Sinne most largely taken signisies XVII The definition of Sin XVIII The difference between a Sin of Infirmity and Malice XIX Vnder what kind of sinne Atheisme is contained XX. What Treason is XXI That by Treason not the Civill but the Naturall Lawes are broken XXII And that therefore it is to be punisht not by the right of Dominion but by the right of War XXIII That obedience is not rightly distinguisht into active and passive I. THey who lesse seriously consider the force of words doe sometimes confound Law with Counsell sometimes with Covenant sometimes with Right They confound Law with Counsel who think that it is the duty of Monarchs not onely to give ear to their Counsellours but also to obey them as though it were in vaine to take Counsell unlesse it were also followed We must fetch the
constitute a Law but for the Will of the Supreme Commander which appeares in this that he hath suffer'd his Sentence whether equall or unequall to passe into custome XVI Sinne in its largest signification comprehends every deed word and thought against right reason for every man by reasoning seeks out the meanes to the end which he propounds to himselfe If therefore he reason right that is to say beginning from most evident principles he makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary he will proceede in a most direct way otherwise hee 'l goe astray that is to say he will either doe say or endeavour somewhat against his proper end which when he hath done he will indeed in reasoning be said to have erred but in action and will to have sinned for sin followes errour just as the Will doth the understanding And this is the most generall acception of the word under which is contain'd every imprudent action whether against the Law as to overthrow another mans house or not against the Law as to build his owne upon the Sand. XVII But when we speak of the Lawes the word Sinne is taken in a more strict sense and signifies not every thing done against right reason but that onely which is blameable and therefore is call'd malum culpae the evill of fault but yet if any thing be culpable it is not presently to be term'd a sinne or fault but onely if it be blameable with reason We must therefore enquire what is to be blameable with reason what against reason Such is the nature of man that every one calls that good which he desires and evill which he eschewes and therefore through the diversity of our affections it happens that one counts that good which another counts evill and the same man what now he esteem'd for good he immediately looks on as evill and the same thing which he calls good in himselfe he tearmes evill in another for we all measure good and evill by the pleasure or paine we either feele at present or expect hereafter Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies because they increase their honours goods and power and of equalls by reason of that strife of honours which is among them both seeme and are irkesome and therefore evill to all and men use to repute those evill that is to say to lay some fault to their charge from whom they receive evill its impossible to be determined by the consent of single men whom the same things doe not please and displease what actions are and what not to be blam'd They may agree indeed in some certaine generall things as that theft adultery and the like are sinnes as if they should say that all men account those things evill to which they have given names which are usually taken in an evill sense but we demand not whether theft be a Sinne but what is to be term'd theft and so concerning other in like manner For as much therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers what is by reason blameable is not to bee measur'd by the reason of one man more then another because of the equality of humane nature and there are no other reasons in being but onely those of particular men and that of the City it followes that the City is to determine what with reason is culpable so as a fault that is to say a SINNE is that which a man do's omits sayes or wills against the reason of the City that is contrary to the Lawes XVIII But a man may doe somewhat against the Lawes through humane infirmity although he desire to fulfill them and yet his action as being against the Lawes iâ— rightly blam'd and call'd a Sinne But there are some who neglect the Lawes and as oft as any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to them no conscience of contracts and betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation Not only the deeds but even the mindes of these men are against the Lawes They who sinne onely through infirmity are good men even when they sinne but these even when they doe not sin are wicked for though both the action and the mind be repugnant to the Lawes yet those repugnancies are distinguisht by different appellations for the irregularity of the action is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unjust deed that of the mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice and malice that is the infirmity of a disturbed soule this the pravity of a sober mind XIX But seeing there is no sin which is not against some Law and that there is no Law which is not the command of him who hath the supreme power and that no man hath a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent in what manner will he be said to sinne who either denies that there is a God or that he governs the world or casts any other reproach upon him for he will say that he never submitted his will to Gods will not conceiving him so much as to have any being And granting that his opinion were erroneous and therefore also a sin yet were it to be numbred among those of imprudence or ignorance which by right cannot be punished This speech seems so farre forth to be admitted that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful yet is it to be refer'd * to sins of imprudence but that it should be excused by imprudence or ignorance is absurd For the Atheist is punisht either immediately by God himselfe or by Kings constituted under God not as a Subject is punished by a King because he keeps not the Lawes but as one enemy by another because he would not accept of the Lawes that is to say by the Right of warre as the Giants warring against God For whosoever are not subject either to some common Lord or one to another are enemies among themselves Yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence Many find fault that I have referr'd Atheisme to imprudence and not to injustice yea by some it is taken so as if I had not declared my selfe an enemy bitter enough against Atheists They object farther that since I had elsewhere said that it might be knowne there is a God by naturall reason I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the Law of nature and therefore not only guilty of imprudence but injustice too but I am so much an enemy to Atheists that I have both diligently sought for and vehemently desired to find so â—e Law whereby I might condemne them of injustice but when I found none I enquired next what name God himselfe did give to men so detested by him Now God speaks thus of the Atheist The fool hath said in his heart there is no God Wherefore I placed their sinne in that rank which God himselfe referres to next I shew them to be enemies of God But I conceive the name of an
enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper then that of an unjust man Lastly I affirme that they may under that notion be justly punishe both by God and supreme Magistrates and therefore by no meanes excuse or extenuate this sinne Now that I have said that it might be known by naturall reason that there is a God is so to be understood not as if I had meant that all men might know this except they think that because Archimedes by naturall reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the square it followes thence that every one of the vulgar could have found out as much I say therefore that although it may be knowne to some by the light of reason that there is a God yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures or seâ—king of riches and honour also men that are not wont to reason aright or cannot do it or â—are not to doe it lastly fools in which number are Atheists cannot know this XX. Seeing that from the vertue of the Covenant whereby each Subject is tyed to the other to perform absolute and universall obedience such as is defined above Chap. 6. art 13. to the City that is to say to the Soveraign power whether that be one man or Councel there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civill Lawes so that that Covenant contains in it self all the Laws at once it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the generall Covenant of obedience doth at once renounce all the Lawes which trespasse is so much worse then any other one sinne by how much to sinne alwayes is worse then to sinne once And this is that sin which is called TREASON and it is a word or deed whereby the Citizen or Subject declares that he will no longer obey that man or Court to whom the supreme power of the City is entrusted and the Subject declares this same will of his by deed when he either doth or endeavours to do violence to the Soveraigns Person or to them who execute his commands of which sort are Traytors Regicides and such as take up armes against the City or during a warre flye to the enemies side and they shew the same will in word who flatly deny that themselves or other subjects are tyed to any such kind of obedience either in the whole as he who should say that wee must not obey him keeping the obedience which we owe to God intire simply absolutely and universally or in part as he who should say that he had no Right to wage warre at his own will to make Peace list souldiers levie monies electing Magistrates and publique Ministers enacting Lawes deciding controversies setting penalties or doing ought else without which the State cannot stand and these and the like words and deeds are Treason by the naturall not the civill Law But it may so happen that some action which before the civill Law was made was not Treason yet will become such if it be done afterwards As if it be declared by the Law that it shall be accounted for a sign of renouncing publique obedience that is to say for Treason if any man shall coyn monies or forge the Priviâ— Seale he that after that Declaration shall doe this will be no lesse guilty of Treason then the other yet he sinnes lesse because he breakes not all the Laws at once but one Law only for the Law by calling that Treason which by nature is not so doth indeed by Right set a more odious name and perhaps a more grievous punishment on the guilty persons but it makes not the sinne it selfe more grievous XXI But that sinne which by the Law of nature is Treason is a Transgression of the naturall not the civill Law for since our obligation to civill obedience by vertue whereof the civill Lawes are valid is before all civill Law and the sin of Treason is naturally nothing else but the breach of that obligation it followes that by the sin of Treason that Law is broken which preceded the civill Law to wit the naturall which forbids us to violate Covenants and betrothed â—aith But if some Soveraign Prince should set sorth a Law on this manner Thou shalt not rebell he would effect just nothing For except Subjects were before obliged to obedience that is to say not to rebell all Law is of no force now the obligation which obligetto what we were before obliged to is superfluous XXII Hence it followes that Rebels Traytors and all others convicted of Treason are punisht not by civill but naturall Right that is to say not as civill Subjects but as Enemies to the Government not by the Right of Soveraignty and Dominion but by the Right of Warre XXIII There are some who think that those acts which are done against the Law when the punishment is determined by the Law it selfe are expâ—ated if the punished willingly undergoe the punishment and that they are not guilty before God of breaking the naturall Law although by breaking the civill Lawes we break the naturall too which command us to keep the civill who have suffered the punishment which the Law required as if by the Law the fact were not prohibited but a punishment were set instead of a price whereby a licence might be bought of doing what the Law forbids by the same reason they might inferre too that no transgression of the Law were a sin but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by his own perill But we must know that the words of the Law may be understood in a twofold sense the one as containing two parts as hath been declared above in the seventh Art namely that of absolutely prohibiting as Thou shalt not doe this and revenging as he that doth this shall be punisht The other as containing a condition for example Thou shalt not doe this thing unlesse thou wilt suffer punishment and thus the Law forbids not simply but conditionally If it be understood in the first sense he that doth it sins because he doth what the Law forbids to be done if in the second he sins not because he cannot be said to doe what is forbidden him that performs the condition For in the first sense all men are forbidden to doe it in the second they only who keep themselves from the punishment In the first sense the vindicative part of the Law obligeth not the guilty but the Magistrate to require punishment in the second he himselfe that owes the punishment is obliged to exact it to the payment whereof if it be capitall or otherwise grievous he cannot be obliged But in what sense the Law is to be taken depends on the will of him who hath the Soveraignty When there is therefore any doubt of the meaning of the Law since we are sure they sinne not who doe it not it will be sin if we doe it howsoever the Law may afterward be explained for so to doe that which a man doubts
an Aristocraty the Nobles make no contract nor are they obliged to any citizen or to the whole People The Nobles must necessarily have their set meetings By what acts a Monarchy is framed That the Monarch is by compact obliged to none for the authoritie he hath received A Monarch is ever in the readier capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to well governing What kind of sin that is and what sort of men are guilty of it when the City performs not its office to the Citizens not the Citizens towards the City A Monarch made without limitation of time may elect his successors Of limited Monarchs A Monarch retaining his Right of Government cannot by any promise whatsoever be conceiv'd to have parted with his Right to the means necessary to the exercise of his Authority my what Beanes a Subject is freed from his subjection What Lord and Servant are The distinction of Servants unto such as upon trust enjoy their naturall liberty or Slaves and such as serve being imprison'd or settered The obligation of a Servant ariseth from that freedome which is granted him by his Lord. Servants that are bound are not obliged to their Lord by any Contract Servants have no propriety in their goods against their Lord. The Lord may sell his Servant or alienate him by Testament The Lord cannot be injurious to his Servant He that iâ— Lord of the Lord is Lord also of the Servants By what meanes servants are freed The Dominion over beasts is by the Right of nature Paternact Dominion riseth not from generation Dominion over Infants belongs to him who who first hath theâ— in his power Dominion over Infants is originally the Mothers The exposed Infant is his that preserves him The sonne of a Subject and chiefe is his that commands In such a conjunction of male and female as neither hath the commanding power over the other the children are the Mothers except by pact or civill law it be otherwise determined Children are no lesse subject to their Parents then servants to their Lords and subjects to their City Of the honour due to Parents and Lords Wherein liberty doth consist and the difference between subjects and servants There is the same Right in an hereditary which there is in an institutive government The question concerning the Right of succession belongs onely to Monarchy A Monarch may dispose of the command of his government by Testament Or give it away or sell it A Monarch dying without Testament is ever understood to will that a Monarch should succeed him And some one of his 〈…〉 children And a male rather then female And of the males the eldest rather then the yonger And his Brother if he want issue before all others In the same manner that men succeed to the power doe they also succeed to the Right of Succession A comparing the state of nature with the civill The gains and losses of the The praise of Monarchy Annotation The government of one cannot be said to be evill in this respect namely because one hath more power then all the rest Rejection of their opinion who say that a Lord with his servants cannot make a City The exactions are more grievous under command of the people then under the Monarch Innocent Subjects are lesse obnoxious to punishment under a Monarch then under the People Single Persons have no lesse liberty under a Monarch then under the People It is no disadvantage to the Subjects that they are not all admitted to the publique deliberations Civill deliberations are unadvisedly committed to many by reason of the unskilfulnesse of most men By reason of their Eloquence By reason of Faction By