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A80192 The Second part of Modern reports, being a collection of several special cases most of them adjudged in the Court of Common Pleas, in the 26, 27, 28, 29, & 30th years of the reign of King Charles II. when Sir. Fra. North was Chief Justice of the said court. : To which are added, several select cases in the Courts of Chancery, King's-Bench, and Exchequer in the said years. / Carefully collected by a learned hand. Colquitt, Anthony.; Washington, Joseph, d. 1694.; Great Britain. Court of Exchequer.; England and Wales. Court of Common Pleas.; England and Wales. Court of Chancery.; England and Wales. Court of King's Bench. 1698 (1698) Wing C5416; ESTC R171454 291,993 354

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of Record the Proceedings may be denied and tryed by Iury. But the Court inclined that it was pleaded well enough and that it was the safest way to prevent mistakes but if the Plaintiff had replied de injuria sua propria absque tali causa that had traversed all the Proceedings Quaere whether such a Replication had been good because the Plaintiff must answer particularly that Authority which the Defendant pretended to have from the Court but no Iudgment was given Sherrard versus Smith TRespass Quare clausum fregit and for taking away his Goods the Defendant justifies the taking by the command of the Lord of the Mannor of which the Plaintiff held by Fealty and Rent and for non-payment thereof the Goods were taken nomine Districtionis The Plaintiff replies that the locus in quo est extra Hors de son Fee when to be pleaded absque hoc quod est infra feodum The Defendant demurrs specially because the Plaintiff pleading hors de son fee should have taken the Tenancy upon him 9 Co. Bucknal's Case 22 H. 6. 2 3. Keilway 73. 14 Ass pl. 13. 1 Inst 1. b. where this is given as a Rule by my Lord Cook Serjeant Pemberton on the other side agreed Ex parte Quer. 13 Assize 28. 28 Assise 41. that in all cases of Assize hors de son fee is no Plea without taking the Tenancy upon him 2 Ass placito 1. And in 5 E. 4. 2. 't is said that in Replevin the Party cannot plead this Plea because he may disclaim but Brook placito 15. tit hors de son fee saith this is not Law and so is 2 H. 6. 1. and many Cases afterwards were against that Book of Ed. 4. and that a Man might plead hors de son fee as if there be a Lord and Tenant holding by Fealty and Rent and he makes a Lease for years and the Lord distrains the Cattel of the Lessee though the Tenant hath paid the Rent and done Fealty there if the Lessee alledge that his Lessor was seised of the Tenancy in his demesn as of fee and held it of the Lord by Services c. of which Services the Lord was seised by the hands of his Lessor as by his true Tenant who hath leased the Lands to the Plaintiff and the Lord to charge him hath unjustly avowed upon him who hath nothing in the Tenancy 't is well enough 9 Co. Case of Avowries and the reason given in 5 Edw. 4. about disclaimer will not hold now for that course is quite altered and is taken away by the Statute of the 21 H. 8. cap. 19. which Enacts That Avowries shall be made by the Lord upon the Land without naming his Tenant But in case of Trespass there was never any such thing objected as here for what Tenancy can the Plaintiff take upon him in this case He cannot say tenen ' liberi tenementi for this is a bare Action of Trespass in which though the pleading is not so formal yet it will do no hourt for if it had been only extra feodum without the Traverse it had been good enough and of that Opinion was the Court in Hillary-Term following when Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff absente Scroggs And the Chief Iustice said That the Rule laid down by my Lord Coke in 1 Inst 1. b. that there is no pleading hors de son fee without taking the tenancy upon him is to be intended in cases of Assize and so are all the Cases he there cites for proof of that Opinion and therefore so he is to be understood but this is an Action of Trespas brought upon the Possession and not upon the Title In the Case of Avowry a Stranger may plead generally hors de son fee and so may Tenant for years and this being in the Case of a Trespass is much stronger and if the Plaintiff destroys the Defendants justification 't is well enough Sir William Hickman versus Thorne alios Prescription against another Prescription not good without a Traverse IN a Replevin The Defendant justifies the taking for that the locus in quo was his Freehold and that he took the Cattel there damage fesant The Plaintiff in bar to the Avowry replies that the locus in quo c. is parcel of such a Common Field and prescribes to have right of Common there as appendant to two Acres which he hath in another place The Defendant rejoyns that there is a Custom that every Free-holder who hath Lands lying together in the said Common Field may enclose against him who hath right of Common there and that he had Lands there and did enclose The Plaintiff demurs and Serjeant Newdigate took Exceptions to the Rejoynder Ex parte Quer. 1. For that he did not averr that the Lands which he enclosed did lye together and therefore had not brought his case within the Custom alledged Sed non allocatur because he could not enclose if the Lands had not laid together 2. He gives no answer to the Plaintiffs right of Common but by argument which he should have confessed with a bene verum est and then should have avoided it by alledging the Custom of Enclosure like the Case of * 2 Leon. 209. Russel and Broker where in Trespass for cutting Oaks the Defendant pleads that he was seised of a Messuage in Fee and prescribes to have rationabile estoverium ad libitum capiend ' in boscis the Plaintiff replies that the locus in quo was within the Forest and that the Defendant and all those c. habere consueverunt rationabile estoverium c. per liberationem Forestarii and upon a Demurrer the Replication was held naught because the Plaintiff ought to have pleaded the Law of the Forest viz. Lex Forestae talis est or to have traversed the Defendants Prescription and not to have set forth another Prescription in his Replication without a Traverse 3. The Defendant should have pleaded the Custom and then have traversed the Prescription of the Right of Common for he cannot plead a Custom against a Custom 9 Co. 58. Aldred's Case where one prescribes to have a Light the other cannot prescribe to stop it up Serjeant Pemberton contra Ex parte Def. He said that which he took to be the only Question in the Case was admitted viz. That such a Custom as this to enclose was good and so it has béen adjudged in Sir Miles Corbet's Case 7 Co. But as to the Objections which have been made the Defendant admits the Prescription for Right of Common but saith he may enclose against the Commoners by reason of a Custom which is a Barr to his very Right of Common and therefore need not confess it with a bene verum est neither could he traverse the Prescription because he hath admitted it 'T is true where one prescribes to have Lights in his House and another prescribes to stop them up this is not good because
