Selected quad for the lemma: law_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
law_n	england_n	king_n	people_n	13,931	5	5.0853	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A87129	Aphorisms political. By James Harrington.	Harrington, James, 1611-1677.	1659 (1659)	Wing H804; Thomason E995_8; ESTC R202590	4,480	11

APHORISMS POLITICAL BY James Harrington LONDON Printed by J. C. for Henry Fletcher at the signe of the three Gilt Cups in St. Pauls Church-yard Aphorisms Political I. OBsequium amicos veritas odium parit The Errours and Sufferings of the People are from their Governours II. When the Foundation of a Government cometh to be changed and the Governours change not the Superstructures accordingly the people become miserable III. The Monarchy of England was not a Government by Arms but a Government by Laws though imperfect or ineffectual Laws IV. The Latter Governments in England have been Governments by Arms. V. The people cannot see but they can feel VI. The people having felt the difference between a Government by Laws and a Government by Arms will always desire the Government by Laws and abhor that of Arms. VII Where the spirit of the people is impatient of a Government by Arms and desirous of a Government by Laws there the spirit of the people is not unfit to be trusted with their Liberty VIII The spirit of the people of England not trusted with their Liberty driveth at the Restitution of Monarchy by Blood and Violence IX The spirit of the people of England trusted with their Liberty if the form be sufficient can never restore Monarchy and if the form be insufficient will restore it without Blood or Violence X. The sufficiency of the form wherein the spirit of a people may be trusted with their Liberty amounteth to a well-ordered Commonwealth or Democracy XI Where there is a well-ordered Commonwealth the people are generally satisfied XII Where the people are generally dissatisfied there is no Commonwealth XIII The parties in England declaring for a Commonwealth hold every one of them something that is inconsistent with a Commonwealth XIV To hold that the Government may be managed by a few or by a party is inconsistent with a Commonwealth XV. To hold that there can be any National Religion or Ministry without publick Indowment and Inspection of the Magistracy or any Government without a National Religion or Ministry is inconsistent with a Commonwealth XVI To hold that there may be Liberty and not Liberty of Conscience is inconsistent with a Commonwealth that hath the Liberty of her own Conscience or that is not Popish XVII Either Liberty of Conscience can have no security at all or under Popular Government must have the greatest security XVIII To hold that a Government may be introduced by a little at once is to wave prudence and commit things unto chance XIX To hold that the Wisdom of God in the Formation of an House or of a Government goeth not universally upon natural principles is inconsistent with Scripture XX. To hold that the wisdom of man in the Formation of an House or of Government may go upon supernatural principles is inconsistent with a Commonwealth and cometh to a kind of breaking of Jests as if one should say God ordained the Temple therefore it was not built by Masons He ordained the Snuffers therefore they were not made by a Smith XXI To hold that Hirelings or an endowed Ministry ought to be removed out of the Church is inconsistent with a Commonwealth XXII Nature is of God XXIII Some part in every Religion is natural XXIV An universal Effect demonstrateth an universal Cause XXV An universal Cause is not so much natural as it is Nature it self XXVI Every man either unto his terrour or consolation hath some sense of Religion XXVII Man may rather be defined a Religious then a Rational Creature in regard that in other Creatures there is something of Reason but nothing of Religion XXVIII Government is of humane Prudence and humane Prudence is adequate unto mans nature XXIX The prudence or Government that is regardless of Religion is not adequate nor satisfactory unto mans nature XXX Where the Government is not adequate or satisfactory unto mans nature it can never be quiet or perfect XXXI The major part of mankinde giveth it self up in the matter of Religion unto the publick leading XXXII That there may be a publick leading there must be a National Religion XXXIII Where the minor part taketh away the National Religion there the major part is deprived of the Liberty of Conscience by the minor XXXIV Where the major part is deprived of the Liberty of Conscience by the minor there they will deprive the minor of that Liberty of Conscience which they might otherwise enjoy XXXV In Israel there was an endowed Clergie or Priesthood and a National Religion under inspection of the Magistrate whence the Christians in Apostolick times defraying their own Ministry could have Liberty of Conscience whereas if the Christians by going about to take away Tythes and abolish the National Religion had endeavoured to violate the Consciences of the unconverted Jews these being far greater in number must needs have taken away the Liberty of Conscience from the Christians XXXVI Paul in Athens could freely and undisturbedly convert Dionysius and others therefore in Athens there was Liberty of Conscience but if Paul and his Converts had gone about to drive Hirelings or an endowed Priesthood or Clergie our of that Church who seeth not that the Athenians would have driven Paul and his Converts out of Athens XXXVII That there may be Liberty of Conscience there must be a National Religion XXXVIII That there may be a National Religion there must be an endowed Clergie XXXIX Till a Commonwealth be first framed how such a Commonwealth should make an effectual Union with another Nation is not possible to be seen XXXX The Union with Scotland as it is vulgarly discoursed of is destructive both to the hopes of a Commonwealth in England and of Liberty in Scotland XLI The Union vulgarly spoken of is by uniting Deputies of divers Commonwealths or Nations in the same standing Councils XLII If the Commonwealth of England receive Deputies from Scotland in a greater number then that of her own she receieth Law from a forraign interest and so loseth her own Liberty XLIII If Scotland be received in an equal number it obstructeth the freedom of both or occasioneth War or Dissention XLIV If Scotland be received in an inferiour number she receiveth Law from England and so loseth her Liberty XLV VVhere Countries are divers in their Laws and yet are to receive Laws one from the other neither the Common-wealth giving Law knoweth what to give nor the Common-wealth receiving Law understandeth what she receiveth in which case the Union returneth unto force or confusion XLVI The best way of holding a Nation different or not different in Laws is by way of Province XLVII A Province especially if she have strong holds may by defraying of a small guard be kept unto a just League and for the rest enjoy her own Laws her own Government and her perfect Liberty other ways of Union will be found more chargeable and less effectual on both sides for if England have no Army in Scotland Scotland will receive no

