〈◊〉 here doth not signifie the mere having of a Talent but the employing using or occupying the same for it is a good Rule among Grammarians That Verbes which primarily signifie to have or possesse oft denote the using of what we have So here Hath notes to use occupie or traffic with what we have To such it shal be given and he shal have more abundance i. e. God wil reward his diligence in using and occupying his Talent be it natural or supernatural with much more in the same kind If his Talent be natural gifts or commun illuminations he shal receive more in that kind if true moral supernatural Virtues his stock shal encrease in its kind Whence it follows But whosoever hath not i. e. employes not by exercice from him shal be taken away even that he hath i. e. his Talent shal be taken from him his commun gifts and seeming virtues shal wither Yea virtuose exercices in the sharpest winter of affliction make Virtue to flourish and prosper Heb. 12.11 12. Thus Heb. 12.11 Every chastisement for the present seems not to be joyous but grievous but afterward it yields the tranquille fruit of righteousnesse to them that are exercised thereby 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exercised as in the Gymnade whence it follows v. 12. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies such a remission or dissolution as is opposed to intension firmitude strength It here denotes sloth and remisnesse as to labor whereof the hand is the instrument Thence he addes and the feeble knees 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the paralytic knees such as are as it were struck with a Palsie and therefore unapt for motion This later clause seems to refer to the Race which required the exercice of the knees as labor that of the hands 8. Formal Beatitude in virtuose Exercices A great and main part of moral Libertie consistes in virtuose exercices because herein consistes formal Beatitude Both Plato and Aristotle place formal Beatitude in virtuose operations Thus Plato in his Conviv pag. 211. makes the perfection of human Felicitie to consiste in contemplating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. the most sincere uniforme divine Beautie c. of which before Chap. 1. The like in his Phaedrus pag. 250. So Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 7. defines formal Beatitude the exercice of the rational Soul according to the best and most perfect Virtue in the most perfect life And Cap. 8. he addes That to act wel and live wel makes man happy And the demonstration hereof is most evident For 1 Operation and exercice is the end of al virtuose Habits and Principes and therefore their perfection for every Forme Power or Habit is ordained to its act as to its perfection Whence Basil termes Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 completive or perfective of Nature Which chiefly belongs to gratiose Acts. Thence Aristotle strongly argues that formal Beatitude cannot consiste 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in possession of objective Beatitude and habitual union therewith but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in use and exercice For a man may possesse the chiefest good and have habitual likenesse thereto and yet not formally happy as virtuose men asleep 2 The more Virtue is in exercice the more it ressembles the Divine Libertie and Perfection The Divine Being and Libertie is a pure simple Act without the least habit or passive power either physic or metaphysic and therefore the more actuose Virtue is the more like it is to God 3 Virtuose exercices bring most satisfaction with them Both Plato and Aristotle instruct us That virtuose Acts are of themselves 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-sufficient They inspire sweet satisfaction into the Soul as before Chap. 1. § 6. And this is very commun in sacred Philosophie Yea we are herein assured that by virtuose exercices we may have some prelibations of formal Beatitude even in this life This seems the import of that Exhortation 1 Tim. 6.12 1 Tim. 6.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exercise thy self in that famose contest of Faith Our Apostle alludes to those famose Olympian Games specially that of the Race wherein they contended for a Crown Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lay hold of eternal life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here as v. 19. is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 1 Cor. 9.24 Phil. 3.12 in which places the Apostle seems to allude to such as ran in the Race who when they came to the end thereof laid hold on the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Crown on the top of the Goal Thus Christians by virtuose exercices lay hold on eternal life as the Crown at the end of their Race Thus he speaks of himself 2 Tim. 4.7 8. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Tim. 4.7 8. I have exercised my self in that famose contest The double Article addes a great Emphase and shews with what vigor and activitie he had dispatcht his Christian race and therefore now was in expectation of the Crown Such efficacious and soverain influence have virtuose exercices on mans formal Beatitude and moral Libertie CHAP. IV. Of Sin and moral Servitude Sin a Transgression of the Law Sin as to its formal reason privative The causes of Sin 1 Mans defectibilitie 2 The Vitiositie of human Nature 3 Practic Error 4 Self-love Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful The moral Servitude of Sin as 1 Repugnant to human Nature 2 Repugnant each to other 3 The Disease of the Soul 4 Defilement 5 Shame and Reproche 6 Tyrannie 7 Penurie 8 Captivitie 9 Folie and Madnesse 10 It makes men Brutes The Adjuncts of this Servitude It is 1 Voluntary 2 Necessary 3 Infinite 4 Most penal Sin the worst punishment Other punishments of Sin It brings 1 Fear and shame 2 Instabilitie 3 Anxietie 4 Eternal punishment Al naturally Slaves of Sin No seeds of Virtue in corrupt Nature Natural impotence to what is good No moral Free wil. A sum of the Pelagian Historie § 1. HAving examined the nature of moral Good Virtue and Libertie we now passe on to the discussion of moral Evil and that Servitude which attends it It 's a good Notion of Aristotle Rhet. l. 3. c. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Parallel opposites illustrate each other So in his Ethics l. 5. c. 1. a. 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the most part therefore the contrary habit is known by its contrary Which holds true here in as much as the beautiful Idea of moral Good serves greatly to illustrate the deformitie of moral Evil. Sin a Transgression of the moral Law Doth al moral Good consiste in conformitie to the moral divine Law What then is moral evil or sin but a Transgression of the Law as 1 Joh. 3.4 That al moral Evil or Sin is a Transgression of the Law is an Hypothesis frequently inculcated as wel in Platonic as in sacred Philosophie Thence Definit Platon pag. 416. 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whiles he endeavors to heap up an infinite treasure of richesse involves himself in infinite evils 3 This servitude of Sin is infinite in regard of the Subject the Soul its infinite insatiable desire after its Idols Hab. 2.5 Thus sacred Philosophie Hab. 2.5 Who enlargeth his desire as Hel. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 amplifiath extendeth even to infinitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Soul desire or lust 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Hel or rather as the grave which is never satisfied with dead carcasses Thence it follows and is as death and cannot be satisfied This infinite inextinguible thirst after terrene goods is wel illustrated by Plato in his Gorg. pag. 507. And therefore he must take care lest that giving way to his lusts and causing them to wander up and down unpunished whiles he endeavors to satisfie them he bring in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an infinite evil and live a vagrant robbers life Natural desires are finite but sinful infinite as Seneca 4 The servitude of Sin is infinite if we consider the nature and kinds of Sin Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. I see as it were from a watch-tower that the face of Virtue is one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but the face of Sin is multiforme and infinite Which his Scholar Aristotle wel explicates Eth. l. 2. c. 5. pag. 89. Moreover there are many ways to sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for sin is interminate and infinite but good terminate and finite as the Pythagoreans hold This he expounds thus There is but one way to hit the marque but infinite ways to misse it Thence saith Seneca Men follow sins without measure without end for indeed they have neither end nor measure Al moral good is bounded and measured by God as its last end and the Law of God as its rule but sin knows no bounds either of End or Law Virtue consistes in number weight and measure but sin is void of each This infinitude of sin and its servitude is set forth to the life in sacred Philosophie Amos 5.12 For I know your manifold transgressions and your mighty sins Here is infinitude both as to multitude and magnitude This infinite servitude of Sin is oft set forth by a miserable Amplitude So Prov. 5.23 And in the amplitude of his folie or sin shal he wander So Prov. 21.4 Esa 57.10 Jer. 13.22 4. The servitude of Sin is most penal and afflictive The servitude of Sin most penal and therefore most miserable There were among the ancient Romans servi poenae servants only of punishment such as were condemned to digge in metallic Mines or to sight with wild bestes and such is every slave of sin he is obnoxious to the most severe punishments This we shal explicate in the following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil has guilt appendent thereto as its immediate effect Guilt is not a physic accident or mode inherent in the Sinner but a moral debt contracted by him which as to God importes a certain moral right he has to punish the offender Whence Guilt is said to be a medium or middle thing between sin and punishment for as to its terme it belongs to punishment but as to the judge it belongs to sin yet it more properly belongs to the sin than punishment because it doth indeed antecede the punishment but is inseparably conjoined with the sin Noxa sequitur caput Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies both Guilt and Sin denoting that guilt doth essentially and inseparably adhere to al moral evil 2 Punishment is an evil of passion inflicted for some moral evil action Punishment is said to be the necessary debt of sin and naturally due to the Sinner as he stands in relation to divine Justice Qui malum fecit malum ferat yet the actual inflicting of this punishment is not absolutely necessary in regard of divine Justice but rather the effect of his wil it is most just and morally necessary that the sin should be punished but yet it is not unjust for God to remit or relaxe this punishment for the greater advance of his glorie Every Soul that sins deserves punishment and fals under an essential natural and necessary obligation thereto and the execution of this punishment is morally necessary for the vindication of divine Justice of which more fully Chap. 11. Of the Justice of God 3 Punishment is either for the correction and emendation of the person offending or for the satisfaction of Justice and the person offended the former is usually stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 castigation which Plato makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the medicine of the Soul So Plato Gorg. pag. 478. tels us That castigation is the medicine of impietie c. Thence Definit Platon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 castigation is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The curation of the Soul from its sin This castigatory punishment is wel consistent with moral libertie for it 's a good Maxime among the Civilians Jure nullus ingenuus fit servus ex supplicio Gloss in Justin. Instit. That by right no ingenuous man is a servant of punishment i. e. albeit he may be punished as a free Citizen yet he is not as a slave devoted and destined thereto But vindictive judiciary punishment for the satisfaction of Justice and the person-offended always carries servitude with it Such offenders are properly poenae servi according to sacred Philosophie children of wrath i. e. sentenced and adjudged to punishment Hence that Effate among the Civilians A Servant whiles he lives is according to the civil Law reputed as dead Whence Slaves were anciently by the Grecians called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rev. 18.13 Bodies as Rev. 18.13 because they had no power over their own life wils or persons but were wholly their Lords Hence 4 Every Sinner under the Dominion of Sin is Servus poenae a Slave adjudged to the punishment of Sin Punishment is the usual attendent of servitude and the proper effect of sin Indeed sin and punishment came into the world together and al the art of man cannot separate them Gen. 2.17 Thus Gen. 2.17 In dying thou shalt die This reduplication according to the Hebrew Idiome notes the certaintie suddennesse perfection and perpetuitie of this death The righteous God never intended that any should purchase sin at an easie rate he gathers his rods for punishment from the same tree we planted by our sin Sin is the proper soil wherein punishment grows those that make bold with Gods Law must expect that he make bold with their peace and comforts Sin is never so swift in flying from God but divine vengeance is as swift in persuing of it Divine wrath which is the sorest vengeance lies in the bowels of every sin Death is the proper wages of sin Rom. 6.23 So Rom. 6.23 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies that stipend of fish or food which they gave
and observe its regular Fluxes and Refluxes c. if we rake into the bowels of the Earth and inquire into the origine of Stones both preciose and commun mineral Juices and Metals Lastly if we destil Plants or anatomise Animals what an incomparable Harmonie Order and Perfection shal we find in each of these both in reference each to other and to the whole Universe This is wel done by Plato in his Timaus pag. 28 c. whence he concludes That there must be an infinitely wise Mind who frames al these things into such an admirable order agreable to his own eternal Ideas Thus also Joan. Damascenus Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 18. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God who in his own nature is invisible is made visible by his operations we know by the admirable constitution and gubernation of the Vniverse Wherein he demonstrates the invisible Essence and Existence of God from his visible operations and workes as Rom. 1.20 § 5. 5. Gods Existence from the connate Idea of God in the Soul Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie from the Microcosme or Man specially his Soul and those innate Ideas of a Deitie loged there Thus Leg. 12. pag. 966. Do we not know that there are two things which make us believe that there is a God one which we before mentioned touching the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is the most ancient and divine of althings made I say of those things whose motion admits generation but so as that it hath obtained an everlasting essence for it self There are two parts in this Argument which demonstrate the existence of a Deitie 1 The divine origine and nature of the Soul 2 Its Immortalitie 1 The divine origine and nature of the human Soul fully evinceth the existence of God Thus Plato Leg. 10. pag. 899. Let him who formerly denied there was a God prove that we speak not truth in giving the Soul the first place or let him believe us and so for the future order his life 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that he dout not of a Deitie But let us consider whether to those that thinke there is no God we have not abundantly proved there is a God So in his Phaedo p. 81. Doth not the mind thus affected go 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the divine Being whereunto it is like This Platonic Argument may be thus improved Is there not a connate Idea of a Deitie impressed and stamped on the very nature of the Soul Doth not its immaterial spirital impassible nature speak its physic cognation with some supreme Spirit that first conferred that spirital Being on it Has not the Soul a physic Amplitude yea infinite Capacitie albeit only remote and passive of contemplating some first Truth and loving some chiefest good Has not the mind an universal empire and dominion over al objects to compound things most opposite and divide things most intimately conjoined to descend from the highest cause to the lowest effect and then to ascend from the lowest effect to the highest cause Has not the Wil an infinite thirst after good yea is never satisfied without the fruition of some supreme infinite good And do not these infinite capacities albeit only natural remote and passive implie some infinite object adequate thereto Was there ever a facultie or power in Nature without an object suited thereto Cicero tels us de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. That Nature her self has impressed a notion of a Deitie on the minds of al. As if he had said according to Plato's mind Has not God stamped an Idea of himself on human Nature May we not as wel abandon our very Beings our selves as abandon the notices and characters of a Deitie engraven on our Beings Doth not every human Soul carrie the signature and marque of his Creator impressed on it self Is there not an impresse and Idea of a Deitie incorporated and contempered in the very complexion and constitution of the Soul And albeit man by sin runs away as a fugitive from his Lord and Maker yet has he not secured his claim to man by his marque and physic Idea stamped on the Soul of man The Ideas and Characters of a Deitie are more clearly and lively stamped on the Souls of men than upon any part of the sensible World 2 As for the Immortalitie of the Soul doth not this also implie an eternal object answerable thereto Thus Plato in his Symposium pag. 207. informes us That man who is mortal as to his terrene part seekes to be immortal as to his more noble part And if the Soul seekes to be immortal must there not be an immortal eternal infinite good in the fruition of which it seeks immortal Beatitude Of this see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. lib. 3. cap. 2. sect 10. § 5. § 6. The Existence of God demonstrated by practic Arguments 1. From Conscience Plato has given us some practic and moral Demonstrations of a Deitie As 1 some moral though imperfect notices of good and evil impressed on Conscience with affections of fear and shame on the commission of sin Plato in his Minos pag. 317. makes mention of a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a royal Law of Nature some notices whereof remain on degenerate human Nature These notions the Stoics terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Aristotelians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commun and innate notions Among which they reckon up such as these That there is a God that this God was the Maker and is the Conservator and Rector of the Vniverse that he is infinitely wise just good c. That he is to be worshipped that virtue is to be embraced vice avoided c. These commun notices they make to be connate and engraven on the Soul And indeed sacred Philosophie assures us that there are such commun notices of good and evil naturally engraven on mens consciences as Rom. 2.14 15. which yet are improved by the workes of Providence as Act. 14.17 where rain and fruitful seasons are said to be Gods witnesse Now al Notions of good and evil clearly demonstrate the existence of a Deitie for the distinction of good and evil as to man refers to some principe above him were there no supreme Rector and Judge to reward good and punish evil the very notions of good and evil would vanish into smoke and vapor What can be good if there be not some Being originally and infinitely good to which it refers and by whole Law it is measured Can we imagine how the notions of good and evil should exist in mens minds if there were not a supreme Rector to give Laws for the measure thereof If man had not some supreme Lord to give Laws to him how could he be guilty of any moral transgression Can he that is his own Law be guilty of an offence Who can charge any man with doing il unlesse he break the Law of some Superior What could be just or unjust if there were not a supreme
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Virtue has for its rule a decorum or that which is most convenient i.e. agreable or conformable to the Law of Nature Hence 3 This Conformitie is stiled by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Symmetrie and Symphonie Al these notions Aristotle comprehended under his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mediocritie of which more fully B. 4. C. 1. § 30. and Philos General P. 2. l. 1. c. 1. sect 4. § 4. Others place the Forme of moral Good in the mode or manner of doing namely that it be done wel How the Forme of Good consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wel doing and we find some foundation for this Hypothesis in Plato's Theaetetus pag. 187. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's better to a little wel than much il Where he seems to make the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wâ—l doing the forme and measure of good So Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 3. pag. 83. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. He therefore shal be a Grammarian who doth what is Grammatic Grammatically i.e. according to Rules of Grammar But yet he addes by way of caution That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of Arts is not the same with that of Virtues for the perfection of Arts is included in themselves without regard to the perfection of the Artificer but the perfection of Virtue requires that the subject be so and so qualified And then he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is a righteous and temperate man not that doth those things but doth them in such a manner as righteous and sober men do them i.e. rightcously and soberly Hence that vulgar Effate That good workes are to be judged by Adverbes for al must be done with those adverbial conditions of sacred Philosophie Tit. 2.12 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 soberly and righteously and piously This is in a peculiar manner true of good actions where the mater is indifferent because such have no goodnesse at al but what is from the Adverb So that it sufficeth not that the Act be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good but it must have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right manner of being done and herein according to some the Forme of its goodnesse doth consiste even in the manner of it and any defect herein wil render the action evil according to those scholastic Maximes The forme gives being and any omission or defect therein gives millitie as to moral Good So in the Canon Law they tel us That the forme must be precisely and punctually observed And indeed this notion of the forme of moral Good amounts to the same with the former and must be resolved thereinto For a moral Act may be said then to have its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or bene factum wel done when it is in al points exactly conformable to the moral Law for al moral Good is a relation of conformitie with the rule of Morals but the least privation thereof is sin But How far Circumstances formalise moral Good to descend to particulars an human Act is then conformable to the Law and wel done when it is not only good for the mater but also clothed with al those Circumstances which necessarily attend its moral goodnesse The particular forme of moral Good consistes much in the Circumstances that attend it The Circumstances oft formalise and specisie the Act making it good or evil sometimes they only make it better or worse But the Circumstances have the greatest sway in things indifferent where the manner of doing doth chiefly specifie the Act. We find the Circumstances of human Acts wel expressed by Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 5. Virtue saith he consistes in the wel doing of things for we may fear trust desire hate despise be angrie pitie rejoice and grieve 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not duely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But truly to be moved with these affections when and in what things and towards whom and for what end and in that manner as we ought this is the golden mean and that which is best wherein Virtue consistes Whence also Aristotle Eth. lib. 3. cap. 10. art 5. pag. 160. assures us That a defect in any one Circumstance renders an Act evil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But sins may be committed some when that is done that ought not others when not as it ought others because not at that time when it ought or the like Thence art 10. he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a valiant man suffers and acts according to the dignitie of the mater and when and in that manner as reason or the Law of Nature dictates Thus we see how Plato and Aristotle require to the constitution of moral Good not only a right mater but that it be clothed with al due Circumstances whereby it may be rendred conformable to the Law as to manner This Hypothesis has been generally maintained among the more sound Schole-men Thus Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 7. Art 2. A Circumstance is a condition or accident of an human Act which toucheth it extrinsecally And seing human Acts are disposed towards their last end by circumstances the contemplation hereof greatly concernes Theologues For a Theologue considers human Acts as a man is thereby ordained to Beatitnde Now whatever is ordained to an end ought to be proportionate thereto But Acts are rendred proportionable to their end by a certain commensuration which they receive from due circumstances whence the consideration of circumstances chiefly belongs to a Theologue What these circumstances are he addes Art 3. In human Acts Who did it By what aides or instruments What Why How When and Abour what he did it are to be inquired into Some explain these Circumstances thus 1 Quis who must not be taken for the efficient cause but for his condition and qualitie as a private person or public c. 2 Quid what must not be understood of the mater or object but of the qualitie thereof 3 Neither must Quomodo how be taken for the forme or manner but whether it be done openly or secretly c. Greg. Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 38. Quaest 1. Art 1. strongly assertes and proves That no moral Act wanting its due Circumstance is morally good By an Act morally good I understand saith he no other according to the Doctors than an Act conforme to right Reason objective i.e. the Divine Law according to al circumstances requisite to this that the Act be truly virtuose When therefore a moral operation is not conforme to right Reason or the Law according to al due circumstances it is vitiose and morally evil This his Hypothesis he proves by two Conclusions 1. Conclus That no moral Act wanting any one due Circumstance is truly virtuose This he proves by shewing that the contrary implies a contradiction For if a moral Act want any one due circumstance it is not as it ought to be therefore it is evil Due circumstances are communly said to be such things as are required to this that
the Act be truly virtuose and if an Act be truly virtuose it is conforme to right Reason or the moral Law and if such then it wants not any due circumstance wherefore if any Act wanting a due circumstance should be truly virtuose it wil then necessarily follow That it doth want and yet that it doth not want a due circumstance or That it is truly virtuose and yet that it is not truly virtuose 2. Conclus That every such Act as wants its due Circumstances is morally evil and sin It is evil because it wants its due bonitie or goodnesse namely its due circumstance For sin is nothing else but the want of a due good or voluntarily to act against the Divine Law Thus much also Suarez grants us That some conditions that are only circumstantial and accidental to an Act in esse rei as to the physic being are yet essential in esse moris as to its moral being So Suarez 1.2 Tract 2. Disp 5. pag. 169. The first opinion saith he is That an human Act may be considered in its natural or moral being and that circumstances are so called in relation to the natural not the moral being of the Act but that al these conditions are substantial Principes or proper Causes of the moral action as such He mentions this as the opinion of some Scholemen namely that there are no accidental circumstances of human Acts morally considered but that al these Circumstances are essential and properly influential on the said moral Acts. Which indeed is a great truth whereunto though not fully yet thus far he assents It is true saith he what the first opinion asserted That some conditions may be accidental to the act in esse rei as a natural act and yet essential to it in esse moris morally considered And the reason addes he is taken à priori because the esse morale or moral being of an Act primarily dependes on the order of Reason we say of the Law but now it oft happens that an act or object hath a diverse order to reason by reason of diverse conditions of those things that concur to the moral Act. Thence pag. 174. he tels us what Circumstances are essential Right Reason which must be understood objectively is the rule of human acts and their circumstances therefore the affection or reason of these Circumstances cannot be better explicated than by their order or regard to right Reason I would say the Divine Law And the same rule is to be used for the understanding when the conditions of moral Acts are not properly Circumstances but essential namely when they are such as according to right Reason are altogether necessary not only as to degrees but simply as to the honestie or turpitude of the act For when a Circumstance altogether changeth the conformitie or difformitie of an human act it changeth its Species In which he plainly grants That al those Circumstances which change the conformitie or difformitie of an human act are specific and essential Which is al that we need contend for because the Controversie is not about natural or civil Circumstances but such as belong to the act morally considered which if good requireth an integritie of Causes and plenitude of Circumstances so that if one Circumstance due to the moral bonitie of the act be defective the whole act is changed and rendred morally evil By the whole of which it is most evident that al Circumstances due to the moral goodnesse of an human act are essential and specific such as concur to formalise moral Good which requires a complete conformitie to the Divine Law not only in Mater Principes and End but also in al Circumstances morally due to the integritie of such an Act For al good as has been sufficiently demonstrated requires an integritie of Causes whereas sin ariseth from the least defect according to that knowen Effate of the spurious Dionysius Divin Nom. cap. 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is from one and complete cause but sin from many and singular defects § 4. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al moral Good Having considered moral Good in its Causes and constitutive parts we now descend to the contemplation thereof in its proper Adjuncts and Attributes which we shal deduce and draw forth in the subsequent Corollaries 1. Al moral Good Virtues and virtuose Acts have one and the same simple uniforme Idea and Nature For al moral Good and virtuose Acts flow from one and the same virtuose Principes tend to one and the same End and are formalised by one and the same conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 445. It appears to me as it were in a Watch-tower 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the face or forme of Virtue is one but that of Improbitie manifold and almost infinite His mind is that al Virtues have one and the same formal Idea or face but sins have varietie yea almost infinite deformed shapes This Aristotle Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having proved that al moral Virtue consistes in a Mediocritie and Vniformitie he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moreover we may sin many ways for as the Pythagoreans conjecture sin is infinite and boundlesse but good is terminate and bounded but there is but one way of doing good Wherein we may observe 1 That al sin is difforme boundlesse and endlesse it hath no forme measure or number 2 But Virtue and moral Good is bounded and uniforme Whence he concludes with a Verse out of some ancient Poet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For good men truly are simply and uniformely such but wicked men are difformely and variously so Thus also Aristotle Mag. Moral lib. 1. cap. 25. affirmes That al Good is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 uniforme but al Vice 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 multiforme Hence Plato asserted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is just is equal and uniforme Whence that Stoic Hypothesis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al moral goods are equal and uniforme i.e. conforme to the rule of Moralitie Al this is wel expressed by Augustine who makes al Good to consiste in Modo Specie Ordine in Mode Species and Order i.e. in a uniforme conformitie to the rule of Moralitie Hence 2. Al moral Good and Virtue supernatural There is no real moral Good or natural Virtue but what is supernatural This Corollarie evidently follows from the former and indeed from the whole of this discourse about moral Good For if al moral Virtue or Good requires an integritie of causes and is formalised by conformitie to the Divine Law thence it necessarily follows that moral Good or Virtue can be but one uniforme simple thing Thence Chrysostome Hom. 4. in Gen. cals Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature And Cyril in Esa termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 above proper Nature as elsewhere 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prerogative above Nature I am not ignorant that many of the Scholemen and