Profit it was answered That the Act took care that Men should not stop up their Chimnies when once made and that this Duty was paid for many Chimnies which were never used and what Profit can a Man have of a Chimny he never useth If there had been an Act that so much should be paid for every Window 't is all one whether it had been for profit or pleasure or whether the Window had been used or not and there is as much reason that a Man should pay for Houses never Inhabited as for such as have been Inhabited and are afterwards without Tenants This Act ought therefore to receive a favourable Construction the Preamble whereof mentions that it was for the encreasing of the Kings Revenue which is pro bono publico and which is for the Peace and Prosperity of the Nation and the protection of every single person therein and though a particular Inconvenience may follow the Party ought to submit When a Man builds a House he proposes a Profit and 't is not fit the Kings Duty should be contingent and depend till he has provided himself of a Tenant Object As to the other Objection that was much relied on viz. where the Act speaks of an Accompt to be given it mentions both Owner and Occupier but where it directs the Payment of the Duty the Occupier only is named by which it was inferred that he alone was chargeable Answ In 16 Car. 2. cap. 3. Owner Proprietor and Occupier are used promiscuously wherein it is provided that they shall not be charged unless within two years after the Duty accrued now if the Owner was not chargeable why is he mentioned there As to the second Point they conceived that the Duty being payeable to the King he had a remedy by distress before the Accompt was certified into the Exchequer for the Return was to inform the King what advantage he maketh of his Revenue and no Process issued upon it besides the Act vests the Duty in him from Lady-day 1662. And by reason of that he may distrain The King hath no benefit by returning of the Account that being only intended to prevent his being cheated so that 't is not to entitle but to inform him 't is only to return a just and true account not but that it may be levied and the King entitled before and 't is no inconvenience to the Subject if there be no such Account returned for if the Officer distrain for more Hearths than in truth there are the Subject has a proper remedy against him The King suffers when Returns are not made of such Duties as he ought to have for the support of his Dignity and because he is lyable to be defrauded in the managing of his Duty is it reasonable that he should lose all As to what was said of the Kings taking by matter of Record 't is true if he divest an Inheritance as in case of Attainder it must be by Record but here the very Duty is given to him by the Act it self which makes it a different Case If the King should be seised in Fee of a great Wast which happens to be improved by his Tenants and thereby Tythes become due it may be as well said that he shall have no Tythes without Record as to say he shall have no Hearth-Mony for Houses newly erected whereby his Revenue is increased For which Reasons Iudgment was prayed for the Defendant and upon the second Argument Iudgment was given accordingly for him Curia That empty Houses are subject and lyable to this Duty Astry versus Ballard IN an Action of Trover and Conversion for the taking of Coals upon Not-Guilty pleaded Grants must be taken according to common intendment Jones 71. the Iury found a special Verdict The Case was thus Viz. That one J. R. was seised in Fee of the Manor of Westerly and being so seised did demise all the Mesuages Lands Tenements and Hereditaments that he had in the said Manor for a Term of years to N. R. in which demise there was a recital of a Grant of the said Mannor Mesuages Lands Tenements Commons and Mines but in the Lease it self to R. the Word Mines was left out Afterwards the Reversion was sold to the Plaintiff Astry and his Heirs by Deed enrolled and at the time of this demise there were certain Mines of Coals open and others which were not then open and the Coals for which this Action of Trover was brought were digged by the Lessee in those Mines which were not open at the time of the Lease and whether he had power so to do was the Question It was said That when a Man is seised of Lands wherein there are Mines open and others not open and a Lease is made of these Lands in which the Mines are mentioned Antea 'T is no new Doctrine to say that the close Mines shall not pass Mens Grants must be taken according to usual and common intendment and when Words may be satisfied they shall not be strained farther than they are generally used for no violent Construction shall be made to prejudice a Mans Inheritance contrary to the plain meaning of the Words A Mine is not properly so called 'till it is opened 't is but a Vein of Coals before and this was the Opinion of my Lord Coke in point in his first Inst 54. b. Where he tells us 5 Co. 12. Sanders Case Roll. Abr. 2 part 816. that if a Man demises Lands and Mines some being opened and others not the Lessee may use the Mines opened but hath no power to dig the unopened Mines and of this Opinion was the whole Court and Iustice Twisden said That he knew no reason why my Lord Coke's single Opinion should not be as good an Authority as Fitzherbert in his Nat. Br. or the Doctor and Student Ipsley versus Turk IN a Writ of Error upon a Iudgment in an Inferiour Court What is admitted in pleading shall not be assigned for Error Jones 81. the Error assigned was That the Mayor who was Iudge of the Court did not receive the Sacrament at any Parish Church nor file any Certificate so that he was not Mayor and Iudgment being given against the Defendant before him it was therefore Coram non Judice like the Case of Hatch and Nichols Roll. Abr. 1 part tit Error 761. Where upon a Writ of Error brought upon a Iudgment in an Inferiour Court the Error assigned was that the Stile of the Court was Curia tent̄ coram J. S. Seneschallo who was not Steward and that was held to be an Error in fact But on the other side it was insisted that this was not Error because the Acts of the Mayor should not be void as to Strangers The Statute of 25 Car. 2. cap. 2. for preventing of dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants disables the Party who is not qualified according to the Act to hold an Office and if he execute the same afterwards
