Selected quad for the lemma: land_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
land_n	pay_v	rent_n	tenant_n	2,576	5	9.7256	5	true

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A54625	A treatise of taxes and contributions shewing the nature and measures of [brace] crown-lands, assessments, customs, poll-moneys, lotteries, benevolence, penalties, monopolies, offices, tythes, raising of coins, harth-money, excize, &c. : with several intersperst discourses and digressions concerning [brace] warres, the church, universities, rents and purchases, usury and exchange, banks and lombards, registries for conveyances, beggars, ensurance, exportation of money/wool, free-ports, coins, housing, liberty of conscience, &c. : the same being frequently applied to the present state and affairs of Ireland.	Petty, William, Sir, 1623-1687.	1662 (1662)	Wing P1938; ESTC R33399	59,466	94

11. 7. Obscurities and doubts about the right of imposing hath been the cause of great and ugly Reluctancies in the people and of Involuntary Severities in the Prince an eminent Example whereof was the Ship-money no small cause of twenty years calamity to the whole Kingdom 12. 8. Fewness of people is real poverty and a Nation wherein are Eight Millions of people are more then twice as rich as the same scope of Land wherein are but Four For the same Governours which are the great charge may serve near as well for the greater as the lesser number 13. Secondly If the people be so few as that they can live Exsponte Creatis or with little labour such as is Grazing c. they become wholly without Art No man that will not exercise his hands being able to endure the tortures of the mind which much thoughtfulness doth occasion 14. 9. Scarcity of money is another cause of the bad payment of Taxes for if we consider that of all the wealth of this Nation viz. Lands Housing Shipping Commodities Furniture Plate and Money that scarce one part of an hundred is Coin and that perhaps there is scarce six millions of Pounds now in England that is but twenty shillings a head for every head in the Nation We may easily judge how difficult it is for men of competent estates to pay a Summe of money on a sudden which if they cannot compass Severities and Charges ensue and that with reason though unluckie enough it being more tolerable to undoe one particular Member then to endanger the whole notwithstanding indeed it be more tolerable for one particular Member to be undone with the whole then alone 15. 10. It seems somewhat hard that all Taxes should be paid in money that is when the King hath occasion to Victual his Ships at Portsmouth that Fat Oxen and Corn should not be received in kind but that Farmers must first carry their Corn perhaps ten Miles to sell and turn into money which being paid to the King is again reconverted into Corn fetcht many miles further 16. Moreover the Farmer for haste is forced to under-sell his Corn and the King for haste likewise is forced to over-buy his provisions Whereas the paying in kinde Pro Hic Nunc would lessen a considerable grievance to the poor people 17. The next consideration shall be of the consequences and effects of too great a Tax not in respect of particular men of which we have spoken before but to the whole people in general To which I say that there is a certain measure and proportion of money requisite to drive the trade of a Nation more or less then which would prejudice the same Just as there is a certain proportion of Farthings necessary in a small retail Trade to change silver money and to even such reckonings as cannot be adjusted with the smallest silver pieces For money made of Gold and silver is to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to the matter of our Food and Covering but as Farthings and other local extrinsick money is to the Gold and Silver species 18. Now as the proportion of the number of Farthings requisite in comerse is to be taken from the number of people the frequency of their exchanges as also and principally from the value of the smallest silver pieces of money so in like maner the proportion of money requisite to our Trade is to be likewise taken from the frequency of commutations and from the bigness of the payments that are by Law or Custome usually made otherwise From whence it follows that where there are Registers of Lands whereby the just value of each mans interest in them may be well known and where there are Depositories of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as of Metals Cloth Linnen Leather and other Usefuls and where there are Banks of money also there less money is necessary to drive the Trade For if all the greatest payments be made in Lands and the other perhaps down to ten pound or twenty pound be made by credit in Lombars or Money-Banks It follows that there needs onely money to pay sums less then those aforementioned just as fewer Farthings are requisite for change where there be plenty of silver two Pences then where the least silver piece is six Pence 19. To apply all this I say that if there be too much money in a Nation it were good for the Commonalty as well as the King and no harm even to particular men if the King had in his Coffers all that is superflous no more then if men were permitted to pay their Taxes in any thing they could best spare 20. On the other side if the largeness of a publick Exhibition should leave less money then is necessary to drive the Nations