reason of the unsetlednesse of the Laws For want of secrecy These inconveniences do adhere to Democraty forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit The inco nveniences of government proceeding from a King who is a childe The power of Generalls is an argument of the excellency of Monarchy The best state of a Common-weale is that where the subjects are the Rulers inheritance Aristocraty is so much better by how much it approaches nearer to Monarchie the worse by how much it is more distant from it The beginning of institutive Government from the consent of the People The power of judicature and determination of warres depend on the will of the supreme Officer They who have the supreme authority are by Right unpunishable That without a supreme power there is no government â—ut confusion That servants and sonnes owe their Lords and Parents simple obedience The absolute power of Princes proved by most evident testimonies of the Scripture as wâ—ll new as old That the judgement of good and evill belongs to private Persons is a seditious opinion That subjects doe sin in obeying their Princes is a seditious opinion That Tyrannicide is lawfull is a seditious opinion That even they who have the Supreme power are subject to the Civill Lawes is a seditious Opinion That the Supreme Power may be divided is a seditious opinion That faith and holiness are not acquired by study and reason but are ever supernaturally infused and inspired is a seditious Opinion That single Subjects have any propriety or absolute Dominion over their own goods is a seditious Opinion Not to know the difference between a People and a Multitude prepares to Sedition Too great a Tax of Money though never so just and necessary disposeth men to Sedition Ambition disposeth men to Sedition So doth the hope of successe Eloquence alone without wisdom is the onely faculty needfull to raise seditions How the folly of the common people and the eloquence of ambitious men concurre to the dissolution of a Common-weale The Right of supreme authority is distinguisht from its exâ—râ—ise The safety of the People is the supreme Law It is the duty of Princes to respect the common benefit of many not the peculiar interest of this or that man By safety is understood all manner of benefits Query Whether it be the duty of Kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects soules as they shall judge best in their own câ—nsciences Wherein the safety of the People consists That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the People To have Souldiers Armes Garrisons and Money in readiness in times of Peace is necessary for the Peoples defence A right instruction of Subjects in civill doctrines is necessary for the preserving of Peace Equall distribution of publique burthens conduceth much to the preservation of peace It s naturall equity that Monies be â—axt according to what every man speuds not to what â—e posseseth It conduces to the preservation of peace to depresse the ambitious And to dissolve factious Lawes whereby gaining arts are cherisht and great expences restrained doâ— conduce much to the enriching of the subject That more ought not to be determined by the Lawes then the benefit of Prince and Subjects require That greater punishments must not be inflicted then are prescribed
but yet have took with the world not so much by giving any light to the understanding as entertainment to the Affections whilest by the successefull Rhetorications of their speech they have confirmed them in their rashly received opinions So that this part of Philosophy hath suffered the same destiny with the publick Wayes which lye open to all passengers to traverse up and down or the same lot with high wayes and open streets Some for divertisement and some for businesse so that what with the Impertinencies of some and the Altercations of others those wayes have never a seeds time and therefore yield never a harvest The onely reason of which unluckines should seem to be this That amongst all the writers of that part of Philosophy there is not one that hath used an idoneous Principle of Tractation For we may not as in a Circle begin the handling of a Science from what point we please There is a certain Clue of Reason whose beginning is in the dark but by the benefit of whose Conduct wee are led as 't were by the hand into the clearest light so that the Principle of Tractation is to be taken from that Darknesse and then the light to be carried thither for the irradiating its doubts As often therefore as any writer doth either weakly forsake that Clue or wilfully cut it asunder he describes the Footsteps not of his progresse in Science but of his wandring from it And upon this it was that when I applyed my Thoughts to the Investigation of Naturall Justice I was presently advertised from the very word Justice wich signifies a steady Will of giving every one his Owne that my first enquiry was to be from whence it proceeded that any man should call any thing rather his Owne then another mans And when I found that this proceeded not from Nature but Consent for what Nature at first laid forth in common men did afterwards distribute into severall Impropriations I was conducted from thence to another Inquiry namely to what end and upon what Impulsives when all was equally every mans in common men did rather think it fitting that every man should have his Inclosure And I found the reason was that from a Community of Goods there must needs arise Contention whose enjoyment should be greatest and from that Contention all kind of Calamities must unavoydably ensue which by the instinct of Nature every man is taught to shun Having therefore thus arrived at two maximes of humane Nature the one arising from the concupiscible part which desires to appropriate to it selfe the use of those things in which all others have a joynt interest the other proceeding from the rationall which teaches every man to fly a contre-naturall Dissolution as the greatest mischiefe that can arrive to Nature Which Principles being laid down I seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident connexion in this little work of mine first the absolute necessity of Leagues and Contracts and thence the rudiments both of morall and of civill Prudence That Appendage which is added concerning the Regiment of God hath been done with this intent that the Dictates of God Almighty in the Law of nature might not seem repugnant to the written Law revealed to us in his word I have also been very wary in the whole tenour of my discourse not to meddle with the civill Lawes of any particular nation whatsoever That is to say I have avoyded coming a shore which those Times have so infosted both with shelves and Tempests At what expence of time and industry I have beene in this scrutiny after Truth I am not ignorant but to what purpose I know not For being partiall Judges of our selves we lay a partiall estimate upon our own productions I therefore offer up this Book to your Lordships not â—avour but censine first as having found by many experiments that it is not the credit of the Author â—…or the newnesse of the work nor yet the ornament of the style but only the weight of Reason which recommends any Opinion to your Lordships Favour and Approbation If it fortune to please that is to say if it be sound if it be usefull if it be vulgar I humbly offer it to your Lordship as both my Glory and my Protection But if in any thing I have erred your Lordship will yet accept it as a Testimony of my Gratitude for that the means of study which I enjoyed by your Lordships Goodnesse I have employed to the procurement of your Lordships Favour The God of Heaven crown your Lordship with length of Dayes in this earthly Station and in the heavenly Jerusalem with a crown of Glory Your Honours most humble and most devoted Servant THO. HOBBS THE AUTHORS PREFACE TO THE READER READER I promise thee here such things which ordinarily promised doe seeme to challenge the greatest attention and I lay them here before thine eyes whether thou regard the dignity or profit of the matter treated of or the right method of handling it or the honest motive and good advice to undertake it or lastly the moderation of the Authour In this Book thou shalt finde briefly described the duties of men First as Men then as Subjects Lastly as Christians under which duties are contained not only the elements of the Lawes of Nature and of Nations together with the true originall and power of Justice but also the very essence of Christian Religion it selfe â— so farre forth as the measure of this my purpose could well bear it Which kinde of doctrine excepting what relates to Christian Religion the most antient Sages did judge fittest to be delivered to posterity either curiously adorned with Verse or clouded with Allegories as a most beautifull and hallowed mystery of Royall 〈◊〉 hâ—â—ity left by the disputations of pâ—…e men it might be de filed Other Philosophers in the mean time to the advantage of mankinde did contemplate the faces and motions of things others without disadvantage their natures and causes But in after times Socrates is said to have been the first who truly loved this civill Soience although hitherto not throughly understood yet glimmering forth as through a cloud in the government of the Common weale and that he set so great a value on this that utterly abandoning and despising all other parts of Philosopy he wholly embraced this as judging it onely worthy the labour of his minde After him comes Plato Aristotle Cicero and other Philosophers as well Greeke as Latine and now at length all men of all Nations not only Philosophers but even the vnlgar have and doe still deale with this as a matter of ease exposed and prostitute to every Mother-wit and to be attained without any great care or study and which makes mainly for its dignity those who suppose themselves to have it or are in such employment as they ought to have it doe so wonderfully please themselves in its Idaea as they easily brooke the followers of other arts to be esteemed and
styled ingenuous learned skilfull what you will except prudent for this Name in regard of civill knowledge they presume to be due to themselves onely Whether therefore the worth of arts is to be weighed by the worthinesse of the Persons who entertain them or by the number of those who have written of them or by the judgement of the wisest certainly this must carry it which so neerly relates to Princes and others engaged in the government of mankinde in whose adulterate Species also the most part of me◅ doe delight themselves and in which the most excellent wits of Philosophers have been conversant The benefit of it when rightly delivered that is when derived from true Principles by evident connexion we shall then best discerne when we shall but well have considered the mischiefes that have befallen mankinde in its counterfeit and babling form for in such matters as are speculated for the exercise of our wits if any errour escape us it is without hurt neither is there any losse but of time onely but in those things which every man ought to meditate for the steerage of his life it necessarily happens that not onely from errours but even from ignorance it selfe there arise offences contentions nay even slaughter it selfe Look now how great a prejudice these are such and so great is the benefit arising from this doctrine of morality truly declared How many Kings and those good men too hath this one errour That a Tyrant King might lawfully be put to death been the slaughter of How many throats hath this false position cut That a Prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed And what blood-shed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused That Kings are not superiours to but administrators for the multitude Lastly how many rebellions hath this opinion been the cause of which teacheth that the knowledge whether the commands of Kings be just or unjust belongs to private men and that before they yeeld obedience they not only may but ought to dispute them Besides in the morall Philosophy now commonly received there are many things no lesse dangerous then those which it matters not now to recite I suppose those antients foresaw this who rather chose to have the Science of Justice wrapt up in fables then openly exposed to disputations for before such questions begā to be moved Princes did not sue for but already exercised the supreme power They kept their Empire entire not by arguments but by punishing the wicked and protecting the good likewise Subjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and judgements of private men but by the Lawes of the Realme nor were they kept in peace by disputations but by power and authority yea they reverenced the supreme power whether residing in one man or in a councell as a certain visible divinity therefore they little used as in our dayes to joyn themselves with ambitious and hellish spirits to the utter ruine of their State for they could not entertain so strange a phansie as not to desire the preservation of that by which they were preserved in truth the simplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly Wherefore it was peace and a golden age which ended not before that Saturn being expelled it was taught lawfull to take up arms against Kings This I say the Antients not only themselves saw but in one of their fables they seem very aptly to have signified it to us for they say that when Ixion was invited by Jupiter to a banquet he fell in love and began to court Juno her selfe offering to embrace her he clasp't a clowd from whence the Centaures proceeded by nature halfe men halfe horses a fierce a fighting and unquiet generation which changing the names only is as much as if they should have said that private men being called to Counsels of State desired to prostitute justice the onely sister and wife of the supreme to their own judgements and apprehensions but embracing a false and empty shadow instead of it they have begotten those hermophrodite opinions of morall Philosophers partly right and comely partly brutall and wilde the causes of all contentions and blood-sheds Since therefore such opinions are daily seen to arise if any man now shall dispell those clowds and by most firm reasons demonstrate that there are no authenticall doctrines conccening right and wrong good and evill besides the constituted Lawes in each Realme and government and that the question whether any future action will prove just or unjust good or ill is to be demanded of none but those to whom the supreme hath committed the interpretation of his Lawes surely he will not only shew us the high way to peace but will also teach us how to avoyd the close darke and dangerous by-paths of faction and sedition then which I know not what can be thought more profitable Concerning my Method I thought it not sufficient to use a plain and evident style in what I had to deliver except I took my begining from the very matter of civill goverment and thence proceeded to its generation and form and the first beginning of justice for every thing is best understood by its constitutive causes for as in a watch or some such small engine the matter figure and motion of the wheeles cannot well be known except it be taken in sunder and viewed in parts so to make a more curious search into the rights of States and duties of Subjects it is necessary I say not to take them in sunder but yet that they be so considered as if they were dissolved i. e. that wee rightly understand what the quality of humane nature is in what matters it is in what not fit to make up a civill government and how men must be agreed among themselves that intend to grow up into a well-grounded State Having therefore followed this kind of Method In the first place I set down for a Principle by experience known to all men and denied by none to wit that the dispositions of men are naturally such that except they be restrained through feare of some coercive power every man will distrust and dread each other and as by naturall right he may so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength hee hath toward the preservatiō of himself You will object perhaps that there are some who deny this truly so it happens that very many do deny it But shall I therefore seem to fight against my self because I affirm that the same men confesse and deny the same thing In truth I do not but they do whose actions disavow what their discourses approve of We see all countries though they be at peace with their neighbours yet guarding their Frontiers with armed men their Townes with Walls and Ports and keeping constant watches To what purpose is all this if there be no feare of the neighbouring power Wee see even in well-governed States where there are