Trotter versus Blake In Scaccario THIS was the Case of my Lord Hollis upon a Tryal at the Barr in the Exchequer in an Ejectione firmae Ejectment will not lie for a Forfeiture where the Tenant refused to pay a Fine being doubtful wherein the Case was this viz. The Lord Hollis was seised of the Mannor of Aldenham in the County of Hartford in Fee and the Lands in question were held of the said Lord by Copy of Court Roll and are parcel of the aforesaid Mannor That the Defendant was admitted Tenant and a Fine of 8 l. imposed upon him for such admittance payable at three distinct payments that the 8 l. was personally demanded of him by the Lord's Steward and he refused payment whereupon the Lord enters and seises the Estate for a Forfeiture which he would not have insisted on but that the obstinacy of the Defendant made it necessary for him to assert his Title and Right Mr. Walker the Lord Hollis his Steward being sworn gave Evidence that a Fine of 8 l. was set upon the Defendant when he was admitted and that the Lands to which he was admitted were usually lett for 7 l. per annum so that the Fine was but a little more than a years value That he himself demanded the 8 l. of the Defendant being a Seafaring-man who refused to pay it That he knew the Defendant to be the same person who was admitted to this Copyhold That the Demand was made at the Stewards Chamber in Staple Inn and because it was payable at three several days he then demanded of him only 2 l. 13 s. 4 d. as a third part of the 8 l. and that he did enter upon the 25th day of November last for Non-payment of the said 2 l. 13 s. 4 d. The Council for the Defendant insisted that the Steward ought to produce an Authority in Writing given to him by the Lord to make this Demand and Entry upon refusal Ex parte Def. for the Lords owning it afterwards will not make a Forfeiture But the Court held clearly that there was no need of an express Authority in Writing Curia and that it was not necessary for the Steward to make a Precept for the seizure but that it was necessary that the Demand should be personal The Reason why the Defendant refused to pay this Fine was because he said that by a Decree and Survey made of this Mannor in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth the Fine to be paid for this Copyhold was setled and it was but 3 l. and no more And Sir Francis Winnington Solicitor General said for the Defendant that the Case was very penal on his side but that he would make it clear that there was no colour for the bringing of this Action either as to the Matter or the Form He said that the Mannor of Aldenham had not been long in this noble Lord he came in as Purchaser or a Mortgagee under the Family of the Harvies whose Inheritance it was anciently and there has been some doubt whilst it was in their possession what Fines were customary to be paid upon Descents and Alienations but that is now settled and the Defendant was in the Case of a descent for which the Fine is not to be arbitrary at the Will of the Lord but is reduced to a certainty in Queen Elizabeth's Reign by Consent and Agreement between the Lord and Tenants and that a Survey was then made by vertue of a Commission directed to some Men of Credit and Worth in those days who were impowred to set forth the quantity of Land and the value thereof which was done accordingly and it was then agreed that a year and an halfs value in case of a Descent and two years value in case of an Alienation should be paid as a Fine to the Lord and the proportion of the value was then computed by the Commissioners and decreed by the Court of Chancery to be binding to the Lords and Tenants for ever The Question now is how this years value shall be computed the Lord would have it according to the improved value the Tenant will pay according as it was rated in Queen Elizabeth's time by those Commissioners Now if this Land had decayed in value the Tenant had still been obliged to pay a Fine according to the valuation of that time and if so it would be very unreasonable to make him pay for his Industry and Improvement of the Land now it is raised in value because that was done by his Labour and at his expence so that the doubt being what Fine shall be paid an Ejectione firmae will not lie because the Matter is doubtful and the Law gives the Tenant Liberty to contest it with the Lord and will never let him be under the peril of a Forfeiture because he will not comply with the Lord to give up his Right without Law But the Lord hath another and a more proper remedy for he may bring an Action of Debt for the Fine thus imposed which will try the Right and is not so penal to the Copyholder which Point was lately resolved And that if a Copyholder had a probable cause to induce him to believe that he ought not to pay the Fine demanded let the Right be as it would yet no Ejectment will lie for it must be only in a plain Case that the Lord can enter for a Forfeiture For no Man forfeits his Estate but by a wilful default in himself such a Forfeiture as is done and presumed to be committed upon his own knowledge but want of understanding cannot be made a wilful neglect 'T is true the Decree in Chancery made here cannot vary the Law but it may be Evidence of the Fact for prima facie it shall be intended that such values have been paid time out of mind because the Court have so decreed but then when the Fine was declared to be certain a doubt did arise how the years value shall be reckoned which has been setled also by another Decree and from that time all the respective Lords of this Mannour have taken Fines according to that value which is mentioned in the Survey and this Lord himself hath taken Fines in pursuance of the same so that 't is clear the Fine cannot be Arbitrary but be it so or not 't is not material to this purpose because the Tenant hath a good and colourable ground to insist upon the Decree and Survey and consequently there is no wilful Forfeiture The Lord Chief Baron agreed That if it be a doubt and the Tenant gives a probable Reason to make it appear that no more is due than what he is ready to pay 't is no Forfeiture but the Law in general presumes that the Fine is incertain if the contrary is not shewed now if the Tenants doubt did arise upon the equitableness of the Fine in such case if he refuse to pay 't is a Forfeiture but here it was whether it shall be paid