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a practice against right reason which must be understood objectively of the Law of Nature as before Whence Plato himself Rep. 9. saith That Sin is most distant from Law and Order Again Leg. 10. he affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Sin is an intemperate excesse of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is of the same import with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and signifies primarily the excesse of any humor in the bodie and thence the inordinate and irregular excesse of the Soul and its Affections For look as Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Concent and Symmetrie of the Soul so sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Asymmetrie and Ataxie Hence also Plato in his Epinom pag. 978. cals Sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A motion void of reason order decorum measure yea a confused agitation whereby the Soul is depraved and contaminated Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 injustice Definit Platon is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit over-looking or despising Laws Yea Plato Repub. 9. pag. 574. cals sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transgression of the Law as sacred Philosophie 1 Joh. 3.4 Thus also Aristotle 1 Joh. 3.4 both in his Ethics and Rhetoric stiles sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Transgression of the Law But this Hypothesis shines with more illustrious beams in sacred Philosophie whence Plato borrowed his choisest Philosophemes Thence in the O. T. al the notions whereby sin is expressed signifie a Transgression of the Law We find three several notions of sin together Psal 32.1 2. 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 32.1 2. which denotes Defection Rebellion Prevarication against God 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies Aberration and Deviation from the right way of Gods Law 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which importes Perversitie Obliquitie Iniquitie Privation of Rectitude 4 Sin is stiled Psal 101.3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Psal 101.3 a mater of Belial i. e. a lawlesse mater such as wil not come under the yoke From 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without a yoke which the LXX translate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and whereto Paul seems to allude 2 Cor. 6.14 15. 5 Sin is stiled a Violation or making void the Law Psal 119.126 Zeph. 3.4 Hos 4.2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They break the bounds of the Law An allusion to Inundations and Land-flouds that break down al bounds So great is the violence which sin offers to the Divine Law 6 Sin is said to be a Tortuositie or wresting of the Law Psal 125.5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obliquations or crooked ways 7 Sin is called a Declination Aberration Deflexion Psal 119 51 67. Psal 101.3 yea v. 4. it is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 perverse 8 It is termed Rebellion Psal 5.10 66.7 Which termes though different in themselves yet they al import Transgression of the Law Thus also in the N. T. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with other notions whereby sin is expressed do al import Transgression of the Law Hence the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That al sins are equal because the least deviation from the Law is a Transgression as wel as the greatest Yet hence it follows not but that there are degrees and aggravations of sins according to their various objects and circumstances Hence it follows Sin as to its formal Reason privative that sin as to its formal Idea Reason or Nature is not positive but privative For the clearing whereof we may consider these following Propositions 1 Al moral Evil or Sin is founded in some natural Good For albeit there be pure good which has no mixture of evil either natural or moral as the chiefest Good yet there is no pure Evil which has not for its subject some natural good It 's true there are some Acts that are intrinsecally evil that is so far evil as that they can never be good as the hatred of God and the like Yet these Acts are called intrinsecally evil not as if their evil were intrinsecal to the natural entitie of the acts for it 's possible that the evil may be separated from the acts but because they cannot be put forth towards such an object morally considered without sin 2 Al Sin is an aggregate composite Being composed of positive and privative The material Subject or natural Act is positive but the formal Reason or moral deficience of Rectitude is privative The positive Act of it self abstracted from the privation is not sinful but both together as mater and forme make up one Compositum It 's a Question in the Scholes Whether Sin thus compounded of privative and positive be unum per se or per accidens And Suarez wel solves this difficultie telling us That if we consider sin as a physical real Being it is unum per accidens but if we consider it as a moral Being so it is unum per se because the positive act and privative deficience are so intimately conjoined for the constitution of one moral Evil that they may be looked on under the notion of act and power or mater and forme so that the act cannot be evil without the privation nor the privation without the act 3 Every Privation as such is evil as every Forme or Act good For what is a privation but the want of some due perfection And is not every want of due perfection evil to that subject that wants it Every thing if it want any good that belongs to it is so far evil 4 When we say the formal reason of Sin is privative the terme formal must not be taken strictly but in a laxe notion and morally For the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Obliquitie of sin being that by which it is formalised and yet not formally intended by the Agent hence sin in a strict sense cannot be said to have any formal Cause yet because this obliquitie or privation of Rectitude doth morally constitute the act sinful it may in a more laxe notion be rightly termed the formal Reason or Cause 5 Sin as to its formal reason is not a Physic or Logic privation nor yet pure nothing but a moral privation or deficience as to moral rectitude In this respect some Divines ascribe to sin something positive not absolutely as if it were somewhat subsistent but relatively and morally as it is opposed to pure nothing for say they sin is a privation which makes the act whereto it belongs sinful and therefore it is not mere nothing So Suarez saith that sin is not a real Being yet it is such a Being as may suffice to the truth of a proposition Thus indeed Plato in his Sophist teacheth us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non-ens may be considered as pure nothing and so it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unintelligible and ineffable or else it may be considered as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which truly is not yet not simply
Veracitie and indeed no wonder seeing it is the great Spring of the Divine life and consolation both here and hereafter § 3. The last Divine Attribute The Sanctitie of God we are to discourse of is the Sanctitie or Holinesse of God whereof we find great and illustrious Characters in sacred Philosophie 1 We find the Sanctitie of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from al created Sanctitie Exod. 15.11 So Exod. 15.11 Who is like unto thee O Lord amongst the Gods or mighty men Who is like unto thee gloriose in Holinesse c Where he placeth Gods transcendent Eminence and Elevation above al Creatures as that wherein his essential Sanctitie chiefly consistes And indeed the peerlesse Eminence of Gods sacred Majestie is that wherein his Sanctitie chiefly consistes as we intend anon more fully to demonstrate Thus 1 Sam. 2.2 There is none holy as the Lord 1 Sam. 2.2 for there is none besides thee neither is there any Rock like our God Hannah here as Moses before placeth the Sanctitie of God in his Supereminence above al Creatures 2 Hence God is frequently brought in as an object of Divine Worship with regard to his Holinesse So Psal 30.4 Give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse i. e. of his peerlesse Eminences And Psal 71.22 Vnto thee wil I sing with the harpe O thou holy One of Israel Also Psal 92.12 Psal 92.12 And give thankes at the remembrance of his Holinesse or celebrate the memorial of his Holinesse i. e. Lift up his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or transcendent Excellences Again Psal 98.1 O sing unto the Lord a new song for he hath done marvellous things his right hand and his holy arme hath gotten him victorie His holy arme or the arme of his Holinesse i. e. of his holy power so much above al other powers The like Psal 99.3 Let them praise thy great and terrible name for it is holy Also v. 9. Exalt the Lord our God and worship at his holy hil for the Lord our God is holy The like v. 5. As God is a transcendent superlative Majestie exalted above al other Gods or Majesties as Exod. 15.11 so in al Acts of Worship we must exalt him by giving him a singular incommunicable peculiar Worship Whence in Scripture those that give that Worship which is due to God to any besides him or in conjunction with him by way of object either mediate or immediate are said to profane his holy Name Ezech. 20.39 43.7 8. because Gods Holinesse consisting in a superlative incommunicable Majestie admits no corrival in point of Worship Hence to sanctifie the holy Name or Majestie of God is 1 to serve and glorifie him because of his transcendent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Eminence and 2 to do it with a peculiar separate incommunicated Worship because he is holy and separate above althings else Not to do the former is Irreligion Profanenesse and Atheisme not to do the later is Idolatrie and Superstition as judicious Mede wel observes Hence 3 God is said to sit on a Throne of Holinesse Psal 47.8 God sitteth upon the Throne of his Holinesse Psal 47.8 Alluding to the Thrones of Princes which were in the midst of the people exalted and lift up that so their Majestie might appear more illustrious God being by reason of his transcendent Eminences exalted infinitely above al Creatures he is therefore said to sit on the Throne of his Holinesse 4 We find Gods Holinesse in a most eminent manner and with emphatic Characters proclaimed by such as have any views of God Thus Esa 6.3 Holy holy holy is the Lord of Hosts So Rev. 4.8 5 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by puritie Hab. 1.13 Hab. 1.13 Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil and canst not look on iniquitie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prae videndo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here is comparative as if he had said O! how pure are thine eyes how impossible is it for thee to behold sin with the least delight or approbation So 1 Joh. 3.3 As he is pure 6 The Sanctitie of God is sometimes described by Rectitude Psal 25 8. Good and upright is the Lord. So Psal 92.15 To shew that the Lord is upright We find also in Plato many great notices of the Sanctitie of God conformable to those of sacred Philosophie So Theaetet pag. 176. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Evils find no place with God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God is in no manner unrighteous but as it seems most righteous So Repub. 2. pag. 379. he saith That in Theologie we should use such modules as come nearest to the Nature of God and demonstrate what God is Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things consentaneous to his Nature Whence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must we not determine then that God is indeed good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But no good is noxious 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that which hurts not doth it do any evil No surely Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good therefore is not the cause of althings but of those things that are good it is the cause but of evils it is not the cause i. e. God is the first Cause and Author of al natural and moral good but as for moral evil he is not the Author or Cause thereof as it is evil because moral evils as such have no efficient cause but only deficient Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of good things we must own no principal cause but God but as for evils we must inquire after some other causes of them for God must not be estimed the cause of them His mind is that God must be owned as the cause of al good both Natural and Moral yea of the materia substrata or the material entitie of sin which is a natural good but as for the proper Moral cause of Sin as Sin is a deordination or difformitie from the Divine Law that is proper to the sinner for God must not be thought to be the Author or Moral cause of sin This he farther explains p. 380. Either we must not at al attribute evils to God or if we do it must be in that manner as before namely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must say that God hath acted wel and justly and has inflicted those punishments on them that thereby he might bring some profit Wherein he informes us that God is the cause of penal evils not as evils but as conducing to good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That God who is good should be the Author or Moral Cause of Evil to any this we must with al manner of contention refute and not suffer any in the Citie to speak or hear such things Plato strongly assertes that God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal cause of al good but not of sin as sin i. e. he neither commands invites
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
or material entitative act of sin This was long ago wel observed by Aquinas who tels us that al locutions in which it is signified that God is the cause of sin or of moral evil ought to be avoided or very cautelously limited because names that implie deformitie conjunct with the act either in general or in particular it cannot be said of them that they are from God Whence it cannot be said of sin absolutely and simply that it is from God but only with this addition or limitation that the Act as it is a real Entitie is from God This being premissed we procede to demonstrate our Proposition That God is the prime efficient cause of the material entitative Act of Sin This may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first Cause Whatever is produced must have some cause of its production as Plato Tim. 28. and if it have a cause must it not also have a first cause And what can this be but God unlesse we wil with the Manichees asset two first Causes one of good and the other of evil 2 From the Participation and Limitation of every finite Act and Being Must not every participate finite create dependent Being be reduced to some essential infinite increate independent Being as the prime Efficient thereof 3 From the conservation of the material entitative Act of Sin Is not the material entitative act of sin a create Being And can any create Being conserve itself Doth not Durandus and his sectators grant that the conservation of Beings is from God And if Gods providential Efficience be necessary to the conservation of the material entitative act of sin is it not as necessary to its first production What is conservation but continued production as to God This argument is wel improved by Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110. and by Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 4 From the Determination of the second cause of its particular effect Every second cause being indifferent to varietie of effects cannot be determined to any one individual effect but by the immediate cooperation of the first cause Thus Suarez Metaphys Disp 22. Sect. 1. pag. 552. 5 From the substrate Mater of al evil which is physically and naturally good There is no moral evil which is not founded and subjectated in some natural good even hatred of God albeit the highest moral evil yet as to its entitative material act it is naturally good which is evident by this that if that act of hatred were put forth against sin it would be morally good 6 From the Ordinabilitie of al evil to some good There is no act so evil but the wise God can turne it to some good the Crucifixion of our Lord which was one of the highest evils what good was by Divine Gubernation brought out of it Doth it not much exalt the skil of a wise Physician so to order poison as to make it medisinal So it exalts Divine Gubernation to bring good out of evil as it aggravates the impietie of wicked men that they bring evil out of good 7 Doth it not take from God the main of his Providence to denie his Concurse to the substrate mater of sin What more conduceth to the Amplitude of Divine Providence than to allow him a Concurse to and Gubernation of al real Acts and Events 8 To denie Gods Concurse to the material entitative Act of Sin doth it not by a paritie of Reason subvert the supernatural concurse of God to what is good For if God can make a Creature that shal be Independent as to any one natural Act why may he not also make a Creature that shal be independent as to good Acts Hence 4. Prop. The substrate mater How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. or material entitie of Sin fals under the Divine Wil. This follows on the former because the whole of Divine concurse or efficience must be resolved into the Wil of God as before once and again But more particularly 1 The Futurition of Sin as to its substrate mater fals under the Eternal Decree of the Divine Wil. Whatever Good or Evil there is under the Sun as to its real Entitie must have its futurition from the Divine Wil. Immo peccatum quatenus à Deo justè permittitur cadit in legem aeternam Augustinus de civitat Dei L. 19. C. 22. sin it self so far as it is justly permitted by God fals under the Eternal Law of the Divine Wil as Augustin wel observes Sin in its own nature as Antecedent to the Divine Wil was only possible now how could it passe from a condition of mere possibilitie to a state of futurition but by some intervening cause And what can we imagine to be the cause hereof but the Divine Wil May we not then hence conclude that Sin was future because the Divine Wil determined for just ends to permit its futurition 2 The Divine Wil is not only the cause of sins futurition but it has moreover a providential Gubernation and Efficience about the actual existence of sin 1 As for the Natural Entitie of Sin the Divine Wil is the total immediate efficient thereof as Ariminensis Sent. 2. Dist 34. Ar. 3. pag. 110. 2 The Divine Wil also physically permits the moral pravitie and obliquitie of Sin as that which may conduce to the advance of Divine Glorie For this greatly conduceth to the illustration of Divine Providence to permit some defects that may render the whole more beautiful as Aquinas at large demonstrates contra Gent. l. 3. c. 71. of which hereafter Hence 5. Gods wil about the Obliquitie of Sin permissive Prop. Gods Wil about the formal reason or obliquitie of Sin is not effective or defective but only permissive 1 That Gods wil about the obliquitie of Sin is not effective is evident because Sin as to its obliquitie has no effective cause 2 That the Wil of God is not a defective cause of Sin is as evident because the same act which is defectuose and sinful in regard of the second cause is not such in regard of God Man breakes a Law and therefore sins but God breakes no Law al his Actions are conforme to the Eternal Law Whence 3 Gods Wil about the obliquitie of Sin is only permissive But now to clear up Gods permissive Wil about Sin we are to consider 1 That permission properly as to men is not an action of the Law but a negation of action when any permits another to do what he might hinder but is under no obligation to hinder Hence no man may permit Sin because he is under an obligation to hinder it but God may because he is under to obligation to hinder it as also because he can bring good out of it 2 That Permission is either of a Legislator or Rector Gods permission of Sin is not as he is Legislator but only as Rector and Governer of the World God gives no man
Judicial Gubernation of Sin consistes of these several particulars 1 God suspendes and withdraws the Celestial Influences of Divine Grace and means of restraint Thus Gen. 6.3 My Spirit shal not always strive with man How soon wil the softest heart grow harder than the Adamant if God withdraw his celestial dews of Grace as Zach. 7.12 14.17 18 Hence 2 God leaves men to the plague of their own corrupt hearts which is Plato notes is the worst judgement 3 God leaves Sinners to the heart-betwitching allurements and blandishments of this World Thus Balaam Num. 22 c. 2 Pet. 2.14 15. 4 God delivers Sinners up to the power of Satan 2 Cor. 4.3 4. 2 Tim. 2.26 5 God so orders and disposeth his providences as that al do accidentally by reason of their corrupt hearts tend to their induration Rom. 11.9 10 11. 6 Yea God permits that the very means of life be to them the savor of death 2 Cor. 2.16 Esa 28.12 13 14. 7 Yea the Prince and Mediator of life is to such a strumbling-stone and occasion of death Esa 8.14 15 16. 38.13 8 God leaves them to a spirit of slumber or spiritual occecasion Rom. 11.8 Esa 19 11-14 44.18 19. 60.1 2. 2 Thes 2.10 11. 9. Prop. In the whole of Divine Gubernation about Sin his Wisdome Justice and Sanctitie Gods Attributes illustrious in his Gubernation of Sin with other Attributes are most illustrious and resplendent 1 Gods Wisdome is eminently manifest in his gubernation of Sin in that he brings the greatest good out of the greatest evils those very sins whereby wicked men endeavor to darken the Glorie of God he turnes to the advance of his Glorie We have a good Philosopheme to this purpose in Plato Theaetet pag. 167. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A wise man makes those things which are in themselves evil turne to good and to seem such as a wise Physician turnes poison into a medicament which similitude he useth 2 The Justice of God is most resplendent in the punishing that sin he permits to be 3 Gods Sanctitie is also most conspicuous in that those very acts which are morally evil in regard of God are both morally and naturally good in regard of Divine Gubernation The sin which God governes is not sin in regard of God but of the Creature that comes short of the Divine Law The holy God violates no Law by concurring as an universal Cause with the Sinner that violates his Law The sinful qualitie of a moral effect may not be imputed to the first universal Cause Duo cùm faciunt idem non est idem Proverb but only to the second particular cause Here that commun Proverbe holds true When two do the same it is not the same i. e. the same sinful act whereto God and the Sinner both concur is not the same as to both but morally evil as to the Sinner and yet naturally yea morally good as to Gods concurrence Sin as to God speakes a negation of his concurse not a privation of any thing due neither doth God wil sin simply as sin under that Reduplication but only as good and conducible to his Glorie The reason of Gods willing and governing sin both in the Elect and Reprobate is univocally one and the same namely the advance of Divine Glorie For the greatest evil of sin has something of good mixed with it which God wils and orders for his Glorie There is nothing in the world purely simply and of it self evil if there were God who is the chiefest good could not wil it Lastly man only is the proper and formal cause of sin or moral evil because he alone comes short of the rule of moral good so that Divine Gubernation both as permissive ordinative and judicial about Sin is sufficiently vindicated from the least imputation thereof CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose men and Angels Supernatural Illumination from God The Infusion of Virtues Gods care of virtuose Men. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World The Angels Law Obedience and Disobedience Good Angels their Communion with Saints The Ministration of Angels 1 At the giving of the Law and Christ's Incarnation 2 For the Protection of Saints 3 For their Conduct 4 Their Sympathie with Saints Their Ministration at the final Judgement Divine Gubernation as to evil Angels Satans power to temt and his Limitation § 1. Supernatural Illumination from God HAving discussed Gods Divne Gubernation about Sin we now passe on to his supernatural Efficience and Gubernation of Virtue and virtuose Men. We intend not to treat hereof as it belongs to Christian Theologie but only as it fals under metaphysic or prime Philosophie termed by some Natural Theologie 1. Plato gives us frequent and great notices of Divine Illumination which is the Origine of al supernatural Virtue Thus in his Theages he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If it please God thou shalt profit much and speedily otherwise not So in his Philebus he assures us That the cognition of the supreme infinitie Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God to men The like Epinom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 How is it that God should be accounted the cause of al other good things and not much more of wisdome which is the best good But to treat more distinctly of Divine Ilumination we are to know that as there is a twofold spiritual Darknesse the one objective in the things to be known the other subjective in the mind that is to know them so proportionably there is a twofold Light the one objective whereby God reveles the things to be known the other subjective whereby God takes off the veil from the mind and thereby inables it to apprehend supernatural Objects Now by this twofold Light Divine Gubernation conductes the Rational Creature to his supernatural end 1 God conductes the Rational Creature by an objective Light or Divine Revelation of his Wil whereby he reveles mans supernatural end and the means conducing thereto Some imperfect fragments or broken notices of this Divine Revelation were gleaned up by the wiser Heathens Pythagoras Solon Socrates Plato which gave them sufficient cause to admire and in some superstitiose manner to imitate the Judaic Institutes and Laws as the Fountain of the best Wisdome as it was foretold by Moses Deut. 4.5 6 7. and as we have sufficiently demonstrated in the precedent Parts Whence we find mention in Plato Minos pag. 317. of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law as elsewhere of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Divine Word which if I mistake not refer to Divine Revelations vouchsafed the Church of God for its conduct unto eternal life 2 As God governes and conductes the Rational Creature by an objective so also by a subjective Light which is essentially requisite for the acquirement of its supernatural end Of this also we find some and those not vulgar notices in Plato So in his Repub. 6. pag. 507 508. where he
8. also Philos Gen. P. 1. L. 1. c. 2. s 5. L. 3. c. 4. BREVIARIE OF CONTENTS The COURT of the GENTILES PART IV. Of Reformed Philosophie Preface THE first Reformers of Philosophie Wiclef Wesselus Savonarola Picus Mirandula Lud. Vives Melanchton Stapulensis and Ramus 1. The Right Vse and Abuse of Platonic Philosophie 4. The Designe of this Discourse to render Philosophie subservient to Christian Theologie 6. A Proemial Scheme of Reformed Philosophie Philosophie Considered 1. Generally 1 in its Historie 2 In its generic Nature Cognition Which includes nine Intellectile Habits 3 In its Ends Adjuncts Differences Right Vse Abuse Parts and Characters c. 1. 2. Particularly 1. As Notional or Logic. Wherein consider 1 Its End the Refinement of the Intellect 3. 2 Its Parts touching 1 Simple Ideas or Notions both Objective and Subjective and these both first and second 4 5. 2 Propositions and Judgements 6. 3 Syllogisme and Discourse its Mater and Forme Figures and Modes 8 9. 4 Method which regardes the former three Parts 12. 2. Real Philosophie 13. 1 Natural Physiclogic and Mathematic Ib. 2 Moral Ethic or Private Oeconomic and Politic. Ib. 3 Metaphysic or Prime 14. BOOK I. Of Moral Philosophie CHAP I. Of Prudence the last End and chiefest Good Use Fruition and Delectation MOral Philosophie its Genus Prudence 2 Prudence its Nature and Object Ib Its Offices and Parts 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3. 4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 4. The Subject of Prudence Conscience 5. The Law of Conscience Ib. Synteresis and Syneidfies what 6. The Rule of Purdence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 7. 1 Subjective right Reason Ib. 2 Objective right Reason 8. The Last End its influence in Morals 9 The last End as extensive as the First Principe and but one 10. The last End desired infinitely 11. God the Last End of al. 12. Assimilation to the Divine Bonitie the Last End of Man 13 To adhere to God as our Last End speakes Perfection 14. The Chiefest Good its Proprietles Ib. 1 It 's the Idea of al Good 15. 2 It 's the Preme Beautle Ib. The Nature of Beaurie Explicated 16. The Soverain Beautie of God 17. 3 The chiefest good most proper 18. Vse and its Regulation Ib. What Temperance is 19. The Vtilitie of things in reference to their Last End 20. Concupiscence the Fruition of created good for itself 22. Intention of God as the Last End how it must be ever actual 23. Fruition its Difference from Vse 25. Al Fruition importes 1 Love 26. 2 Vnion and Possession 28. 3 Communion with the best Good 29. By Contemplation and Love 30. 4 Delectation and Joy 31. Which requires 1 a sweet Good 32. 2 Possession thereof 33. 3 Action thereon 34. Adjuncts of Delectation 1 Realitie 35. 2 Connaturalitie and Agreament 36. 3 Vniformitie and Harmonie 37. 4 Puritie 5 Force 39. 6 Infinitude without excesse 40. The Effects of Delectation 1 Amplitude Ib. 2 Quietation and Satisfaction 41. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie THE Moralitie of human Acts. 42. Moral Bonitie in Conformitie to the Divine Law 46. The measure of Moral Good Perfect 48. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Ib. Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good 50. No human Law a perfect Rule Ib. The Divine Law the rule of Moral Good 51. Right Reason Objective Light 52. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule 54. The Parts and Causes of Moral Good 55. The Mater of Moral Good 56. Things Indifferent in Genere and Specie 57. No Action Indifferent in Individuo 58. A Virtuose Wil the Effective Principe of Moral Good 60. The best End Essential to Moral Good 62. The Forme of Moral Good in Conformitie to the Moral Law 63. How the Forme of Good Consistes in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wel-doing Ib. How far Circumstances Moralise 64. The Vnitie and Vniformitie of Good 68. Al Good and Virtue Supernatural 69. The Difficultie of Moral Good 70. The Virtues of Pagans only lesser Sins 71. The Distribution of Virtue into Pietie and Justice 72. CHAP. III. Of Virtue and Moral Libertie MOral Virtue an Habitual Perfection 74. Moral Libertie as to State in Virtuose Habits 76. Virtue gives 1 Dominion 78. 2 Life Health Vigor and Force 79. 3 Amplitude and Enlargement 80. 4 Nobilitie and Dignitie 82. 5 Beautie and Glorie 84. Moral Libertie as to Exercice 85. 1 Contemplation of God 86. 2 Adherence to the chiefest Good 87. 3 Dependence on the first Cause 90. 4 Conformitie 1 To Gods Precept 93. 2 To his Providential Wil. 95. 5 The reference of althings unto God as the Last End 96. Moral Libertle of Exercice the highest demonstrated 1 From its Order 98. 2 From its Spontaneitie and Suavitie 99. 3 From its Vitalitie 101. 4 From its Amplitude 103. 5 From its Purgation of Sin Ib. 6 From its Stabilitie 104. 7 From its Improving Virtue 105. 8 From its Formal Beatitude 106. CHAP. IV. Of Sin and Moral Servitude SIN a Transgression of the Law 108. Sin as to its formal Reason Privative 110. The Causes of Sin 1 Mans Defectibilitie 111. 2 The Vitiositie of human nature 112. The Nature and Influence of Original Sin 114. 3 Practic Error 115. 4 Self-love 119. Sins of Ignorance Passion Wilful 121. The Moral Servitude of Sin 122. 1 Sin repugnant to human Nature 123. 1 As a Falling from God Ib. 2 As it strips of the Image of God 124. 3 As Enmitie against God 125. 4 As it divestes men of Humanitie 126. 2 Sins repugnant each to other 127. 3 Sin most Impotent 128. 4 Sin the defilement of the Soul 129. 5 Sin ful of Shame and Reproche 130. 6 Sin the Tyrannie of the Soul 132. 7 Sin ful of Penurie and Want 133. 8 Sin the Fetters of the Soul 134. 9 Sin Folie and Madnesse 135. 10 Sin makes Men Bestes 136. The Adjuncts and Effects of this Servitude 137. The Servitude of Sin 1 Voluntary Ib. 2 Necessary the Degrees and Kinds of this sinful Necessitie 138. 3 Infinite as to Number and Magnitude 141. 4 Penal with the Nature of Punishment 142. 5 Sin in it self the greatest Punishment 144. 6 Other Punishments of Sin 145. 1 Sin breeds Fear and Shame Ib. 2 Sin ful of Instabilitie 146. 3 Sin ful of Anxietie and Torment Ib. 4 Eternal Punishment of Sin 147. Sinners Dead in Sin 148. 1 The Death of Sin not Metaphoric or Hyperbolic but Real 149. 2 No Seeds of Virtue or Spiritual Life in Corrupt Nature 150. 3 The Impotence of Corrupt Nature to what is Good Vniversal and Total 152. 4 Man cannot prepare himself for the Reception of Virtue 153. 5 No Freewil in Nature to Moral Good 155. CHAP. V. Of Plato's Politie its Essential Constitution and Administration POlitic Philosophie what 158. Politie its Forme in Order 159. The Object of Politie the Multitude or Communitie 161. God the Founder of al Polities 162. Man's