precept of Nature is That every man render himself usefull unto others which that we may rightly understand we must remember that there is in men a diversity of dispositions to enter into society arising from the diversity of their affections not unlike that which is found in stones brought together in the Building by reason of the diversity of their matter and figure for as a stone which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones then it fils up it selfe neither because of the hardnesse of its matter cannot well be prest together or easily cut and would hinder the building from being fitly compacted is cast away as not fit for use so a man who for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself and detaining of necessaries from others and being incorrigible by reason of the stubbornnesse of his affections is commonly said to be uselesse and troublesome unto others Now because each one not by Right onely but even by naturall necessity is suppos'd with all his main might to intend the procurement of those things which are necessary to his own preservation if any man will contend on the other side for superfluities by hâ—s default there will arise a Warre because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending he therefore acts against the fundamentall Law of Nature Whence it followes which wee were to shew that it is a precept of nature That every man accommodate himselfe to others But he who breaks this Law may be called uselesse and troublesome Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity to this usefulnesse as having regard to this very Law X. The fift precept of the Law of nature is That we must forgive him who repents and asketh pardon for what is past having first taken caution for the time to come The pardon of what is past or the remission of an offence is nothing else but the granting of peace to him that asketh it after he hath warr'd against us now is become penitent But Peace granted to him that repents not that is to him that retains an hostile mind or that gives not caution for the futures that is seeks not peace but oportunity is not properly peace but feare and therefore is not commanded by nature Now to him that will not pardon the penitent and that gives future caution peace it selfe it seems is not pleasing which is contrary to the naturall Law XI The sixth precept of the naturall Law is That in revenge and punishments we must have our eye not at the evill past but the future good That is It is not lawfull to inflict punishment for any other end but that the offender may be corrected or that others warned by his punishment may become better But this is confirmed chiefly from hence that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one another provided he give caution for the future as hath been shewed in the foregoing Article Furthermore because revenge if the time past be onely considered is nothing else but a certain triumph and glory of minde which points at no end for it contemplates onely what is past but the end is a thing to come but that which is directed to no end is vain That revenge therefore which regards not the future proceeds from vaine glory and therefore without reason But to hurt another without reason introduces a warre and is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature It is therefore a precept of the Law of nature that in revenge wee look not backwards but forward Now the breach of this Law is commonly called CRUELTY XII But because all signes of hatred and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives that I say not their Peace then suffer slander it followes in the seventh place That it is prescribed by the Law of nature that no man either by deeds or words couâ—tenance or laughter doe declare himselfe to hate or scorne another The breach of which Law is called Reproach But although nothing be more frequent then the scostes and jeers of the powerfull against the weak and namely of Judges against guilty persons which neither relate to the offence of the guilty nor the duty of the Judges yet these kind of men do act against the Law of nature and are to be esteemed for contumelious XIII The question whether of two men be the more worthy belongs not to the naturall but civill state for it hath been shewed before Chap. 1. Art 3. that all men by nature are equall and therefore the inequality which now is suppose from riches power nobility of kindred is come from the civill Law I know that Aristotle in his first book of Politiques affirmes as a foundation of the whole politicall science that some men by nature are made worthy to command others onely to serve as if Lord and Master were distinguished not by consent of men but by an aptnesse that is a certain kind of naturall knowledge or ignorance which foundation is not onely against reason as but now hath been shewed but also against experience for neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himselfe then to yeeld himselfe to the government of another neither if the weaker and stronger doe contest have these ever or after the upper hand of those Whether therefore men be equall by nature the equality is to be acknowledged or whether unequall because they are like to contest for dominion its necessary for the obtaining of Peace that they be esteemed as equall and therefore it is in the eight place a precept of the Law of nature That every man be accounted by nature equall to another the contrary to which Law is PRIDE XIV As it was necessary to the conservation of each man that he should part with some of his Rights so it is no lesse necessary to the same conservation that he retain some others to wit the Right of bodily protection of free enjoyment of ayre water and all necessaries for life Since therefore many common Rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state and that many peculiar ones are also acquired hence ariseth this ninth dictate of the naturall Law to wit That what Rights soever any man challenges to himselfe he also grant the same as due to all the rest otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former Article For what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of society but to attribute equall Right and Power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society But to ascribe equall things to equalls iâ— the same with giving things proportionall to proportionals The observation of this Law is called MEEKNES the violation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the breakers by the Latines are styled Immoditi immodesti XV. In
the tenth place it is commanded by the Law of nature That every man in dividing Right to others shew himselfe equall to either party By the foregoing Law we are forbidden to assume more Right by nature to our selves then we grant to others We may take lesse if we will for that sometimes is an argument of modesty But if at any time matter of Right be to be divided by us unto others we are forbidden by this Law to favour one more or lesse then another For he that by favouring one before another observes not this naturall equality reproaches him whom he thus undervalues but it is declared above that a reproach is against the Lawes of Nature The observance of this Precept is called EQUITY the breach Respect of Persons The Greeks in one word term it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 XVI From the foregoing Law is collected this eleventh Those things which cannot be divided must be used in common if they can and that the quantity of the matter permit every man as much as he lists but if the quantity permit not then with limitation and proportionally to the number of the users for otherwise that equality can by no means be observed which we have shewed in the forgoing Article to be commanded by the Law of Nature XVII Also what cannot he divided nor had in common it is provided by the Law of nature which may be the twelfth Precept that the use of that thing be either by turns or adjudged to one onely by lot and that in the using it by turns it be also decided by lot who shall have the first use of it For here also regard is to be had unto equality but no other can be found but that of lot XVIII But all lot is twofold arbitrary or naturall Arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the Contenders and it consists in meer chance as they say or fortune Naturall is primogeniture in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were given by lot or first possession Therefore the things which can neither be divided nor had in common must be granted to the first possessour as also those things which belonged to the Father are due to the Sonne unlesse the Father himselfe have formerly conveighed away that Right to some other Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth Law of Nature XIX The 14 Precept of the Law of nature is That safety must be assured to the Mediators for Peace For the reason which commands the end commands also the means necessary to the end But the first dictate of Reason is Peace All the rest are means to obtain it and without which Peace cannot be had But neither can Peace be had without mediation nor mediation without safety it is therefore a dictate of Reason that is a Law of nature That we must give all security to the Mediators for Peace XX. Furthermore because although men should agree to make all these and whatsoever other Lawes of Nature and should endeavour to keep them yet doubts and controversies would daily arise concerning the application of them unto their actions to wit whether what was done were against the Law or not which we call the Question of Right whence will follow a fight between Parties either sides supposing themselves wronged it is therefore necessary to the preservation of Peace because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on that both the disagreeing Parties refer the matter unto some third and oblige themselves by mutuall compacts to stand to his judgement in deciding the controversie And he to whom they thus refer themselves is called an Arbiter It is therefore the 15. Precept of the naturall Law That both parties disputing concerning the matter of right submit themselves unto the opinion and judgement of some third XXI But from this ground that an Arbiter or Judge is chosen by the differing Parties to determine the controversie we gather that the Arbiter must not be one of the Parties for every man is presumed to seek what is good for himselfe naturally and what is just onely for Peaces sake and accidentally and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by the Law of nature so exactly as a third man would do It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the Law of nature That no man must be Judge or Arbiter in his own cause XXII From the same ground sollowes in the seventeenth place That no man must be Judge who propounds unto himself any hope of profit or glory from the victory of either part for the like reason swayes here as in the foregoing Law XXIII But when there is some controversie of the fact it selfe to wit whether that bee done or not which is said to bee done the naturall Law wills that the Arbiter trust both Parties alike that is because they affirm contradictories that hee believe neither He must therefore give credit to a third or a third and fourth or more that he may be able to give judgement of the fact as often as by other signes he cannot come to the knowledge of it The 18. Law of nature therefore injoynes Arbiters and Iudges of fact That where firm and certain â—ignes of the fact appear not there they rule their sentence by such witnesses as seem to be indifferent to both Parts XXIV From the above declared definition of an Arbiter may be furthermore understood That no contract or promise must paste between him and the parties whose Iudge he is appointed by vertue whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part nay or be oblig'd to judge according to equity or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equall The Judge is indeed hound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the Law of Nature re-counted in the 15. Article To the obligation of which Law nothing can be added by way of Compact Such compact therefore would be in vain Besides if giving wrong judgement he should contend for the equity of it except such Compact be of no force the Controversie would remain after Judgement given which is contrary to the constitution of an Arbiter who is so chosen as both parties have oblig'd themselves to stand to the judgement which he should pronounce The Law of Nature therefore commands the Judge be to dis-engâ—g'd which is its 19 precept XXV Farthermore forasmuch as the Lawes of Nature are nought else but the dictates of Reason so as unlesse a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning he cannot observe the Lawes of Nature it is manifest that he who knowingly or willingly doth ought whereby the rationall faculty may be destroyed or weakned he knowingly and willingly breaks the Law of nature For there is no difference between a man who performes not his Duty and him who does such things willingly as make it impossible for him to doe it But
by the same reason that all the necessary means to Peace be good also and therefore that Modesty Equity Trust Humanity Mercy which we have demonstrated to be necessary to Peace are good Manners or habits that is Vertues The Law therefore in the means to Peace commands also Good Manners or the practise of Vertue And therefore it is call'd Morall XXXII But because men cannot put off this same irrationall appetite whereby they greedily prefer the present good to which by strict consequence many unfore-seenevills doe adhere before the future it happens that though all men doe agree in the commendation of the foresaid vertues yet they disagree still concerning their Nature to wit in what each of them doth consist for as oft as anothers good action displeaseth any man that action hath the name given of some neighbouring vice likewise the bad actions which please them are ever entituled to some Vertue whence it comes to passe that the same Action is prais'd by these and call'd Vertue and dispraised by those and termed vice Neither is there as yet any remedy found by Philosophers for this matter for since they could not observe the goodnesse of actions to consist in this that it was in order to Peace and the evill in this that it related to discord they built a morall Philosophy wholly estranged from the morall Law and unconstant to it self for they would have the nature of vertues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity betweene two extremes and the vices in the extremes themselves which is apparently false For to dare is commended and under the name of fortitude is taken for a vertue although it be an extreme if the cause be approved Also the quantity of a thing given whether it be great or little or between both makes not liberality but the cause of giving it Neither is it injustice if I give any man more of what is mine own then I owe him The Lawes of Nature therefore are the summe of Morall Philosophy whereof I have onely delivered such precepts in this place as appertain to the preservation of our selves against those dangers which arise from discord But there are other precepts of rationall nature from whence spring other vertues for temperance also is a precept of Reason because intemperance tends to sicknesse and death And so fortitude too that is that same faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers and which are more hardly declined then overcome because it is a means tending to the preservation of him that resists XXXIII But those which we call the Lawes of nature since they are nothing else but certain conclusions understood by Reason of things to be done and omitted but a Law to speak properly and accurately is the speech of him who by Right commands somewhat to others to be done or omitted are not in propriety of speech Lawes as they proceed from nature yet as they are delivered by God in holy Scriptures as we shall see in the Chapter following they are most properly called by the name of Lawes for the sacred Scripture is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest Right CHAP. IV. That the Law of Nature is a Divine Law I. THE same Law which is Naturall and Morall is also wont to be called Divine nor undeservedly as well because Reason which is the law of Nature is given by God to every man for the rule of his actions as because the precepts of living which are thence derived are the same with those which have been delivered from the divine Majesty for the LAWES of his heavenly Kingdome by our Lord Iesus Christ and his holy Prophets and Apostles What therefore by reasoning we have understood above concerning the law of nature we will endeavour to confirme the same in this Chapter by holy writ II. But first we will shew those places in which it is declared that the Divine Law is seated in right reason Psalm 37. 31 32. Theâ— mouth of the righteous will be exercised in wisdome and his tongue will be talking of Iudgement The law of God is in his heart Jerem. 31. 33. I will put my law in their inward parts and write it in their hearts Psal 19. 7. The law of the Lord is an undefiled law converting the soule ver 8. The Commandement of the Lord is pure and giveth light unto the eyes Deuteron 30. 11. This Commandement which I command thee this day it is not hidden from thee neither is it far of c. vers 14. But the word is very nigh unto thee in thy mouth and in thine heart that thou maist doe it Psal 119. 14. Give me understanding and I shall keep thy law vers 105. Thy word is a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my paths Proverbs 9. 10. The knowledge of the holy is understanding John 1. 1. Christ the Law-giver himselfe is called the word vers 9. The same Christ is called the true light that lighteth every man that cometh in the world All which are descriptions of right reason whose dictates we have shewed before are the lawes of nature III. But that which wee set downe for the fundamentall law of nature namely that Peace was to be sought for is also the summe of the divine law will be manifest by these places Rom. 3. 17. Righteousnesse which is the summe of the law is called the way of Peace Psal 85. 10. Righteousnesse and Peace have kissed each other Matth. 5. 9. Blessed are the Peace-makers for they shall be called the children of God And after Saint Paul in his 6. Chapter to the Hebrewes and the last verse had called Christ the Legislator of that law we treat of an High-Priest for ever after the order of Melehizedeck he addes in the following Chapter the first verse This Melchizedeck was King of Salem Priest of the most high God c. vers 2. First being by interpretation King of Righteousnesse and after that also King of Salem which is King of peace Whence it is cleare that Christ the King in his Kingdome placeth Righteousnesse and Peace together Psal 34. 13. Eschue evill and doe good seek peace and ensue it Isaiah 9. 6 7. Unto us a child is born unto us a Sonne is given and the government shall be upon bis shoulder and his name shall be called Wonderfull Counsellour the mighty God the everlasting Father the Prince of peace Isaiah 52. 7. How beautifull upon the mountaines are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings that publisheth peace that bringeth good tidings of good that publisheth salvation that saith unto Sion thy God reigneth Luke 2. 14. In the Nativity of Christ the voice of them that praised God saying Glory be to God on high and in earth peace good will towards men And Isaiah 53. 5. The Gospell is called the chastisement of our peace Isay 59. 8. Righteousnesse is called the way of Peace The way of peace they know not and there is no