Trade then the mischief thereof would be the doing of less work which is the same as lessening the people or their Art and Industry for a hundred pound passing a hundred hands for Wages causes a 10000l worth of Commodities to be produced which hands would have been idle and useless had there not been this continual motive to their employment 21. Taxes if they be presently expended upon our own Domestick Commodities seem to me to do little harm to the whole Body of the people onely they work a change in the Riches and Fortunes of particular men and particularly by transferring the same from the Landed and Lazy to the Crafty and Industrious As for example if a Gentleman have let his Lands to Farm for a hundred pound per annum for several years or lives and he be taxed twenty pound per annum to maintain a Navy then the effect hereof will be that this Gentlemans twenty pound per annum will be distributed amongst Seamen Ship-Carpenters and other Trades relating to Naval matters but if the Gentleman had his Land in his own hands then being taxed a Fifth part he would raise his Rents near the same proportion upon his under Tenants or would sell his Cattle Corn and Wooll a Fifth part dearer the like also would all other subdependents on him do and thereby recover in some measure what he paid Lastly but if all the money levied were thrown into the Sea then the ultimate effect would onely be that every man must work a fifth part the harder or retrench a fifth part of his consumptions viz. the former if forreign Trade be improveable and the latter if it be not 22. This I conceive were the worst of Taxes in a well policyed State but in other States where is not a certain prevention of Beggary and Theevery that is a sure livelihood for men wanting imployment there I confess an excessive Taxe causes excessive and insuperable want even of natural necessities and that on a sudden so as ignorant particular persons cannot finde out what way to subsist by and this by the law of Nature must cause sudden effects to relieve it self that is Rapines Frauds and this again must

Land with such another measure of Labour forasmuch as both Ships and Garments were the creatures of Lands and mens Labours thereupon This being true we should be glad to finde out a natural Par between Land and Labour so as we might express the value by either of them alone as well or better then by both and reduce one into the other as easily and certainly as we reduce pence into pounds Wherefore we would be glad to finde the natural values of the Fee simple of Land though but no better then we have done that of the usus fructus abovementioned which we attempt as followeth 19. Having found the Rent or value of the usus fructus per annum the question is how many years purchase as we usually say is the Fee simple naturally worth If we say an infinite number then an Acre of Land would be equal in value to a thousand Acres of the same Land which is absurd an infinity of unites being equal to an infinity of thousands Wherefore we must pitch upon some limited number and that I apprehend to be the number of years which I conceive one man of fifty years old another of twenty eight and another of seven years old all being alive together may be thought to live that is to say of a Grandfather Father and Childe few men having reason to take care of more remote Posterity for if a man be a great Grandfather he himself is so much the nearer his end so as there are but three in a continual line of descent usually co-existing together and as some are Grandfathers at forty years yet as many are not till above sixty and sic de caeteris 20. Wherefore I pitch the number of years purchase that any Land is naturally worth to be the ordinary extent of three such persons their lives Now in England we esteem three lives equal to one and twenty years and consequently the value of Land to be about the same number of years purchase Possibly if they thought themselves mistaken in the one as the observator on the Bills of Mortality thinks they are they would alter in the other unless the consideration of the force of popular errour and dependance of things already concatenated did hinder them 21. This I esteem to be the number of years purchase where Titles are good and where there is a moral certainty of enjoying the purchase But in other Countreys Lands are worth nearer thirty years purchase by reason of the better Titles more people and perhaps truer opinion of the value and duration of three lives 22. And in some places Lands are worth yet more years purchase by reason of some special honour pleasures priviledge or jurisdiction annexed unto them 23. On the other hand Lands are worth fewer years purchase as in Ireland for the following reasons which I have here set down as unto the like whereof the cause of the like cheapness in any other place may be imputed First In Ireland by reason of the frequent Rebellions in which if you are conquered all is lost or if you conquer yet you are subject to swarms of thieves and robbers and the envy which precedent missions of English have against the subsequent perpetuity it self is but forty years long as within which time some ugly disturbance hath hitherto happened almost ever since the first coming of the English thither 24. 