Inclination to Sociatle Ib. Consociation constitutes a Politic Bodie or Societie 163 Al Consociation by some Law 164 Perfect Politie requires Amitie and Fraternitie 165. Religion the Principal Ligament of Politic Societie 166. The Ends of Politie 1 Gods Glorie 169 2 To render men Virtuose 170. 3 The Good of the whole 171. 4 Mutual Assistences 172. A Politic Bodie or Citie what Ib. Legislation its Origine 176. The Necessitie of Laws 177. Al Laws Originally from God 178. The Qualification of human Legislators 179. Al Laws from the Multitude Ib. Al Laws for public Good 181. Virtue a principal End of Laws 182. The Qualities of good Laws 183. The Law of Equitie its use 184. Conservators of Laws 185. A Law its Equitie and Constitution 186. Three kinds of Politic Administration Monarchie Aristocratie Democratie 187. Monarchie mixed with Democratie 190. Mixed Politie its use Ib. Moderate Empire best 191. Tyrannie Empire its Origine c. 192. The Evils of Tyrannie 193. Civil Magistrates 1. Their End 194. 2. Their Qualifications 1 Wisdome both Natural and Acquired 195. Knowlege of human Laws and Factes 196. Knowlege of Divine Laws 197. 2 Virtue both Natural and Moral 198. 3 A Public Spirit free from Self-interest Ib. A Magistrates Diet and Richesses 199. 4 His Education and Examen Ib. Scriptural Qualifications 200. A Magistrates Facultie and Authoritie Ib. 1 Divine 2 Human. 201. Magistrates Conservators of Laws 202. The Magistrates Exerclce of his Office 1 With Justice without Briberie 204. 2 With Temperance 205. 3 Moderation 4 Clemence 5 Fidelitie 206. The Effects of Polities Good and Bad 207. Things destructive to Republies 1 Atheisme Ib. 2 Lururie and Idlenesse 208. 3 Prosperitie and Povertie Ib. 4 Divisions 5 Injustice 209. BOOK II. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie c. CHAP. I. Of Metaphysic in General ARistotle's Metaphysics 210. Metaphysic Sapience what 211. Metaphysic a Natural Sapience 212. Contemplation its proper Act. 213. Contemplation of God best 214. CHAP. II. Of Atheisme and the Existence of a Deitie THe Origine of Atheisme 215. Atheisme 1 From Polytheisme 216. 2 From Vain Philosophie and Policie 217. 3 From Mans Carnal Mind and Pride 218. Three sorts of Atheisme 220. The Monstrose Nature and Pestiferous Influences of Atheisme 221. The Punishment of Atheisme 222. The Existence of God demonstrated 1 From Vniversal consent 223. 2 From the Subordination of second Causes to a First 224. The World made by a Prime Cause 225. 3 From a Prime Motor 228. 4 From the Order of the Vniverse 230. 5 From the Connate Idea of God in the Soul 231. 6 From Practic Arguments 232. 1 From Conscience its Notions and Exercices 233. 2 From the sense of Religion 234. 3 From the Politic World 235. 4 From the Atheistes Cavils and Enmitie 236. CHAP. III. Of God his Names Nature Attributes Unitie and Simplicitie GODs Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being 237. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah 239. Jehovah the proper Name of God 240. The explication of Jehovah and Jah 241. Ehjeh Elohim El Shaddai Adonai 242. Elion Zebaoth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 243. The Divine Essence and Attributes Ib. God not Capable of a Definition 244. Gods Essence Absolute and Independent 245. 1. The Divine Unitie demonstrated 249. 2. The Simplicitie of God Explicated 251. The Simplicitie of God demonstrated 254. CHAP. IV. Of Gods Immutabilitie Infinitude Eternitie Immensitie and Incomprehensibilitie 3. THe Immutabilitie of God 257. God Immutable 1 In his Essence 259. 2 In his Immanent Acts. 260. 3 In regard of his Word 263. Gods Immutabilitie demonstrated Ib. 4. Gods Infinitude demonstrated 266. 1 By his Independence 267. 2 From his Vnitie and Simplicitie 268. 3 From his Transcendence 269. 4 From the Idea of Perfection 271. 5 From the infinite Bonitie and Beatitude of God 273. 6 From Gods Infinite Power 274. 5. Gods Eternitie explicated 1 By Scripture 275. 2 By Plato's Philosophemes 276. The Eternitie of God demonstrated 277. What Eternitie is 279. 1 Eternitie not mesurable by time Ib. 2 Eternitie without beginning or end 281. 3 Eternitie most Simple and Vniforme 282. 4 How Eternitie coexistes to the parts of Time 283. 5 Eternitie a fixed Instant 284. 6 Eternitie the same with the Divine Essence 286. 6. Gods Immensitie and Omnipresence 288. The Explication and Demonstration thereof 1 From the Infinitude of the Divine Essence 290. 2 From Gods Simplicitie Ib. 3 From his Infinite Power and Operations 291. 7. Gods Incomprehensibilitie 292. It s Demonstration by 6 Arguments 294. How far we may apprehend God 296. Against Poetic figments of God Ib. Against Curiositie in our Inquiries after God 297. The least Notices of God of great moment 299. Al Notices of God by Divine Revelation Ib. The Grades or Ascents of Knowing God 1 Natural 300. 1 By way of Causalite 301. 2 By way of Eminence 302. 3 By way of Rematiom 303. 2 Supernatural 1 By Christ Ib. 2 By the Scriptures c. 304. CHAP. V. Of Gods Life Knowlege Wil and Power THe Life of God 305. Life in its generie Notion 306. The Life of God 1 most Spirituose 307. 2 Most Actuose 308. 3 Most Self-moving 309. 4 Life it self 310. 5 Eternal Life 311. 6 The first cause of Life Ib. Gods Science and 〈◊〉 most Perfect 312. The Object of Gods knowlege 313. 1 The Divine Essence Ib. 2 Althings cognoscible 114. The Object of Gods Owniscience 1 Complexe Intelligibles 315. 2 Incomplexe Intelligibles 316. 3 The Human soul 317. God knows althings by his Essence 318. How the Divine Ideas represent althings 321. Gods Science 1 most Simple 322. 2 Intuitive not discursive 323. 3 Immutable and Necessary 325. 4 Most Certain 327. 5 Absolute and Independent Ib. 6 Eternal 329. 7 Infinitely perfect Essentially Intensively Extensively 330. Gods Simple Intelligence 331. Gods Science of Vision 332. God knows things future by his Wil. Ib. Against Scientia Media 334. The Wil of God 336. 1 The Object of the Divine Wil. 337. 2 The Divine Wil one pure Act. 338. 3 The Divine Wil Independent 339. God Independent Physically and Morally 340. 4 The Divine Wil Immutable 343. 5 Gods Wil Absolute not Conditionate 344. 6 Gods Wil Antecedent not Consequent 347. 7 The Divine Wil most perfect 348. 1 Intensively 2 Extensively 349. 3 Effectively 350. 8 The Divine Wil most Free 351. What Indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God 352. 9 Gods Wil Irresistible 353. Gods Wil distributed 1 Into Decretive or Preceptive 355. 2 Into Secret or Reveled 356. 3 Into Complacential Providential and Beneplacite 357. Gods Power Ib. Gods Power his Essence 358. Gods Ordinate Power the same with his Wil. 359. The Object of Gods Power every thing possible 360. What things are Impossible 361. Divine Power Omnipotence 363. CHAP. VI. Of Gods Justice Veracitie and Sanctitie Also of the Trinitie THe Justice of God 365. Gods Absolute Justice as to the afflicting the Innocent and acquitting the Nocent 367. How far Gods Punitive Justice
is necessary 368. Gods Ordinate Justice from his Wil. 370. Gods Ordinate Justice the same with his Veracitie 371. No Acception of Persons with God 372. The Difference between the Justice of God and that of Men. Ib. How far Gods Justice regardes the Qualities of its Object 373. Gods Veracitie and Fidelitie Ib. 1 In fulfilling Promisses 376. 2 In fulfilling Threats 377. Gods Veracitie Demonstrated 378. The Sanctitie of God 379. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinitie with their Abuse 382. CHAP. VII Of Gods Prime Causalitie Efficience and Concurse in general 1 GOD the first Cause of althings 387. 2. The Object of Divine Concurse 391. 1 God's Concurse not merely conservative of the Principe 392. Durandus's Objections against Gods Immediate Concurse to al Operations answered 394. Gods Concurse to the Substrate mater of Sin what 395. 2 Divine Concurse reacheth the human Wil and al its Acts. 396. 3 Gods Concurse Vniversally extensive as to al Objects 397. 4 Gods Concurse Principal 398. How Second Causes are al Instruments of the First 399. 3. Divine Concurse as to its Principe or Subject 401. 1 Gods Concurse not his Essence absolutely considered 402. 2 Gods Concurse procedes not from any executive Power in God 403. 3 The Divine Wil Omnipotent 404. 4 The Divine Wil of it self Operative and Influential on al second Causes and Effects 405. 4. The Adjuncts of Gods Concurse 406. It is 1 Immediate Ib. 1 God Concurs Immediately to every Act of the second Cause 408. 2 God Concurs Immediately to the second Cause it self 409. 3 The Act of the first and second Cause the same 410. 2 Independent and Absolute 412. 3 Previous and Antecedent 416. 4 Total not Partial 417. 5 Particular not general only 420. Objections against Gods Particular Concurse answered 421. 6 Most potent and efficacious 422. Gods Moral and Physic Concurse 426. Gods Efficacious Concurse Demonstrated 427. 7 Congenial and Connatural 428. The Suavitie and Efficace of Divine Grace 429. CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in General GODs Creation demonstrated and explicated 431. Creation the Production of something out of nothing 432. Active Creation the Act of the Divine Wil. 433. Passive Creation a mode of the thing Created 435. The Providence of God demonstrated 436. The Wisdome of Divine Providence 439. The Eternal Law of Providence 441. The Wisdome of Providence Active 442. Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. 443. The Spirit the Immediate Efficient of Providence 445. Platonic notions of the Mundane Spirit 447. Providential means used by the Spirit 449. No second Cause can act but in Subordination to God and by his Providence 450. Fire the Create Vniversal Spirit 452. The Object of Divine Providence Vniversal 453. The particular Objects of Providence 454. The Adjuncts of Providence It is 1 Efficacious 455. 2 Immobile and fixed 456. 3 Connatural and Agreable 457. 4 Beautiful and Perfect Ib. 5 Mysterious 459. The distributions of Providence 460. Of Miracles Ib. Providential Conservation proper to God 461. Gods Conservative Influxe Immediate 463. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. 464. Gods Conservation by Means 465. Gods Extraordinary Provision for some 466. Conservation continued Creation 467. The Object of Divine Conservation 468. CHAP. IX Of Divine Gubernation in general and as to Sin DIvine Gubernation 469. God the supreme Gubernator 470. Divine Glorie the last end of Divine Gubernation 471. The order of Divine Gubernation fixed 472. None can avoid Divine order and Gubernation 474. The order of Gods Gubernation a Law Ib. Gods Gubernation by second Causes 475. Gods Gubernation reaches althings 476. Divine Gubernation as to Man 1 Moral by Law 2 Efficacious 477. Wicked Men fal under Gods Gubernation 478. Gods Gubernation about Sin Ib. The Causes and parts of Sin 479. God not the Author of Sin 480. God the Prine Cause of the Entitative Act of Sin 482. Gods Concurse to the Entitative Act of Sin Demonstrated 483. How Sin fals under the Divine Wil. 485. Gods Wil about the Obliquitie of Sin Permissive Ib. Gods Permissive Wil about Sin Efficacious 486. Gods Gubernation of Sin Ordinative 487. Judicial Gubernation of Sin 488. Gods Attributes Illustrious in the Gubernation of Sin 489. CHAP. X. Of Divine Gubernation about Virtue Virtuose Men and Angels SVpernatural Illumination from God 490. The Infusion of Virtues 493. Gods care of Virtuose Men. 496. Gods Gubernation of the Angelic World 498. The Angelic Law Obedience and Disobedience 500. Good Angels Ministerie as to God Ib. Good Angels Converse with Saints 501. Angels employed 1 at the giving of the Law 502. At Christs Birth and for the propagation of the Gospel Ib. 2 For the Conservation and Protection of the Saints Ib. 3 For Information Counsel Conduct and Consolation 503. 4 Angels Communion with Saints 504. 5 The final service of Angels 505. Gods Gubernation as to evil Angels Ib. Satans the Prince of this World 507. Satans Power to Temte 508. CHAP. XI Of Creatural Dependence both Natural and Supernatural CReatural Dependence what 509. Every Being Dependent or Independent 510. One Prime Independent Being 511. Dependent Being by Participation 512. The Origine of Dependence 515. 1 Passive Power Ib. 2 The Dominion of God 516. Every Creature Dependent Ib. Dependence the same with the Essence 517. Dependence Importes 1 Subordination 519. 2 Posterioritie Ib. 3 Inferioritie 520. Creatural Dependence 1 As to Futurition Ib. 2 As to Essence and Conservation 521. 3 As to Operation 522. 4 The Dependence of the human Wil in al its Acts. 523. Dependence Natural Moral and Supernatural 524. Supernatural Dependence on Christ Ib. 1 For Habitual Grace 526. 2 For Actual Grace 527. Table of Hebraic Notions Explicated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Adonai my Lord 242 339 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ehjeh I shal be 242 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Light and Fire 452 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Then Eternitie 275 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 El the potent God 242 358 430 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eloah and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Elohim 242 358 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If a formule of swearing 374 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Amen ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truth Fidelitie 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 desperately sick 128 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince or Principatie 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Belial lawlesse 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a son devoted 122 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to create 419 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gillulehim filthy Idols 129 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to adhere 88 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a word or thing 363 428 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dath Order Law 187 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad sinners 136 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hallelujah 241 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 separate 496 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 glued 135 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force or power 429 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to see 35 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aberration 109 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Abilitie force 200 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 notes Gods soverain Wil 340 345 〈◊〉
Defin. pag. 412. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sagacitie is a natural generositie of mind whereby a person is enabled happily to conjecture what ought to be done Again 't is stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an acumen of judgment This natural Sagacitie Plato Repub. 2. pag. 376. makes very essential to a Magistrate in order to his more exact judging of persons and things and final decision of Controversies Solomon we know was endowed with this natural Sagacitie even to admiration which discovered it self in the decision of that arduous case between the two Harlots 1 Kings 3.23 24 c. as also in resolving the Queen of Sheba's questions 2 Chron. 9.1 which kind of Sagacitie Politicians cal King-Craft This natural Sagacitie is elsewhere stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a facilitie of judgement which in the Platon Defin. pag. 414. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A good judgement tenacious of what is determined by reason Again this natural Sagacitie passeth sometimes under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is defined Platon Defin. pag. 412. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 An habit elective of what is best One great office of this natural Sagacitie consistes in the knowlege of men their several Humors Inclinations Designes Interests 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Experience and Combinations c. 4 Another part of moral Prudence is Experience which Plato cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and makes very essential to a true Philosopher So Plato Repub. 9. pag. 582. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The experienced person endowed with prudence is the only true Philosopher Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thence in the same Repub. 9. he joyns Prudence and Experience together with Reason which he makes the best Judges of human Affairs 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We rightly judge by Experience joyned with Prudence and Reason And Plato in his Gorgias gives us the reason why Experience is so essential to Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Experience makes our life to passe away according to Rules of Art whereas inexperience makes us live casually Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There are many Arts experimentally found out among men from several Experiments c. And because experimental Prudence is gained by sense and sensible observation thence Plato Timaeus pag. 103. defineth it a subtiltie of sense or good sensation of the Soul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence is a good sensation of Soul Expetience is indeed the main Seminarie of human Prudence 1 In that it furnisheth us with the choisest observations of past and present times whereby we are capacitated to make some prudent conjecture of what is likely to succede 2 Experience draws down general Rules and Precepts of Wisdome to particular and proper use 3 Experience gives men a more inward feeling and lively apprehension of themselves and others Thence Plato makes this self-knowlege the highest piece of Prudence which he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good sensation 4 Experience does much greaten and adde to the quantitie of our knowlege by furnishing the mind with fresh observations whence Plato brings in Solon speaking thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The longer I live the more I know and teach 5 Experience addes not only to the quantitie but also to the qualitie of our knowlege by rendring it more clear and distinct For experience reduceth particular observations in themselves confused unto a regular Series and Order whence general Rules are framed which makes our knowlege more distinct and certain 6 Experience greatly fixeth and confirmeth our Notions of things 2. Having finished the Generic Notion of moral Philosophie 2. The Subject of Moral Prudence the Soul and particularly the Conscience which is moral Prudence we now procede to the Subject thereof expressed in the Platonic Definition by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Soul for indeed moral Prudence moveth and influenceth the whole Soul and therefore it is not unjustly seated therein though the proper seat thereof be the practic Judgment which Divines terme Conscience which is a petty God or God's Vice-gerent and Vicar in the Soul to command or threaten to accuse or excuse to justifie or condemne This Vicarious Divine office of Conscience Plato seems to have had some Traditional Notices of whence he termes Conscience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fame and makes it to be a kind of Demon or petty God in men So de Leg. 8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This Law of Fame partakes of a marvellous facultie seing no one durst to breathe otherwise than according to the Dictates of her Law Serranus here acquaints us Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Conscience's Law That Plato cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Law of Fame that Imperial power of Conscience wel known to al which comprehends those commun Principes That God is to be feared c. This Law of Conscience he saies is unwritten yet notwithstanding there is in al mens minds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Sacred Law whose force and efficace tames every Soul and compels it by fear to obey positive Laws From the authoritie of this Law it is as the Philosopher teacheth that men come to understand the difference of good and evil Again Serranus addes Our Philosopher cals this Divine Law of Conscience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Fame and saies that it is connate in al men it being a Science that teacheth the difference of good and evil and the Conservator and Vindictor of al Laws and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Precursor of that most excellent Chorus of Virtues whose admirable faculties and actions flow from no other Fountain than the sparks of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. This Law or Light of Conscience is twofold 1 Habitual which is called in the Scholes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Synteresis 2 Actual which is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Syneidesis 1 The Synteresis 1. Synteresis the Habit of Principes or habitual Light of Conscience is defined in the Scholes a natural habit of active Principes For as speculative Reason discourseth of Speculatives so practic Reason of Practics as therefore there are naturally implanted in us certain speculative Principes which appertein to Intelligence so also are there certain active Principes which belong to that natural habit of Conscience called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Synteresis as Aquinas Part. 1. Q. 79. And this habitual Light or Law of Conscience is the same with Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law of Fame which is elsewhere by him termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. The Syneidesis self-reflexion Right Reason as anon 2 The actual Light or Law of Conscience called by the Ancients 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is Conscience strictly taken So Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 79. Art 13. Conscience taken properly is not a power but an Act whereby we apply our Science to what we undertake which application is followed by Testification or Ligation or Excusation and Accusation By
thing if splendor and beautie give not life and efficace to it as we see in lively colors So in man his beautie is not accomplisht without a good grace and lustre which is the life of beautie Thus in the soverain Beautie of God the Splendor and Brightnesse of his Perfections renders him most beautiful Whence Beautie and Glorie both in profane and sacred Philosophie have one and the same Idea for what is beautie but the effulgence or shine of al perfections in any object And if this fulgor or splendor be illustrious and most bright it 's termed Glorie So the beautie of the Sun what is it but the gloriose effulgence or brightnesse of its light Whence it being a grand Question among the Ancients What in Nature was most beautiful it was answered Light Hence beautie is defined by the Orator A due congruence with a certain suavitie of color This suavitie of color is nothing else but the light or splendor of that perfection or goodnesse which is in the subject Whence Aquinas defines Beautie A certain bland face of Bonitie or Goodnesse And do not al these notions of beautie greatly illustrate the surpassing heart-ravishing Beautie of God the chiefest Good What more gloriose resplendent and effulgent than the chiefest Good Where may we expect more gloriose light and beautie than with the Fountain of Light in whose light alone we behold light Has not the chiefest Good the most sweet color and bland face of goodnesse Yea Plato Repub. lib. 6. pag. 509. discriminating 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 those things which are good by participation only from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the chiefest Good he addes That this has 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a certain infinite immense Beautie So Conviv pag. 211. he assures us That althings else are beautiful 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. by participation and in some certain mode only but the first Beautie is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. most sincere pure immixed not contaminated with human colors or other trifles And then he breaks forth into this rapture of Admiration O what a blessed sight would it be to contemplate this divine sincere incontaminate simple uniforme Beautie Yea he positively affirmes That God who is the chiefest Good has 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most illustrious and amiable Beautie Thus the spurious Dionysius de Nom. Divin cap. 4. saith That God as the soverain Beautie is the Author of the soverain Convenance beautiful Grace and lustre which is in althings making the distributions and departments of his rayes by which althings are made beautifully to shine forth God intending to render althings beautiful and good hath reduced their multitude and distinction to a perfect unitie i. e. to subserve the enjoyment of himself as the first Beautie 3. Plato makes the chiefest Good to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The chiefest Good most proper c. most proper So Repub. 9. pag. 586. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is best for every one that is most proper Thus Conviv pag. 205. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The chiefest Good is most proper to every one and yet commun to al Proprietie with Communitie is proper only to the chiefest Good There are several other proprieties of the chiefest Good mentioned by Plato namely that it is the most pleasant solid substantial vital uniforme agreable infinite eternal necessary divine Good which by his own concession are applicable to none but God Of which hereafter more in Aristotle's Philosophie B. 4. c. 1. § 22. § 4. Next to the last End Of Vse and its Regulation and chiefest Good follows Vse and Fruition the former belonging to the Means the later to End Vse properly consistes in the subordination and reference of althings to our last end which alone is the object of Fruition The whole life of man is distributed into Vse and Fruition Vse is a tendence or referring thing to our end This by Plato is oft expressed under the notion of Temperance which he makes to be the moderate use and reference of althings to our last end So in his Gorgias pag. 507. he begins thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The temperate Soul is good Thence he collects That the intemperate Soul is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mad and dissolute Whence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The temperate man wil do that which has a decorum both towards God and men And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For it is not the part of a temperate man to prosecute or flie from what he ought not but to flie from and prosecute both things persons and pleasures as need requires as also patiently to tolerate the same Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. This seems to me to be the primarie and chief end of a regular life that Justice and Temperance be always present In which we have these observables 1 That the temperate Soul is the best and the intemperate the worst 2 That Temperance formally consistes in giving al persons and things their just decorum and measure 3 That we then give althings their just measure when we prosecute or flie from them in that manner and measure as we ought 4 That we then prosecute and flie from things as we ought when we use or use them not in subservience to our last end which is the measure of althings This is wel expressed by Aristotle who followed Plato herein Eth. l. 3. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore in a temperate man the concupiscent part ought to conforme to reason for moral good is the end of both Thence a temperate man desires what he ought and in that manner as he ought and when he ought which is the Constitution Law and Order of Reason Whereby he fully confirmes Plato's sentiment that Temperance gives althings their just number weight and measure by reducing al to such an Order as may render them subordinate to the last end The Stoic expresseth this Temperance in the use of things by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sustain what is grievous and abstain from what is delicious Which is thus expounded The temperate man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sustains without grief the absence of pleasures and abstains from the fruition of them when present This some make to be a great degree of fortitude for the valiant man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bears things terrible and forbears things audacious The sum of al is that the temperate man is not inordinately afflicted for the losse or excessively affected with the presence of any inferior good but useth althings in measure and subservience to his last end This Temperance in the use of things Plato also illustrates by the notions of Order and universal Justice So Gorg. pag. 506. The virtate of every thing is its order 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That therefore which is constituted and conformed by order is the virtue of every thing Wherefore the Soul that keeps its order is better than