Except your righteousnesse shall exceed the righteousnesse of the Scribes and Pharisees ye shall in no case enter into the Kingdom of Heaven and in the following verses our Saviour explains to them how that the commands of God are broken not by Deeds only but also by the Will for the Scribes and Pharises did in outward act observe the Law most exactly but for Glories sake onely else they would as readily have broken it There are innumerable places of Scripture in which is most manifestly declar'd that God accepts the Will for the Deed and that as well in good as in evill actions XXII That the Law of Nature is easily kept Christ himself declares in the 11. Chapter of Saint Matthew 28 29 30. Come unto me c. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me c. for my yoke is easie and my burthen light XXIII Lastly the Rule by which I said any man might know whether what he was doing were contrary to the Law or not to wit what thou wouldst not be done to doe not that to another is almost in the self same words delivered by our Saviour Mat. 7. 12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you do you even so to them XXIV As the law of nature is all of it Divine so the Law of Christ by conversion which is wholly explain'd in the 5 6 and 7. Chapter of S. Matthewes Gospell is all of it also except that one Commandement of not marrying her who is put away for adultery which Christ brought for explication of the divine positive Law against the Jewes who did not rightly interpret the Mosaicall Law the doctrine of Nature I say the whole Law of Christ is explain'd in the fore-named Chapters not the whole Doctrine of Christ for Faith is a part of Christian Doctrine which is not commprehended under the title of a Law for Lawes are made and given in reference to such actions as follow our will not in order to our Opinions and Belief which being out of our power follow not the Will Quisquamne regno gaudet O fallax bonum Quantum malorum fronte quam blanda tegis Necesse est ut multos timeat quem multi timent Auro venexum bibitur expertus loquor DOMINION CHAP. V. Of the causes and first begining of civill Government I. That the Lawes of Nature are not sufficient to preserve Peace II. That the Lawes of Nature in the state of nature are silent III. That the security of living according to the Lawes of Nature consists in the concord of many Persons IV. That the concord of many Persons is not constant enough for a lasting Peace V. The reason why the government of certain bruit creatures stands firm in concord onely and why not of men VI. That not onely consent but union also is required to establish the Peace of men VII What union is VIII In union the Right of all men is conveighed to one IX What civill society is X. What a civill Person is XI What it is to have the supreme power and what to be a subject XII Two kindes of Cities naturall and by institution IT is of it selfe manifest that the actions of men proceed from the will and the will from hope and feare insomuch as when they shall see a greater good or lesse evill likely to happen to them by the breach then observation of the Lawes they 'l wittingly violate them The hope therefore which each man hath of his security and self-preservation consists in this that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour either openly or by stratagem Whence we may understand that the naturall lawes though well understood doe not instantly secure any man in their practise and consequently that as long as there is no caution had from the invaâ—ion of others there remains to every man that same primitive Right of selfe-defence by such means as either he can or will make use of that is a Right to all things or the Right of warre and it is sufficient for the fulfiling of the naturall law that a man be prepared in mind to embrace Peace when it may be had II. It is a fond saying That all lawes are silent in the time of warre and it is a true one not onely if we speak of the civill but also of the naturall lawes provided they be referr'd not to the mind but to the actions of men by the third Chapter Act. 29. and we mean such a war as is of all men against all men such as is the meer state of nature although in the warre of nation against nation a certain mean was wont to be observed And therefore in old time there was a manner of living and as it were a certain oeconomy which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 living by Rapine which was neither against the law of nature things then so standing nor voyd of glory to those who exercised it with valour not with cruelty Their custome was taking away the rest to spare life and abstain from Oxen fit for plough and every instrument serviceable to husbandry which yet is not so to he taken as if they were bound to doe thus by the law of nature but that they had regard to their own glory herein left by too much cruelty they might be suspected guilty of feare III. Since therefore the exercise of the naturall law is necessary for the preservation of Peace and that for the exercise of the naturall law security is no lesse necessary it is worth the considering what that is which affords such a security for this matter nothing else can be imagined but that each man provide himselfe of such meet helps as the invâ—sion of one on the other may bee rendered so dangerous as either of them may think it better to refrain then to meddle But first it is plain that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a security because that the addition but of one or some few on the other side is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure and hartens the enemy to attacque us It is therefore necessary to the end the security sought for may be obtained that the number of them who conspire in a mutuall assistance be so great that the accession of some few to the enemies party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory IV. Farthermore how great soever the number of them is who meet on selfe-defence if yet they agree not among themselves of some excellent means whereby to compasse this but every man after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours nothing will be done because that divided in their opinions they will be an hinderance to each other or if they agree well enough to â—ome one action through hope of victory spoyle or revenge yet afterward through diversity of wits and Counsels or emulation and envy with which men naturally contend they
will be so torne and rent as they will neither give mutuall help nor desire peace except they be constrained to it by some common feare Whence it followes that the consent of many which consists in this onely as we have already defined in the foregoing section that they direct all their actions to the same end and the common good that is to say that the society proceeding from mutuall help onely yeelds not that security which they seek for who meet and agree in the exercise of the above-named lawes of nature but that somewhat else must be done that those who have once consented for the common good to peace and mutuall help may by fear be restrained leâ—t afterward they again dissent when their private Interest shall appear discrepant from the common good V. Aristole reckons among those animals which he calls Politique not man only but divers others as the Ant the Bee c. which though they be destitute of reason by which they may contract and submit to government notwithstanding by consenting that is to say ensuing or eschewing the same things they so direct their actions to a common end that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions Yet is not their gathering together a civill government and therefore those animals not to be termed politicall because their government is onely a consent or many wills concurring in one object not as is necessary in civill government one will It is very true that in those creatures living only by sense and appetite their consent of minds is so durable as there is no need of any thing more to secure it and by consequence to preserve peace among them then barely their naturall â—nclination But among men the case is otherwise For first among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment among beasts there is none whence hatred and envy out of which arise sedition and warre is among men among beasts no such matter Next the naturall appetite of Bees and the like creatures is conformable and they desire the common good which among them differs not from their private but man scarce esteems any thing good which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment more then that which others doe possesse Thirdly those creatures which are voyd of reason see no defect or think they see none in the administtation of their Common-weales but in a multitude of men there are many who supposing themselves wiser then others endeavour to innovate and divers Innovators innovate divers wayes which is a meer distraction and civill warre Fourthly these brute creatures howsoever they may have the use of their voyce to signify their affections to each other yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind whereby good is represented to it as being better and evill as worse then in truth it is But the tongue of man is a trumpet of warre and sedition and it is reported of Pericles that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered and lightened and confounded whole Greece it selfe Fiftly they cannot distinguish between injury and harme Thence it happens that as long as it is well with them they blame not their fellowes But those men are of most trouble to the Republique who have most leasure to be idle for they use not to contend for publique placcs before they have gotten the victory over hunger and cold Last of all the consent of those brutall creatures is naturall that of men by compact onely that is to say artificiall it is therefore no matter of wonder if somewhat more be needfull for men to the end they may live in peace Wherefore consent or contracted society without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled through feare of punishment doth not suffice to make up that security which is requisite to the exercise of naturall justice VI. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace and to make a lasting defence it is requisite that in those necessary matters which concern Peace and selfe-defence there be but one will of all men But this cannot be done unlesse every man will so subject his will to some other one to wit either Man or Counsell that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the common peace it be received for the wills of all men in generall and of every one in particular Now the gathering together of many men who deliberate of what is to be done or not to be done for the common good of all men is that which I call a COUNSELL VII This submission of the wils of all those men to the will of one man oâ— one Counsell is then made when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest not to resist the will of that one man or counsell to which he hath submitted himselfe that is that he refuse him not the use of his wealth and strength against any oâ—hers whatsoever for he is supposed still to retain a Right of defending himselfe against violence and this is called UNION But we understand that to be the will of the counsell which is the will of the major part of those men of whom the Counsell consists VIII But though the will it self be not voluntary but only the beginning of voluntary actions for we will not to will but to act and therefore falls least of all under deliberation and compact yet he who submits his will to the will of an other conveighs to that other the Right of his strength and faculties insomuch as when the rest have done the same he to whom they have submitted hath so much power as by the terrour of it hee can conforme the wills of particular men unto unity and concord IX Now union thus made is called a City or civill society and also a civill Person for when there is one will of all men it is to be esteemed for one Person and by the word one it is to be knowne and distinguished from all particular men as having its own Rights and properties insomuch as neither any one Citizen nor all of them together if we except him whose will stands for the will of all is to be accounted the City A CITY therefore that we may define it is one Person whose will by the compact of many men is to be received for the will of them all so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace and for common defence X. But although every City be a civill Person yet every civill Person is not a City for it may happen that many Citizens by the permission of the City may joyne together in one Person for the doing of certain things These now will be civill Persons as the companies of Merchants and many other Convents but Cities they are not because they have not submitted
that all controversies are bred from hence that the opinions of men differ concerning Meum Tuum just and unjust profitable and unprofitable good and evill honest and dishonest and the like which every man esteems according to his own judgement it belongs to the same chiefe power to make some common Rules for all men and to declare them publiquely by which every man may know what may be called his what anothers what just what unjust what honest what dishonest what good what evill that is summarily what is to be done what to be avoyded in our common course of life But those Rules and measures are usually called the civill Lawes or the Lawes of the City as being the Commands of him who hath the supreme power in the City And the CIVILL LAWES that we may define them are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chiefe authority in the City for direction of the future actions of his Citizens X. Furthermore since the affaires of the City both those of Warre and Peace cannot possibly be all administred by one man or one Counsell without Officers and subordinate Magistrates and that it appertains to Peace and common defence that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies to search into neighbouring counsels prudently to wage war and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the City should also rightly exercise their offices it is consonant to reason that they depend on and be chosen by him who hath the chiefe command both in War and in Peace XI It is also manifest that all voluntary actions have their beginning from and necessarily depend on the will and that the will of doing or omitting ought depends on the opinion of the good and evill of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall receive by the act or omission so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each wherefore by evident and necessary inference we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of Peace that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to Citizens by which they may imagine that either by Right they may not obey the Lawes of the City that is the commands of that man or Counsell to whom the supreme power is committed or that it is lawfull for to resist him or that a lesse punishment remaines for him that denies then him that yeelds obedience For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of naturall death another forbids it under pain of eternall death and both by their own Right it will follow that the Citizens although innocent are not onely by Right punishable but that the City it selfe is altogether disolved for no man can serve two Masters nor is he lesse but rather more a Master whom we believe we are to obey for feare of damnation then he whom we obey for feare of temporall death It followes therefore that this one whether Man or Court to whom the City hath committed the supreme power have also