2. The Claims upon Claims which each hath to the others Estates and the facility of making good any pretence whatsoever by the favour of some one or other of the many Governours and Ministers which within forty years shall be in power there as also by the frequency of false testimonies and abuse of solemn Oaths 25. 3. The paucity of Inhabitants there being not above the â…• th part so many as the Territory would maintain and of those but a small part do work at all and yet a smaller work so much as in other Countreys 26. 4. That a great part of the Estates both real and personal in Ireland are owned by Absentees and such as draw over the profits raised out of Ireland refunding nothing so as Ireland exporting more then it imports doth yet grow poorer to a paradox 27. 5. The difficulty of executing justice so many of those in power being themselves protected by Offices and protecting others Moreover the number of criminous and indebted persons being great they favour their like in Juries Offices and wheresoever they can Besides the Countrey is seldom enough to give due encouragement to profound Judges and Lawyers which makes judgements very casual ignorant men being more apt to be bold and arbitrary then such as understand the dangers of it But all this with a little care in due season might remedy so as to bring Ireland in a few years to the same level of values with other places but of this also elsewhere more at large for in the next place we shall come to Usury CHAP. V. Of Usury WHat reason there is for taking or giving Interest or Usury for any thing which we may certainly have again whensoever we call for it I see not nor why Usury should be scrupled where money or other necessaries valued by it is lent to be paid at such a time and place as the Borrower chuseth so as the Lender cannot have his money paid him back where and when himself pleaseth I also see not Wherefore when a man giveth out his money upon condition that he may not demand it back until a certain time to come whatsoever his own necessities shall be in the mean time he certainly may take a compensation for this inconvenience which he admits against himself And this allowance is that we commonly call Usury 2. And when one man furnisheth another with money at some distant place and engages under great Penalties to pay him there and at a certain day besides the consideration for this is that we call Exchange or local Usury As for example if a man wanting money at Carlisle in the heat of the late Civil Wars when the way was full of Souldiers and Robbers and the passage by Sea very long troublesome and dangerous and seldom passed why might not another take much more then an 100l at London for warranting the like summe to be paid at Carlisle on a certain day 3. Now the Questions arising hence are what are the natural Standards of Usury and Exchange As for Usury the least that can be is the Rent of so much Land as the money lent will buy where the security is undoubted but where the security is casual then a kinde of ensurance must be enterwoven with the simple natural Interest which may advance the Usury very conscionably unto any height below the Principal itself Now if things are so in England that really there is no such security as abovementioned but that all are more or less hazardous troublesome or chargeable to make I see no reason for endeavoring to limit Usury upon time any more

of a thousand pound per annum to pay for an hundred Chimneys few of their Mansion-Houses having more then for Labourers to pay for two Moreover if the Land-Lord onely pay this Tax then is it not an Accumulative Excize for all but a particular Excize upon but one onely Commodity namely Housing 12. Now the Reasons for Excize are these viz. First The Natural Justice that every man should pay according to what he actually enjoyeth upon which account this Tax is scarce forced upon any and is very light to those who please to be content with natural Necessaries Seondly This Tax if it be not farmed but regularly collected engages to thrift the onely way to enrich a Nation as by the Dutch and Jews and by all other men who have come to vaste Estates by Trade doth appear Thirdly No man payes double or twice for the same thing forasmuch as nothing can be spent but once whereas it is frequently seen that otherwise men pay both by the Rent of their Lands by their Smoaks by their Titles and by Customs which all men do though Merchants chiefly talk of it they also pay by Benevolence and by Tythes whereas in this way of Excize no man need pay but one way nor but once properly speaking Fifthly By this way an excellent account may be taken of the Wealth Growth Trade and strength of the Nation at all times All which Reasons do make not for particular compoundings with 〈◊〉 nor for letting the whole to farm but for collecting it by special Officers who having a full employment will not be a fourth of the charge of our present many multiform Levies for to put extraordinary trouble and hazzard upon the Countrey Officers is a sorer Taxing of them then to make them pay a small Reward unto practised Persons to be their Substitutes All which are the common Objections against Excize 13. I should here adde the manner of Collecting it but I refer this to the practice of Holland and I might also offer how men may be framed to be fit for this and other Publick Trusts as to be Cashiers Store-keepers Collectors c. but I refer this Enquiry unto a more ample and fit occasion Errata Pag. line 1 14 between who and spent interline have 5 13 after want read general instead of more 6 19 before