attends the fruition of the sweetest Good brings with it infinite Quietation and Satisfaction Satisfaction These spiritual pleasures do not only amplifie and widen the Soul but also bring satisfaction Carnal joys breed a vexatious enlargement of the desires but never sil them with satisfaction they may slater and tickle the senses but never quiet the appetite the best they leave behind them is repentance This is wel explicated by Digby of the Soul pag. 460. The violence of fruition in those foul puddles of flesh and bloud presently glutteth with satietie and is attended with annoy and dislike and the often using and repeting it weareth away that edge of pleasure which only maketh it sweet and valuable even to them that set their hearts upon it and nothing heighteneth it but an irritation by a convenient hunger and abstinence Contrary in the Soul the greater and more violent the pleasure is the more intense and vehement the fruition is and the oftener it is repeted so much the greater appetite and desire we have to returne unto the same Spiritual Delectation in the fruition of our last end doth not only widen but fil the Soul and crown its desires with satisfaction Delectation is the quiet of the Appetite in the fruition of its end where there is no rest there can be no perfect delight or satisfaction and where there is want there can be no rest every want wrings the Soul and keeps it in a restlesse condition So that Quiet and Satisfaction is appropriated to the fruition of the last end and sweetest good Thence Plato Conviv pag. 211. assures us That the contemplation of the first sincere most perfect Beautie is formal Beatitude that which brings with it perfect Delectation and Satisfaction for they who arrive hereto are content to live alone in conversation with this first Beautie c. Of which see Philos General Part. 1. lib. 3. cap. 3. sect 1. § 2. CHAP. II. Of the Moralitie of human Acts and Moral Bonitie The Moralitie of human Acts. Moral Goodnesse in Conformitie to the Divine Law The measure of moral Goodnesse perfect The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Subjective right Reason not the measure of Moral Good but the Moral Law Right Reason among the Philosophers the objective Law of Nature The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule The Parts and Causes of moral Bonitie 1 The Mater Things indifferent in genere specie Nothing indifferent in individuo A virtuose Wil the Principe of Moral Good The best End essential to Moral Good The forme of moral Good Conformitie to Gods Law How 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 gives Forme How far Circumstances formalise Moral Good The Vnitie and Vniformitie of al Moral Good There is no real moral or natural Good but what is supernatural Moral Good most difficult The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only The distribution of Moral Good into Pietie and Justice § 1. HAving dispatcht the generic Idea and last End The Moralitie of human Acts. which has the place of a first Principe in Ethics we now passe on to the Moralitie of Human Acts and their Bonitie And here we should first treat of the natural interne Principes of human Acts namely the practic Judgement or Knowlege Volition Consultation and Election But having discussed these more largely in Court of the Gentiles P. 1. B. 4. c. 1. § 24. we shal not here undertake the discussion of them As for the Moralitie of human Acts there are great disputes in the Scholes Wherein the Esse morale of human Acts doth consiste Suarez in 1.2 which vulgarly they stile his Ethics Tract 3. Disp 1. pag. 207. discourseth largely of the Moralitie of human Acts under these heads 1 He makes the formal denomination or that forme whereby an Act is denominated moral to be more than an Ens rationis properly so termed or a figment of mens minds something in or appendent to the things themselves This we grant 2 He thence deduceth That the Esse morale in the act of the Wil besides its Entitie and substance addes a certain mode of emanation or moral dependence on the Reason adverting and the Wil freely working This Hypothesis needs animadversion and restriction It 's true the Moralitie of human Acts hath dependence on the Reason and Wil as the subject of those Acts for al moral Acts depend on the physic Principes of those Acts there is no moral Being but has its foundation in some physic or natural Being As al moral capacitie is subjected in natural so al moral Acts. Virtue flowing from God has its seat in the Creature and so supposeth a create intelligent Nature as antecedent thereto Thus Cyril Alexandr Compend Dialog de S. Trinit Tom. 5. part 1. pag. 673. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is holy by participation being the receptacle of adventitious Sanctitie that of it self existes primarily in proper nature namely as Man and Angel or any other rational Creature So Damascene Dialect cap. 59. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is first by nature which is inferred but infers not i.e. secundùm existendi consequentiam if there be Grace there must be human Nature wherein it is seated but if there be human Nature it doth not necessarily follow that there must be Grace Thus the human Understanding and Wil precede Virtue as the subject thereof Yet hence it follows not as Suarez seems to conclude that moral Acts receive their formal denomination from their relation to the Understanding and Wil. 3 Hence Suarez concludes that the Esse morale is a mode not physically and intrinsecally inherent in the moral act but in the externe act it speaks denomination from the free act of the Wil and in the very act of the Wil besides its physic emanation from the Wil it speaks denomination from the reason directing and the Wil acting with a plenarie power Though as it has been granted al Moralitie of human Acts doth presuppose the emanation of those acts from the Understanding and Wil as their main Principles yet it follows not hence that the formal reason of their Moralitie must be taken from this mode of emanation May we not as wel argue that al virtuose acts are formalised by their relation to the natural Principes of human acts because they flow thence But there lies a mysterie in this Jesuitic Hypothesis which when laid open wil soon evidence its vanitie and falshood The Jesuites and some other Schole-men in imitation yet on mistaken grounds of the ancient Philosophers place the formal reason of al moral Virtue in conformitie to right Reason Hence no wonder if they make al Moralitie formally considered to be a mode dependent on Reason and Wil. But the falsitie hereof wil appear by what follows If we consider the Moralitie of human Acts as stated by Plato it cannot be denied but that he also makes mention of an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a right Reason which he seems to make the measure of al Moralitie
Bonitie and Vice But what a vast distance there is between Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason and that maintained by the Jesuites and some other Schole-men we shal when we come to discourse of moral Bonitie sufficiently evince For the present we shal endeavor to determine the true nature of Moralitie so much darkened by scholastic niceties in the following Propositions 1 Prop. Al Moralitie of human Acts speaks some fundamental subjective dependence on the natural Principes of human Acts. For there is nothing in Moralitie but has some relation to yea dependence on human Nature as its subject and fundament Moralitie is but a mode or relation which cannot subsist of it self without a subject and foundation in Nature Can a man know and love God without reason and wil 2 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is not formalised or specified in genere moris by the relation such Acts have to Reason or Wil. For every thing is specified and formalised by its formal reason and what is the formal reason of any thing but the Idea of its Essence And wherein consistes the essence of moral Acts but in their conformitie to if good or difformitie from if bad the perfect measure of Morals and what is the perfect measure of Morals but the moral Law 3 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts is a real mode not absolute but relative appendent to those Acts. That Moralitie is not a mere figment of Reason but something real is generally confessed and that on invincible grounds because it has real influences and effects Moreover that Moralitie is not an absolute mode but relative is as evident because the whole of its essence speaks a relation to somewhat else Hence 4 Prop. The Moralitie of human Acts speaks some relation to the last end For the last end in Morals hath the force of a first Principe Forme and Measure It 's a great Effate in the Scholes That the End specifies in Morals Althings are defined and measured by their last End but this by nothing The last end as a pregnant universal Principe conteins al Morals in its wombe 5 Prop. The object mater doth also in some degree concur to the formalising of moral Acts. Thence saith Aquinas A moral Act receives its species from the object and end And Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 165. addes That an Act is moral from the order it has to its object not considered in its being but morally as subject to the Rules of Moralitie To this of the object we may adde al essential moral circumstances which oft adde much to the being and intension of Moralitie 6 Prop. But yet we must conclude That the adequate exemplar and perfect measure of al Moralitie formally considered is the Law of God This comprehends and gives measure to al other Rules of Moralitie the last end object and circumstances are al measured hereby Thus Scotus and other of the Schole-men determine That the Esse morale or Moralitie of an Act as such is its relation to that Law unto which it is referred And the reason is most evident because al Moralitie speaks a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation to some Rule And what adequate perfect Rule is there of moral Acts but some moral Law And thus we must understand the ancient Philosophers as also some late Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or measure of moral Acts. That by right Reason we are to understand an objective Reason or a divine Law wil be most evident by what follows touching moral Bonitie and its measure § 2. Moral Goodnesse in conformitie to the Divine Law Having inquired into the Moralitie of human Acts in the general we descend to examine their moral Bonitie and Pravitie Every thing is so far good as it answers to its proper measure and rule but evil so far as it comes short thereof And what is the measure or rule of moral Bonitie but the divine Wil and Law Thus Plato Repub. 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That is most distant from reason which is most remote from Law and Order i. e. Things are so far conformed to reason and good as they are conformed to Law and Order Whence Definit Platon pag. 4.13 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which puts an end to controversies about what is unjust or just Thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is also defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an obedience of virtuose Laws And on the contrarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Injustice is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an habit that over looks Laws This Plato more fully explicates Gorg. 504. And truly that wherein the order of the bodie consistes may as it seems to me wel be termed Salubritie whence the bodies health ariseth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but those things wherein the order and ornament or goodnesse of the mind consistes we cal legal and Law whence men become legitime and orderly He compares the Bonitie of the Soul to the sanitie or health of the Bodie which as it consistes in the order and regular temperament of al humors so the goodnesse of the mind doth in like manner consist in its order or conformitie to Law This is wel explicated by his Scholar Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 9. art 9. pag. 44. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse truly is a virtue by which al have what is their own and as the Law establisheth But Injustice by which men possesse what is not their own against the precepts of the Law What he here determines of Justice and Injustice in particular holds true of al other Virtue and Bonitie or Vice But to bring Plato's Philosophemes to sacred Philosophie touching the conformitie of al moral Good to the divine Law we shal determine the whole in the following Propositions 1. Prop. Al moral Bonitie Moral Bonitie in conformitie to a Law whether objective or subjective and formal denotes a conformitie to some Law The Scholes distinguish moral Bonitie or Honestie into objective and formal The former is that which constitutes a thing morally good as an object but the later that which constitutes an act as an act morally good 1 In the objects of human Acts there is necessarily required a moral goodnesse which agrees thereto as objects as Suarez 1.2 Tract 3. Disp 2. strongly proves And the reasons are demonstrative For 1 If the object or mater be not morally good or lawful the act conversant thereabout can never be good because al moral good requires an integritie of causes an irregularitie in the object wil render the act irregular 2 The object of the Wil is good as good therefore that Bonitie which moves the Wil cannot slow from it but must be supposed as inherent in or appendent to its objects 3 This moral goodnesse of the object doth not only agree to human Acts but also to al other things which may be lawfully loved and embraced
4 This moral objective Bonitie ariseth from the mater as clothed with al its conditions and circumstances whereby it is rendred a meet object for the Soul to close with 5 The moral goodnesse of any object consistes in its conformitie to or agreament with the Divine Law 2 There is also formal Bonitie or Goodnesse which constitutes a man formally good For 1 An object though never so good cannot constitute a man or his act formally good It 's true the Act receives some goodnesse from its object yet only materially and terminatively not formally so as to constitute the Act formally good 2 The Act is so far formally good as virtuose i. e. proceding from right Principes tending to a right end and measured by a perfect Rule Al which presuppose some divine Law as the measure 2. The Measure of Moral Good perfect Prop. That Law which is the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect This Hypothesis is most evident and wil appear to be such if we consider either the nature of a measure or the condition of the thing measured 1 As for the nature of a measure Plato Repub. 6. wel explicates the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A defective measure of such things is no measure for that which is imperfect cannot be the measure of any thing Every Measure or Rule is indivisible and therefore capable neither of addition or substraction Thus Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Canon or Rule is an infallible measure admitting neither addition nor detraction And thus much indeed is formally included in the notion Canon for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Canna whence it is derived primarily denotes a reed of such a just longitude whereby they measured their Lands and thence it was used in the general for an exact measure as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Job 38 5. is rendred by Aquila 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 Phil. 3.16 Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2 Cor. 10.13 is explicated by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 such is its use Gal. 6.16 Phil. 3.16 whereby the perfection of the Divine Law is illustrated 2 That the measure of moral Bonitie must be perfect is easily demonstrated from the condition of moral Bonitie for a plenitude of being or integritie of Bonitie is essential to al moral good Moral evil ariseth from the least defect but moral good requireth an integritie of causes and parts If there be the least circumstance misplaced or mistimed it renders the act vitiose Now if al moral good must be thus perfect and entire then it necessarily follows that its measure and rule must be perfect and entire But of this more in what follows 3. The Vniversalitie of a perfect Law Prop. The perfection of a Law as it is the measure of moral Bonitie consistes in its comprehension of the most perfect objective mater end and principes The explication and demonstration of this Proposition depends on the explication of moral good as to its constitutive parts and causes It was said before that al moral good requires an integritie of Being and Causes In the Scholes they make four Causes of moral Good proportionable to those in natural productions namely Mater Forme End Efficient We shal not at present think our selves obliged to examine or defend the legalitie of this distribution but endeavor to demonstrate that a perfect measure of moral Bonitie comprehends each of these Causes and Principes 1 It must comprehend the objectmater of al moral Bonitie in its fullest Amplitude Extension and Vniversalitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Truth and Equitie require that they who wil discourse of a divine Republic determine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that the Legislator has respect not to one only particle of virtue and that truly the least but rather to al virtue and that he find out Laws according to those several Species of Virtue i. e. The Law of moral Bonitie must extend it self to al the various Species and Offices of Virtue If there be any moral Dutie which the Law of Moralitie extends not to it is no perfect measure And this argues the imperfection of Natures light in us and al human Laws as hereafter 2 As for the Forme of moral Bonitie it consistes in conformitie to the Rule or Law of Moralitie which if perfect exacts the most perfect conformitie Thus Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. Our whole discourse tends to this to shew that this Legislator and al other who wil institute utile Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ought in framing Laws to aim at the highest Virtue i. e. at the highest conformitie to the best Law 3 That a perfect Law of Moralitie comprehends the most perfect End is also most evident because the end is as the Soul and Spirit in Morals al offices of virtue are but as a dead Corps without a spirituose perfect end as Jansenius demonstrates out of Augustine Thence Plato Repub. 5. pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good Institutes or Laws make way for Virtue but bad precipitate men into vice Now he elsewhere assures us That the end gives life and perfection to al virtuose Acts. Yea Leg. 1. he openly saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Laws are to be so constituted as that they may promote the best end 4 The Law of moral Bonitie must be perfect as to the Efficient or Principe of Moralitie i. e. it must extend it self to the qualification of the subject and its virtuose disposition for as the end directs the act so the principes or dispositions of the subject direct the end Arist Eth. lib. 3. c. 10. assures us That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the end of every act is according to the habit i. e. if the mind be not wel-disposed or clothed with virtuose habits it wil never aim at a virtuose end Thence that great Saying of Augustine The intention of the best end makes the worke good and Faith directs the intention So that the Law of Moralitie if perfect extends it self to al virtuose principes and moral habits which the subject ought to be invested with 3. Subjective right Reason not the measure of moral Good Prop. Subjective right Reason or objective human Laws are not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie There are two parts in this Proposition to be examined 1 That subjective right Reason is not a perfect Rule of moral Bonitie To explicate and demonstrate this Hypothesis we grant 1 That Reason is the Organ of apprehending albeit not the measure of our dutie 2 That practic Reason or Conscience so far as illuminated by the Spirit of God is the regula regulata of our dutie for Conscience is God's Deputie and a Law unto a mans self Yet we denie that there is an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or right Reason in nature corrupted which may suffice as a Rule of moral Goodnesse I am not ignorant how much the Light of Nature or as some terme it Right
Reason is cried up by some as the only Rule of Moralitie Thus Seneca would needs persuade us That we have this merit of Nature that virtue doth premit its light into the minds of al yea those that wil not follow yet see it And not only some vulgar capacities now a-days but also the Stoics of old generally cried up the Light within them as the Rule of Moralitie The Schole-men also in imitation of Aristotle their Oracle generally proclaim right Reason to be the formal Rule of moral Good But that Aristotle and Plato by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason understood the objective Law either of Nature or Moses I no way dout but hereafter to demonstrate Indeed al our subjective Light by Nature is no other than a nocturne dreaming tenebrous knowlege as Plato stiles it 2 That no human Law or Laws is the perfect measure of moral Bonitie No human Laws a perfect Rule of moral Good is also evident because al human Laws are extreme defective in their extension and prescripts as to al the Causes and Principes of moral Goodnesse how deficient are they both as to the Mater and Manner of moral Good What Restrictions Emendations and Alterations do they need What an infinite number of particular cases are there which no human Law can reach Wel therefore doth Androcles in Aristotle Reth l. 2. c. 25. informe us That al human Laws need another Law to correct them as fishes need salt to preserve them from putrefaction This corrective Law they terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Equitie which indeed is no other than the Law of Nature as hereafter cap. 5. § 5. 4. The Divine Law the Rule of moral Good Prop. The adequate perfect rule and measure of moral Bonitie is the Divine Law This Hypothesis being the main wil require more ample explication and demonstration 1 The Divine Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first essentially just and holy Being and therefore the first essential rule or measure of al Justice and Sanctitie 2 But the Divine Essence being too remote and distant from the Creature he hath therefore given us a divine Law as the Miroir and Idea of his essential Sanctitie to be the rule of al moral Bonitie as to us 3 This Divine Law given us as the Rule of moral Bonitie was concreate and connatural as to Adam it being impressed and engraven on his nature and so needed not any further promulgation 4 Hence the objective and subjective Law or Light of Nature was to Adam in his innocent state one and the same he having a perfect understanding and comprehension of the whole Dutie of man and so became a Law unto himself 5 But lapsed man having lost his subjective Law and Light of Nature as to supernaturals and very far as to naturals and civils retaining only some fragments or broken notices our most benigne Lord out of his great clemence and pitie to lapsed man gave a new Edition of that natural Law and therein fresh notices of his soverain wil and pleasure touching mans dutie So that the World was never without an objective Law and Light of Nature albeit the subjective was lost in Adam Yea some Divines of great note conceive that those very commun natural Notions communly called the Fragments or Remains of the Image of God lost by Adam are vouchsafed to us by the Covenant of Grace in and by the Mediation of Christ Thus they interpret Joh. 1.9 of Christ's illightening every man Joh. 1.9 i. e. not only supernatural light vouchsafed to the Elect but even the natural notices or Light of Nature vouchsafed to the lapsed Sons of Adam is the effect of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation And the reason seems demonstrative because our very Beings and al the comforts of our Beings having been forfeited by the breach of the first Covenant whatever good we enjoy on this side Hel is but the overflowing of the Grace of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation by which the whole World stands So far are we from any real claim to a subjective Light of Nature by virtue of the first Covenant as that both subjective and objective Light is from Christ The objective Light or Law of Nature is stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and its Offices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the knowen Duties i.e. by nature to which they opposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine namely Institutes or positive Commands of God For Jus naturale the natural Law is not opposed to supernatural but to positive Laws as Grotius hath wel observed Right Reason the objective Law of Nature 6 This objective Law of Nature in its second Edition as conteined in divine Revelations of moral Bonitie was not altogether unknowen to the wiser of the Heathen and that Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason was but an Imitamen hereof we now undertake to demonstrate He discourseth hereof professedly in Minos pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is Right is the Royal Law 1 That by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he means the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to me unquestionable and I think it wil clearly appear so to others by what follows 2 He saith this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law which is the stile the Hebrews gave their moral Law as Jam. 2.8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jam. 2.8 And why doth he terme it the Royal Law but because it was the supreme Law of God the King of Kings Thence Socrates addes We therefore rightly granted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that this Law was the invention of Being it self or of the first independent Being For this generally he understands by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thence Defin. Plat. pag. 416. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an operation against right Reason i. e. the objective Law and Light of Nature Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 2. art 6. pag. 76. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And truly this to act according to right Reason is commun to al and let it be fixed as a Canon So again Eth. l. 3. c. 8. pag. 153. he saith Virtues are mediocrities freely undertaken 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so as right Reason shal prescribe This right Reason he elsewhere termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal commun Law which al by nature are subject to So Rhet. l. 1. c. 14. art 3. pag. 69. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I say Law is either proper or commun proper or private Law is that written Law which belongs to particular Nations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The commun Law I cal that which is according to nature for there is a certain commun Just and unjust which al consent unto albeit there should be no societie or confederation of men This commun Law of Nature is the same with his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For look as in speculative Sciences there are certain first
Principes which are the foundation of al demonstration so in Practics and Morals there is an objective Law or Light of Nature containing certain practic Principes which are the Rule of Conversation Thus also we are to understand the Stoics if we wil make a right use of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of which Diog. Laâ—rt in Zeno The Stoics say that to live according to nature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to do nothing that the commun Law prohibits which is right Reason diffusing it self throughout althings Where it deserves a remarque That they make the commun Law of Nature the same with right Reason Which cannot rightly be understood of subjective right Reason but of objective it may Again they say This right Reason diffuseth it self throughout althings Which cannot be understood of any subjective reason which is confined to individuals but must be applied to the commun objective Light and Law of Nature which is diffused throughout the whole Creation according to the various conditions of things Thus Hierocles in Pythagor Carm. pag. 106. saith That the vices of the mind are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aversions and Errata from right Reason And pag. 209. he addes This right Reason is the great Legislatrix and Judge of al human affairs c. And Stobaeus de Virt. Serm. 1. pag. 9. also informes us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is a Syntaxe or orderly contexture according to right Reason but Vice a Transgression against right Reason Where by right Reason we must necessarily understand the commun objective Light or Law of Nature not that darke subjective Light in the minds of blind Mankind Thus also we must understand Parker Amyraldus and other Divines who make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason the unic Criterion or Rule of moral Virtue Though I denie not but that the Stoics generally and perhaps Aristotle as many of his Followers among the Schole-men by right Reason understand the subjective Light of Nature in mens minds yet I am very apt to persuade my self that Socrates and Plato who seem to be the first Promulgators of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 meant thereby no other than the objective Light and Law of Nature whereof some more commun Precepts were conveighed down by the posteritie of Noah but those irradiant and bright notices thereof which shone among them they received by oriental Tradition from the sacred Books of Moses wherein Plato was not a little versed and which by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 royal Law he seems to allude unto 5. The Mosaic Law a perfect Rule Prop. That Divine Law which is the adequate perfect Rule and Measure of moral Bonitie is no where to be found but in the sacred Philosophie or Scriptures Here and here only is extant Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This sacred Rule whereof he had great notices he sometimes cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine Word Here also Aristotle's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Commun Law of Nature in its perfection is alone to be found Hence likewise it was that Pythagoras Lycurgus Solon Minos and Plato borrowed the principal heads of their best Laws as we have at large proved Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. The sum of the Law of Nature and al divine Precepts is conteined in the Decalogue or Moral Law delivered by Moses which is thence stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the matrices of the Law and its roots And indeed what are the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law but a Transumt Compend Abstract or rather extended Copie of the Law of Nature given to man in the beginning from that first original Exemplar the eternal Law Is not the formal reason of al Equitie prescribed and expressed in the moral Law Ought not this then to be the terme measure and scope of al Laws To clear which we are to remember that the Ten Commandments conteined in the moral Law must not be taken literally as ten Words but in a more ample extensive notion as Christian Pandects or commun heads of al moral Duties towards God and man to be explicated and extended accordingly to the Illustrations and Commentaries of the Prophets our great Lord and his Apostles Though the Decalogue doth not mention each particular Dutie in the Gospel yet it doth command obedience to al that are or shal be specified and expresseth every particular Dutie generically or synecdochically and although it were not a Dutie from the general Precept til it was specified in the Gospel yet when it is once a Dutie the neglect of it is a sin against the Decalogue Indeed are there not almost in al the Precepts manifest Synecdoches Is it not then ridiculous for men to restrain the most ample sense of the moral Law to the narrow confines of its words Doth not the great Legislator take the blackest sins as Murder Adultery Theft c. and place them as so many commun Heads in the Decalogue that so by these we may be instructed how black and odiose al those other sins reducible to those heads are Wherefore to penetrate and dive into the nature and contents of the Ten Commandments we must in a particular manner inquire 1 What in every Command is treated of 2 The end for which it was given 3 What therein is displeasing or pleasing to God And after al we shal find that the moral Law is spiritual holy just and good as Rom. 7.12 14. reaching al the motions and dispositions of the heart And indeed how absurd is it to conceit that he who made the heart and knows al the diverticules or turnings and windings of it should make a Law to reach only the outward acts and not the inward principes and motions May we not then conclude that the Decalogue and moral Law of the supreme Legislator extends its Precepts to the whole Soul and al its Principes Powers Inclinations Thoughts Affections and Operations interne and externe directing the same to their right objects and ends affecting them with their inseparable Accidents and Modifications clothing them with their immutable circumstances in such sort that the action good by this Law can never be made evil that which is evil by this Law can never be made good that which is good or evil by this Law can never be made indifferent Hence Plato brings in Pindar speaking thus of the regal Power as I take it of the Law of Nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Law is King over al both mortals and immortals And Aristot. Pol. l. 4. c. 4. affirmes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Law ought to command al. Which is most proper and peculiar to the moral Law that lively Idea and Image of the Divine Sanctitie and Wil the original and universal Exemplar of moral Bonitie that great bond of union by conformitie whereto mans Wil becomes one with the Divine Wil yea man himself one with God Whence as Tyndal pag. 83. wel observes Mans