in the Common-Pleas And it was now said for the Plaintiff in the Errors That it doth not appear by the Pleadings whether the Plaintiff in the Prohibition would discharge himself by a Praescription in non decimando or in modo decimandi for the Grant from the Prior being the foundation of his Title he could not thereby be discharged because a Deed before Memory cannot be pleaded unless it hath been allowed in a Court of Eyre or some Court of Record since Memory and this Deed being dated in the Reign of King Henry the I. which was 65 years before the time of Memory by the Common Law that beginning in the Reign of Richard the I. whatever is before that time cannot be tried by Law if it had been allowed in Eyre or in some of the Courts of Record it may be pleaded but no usage in pais can confirm it But supposing the Deed to be good the Plaintiff hath alledged a Grant of a portion of Tythes which he cannot have for at the Common Law a Lay-man was not capable of Tythes in prender for no one had capacity to take or receive them Jones 369. 2 Co. 49. save only spiritual persons for which Reasons a Lay-man could not prescribe in non decimando but in modo decimandi he might because there is still an annual recompence in satisfaction thereof 2. 'T is not alledged that the place where c. was parcel of the Demesus of the Mannor therefore for what appears it might have been always in Tenancy and though a Prescription to a modus by the Lord for himself and all his Tenants is good Cro. Eliz. 599. because it might have a lawful beginning for the Lands at first might be all in his Hands before it was a Mannor and so much paid for the Tythes thereof yet such a Prescription by a Tenant is not good 3. He hath alledged payment to the Prior and afterwards to the King and so would infer a Modus to which he hath not positively prescribed but by an old Deed upon payment of 5 s. to all those whose Estates c. And this will not do for unless the Modus doth go to the person who by Law ought to have Tythes or unless it be for his benefit 't is not good as where it was alledged that he ought to be discharged because time out of memory he employed all the profits of the Land for the Repairs of the Body of the Church and to find necessaries c. this was not a good Modus 1 Roll. Abr. 649 placito 8. because 't is no recompence for the Parson But it was said by Saunders for the Plaintiff in the Prohibition That by the Suggestion there was a good Title alledged to be discharged of Tythes for 't is set forth that the Prior had a portion of Tythes and the Lands simul semel and being a Corporation they might prescribe for Tythes in prender and the Tythes being well in them they may well grant it to Fitzherbert paying 5 s. and constant payment being alledged ever since 't is a good Title As to the Deed t is true 't is dated before the time of Memory but yet 't is pleadable because 't is a private Deed and so need not be allowed in Eyre or in Courts of Record for such as are not to be pleaded unless allowed there are only Grants of Franchises and Liberties from the King but the confession of the Deed to be beyond Memory and the constant payment of 5 s. is a sufficient title to the Plaintiff if the Deed is not pleadable and if it is then 't is a good discharge that way And as to the Objection that the Modus is payable to a wrong person there are many such which are not paid to the Parson of the Parish but to Lay-men But in this Case it doth appear that there was a Modus in the Prior which being received till it came to the Crown 't is good although now paid to others so that for that reason the Spiritual Court ought to be prohibited and of that Opinion was all the Court for if a Modus be payable to him who hath the Right of the Tythes though it be not to the Parson of the Parish 't is well enough especially where the Plaintiff as here alledgeth it to be Portio Decimarum belonging to the Prior so that it cannot be said that the Parson hath not quid pro quo for he had nothing at first This Composition was made with the Prior and the Plaintiff is only to shew payment to him and to those who have his Right And as to the date of the Deed 't is pleadable though time out of memory because 't is a private Deed but Grants of Franchises and Liberties must be allowed in Eyre and so is my Lord Rolls to be understood in his Abridgment Whereupon Iudgment was affirmed FINIS A TABLE of the Principal Matters contained in these REPORTS A. Abatement WHERE it shall be taken in Barr 64 65 Action on the Case Where two matters are laid in two Counties the Action may be brought in either by Pleading 23 Process is directed to six Coroners one of them commits a Tort the Action lies against all of them 23 24 It lies for an Acquittal upon an Indictment for a Trespass 52 306 It lies for these Words viz. I dealt not so unkindly with you when you stole my Corn 58 It doth not lye against the Sheriff for returning a Cepi Corpus paratum habeo though the Party doth not appear 85 86 Action Misconceived by the Plaintiff and a Verdict against him no barr to a new Action 294 Accord Where 't is pleaded it must be averred to be executed in all points 44 Accompt After 't is stated an Insimul computasset and not Indebitatus Assumpsit doth lye 44 Acquittal After an Acquittal for a Trespass an Action on the Case will lie 306 Act. Who is to do the first Act 76 203 Act of God of the Party and of a Stranger where it excuses the Obligee 204 Act of Parliament Affirmative words therein where they shall have the force of a negative 40 Where it restores the Common Law 't is to be taken favourably 73 Private Acts must be taken strictly 57 71 Administration Of a Chose en Action of a Feme Covert whether grantable to the Husband or to be distributed amongst the Kindred 20 Pleaded without saying loci istius Ordinarius and held good 65 Where an Executrix dies before Probate it shall be committed to the next of Kin of the Testator 101 It cannot be granted where there is an Executor 149 Where 't is committed to the Debtee in Execution how she shall be discharged 315 Administrator sells the Term an Executor appears who refuses yet the Vendee of the Term hath no Title 148 149 Amerciament Must be made upon the Sheriff if Defendant doth not appear at the Return of the Writ 84 Amendment Not allowed after
Heir enters and claims generally it shall be intended as Heir and the words that he shall not molest by Suit or otherwise are to be intended occasione praemissorum 3dly There is no néed of Entry to avoid an Estate in case of a Limitation because thereby the Estate is determined without Entry or Claim and the Law casts it upon the Party to whom it is limited and in whom it vests till he disagrées to it A. devises Land to B. and his Heirs and dies 't is in the Devisee immediately but indeed till Entry he cannot bring a possessory Action as Trespass c. Pl. Com. 412 413. 10 Co. 40. b. where a Possession vests without Entry a Reversion will vest without Claim Nota. Curtis versus Davenant Prohibition A Bishop cannot appoint Commissioners to tax the Parish for building or repairing a Church IN a Prohibition the Question was whether if a Church be out of repair or being so much out of order that it must be re-edified whether the Bishop of the Diocess may direct a Commission to impower Commissioners to tax and rate every Parishioner for the re-edifying thereof The Court did unanimously agree such Commissions were against Law and therefore granted a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court to stop a Suit there commenced against some of the Parishioners of White-Chappel for not paying the Tax according to their proportions It was agréed that the Spiritual Court hath power to compel the Parish to repair the Church by their Ecclesiastical Censures but they cannot appoint what Sums are to be paid for that purpose because the Churchwardens by the consent of the Parish are to settle that As if a