Selected quad for the lemma: law_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
law_n	good_a	sin_n	transgression_n	4,384	5	10.5404	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A29500	An essay in morality written by G.B. to his friend H.P., Esquire ; in which the nature of virtue and vice is distinctly stated, their respective reasonableness and unreasonableness demonstrated, and several useful conclusions inferred.	G. B. (George Bright), d. 1696.; Plumptre, Henry.	1682 (1682)	Wing B4672; ESTC R18007	26,324	158

where there is no Law there is no transgression because God himself and his Volition of what is right and just are eternal or the Apostle may mean by Law not strictly an act of some Will concerning anothers Action and Will but an obligation to will or do any thing a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such there always is whenever any will exist being a relation betwen the Will and its due Object the Universal good Besides St. Paul may mean comparatively the Transgression or Sin is much less where there is no express known Law 23. Nor doth the nature of Sin or Virtue depend upon liberum arbitrium or Free-will for whether any Will hath power to determine its own Volition to the greatest or any lesser good or no which I do not deny yet most certainly whenever there is a direction thereof to a lesser good there is a defect in that Volition come it from what cause it will though it should be the effect of some other Being without it which by his power was able so to determine it or suppose any Nature should be eternally and necessarily so constituted 24. It follows likewise that supposing it possible for any Being to have for the Object of his Volition the rectitude the perfection thereof and should not place it in the willing the greatest good but in willing some particular or which is most common some personal good as self-preservation this very Volition would have that defect in it we call Sin and would not be capable of any reward i. e. any thing which should maintain or encourage such an action If it were possible for a man unfeignedly in his Conscience to judge it his bounden duty to desire and pursue always as his ultimate end his own greatest personal good without regard to God or others and accordingly should Will and Act this would be a vitious man And whether God may not by way of punishment for pride c. permit a man so to err is not here to be determined and there have been two pernicious and foolish mistakes if not wilful Errors that men might securely indulge their lusts of some late new Modellers of Morality to which a great part of the ill-nature and debauchery of the Age is to be imputed the one the advancing of their personal good to the place and dignity of the last end of all their actions the other the pitching upon no better than the preservation of life and limb or to enlarge their own Sence the greatest measures of the Conveniencies Comforts and Pleasures proper to this bodily life In these Opinions they have quite perverted the nature of things and made Vice to be Virtue Or because according to the same mens Doctrine every one is necessarily carried to his own greatest good or happiness in general only through ignorance is oft out of the way they have made no Vice at all substituting in its room Folly and Imprudence 25. What hath been said of Volition may be said of Actual and Habitual Inclination and because Volition and Actual Inclination are but sometimes existent in men but Habitual Inclinations constant and perpetual 't is according to this a man is chiefly to be estimated viz. by three things 1. It s direction to its right Object the Universal Good 2. The force and strength thereof 3. It s constancy or frequency in the Soul each of which hath degrees so that it is easie to set down certain rules for the judgment of the goodness or badness of any man For example sake only He is the worst man in the first respect who is habitually inclined to and in love with the meanest or least delectable good in the second respect who is the most vehemently inclined thereto in the third respect who is perpetually or constantly so Contrariwise he is the best who hath the greatest good absolutely or the Eternal Felicity for by Felicity I mean the greatest degree of delight or pleasure as to intension of the Vniverse or all Beings existent for the Object of his Habitual Inclination or who is habitually inclined thereto and that with the greatest force and strength of his nature and then constantly and perpetually It is easie to see what an indefinite number of degrees there are between these two extremes in all the three respects The greatest difficulty is not to know these Rules of our Judgment but to know our selves and consequently to apply them And since Denominatio fit à Majore he only is to be called a good man who hath a stronger and more constant Habitual Inclination to the Universal good than to any one or more particulars And this was or might have been the reason why Martyrdome was so highly esteemed and magnified in the Primitiue Church A Martyr by his suffering for his Faith even though he was not actually Baptized was thought to expiate all former bad life and to be undoubtedly saved or to obtain a most glorious and blissful condition in Heaven because such his suffering death or parting with life itself deemed the greatest personal good amongst men rather than to deny that Truth which they supposed God had commanded to believe and profess and consequently to disobey God was a certain sign and argument of a stronger actual and habitual inclination at that time of his death to obey God and consequently to that which was right just and good than to any other thing in the world besides Nor may it be here amiss to hint how easie it is to understand it possible for this Habitual Inclination Bent and Propension to any certain Object to be so forcible and strong as to be inconsistent with an act of Free Will or choice about that Object nor may a man be able to divert suspend or withhold his actual Volition consent or embrace from it when it is proposed Though by prudent contrivance these Habitual Inclinations generally I do not say all may also by degrees be weakned and at last quite extinguished and destroyed 26. 'T is as easie hence to deduce all particular virtues and vices of which we shall find many to have as yet no Names For one way and the most common is by distinguishing particular delectable Good or Pleasure whether that particular Good be in a mans self or in another as the Subject whether it be mine or anothers but it is usually if not always a mans own from its various Causes or Objects And it seems there may be six general ones I do but now suggest not determine 1 The possession of any Good in general so esteemed many things thus onely please 2 The pain mischief evil suffering of another Whether any Being is of such a temper as to be delighted therewith let others consider but I see no reason why it is not possible Now to will ones delight or pleasure from this Object or Cause is called Malice to be habitually inclined thereto Maliciousness but the renouncing of this or the