Law from England and if England have an Army there her hold consisteth not in the Union but in the force XLVIII If a Country be very small and not able to subsist of it self as Wales it may be safely united and held but the advantage that Wales hath in participation of all Magistracies and Offices is not that which England is able to afford unto such a Country as Scotland without subjecting her neck under the yoak XLIX The order of a Commonwealth requireth that it consist first of a Civil secondly of a Religious thirdly of a Military and fourthly of a Provincial Part. The manner of uniting Provinces or different Nations appertaineth unto the last part and in the formation of a Commonwealth to begin with that first which is naturally last is to invert the order and by Consequence the Commonwealth which indeed is nothing but order L. Where there can be any other Government there can be no Commonwealth LI. Where there can be a Commonwealth what tumults soever there happen and which soever prevail there can be no other Government that is to say without forraign invasion which throughout I must be understood to except LXII If Sir George Booth had prevailed he must either have introduced a Commonwealth or have restored a King LIII If a King were restored he must either govern by an Army or by Parliaments LIV. A King governing now in England by an Army would for the same Causes finde the same effects with the late Protector LV. A King governing now in England by Parliaments would finde the Nobility of no effect at all LVI A Parliament where the Nobility is of no effect at all is a meer popular Council LVII A meer popular Council will never receive Law from a King XVIII A meer popular Council giving Law unto a King becometh thereby a Democracy or equal Commonwealth or the difference is no greater then in the imperfection of the Form LIX A Commonwealth or Democracy to be perfect in the Form must consist especially of such an Assembly the result whereof can go upon no interest whatsoever but that onely which is the common interest of the whole people LX. An Assembly consisting of a few may go upon the interest of one man as a King or upon the interest of one party as that of Divines Lawyers and the like or the interest of themselves and the perpetuation of their Government LXI The popular Assembly in a Commonwealth may consist of too few but can never consist of too many LXII If the popular Assembly consist of so few and so eminent persons as are capable of any orderly debate it is good for nothing but to destroy the Commonwealth LXIII If the popular Assembly consist of so many and for the greater part of so mean persons as are not capable of debate there must be a Senate to help this defect LXIV The Reason of the Senate is that a popular Assembly rightly constituted is not capable of any prudent debate LXV The Reason of the popular Assembly is that a Senate rightly constituted for debate must consist of so few and eminent persons that if they have the result too they will not resolve according unto the interest of the people but according to the interest of themselves LXVI The Senate and the popular Assembly being once rightly constituted the rest of the Commonwealth will constitute it self LXVII The Venetians having slain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny and being assembled by such numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of debate pitched upon thirty Gentlemen who were called Pregati in that they were prayed to go apart and debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth to propose as they thought good unto the great Council and from thence first arose the Senate of Venice to this day called the Pregati and the Great Council that is the Senate and the popular Assembly of Venice and from these two arose all those admirable Orders of that Com-wealth LXVIII The popular Assembly of Venice at this day consisteth of about two thousand the popular Assemblies in the Province onely of Holland consist of about five hundred by which I guess that in all the united Provinces they may amount unto about three thousand in Switz they come unto a far greater number and all or the most of these are perpetually extant LXIX If a popular Assembly consisting of eleven hundred or a thousand may be so framed in England as to be sufficient to preserve the interest of the people such an Assembly of so few in a Territory of so large an extent will be altogether new in the world and without any example LXX That a people of themselves should have such understanding as when they of Venice did institute their Pregati or Senate is rare LXXI That a Senate or Council of Governours having supreme power should institute a popular Assembly and propose to it though in all reason it be the far more facile and practicable is that wich is rarer LXXII Where such Elections are proposed unto the people as being made accordingly must needs produce a well-ordered Commonwealth and the people who never stick at such work elect accordingly there not the Proposers of any power in them but the people by their peculiar and natural right and power do institute and ordain their whole Common-wealth LXXIII An Assembly of men being all Assemblies are naturally void of invention is not capable of inventing any perfect Model or Method of Government LXXIV The wisest Assemblies through this necessity have in the Formation or Reformation of their Governments still pitched upon some one man LXXV It is not below the dignity of any Assembly but according unto the practice of a good Commonwealth to admit of any man that is able to propose to them LXXVI One mans reason is as another mans judgment yet is it in Art to say things which will do themselves at least it is lawful for any man to appeal unto Event and so do I in these Aphorisms Aug. 25. 1659. FINIS