Bridge be out of repair the Iustices of Peace cannot set Rates upon the persons that are to repair it but they must consent to it themselves These Parishioners here who contribute to the charge of repairing the Church may be spared but as for those who are obstinate and refuse to do it the Spiritual Court may proceed to Excommunication against them but there may be a Libel to pay the Rates set by the Church-wardens Nurse versus Yearworth in Cancellaria Bill in Cancellaria for the Assignment of a Term. RIchard Yearworth being seised of Lands in Fee makes a Lease to the Defendant Christopher Yearworth for 99 years to such use as by his last Will he should direct Afterward he makes his Will in writing having then no Issue but his Wife grossement enseint and thereby devises the same Land to the Heirs of his Body on the Body of his Wife begotten and for want of such Issue to the said Christopher the Defendant and his Heirs Richard dies and about a month after a Son is born the Son by vertue of this Devise enjoys the Land but when he attains his full age of one and twenty years he suffers a Common Recovery and afterwards devises the Land to the Complainant Nurse and dies The Complainant exhibits a Bill against the Defendant to have the Lease for 99 years assigned to him and whether he should have it assigned or not was the Question 1. It was pretended that an Estate in Fée being limited by the Will to Christopher who was Lessee for 99 years the Term is thereby drowned 2. It was objected that the Devise by Richard to the Infant in ventre la mere was void and then the Complainant who claimed by a Devise from the Posthumus could have no Title but that the Defendant to whom an Estate was limited by the Will of Richard in Remainder should take presently But notwithstanding what was objected the Lord Keeper Finch decréed that the Lease which was in Trust should be assigned to the Complainant Nurse He said that at the Common Law without all question a Devise to an Infant in ventre sa mere of Lands devisable by Custom was good so that the doubt arises upon the Statute of H. 8. Roll. Abr. tit Devise 609. lit H. pl. 2. Godb. 385. 11 H 6. 13. dubitatur which enacts That it shall be lawful for a Man by his Will in writing to devise his Lands to any person or persons for in this Case the Devisée not being in rerum naturâ in strictness of spéech is no person and therefore it hath beén taken that such a Devise is void Moor's Rep. and 't is left as a Quaere in the Lord Dyer 304. But in two Cases in the Common Pleas one in the time when the Lord Chief Iustice Hale was Iudge there the other in the Lord Chief Iustice Bridgman's time it hath been resolved that if there were sufficient and apt words to describe the Infant though in ventre sa mere the Devise might be good But in the King's Bench the Iudges since have been divided upon this Point that as the Law stands now adjudged this Devise in our Case seems not to be good But should the Case come now in question he said he was not sure that the Law would be so adjudged for 't is hard to disinherit an Heir for want of apt Words to describe him and 't is all the reason in the World that a Mans intent lying in extremis when most commonly he is destitute of Council should be favoured Whitrong versus Blaney Process into Wales THIS Term the Court delivered their Opinions in this Case North Chief Iustice who had heard no Arguments herein being absent The Case was this The Plaintiff upon a Iudgment in this Court sues out a Scire facias against the Heir and the Ter-tenants which was directed to a Sheriff of Wales the Defendant is returned Tertenant but he comes in and pleads Non tenure generally and traverses the Return the Plaintiff demurs Two Points were spoke to in the Case 1. Whether the Defendant can traverse the Sheriffs Return And all the three Iustices agreéd that he cannot 2. Whether a Scir̄ Fac̄ Ca. Sa. Fi. Fa. c. would lie into Wales on a Iudgment here at Westminster And they agréed it would well lie An Indictment may be removed 2 Cro. 484. Ellis Iustice agreéd If Iudgment be given in Wales it could not be removed into the Chancery by Certiorari and sent hither by Mittimus and then Execution taken out upon that Iudgment here because such Iudgments are to be executed in their proper Iurisdictions and such was the Resolution of the Iustices and Barons Cro. Car. 34. But on a Iudgment obtained here Execution may go into Wales No Execution can go into the Isle of Man because 't is no part of England but Wales is united to England by the Statute of 27 H. 8. c. 26. And therefore in Bedo and Piper's Case 2 Bulstr 156. it was held that such a * Het 20. 2 Cro. 484. The Opinion of Dodderidge Roll. 395. 2 Sand. 194. Twisden denied it Writ of Execution goes legally into Wales He said he had a Report of a Case in 11 Car. 2. where a Motion was made to quash an Elegit into Wales
and takes notice that this Writ is not returnable into that Court from Wales and therefore orders that the Significavit shall be sent by Mittimus out of the Chancery to the Chief Iustice there and gives them power to make Process to inferior Officers returnable before them at their Sessions for the due Execution of this Writ all which had beén in vain if the Capias might go into Wales before the making this Act. Answ But that is an original Writ and so comes not up to this Case Wyndham Iustice agreed in omnibus and said that the Statute of 1 Ed. 6. was very needful for if a Man should be outlawed if the Process should be sent to the Sheriff of the next adjoining County in England he could not have any notice that he was outlawed and so could not tell when oulawed or at whose Suit Vaughan late Lord Chief Iustice held strongly Vaugh. 395. 2 Saund. 194. that no Execucution would go into Wales when this Case was argued before him and of the same Opinion was Iustice Twisden Williamson versus Hancock Collateral Warranty Mod. Rep. 192. A Special Verdict was found in an Ejectment where the Case was Richard Lock the Father was Tenant for Life with Remainder in Tail to Richard his Son Remainder to the right Heirs of the Father who levies a Fine with Warranty to the use of Susan and Hannah Prinn in Feé they by Bargain and Sale convey their Estate to the Defendant The Son in his Fathers life time before the Warranty attached comes of full age the Father dies The Question was whether the Sons Entry was barred by this collateral Warranty thus discended And the thrée Iustices absente North Chief Iustice were clear of Opinion that the collateral Waranty was a barr to the Son and so Iudgment was given for the Defendant Ellis Iustice held that his Entry is taken away for in every Warranty two things are implied a Voucher and Rebutter he that comes in by Voucher calleth the person into Court who is bound in the Warranty to defend his Right or yield him other Land in recompence and must come in by Privity but if a Man have the Estate though he comes in the Post he may rebut that is he