good actions In the Scripture it is the Spirit living according to the Spirit and being led by the Spirit and delighting in the Law of God according to the inward man and the new man created after God because the Object that pleaseth is a Spiritual thing and because it is according to the Word of God dictated by the Spirit of God and from the influence or efficiency of Gods Spirit in us Here may be noted that the degree of the strength of our Volition and inclination to the Universal good and in order to that of our passions ought at least to exceed that which is to any other particular good or else it will be ineffectual Whence it may be further usefully observed That they are not always to be deemed or termed good men who in Pulpit Church or private Conversation not only appear but really are very zealous and affectionate in Religion because they generally are of passionate Tempers in other matters and may perhaps have greater affections and consequently inclinations to other Objects A man of a more calm and sedate temper in Religion provided that the greatest degree of affection he hath be directed to his duty may be a good man when one of a more boisterous and passionate one whatever he is vulgarly taken for may be indeed a bad man The one shall more steadily and constantly do his duty than the other In like manner when a man sins deliberately it is a sign of a greater bent strength and intension of the inclination of the Will to its undue Object and of a less to Virtue when he sins by surprize or on a sudden it is not so much a sign thereof But these and many other things usually treated of in Morality may with a little consideration be easily and distinctly determined from the foregoing Conclusions and a wary observation and experience of the operations of our Minds 20. The second Perfection of our Volition and inclination in respect of the Action is Constancy Continuance or Duration So that in this respect the highest degree is to have the Volition and Inclination perpetually and eternally directed to the absolutely greatest good the lowest to have them so directed but for one moment or the least of time This perfection of the Action of Volition belongs only to God who always actually so wills for he is always the same without any change but of habitual inclination may be in us and other rational Creatures So that there are only these three general perfections of Virtue The first the direction of Volition and Inclination to their right Object the second that they be with the greatest force or strength any Nature is capable of the third that they be the most perpetual and constant or continued and lasting or in three words Sincerity Generosity Constancy 21. And yet there seems to be another perfection of Volition in respect of the Action and that is the just moderation of it to the various parts of this Universal good i. e. When we will any part thereof knowingly to will it more or less in due proportion to the share of goodness that is in it compared with another part and the defect contrariwise will be to will a less good more than a greater and the greatest defect is when we will the least part more than all the rest for example a moment of the least pleasure to our selves before the Eternal Felicity of God and all the world besides And this may be not only when any two parts are inconsistent one with another as when I will to gratifie my self in that which displeaseth God and is mischievous or hurtful to my Neighbour but also when they are consistent nay conjoyned together and they are altogether the Object of my Will Thus if a man builds an Hospital or gives any Alms to the Poor he knows this action will please God benefit others procure himself Reputation and he doth it for all these reasons he wills all this good together as one but here that of these which he may most will that which he chiefly intends is his Reputation and his own pleasure therefrom which ought to be possibly without compare the least regarded though somewhat But in truth this is but a sign of that perfection and defect of Volition which is in respect of the Object or of the Action For if a man wills only his own good or only to please God exclusively one to the other the defect seems to be in not having the Universal good but some particular good for the Object of his Volition because both and more should be taken together But if a man wills one good composed of more parts and wills that part most which in truth is the least good either he doth it knowingly or ignorantly if knowingly which is most frequent whatever pretences men may make then the defect is in not willing the greatest good and consequently it is a defect in respect of the Object before-mentioned for he cannot but know that it tends to a lesser Good to will a lesser more than a greater If ignorantly and erroneously judging that the greater Good which is indeed the lesser the ignorance is either through some present defect in the actual Volition or habitual inclination to the Universal good ones Duty Right Honest or it is not if it be it is plain where and what the defect is viz. in the Action or Inclination before-mentioned if it be not then there is no defect in the present Volition at all whatever may have been in former Actions of the Will by which such ignorance may be contracted but only in the Understanding the Volition may have for all that its due Object viz. the greatest good 22. From these propositions it follows that the nature of this defect of Volition or of Sin depends not upon any Law or upon any Beings Will whatsoever though its existence doth because it being only a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or relation it cannot exist actually unless the subject thereof do namely some Will or other but though we suppose no other Being in the World besides one and no antecedent Will yet these which have been before-mentioned would be perfections and defects whensoever it exists It is true that Laws may be the signs of what is just and unjust right and wrong but not the efficient causes any otherwise than a Subject is the efficient cause of the existence of its property as is but now said These Laws also are sometimes necessary inseparable signs sometimes in several degrees contingent and probable only according to the knowledge and justice of the Law-maker Those which are certainly Laws of God who is infallibly wise and immutably just are most inseparable and certain signs of what is just and right but those which are any other Creatures are more or less probable ones Laws do not make but suppose the thing just which they command It is true also what the Apostle St. Paul saith That