starve interline needlesly 6 29 before cause read one instead of the 6 30 read is instead of are 8 7 read them for him 8 8 read their for his 17 19 read viz. for that is 18 3 read 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 instead of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 20 17 read Excisum not Excisium 21 7 read obligees not obliges 22 12 read enhansing not exhausting 22 23 between way and Land-Tax interline of a 22 25 deleatur sometimes 24 25 between Rents and we interline in order to Taxes 28 24 between seldom and enough interline rich 28 28 deleatur with 30 11 after hazards interline and 14 read omitted 27 read apparatus instead of appurtenances 32 10 after the interline former 11 after Land read this latter instead of the 33 26 deleatur by 31 between c. and then interline could be fertilized 34 36 read worth not work 36 16 after market interline abroad 37 12 read paribus not talibus 39 6 read conniving not coyning Pag. line 39 32 deleatur as much harm ibid. between of and one interline the penult after Coffee inter and 40 2 read meerly for merrily ult before certainly interline case 41 13 dele out 24 read so or not instead of use 47 26 read on for of 51 3 read their for the 15 after Heterodox interline Believer 29 read wearing for weaving 53 14 read defect for dissent 54 36 between then and is interline it 56. ult after yet the interline said 57 3 read offices for officers 60 2 read shared for shred 61 15 read consequences for calamities 32 read an for no 62 1 after plentiful interline year 65 21 read medalls instead of a medall 66 10 between consisting and great interline of 67 29 read d'Escu instead of d'Esens 68 36 read abating for abasing 69 11 after former interline better 70 12 read prices for proceed 71 5 read as for the 75 25 read families for faculties FINIS

bring Death Mutilations and Impisonments according to the present Laws which are Mischiefs and Punishments as well unto the State as to the particular sufferers of them CHAP. IV. Of the several wayes of Taxe and first of setting a part a proportion of the whole Territory for Publick uses in the nature of Crown Lands and secondly by way of Assessement or Land-taxe BUt supposing that the several causes of Publick Charge are lessened as much as may be and that the people be well satisfied and contented to pay their just shares of what is needfull for their Government and Protection as also for the Honour of their Prince and Countrey It follows now to propose the several wayes and expedients how the same may be most easily speedily and insensibly collected The which I shall do by exposing the conveniencies and inconveniences of some of the principal wayes of Levyings used of later years within the several States of Europe unto which others of smaller and more rare use may be referred 2. Imagine then a number of people planted in a Territory who had upon Computation concluded that two Millions of pounds per annum is necessary to the publick charges Or rather who going more wisely to work had computed a twenty fifth part of the proceed of all their Lands and Labours were to be the Excisium or the part to be cut out and laid aside for publick uses Which proportions perhaps are fit enough to the affairs of England but of that hereafter 3. Now the question is how the one or the other shall be raised The first way we propose is to Excize the very Land it self in kinde that is to cut out of the whole twenty five Millions which are said to be in England and Wales as much Land in specie as whereof the Rack-rent would be two Millions viz. about four Millions of Acres which is about a sixth part of the whole making the said four Millions to be Crown Lands and as the four Counties intended to be reserved in Ireland upon the forfeitures were Or else to excize a sixth part of the rent of the whole which is about the proportion that the Adventurers and Souldiers in Ireland retribute to the King as Quit Rents Of which two wayes the latter is manifestly the better the King having more security and more obliges provided the trouble and charge of this universal Collection exceed not that of the other advantage considerably 4. This way in a new State would be good being agreed upon as it was in Ireland before men had even the possession of any Land at all wherefore whosoever buyes Land in Ireland hereafter is no more concerned with the Quit Rents wherewith they are charged then if the Acres were so much the fewer or then men are who buy Land out of which they know Tythes are to be paid And truly that Countrey is happy in which by Original Accord such a Rent is reserved as whereby the Publick charge may be born without contingent sudden superadditions in which lies the very Ratio of the burthen of all Contributions and Exactions For in such cases as was said before it is not onely the Landlord payes but every man who eats but an Egg or an Onion of the growth of his Lands or who useth the help of any Artisan which feedeth on the same 5. But if the same were propounded in England viz. if an aliquot part of every Landlords Rent were excinded or retrenched then those whose Rents were settled and determined for long times to come would chiefly bear the burthen of such an Imposition and others have a benefit thereby For suppose A. and B. have each of them a parcel of Land of equal goodness and value suppose also that A. hath let his parcel for twenty one years at twenty pound per