may repel the Action of the Heir by the Warranty of his Ancestor without shewing how the Estate came to him Fitzh Nat. Br. 135. In a Formedon in the Discender to say the Ancestor enfeoffed J.S. with Warranty without shewing how J. S. came by his Estate is good Object It was objected by Serjeant Maynard that no person can take advantage of a Warranty who comes in by way of use as in this Case Answ But 't is expresly resolved otherwise in Lincoln Colledge Case 3 Co. 62. b. and the Prinns in this Case came in by Limitation and Act of the Party and the Defendant who hath the Reversion likewise by Limitation of Vse though he be in the Post shall take benefit of the Warranty as Assignee within the Statute of 32 H. 8. Mod. Rep. 181. c. 34. and so it was resolved in Fowl and Dobles Case in this Court that he who comes in by way of use may rebut and Iustice Jones in his Report fol. 199. affirms the fourth resolution in Lincoln Colledge Case to be Law It was formerly objected by the Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan that this Warranty goes only to the Heirs not to the Assigns and here the Estate was conveyed by the two Prinns before the Warranty attached Answ But when the Estate passeth the Warranty and Covenant followeth and the Assignée shall have the benefit thereof though not named and so is the Authority of 38 E. 3. 26. if a Warranty be made to a Man and his Heirs the Assigneé though not named shall Rebutt but he cannot Vouch. So if A. enfeoff B. with Warranty and B. enfeoff C. without Déed C. shall vouch A. as Assigneé of the Land of B. for the Warranty cannot be assigned In this Case though the Warranty did not attach before the Estate in the Land was transferred yet if it attach afterwards 't is well enough and he who hath the Possession shall Rebutt the Demandant without shewing how he came by the Possession If a Warranty be to one and his Heirs without the word Assigns the Assignée indeéd cannot Vouch but he may * 1 Inst 265. a 384. Rebutt for Rebutter is so incident to a Warranty that a Condition not to Rebutt is void in Law But 't is otherwise of a Condition not to Vouch for in such case you may Rebutt 'T is true it hath béen an Opinion that he who claimeth above the Warranty if it be not attached cannot take benefit of it by way of Voucher or Rebbutter as if Tenant in Dower maketh a Feoffment to a Villain with Warranty and the Lord entreth upon him before the descent of the Warranty the Villain can never take advantage of this Warranty by way of Rebutter because the Lords Title is paramount the Warranty and he cometh not under his Estate to whom the Warranty was made If Land be given to two Brothers in Feé with Warranty to the eldest and his Heirs the eldest dies without Issue the Survivor shall not take benefit by this Warranty for the reason aforesaid But in the Case at Barr the Warranty being collateral and annexed to the Land goeth with the Estate and whilst that continues the Party may Vouch or Rebutt so here the Defendant though he be only Tenant at Will for the Estate is in the Bargainors and their Heirs there being no Execucution of it either by Livery or Enrolment yet he may Rebutt Iustice Atkins was of the same Opinion that by this collateral Warranty the Entry of the Lessor of the Plaintiff was taken away for 't is the nature of a collateral Warranty to be a Barr a * Jones Rep. 199 200. 1 Inst 366 385. 25 H. 6. 63. Bro. Gar. 4. Right is bound by it it extinguishes a Right 't is annexed to the Land and runs with it If then a collateral Warranty be of this nature 't is against all reason that he who is thus bound should make any Title to the Land but 't is very reasonable that he who comes in quasi by that Estate should defend his Title The Opinions of Iustice Jones and Iustice Crook in the Case of * Cro. Car. 368. Spirt and Bence has occasioned this doubt The Case was shortly thus Cann being seised in Fée had thrée Sons Thomas Francis and Henry and devised Lands to the two eldest in Tail and to Henry the Meadow called Warhay which was the Land in question but doth not limit what Estate he should have in it then he adds these Words viz. Also I will that he shall enjoy all Bargains I had of Webb to him and his Heirs and for want of Heirs of his * Notwithstanding the word Body he had but an Estate for Life in Warhay for that
de se by Inquisition and then comes an Act of Indempnity that shall not divest the King of his Right But where nothing Vests before the Office found a Pardon before the Inquisition extinguishes all Forfeitures as it was resolved in Tomb's Case So if the Pardon in this Case had come before the Presentation the Party had been restored Statu quo c. The King can do no more the Bishop is to do the rest neither is the Presentation revoked by this Act it might have been revoked by implication in some Cases as where there is a second Presentation but such a general revocation will not do it and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ of Error brought but the Cause was ended by Agreement Hill versus Pheasant Gaming at several meetings whether within the Statute AN Action of Debt was brought upon the Statute of 16 Car. 2. cap. 7. made against deceitful and disorderly Gaming which Enacts That if any person shall play at any Game other than for ready Mony and shall lose any Sum or other thing played for above the Sum of 100 l. at any one time or meeting upon Tick and shall not then pay the same that all Contracts and Securities made for the payment thereof shall be void and the person winning shall pay treble the Mony lost It happened that the Defendant won 80 l. at one meeting for whcih the Plaintiff gave Security and another meeting was appointed and the Defendant won 70 l. more of the Plaintiff being in all above 100 l. And if this was within the Statute was the Question The like Case was in the Kings-Bench Trin. 25 Car. 2. Rot. 1230. between Edgberry and Roseberry and in Michaelmas Term following this Case was argued and the Court was divided which the Plaintiff perceiving Anonymus Postea desired to discontinue his Action but the better Opinion was that it was not within the Statute though if it had been pleaded That the several meetings were purposely appointed to elude the Statute Sid. 394. in might be otherwise Calthorp versus Heyton Traverse not good viz. Absque hoc quod legitimo modo oneratus IN Replevin The Defendant avowed for that the King being seised in Fee of a Mannor and of a Grange which was parcel of the Mannor granted the Inheritance to a Bishop reserving 33 l. Rent to be yearly issuing out of the whole and alledges a Grant of the Grange from Sir W. W. who claimed under the Bishop to his Ancestors in Fee in which Grant there was this Clause Viz. If the Grantee or his Heirs shall be legally charged by Distress or with any Rent due to the King or his Successors upon account of the said Grange that then it should be lawful for them to enter into Blackacre and distrein till he or they