this Right That he both * judge what opinions and doctrines are enemies unto peace and also that he forbid them to be taught Judge what opinions c. There is scarce any Principle neither in the worship of God nor humane sciences from whence there may not spring dissentions discords reproaches and by degrees war it selfe neither dâ—th this happen by reason of the falshood of the Principle but of the disposition of men who seeming wise to themselves will needs appear such to all others But though such dissentions cannot be hindered from arising yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme power that they prove no hinderance to the publique peace Of these kind of opinions therefore I have not spoken of in this place There are certain doctrines wherewith Subjects being tainted they verily believe that obedience may be refused to the City and that by Right they may nay ought to oppose and fight against chiefe Princes and dignities Such are those which whether directly and openly or more obscurely and by consequence require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed I deny not but this reflects on that power which many living under other government ascribe to the chiefe head of the Church of Rome and also on that which elsewhere out of that Church Bishops require in theirs to be given to them and last of all on that liberty which the lower sort of Citizens under pretence of Religion doe challenge to themselves for what civill war was there ever in the Christian world which did not either grow from or was nourisht by this Root The judgement therefore of doctrines whether they be repugnant to civill obedience or not and if they be repugnant the power of prohibiting them to be taught I doe here attribute to the civill authority for since there is no man who grants not to the City the judgement of those things which belong to its Peace and defence anâ— it is manifest that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its Peace it followes necessarily that the examination of those opinions whether they be such or not must be referred to the City that is to him who hath the supreme authority XII Last of all from this consideration that each Citizen hath submitted his Will to his who hath the Supreme Command in the City so as he may not employ his strength against him it followes manifestly that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands must not be punisht for as he who hath not power enough cannot punish him naturally so neither can he punish him by Right who by Right hath not sufficient power XIII It is most manifest by what hath been said That in every perfect City that is where no Citizen hath Right to use his faculties at his owne discretion for the preservation of himselfe or where the Right of the private Sword is excluded there is a Supreme power in some one greater then which cannot by Right be conferr'd by men or greater then which no mortall man can have over himself But that power greater then which cannot by men be conveigh'd on a man we call * ABSOLUTE for whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the City That he can unpunisht dâ—e any thing make Lawes judge Controversies set Penalties make use at his own pleasure of the strength and wealth of men and all this by Right truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted This same may be confirm'd by experience in all the Cities which are or ever have beene for though it be sometimes in doubt what Man or Counsell hath the Chief Command yet ever there is such a Command and alwayes exercis'd except in the time of Sedition and Civill War and then there are two Chiefe Commands made out of one Now those seditious persons who dispute against absolute Authority
In both cases he is free from the Lawes of his former Country because he is tyed to observe those of the latter CHAP. VIII Of the Rights of Lords over their Servants I. What Lord and Servant signifie II. The distinction of Servants into such as upon trust enjoy their naturall liberty or slaves and such as serve being imprison'd or bound in fetters III. The Obligation of a Servant arises from the liberty of body allow'd bim by his Lord. IV. Servants that are bound are not by any Compacts tyed to their Lords V. Servants have no propriety in their goods against their Lord. VI. The Lord may sell his Servant or alienate him by Testament VII The Lord cannot injure his Servant VIII He that is Lord of the Lord is Lord also of his Servants IX By what means Servants are freed X. Dominion over Beasts belongs to the Rights of nature I. IN the two fore-going Chapters we have treated of an institutive or fram'd Government as being that which receives its originall from the consent of many who by Contract and Faith mutually given have oblig'd each other Now followes what may be said concerning a naturall Government which may also be call'd Acquired because it is that which is gotten by power and naturall force But we must know in the first place by what means the Right of Dominion may be gotten over the Persons of men Where such a Right is gotten there is a kind of a little Kingdome for to be a King is nothing else bâ—t to have Dominion over many Persons and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom a Little Kingdome a Family Let us return again to the state of nature and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth and suddainly like Mushromes come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other There are but three wayes only whereby one can have the Dominion over the Person of anoâ—her whereof the first is if by mutuall Contract made between themselves for Peace self-defences sake they have willingly given up themselves to the Power and Authority of some man or Councel of Men of this we have already spoken The 2d is If a man taken Prisoner in the Wars or overcome or else distrusting his own forces to avoid Death promises the Conquerour or the stronger Party his Service i. e. to do all whatsoever he shall command him in which Contract the good which the vanquisht or inferiour in strength doth receive is the grant of his life which by the Right of War in the naturall stâ—te of men he might have depriv'd him of but the good which he promises is his service and obedience By vertue therefore of this promise there is as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquisht to the vanquisher as possibly can be excepting what repugns the Divine Lawes for he who is oblig'd to obey the Commands of any man before he knowes what he will command him is simply and without any restriction tyed to the performance of all Commands whatsoever Now he that is thus tyed is call'd a SERVANT he to whom he is tyed a LORD Thirdly there is a Right acquir'd over the Person of a Man by Generation of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following Chapter II. Every one that is taken in the War and hath his life spar'd him is not suppos'd to have Contracted with his Lord for every one is not trusted with so much of his naturall liberty as to be able if he desir'd it either to flie away or quit his service or contrive any mischief to his Lord. And these serve indeed but within Pâ—isons or bound within Irons and therefore they were call'd not by the common name of Servant onely but by the peculiar name of Slave even as now at this day un serviteur and un serf or un esclave have diverse significations The obligation therefore of a Servant to his Lord arisâ—th not from a simple grant of his life but from hence rather That he keeps him not bound or imprison'd for all obligation derives from Contract but where 's no trust there can be no Contract as appears by the 2. Chap. Artic. 9. where a Compact is defin'd to be the promise of him who is trusted There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardon'd life whereby the Lord affords him his corporall liberty so that if no obligation nor bonds of Contract had happen'd he might not onely have made his escape but also have kill'd his Lord who was the preserver of his life IV. Wherefore such kind of Servants aâ— are restrain'd by impâ—isonmâ—nt oâ—bonds are not comprehended in that definition of Servants given above because those serve not for the Contracts sake but to the end they may not suffer and therefore if they flie or kill their Lord they offend not against the Lawes of Nature for to bind any man is a plain signe that the binder supposes him that is bound not to be sufficiently tyed by any other obligation V. The Lord therefore hath no less Dominion over a Servant that is not then over one that is bound for he hath a Supreme Power over both and may say of his Servaâ—t no lesse then of another thing whether animate or inanimate This is mine whence it followes that whatsoever the Servant had before his servitude that afterwards becomes the Lords and whatsoever he hath gotten it was gotten for his Lord for he that can by Right dispose of the Person of a man may surely dispose of all those things which that Person could dispose of There is therefore nothing which the Servant may retaine as his own against the will of his Lord yet hath he by his Lords distribution a propriety and Dominion over his own goods insomuch as one Servant may keep and defend them against the invasion of his fellow Servant in the same manner as hath been shewed before that a subject hath nothing properly his owne against the will of the Supreme Authority but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow subject VI. Since therefore both the Servant himself and all that belongs to him are his Lords and by the Right of Nature every man may dispose of his owne in what manner he pleases the Lord may either sell lay to pledge or by Testament conveigh the Dominion he hath over his Servant according to his own will and pleasure VII Farthermore what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects in an institutive Government namely that he who hath the Supreme Power can doe his subject no injury is true also concerning Servants because they have subjected their will to the will of the Lord wherefore whatsoever he doth it is done with their wills but no injury can be done to him that willeth it VIII But if it happen that the Lord either by captivity or voluntary subjection doth become a Servant or
Subject to another that other shall not onely be Lord of him but also of his Servants Supreme Lord over these immediate Lord over him Now because not the Servant only but also all he hath are his Lords therefore his Servants now belong to this man neither can the mediate Lord dispose otherwise of them then shall seeme good to the Supreme And therefore if sometime in civill Governments the Lord have an absolute power over his Servants that 's suppos'd to be deriv'd from the Right of Nature and not constituted but slightly pass'd over by the Civill Law IX A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude that a Subject in an institutive government is freed from his subjection First if his Lord enfranchize him for the Right which the servant transferred to his Lord over himselfe the same may the Lord restore to the servant again And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called MANUMISSION which is just as if a City should permit a Citizen to conveigh himselfe under the jurisdiction of some other City Secondly if the Lord cast off his servant from him which in a City is banishment neither differs it from Manumission in effect but in manner onely for there liberty is granted as a favour here as a punishment In both the Dominion is renounced Thirdly if the servant be taken prisoner the old servitude is abolished by the new for as all other things so servants also are acquired by warre whom in equity the Lord must protect if he will have them to be his Fourthly the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successour the Lord dying suppose without any Testament or Heire for no man is understood to be obliged unlesse â—e know to whom he is to perform the obligation Lastly she servant that is put in bonds or by any other means deprived of his corporall liberty is freed from that other obligation of contract for there can be no contract where there is no trust nor can that faith be broken which is not given but the Lord who himselfe serves another cannot so free his servants but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme for as hath been shewed before such servants are not his but the supreme Lords X. We get a right over irrationall Creatures in the same manner that we doe over the Persons of men to wit by force and naturall strength for if in the state of nature it is lawfull for every one by reason of that warre which is of all against all to subdue and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good much more will the same be lawfull against â—rutes namely at their own disâ—retion to reduce those to servitude which by aâ—t may be tamed and â—â—tted for use and to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpeâ—uall warre as daâ—gerous and noâ—ious Our Dâ—miâ—ioâ— therefore over beasts hath its originall from the right of nature not from divine positive Right for if such a Right had not been before the publishing of the sacred Scriptures no man by right might have killed a beast for his food but he to whom the divine pleasure was made manifest by holy Writ a most hard condition for men indeed whom the beasts might devoure without injury and yet they might not destroy them Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of nature that a beast may kill a man it is also by the same Right that a man may slay a beast CHAP. IX Of the right of Parents over their children and of hereditary Government I. Paternall Dominion ariseth not from generation II. Dominion over Infants belongs to him or her who first hath them in their power III. Dominion over infants is originally the Mothers IV. The exposed infant is his from whom he receives his preservation V. The child that hath one Parent a Subject and the other a Soveraign belongs to him or her in authority VI. In such a conjunction of man and woman as neither hath command over the other the children are the Mothers unlesse by compact or civill Law it bee otherwise determined VII Children are no lesse subject to their Parents then Servants to their Lords and Subjects to their Princes VIII Of the honour of Parents and Lords IX Wherein Liberty consists and the difference of Subjects and Servants X. There is the same Right over Subjects in an hereditary Government which there is an institutive Government XI The question concerning the right of Succession belongs only to Monarchy XII A Monarch may by his Will and Testament dispose of his supreme authority XIII Or give it or sell it XIV A Monarch dying without Testament is â—ver supposed to will that a Monarch should succeed him XV. And some one of his children XVI And a male rather then female XVII And the eldest rather then the yonger XVIII And his Brother if he want issue before all others XIX In the same manner that men succeed to the power doe they also succeed to the right of succession I. SOcrateâ— is a man and therefore a living creature is a right seasoning and that most evident because there is nothing needfull to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence but that the word Man be understod because a living creature is in the definition it selfe of a Man and every one makes up the proportion which was desired namely this Man is a living Creature And this Sopâ—roniscus is Socrates his Father and therefore his Lord is perhaps a true inference but not evident because the word Lord is not in the definition of a Father wherefore it is necessary to make it more evident that the connexion of Father and Lord be somewhat unfolded Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the Dominion of a Parent over his children have brought no other argument then that of generation as if it were of it selfe evident that what is begotten by me is mine just as if a man should think that because there is a triangle it appeares presently without any farther discourse that its angles are equall to two Rights Besides since Dominion that is supreme power is indivisible insomuch as no man can serve two Masters but two Persons male and female must concâ—rre in the act of generation its impossible that Dominion should at all be acquired by generation onely Wherefore we will with the more diligence in this place enquire into the original of paternal Government II. Wee must therefore returne to the state of nature in which by reason of the equality of nature all men of riper yeares are to be accounted equall There by right of nature the Conqueror is Lord of the conquered by the Right therefore of nature the Dominion over the Inâ—ant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power but it 's manifest that 〈◊〉 who is newly born is in the Mothers power before any others insomuch as she may rightly and at