imagination can make the Law of God neither greater nor lesser neither can it adde to or diminish from the Law of God Gods Commandment is as great as himself Such is the Amplitude of the moral Law as the immutable universal Rule of moral Bonitie § 3. Having considered the Measure and Rule of moral Bonitie The parts and causes of moral Good we now passe on to examine the Nature and Causes thereof It was before suggested that al moral Bonitie requires a plenitude of Being and integritie of Causes albeit any defect render an action morally evil This Canon holds true whatever distribution we give the causes of moral Bonitie Jansenius in imitation of Augustine makes two essential constitutive parts of al moral Good 1 The Office or Mater of the Act which he makes to be as the Corps and the End which he makes to be as the Forme that specifies 2 Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 187. and Arist. Eth. l. 2. c. 4. seem to distribute moral Good into the good deed done and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel-doing of it i.e. into Bonum and Bene. The good deed-done is as the mater and the bene or wel-doing of it as the forme 3 Others according to the Aristotelian distribution of the causes make four causes of al moral Good the Mater Efficient End and Forme Albeit I judge this distribution of Causes as to Naturals every way absurd and that which can never be defended because it makes the same things both constitutive Parts of the whole and yet also Causes thereof so that it hence follows the mater and forme are causes of themselves which constitute the whole yet in Morals where the causes need not such an accurate distinction from the parts we may admit this distribution or else we may take the mater and forme as parts and the efficient and end as causes of moral Good This being the commun and received distribution I am not scrupulose in following the same yet so as not to exclude the two former divisions 1. The Mater of moral Good If we reflect on the Mater of moral Good it comprehends al human Acts with the Objects and Circumstances relating thereto whether things necessary or indifferent It 's true as to the Circumstances of moral Good there are some that relate to the forme others to the efficient and end yet some also that regard the mater The mater of every good action is either good or indifferent it is good when commanded by and conforme to the moral Law the measure of objective goodnesse as before it is indifferent when neither good nor evil but as it were in the middle between both Here that which chiefly requires an examen and discussion is the nature of things indifferent which so far as it may concerne moral Good we shal inquire into Plato in his Gorgias Things indifferent cals a thing indifferent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither good nor evil but a middle between these So Diogenes the Cynic taught 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That things between virtue and vice were indifferent And the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Of things some were good some bad some neither good nor bad i. e. indifferent These neuters or things indifferent they said were such as neither profited nor did hurt Again they affirmed That things might be termed indifferent two ways 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as pertein not either to felicitie or miserie as Riches Glorie c. 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Such things as men act neither with an Impetus nor aversation as the extending the finger or numbering the hairs of the head c. as Laertius in Zeno. But the more fully to explicate the nature of things indifferent we are to consider that things are said in the general to be indifferent which in themselves are neither good nor evil but equally inclined to either Now this indifference of actions or things may be considered physically or morally according to the generic specific or individual nature of Actions and Things 1. If we consider Actions and Things in genere abstracto Physic Indifference in Genere in their generic abstract nature without the supervenient determination of the moral Law so they are in themselves nakedly considered indifferent For althings physically considered without their moral estimation and respect to the Law are neither morally good nor evil Thus al our Thoughts Words and Actions nakedly and physically considered without respect to the moral Law which is the rule and measure of moral Good and Evil are said to be indifferent 2. Actions and Things are said to be indifferent in specie Moral Indifference in Specie when the mater of them is neither commanded nor forbidden by the moral Law For as althings are of God through God and for God so it belongs to his regal Wil to give moral or spiritual determination to them whereby they are made good or evil in specie as to the mater of them Neither can any created limited power make that which is good evil or that which is evil good or that which is indifferent good or evil except on supposition of predetermination from him who being Creator of al has an absolute dominion over al. Every Creature having termes to its Essence has also termes to its dominion and operation a limited Cause must necessarily have a limited power and activitie Except man had being of himself and a World of his own framing he could not be a rule to himself for the determination of his actions but must be determined by the Law of his Maker for the specific nature or qualitie of his acts as good Quando dicimus dari actus indifferentes quoad speciem qui non sunt boni nec mali id intelligendum est negativé Petr. à Sancto Joseph Thes 167. or evil or indifferent Thence a thing is said to be morally indifferent in specie when it is neither commanded nor forbidden by God and so neither good nor evil for al moral determination ariseth from the Divine Wil expressed in the moral Law Whence it appears evident that The reasons of good and evil are not eternal as some Platonists would fain persuade us but dependent on the divine Wil and Determination for althings are therefore good or evil in specie because so determined by the soverain Wil promulgated in the natural or moral Law Whence also we may easily perceive the danger of that commun Notion among some Divines That somethings are good because commanded other things are commanded because good Indeed this Maxime may be of use to expresse the difference between moral and positive Precepts with this limitation that positive Precepts which regard Worship c. are good because commanded but moral Precepts are commanded because good i. e. agreable to human Nature not that they have any moral goodnesse antecedent to the divine Wil and Determination Hence 3. No Action
indifferent in individuo No Action considered in individuo in its individual nature is morally indifferent i.e. every individual action considered as clothed with its Circumstances and in relation to its Principes Manner and End is either good or evil That moral Indifference hath place only in specie in the specific nature of Acts not in individuo in their individual nature is generally avouched by the Orthodoxe yea among the more sober of the Schole-men This was one of John Husse's Articles condemned in the Council of Constance Art 16. Quòd nulla sint opera indifferentia sed haec sit divisio immediata humanorum operum quòd sint virtuosa vel vitiosa That there are no workes in individuo indifferent but this is an immediate division of human workes that they are either virtuose or vitiose This indeed we may argue from Plato's Placites who strongly proves That al our Acts ought to tend to some good end So Gorg. pag. 499. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It seems that althings must be done for good c. So elsewhere he saith That God is the marque and scope unto which al our Acts as so many arrows ought to tend This is wel determined by Aquinas 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. It happens sometimes that an Act is indifferent as to its Species which yet considered in individuo is either good or evil and that because every moral Act receives its Bonitie not only from its object but also from its circumstances And it 's necessary that every individual Act hath some circumstance by which it is drawen to good or evil at least as to the intention of the end For in as much as it belongs to Reason to order al human Acts if any Act be not ordered to its last end it is so far evil if it be ordered to its last end it is then good c. Thus Gibieuf de Libertat pag. 74. We most evidently gather from the subordination of our Wil to its last end that there are no human Acts indifferent in individuo but al are good or evil for it is not lawful for a rational Creature so long as he is such not to returne that back to God which he received from God Again p. 77. Every thing ought to act according to its nature and he that doth otherwise is deficient because nature is the measure of other things If therefore man puts forth an human Act he ought thereby to be converted towards God Indeed Indifference can no more be found in individual Acts than it can be denied as to some Acts considered in their Species Al Acts of Man in Innocence were good al the Acts of man under the dominion of corrupt Nature are evil al the Acts of man in Glorie shal be good al the Acts of man under Grace are either good or evil not one of al these indifferent Were al our actions regulated by the Divine moral Law they would be al good Yea our very natural and civil Acts as to their manner so far as they are morally good or evil are al regulated and determined by the moral Law For albeit the Divine Law be not as it ought not to be a general sum of Arts and Sciences nor yet a particular Directorie for the Government of States or Politic Acts yet the particular determination of al our Acts fals under the Divine Law so far as they are moral and Christian according to the nature of al Professions and Sciences coincident for the most part in the mater but distinct in the manner of consideration Thus much Petrus à Sancto Joseph that late compilator of Schole-Divinitie Thes 167. acknowledgeth There is not saith he any Act indifferent in individuo but every such Act if it procede from sufficient deliberation is either good or evil although not as to its object yet in regard of its circumstances The scratching of the head or the taking up of a straw is either good or evil This seems a Paradoxe to some that are ignorant and disgustful to Libertines who would be so yet generally granted by Philosophers and Divines yea scarce ever professedly denied by any save some sew who distinguish between Acts proceding from mere Imagination and such as are deliberate That no Acts in individuo are indifferent see the Commentators in Sent. lib. 2. dist 41. and in Thomam 1.2 Quaest 18. Art 9. 2. A virtuose Wil the Principe of moral Good Having discussed the Mater of moral Good we now procede to its next efficient Cause or Principe which is the Wil or rather Soul clothed with supernatural Habits of Virtue or Grace The moral Law requires that to the constitution of an Act morally good there concur a good Principe now the Wil or Soul as willing being the fountain of al moral efficience and operation its rectitude is necessary to constitute an Act morally or spiritually good Such therefore as the disposition of the Wil is such wil the action prove as to its goodnesse or pravitie The bent of the Wil is as a Pondus that carries the whole Soul either to good or bad when the deliberation and intention of a bended Wil concurs in a good mater for a good end the action is good And what bends the Wil in this manner Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas ab hac enim est actio but virtuose habits So many degrees as there are of a sanctified Wil in any Act so many degrees there are of moral Good therein Moralitie as wel as Divinitie is in a more special manner conversant in ruling the Wil which is the measure of good and evil The bent of the Wil makes a good or bad man as also act Thus Plato Meno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is to wil and to be able to performe good Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 If he wil not to do unrightcously this is sufficient he shal not do unrighteously But more particularly Plato Leg. 3. thus philosophiseth This is not to be desired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that althings follow his Wil but that his Wil follow Reason i.e. that it prosecute what is good This is wel expressed by Simplicius in Epich c. 1. pag. 14. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For when the Wil is free and pure in the power of Reason it self on which our nature dependes then it is carried to things truly eligible yea to truth it self Wherefore the proper good of the Soul is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly desirable and attained by real election Simplicius here in imitation of Plato whom he much follows asserteth 1 That the moral Goodnesse of human Acts dependes on the puritie and goodnesse of the Wil. 2 That moral Good is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue because most eligible Which derivation he borrowed from Plato What Virtue properly is and how it disposeth the Wil to what is morally good wil hereafter § 4. and sect 3. §
1 2. come under contemplation at present this may suffice to demonstrate that al moral Good requireth a moral Principe virtuously inclined for the production thereof And had we no other evidence hereof but what sacred Philosophie doth assord it might suffice Thus Solomon the wisest of mere men since the Fal Prov. 4.23 Above al keeping keep thine heart Prov. 4.23 for out of it are the issues of life i. e. al spiritual life and moral good issueth from the heart rightly disposed and qualified with virtuose graciose Principes where the heart thus qualified is not the Spring there no Act is morally or spiritually alive towards God but dead Be the actions never so seemingly splendid and gloriose as to the mater of them yet if they flow not from this living Fountain they are but as your Automata those artificial Machines or Images called Puppits which seem to move their eyes hands feet c. whereas indeed they are moved only by artificial forrein impresses such are al moral Acts that flow not from a vital Principe virtuosely disposed morally dead albeit they may seem to have shadows of life Or look as no member of the bodie performes any action of natural life wherein a pulse derived from the heart beats not so no action is morally good wherein there beats not some pulse of a virtuose rightly disposed Wil. Actions are conformable to the fountain whence they spring no living virtuose Act can procede from a dead corrupt Principe Being life and motion go together in Morals as wel as in Naturals such as the Facultie Spring and Principe is such wil the motion and operation be both in Grace and Nature as Medo has wel observed on Prov. 4.23 Thus Augustine on Mat. 7.18 where by the good Tree he understands a believing Wil which he makes essential to every good Act for if the Wil be bad the Act cannot be good and every unbelieving Wil is a bad Wil for where there is no Faith in Christ as the first Principe of life there can be no love to God as the last End as the end formes the Wil so Faith formes the End Thence that of the supposed Ignatius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Faith is the Principe of life Love the end these two in unitie perfect the man of God And Chrysostome saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Nothing is good without Faith 3. The best End essential to moral Good To the Constitution of moral Good there is also essentially requisite the best End Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 499. assures us That al Acts must be undertaken for the last end and best good as before Sect. 1. § 2. This is wel explicated by Aquinas 2.2 Quaest 2.3 Art 8. It must be said that in Morals the forme of an Act is principally to be attended in regard of its end and the reason is most evident because the Wil is the Principe of moral Acts and the End the main Object and as it were the forme of the Wil but now the forme of an Act always follows the forme of an Agent whence in Morals it is necessary that what gives an Act its order to an end give it is also forme c. This is more nakedly laid down by Angustine Whatever good is done by man but not for that end for which it ought to be done albeit the office it self i. e. the mater of the Act seem good yet the end being not right it is sin This is wel explicated by Jansenius August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 10. Two things are to be regarded in every act of a virtuose Wil 1 The office or worke it self done 2 The cause for which it is done or the End In the weighing the Bonitie of any Virtue our main regard must be to the End This is as it were the last rest and scope of the mind in acting that which the Wil its habit and act most incline unto This deservedly rules al Offices which flow from its Empire are tinctured with its color and sapor and ought to be referred to it This is the genuine cause why so many vexatious litigations were found among the Gentile Philosophers touching the chiefest Good So again he saith That the Office it self is but as the Corps of Virtue which is animated by the End which gives forme and life without which the office is but as mater without forme or a carcasse without Soul Aristotle wel instructes us That the end is the measure of althings which is true as to moral Good Thence Petrus à Sancto Joseph Thes 166. assertes That an human action takes its Bonitie or pravitie not only from the intrinsec end of the worke which is coincident with the object but also from the extrinsec which is the end of the Worker Certainly Offices are to be weighed not so much by their Acts as Ends And what is the last end of al good workes but the Glorie of God which though last in Execution yet ought to be first in Intention at least virtually if not formally in al we do Thence saith Angustine That is not true Virtue which tends not to that end wherein the best Good of man consistes And Gregor Ariminensis 2. Sent. Dist 29. Quaest 1. proves that Every volition which refers not to God for himself or to other things for God is vitiose 4. The last Cause The Forme of moral Good conformitie to the moral Law or rather constitutive part of moral Good is its Forme which consistes in its Conformitie to the divine moral Law This may deservedly be termed the Forme of moral Good because it gives forme and measure to al the former Principes and parts For wherein consistes the Goodnesse of the Mater Principes and End but in their Conformitie to the Divine Wil and Law This therefore is the formal Idea or Reason of al moral Good whereby al difference and perfection is to be measured Arist. Eth. lib. 5. cap. 2. tels us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the great difference of things is according to their Idea or formal Reason Hence Conformitie to the Divine Law being the formal Reason or Idea of al moral Good by this we are to take our measures of al differences or perfection therein This Conformitie of moral Good to the Divine Law is described by Plato under various emphatic notions as 1 it is termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So Protag pag. 326. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al the life of man ought to consist of Concent and Harmonie i. e. of Uniformitie and Conformitie to the Divine Law Hence 2 In his Phaedo he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Virtue consistes in Harmonie whereas vice is a confused inordination or irregularitie So in his Timaeus pag. 47. he saith That Harmonie being very near akin to the motions of the Soul it is given us to reduce the disorders of the Soul to a decorum So Stobaeus Serm. 1. de Virtut pag. 15. 〈◊〉
too many of our Divines in imitation of them make a twofold Good and Virtue one natural and moral the other spiritual and supernatural The natural Virtue and moral Good they make to be that which a man may by the force of natural Conscience and other natural Principes attain unto The spiritual and supernatural Good or Virtue they make to be infused Albeit this distinction may with due limitations passe for orthodoxe yet in as much as it was at first framed by the Pelagians and taken up by their Sectators in the Scholes I should be glad if Jansenius's advice for the utter extirpation of it were embraced who in his August Tom. 2. lib. 4. cap. 14. pag. 256. gives us the origination of this Distinction which he makes to be first taken up by the Pelagians from the Gentile Philosophers specially the Peripatetics and Stoics who held that there were in men natural seeds of Virtue which being wel cultivated might arise up to perfect Virtue These natural seeds of Virtue addes he first the Pelagians and Semipelagians brought into their Heresie and afterwards the Schole-men introduced the same into the Christian Scholes to the great prejudice of our Doctrine For those Heretics held that out of those philosophic seeds true Virtues-might be educed by the alone power of the human Wil. But because the Schole-men saw that this Dogme was openly contrary to the constantly received Doctrine they therefore framed a double man in one man and thence a double Charitie double Virtues double Workes some natural others supernatural of which there is not the least footstep in the whole Doctrine of Augustine As if those very Virtues which the Philosophers and Schole-men cal Natural were not by Augustine stiled Vices And Tom. 2. lib. 2. cap. 2. pag. 326. he assures us That he has oft greatly wondred that many of the Philosophers had more truly accurately and holily philosophised of the main Heads of moral Doctrine than many Schole-men who would fain frame two men in one the one a Philosopher and the other a Christian whence they also coined a twofold Charitie twofold Virtues twofold Workes and a twofold Beatitude the one natural the other supernatural Hence 3. The difficultie of moral Good To performe any moral Good or virtuose Act is most difficult and rare O! how difficult and rare is it for men to performe what is good from good Principes Ends in a good manner as to Circumstances and universal Conformitie to the Divine Law Thus Plato Repub. 5. pag. 476. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But of such as can arrive to the first Beautie and contemplate him in himself are there not very few So Phileb pag. 16. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To explain Wisdome is not very difficult but to reduce it to practice and use most difficult So again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What way men may attain to be good is most difficult i.e. to understand and practise Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is difficult for a man to be made good and to continue such Whence in his Cratylus pag. 385. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 According to the old Proverbe things good are very difficult Thence also in his Epinomis pag. 973. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I say it is not possible for men to be blessed and happy here except some few only Lastly Plato in his Repub. 6. saith That Virtue hath the most perfect accurate forme and therefore it requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the most perfect exactitude and diligence for the acquirement thereof for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Do not the greatest things require the greatest exactitude And what things greater than moral Goods and Virtues Thus Aristotle also in imitation of his Master once and again demonstrates the difficultie and raritie of moral Good So Eth. lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 89. having shewed That there were varietie of ways wherein men might sin but one only way of doing good he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore it is most easie to offend but most difficult to do good for to erre from the scope is most-facile but to hit it is most difficult So in like manner c. 9. pag. 108. he saith Virtue consistes in mediocritie i.e. in one indivisible point of conformitie Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Wherefore to acquire Virtue is most difficult and laborious for it is an hard worke to attain to the middle of any thing As every one cannot find out the point of a Circle but only the intelligent Mathematician So to be angrie to give money or the like is easie but to be angrie to give money c. to whom and in such a measure and at such a time and for such an end and in such a manner as we ought this is not easie Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The bene or manner of doing good is difficult laudable and beautiful Wherein indeed he gives us an excellent account of the nature and difficultie of moral Good 1 He supposeth al moral Good to consiste as it were in one middle indivisible point so that the least deviation therefrom destroys it Quò enim magis strenuè currit extra viam eò longiùs à scopo recedit ideóque sit miserior Calvin 2 That it is very difficult to find out this golden mean but much more difficult to reach it by our actions True indeed it 's no difficult worke to performe the act materially good as to give almes or the like but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the wel doing of it i.e. from those Principes for those Ends and with those Circumstances that the Act requires in regard of its formal constitution this is most rare difficult and only laudable Hence 4. The splendid Heroic deeds of Pagans The Virtues of Pagans lesser sins only and al such whose minds are not virtuosely disposed are but lesser Sins This is most evident by the confessions of the Philosophers themselves who require to moral Good an integritie of Causes and constitutive Principes so that it sufficeth not that the Mater or Office be good but there is also required a good disposition and habit the best end and al such Circumstances as essentially concur to formalise the Act or denominate it morally good Now let us inquire did ever any Pagan or man in his natural state performe any one Act thus morally good What can we produce any Pagan or natural man who had his mind so far sanctified by Faith and Love as to act by force received from God out of love to God and his Glorie Truly Augustine and Jansenius out of him are not afraid to declare that al those Heroic Acts and Exploits which the Philosophers and Schole-men honor with the title of natural or moral Virtues are indeed but more splendid sins because poisoned with pride and vain-glorie Yea they rise higher and affirme that the Stoics themselves who seemed to be the greatest admirers and sectators
prove his gain his reproche his glorie his confinement his libertie This is incomparably wel expressed by Epictetus in several Philosophemes So Enchirid. cap. 38. Know saith he that this is the main part of Religion towards God that thou conforme thy self 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to obey him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to acquiesce in althings that happen and willingly to follow as that which is best governed by the most excellent Mind Thus also in Arrian l. 1. c. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To submit the mind to the mind that governes althings as good Citizens to the Law of the Citie this is libertie in its perfection So lib. 3. cap. 7. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I always rather wil what happens for I estime what God wils better than what I wil. I adhere to him as a minister and sectator I desire what he desires and simply wil what God wils thus Seneca That is a great and free mind which has given up it self to God 5. Moral Libertie as to exercice importes the using and referring althings in order to the service and fruition of God The reference of althings to God Libertie according to both sacred and Platonic Philosophie consistes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the concent harmonie symmetrie and right order of althings i. e. when al subserve our last end And what is the last end of man but to serve and enjoy God Whence Plato Protag 3. pag. 326. saith That the whole life of man should be composed of harmonie and uniformitie i. e. al actions means occurrences should sweetly conspire and agree for the promoting our supreme end The mind is morally free not by extending it self to varietie of objects but by reducing al to unitie or God who is the supreme Unitie which reduceth althings to it self Again Libertie implies Election and is not that the best election which refers al to its last end the respect we have to Creatures depends on the respect they have to God and so far as we refer them to God so far we are free in the use of them By subjecting our selves and al enjoyments to the service of God we gain dominion and freedome over althings but if the heart be irregular and inordinate in adhering to the use of the most lawful comfort it is immediately captivated thereby This is most evident from sacred Philosophie as 1 Cor. 6.12 Althings are lawful to me 1 Cor. 6.12 13. Paul seems to have taken up the commun Phrase of those Corinthian Libertines who under a pretexte that althings were lawful did abuse their just libertie to the grieving of their weak Brethren It 's true saith he althings are lawful I grant it yet withal remember that althings are not expedient if you have not a great care your desires and use of things lawful wil soon prove unlawful For my part addes he althings are lawful for me but I wil not be brought under the power of any 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Here is an elegant Paronomasie between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which the Corinthian Libertines boasted of and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies primarily to be brought into bondage under the power of another They that use things lawful without regard to their expendience and subservience to the service of God are brought under bondage to them Thence the Apostle addes v. 13. Meats are for the belly i. e. for the ventricule or stomach and intestines to supplie them with nutriment and the belly is for meats i.e. to receive and digest them But God shal destroy both it and them i. e. take away the use both of meats and ventricule in Heaven The Apostle brings this as an argument to prove that our Christian Libertie doth not lie simply in the use of these things because when we are most free there wil be no use of them God gives not men libertie to enjoy what they list but what they ought the free use of Creatures consistes in this to make us more free inthe service of God herein lies the goodnesse of any Creature in our being thereby enabled to do good Those that subject their hearts to God in the use of Creatures are most free therein yea you are never free longer than you serve God by them That to serve God is the highest Libertie that human Nature is capable of sacred Philosophie doth abundantly assure us It 's an old Saying but most true that To serve God is to reign This is a Kings life Every one hath his Talent from God and as he doth more or lesse employ it for God so he is more or lesse free It 's honor enough for the Creature to be employed by his Creator Yet over an above this God rewards every degree of servicer with some degree of libertie tranquillitie and peace There is nothing that has greater dignitie and libertie entailed on it than the service of God Thus Luk. 22.29 Luk. 22.29 30. And I appoint unto you a kingdome as my Father hath appointed unto me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to appoint or dispose by Wil and Testament The mind of our Lord is that as the Father appointed to him a Kingdome to be acquired by suffering and service so in like manner he appointed to his Servants a Glorie and Dignitie next to his royal Majestie to be acquired in the same manner and way This our Lord addes to give check to their carnal ambitiose humor v. 24 25. It follows v. 30. That ye may eat and drink at my table and sit on thrones judging the twelve Tribes of Israel There are two things wherein the preeminence of Nobles and Peers is most illustrious 1 In the honor vouchsafed them by their Prince 2 In their Power and Autoritie over others Both of these are here mentioned as belonging to Christs Servants 1 Their honor consistes in sitting at Christs table 2 Their power in sitting on Thrones c. Yea we find a strange and unusual honor vouchsafed by Christ to his Servants Luk. 12.37 He shal gird himself and make them sit down to mean and wil come forth and serve them Joh. 12.26 O1 what an incomparable honor is this The like Joh. 12.26 If any man serve me Our Lord here speaks of himself as a great King who hath many Ministers of State to order his Affairs and every Minister of his is a King in his place Thence he addes And where I am there also shal my servant be i. e. in my Kingdome of Glorie if he follows me in the Kingdome of my Patience yea he addes If any man serve me him wil my Father honor i. e. he shal not only be happy but most honorable Neither is this Dignitie and Libertie reserved only for Heaven but even in this life God investes his saithful Servants therewith Thus it was with Joshua Zach. 3.7 And I wil give thee walkes among those that stand by i. e. among the Angels that stand by and minister