annum but that B. is free now there comes out a Taxe of a fifth part hereupon B. will not let under 25 l. that his remainder may be twenty whereas A. must be contented with sixteen neat nevertheless the Tenants of A. will sell the proceed of their bargain at the same rate that the Tenants of B. shall do The effect of all this is First that the Kings fifth part of B. his Farm shall be greater then before Secondly that the Farmer to B. shall gain more then before the Taxe Thirdly that the Tenant or Farmer of A. shall gain as much as the King and Tenant to B. both Fourthly the Tax doth ultimately light upon the Landlord A. and the Consumptioners From whence it follows that a Land-taxe resolves into an irregular Excize upon consumptions that those bear it most who least complain And lastly that some Landlords may gain and onely such whose Rents are predetermined shall loose and that doubly viz. one way by the raising of their revenues and the other by exhausting the prices of provisions upon them 6. Another way is an Excisium out of the Rent of Houseing which is much more uncertain then that of Land For an House is of a double nature viz. one wherein it is a way and means of expence the other as 't is an Instrument and Tool of gain for a Shop in London of less capacity and less charge in building then a fair Dining-Room in the same House unto which both do belong shall nevertheless be of the greater value so also shall a Dungeon Sellar then a pleasant Chamber because the one is expence the other profit Now the way Land-taxe rates housing as of the latter nature but the Excize as of the former 7. We might sometimes adde hereunto that housing is sometimes disproportionally taxed to discourage Building especially upon new Foundations thereby to prevent the growth of a City suppose London such excessive and overgrown Cities being dangerous to Monarchy though the more secure when the Supremacy is in Citizens of such places themselves as in Venice 8. But we say that such checking of new Buildings signifies nothing to this purpose forasmuch as Buildings do not encrease until the People already have increased but the remedy of the abovementioned dangers is to be sought in the causes of the encrease of People the which if they can be nipt the other work will necessarily be done But what then is the true effect of forbidding to build upon new foundations I answer to keep and fasten the City to its old seat and ground-plot the which encouragement for new Buildings will remove as it comes to pass almost in all great Cities though insensibly and not under many years progression 9. The reason whereof is because men are unwilling to build new houses at the charge of pulling down their old where both the old house it self and the ground it stands upon do make a much dearer ground-plot for a new house and yet far less free and convenient wherefore men build upon new free foundations and cobble up old houses until they become fundamentally irreparable at which time they become either the dwelling of

Shires of Essex Kent Surrey Middlesex and Hertford next circumjacent to London did communibus annis produce and would withal compute the Consumptioners of them living in the said five Shires and London The which if I found to be more then were the Consumptioners living upon the like scope of other Land or rather upon as much other Land as bore the like quantity of Provisions Then I say that Provisions must be dearer in the said five Shires then in the other and within the said Shires cheaper or dearer as the way to London was more or less long or rather more or less chargeable 14. For if the said five Shires did already produce as much Commodity as by all endeavour was possible then what is wanting must be brought from a far and that which is near advanced in price accordingly or if by the said Shires by greater labour then now is used as by digging instead of Ploughing setting instead of sowing picking of choice seed instead of taking it promiscuously steeping it instead of using it wholly unprepared and manuring the ground with salt instead of rotten straw c. then will the Rent be as much more advanced as the excess of encrease exceeds that of the labour 15. Now the price of labour must be certain as we see it made by the Statutes which limit the day wages of several workmen the non-observance of which Laws and the not adapting them to the change of times is by the way very dangerous and confusive to all endeavours of bettering the Trade of the Nation 16. Moreover the touchstone to try whether it be better to use those improvements or not is to examine whether the labour of fetching these things even from the places where they grow wilde or with less Culture be not less then that of the said improvements 17. Against all this will be objected that these computations are very hard if not impossible to make to which I answer onely this that they are so especially if none will trouble their hands or heads to make them or give authority for so doing But withall I say that until this be done Trade will be too conjectural a work for any man to employ his thoughts about for it will be the same wisdom in order to win with fair Dice to spend much time in considering how to hold them how much to shake them and how hard to throw them and on what angles they should hit the side of the Tables as to consider how to advance the Trade of this Nation where at present particular men get