be satisfied And afterwards the Grantee and his Heirs were upon a Bill Exhibited against them in the Exchequer decreed to pay the King 4 l. per Annum as their proportion out of the Grange for which he distreined and so justified the taking The Plaintiff pleads in barr to the Avowry and traverseth that the Defendant was lawfully charged with the said Rent and the Defendant demurred Baldwyn Serjeant maintained the Avowry to be good Ex parte Def. having alledged a legal charge and that the Barr was not good for the Plaintiff traverseth quod Defendens est ligitimo modo oneratus which being part matter of Law and part likewise matter of Fact is not good and therefore if the Decree be not a legal charge the Plaintiff should have demurred But on the other side it was argued by Seys Serjeant Ex parte Quer. That the Avowry is not good because the Defendant hath not set forth a legal charge according to the Grant which must be by Distress or some other lawful way and that must be intended by some execution at Common Law for the coactus fuit to pay is not enough a Suit in Equity is no legal disturbance Moor 559. The same Case is Reported in 1 Brownl 23. Selby versus Chute Besides the Defendant doth not shew any Process taken out or who were Parties to the Decree and a Que estate in the Case of a Bishop is not good for he must pass it by Deed. North and the whole Court A Rent in the Kings Case lies in Render and not in Demand and after the Rent day is past he is oneratus and the Decree is not material in this Case for the charge is not made thereby but by the Reservation for payment whereof the whole Grange is chargeable The King may distrain in any part of the Land he is not bound by the Decree to a particular place that is in favour only to the Purchasor that he should pay no more than his proportion As to the Que estate the Defendant hath admitted that by saying bene verum est that Sir W. W. was seised The Traverse is ill and Iudgment was given for the Avowant Vaughan versus Wood. Trespass justified for taking corrupt Victualls Mod. Rep. 202. TRespass for taking Beef The Defendant pleads a Custom to choose Supervisors of Victuals at a Court Leet That he was there chosen and having viewed the Plaintiffs Goods found the Beef to be corrupt which he took and burned The Plaintiff demurrs for that the Custom is unreasonable and when Meat is corrupt and sold there are proper remedies at Law by Action on the Case or presentment at a Leet 9 H. 6. 53. 11 Ed. 3. 4. 6. Vide Stat. 18 Eliz. cap. 3. But the Court held it a good Custom and Iudgment was given for the Defendant the Chief Iustice being not clear in it Chapter of Southwel versus Bishop of Lincoln Grant of next Avoidance not bind the Successor Mod. Rep. 204. IN a Quare Impedit the Question upon pleading was Whether the Grant of the next Avoidance by the Chapter was good or not to bind the Successor The doubt did arise upon the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 10. which was objected not to be a publick * Yelv. 106. Act because it extends only to those who are Ecclesiastical persons or if it should be adjudged a publick Law yet this is not a good Grant to bind the Successor for though the Grant of an Avoidance is not a thing of which any profit can be made yet it is an * Cro. Eliz. 441. Hereditament within the meaning of that Statute by which among other things 't is Enacted That all Grants c. made by Dean and Chapter c. of any Lands Tythes Tenements or Hereditaments being parcel of the Possessions of the Chapter other than for the Term of 21 Years or 3 Lives from the time of the making the said Grant shall be void But it was agreed by the Court to be a general Law like the Statute of Non Residency which hath been so ruled and that this Presentment or Grant
year before the Sale After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of Iudgment by Serjeant Barrell because the Information had set forth the right of these Lands purchased to be in J. S. and that the Son of J. N. had conveyed them by general words 2 Anders 57. as descending from his Father which Title of the Son the Defendant bought whereas if in truth the Title was in J. S. then nothing descended from the Father to the Son and so the Defendant bought nothing Sed non allocatur for if such construction should be allowed there could be no buying of a pretended Title within the Statute unless it was a good Title but when 't is said as here that the Defendant entred and claimed colore of that Grant or Conveyance which was void yet 't is within the Statute so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Wine versus Rider al. TRespass against five Quare clausum fregerunt Traverse immaterial and took Fish out of the Plaintiffs Several and Free-Fishery Four of them pleaded Not Guilty and the fifth justified for that one of the other Defendants is seised in Fee of a Close adjoyning to the Plaintiffs Close and that he and all those c. have had the sole and separate Fishing in the River which runs by the said Closes with liberty to enter into the Plaintiffs Close to beat the Water for the better carrying on of the Fishing and that he as Servant to the other Defendant and by his Command did enter and so justified the taking absque hoc that he is Guilty aliter vel alio modo The Plaintiff replies That he did enter de injuria sua propria absque hoc That the Defendants Master hath the Sole Fishing The Defendant demurs Ex parte Def. and Newdigate Serjeant argued for him That the Iustification is good for when he had made a local justification 2 Cro. 45 372. he must traverse both before and after as he has done in this Case 2. The Plaintiffs Replication is ill for he ought not to have waved the Defendants Traverse and force him to accept of another from him because the first is material to the Plaintiffs Title and he is bound up to it Hob. 104. 3. There was no occasion of a Traverse in the Replication for where a Servant is Defendant de injuria sua propria is good with a Traverse of the Command Ex parte Quer. But on the Plaintiffs side Serjeant Baldwin held the Defendants Traverse to be immaterial for having answered the Declaration fully in alledging a Right to the sole fishing and an Entry into the Plaintiffs Close 2 Cro. 372. 