to me and my Church as Tarnovius § 4. Having explicated what moral Libertie as to Exercice is we are now to demonstrate Moral Libertie of Exercice the highest that this is the supreme Libertie that a rational Creature is capable of 1. The more ordinate and regular human Acts are the more morally free they are It s Order for al moral freedome denotes order and reference to our last End and are not virtuose Acts most ordinate and regular Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 504. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soul and its acts receive order and ornament from the Law whence men are made regular and orderly which belongs to Justice and Temperance i. e. al Acts are so far regular as they partake of Justice and Temperance which give order and harmonie to al our Exercices Justice and Temperance according to Plato are universal cardinal Virtues which regulate and dispose al human Acts according to the best order wherein their freedome chiefly consistes Whence Plato makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Chorus of Virtues wherein al move in the most regular orderly manner Yea he affirmes That the whole life of man should consiste of Harmonie Order and Vniformitie And Rep. 3. pag. 412. he informes us That a life composed of Contemplatives and Actives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is most musical and harmonious i. e. The whole life of a virtuose man must be composed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Symphonie or Concent and musical Ryme so that Thoughts and Affections must answer to Rule Words to Thoughts and Actions to Words and herein consistes the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order and Libertie of human Exercices So again in his Laches pag. 188. he assures us Non est hujus animus in recto cujus acta discordant Omnia facta dictáque tua inter se congruant ac respondeant sibi una forma percussa sint Virtus aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi Sen. Epist. That is the best Music when words and life concord or agree among themselves as also to the Rule Virtuose Exercices consiste in all equal tenor of life agreable to it self and to the Law which is always attended with a good order and libertie It is an excellent Character of Padre Paul the Venetian mentioned in his Life pag. 133. That his life was singularly composed of active and contemplative he always yielding to God what he could to his Prince what he ought and of that which belonged to his own Dominion more than he ought by any Law but that of charitie Again pag. 175. That which made him most admired was the coupling together of Virtues and with conditions that are not usually met in one and the same subject as Knowlege and Humilitie Prudence with Meeknesse Retirednesse and Officiousnesse Seriousnesse and Pleasantnesse Argutenesse without offence Brevitie and Perspicuitie Sweetnesse and Soliditie So great was the concent and order of virtuose Exercices in this great Soul Indeed order is the life and perfection of moral Acts and the more of order the more of libertie Now virtuose Acts are of al most regular and orderly because they are measured by the exactest Rule and directly tend to the last End which is the first Principe in Morals Thus in sacred Philosophie Gal. 6.16 Gal. 6.16 And as many as walke according to this rule peace be unto them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a Reed whereby Geometers measured their ground also the white Line in the Grecian Race And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies so to walke as to keep an exact order not to deviate the least from the white Line in our Race And what is the privilege of those who thus walke Peace be to them i.e. moral Libertie and Tranquillitie 2. The Libertie of an Act both Natural and Moral is to be measured by its Spontaneitie Connaturalitie Facilitie and Suavitie Virtuose Exercies most spontaneous and sweet For al Libertie consistes in an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-motion and by how much the more spontaneous connatural facile and sweet the self-motion is by so much the more free it is judged to be And what motions of the Soul are more spontaneous spiritually connatural and sweet than such as are virtuose Plato in his Lysis assures us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is most proper to our nature and what is better than virtuose acts are they not then most proper or connatural Thence Definit Platon pag. 411. Temperance is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-motion according to nature i.e. connatural or agreable to rectified human Nature And Plato in his Timaeus tels us That the best motion of the Soul is in it self because this is most akin to rational Nature And when doth the Soul move more in it self than when it moves virtuosely towards its last end Is not the last end the best part of our selves Therefore when the Soul moves virtuosely towards it doth it not move most in it self It 's a great Notion among the Platonists That Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most proper and congenial to man but sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most aliene and repugnant And Bradwardine strongly demonstrates That to adhere to God as our first Cause and last End is the most natural act of a rectified Soul and is it not then most free Every motion of the Soul is so far free as connatural and proper O! then how free are virtuose Acts The Platonist instructes us That to a good man God is a Law but to the wicked Lust is a Law Now if God be a Law to a good man then al his motions toward God are most free There is indeed a divine Sympathie between a virtuose Soul and the divine Law Repugnanti non volenti necessitas est In volente necessitas non est Sen. and therefore he most freely obeys it for al obey what they love as Plato assures us Hence a virtuose man is a Law to himself he has the divine Law impressed on his Soul and thence the Law of God is to him a Law of Love and Libertie so that he obeys it not out of force but choice for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force cannot touch love There is a service of Love which is most free by how much the more closely and inviolably the Soul is by virtuose acts subjected to God by so much the more free it is for the very act of love as terminated on the Creator is formal moral Libertie as Jansenius acutely demonstrates August Tom. 2. pag. 41. Yea virtuose exercices are not only spiritually natural to the virtuose Soul but also most facile sweet and delicious Plato Timae pag. 81. tels us Whatever is repugnant to Nature is most irkesome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but what is consentaneous to Nature is most sweet Now that virtuose acts are most agreable to rectified Nature has been already demonstrated What can furnish us
as are dead in sin are under an universal privation of spiritual life and total impotence to what is spiritually good This Hypothesis may be demonstrated 1 From the universal ignorance of the natural mind Plato discourseth accurately of this Theme as we have in what precedes § 3. mentioned but more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. Yea so great and soverain is the natural ignorance of the mind that those very commun notions of knowlege loged therein are not to be estimed as some cal them the fragments of the Image of God but rather effects of divine Bountie vouchsafed his lapsed Creature upon the Intercession of the Mediator who illuminates every man that comes into the world as Joh. 1.9 That al true knowlege of things divine is the effect of divine illumination has been generally confest by Platonists as wel as Divines Thence Clemens Alexandr cals Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a supernatural contemplation So Chrysostome cals divine Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which instructes and illustrates the mind Grace from above not from human Nature 2 From the formal Idea and nature of moral or spiritual good which consistes in a conformitie to the moral Law and that not only as to its mater but also as to its end and manner now it is impossible for corrupt nature by its own power to reach a supernatural end or conforme to the moral Law 3 From the disproportion and incapacitie of the subject The natural power of the Wil as now vitiated has no connatural capacitie next power or formal capacitie for the production of what is spiritually good Alas what proportion is there between a carnal mind and spiritual objects And can an object be received into the mind unlesse there be some proportion Is not every thing received according to the nature and disposition of the recipient Can then a carnal mind have any other than carnal notions of things spiritual as a spiritual mind has spiritual notions of things carnal See 1 Cor. 2.14 Joh. 6.44 8.43 12.39 40. So also for the corrupt wil it cannot possibly have any connatural virtue next power or formal capacitie for the production of any virtuose Act. Is it possible that a natural power should have any causal connexion with or connaturalitie unto a supernatural act or effect 4 Should we suppose corrupt Nature to have any moral power for the production of Virtue would not this subvert the whole Oeconomie and Dispensation of efficacious Grace For 1 Thence the whole efficace of Grace would be measured and specificated according to the complexion of Free-wil and so variated according to its diversitie 2 Whence also the last differential reason whereby Grace is differenced from Nature must be resolved into Nature 3 Natural Free-wil would from this Hypothesis be of it self and nextly flexible to spiritual good and so Virtue not the gift of God Aristotle himself who was a good Friend to corrupt Nature confesseth al good to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the gift of God 5 From sacred Philosophie Jer. 13.33 Thus Jer. 13.23 Can the Ethiopian change his skin c. Consider 1 That this is a proverbial speech touching the vain attemts of such as endeavor to bring about things impossible Hence that commun Proverb To wash a Black-moor relating to such as attemt things impossible 2 The manner of expressing it is very emphatic for such rhetoric interrogations carrie in them more vehement logic negations Then he addes or the Leopard his spots Then may ye also do good who are accustomed to do evil And that this impotence is total and universal on al mankind is evident from that other Proverb Ezech. 16.44 As is the mother such is the daughter Ezech. 16.44 i. e. This contagion runs in the bloud it is an hereditary disease commun to al mankind Hence sinners are said to be borne in sin Psal 51.5 and to be in sin Exod. 32.22 1 Joh. 5.19 The whole world is said to be in sin i. e. immersed and plunged thereinto What this impotence to sin is and how far natural we have explicated Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 5. § 1. 4. Prop. Man under the servitude of Sin cannot dispose or prepare himself for the reception of Virtue Thus Greg. Nyss or de Scopo Christ Man cannot prepare himself for Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The force of human virtue is not of it self sufficient to elevate Souls void of Grace to a forme of divine life unlesse God build the house c. That there can be no disposition though never so remote unto true moral Virtue from the alone facultie of Nature is evident because nothing can dispose it self to a condition above its nature by its own force unlesse it be influenced by a superior Agent A man in the state of corrupt nature cannot by al his own forces natural or moral 1 overcome any one tentation or 2 mortifie any one lust or 3 attain any one good thought inclination or desire or 4 remove the Remora or bar in his heart against conversion or 5 by doing what in him lieth lay any obligation on God to give grace I know it is a Position maintained by some That such as improve their natural abilities to their utmost power shal thereby obtain supernatural Grace But for answer hereto 1 It 's certain that none ever did or wil improve to the utmost their natural abilities 2 Or if men should improve their natural forces to the utmost what obligation is there on God to give to such supernatural Grace Is God obliged by any law or promise to give grace upon the performance of such an act or condition which is in it self sinful and hath nothing of true moral virtue in it And have we not already sufficiently proved that there can be no true moral virtue but by supernatural Grace That there is no law or obligation on God to give supernatural Grace to natural emprovements is wel demonstrated by Bradwardine de Caus Dei l. 1. c. 37. pag. 316. Yea doth it not implie a contradiction in the Adject that man should make a right use of his natural abilities or prepare himself for the reception of supernatural Grace Is it not also a sacrilegious Hypothesis to suppose that God should fetch the commun rule of his giving or not giving grace from mans dignitie or indignitie Corrupt nature wants not only an active power to do good but also an immediate passive power to receive good thence it can't dispose it self to virtue which is above its natural capacitie Is not al true virtue above the whole sphere of corrupt nature The Greek Fathers such as were more orthodoxe acknowleged That the preparation to Grace was from Grace whence it was by them termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the direction of the way also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the preparation of the wil likewise 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the attraction of
Effate of Basil in his Homilie of Humilitie where explicating that of the Apostle 1 Cor. 4.7 And what hast thou that thou didst not receive 1 Cor. 4.7 c. he thus philosophiseth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Here al the sublimitie of pride fals to the ground there is nothing left thee O man as mater of arrogance Tel me why doest thou lift up thy self in reference to thine own good workes whenas thou oughtest rather to render thankes to the Donor of them For what hast thou which thou hast not received And if thou hast received any thing why doest thou glorie as if thou receivedst it not Thou hast not known God by thine own justice but God hath known thee by his own benignitie Thence he addes It is the greatest stupiditie not to understand a man is partaker of grace but to arrogate to his own Virtue what belongs to Grace CHAP. V. Of Plato's Politie its essential Constitution and Administration Politic Philosophie what Politie its Forme in Order its Object the Communitie its first Founder God Mans inclination to Societie The Constitution of a Politic Bodie from Consociation which is formalised by some Law Politic Amitie and Fraternitie founded in Religion The Ends of Politie 1 Gods Glorie 2 Virtue 3 Public Good 4 Mutual Assistance A Politic Bodie or Citie what Legislation its Origine Laws their Necessitie and Origine The Qualifications of Legislators Laws from the multitude for public Good their principal end Virtue Their Qualities the Law of Equitie Politic Governement Monarchic Aristocratic Democratic or mixed Moderate Empire best Tyrannic Empire its Origine c. Civil Magistrates their End Their Qualifications 1 Wisdome 2 virtue 3 Public Spirits Their Education Their Autoritie and Office as Conservators of the Law The Exercice of their Office with Justice Temperance Moderation and Clemence Things destructive to Politie Atheisme Luxurie Divisions Injustice § 1. MOral Philosophie regards persons either in their single Capacities Politic Philosophie or as conjunct in Societies the former which they stile Ethic we have dispatcht and therefore passe on to philosophise though more cursorily of the later A Societie called by the Grecians 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Communitie or Communion is either of a single Familie or of many Families incorporated Moral Philosophie as it regards a single Familie is termed Oeconomie as many Families incorporated Politic. The former is but a species of the later and may be deservedly included therein and therefore Plato hath not philosophised distinctly thereof But of the later namely Politic he philosophiseth most copiosely and accurately in his Menexenus Politicus Minos Epinomis X. Books of Republic and XII Books of Laws That Plato traduced the chief Ideas of his Politic Philosophemes from Mosaic Politics either immediately or mediately is generally asserted by the Learned both ancient and moderne Thus Clemens Alexandr Strom. 1. pag. 256 257. and Admon ad Gentes Eusebius praepar Evang. l. 12. c. 37 38 39 40 41 42 47 48. Of which see Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. § 6. Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 6. § 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Politie according to the Platonic Definition Politie its forme in Order pag. 4.13 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A lawful or regular communion of a multitude sufficient to Beatitude In which Description we have the formal Constitution Object and End of Politie 1. It s formal constitution which consistes in a lawful regular Communion or Order Thus Aristotle Polit. 3.1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Politie is the Order of the Citie That Order is the Forme Spirit and Life of al Politie is generally asserted by Politicians and Philosophers Thus Plato Repub. 4. pag. 433. philosophising of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or good Order of a Republic under the notion of Vniversal Justice he makes it to consist in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the regular consent of Governors and Governed so that every one keeps his proper place and station 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that every one actes his own part and intermeddles not with what is aliene This is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order which gives life and forme to al Politie that there be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a mutual consent between Magistrates and people to walk and act according to that commun Law or Rule they are under Thus also pag. 443. he makes Justice to be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Eutaxie of moderate Empire i. e. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the natural constitution of Governors and Governed when each understands and actes his proper parts This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order he makes to be pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Preservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Health 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the good Habitude and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Pulchritude or Beautie of a Republic Whereas on the contrary Disorder 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when men keep not their stations but invade the offices or places of others he makes to be that which brings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Disease Turpitude Infirmitie Vitiositie and Anarchie or Confusion to a Republic Thus pag. 434. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore seing there are these three distinct orders of men in a Citie a curiositie in medling with the Office of another and mutual Permutation or Invasion of each others place is that which without al dout brings the greatest dammage to a Citie and therefore may be rightly termed its peste This Invasion of each others place he makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a certain sedition as also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Insurrection and Ataxie or want of good order in the Citie Plato tels us also That the best and most perfect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Politie consistes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in a wel agreeing temperament or harmonie of al parts so that every member keeps its station This also Repub. 2. pag. 372. he makes to be the Vniversal Justice of a Republic that althings be acted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to right Order The force of which order diffuseth it self throughout al parts and is in a special manner visible in the distinct Administrations and Subordinations of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rulers and Ruled which have each their proper offices and workes Thence in his Repub. 4. he makes the Justice of a Citie to consiste in this That every one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 do what belongs to him and thence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what is convenient So that albeit there are diverse Rankes of men yet they al by virtue of this universal Justice conspire to make up one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Symmetrie or exact proportion and good order which gives forme and perfection to every Societie Thence that of Nazianzen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Order is the Mother of Beings as also their securitie This good Order Definit Plat. pag.
413. is thus defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Order is a similitude of office and action in al persons and things that relate each to the other or more concisely and distinctly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a proportion of Societie or Communion i. e. when every person and thing keeps its proper place and station The seeds of this Order are diffused throughout al parts of human Polities and are the main Foundation of al Societie and Communion For where things are not bounded by Order there infinite confusions disturbe Societies Thence Augustin de Civit. Dei l. 13. c. 13. defines Order the Disposition of things equal and inequal giving to every thing its proper place And herein he makes the Health both of Soul and Bodie to consiste yea indeed the Conservation Beautie Perfection Vigor and Activitie of al Bodies both natural and artificial Military Politic and Ecclesiastic seem chiefly to consiste in their right Order Thence Job 10.22 the confusion of the grave or state of the dead is lively illustrated by this that it is a land of darkenesse without any order i. e. where there is no orderly succession of day and night or no order among men Plato philosophiseth accurately of the great Advantages which althings acquire by Order So in his Gorgias pag. 503. If we consult Painters and Builders and al other Artificers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how each of them dispose their worke distinctly in the best order and compel althings to agree each to other til their whole worke be constituted and composed in order and with ornament Thence he addes pag. 504. That Order is that which gives Beautie Forme and Perfection to al Bodies of which see more in what follows § 5. Again he saith pag. 506. The virtue of every thing both of an instrument and of bodie and mind and lastly of every thing animate is not rashly and confusedly acquired 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but by Order and Rectitude c. Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That therefore which is constituted and conformed by Order is the virtue of every thing And thence he subjoins That Order or ornament which is proper and peculiar to every thing brings good to althings By al this it appears that the Life Beautie Wel-being and Perfection of any Societie consistes in its Order And the reason is evident because al Polities and politic Bodies whether Civil or Ecclesiastic are not composed of homogeneous similar parts al of like name and nature with themselves and the whole but of dissimilar such as consiste of diverse Members of distinct Offices Formes Situations Places as the human bodie is composed of diverse members which have al their proper situation office c. So in politic Bodies there is varietie of Members which are al to keep their station and legitime subordination without invading each others place or function Whence Plato placeth Civil Justice in this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not to invade the affaires of others but to performe each his own worke And as Order gives Forme Beautie Vigor and Perfection to Militarie Natural Artificial and Civil Bodies so also to Ecclesiastic Thence the Apostle saith Col. 2.5 it was a great joy to him Col. 2.5 to behold their order 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primarily notes militarie Order which of al Orders seems most beautiful and exquisite Whence the Church in regard of her incomparable admirable Order is said to be Cant. 6.10 Cant. 6.10 Terrible as an Armie with Banners What more terrible to an enemie and admirable to friends than to see an Armie on the March wel-disciplinated with Banners flying and every part moving orderly § 2. The formal Reason of Politie being dispatcht The object of Politie we now passe on to its Object which in the Platonic Definition is brought in under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Multitude or Communitie not simply considered but as consociated or conjoined by some commun ligament and bond For in as much as no man can politically rule himself nor yet one another properly therefore Politie requires a multitude united together which Communitie is termed a Citie or Republic And indeed man is borne for Societie as his Speech and Affections do sufficiently indigitate wherefore al persons naturally incline to consociation either Domestic or Politic. Domestic Consociation is either the first communitie and unitie of man and woman Gen. 2.23 24. instituted by the Law of Creation Gen. 2.23 24. or of parents and children or of the whole Familie Politic Consociation is of many Families in one Citie or of many Cities in one Republic And for the more ful and distinct explication of the whole we are to inquire into the original Foundation Causes and Effects of politic Consociation and Communitie 1. God the Founder of al Politics The original prime Founder of al politic Societie is God Thence Plato Leg. 4. tels us That every Republic rightly constituted dependes not on human Comments but on Divine Constitution or Laws whence he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore in order to the right constitution of a Citie let us first cal upon God that he being present would favor our desires and adorne our Citie with good Laws Whence Politic. pag. 290. he saith That among the Egyptians the King was a Priest to shew that he ought to consult God in al his Administrations Thence al your great Legislators and Founders of Cities when they were about to lay the foundation of their politic Societies consulted in apparence at least some divine Oracle as that without which they expected no happy issue of their undertakements Thus Numa pretended that he had his Laws for the Roman Governement from the Nymphe Egeria in the Arecine Grove and Zaleucus his for the Locrian Constitution from Minerva and Lycurgus his for the Lacedemonian Republic from Apollo at Delphos and Minos his for the Cretians from Jupiter in the Cretensian Den. And that Plato did really traduce the best of his politic Constitutions from the divine Constitutions delivered by Moses we have more largely proved Court Gent. P. 1. B. 3. C. 9. § 6. 2. Mans inclination to Societie God hath implanted in Mankind a natural Inclination to Societie Thus Plato in his Politicus pag. 261. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But we shal not find that a Politician doth concerne himself about one single thing only as he that drives an oxe or dresseth an horse but he is rather like such as provide for a number of horses or bullocks Whereby he illustrates how Politics regard not single persons but men in Societie and Communitie Whence in what follows he cals this politic Science 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Nutrition of an Herd or the commun Nutrition i. e. as he explicates his own mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the commun Nutrition or Gubernation of many He makes politic Philosophie to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 namely as it concernes a Communitie or Companie of men who
are of al other living Creatures most 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inclinable to flock together as Herds For as God hath given Man the benefit of Reason and Speech the principal Organs of Societie so he has also given him natural inclinations and affections of and for Consociation And that which renders these natural inclinations more efficacious and forcible is the indigent necessitous condition of man in this his lapsed condition which cals for the Advice Conduct Assistance and Relief of Societie as hereafter when we come to the Ends of Politie 3. Albeit man has a natural inclination to Societie Consociation constitutes a politic Bodie yet that which formaliseth and constitutes any politic Bodie is Confederation and Consociation For a politic Bodie being an aggregate collected out of many individuals cannot acquire any real union but by Confederation Thus Plato Repub. 4. pag. 433. makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The consent of Governors and Governed to be the formal bond of al politic Societies This consent or confederation is either in a way of Subordination between the Governors and Governed or in a way of Coordination between the Governed themselves That Confederation is essential to al politic Societie is evident from the very nature of Order which gives forme to al Politie What is Order but the union of the things ordered And what union can there be between varietie of persons but by mutual consent The Order Beautie Vigor Force Consistence flourishing and perfection of althings both Natural Artificial Moral and Politic consiste in their Vnitie Division ever brings with it Dissolution and Confusion every natural bodie hangs together by some ligament or commun bond of Union so in like manner al politic Bodies Now what bond of union can there be in a politic Bodie but Confederation Plato Repub. 4. assures us That the best Terme or Boundarie of any Citie is its Vnitie and what more conduceth to the Unitie of a Citie than Consociation by mutual consent This may be also argued from the very nature and Idea of a Citie which is defined by Grotius de Jur. Belli Pacis pag. 6. A perfect Companie of Free-men consociated for commun utilitie and enjoying the same Right So that Confederation is by al made essential to a politic Bodie whether Civil or Ecclesiastic 4. Confederation by some Law The Confederation and Consociation of every politic Bodie must be bounded and regulated by some commun Law There can be no politic Societie without consent unto some certain Bond of Consociation which Bond is that commun Law whereby the Order of that Societie is bounded and regulated Thus Plato in his Politicus tels us That in al politic Communitie and Societie for the preventing Tyrannie and Anarchie there must be Laws agreed on according to which Magistrates must rule and people obey Thus also Leg. 3. he saith That man being by nature 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sociable and communicative he cannot want societie neither can human societie want a Law which Law gives bounds and measures to al Orders whereby the excesses of the more patent are restrained and the defects of the more infirme relieved The like in his Protagoras pag. 326. where he tels us That a wel-governed Republic is bounded by the formule of certain Laws which prescribe the Offices both of Rulers and Ruled and compel each to live accordingly This is also wel expressed by Hooker in his Ecclesiastic Politie pag. 25. Two foundations there are which bear up public Societies the one a natural Inclination whereby al men desire sociable life and fellowship the other an Order expressely or secretly agreed upon touching the manner of their union in living together The later is that which we cal the Law of a Commun-wealth the very Soul of a politic Bodie the parts whereof are by Law animated held together and set on worke in such actions as the commun good requireth Thus much touching the necessitie of some commun Law as the bond of Confederation but as for the Origine Nature and Effects of politic Laws we are to treat thereof under politic Legislation § 5. 5. Amitie and Fraternitie Perfect Politie requires not only Confederation but also intime Amitie and Fraternitie Plato Repub. 3. pag. 415. gives us a Phenician Fable touching the original Fraternitie of al men which he makes to be the foundation of Polities 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Ye are indeed al who converse together in the Citie Brethren but seing God has made those of you who are fit to rule as Gold and those who are to assist them as Silver the Ruled are but as Iron and Brasse Two things are here laid down 1 That al the Members of a politic Societie are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 borne out of the Earth that commun Mother and therefore a Fraternitie 2 Yet so as that this Fraternitie may not destroy the distinct Orders of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Governors and Governed This Amitie and Fraternitie is sometimes termed Familiaritie which Definit Plat. is thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Familiaritie is a Communion or Societie of the same kind Sometimes it is stiled Fellowship which is thus defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fellowship is an Amitie according to the same custome of life According to the Civil Law a Societie is defined a right of Fraternitie Societas est jus fraternitatis Thence Bacon in the Life of Henry VII tels us what we al know by experience That Colleges and Societies of Merchants and Artificers according to the English mode are called Fraternities So the Pythagoreans called in imitation of the Essenes their Societie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Fraternitie Plato carried this Amitie and Fraternitie so far as to take away al distinction of meum and tuum and to reduce al to a communitie of Goods So Repub. 5. pag. 462. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These words Mine and not Mine are not used in the Citie And pag. 464. he gives the reason of this communitie of althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There are no contentions or Law-suits each with other because none shal have any thing proper to himself but his own person althings else are commun to al. This communitie of althings if wel bounded and not abused may be of great use in some cases as in the primitive Churches it was a great effect of that Fraternitie and Amitie which was among them as Act. 2.44 45 46. Thence Plato Repub. 5. pag. 463. Act. 2.44 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He estimes and cals his familiar friend as himself We find this Fraternitie and Communitie establisht to an high degree by Lycurgus in the Spartan Republic as Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus pag. 49 c. relates Lycurgus persuaded the Spartans to make a new division of their Lands equally among themselves to live from thenceforth as Brethren together so that none should seek to go before each other save in virtue only thinking there should be no difference