from their neighbours not from the earth and sea rather by hit then wit and by the false opinions of others rather then their own judgements Credit every where but chiefly in London being become a meer conceit that a man is responsible or not without any certain knowledge of his Wealth or true Estate Whereas I think the nature of credit should be limited onely to an opinion of a mans faculties to get by his art and industry The way of knowing his Estate being to be made certain and the way of making him pay what he owes to the utmost of his ability being to be expected from the good execution of our Laws 18. I should here enlarge upon a Paradox to prove that if every mans Estate could be alwayes read in his forehead our Trade would much be advanced thereby although the poorer ambitious man be commonly the more industrious But of this elsewhere 19. The next objection against this so exact computation of the Rents and works of Lands c. is that the Sovereign would know too exactly every mans Estate to which I answer that if the Charge of the Nation be brought as low as it may be which depends much upon the people in Parliament to do and if the people be willing and ready to pay and if care be taken that although they have not ready money the credit of their Lands and Goods shall be as good and lastly that it would be a great discommodity to the Prince to take more then he needs as was proved before where is the evil of this so exact knowledge And as for the proportion of every Contributor why should any man hope or accept to ease himself by his craft and interest in a confusion or why should he not fear though he may be advantaged this time to suffer in the next CHAP. VI. Of Customs and Free Ports CUstom is a Contribution or Excisium out of Goods sent out or imported into the Princes Dominions In these Countreys of a twentieth part not according to the Prices currant among Merchants of each respective Commodity but according to other standing Rates set by the State though advised for the most part by concerned Persons 2. I cannot well imagine what should be the natural Reasons why a Prince should be paid this duty inward and outward both there seems indeed to be some why he should be paid for indulging the Exportation of some such things as other Countreys do really want 3. Wherefore I think that Customs at the first were a praemium allowed the Prince for protecting the Carriage of Goods both inward and outward from the Pyrats and this I should verily believe if the Prince were bound to make good losses of that kinde And I thought that the proportion of five pound per cent was pitched upon computation that the Merchants before the said undertaking and composition had usually lost more by Pyracy And finally that the Customs had been an ensurance upon losses by enemies as the ensurance now usual is of the casualties of sea winde weather and Vessel or altogether or like the ensurance in some Countreys of Houses from Fires for a certain small part of their yearly Rent But be it what it will it is anciently established by Law and ought to be paid until it shall be abolished Onely I take leave as an idle Philosopher to discourse upon the Nature and Measures of it 4. The Measures of Customs outwards may be such as after reasonable profit to the Exporter will leave such of our own Commodities as are necessary to Forreigners somewhat cheaper unto them then they can be had from elsewhere As for example Tin is a Native Commodity which governs the Market that is there is none so good and so easie to be had and exported Now suppose Tin might be made in Cornwall for four pence the pound and that the same would yield twelve pence at the nearest part in France I say that this extraordinary profit ought to be esteemed as a Mine Royal or Tresor Trovè and the Sovereign ought to have his share in it Which he will have by imposing so great a duty upon Tin Exported as on one side may leave a subsistence to the Workmen and no more with a competent profit to the owners of the ground and on the other side may leave the price abroad less then that for which Tin may be had from any other

in effect but at half the usual rate which unto them that want such commodities will as well yield the full so that abating our prices will as well allure strangers to buy extraordinary proportions of our Commodities as raising their money will do But neither that nor abating the price will make strangers use more of our Commodities then they want for although the first year they should carry away an unuseful and superfluous proportion yet afterwards they would take so much the less 14. If this be true as in substance it is why then have so many wise States in several ancient as well as modern times frequently practised this Artifice as a means to draw in money into their respective Dominions I answer that something is to be attributed to the stupidity and ignorance of the people who cannot of a sudden understand this matter for I finde many men wise enough who though they be well informed that raising of money signifies little yet cannot suddenly digest it As for example an unengaged person who had money in his purse in England and should hear that a shilling was made fourteen pence in Ireland would more readily run thither to buy Land then before not suddenly apprehending that for the same Land which he might have bought before for six years Purchase he shall now pay seven Nor will Sellers