other forms of government unlesse that by the word King may perhaps be understood not one man onely but also a Court provided that in it there reside a supreme power which if it be taken in this sense yet hence it may follow that without a supreme and absolute power which we have endeavoured to prove in the sixth Chapter there will be a liberty for every man to doe what hee hath a minde or whatsoever shall seem right to himselfe which cannot stand with the preservation of mankinde and therefore in all Government whatsoever there is ever a supreme power understood to be somewhere existent V. We have in the 8. Chapter the 7. and 8. Article said that Servants must yeeld a simple obedience to their Lords and in the 9. Chapter Article 7. that Sonnes owe the same obedience to their Parents Saint Paul sayes the same thing concerning Servants Servants obey in all things your Masters according to the flesh not with eye service as men-pleasers but in singlenesse of heart fearing God Colos 3. 22. Concerning Sonnes Children obey your Parents in all things for this is well pleasing unto the Lord. Colos 3. 20. Now as wee by simple obedience understand ALL THINGS which are not contrary to the Lawes of God so in those cited places of Saint Paul after the word ALL THINGS we must suppose excepting those which are contrary to the Lawes of God VI. But that I may not thus by peece meale prove the right of Princes I will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the whole power namely that there is an absolute and simple obedience due to them from their subjects And first out of the new Testament The Scribes and Pharisâ—es sit in Moyses seat all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe that observe and doâ— Mat. 23. 2. Whatsoever they bid you sayes he observe that is to say obey simply Why Because they sit in Moyses seat namely the civill Magistrates not Aaron the Priests Leâ— every soule be subject to the higher powers for there is no power but of God the powers that be are ordained of God whosoever therefore resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation Rom. 13. 1. Now because the powers that were in Saint Pauls time were ordained of God and all Kings did at that time require an absolute entire obedience from their subjects it followes that such a power was ordained of God Submit your selves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords sake whether it bee to the King as supreme or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of wicked doers and for the praise of them that doe well for so is the will of God 1 Pet. 2. 13. Again Saint Paul to Titus Put them mind to bee subject to Principalitiies and Powers to obey Magistrates c. Chap. 3. vers 1. What Principalities Was it not to the Principalities of those times which required an absolute obedience Furthermore that we may come to the example of Christ himselfe to whom the Kingdome of the Jewes belonged by hereditary Right derived from David himselfe He when he lived in the manner of a subject both paid tribute unto Caesar and pronounced it to be due to him Give unto Caesar saith he the things which are Caesars and unto God the things which are Gods Mat. 22. 21. When it pleased him to shew himselfe a King he required entire obedience Goe said he into the village over against you and straightway yee shall finde an Assetyed and a Colt with her loose them and bring them unto me and if any man say ought unto you yec shall say the Lord hath need of them Mat. 14. 2. This he did therefore by the right of being Lord or a King of the Jewes But to take away a subjects goods on this pretence onely because the Lord hath need of them is an absolute power The most evident places in the old Testament are these Goe thou near and heare ALL that the Lord our God shall say and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee and we will hear it and doe it Deut. 5. 27. But under the word all is contained absolute obedience Again to Joshua And they answered Joshua saying ALL that thou commandest us we will doe and whithersoever thou sendest us we will goe according as we hearkened unto Moyses in ALL things so will we hearken unto thee onely the Lord thy God be with thee as he was with Moyses whosoever hee be that doth rebell against thy Commandement and will not hearken unto thy words in ALL that thou commandest him he shall be put to death Joshua 1. 16 17 18. And the Parable of the Bramble Then said all the trees unto the Bramble Come thou aâ—d reign over us And the Bramble said unto the trees If in truth yee anoint me King over you then come and put your trust in my shadow and if not let sire come out of the Bramble and devoure the Cedars of Lebanon Juages 9. vers 14 15. The sense of which words is that we must acquiese to their sayings whom we have truly constituted to be Kings over us unlesse we would chuse rather to be consumed by the fire of a civill warre But the Regall authority is more particularly described by God himselfe in the 1. Sam. 8. vers 9. c. Shew them the Right of the King that shall reign over them c. This shall be the Right of the King that shall reign over you he will take your Sons and appoint them for himself for his Chariots and to he his horsemen and some shall runne before his Chariots c. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries c. And he will take your vineyards and give them to his Servants c. Is not this power absolute And yet it is by God himself styled the KINGS RIGHT neither was any man among the Jewes no not the High Priest himselfe exempted from this obedience For when the King namely Solomon said to Abiathar the Priest Get thee to Anathoth unto thine â—wn fields for thou art worthy of death but I will not at this time put thee to death because thou â—arest the Ark of the Lord God before David my father and because then hast been afflicted in all wherein my Father was afflicted So Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being Priest unto the Lord. 1 Kings 2. 26. It cannot by any argument be proved that this act of his displeased the Lord neither read we that either Solomon was reproved or that his Person at that time was any whit lesse acceptable to God CHAP. XII Of the internall causes tending to the dissolution of any Government I. That the judging of good and evill belongs to private Persons is a seditious opinion II. That subjects doâ— sinne by obeying their Princes is a seditious opinion III. That Tyrannicide is
he was a Tyrant hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eatâ— For why doest thou call him a Tyrant whom God hath made a King except that thou being a private Person usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill But how pernicious this opinion is to all governments but espcially to that which is Monarchieall we may hence discerne namely that by it every King whether good or ill stands exposed to be condemned by the judgement and slain by the hand of every â—…rtherous villain IV. The fourth adversary opinion to Civill Society is theirs who hold That they who bear Rule are Subject also to the Civill Lawes which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true in the 6. Chap. Arâ—ic 14. from this Argument That a City can neither be bound to it self nor to any subject not to it selfe because no man can be obliged except it be to another not to any Subject because the single wills of the Subjects are contained in the will of the City insomuch that if the City will be free from all such obligation the Subjects will so too and by consequence she is so But that which holds true in a City that must be supposed to be true in a man or an assembly of men who have the Supreme Authority for they make a City which hath no being but by their Supreme Power Now that this Opinion cannot consist with the very being of Government is evident from hence that by it the knowledge of what is Good and Evill that is to say the definition of what is and what is not against the Lawes would return to each single Person Obedience therefore will cease as oft as any thing seemes to be commanded contrary to the Civill Lawes and together with it all coercive jurisdiction which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of Government Yet this Errour hath great props Aristotle and others who by reason of humane infirmity suppose the Supreme Power to be committed with most security to the Lawes onely but they seem to have lookt very shallowly into the nature of Government who thought that the constrainning Power the interpretation of Lawes and the making of Lawes all which are powers necessarily belonging to Government should be left wholly to the Lawes themselves Now although particular Subjects may sometimes contend in judgement and goe to Law with the Supreme Magistrate yet this is onely then when the question is not what the Magistrate may but what by a certain Rule he hath declared he would doe As when by any Law the Judges sit upon the life of a Subject the question is not whether the Magistrate could by his absolute Right deprive him of his life but whether by that Law his will was that he should be deprived of it but his will was he should if he brake the Law else his will was he should not This thetefore that a Subject may have an action of Law against his Supreme Magistrate is not strength of Argument sufficient to prove that he is tyed to his own Lawes On the contrary it is evident that he is not tied to his owne Lawes because no man is bound to himself Lawes therefore are set for Titius and Caius not for the Ruler however by the ambition of Lawyers it is so ordered that the Lawes to unskilfull men seeme not to depend on the Authority of the Magistrate but their Prudence V. In the fifth place That the Supreme Authority may be divided is a most fatall Opinion to all Common-weales But diverse men divide it diverse wayes For some divide it so as to grant a Supremacy to the Civill Power in matters pertaining to Peace and the benefits of this life but in things concerning the salvation of the Soul they transfer it on others Now because justice is of all things most necessary to Salvation it happens that Subjects measuring justice not as they ought by the Civill Lawes but by the precepts and doctrines of them who in regard of the Magistrate are either private men or strangers through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their Princes through fear falling into that which they most feared Now what can be more pernicious to any state then that men should by the apprehension of everlasting torments be deterred from obeying their Princes that is to say the Lawes or from being just There are also some who divide the Supreme Authority so as to allow the power of War and Peace unto one whom they call a Monarch but the right of raising Monies they give to some others and not to him But because monies are the sinewes of War and Peace they who thus divide the Authority doe either really not divide it at all but place it wholly in them in whose power the money is but give the name of it to another or if they doe really divide it they dissolve the Government for neither upon necessity can War be waged nor can the publique Peace be preserved without Money VI. It is a common doctrine That faith and holinesse are not acquired by study and naturall reason but are alwayes supernaturally infused and inspired into mâ—n which if it were true I understand not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith or why any man who is truly a Christian should not be a Prophet or lastly why every man should not judge what 's fit for him to doe what to avoid rather out of his own inspiration then by the precepts of his Superiours or right Reason A return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of Good and Evil which cannot be granted without the ruine of all Governments This Opinion hath spread it self so largely through the whole Christian world that the number of Apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite and it sprang from sick-brained men who having gotten good store of Holy Words by frequent reading of the Scriptures made such a connexion of them usually in their preaching that their Sermons signifying just nothing yet to unlearned men seemed most divine for he whose non-sense appears to be a Divine speech must necessarily seeme to be inspired from above VII The seventh Doctrine opposite to Government is this That each subject hath an absolute Dominion over the goods be is in possession of That is to say such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods but also of the Magistrate himself which is not true for they who have a Lord over them have themselves no Lordship as hath been proved Chap. 8. Artic. 5. Now the Magistrate is Lord of all his Subjects by the constitution of Government Before the yoke of Civill Society was undertaken no man had any proper Right all things were common to all men tell me therefore how gottest thou this propriety but from the Magistrate How got the
it s necessarily requisite to the peoples defence that they be fore-armed Now to be fore-armed is to be furnisht with Souldiers Armes Ships Forts and Monies before the danger be instant for the listing of Souldiers and taking up of Armes after a blow is given is too late at least if not impossible In like manner not to raise Forts and appoint Garrisons in convenient places before the Fromiers are invaded is to be like those Country Swains as Demosthenes said who ignorant of the art of Fencing with their Bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first fâ—lt the smart of the strokes But they who think it then seasonable enough to raise Monies for the maintenance of Souldiers and other Charges of War when the danger begins to shew it self they consider not surely how difficult a matter it is to wring suddainly out of close fisted men so vast a proportion of Monies for almost all men what they once reckon in the number of their goods doe judge themselves to have such a right and propriety in it as they conceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to imploy but the least part of it for the publique good Now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the Country with Armes will not soon be raised out of the treasure of Imposts and Customes we must therefore for fear of War in time of Peace hoord up good summs if we intend the safety of the Common-weal Since therefore it necessarily belongs to Rulers for the Subjects safety to discover the Enemies Counsell to keep Garrisons and to have Money in continuall readinesse and that Princes are by the Law of Nature bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their Subjects it followes that it s not onely lawfull for them to send out Spies to maintain Souldiers to build Forts and to require Monies for these purposes but also not to doe thus is unlawfull To which also may be added whatsoever shall seeme to conduce to the lesning of the power of forraigners whom they suspect whether by sleight or force For Rulers are bound according to their power to prevent the evills they suspect lest peradventure they may happen through their negligence IX But many things are required to the conservation of inward Peace because many things concur as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter to its perrurbation We have there shewed that some things there are which dispose the minds of of men to sedition others which move and quicken them so disposed Among those which dispose them we have reckoned in the first place certaine perverse doctrines It s therefore the duty of those who have the chief Authority to root those out of the mindes of men not by commanding but by teaching not by the terrour of penalties but by the perspicuity of reasons the Lawes whereby this evill may be withstood are not to be made against the Persons erring but against the Errours themselves Those errours which in the foregoing Chapter we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the Common-weal have crept into the mindes of ignorant men partly from the Pulpit partly from the daily discourses of men who by reason of little employment otherwise doe finde leasure enough to study and they got into these mens mindes by the teachers of their youth in publique schooles Wherefore also on the other side if any man would introduce sound Doctrine he must begin from the Academies There the true and truly demonstrated foundations of civill Doctrine are to be laid wherewith young men being once endued they may afterward both in private and publique instruct the vulgar And this they will doe so much the more cheerfully and powerfully by how much themselves shall be more certainly convinced of the truth of those things they profess and teach for seeing at this day men receive propositions though false and no more intelligible then if a man should joyne together a company of termes drawn by chance out of an urne by reason of the frequent use of hearing them how much more would they for the same reason entertain true doctrines suitable to their own understandings and the nature of things I therefore conceive it to be the duty of Supreme Officers to cause the true elements of civill Doctrine to be written and to command them to be taught in all the Colledges of their severall Dominions X. In the next place we shewed that grief of mind aâ—ising from want did dispose the Subjects to Sedition which want although deriv'd from their own luxury and sloth yet they impute it to those who govern the Realm as though they were drained and opprest by publique Pensions Notwithstanding it may sometimes happen that this complaint may be just namely when the burthens of the Realm are unequally imposed on the Subjects For that which to all together is but a light weight if many withdraw themselves it wil be very heavy nay even intollerable to the rest Neither are men wont so much to grieve at the burthen it self as at the inequality With much earnestnes therefore men strive to be freed from taxes in this conflict the lesse happy as being overcome do envy the more fortunate To remove therefore all just complaint it s the interest of the publique quiet and by consequence it concernes the duty of the Magistrate to see that the publique burthens be equally born Furthermore since what is brought by the subjects to publick use is nothing else but the price of their bought Peace its reason good that they who equally share in the peace should also pay an equall part either by contributing their Monies or their labours to the Common-weal now it is the Law of Nature by the 15. Article of the 3. Chapter that every man in distributing right to others doe carry himself equall to all wherefore Rulers are by the naturall Law obliged to lay the burthens of the Common-weal equally on their Subjects XI Now in this place we understand an equality not of Money but of Burthen that is to say an equality of reason between the Burthens and the Benefits For although all equally enjoy Peace yet the benefits springing from thence are not equall to all for some get greater possessions others lesse and againe some consume lesse others more It may therefore be demanded whether Subjects ought to contribute to the publique according to the rate of what they gain or of what they spend that is to say whether the persons must be taxt so as to pay contribution according to their wealth or the goods themselves that every man contribute according to what he spends But if we consider where Monies are raised according to wealth there they who have made equall gain have not equall possessions because that one preserves what he hath got by frugality another wastes it by luxury and therefore equally rejoycing in the benefit of Peace they doe not equally sustaine the Burthens of the