or inequalitie among inhabitants of one Citie but the reproches of dishonestie and praise of virtue Further he made another Law for eating and drinking and against Festes and Banquets First he commanded them to eat together al of one meat and chiefly of those he had permitted by his Ordinance In these commun Repastes which the Cretians called Andria and the Lacedemonians Philitia either because they were places wherein they learned to live soberly from Phido to save or spare or else because their amitie and friendship grew there one towards another as if they would have called them Philitia Love-festes by changing d into l. And Plato Leg. 11. pag. 915. makes mention of such a kind of Love-feste in use among the Grecians His words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. In that kind of Feste which is made up of Symbols or Collations and called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and celebrated among friends c. This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Love-feste was for the preservation of love and amitie among those of the same Societie which was in use also among the Jews as it appears by their Feste after the Passeover whence the Grecians seem to have borrowed their custome as the Christians their Love-festes mentioned Jude 12. Jude 12. See more of the nature of this Friendship Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 6. § 1 c. 6. Religion the principal foundation of Polities The principal Foundation and Ligament of al politic Fraternitie and Societie is Religion Thus Plato Leg. 4. pag. 713. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But it behoved if the Citie be designed by this name that it be called by the name of God himself who is the true Lord of wise men His mind is that a Citie ought to be composed of wise virtuose men who have God for their Lord and therefore may be called the Citie of God Whence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Namely this Discourse reteining the vestigia of the primigenous Truth teacheth that there wil be no cessation of evils and troubles in those Cities whatsoever they be in which not God but some mere mortal ruleth but it commandeth that with al possible endeavors we imitate that life which was under Saturne i. e. in the golden Age of the state of Innocence in which Religion and Virtue flourished Thence in his Politicus pag. 290. Plato acquaints us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That among the Egyptians it is not lawful for a King to rule without a Priesthood yea if any one out of the Royal line should by violence usurpe the Empire he is forced to be initiated in Sacreds Moreover in many Cities of Grece and specially among you Athenians thou shalt find the chief Sacreds to be instituted by the supreme Magistrates For among you they say that the most august Sacreds and most ancient Rites of Religion are committed to the charge of the King created By which he shews how much the supreme Magistrate both among the Egyptians and Grecians was concerned for the conservation of Religion Thence Campanella Pol. cap. 8. pag. 156. saith That the Priesthood acts Gods part in an Empire therefore there never was any Republic or Societie of men nor yet can be without a Priesthood So essential is Religion to politic Societies How much the Civil Magistrate is to concerne himself for the conservation of Religion is evident from the promise and practice of David Psal 75.2 3. Psal 75.2 When I shal receive the congregation I wil judge uprightly David promiseth in these words that when he should obtain the ful gubernation of the Kingdome he would administer it with justice and settle Religion which was then miserably dissolved So it follows v. 3. The earth and al the inhabitants thereof are dissolved I bear up the pillars of it By the Earth he means the Judaic Kingdome which was growen very dissolute but saith he I do or by an Enallage of Tenses I wil bear up or confirme the pillars thereof Some by pillars understand just and religiose Magistrates others Religion and Justice which are the primarie pillars of a Nation and these David promiseth to confirme when King That Religion is the principal Pillar of any State Plato more expressely inculcates Repub. 4. pag. 424. where he premits this as a preliminary proposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a Republic if it be once wel begun doth always encrease as a circle Whereby he shews that the perfection of a Republic dependes greatly on a good beginning Thence he procedes to shew That the best beginning and perfection of a Republic consistes in Religion which he symbolically expresseth under the notion of Music 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore the Fortresse as it seems in which the Office of the Keepers is constituted consistes in Music And the prevarication hereof doth secretly steal into and influence mens minds 1 By the Keepers he understands the Magistrates whom he makes to be Conservators of the Laws 2 He saith the Fortresse and strong Tower of these Conservators of the Laws consistes in the Discipline of Music That by the Discipline of Music must be understood Religion is evident by the coherence as also by the use of this phrase elsewhere For Plato herein following the Pythagorean mode stileth Virtue and Religion Music or Harmonie 3 He saith the prevarication or perversion of Religion hath a great force and efficace for the corrupting mens minds and therefore the preservation of it has great influence on the wel-being of Societies Thence in his Leg. 12. pag. 966. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Is not this one of the chiefest things concerning which we have hitherto much discoursed namely touching God that he is and how great and august his forces are as to human affaires Whence he concludes That no one ought to be elected to the Office of a public Magistrate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 save he that is divine or religiose and addicted to divine studies Wherein he assertes 1 That the knowlege of God is the best Wisdome and the very Soul of Virtue 2 That nothing is more 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impolitic or against the interest of a politic Societie than the ignorance of God and neglect of Religion For without Laws a Republic cannot be happy neither can there be good Laws without a prudent knowlege of what is best neither can there be a prudent knowlege of what is best without the knowlege of God 3 He shews also that a Republic cannot be happy without Virtue which also belongs to Religion 4 Having placed Religion as the Foundation of an happy Republic he explicates the parts thereof such as are most influential on politic Bodies namely the knowlege of the Deitie his Providence Justice c. Thus elsewhere Plato makes Religion to be the principal Fundamen of a Republic and thence more ancient wherefore the first care of Legislators and Politicians in order to the right constitution of
any Republic as also for the preservation thereof ought to be for the establishment of Religion The like Aristotle Eth. l. 1. c. 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's manifest that a Politician ought to know what concernes the Soul as he that wil cure the eyes must understand the whole bodie His designe is to shew that it belongs to Politicians and Statesmen to make the people happy and thence to make them virtuose Campanella Polit. cap. 7. tels us That three Causes to speak politicly found and governe Empires namely God Prudence and Occasion but in some Empires one is more visible in some another In the Hebraic Kingdome God was more visible in the Roman Prudence in the Spanish Occasion Although physically God is the Cause of al other Causes Whence Cap. 8. he addes That al Governements except wicked Machiavel have acknowleged that Prudence doth not so far avail as to foreknow what Goods or Evils are approching therefore al Nations have had recourse to God c. But how much the Interest of any politic Bodie or State lies involved in that of Religion is excellently laid down by Padre Paul the Venetian that pious and great Politician as we find it in his Life pag. 161. Touching the provisions that were to be made from time to time with the Senators the Father gave his opinion and counsel vivâ voce and vehemently upon al occurrents having always taught and inculcated that not only for Truth and Conscience sake but even for Necessitie and Reasons of State every faithful man but most of al Princes ought to invigilate the maintenance and conservation of Religion He affirmed that to this end God had constituted Princes as his Lieutenants in those States wherein the Church was planted and conferred their greatnesse on them to make them Protectors Defenders Conservators of the holy Church as sacred Scripture makes mention in which calling the greatest of them can never give a sufficient discharge of himself except it be by a godly and vigilant care in maters of Religion Thus that great Master of Wisdome and true Christian Politics How much Religion is the support of States is wel determined by Solomon the wisest Politician or rather by Christ himself Prov. 8.15 By me Kings reigne c. or as some render it In me i. e. in the exalting of me Kings reigne most prosperously The exaltation of Christ is the support and exaltation of States Religion is both the conservant and promovent Cause of States 1 King 11.37 38. Jeroboam held his Crown by it So Deut. 9.25 29. § 3. Having finisht the original and principal Causes of politic Societies we now descend to its principal Ends which The Ends of Politie in the Platonic Definition are al included in that notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the Beatitude or wel-being of a politic Bodie This politic Beatitude implies many particulars Gods Glorie As 1. The Glorie of God which is the last end not only in Ethic or moral but also in politic Beatitude Thus Plato Leg. 4. pag. 713. assures us That al manner of evils wil befal that State where God reignes not And he addes the reason pag. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. God hath in himself the principe and end and middle of althings i. e. althings not only natural and moral but also politic have their origine from God dependence on him and therefore ought to end in him as their main Centre Whence pag. 716. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But God is to us principally the measure of althings Lastly pag. 717. he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. This namely the Worship and Service of God is the primary end of our life unto which al our actions ought to collime as arrows to their Scope Thence he procedes according to his blind capacitie to shew how we ought to honor and worship God Hence 2. Virtue Another principal end of politic Societie is to render men virtuose and like unto God This indeed Plato greatly inculcates So Leg. 4. pag. 716. he saith That a good man follows God and is like unto him and therefore only fit to honor and worship him which gives stabilitie to a State So Leg. 12. he makes the knowlege of God and Virtue the great pillars and principal end of Politics Thence Leg. 9. pag. 877. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It behoveth a Citie to have its Families so far as it may be most holy and most happy Wherein he seems to place the happinesse of a Citie in its Holinesse and Virtue So Alcibiad 1. pag. 134. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It cannot therefore be that any should be happy unlesse good Whence he addes Therefore Alcibiades Cities want not Wals or Naval forces to render them happy neither can they be so by a multitude of men or by the magnitude of power without Virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But if thou doest purpose to governe the Republic rightly and worthily Virtue is to be communicated to thy Citizens Thence Definit Plat. pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 politic Philosophie is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science of things honest and utile Also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Science effective of Justice in the Citie The like Aristotle in his Ethics l. 1. c. 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And it seems that he who is really a Politician gives his mind and endeavors chiefly to this namely Virtue because his designe is to make Citizens good and obedient to Laws We have instances hereof in the Cretensian and Lacedemonian Legislators who made it the grand designe to promove Virtue So l. 1. c. 9. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We made the last end of politic Philosophie to be the chiefest Good but this makes it the chiefest Concerne to render the Citizens wel qualified and good and Agents of the best things Such illustrious notices had these poor Pagans of the essential connexion between Virtue and true Politics 3. Another principal end of politic Societie is the good of the whole The Good of the whole not only of particulars Thus Plato Repub. 4. pag. 420. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We constitute a Citie not for this end that some one particular number of Citizens be separately happy but principally that the whole Citie be so The like he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now therefore we frame a Republic as happy when not a few only therein are such but the whole That the public good is a principal end of al Politie and politic Societie Plato frequently assertes So Repub. 1. pag. 345. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But now I estimed it necessary for us to confesse that al Empire as Empire must regard the good of none other but such as are subject to that Empire and committed to its care whether it be in politic or private Empire Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 As if the profit from that dignitie of governing
were not to returne to them but to those that are subject to them By which he instructes us that Magistrates ought to intend not their private interest but the public Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That must be done which seems best for the Citie And elsewhere he saith That neither Republics nor Laws are good but seditiose when the public good is not principally regarded Thence Leg. 9. pag. 859. he tels us That Legislators ought to put on the person of a Father not of a Tyrant i.e. they ought to aim at the public good not their own private advantage For public Laws ought to regard public good But of this more in what follows of politic Administrations Laws and Magistrates Hence 4. Mutual Assistance Mutual Assistance is another principal end of politic Societie This Plato Repub. 2. pag. 369. largely philosophiseth on as that which gave the original foundation to al politic Societies He begins thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. A Citie thence received its origine because none of us was of himself sufficient but deficient as to many things Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 scil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But our necessitie as it seems wil make this Citie 1 He makes our necessitie and indigence that which first gave origine to al Cities and politic Societies 2 The cause of this necessitic he makes to be the insufficience of al men to live of themselves without mutual assistances each from other Hence it was saith he that men at first congregated into Societies for the mutual relief each of other Gen. 2.18 according to that general Edict of God Gen. 2.18 It is not good that man should be alone which albeit there it regards conjugal Societie yet it may be extended to al politic Societie For as Aristotle saith It was necessary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that they consociate together who cannot subsiste without each others assistance Thence Plato procedes to shew the various degrees of Necessitie which forced men to congregate into politic Societies 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The first and greatest kind of necessitie is the provision of food that we may subsiste and live 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second of Habitation 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the third of Raiment and such like Now for the supplie of these necessities he saith there must be in a politic Societie varietie of Artificers for al are not sufficient for al employments neither must any one invade the office of another but every one ought to take that part as is most proper to him of which more in what immediately follows § 4. § 4. A politic Bodie or Citie what From what has been laid down touching the Constitution and Ends of Politic we may with facilitie delineate the true Idea of a politic Bodie as also what is preservative or destructive thereof The Grecians usually confine the notion of a politic Bodie to a Citie because at first their Republics and Polities were usually confined to one single Citie Plato's Idea of a Citie with its origine we have in what immediately precedes hinted He gives it us Repub. 2. pag. 369. as before making the necessities of men the ground of their consociation adding 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore in this manner whiles one associated to himself another seing there was need of many for that affaire necessitie caused that those first men congregated many into one seat and place of habitation as companions and coadjutors each of other This companie of men we cal a Citie Wherein he gives us a summary description of a Citie its Origine End Mater and constitutive Parts which he more copiosely explicates in what follows 1 He makes the origine end and occasion of mens congregating into Cities to be commun necessities and mutual assistances This he more fully explicates in what immediately follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But one again impartes what he hath to the other or receiveth from his companion thus mutually giving and receiving each from other accounting this way of reciprocal communication ever best Mutual assistance and communication is the original end and occasion of al politic Societies The sum is this Men being not in their single capacities 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-sufficient they find themselves under an essential obligation to congregate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 into Corporations that so they might assist each other by their mutual 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or conversation which consistes in their giving to and receiving from each other 2 As to the Mater of a Citie as also other politic Bodies he tels us That it is not sufficient that it consiste of three or sour members but there must be a Societie of different Occupations and Offices This he insistes on pag. 369 370. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is need therefore of more than four to provide those things of which we have spoken i. e. Food Raiment Habitations and other Conveniences for which he tels us that there is need of Husbandmen and al manner of Artificers And he gives his reason for it pag. 370. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Because truly first every one is not borne alike to every one but very diverse in nature therefore one is naturally more inclined to one worke Thus also pag. 371. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore our Citie needs many Husbandmen and other Artificers And he gives the reason in what follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For which causes namely that there might be a free Commerce and Trade we have instituted a Citie So that the main end of a Citie being freedome of commerce and mutual conversation it 's necessary that there be a multitude or communitie to constitute the same 3 As to the formal Constitution of a Citie as of al other politic Societies he saith this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Communion must not be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Confusion but althings must be transacted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with Eutaxie or good Order which he termes Justice as it consistes in the prescribing to each member his proper ranke place office and exercice in the politic Bodie For this good Order or universal Justice requires 1 That every member has his proper place and worke prescribed to him and that he take diligent heed not to invade the office and worke of another Which invasion Plato greatly condemnes as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a curiose and pragmatic interposition in other mens affaires 2 That there be a due observation of the distinct Orders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Governors and Governed 4 Lastly he makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the plenitude and perfection of a Citie or Republic to consiste in the fore-mentioned communitie and multitude under their different offices conspiring together and falling into one certain harmonie for the commun utilitie of the whole Thence Definit Platon pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Citie is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
〈◊〉 an habitation of a multitude of men using the same commun Decretes or Constitutions Also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a multitude of men which are under the same Law Whence it is added 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Virtue of a Citie is the constitution of a right Politie Whence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Politician or Statesman is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that understandes the constitution of a Citie or Republic Agreably to those Platonic Philosophemes Aristotle in his Politics 1. 5. makes a Citie to be a kind of animate or animal nature For look as an Animal rightly disposed according to nature is composed of certain proportionate parts mutually ordinate and communicating each to other as also to the whole their exercices and operations so in like manner a Citie when duely disposed and instituted is constituted of such proportionate parts for the mutual aide and assistance each of other And such as the comparation of an Animal and his parts is as to sanitie such is that of a Citie or Republic and its parts as to tranquillitie And what is sanitie according to the Philosophemes of the wisest Physiologistes but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good Disposition or right Order of al parts in the Animal whereby they are capacitated perfectly to exert al exercitations and operations convenient to their nature according to which Analogie or proportion the Tranquillitie of a Citie or Republic is nothing else but its 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order or right Disposition of al its parts counected together by some commun Law as Marsilius Patavinus that great Politician in his Defensor pacis cap. 2. pag. 6. has wel determined Cicero defines a Republic Rem populi the Affaire of the People and he desines the People a Societie of the multitude Populus coetus multitudinis juris consensu utilitatis communione sociatas Cic. consociated by the consent of Right and communion of Vtilitie i. e. according to our English Phraseologie The people are a Societis consociated by commun consent and according to some Law for public Good This Strabo also lib. 16. makes to be the origine and formal constitution of al ancient politic Societies as we shal shew § 5. on that head of Legislation A People is defined by Augustin de Civ Dei l. 19. c. 24. a Societie of the rational multitude consociated for concordant communion in those things they consent unto Which is by so much the better by how much the more they concord in what is best and by so much the worse by how much the more they concord in things that are worse And as the processe of Nature and Art is always from things lesse perfect to that which is more perfect so it hath been with al Societies which begin at first only with two Man and Woman Gen. 2.18 c. which Plato termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whence this imperfect Societie extended it self to more perfect families and then domestic Societie extended it self to Pagus i. e. to the Societie of Villages for anciently Pagani were those in the same Pagus or Village who dranke of the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Dor. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This Societie of Villages at last extended it self to that of a Citie as this to that of a Republic as Aristot Polit. l. 1. c. 1. A Citie was at first instituted for the securitie preservation and wel-being of the whole Hence a Citie is defined by Augustin de Civit. lib. 15. cap. 8. A multitude of men collected together by some commun bond of Societie So also de Civit. Dei l. 1. c. 15. he saith A Citie is nothing else but a concord multitude of men Thence Grotius de Jure belli pag. 6. defines a Citie a companie of men consâ—ciated together for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Vtilitie Wherein note 1 The generic Idea of a Citie which is a Companie or Communitie i. e. perfect for it is essential to a Citie both as to Mater and Forme that it be perfect It is perfect as to Mater in that it is composed of al manner of Artificers and Occupations necessary for the subsistence and welfare of a Communitie It is also perfect as to Forme as it has a perfect Order and Regiment for the conservation and gubernation thereof 2 Whence follows the formal constitution of a Citie which consistes in its regular consociation of which before 3 Thence also its End is for the enjoyment of the same Right and commun Vtilitie of which also in what precedes Touching a Citie its constitution and perfection see more fully that pious and great Reformer not only of Religion but also of Philosophie Savonarola Epit. Ethicae l. 10. § 5. Legislation its Origine Having hitherto discussed and explicated the essential Constitution of a Politie and politic Bodie we now passe on to the Empire thereof which consistes in Legislation and Administration or Jurisdiction That al politic Bodies are bounded and governed by Laws has been already proved § 2. And we find a clear account hereof in Strabo Geogr. l. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Men that are politic or civil do lead their lives after one commun Law appointing them what to do for otherwise that a multitude should without harmonie among themselves concur in the doing of one thing it is impossible Of what great use Laws are for the right ordering and governing Republics and al politic Bodies is wel laid down by Plato Protag pag. 326. where speaking of the Education of Youth he saith That after they depart from under their Preceptors the Republic compels them to learne the Laws and to live according thereunto a certain Formule being framed that so none act rashly according to their own wils but as Writing-masters prescribe such as begin to write certain half-letters and strokes of the pen thereby to forme their hand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. So the Republic having framed a Formule of Laws invented by good and ancient Legislators according to their prescript compels both those that governe and those that are governed to act but if any transgresse their bounds him they punish which kind of punishment they cal 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Correction 1. The necessitie of Laws Touching the Necessitie of Laws we have an excellent Disscourse in Plato Leg. 9 p. 874 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. It 's necessary that Laws be framed for men that so they may live according to Laws for if they should live without these they would in nothing differ from the savage bestes The cause whereof is this because no mans ingenie is so framed by nature as that he should certainly know what conduceth to the commun utilitie of human life or if he should know what is best yet he is not always able or willing to act the same This grand reason of State inducing a necessitie of Laws he explicates in the
parts thereof 1 He saith it is very difficult without Laws for any to understand what most conduceth to the public good which is the measure and bond of Societies So pag. 875. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For first it is very difficult without Laws to know what that public not private interest is which true politic Discipline is to provide for Thence he addes 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Moreover although peradventure some one may by the aide of politic Science abundantly understand these things yet if it be so that he hath gained an absolute power and is not obnoxious to the check of any other he wil not be able throughout his life to persevere in this resolution of preferring the public Interest as best and of postponing his private concernes after the public utilitie but mortal nature always impels him to his proper interest and private opportunitie which without al reason flies from grief and persues pleasure and thence wil fil the Citie with al manner of evil These are the principal reasons which enforce the establishment of Laws namely mens ignorance of what is best and their strong inclination to promove their private interest more than the public good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Namely if any mortal were indued with such a nature as could understand the public good and were by a divine afflation made apt to undertake the same such an one would not need Laws or their Empire But such a Divine nature addes he is no where to be found and therefore there remains an absolute necessitie of Laws to instruct men in what is their dutie to restrain them from the prosecution of their private interest and lusts as also to constrain them to what is good Laws have much more force to compel men to their dutie than the wisest of men For let men though never so wise and just oppose themselves in the wisest and most just manner to the irregularities of others yet how inefficacious are their endeavors for reformation what contradictions do they meet with from those they endeavor to reforme Yet let the same persons be instructed in their dutie by a Law and they are with more facilitie convinced thereof and inclined thereto and why because they presume the Law doth speak without prejudice partialitie and private interest therefore they look on it as the Oracle of God 2. Al Laws originally from God As for the Origine of Laws Plato assures us That the best are such as come from God For he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 No mere mortal can make Laws to purpose Whereby he instructes us that a Republic ought not to depend on mere Comments of men but on some Divine Law namely the eternal Mind and Wil which is the source of al true politic Laws Whence also he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Let us therefore cal upon God for the right disposition of the Citie and that he favoring us may be present and grant our requests and constitute our Laws and Citic And touching the first Institution of Laws he saith expressely Repub. 4. pag. 427. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It belongs not truly to us but to the Delphic Apollo the chiefest best and first Institutes of Laws belong 1 That by Apollo he symbolically indigitates the true God though unknown wil be evident to any that observes his Phraseologie Thus also Lycurgus as Plutarch in his Life relates being about to frame his Laws he consultes first with the Oracle of Apollo to establish good Laws in his Countrey And Lycurgus took so great care to establish wel his Laws that he brought an Oracle from Apollo's Temple for the chief of them which Oracle is to this day called Retra i. e. the Statute-Oracle Thus also Plato in his Minos pag. 319. treating of the Origine of Laws brings in Homer commending Minos for consulting Jupiter in order to the framing right Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he saith Sanè caeterorum Legislatorum quos tantopere admirata omnis vetustas est sanctiones multae Mosaicis similes fuêre Cunaeus de Repub. Jud. that Minos conversed with Jupiter and used secret conference with him for nine years space and that he addressed himself to Jupiter as to a certain Sophist that he might be instructed i.e. how to frame Laws aright 2 That Plato ownes God as the supreme Legislator from whom the best and first Laws came is as evident and that not only from his confession but also by his practice in making such a curiose inquisition into the sacred Mosaic Laws and traducing thence the choisest of his Laws as we have more largely proved out of his own Workes as also out of Clemens Alexandr Eusebius and others Court Gent. B. 3. C. 9. Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 6. § 6. 3. Human Legislators ought to be men of Wisdome public Spirits and virtuose We find an excellent Character of an human Legislator in Plato Leg. 9. pag. 858. where he puts this Question Whether ought we to consult a Legislator more than other Writers touching things honest good beautiful just Which being granted he assumes It is consentaneous that of al the Writings which are used in Republics those that concerne Laws be most accurately composed and that al the Writings of other men be so far approved as they agree to these Laws and so far exploded as they are dissentaneous Whence he concludes pag. 859. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Let us therefore take this course in framing Laws for Cities that the Legislator entirely clothe himself with the person of a Father and Mother that so those written Laws may represent the image of men indued with a certain sollicitous affection whereby they take care of those for whom they dictate Laws as also with a sagacious prudence whereby they know how to consult things good and commodous for them But they must not put on the person of a Tyrant and some impotent domineering Lord who with an infinite or absolute kind of Empire commands what he lists and adding menaces wils that his pleasure stand for reason and Law whereby he begets only hatred and envie Wherein we find many great Characters of a good Legislator He saith 1 He must have a sagacious prudence or prudent sagacitie to find out what Laws are best and most commodous 2 He must put on the person of a Father and Mother i. e. al manner of tender affections such as are sollicitous for the good of those for whom the Laws are made 3 He must avoid al shadow of Tyrannie and absolute Dominion of such as make their Wil their Law without Reason 4 He must make such Laws as may beget in those for whom they are made a good opinion of and love to them not hatred Hence 4. Al Laws from the Multitude Al politic Laws ought to procede originally from the Multitude or from their Representatives Thus Plato in his Gorgias pag.
488. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Doth not the Law of Nature constitute that MANY or the multitude are better than ONE who truly make Laws for one namely for the commun good Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore the Laws of the MANY or Multitude are the Laws of the most excellent Whence he farther argues That the Laws of the Multitude are of the best 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Are they not also the Laws of the best For they that are more excellent are better Thence he addes another Argument 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Are not their the many Laws according to nature beautiful and honest because they are most excellent Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Do not therefore the MANY or multitude judge that it is just to live according to some equal Right or Law of Equitie and more base to do injustice than to suffer it By al which he demonstrates that the most equal Laws are such as procede from the MANY or Multitude Thus Plato in his Minos shews That it is both useful and necessary that Laws be framed by the free suffrage of the people And his reason is invincible namely because al Laws ought to regard the public Utilitie and therefore ought to be confirmed by public consent Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur Jus Civil For that which concernes al must be approved by al. And herein Plato is followed by his Disciple Aristotle who Polit. l. 3. c. 6. demonstrates That the Legislative power belongs to the people and universitie of Citizens or to their Representatives congregated in some general Assemblie This politic Hypothesis is strenuously defended by that great Christian Politician Marsilius Patavinus in his Defensor Pacis cap. 12. pag. 36. where he proves it by these Arguments 1 The Universitie of Citizens or Communitie do more perfectly understand and affect the public Good which is the principal end and measure of al Politie 2 Laws framed by the whole multitude or their Repreentatives are better observed than such as are imposed on them against their consent For a Citie being a Communitie of Free-men as Aristot Pol. 3.4 al Laws are most confirmed by their consent Again he proves that the coactive power is in the multitude or their more prevalent part and therefore those Laws are best observed which are made by their consent 3 The Communitie or Universitie of the multitude do best understand what is most commodous or incommodous for the preservation and promotion of their Societie now al Laws are for the preservation and promotion of the Societie therefore they ought to be approved by al according to that commun Maxime That which toucheth the commun good of al must be approved by al. Thence he procedes p. 42. to solve a commun objection against the peoples consent in Legislation namely That the multitude are ignorant depraved perverse c. To which he respondes 1 That the whole multitude hath a better judgement and affection than any single part because the wisdome of single persons is included in the whole 2 That the first invention and examen of Laws may be committed to prudent men and yet the approbation and confirmation of them appertain to the universitie or commun multitude 3 The multitude may commit the whole of Legislation to certain Representatives elected by them Thus Hooker Ecclesiast Politie pag. 28 29. By the Law of Nature whereunto God hath made al subject the lawful power of making Laws to command whole politic Societies of men belongeth so properly unto the same entire Societies that for any Prince or Potentate of what kind soever upon earth to exercise the same of himself and not either by expresse commission immediately and personally received from God or else by Authoritie derived at first from their consent upon whose persons they impose Laws it is no better than mere Tyrannie But approbation not only they give who personally declare their assent by voice signe or act but also when others do it in their names by right originally at least derived from them As in Parliaments and like Assemblies The like Campanella Polit. cap. 4. As Virtue is the private Law of an individual person so the Law is a public Virtue of the Communitie therefore none may make a Law but the Republic in whom the commun reason and consent is or the most wise men to whom this commun reason is committed by the Communitie as Solon and Lycurgus and Numa or God who takes care of al and is the supreme Reason Hence 5. Al politic Laws must tend to Al Laws for public Good and be measured by the public Good For that which has its origine from public consent and dependence thereon must tend to the public Good Al Laws being but an effect of the public Wil ought to end in the public Good whence it is a Maxime in the Civil Law Publicum jus publicam utilitatem respicit Just. Institut Public Right regards the public Vtilitie Thus Plato Minos pag. 317. from the origination of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is generally derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to distribute stiles a Legislator 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good Distributor one that distributes to every one what is proper to him Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is that which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 distributes to al their due measuring al by the commun good Whence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore the distributions hereof and Laws are best and he that observes in these things the most accurate reason of Laws is most skilful in Law and the best Distributor His mind is that he that frames Laws and distributes to every one according to what is due to him and the public Good is the best Legislator and Distributor of Justice Thus pag. 320. discoursing of Minos's Legislation he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore he framed such Laws for his Citizens by the Benefice whereof both Crete enjoyeth a perpetual felicitie and Lacedemon from the time that she began to use these Divine Laws So greatly were Minos's Laws calculated for the public Good But this Plato more fully determines Leg. 4. pag. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Truly we denie those to be Republics neither do we account those to be right Laws which are not referred to the commun Vtilitie of the Citie But those who so indulge their lusts as that they make Laws in favor of some Parties we affirme those to be not Citizens but seditiose persons and al those Titles of Right and Laws which they by their Comments pretend to be void So severe is Plato ' in this point as that he judgeth al Laws made in favor of some one Partie and not for the commun Good to be ipso facto seditiose and void And he gives the reason Leg. 9. pag. 875. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the public Reason and Good doth firmely connect and keep together Republics but oblique regard to
private Interest doth subvert and overthrow them 6. The principal public Good Virtue a principal end of Laws unto which al Laws ought to tend is universal Justice and Virtue For as Virtue is a private Law so Law is the public Virtue or that whereby the Virtue of the whole Communitie is measured and promoted Thus Plato Leg. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Al Laws are to be constituted for the best end namely for Virtue So he explicates himself pag. 630. where he saith That a Legislator sent by God to establish utile and commodoâ—s Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wil in the constitution of Laws have regard to no other than the chiefest Virtue Yea he addes That he who wil constitute a Divine Republic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must as Legislator have respect not only to one particle of Virtue and that the least but to universal Virtue and accordin gto the formes or kinds of Virtue find out Laws proportionable thereto The like he lays down Repub. 4. pag. 444. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Do not therefore the preclare and illustrious Institutes or Laws of living make way to Virtue but base Laws precipitate men into vice Whereby he instructes us that Laws if good have an efficacious force for the promoting Virtue but if bad of Vice Hence 7. Al politic Laws must be natural voluntary facile expedite Laws must be proper and universal otherwise they cannot reach that universal Virtue and public Good they tend unto 1 Al Laws ought to be Natural So Plato Leg. 3. pag. 690. saith Natural That Laws ought to be constituted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 against nature but according to nature i. e. the natural condition and exigence of the Communitie 2 Laws must be Voluntary Voluntary or such as the Communitie may chearfully assent and consent to Thus Plato Leg. 4. pag. 684. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But now many prescribe that to Legislators that they frame such Laws as the people and Communitie may freely receive as if any should command Physicians that they heal with a kind of pleasure and jucunditie to such as they heal Hence Facile 3 Laws must be facile and expedite otherwise how can the Communitie consent thereto or chearfully observe the same Thus Plato Leg. 3. pag. 684. in what follows on the former 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That also had great force at that time that Laws were more easily constituted Campanella Pol. cap. 4. tels us That those Laws are best which are curt facile few in number accommodated to the manners of the people and public Good Whereas tyrannic Laws are numerous obscure difficile as many snares utile only to one or few neither accommodated to public manners and utilitie 4 Laws ought to be proper and agreable to the Communitie Proper their state and condition Hence that commun Aphorisme among Politicians That laws are to be fitted to times and persons as the shooe to the foot In matters of Governement men must do what they can not what they would Vniversal Hence 5 Laws must be universally extensive unto al cases So Plato Leg. 1. pag. 630. saith Laws ought to reach 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 universal Virtue Thus Aristotle Pol. 3. where he gives us this difference between the particular judgement of a Judge and Laws A Judgement is a particular Law but a Law is an universal Judgement i. e. such as must reach al cases though indeed al human Laws are greatly defective in this particular as it wil appear by what immediately follows Hence 8. The Law of Equitie Seing human Legislators cannot by their Laws reach al particular cases therefore al politic Laws need 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Equitie to correct their defects as also Conservators to keep them from degenerating 1 That al human politic Laws are greatly defective as to their comprehension of particular cases is most evident from their Generalitie Thus much Plato acknowledgeth Leg. 4. p. 718. where he saith That althings cannot be opportunely reduced to one certain formule of Law therefore a Legislator ought to lay down some general indication before he procede to a singular constitution of Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Moreover these things are such as that they cannot be comprehended and defined by one certain formule Wherein he instructeth us that seing Laws cannot be prescribed to al things singular therefore a Legislator ought to draw up some general Institutes c. This imperfection of Laws was taken notice of by Solon and others who have compared Laws to Spiders webs which ensnare and entangle the lesser flies but let the greater break thorough Hence 2 al human Laws need 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law of Equitie for the correction of their defects Thus Plato Minos pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 In these things therefore that concerne maters just and injust and universally such as regard the commodous disposition and ordering of the Citie that which is RIGHT is the royal Law 1 That by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which is right he understands the Law of Nature and Equitie is most evident in that he stiles it the Royal Law 2 He saith that by this Law of Rectitude or Equitie al other Laws and politic Institutes are to be regulated and corrected 3 This Equitie of Nature he makes to be the fundament of al good Laws in as much as it is one uniforme sempiterne and incommutable Rule of Justice in al times and Nations whereas al particular Laws of Nations are various and mutable according to the various conditions and mutations of Times and Nations This Law of Equitie he describes also Minos pag. 314. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Law therefore is the invention of him that truly IS Serranus by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which is understands the eternal Law of Nature which is the source of al private Laws which is a truth But considering Plato's Phraseologie I should rather understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of God from whom the Law of Equitie and al other Laws have their emanation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Equitie Definit Plat. is described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The imminution and correction of things just and utile moderation in commerces a good composition of the rational Soul as to things honest and base That al politic Laws need a Law of Equitie to correct them was anciently observed by Androcles cited by Aristotle Rhet. lbi 2. cap. 25. who said That al Laws need a Law to correct them as fishes need salt to preserve them Touching this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Law of Equitie its Necessitie Vse and Nature see Idea Theolog. lib. 1. cap. 8. sect 2. 3 Politic human Laws need not only a Law of Equitie to correct them but also Conservators to keep them from degenerating Conservators of Laws Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Autoritie Definit Platon pag. 415. is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Tuition of the Law Thence
Plato Leg. 12. pag. 951. institutes a College for the inspection and conservation of Laws His words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Let him have recourse to their College which is constituted for the inspection of Laws Let this College consiste of Juniors and Seniors and daily at the break of day before the Sun rising let them convene First let there be of the Priests such as excel in the offices of Virtue then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Conservators of the Laws ten of those that excel in age and virtue c. The sum of al is this In as much as Laws without diligent conservation are apt to degenerate and fal under depravation from the unbridled lusts of men therefore there is need of certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Conservators of Laws to keep their Autoritie inviolable on which account Plato constituted this his sacred College 9. From what has been laid down of Laws in the general A Law what we may with facilitie forme a particular Idea of a Law which Definit Platon is thus described 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Law is a politic Decree of the Communitie constituted not for a certain time only This last clause is added to discriminate a Law from a Suffrage or Vote which is there thus defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Vote or Suffrage is a politic Decree constituted only for a certain time To speak more distinctly of a Law it includes two formal essential parts 1. It s Equitie Equitie and politic Constitution 1 Eqitio is as the Soul of the Law that which gives vital spirits and life to it and is one and the same immutable Reason which ought to diffuse it self throughout al Laws Whence a Law is defined by Pet. à Sancto Joseph The Ordination of Reason promulgated by him that hath the care of the Communitie for the commun Good Whence he proves That al Laws so far as they participate of right reason are derived from the eternal Law as also from natural Precepts By the Eternal Law they understand the Divine Decree or soverain pleasure of God whence the Reason and Equitie of al Laws both natural and politic receives its derivation Of this Equitie we have suffiiently discoursed in what immediately precedes 2. It s Constitution 2 Politic Constitution is that which draws down general equitie and applies it to this or that politic Societie according to the various exigences circumstances and reasons of State which are peculiar to that Societie or Republic for which the Laws are made 1 This politic Constitution is that which gives formal reason to politic Laws and renders them obligatorie to the Societie for which they are made Thence Definit Plat. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Legislator is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Framer of Laws accordin gto which we ought to live in Republics 2 This politic Constitution is the measure of al Controversies Determinations and Civil Justice in any politic Bodie Whence Definite Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Law is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Disceptation whether things be done justly or not And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Bonitie of Laws is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the obedience of right Laws 3 This politic Constitution is that which gives Order to al Politie Thence Definit Platon pag. 413. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Order is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a similitude of Office and Action of al those things that are compared among themselves or more briefly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Symmetrie or proportion of Societie i.e. when al that appertein to such a Societie consent to walke and live together by soem commun Law That politic Constitution or Law gives Beautie Perfection and Order to al politic Bodies we are assured by Plato in his Gorgias pag. 503 504. where he shews that althings both natural and artificial receive their perfection from Order 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore an house having acquired order and ornament wil be good and commodous Whence he concludes That as health is the virtue and order of the bodie natural so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Legal and Law is the Order of the Soul as also of Bodies politic Politic Law and Order are intimely conjoined both as to Name and Thing As for Names whence had 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Order its origination but from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dath or as we may pronounce it tat Law Order Hence sprang 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with its Derivates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies Law as wel as Order so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to distribute orderly Order as wel as Law Neither do Law and Order agree in the reciprocation of Names only but also in their Natures Hence Plato oft useth them promiscuously one for the other and joins them together as exegetic each of other So â—eg 7. pag. 780. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For whatever in a Republic is comprehended under a certain Order and Law and by the conduct thereof is governed cannot but be conjoined with the greatest goods But on the contrary either when there is no Order or when things are il constituted there cannot but follow the greatest perturbation which pervertes that good Order and al that Vtilitie that floweth thence Wherein we have these observables 1 He useth Order and Law promiscuously for one and the same thing So Leg. 9. pag. 875. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. In the next place we ought to choose Order and Law which propose what we are to consider and concernes the commun use of life 2 He saith that from this legal Order and its conduct the bonitie and perfection of things politic ariseth 3 that from the defect and want of this legal Order al perturbation confusion and evils in a politic bodie do arise More touching Order see § 1. § 6. Having explicated Legislation The several kinds of politic Administration which takes in the first part of Empire we now passe on to the second namely Administration or Jurisdiction which in Plato's Philosophie passeth under the notion of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Regiment or Governement from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 arche a Prince Principatie or Governement Whence Lot is stiled by the Rabbines 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince of the Judges So Rom. 8.38 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is taken for Principaties Definit Platon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Principatie is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The care or charge of the whole Which is a good Idea of politic Jurisdiction and Administration And that which we are herein to consider may be reduced to these two commun Heads 1 The several kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Administration with their preferences 2 The Civil Magistrate who is the Administrator of politic Jurisdiction First as for the several kinds of politic Jurisdiction or Administration they are reduced by Plato as
by others to these three Heads Monarchie Aristocratie and Democratie Monarchie Aristocratie Democratie Of these he treats distinctly in his Politicus pag. 291. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Monarchie is one forme of politic Gubernations Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And after Monarchie we may place the Governement of a few i. e. Aristocratie Lastly he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The third forme of Governement is it not that of the people called Democratie These three formes of Administration he distinctly explicates according to their legitime constitutions excesses and comparations each with other The excesse of Monarchie he makes to be Tyrannie when Princes governe without or contrary to Law and the excesse of Aristocratie he makes to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Oligarchie when a few usurpe the sole Administration of politic Affaires the excesse of Democratie is Anarchie or popular confusion when there is no distinction between Governors and Governed As for the comparation of these three Formes among themselves he affirmes that Monarchie or the Administration of One is to be preferred so far as it is moderated and bounded by good Laws together with a good Moderator and interpreter of those Laws but on the contrary if it degenerate into Tyrannie it is then of al the worst His own words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Monarchie bounded by good Laws is of al best but if it be lawlesse it is of al the most difficult and intolerable Thence Definit Plat. pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a King is said to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Prince that governes according to Laws whereby he is opposed to a Tyrant who is said to be one that governes only according to his wil as hereafter In Aristocratie there must be one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 chief among the Senators who ought to direct and order affaires The Athenian Politie mixed of Aristocratie and Democratie yea in Democratie there is something of Aristocratie from the peoples consent Thence Plato in his Menexenus pag. 238. treating of the Athenian Republic its original state as also that it then enjoyed he saith It was an Aristocratie mixed with Democratie His words are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. For there was the same forme of Politie then as now namely Aristocratie under which now we live and have kept the same for a long time Some would cal it Democratie others by another name But to speak truth it is the Gubernation of the best men with the peoples consent For we had in times past Kings and these truly sometimes came to the Governement by enheritance sometimes by the suffrage of the people But now sithat the power is in the people they commit the Administration to some most excellent and virtuose persons neither is any laid aside by reason of infirmitie or povertie or low degree of parentage neither if the contrary conditions are found is he therefore promoted as in other Cities but there is one Rule of determining al Offices namely he that is judged the wisest and best man he is called to public Administration and Office And the cause of this Administration among us is our equalitie and paritie as to origine For other Cities being composed of persons different and inequal they have inequal and different formes of Administration namely Tyrannie and Oligarchie also some are Slaves others Lords but we being borne al of one Mother judge it not equal that some be Lords and some Vassals but that equalitie of stock hath made us to find out this equalitie of Politie that none precede the other but in the estime of Wisdome and Virtue Wherefore their parents and ours having been educate in al kind of libertie many noble deeds for the commun utilitie of Mankind have been performed having always judged it necessary for libertie to fight against the Grecians for the Grecians and against the Barbarians for the Grecians Thus Plato of the Athenian Politie wherein he shews that Democratie doth not require that al Administrations be transacted by the people but that the supreme Power be in the people and that they be their free suffrage elect such as they judge to excel in Wisdome and Virtue as Administrators or Magistrates of public Affaires This he exemplifies by the Athenian Republic which was a Democratie in which 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the supreme Power was in the Communitie yet so as that the Administrationof that Power was by the peoples suffrage committed to such as they judged most eminent for Wisdome and Virtue So that this Politie was indeed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an Aristocratie with the peoples consent i. e. mixed with Democratie Plato here joins Democratie with Aristocratie Monarchie mixed with Democratie so in his Leg. 3. pag. 693. he joins Monarchie and Democratie as the two constitutive parts of a good Politie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. There are as it were two Mothers of public Administrations or Polities out of which he that shal say other formes of Gubernation resulted speaks the truth the one of these is called Monarchie the other Democratie the former is most eminently in use among the Persians the later among us And almost al other kinds of Polities are variously composed out of these And it 's necessary that a Citie which would enjoy her libertie and amitie with prudence participate of both of these which indeed our commun speech signifies when we say that a Citie destitute of these cannot be rightly administrated and governed In which he demonstrates that Regal Monarchie contempered with popular Democratie is the most equal and best of Dominations provided that it be wel confined and bounded by Laws for such a mixed Politie comes nearest to paterne Autoritie which is most natural By comparing these Philosophemes of Plato it is evident that according to his mind Mixed Politie its use a mixed Politie or Gubernation of Monarchie Aristocratie and Democratie if wel limited and bounded by Laws is generally useful Thus the Stoics also held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the best Politie or Regiment is that which is mixed of Democratie the Regal Power and Aristocratie as Laertius in Zeno. And the reasons hereof are these Monarchie has an unitive efficace for the rpeventing Division Dissolution and Ruine which usually ariseth out of Factions unto which Democratie and Aristocratie is obnoxious Democratie hath a diffusive facultie as it takes in the concernes and interest of each individual Aristocratie has a collective virtue as it gathers up the interest of the whole Communitie into a systeme of the wisest and best Administrators As al these three kinds of Polities have their virtues and efficaces so also they have their excesses Monarchie with facilitie degenerates into Tyrannie Aristocratie into Oligarchie and Democratie into Anarchie as Plato Repub. 8. pag. 563. hath wel observed Whence for the preventing the excesse of each some great Politicians as also Theologues have judged a complexe or mixed constitution of al
fully laid down in the N. T. The powers that be are ordained by God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. are ordained by the constitution and commission of God 2 As for the human Facultie 2. Human. Commission and Autoritie of the Magistrate Plato derives it from the peoples Election and Consent So Repub. lib. 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thus Leg. 6. treating of the Election of Magistrates he saith Such should be chosen as are most eminent for prudence and probitie and best qualified for the Offices they are elected unto as also wil attend the same with fidelitie and industry The termes used to expresse this Election and Creation by are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3 Touching the Autoritie of Civil Magistrates Plato makes it to be not Absolute 3. Magistrates Conservators of the Law but Subordinate to the Law For his great Character of a Magistrate is that he be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Conservator and Minister of the Law He layeth down this for a fundamental Principe That a Magistrate may not do what he list but what he ought Thus Alcibiad 1. pag. 134. where Socrates instructes young Alcibiades in this manner 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore remember that Power and Empire is not to be acquired that thou mayest rule over thy self or the Citie as thou list but according to justice and wisdome Thence in his Politicus pag. 276. he distributes civil Government into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tyrannic and Voluntary Tyrannic Governement he makes to be violent when Subjects are forced against Law but voluntary when men are governed by their own Laws and this kind of Administration he saith becomes most 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one that is truely a King and Civil Magistrate So pag. 305. he makes a Civil Magistrate to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Conservator or Keeper of Laws Hence he cites a great Saying of Pindar 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pindar saith the Law is King over al both mortals and immortals Whence that Latin Effate Lex est Rex The Law is King The subordination of the Civil Magistrate to Law Plato more fully expresseth Leg. 4. pag. 715. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I have stiled Magistrates Ministers of the Law not from an affectation of novitie but because I am persuaded that the safety of a Republic consistes herein but the peste and ruine in the contrary And he subjoins the reason of this his persuasion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For I behold ruine prepared for and present to that Citie in which Laws are not superior to the Magistrates but Magistrates to the Laws but on the contrary safetie to that Citie where the Law rules over Magistrates and Magistrates are Servants of the Law i. e. they subject themselves to the Law and obey the same For I apprehend al manner of good things which God usually confers on Cities to attend this Citie So prosperous is the condition of that Citie wherein the Magistrates Administration and Jurisdiction is bounded and circumscribed by as also subordinate to the Law which is to speak in Pindars phrase the King both of Magistrates and People Whence Leg. 6. pag. 761. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But let no Judge or Magistrate be exemted and free from rendring accounts but let him render the account of his discharge of his Office to the Citizens only those excepted unto whom the last Appeal is made according to the exemple of the Regal power Whence pag. 767. he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But in public crimes it 's in the first place necessary that the affaire be brought to the communitie or multitude for when the Citie is affected with an injurie it belongs to al to take cognizance thereof therefore the people may justly take it il if the cognizance of such affaires should be wrested from them Therefore the beginning and end of this controversie ought to be brought to the people but the examen and dijudication to the three chief Magistrates Thence Definit Platon pag. 415. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Autoritie is defined the Tuition of the Law 4. The Magistrates Exercice of his Office Next to the Facultie and Autoritie of the Civil Magistrate we are to consider him in the actual Administration or Exercice of his Office which ought to be performed with the greatest exactitude and fidelitie It 's a good observation of Aristotle Rhet. l. 2. c. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Dignitie makes great men more conspicuous and illustrious wherefore such act with greater moderation and exactitude Whence also that great Aphorisme of Pittachus mentioned by Laertius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magistratie or Governement discovers what the man is If there be an irregular principe or passion in a Magistrate it usually appears in the exercice of his Office Therefore Plato Leg. 12. requires That a Magistrate be most eminent for al manner of Virtues as before Now the main Virtues which ought to appear most illustriously in a Magistrates exercice of his Office are such as these Justice Temperance Moderation as to passions Clemence Self-denial Courage Industrie and Fidelitie of which we find many and great Philosophemes in Plato 1 The Magistrates Administration of his Office must be with Justice 1. Justice and against Briberie without Briberie Partialitie and al Respect of persons Hence Plato Leg. 12. requires 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That a Judge be sworne before he come to judge And that he may passe a righteous Sentence he also ordaines Demodocus pag. 383. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Neither judge any cause before thou hast heard both parties And against Briberie he speakes expressely Leg. 12. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That a Magistrate ought to administer Justice without Gifts Yea the 12 Tables determine That a Judge convicted of Briberie shalt be punisht with death Briberie in Courts of Judicature is like judicial Astrologie which as Tacitus observes is always forbidden and yet always retained But sacred Philosophie doth strictly oblige Magistrates to the exercice of Justice and against al Briberie in their Administrations So Psal 82.1 Psal 82.1 2. God standeth in the congregation of the mighty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 standeth i. e. as President and supreme Judge teaching others how they are to judge and punishing them if peccant So it follows he judgeth among the Gods i. e. rewarding those that are faithful but punishing the unfaithful and unjust Thence v. 2. How long wil ye judge unjustly and accept the persons of the wicked Selah As if he had said Dare ye be so unjust and partial when as God sits President in the midst of you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and accept the face or person of the wicked as Lev. 19.15 Ezra renders it lift up the faces of the wicked i. e. by your favour exhilarate and make glad the wicked Thence he procedes v. 3 4. to exhort the Judges to the execution of justice And v. 5. he shews the ruines that follow on unjust Administrations v.
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
extraordinary Impressions which Divine Gubernation shal offer to them 6. Prop. Gods Gubernation by second Causes The Executions of Divine Gubernation are oft committed to second Causes and Instruments yet so as it actes immediately in and with them yea sometimes contrary to their natural Inclinations Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 903. speaking of Gods Soverain Providential Gubernation saith That albeit God takes the care of the whole Vniverse himself yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And over al these parts of the Universe are set Rulers and Moderators who constantly governe althings even the most minute parts that so by these they may governe al even to the last part unto their end By those Rulers under Divine Gubernation I presume he understandes al second Causes made use of thereby Divine operations do not exclude the operations of the second causes but these include subordination to Divine operations Divine Gubernation orders and governes Inferior Creatures by Superiors Corporals by Spirituals and Inferior sublunary bodies by Superior and Celestial Thus he governes althings immediately as to the manner of Order and yet many things mediately as to the execution thereof So that nothing can fal out against or beside the Universal Order of Divine Gubernation albeit many things do contrary to the order of particular Causes Touching the Executions of Divine Providence see § 3. Prop. 4. 7. Gods Gubernation reacheth althings Prop. The Object of Divine Gubernation is althings in their most extensive latitude Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 903. proves That nothing is so minute and inconsiderable but it fals under Divine Gubernation But to descend to particulars 1 Divine Gubernation disposeth of al Seasons both Natural and Politic. 1 Natural Seasons Eccles 3.1 as Eccles 3.1 To every thing there is a season and a time to every purpose A Season i. e. a certain fixed determinate time 2 Politic Seasons for Human and Politic Actions 2 Gods Divine Gubernation orders al Vicissitudes and Changes in the world without the least vicissitude or change in himself Dan. 2.20 21. So Dan. 2.20 For Wisdome and Might are his i. e. for the Gubernation of althings Whence it follows v. 21. And he changeth the Times and the Seasons he removeth Kings and setteth up Kings 3 Divine Gubernation orders al the Meteors Snow Job 37.6 7. Rain c. So Job 37.6 For he saith to the Snow be thou on the earth likewise to the smal Rain and to the great Rain of his strength Whence it follows v. 7. He sealeth up the hand of every man that al men may know his worke He sealeth up the hand of every one Elibu's meaning is that when God sendeth his Snow and shours of Rain he thereby seals up or shuts up the hand of the Husbandman that so he may retire out of the fields home and consider his worke Then the Bestes go into Dens as v. 8. 4 God governeth al motions of second Causes even such as are most contingent and voluntary in the most certain manner 5 God governes al Events of things It was a great saying of Julius Caesar which he gained by experience That Fortune whereby the Ancients expressed Divine Gubernation has great force in althings but more particularly in the affaires of war wherein oft the most inconsiderable rencontres or occurrences produce the greatest changements Such is the wise and potent Gubernation of God in Military Affaires § 2. Divine Gubernation as to Man Having dispatcht the Gubernation of God in the general notion thereof we now descend to consider it in its special relation to Man both in his sinful and renovate State Gubernative Providence doth reach the whole Universe but in a more special manner Man and his Affaires So Plato saith Leg. 4. p. 709. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That God truely and with God Fortune and Opportunitie governe al human affaires By Fortune and Opportunitie we must understand Divine Gubernative Providence which in a more peculiar manner regardes Man because he is capable not only of Natural but also of Moral Gubernation God governes every Creature according to its capacitie whether Natural or Moral but now al Creatures inferior to man are capable only of Natural Gubernation and Passive Reduction to their last end they may be governed and directed to their last end but they cannot governe or direct themselves thereto But Man being invested with a Natural Passive remote capacitie of understanding and Wil can when in a special manner aided and assisted by supernatural Gubernation actively conduct and direct himself to his last end Hence Divine Gubernation as to Man is either Moral 1. Moral by Law or Efficacious 1 Gods Moral Gubernation is by Laws and Institutions Look as irrational Creatures are governed by natural Instinctes and Inclinations which are to them a Law directing them to their end so Rational Creatures have a more expresse formal Law which was at first impressed on their Beings but now under a new Edition by Divine Revelation whereby they are directed to their last end For a Law being nothing else but a certain Reason or Rule of operating it properly only can belong to intellectual rational Creatures who alone can understand the reason of their operations And that this Law is given to Man principally to direct him to his last end is evident because the Supreme Intention and Efficace of the Divine Law is to bring Man into subjection to God and who are subject to God but those who refer al to him as their last end Is it not the Intendement of every Lawgiver to make those good to whom his Laws are promulgated And wherein consistes the goodnesse of Man but in subjection to God and adhering to him as his last end So that the main end of al Laws both Positive and Moral is to direct man to his last end 2 This also is the main designe of Divine Efficacious Gubernation 2. Efficacious namely to reduce man unto to a subordination and subservience to his last end Only it has a different ay of operation as to wicked and pious men Wicked men if they persevere in their wickednesse are by Divine Gubernation reduced to their last end only passively by penal executions in order to the vindication of Divine Justice but elect pious Souls are actively reduced and directed to their last end by the supernatural Gubernation of the Divine Spirit Of both these in their order That wicked men Wicked men fal under Gods Gubernation and al their sinful Acts and Deeds are by Divine Gubernation reduced to the last end of al the Glorie of God wil appear evident if we reflect on what was before hinted that if the Creature withdraw it self from one order of Divine Gubernation it immediately fals under another if lawlesse irregular men substract and withdraw themselves from Gods gracious and easie yoke of obedience in order to life they deservedly fal under Gods Iron Yoke of vindictive Justice and Eternal Death and