in Ireland of a sudden apprehend cause to raise their Land proportionally but will at least be contented to compound the business viz. to sell at six and an half and if the difference be a more ragged fraction men under a long time will not apprehend it nor ever be able exactly to govern their practice according to it 15. Secondly Although I apprehend little real difference between raising Forreign Money to double and abasing half in the price of our own Commodities yet to sell them on on a tacite condition to be paid in Forreign present Money shall increase our money forasmuch as between raising the money and abasing the price is the same difference as between selling for money and in barter which latter is the dearer or between selling for present money and for time barter resolving into the nature of uncertain time 16. I say suppose English Cloth were sold at six shillings a Yard and French Canvas at eighteen pence the Ell the question is whether it were all one in order to increase Money in England to raise the French Money double or to abate half of the price of our Cloth I think the former because that former way or proposition carries with it a condition of having Forreign Money in specie and not Canvas in barter between which two wayes the world generally agrees there is a difference Wherefore if we can afford to abate half our price but will not do it but for our neighbours money then we gain so much as the said difference between Money and Barter amounts unto by such raising of our Neighbours Money 17. But the fundamental solution of this Question depends upon a real and not an imaginary way of computing the prices of Commodities in order to which real way I premise these suppositions First then suppose there be in a Territory a thousand people let these people be supposed sufficient to Till this whole Territory as to the Husbandry of Corn which we will suppose to contain all necessaries for life as in the Lords Prayer we suppose the word Bread doth and let the production of a Bushel of this Corn be supposed of equal labour to that of producing an ounce of Silver Suppose again that a tenth part of this Land and tenth of the people viz. an hundred of them can produce Corn enough for the whole suppose that the Rent of Land found out as above-mentioned be a fourth part of the whole product about which proportion it really is as we may perceive by paying a fourth Sheaf instead of Rent in some places suppose also that whereas but an hundred are necessary for this Husbandry yet that two hundred have taken up the Trade and suppose that where a Bushel of Corn would suffice yet men out of delicacy will use two making use of the Flower onely of both Now the Inferences from hence are First That the goodness or badness or the value of Land depends upon the greater or lesser share of the product given for it in proportion to the simple labour bestowed to raise the said Product Secondly That the proportions between Corn and Silver signific onely an artificial value not a natural because the comparison is between a thing naturally useful and a thing in it self unnecessary which by the way is part of the reason why there are not so great changes and leaps in the pro●●ed of Silver as of other Commodities Thirdly That natural dearness and cheapness depends upon the few or more hands requisite to necessaries of Nature As Corn is cheaper where one man produces Corn for ten then where he can do the like but for six and withall according as the Climate disposes men to a necessity of spending more or less But Political Cheapness depends upon the paucity of Supernumerary Interlopers into any Trade over and above all that are necessary viz. Corn will be twice as dear where are two hundred Husbandmen to do the same work which an hundred could perform the proportion thereof being compounded with the proportion of superfluous Expence viz. if to the cause of dearness abovementioned be added to the double Expence to what is necessary then the natural price will appear quadrupled and this quadruple Price is the true Political Price computed upon naturall grounds And this again proportioned to the common artificiall Standard Silver gives what was sought that is the true Price Currant 18. But forasmuch as almost all Commodities have their Substitutes or Succedanea and that almost all uses may be answered several wayes and for that novelty surprize example of Superiours and opinion of unexaminable effects do adde or take away from the price of things we must adde these contingent Causes to the permanent Causes abovementioned in the judicious foresight and computation whereof lies the excellency of a Merchant Now to apply this Digression I say that to encrease Money it is as well necessary to know how to abate the raise the price of Commodities and that of Money which was the scope of the said Digression 19. To conclude this whole Chapter we say that raising or embasing of Moneys is a very pittiful and unequal way of Taxing the people and 't is a sign that the State sinketh which catcheth hold on such Weeds as are accompanied with the dishonour of impressing a Princes Effigies to justifie Adulterate Commodities and the breach of Publick Faith such as is the calling a thing what it really is not CHAP. XV. Of Excize IT is generally allowed by all that men should contribute to the Publick Charge but according to the share and interest they have in the Publick Peace that