Common-weal and on the other side where the goods themselves are taxt there every man while he spends his private goods in the very act of consuming them he undiscernably payes part due to the Common-weal according to not what he hath but what by the benefit of the Realm he hath had it is no more to be doubted but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity and therefore against the duty of Rulers the latter is agreeable to reason and the exercise of their authority XII In the third place we said that that trouble of minde which riseth from ambition was offensive to publique Peace For there are some who seeming to themselves to be wiser then others and more sufficient for the managing of affaires then they who at present doe govern when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their vertue would prove to the Common-weale they shew it by harming it but because ambition and greedinesse of honours cannot be rooted out of the mindes of men it s not the duty of Rulers to endeavour it but by constant application of rewards and punishments they may so order it that men may know that the way to honour is not by contempt of the present government nor by factions and the popular ayre but by the contraries They are good men who observe the Decrees the Lawes and Rights of their Fathers if with a constant order we saw these adorned with honours but the factions punisht and had in contempt by those who bear command there would be more ambition to obey then withstand notwithstanding it so happens sometimes that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much fiercenesse so a stiffe neckt subject must be flatter'd for fear of his poweâ— but as that happens when the rider so this when the Commander is in danger of falling But we speak here of those whose authority aund power is intire Their duty I say it is to cherish obedient subjects and to depresse the factious all they can nor can the publique power be otherwise preserved nor the subjects quiet without it XIII But if it be the duty of Princes to restrain the factious much more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions themselues Now I call a faction a multitude of subjects gathered together either by mutuall contracts among themselves or by the power of some one without his or theirs who bear the supreme Rule A faction therefore is as it were a City in a City for as by an Union of men in the state of nature a City receives its being so by a new union of subjects there ariseth a faction According to this definition a multitude of subjects who have bound themselves simply to obey any forreign Prince or Subject or have made any Pacts or Leagues of mutuall defence between themselves against all men not excepting those who have the supreme power in the City is a faction Also favour with the vulgar if it be so great that by it an Army may be rais'd except publique caution be given either by hostages or some other pledges contains faction in it The same may be said of private wealth if it exceed because all things obey mony Forasmuch therefore as it is true that the state of Cities among themselves is naturall and hostile those Princes who permit factions doe as much as if they received an enemy within their walls which is contrary to the subjects safety and therefore also against the Law of nature XIV There are two things necessary to the enriching of Subjects Laobur and thrife there is also a third which helps to wit the naturall increase of the earth and water and there is a fourth too namely the Militia which sometimes augments but more frequently lessens the subjects stock The two first are only necessary For a City constituted in an Island of the Sea no greater then will serve for dwelling may grow rich without sowing or fishing by merchandize and handicrafts only but there is no doubt if they have a territory but they may be richer with the same number or equally rich being a greater number but the fourth namely the Militia was of old reckoned in the number of the gaining Arâ—s under the notion of Booting or taking prey and it was by mankind disperst by families before the constitution of civill societies accounted just and honourable for preying is nothing else but a warre waged with small forces And great Common-weales namely that of Rome and Athens by the spoyles of warre forraigne tribute and the territories they have purchased by their armes have sometimes so improved the Common-wealth that they have not onely not required any publique monies from the poorer sort of subjects but have also divided to each of them both monies and lands But this kind of increase of riches is not to be brought into rule and fashion For the Militia in order to profit is like a Dye wherewith many lose their estates but few improve them Since therefore there are three things only the fruits of the earth and water Labour and Thrifâ— which are expedient for the enriching of subjects the duty of Commanders in chief shall be conversant onely about those three For the first those lawes will be usefull which countenance the arts that improve the increase of the earth and water such as are husbandry and fishing For the second all Lawes against idlenesse and such as quicken industry are profitable the arâ— of Navigation by help whereof the commodities of the whole world bought almost by labour only are brought into one City and the Mechanicks under which I comprehend all the arts of the most excellent workmen and the Mathemacicall sciences the fountains of navigatory and mechanick employments are held in due esteem and honour For the third those lawes are usefull whereby all inordinate expence as well in meats as in clothes and universally in all things which are consumed with usage is forbidden Now because such lawes are beneficiall to the ends above specified it belongs also to the Office of supreme Magistrates to establish them XV. The liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the Lawes of the City or that they who have the supreme power cannot make what Laws they have a mind to but because all the motions and actions of subjects are never circumscribed by Lawes nor can be by reason of their variety it is necessary that there be infinite cases which are neither commanded nor prohibited but every man may either doe or not doe them as he lifts himselfe In these each man is said to enjoy his liberty and in this sense liberty is to be understood in this place namely for that part of naturall Right which is granted and left to Subjects by the civill Lawes As water inclosed on all hands with banks stands still and corrupts having no bounds it spreds too largely and the more passages it findes the more freely it
distinction between Counsel and Law from the difference between Counsell and Command Now COUNSELL is a precept in which the reason of my obeying it is taken from the thing it self which is advised but COMMAND is a precept in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the Commander For it is not properly said Thus I will and thus I Command except the will stand for a Reason Now when obedience is yielded to the Lawes not for the thing it self but by reason of the advisers will the Law is not a Counsell but a Command and is defined thus LAW is the command of that Person whether Man or Court whose precept containes in it the reason of obedience as the Precepts of God in regard of Men of Magistrates in respect of their Subjects and universally of all the powerfull in respect of them who cannot resist may be termed their Lawes Law and Counsell therefore differ many ways Law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth Counsell to them who have no power To follow what is prescribed by Law is duty what by Counsell is free-will Counsell is directed to his end that receives it Law to his that gives it Counsell is given to none but the willing Law even to the unwilling To conclude the right of the Counsellour is made void by the will of him to whom he gives Counsell the right of the Law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a Law imposed II. They confound Law and Covenant who conceive the Lawes to be nothing else but certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or forms of living determined by the common consent of men Amongst whom is Aristotle who defines Law on this manner 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say Law is a speech limited according to the common consent of the City declaring every thing that we ought to doe which definition is not simply of Law but of the Civill Law for it is manifest that the Divine Lawes sprang not from the consent of men nor yet the Lawes of Nature for if they had their originall from the consent of men they might also by the same consent be abrogated but they are unchangeable But indeed that 's no right definition of a Civill Law for in that place a City is taken either for one civill person one will or for a multitude of men who have each of them the liberty of their private wills if for one person those words common consent are ill placed here for one person hath no common consent neither ought he to have said declaring what was needfull to be done but commanding for what the City deolares it commands its Subjects He therefore by a City understood a multitude of men declaring by common consent imagine it a writing confirm'd by Votes some certain formes of living but these are nothing else but some mutuall contracts which oblige not any man and therefore are no Lawes before that a Supreme Power being constituted which can compell have sufficient remedy against the rest who otherwise are not likely to keep them Lawes therefore according to this definition of Aristotle are nothing else but naked and weak contracts which then at length when there is one who by right doth exercise the Supreme Power shall either become Lawes or no Lawes at his will and pleasure Wherefore he confounds Contracts with Lawes which he ought not to have done for Contract is a promise Law a command In Contracts we say I will do this In Lawes Doe this * Contracts oblige us Lawes vie us fast being obliged A Contract obligeth of it self The Law holds the party obliged by vertue of the universall Contract of yeelding obedience Therefore in Contract its first determined what is to be done before we are obliged to doe it But in Law we are first obliged to performe and what is to be done is determined afterwards Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civill law thus A civill law is a speech limited by the will of the City commanding every thing behoofefull to be done which is the same with that we have given above in the 6. Chap. art 9. to wit that the civill lawes are the command of him whether man or Court of men who is endued with supreme power in the city concerning the future actions of his Subjects Contracts oblige us To be obliged and to be tyed being obliged seems to some men to be one and the same thing and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words but none indeed More cleerly therefore I say thâ—… That a man is obliged â—y his contracts that is that he ought to performe for his promise sake but that the Law tyes him being obliged that is to say it compells him to make good his promise for fear of the punishment appointed by the Law III. They confound Lawes with Right who continue still to doe what is permitted by divine Right notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civill Law That which is prohibited by the divine Law cannot bee permitted by the civill neither can that which is commanded by the divine Law be prohibited by the civill notwithstanding that which is permitted by the divine Right that is to say that which may be done by divine Right doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civill Lawes for inferiour Lawes may restrain the liberty allowed by the superiour although they cannot enlarge them now naturall liberty is a Right not constituted but allowed by the Lawes For the Lawes being removed our liberty is absolute This is first restrained by the naturall and divine Lawes the residue is bounded by the civill Law and what remains may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular Towns and Societies There is great difference therefore between Law and Right For Law is a setter Right is freedome and they differ like contraries IV. All Law may be divided first according to the diversity of its Authors into Divine and humane the Divine according to the two wayes whereby God hath made known his will unto men is twofold naturall or morall and positive naturall is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternall word borne with them to wit their naturall Reason and this is that Law which in this whole book I have endeavoured to unfold Positive is that which God hath revealed to us by the word of Prophesie wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man Such are the Lawes which he gave to the Jewes concerning their government and divine worship and they may be termed the Divine civill Lawes because they were peculiar to the civill government of the Jewes his peculiar people Again the naturall Law may be divided into that of Men which alone hath obtained the title of the I aw of nature and that of Cities which may be called that of Nations but vulgarly it is termed the Right of Nations The precepts
Law to take away other mens goods they commanded that these goods should not bee accounted other mens but their own who took them and therefore such surreptions were no thefts In like manner copulations of heathen Sexes according to their Lawes were lawfull marriages XI It s necessary to the essence of a Law that the Subjects be acquainted with two things First what man or Court hath the supreme power that is to say the Right of making Lawes Secondly what the Law it self sayes for he that neither knew either to whom or what he is tyed to cannot obey and by consequence is in such a condition as if he were not tyed at all I say not that it is necessary to the essence of a Law that either one or the other be perpetually known but onely that it be once knowne and if the Subject afterward forget either the Right he hath who made the Law or the Law it self that makes him no lessâ— tyed to ohey since he might have remembred it had he had a will to obey XII The knowledge of the Legislator depends on the Subject himselfe for the right of making Lawes could not be conferr'd on any man without his owne consent and covenant either exprest or suppos'd exprest when from the beginning the Citizens doe themselves constitute a forme of governing the City or when by promise they submit themselves to the Dominion of any one or suppos'd at least as when they make use of the benefit of the Realme and Lawes for their protection and conservation against others for to whose Dominion we require our fellow Subjects to yeeld obedience for our good his Dominion we acknowledge to be legitimate by that very request and therefore ignorance of the power of making Lawes can never be a sufficient excuse for every man knowes what he hath done himselfe The knowledge of the lawes depends on the Legislator who must publish them for otherwise they are not Lawes for Law is the command of the Law-maker and his command is the Declaration of his Will it is not therefore a Law except the will of the Law-maker be declar'd which is done by promulgation Now in promulgation two things must be manifest whereof one is that he or they who publish a Law either have a right themselves to make Lawes or that they doe it by authority deriv'd from him or â—hem who have it the other is the sense of the Law it selfe Now that the first namely publisht Lawes proceed from him who hath the supreme command cannot be manifest speaking exactly and philosophically to any but them who have received them from the mouth of the Commander the rest beleeve but the reasons of their beliefe are so many that it is scarce possible they should not believe And truly in a Democratical City where every one may be present at the making of Laws if he will he that shall be absent must beleeve those that were present but in Monarchies and Aristocraties because it s granted but to few to be present and openly to heare the commands of the Monarch or the Nobles it was necessary to bestow a power on those few of publishing them to the rest And thus we beleeve those to be the Edicts and Decrees of Princes which are propouÌ„ded to us for such either by the writings or voices of them whose office it is to publish them But yet when we have these causes of beliefe that we have seen the Prince or supreme Councell constantly use such Counsellors Secretaries publishers and scales and the like arguments for the declaring of his will that he never took any authority from them that they have bin punisht who not giving credit to such like promulgations have transgrest the Law not onely he who thus believing shall not obey the Edicts and Decrees set forth by them is every where accus'd but he that not believing shall not yield obedience is punisht for the constant permission of these things is a manifest signe enough and evident declaration of the Commanders will provided there be nothing contain'd in the Law Edict or Decree derogatory from his supreme power For it is not to be imagin'd that he would have ought taken from his power by any of his Officers as long as he retaines a will to governe Now the sense of the law when there is any doubt made of it is to be taken from them to whom the supreme authority hath committed the knowledge of causes or Judgements for to judge is nothing else then by interpretation to apply the lawes to particular cases now we may know who they are that have this Office granted them in the same manner as we know who they be that have authority given them to publish Laws XIV Againe the civill law according to its two fold manner of publishing is of two sorts written unwritten By written I understand that which wants a voice or some other signe of the will of the â—egislator that it may become a Law For all kind of Laws are of the same age with mankinde both in nature and time and therefore of more antiquity then the invention of letters and the Art of writing wherefore not a writing but a voice is necessary for a written law this alone is requisite to the being that to the Remembrance of a Law for we reade that before letters were found out for the help of memory that Lawes contracted into Meetre were wont to be sung The unwritten is that which wants no other publishing then the voice of nature or naturall reason such are the lawes of nature For the naturall Law although it be distinguisht from the civill for as much as it commands the Will yet so farre forth as it relates to our actions it is civill for example this same Thou shalt not covet which onely appertaines to the minde is a naturall Law onely but this Thou shalt not invade is both naturall and civill for seeing it is impossible to prescribe such universall Rules whereby all future contentions which perhaps are infinite may be determined it s to be understood that in all cases not mentioned by the written lawes the law of â—aturall equity is to be followed which commands us to distribute equally to equals and this by the vertue of the civill law which also punisheth those who knowingly and willingly doe actually transgresse the lawes of nature XV. These things being understood it appeares first That the Lawes of Nature although they were describ'd in the Books of some Philosophers are not for that reason to be termed Written lawes and that the Writings of the Interpreters of the Lawes were no Lawes for want of the Supreme Authority nor yet those orations of the Wise that is to say Judges but so farre forth as by the consent of the Supreme power they part into custome and that then they are to be received among the Written lawes not for the Customes sake which by its own force doth not
submitted themselves to be protected and judged by reason of the great esteem they had of Prophecies The Reason of this thing was because that though penalties were set and Judges appointed in the institution of Gods priestly Kingdome yet the Right of inflicting punishment depended wholly on private judgement and it belonged to a dissolute multitude and each single Person to punish or not to punish according as their private zeale should stirre them up And therefore Moyses by his own command punisht no man with death but when any man was to be put to death one or many stirred up the multitude against him or them by divine authority and saying Thus saith the Lord. Now this was conformable to the nature of Gods peculiar Kingdome For there God reignes indeed where his Lawes are obeyed not for fear of men but for fear of himselfe and truly if men were such as they should be this were an excellent state of civill government but as men are there is a coercive power in which I comprehend both right and might necessary to rule them and therefore also God from the beginning prescribed Lawes by Moyses for the future Kings Deut. 17. vers 14. and Moyses foretold this in his last words to the people saying I know that after my death ye will utterly corrupt your selves and turn aside from the way that I have commanded you c. Deut. 31. 29. when therefore according to this prediction there arose another generation who knew not the Lord nor yet the works which he had done for Ispael the children of Israel did evill in the sight of the Lord and served Bâ—laam Iud. 2. 10 11. to wit they cast off Gods government that is to say that of the Priest by whom God ruled and afterward when they were overcome by their enemies and opprest with bondage they looked for Gods will not at the hands of the Priest any more but of the Prophets These therefore actually judged Israel but their obedience was rightly due to the High Priest Although therefore the Priestly Kingdome after the death of Moyses Ioshuah was without power yet was it not without Right Now that the interpretation of Gods word did belong to the same High Priest is manifest by this That God after the Tabernacle the Ark of the Covenant was consecrated spake no more in mount Sinai but in the Tabernacle of the Covenant from the propitiatory which was between the Cherubims whether it was not lawfull for any to aproach except the High Priest If therefore regard be had to the Right of the Kingdome the supreme civill power and the authority of interpreting Gods word were joyned in the High Priest If we consider the fact they were united in the Prophets who judged Israel For as Iudges they had the civill authority as Prophets they interpreted Gods word and thus every way hitherto these two powers continued inseparable XVI Kings being once constituted it s no doubt but the civill authority belonged to them for the Kingdome of God by the way of Priesthood God consenting to the request of the Israelites was ended which Hierom also marks speaking of the books of Samuel Samuel sayes he Eli being dead and Saul slain declares the old Law abolisht Furthermore the Oaths of the new Priesthood and new Soveraignty in Zadok and David do testifie that the Right whereby the Kings did rule was founded in the very concession of the People The Priest could Rightly doe whatsoever every man could rightly doe himselfe for the Israelites granted him a Right to judge of all things and to wage warre for all men in which two are contained all Right whatsoever can be conceived from man to man Our King say they shall judge us and goe out before us and fight our battails 1. Sam. 8. 20. Iudicature therefore belonged to the Kings but to judge is nothing else then by interpreting to apply the facts to the Lawes to them therefore belonged the interpretation of Lawes too and because there was no other written word of God acknowledged beside the Law of Moyses untill the Captivity the authority of interpreting Gods word did also belong to the Kings Nay forasmuch as the word of God must be taken for a Law if there had been another written word beside the Mosaicall Law seeing the interpretation of Lawes belonged to the Kings the interpretation of it must also have belonged to them When the book of Deuteronomie in which the whole Mosaicall Law was contained being a long time lost was found again the Priests indeed asked Counsell of God concerning that book but not by their own authority but by the Commandement of Iosiah and not immediately neither but by the meanes of Holda the Prophetesse whence it appears that the authority of admitting books for the word of God belonged not to the Priest neither yet followes it that that authority belonged to the Prophetesse because others did judge of the Prophets whether they were to be held for true or not for to what end did God give signes and tokens to all the People whereby the true Prophets might be discerned from the false namely the event of predictions and conformity with the Religion â—stablisht by Moyses if they might not use those marks The authority therefore of admitting books for the word of God belonged to the King thus that book of the Law was approved and received again by the authority of King Iosiah as appears by the fourth book of the Kings 22. 23. Chap. where it is reported that he gathered together all the severall degrees of his Kingdome the Elders Priests Prophets and all the people and he read in their cares all the words of the Covenant that is to say he caused that Covenant to be acknowledged for the Mosaicall Covenantâ— that is to say for the word of God and to be again received and confirmed by the Israclites The civill power therefore and the power of discerning Gods word from the word of men and of interpreting Gods word even in the dayes of the Kings was wholly belonging to themselves Prophets were sent not with authority but in the form and by the Right of Proclaimers and Preachers of whom the hearers did judge and if perhaps these were punisht who did not listen to them plainly teaching easie things it doth not thence follow that the Kings were obliged to follow all things which they in Gods name did declare were to be followed for though Iosiab the good King of Iudah were slain because he obeyed not the word of the Lord from the mouth of Neobo King of Aegypt that is to say because he rejected good Counsell though it seemed to come from an enemy yet no man I hope will say that Iosiah was by any bond either of divine or humane Lawes obliged to beleeve Pharoah Neobo King of Aegypt because he said that God had spoken to him But what some man may object against Kings that for want of learning they are seldome
they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty who doe that which disturbs the mind from its naturall state that which most manifestly happens to Drunkards and Gluttons we therefore sin in the 20 place against the Law of Nature by Drunkennesse XXVI Perhaps some man who sees all these precepts of Nature deriv'd by a certain artifice from the single dictate of Reason advising us to look to the preservation and safegard of our selves will say That the deduction of these Lawes is so hard that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known and therefore neither will they prove obliging for Lawes if they be not known oblige not nay indeed are not Lawes To this I answer it 's true That hope fear anger ambition covetousnesse vain glory and other perturbations of mind doe hinder a man so as he cannot attaine to the knowledge of these Lawes whilst those passions prevail in him But there is no man who is not somettmes in a quiet mind At that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know though he benever so rude and unlearn'd then this only Rule That when he doubts whether what he is now doing to another may be done by the Law of Nature or not he conceive himselfe to be in that others stâ—ad Here instantly those perturbations which perswaded him to the fact being now cast into the other scale disswade him as much And this Rule is not onely easie but is Anciently celebrated in these words Quod tibi â—ieri non vis alteri nè feceris Do not that to others you would not have done to your self XXVII But because most men by reason of their perverse desire of present profit are very unapt to observe these Lawes although acknowledg'd by them if perhaps some others more humble then the rest should exercise that equity and usefulnesse which Reason dictates those not practising the same surely they would not follow Reason in so doing nor would they hereby procure themselves peace but a more certain quick destruction and the keepers of the Law become a meer prey to the breakers of it It is not therefore to be imagin'd that by Nature that is by Reason men are oblig'd to the * exercise of all these Lawes in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd by others We are oblig'd yet in the interim to a readinesse of mind to observe them whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce to the end for which they were ordain'd We must therefore conclude that the Law of Nature doth alwayes and every where oblige in the internall Court or that of Conscience but not alwayes in the externall Court but then onely when it may be done with safety The exercise of all these Lawes Nay among these Lawes some things there are the omission whereof provided it be done for Peace or Self-preservation seemes rather to be the fulfilling then breach of the Naturall Law for he that doth all things against those that doe all things and plunders plunderers doth equity but on the other side to doe that which in peace is an handsome action and becomming an honest man is dejectednesse and poornesse of spirit and a betraying of ones self in the time of War But there are certain naturall Lawes whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of War it self for I cannot understand what drankennesse or cruelty that is Revenge which respects not the future good can advance toward peace or the preservation of any man Briefly in the state of nature what 's just and unjust is not to be esteem'd by the Actions but by the Counsell and Conscience of the Actor That which is done out of necessity out of endeavour for peace for the preservation of our selves is done with Right otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the naturall Law and an injury against God XXVIII But the Lawes which oblige Conscience may be broken by an act not onely contrary to them but also agreeable with them if so be that he who does it be of another opinion for though the act it self be answerable to the Lawes yet his Conscience is against them XXIX The Lawes of Nature are immutable and eternall What they forbid can never be lawfull what they command can never be unlawfull For pride ingratitude breach of Contracts or injury inhumanity contumâ—ly will never be lawfull nor the contrary vertues to these ever unlawfull as we take them for dispositions of the mind that is as they are considered in the Court of Conscience where onely they oblige and are Lawes Yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances and the Civill Law that what 's done with equity at one time is guilty of iniquity at another and what suits with reason at one time is contrary to it another Yet Reason is still the same and changeth not hâ—r end which is Peace and Defence nor the meanes to attaine them to wit those vertues of the minde which we have declar'd above and which cannot be abrogated by any Custome or Law whatsoever XXX It 's evident by what hath hitherto been said how easily the Lawes of Nature are to be observ'd because they require the endeavour onely but that must be true and constant which who so shall performe we may rightly call him JUST For he who tends to this with his whole might namely that his actions be squar'd according to the precepts of Nature he shewes clearly that he hath a minde to fulfill all those Lawes which is all we are oblig'd to by rationall nature Now he that hath done all he is oblig'd to it a Just Man XXXI All Writers doe agree that the Naturall Law is the same with the Morall Let us see wherefore this is true We must know therefore that Good and Evill are names given to things to signifie the inclination or aversion of them by whom they were given But the inclinations of men are diverse according to their diverse Constitutions Customes Opinions as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense as by tasting touching smelling but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life where what this man commends that is to say calls Good the other undervalues as being Evil Nay very often the same man at diverse times praises and dispraises the same thing Whilst thus they doe necessary it is there should be discord and strife They are therefore so long in the state of War as by reason of the diversity of the present appetites they mete Good and Evill by diverse measures All men easily acknowledge this state as long as they are in it to be evill and by consequence that Peace is good They therefore who could not agree concerning a present doe agree concerning a future Good which indeed is a work of Reason for things present are obvious to the sense things to come to our Reason only Reason declaring Peace to be good it followes