't is insignificant afterwards to traverse that he is guilty aliter vel alio modo Then the matter of the Plea is not good because the Defendant justifies by a Command from one of the other Defendants who have all pleaded Not-guilty and they must be guilty if they did command him for a Command will make a Man a Trespasser Curia The Court were all of Opinion that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff For as to the last thing mentioned which was the Matter of the Plea they held it to be well enough for the * Mires and Solebay Post Servant shall not be ousted of the advantage which the Law gives him by pleading his Masters Command Then as to the Replication 't is good and the Plea is naught with the Traverse for where the Iustification goes to a time and place not alledged by the Plaintiff there must be a Traverse of both In this Case the Defendant ought to have traversed the Plaintiffs free fishing as alledged by him in his Declaration which he having omitted the Plea for that reason also is ill and so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff DE Termino Paschae Anno 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco Lee versus Brown IN a Special Verdict in Ejectment The Case was this Where reputed Lands shall pass under general words viz. There were Lands which re vera were not parcel of a Mannor and yet were reputed as parcel A Grant is made of the Mannor and of all Lands reputed parcel thereof and whether by this Grant and by these general Words those Lands would pass which were not parcel of the Mannor was the Question This Term the Lord Chief Iustice delivered the Opinion of the Court That those Lands would pass Postea Cro. Car. 308. and they grounded their Opinions upon two Authorities in Co. Entr. fol. 330 384. The King versus Imber Wilkins If the Iury had found that the Lands in question had beén reputed parcel of the Mannor it would not have passed had they found no more because the Reputation so found might be intended a Reputation for a small time so reputed by a few or by such as were ignorant and unskilful But in this Case 't is found that not only the Lands were reputed parcel but the reason why they were reputed parcel for the Iury have found that they were formerly parcel of the Mannor and after the division they were again united in the possession of him who had the Mannor which being also Copyhold have since béen demised by Copy of Court Roll togethet with the Mannor and these were all great marks of Reputation and therefore Iudgment was given that the Lands did well pass 2 Roll. Abr. 186. Dyer 350. Wakeman versus Blackwel Common Recoveries how to be pleaded QUare Impedit The Case was The Plaintiff entituled himself to an Advowson by a Recovery suffered by Tenant in Tail in pleading of which Recovery he alledges two to be Tenants to the Praecipe but doth not shew how they came to be so or what Conveyance was made to them by which it may appear that they were Tenants to the Praecipe and after search of Presidents as to the form of pleading of Common Recoveries the Court inclined that it was not well pleaded but delivered no Iudgment Searl versus Bunion Justification where good IN Trespass for taking of his Cattel The Defendant pleads that he was possessed of Blackacre pro termino diversorum annorum adtunc adhuc ventur̄ and being so possessed the Plaintiffs Cattle were doing damage and he distrained them Damage fesant ibidem and so justifies the taking c. The Plaintiff demurrs and assigns specially for cause that the Defendant did not set forth particularly the commencement of the Term of years but only that he was possessed of an Acre for a Term of years to come and regularly where a Man makes a Title to a particular Estate in pleading he must shew the particular time of the Commencement of his Title that the Plaintiff may replie to it Curia The Chief Iustice and the whole Court held that the Plea was good upon this difference where the Plaintiff brings an Action for the Land or doing of a Trespass upon the Land he is supposed to be in possession
Authorities with great exactness and nicety yet this Matter of Livery upon Endorsements of Writing was always favourably expounded of later times unless where it plainly appeared that the Authority was not pursued at all Sid. 428. as if a Letter of Attorney be made to thrée joyntly and severally two cannot execute it because they are not the Parties delegated they do not agreé with the Authority And Iudgment was given accordingly Richards versus Sely. THIS was a Special Verdict in Ejectione firmae for Lands in the County of Cornwal The Case was this viz. Covenant made to enjoy a Copy-hold de anno in annum 't is a Lease and so a Forfeiture Thomas Sely was seised of the Lands in question for life according the Custom of the Mannor of P. and he together with one Peter Sely were bound in a Bond to a third person for the payment of 100 l. being the proper Debt of the said Thomas who gave Peter a Counter-bond to save himself harmless And that Thomas being so seised did execute a Déed to Peter as a Collateral Security to indempnifie him for the payment of this 100 l. by which Deéd after a recital of the Counterbond given to Peter and the Estate which Thomas had in the Lands he did covenant grant and agree for himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns with the said Peter that he his Executors and Administrators should hold and enjoy these Lands from the time of the making of the said Déed for seven years and so from the end of seven years to seven years for and during the term of 49 years if Thomas should so long live 2 Cro. 301. In which Déed there was a Covenant that if the said 100 l. should be paid and Peter saved harmless according to the Condition of the said Counterbond then the said Déed to be void The Question was whether this being in the Case of Copyhold Lands will amount to a Lease thereof and so make a Forfeiture of the Copyhold Estate there being no Custom to warrant it Ex parte Quer. This Case was argued this Term by Serjeant Pemberton for the Plaintiff and in Trinity Term following by Serjeant Maynard on the same side who said that this was not a good Lease to entitle the Lord to a Forfeiture It hath béen a general Rule that the Word Covenant will make a Lease though the Word Grant be omitted nay a Licence to hold Land for a time without either of those Words will amount to a Lease much more when the Words are to * 2 Cro. 92 398. Noy 14. 1 Roll. Abr. 848 849. Cro. Car. 207. have hold and enjoy his Land for a Term certain for those are Words which give an Interest and so it hath béen ruled in Tisdale and Sir William Essex's Case which is reported by several and is in Hob. 35. and 't is now setled that an Action of Debt may be brought upon such a Covenant And all this is regularly true in the Case of a Fréehold But if the construing of it to be a Lease will work a Wrong then 't is only a Covenant or Agreément and no Interest vests and therefore it shall never be intended a Lease in this Case because 't is in the Case of a Copyhold Estate for if it should there would be a Wrong done both to the Lessor and Lessée for it would be a Forfeiture of the Estate of the one and a defeating of the Security of the other It has beén generally used in such Cases to consider what was the intention of the Parties and not to intend it a Lease against their meaning for which there is an express Authority 2 Cro. 172. in the Case of Evans and Thomas Noy 128. in which Howel covenants with Morgan to make a Conveyance to him of Land by Fine provided that if he pay Morgan 100 l. at the end of thirtéen years that then the use of the Fine shall be to the Congnisor and covenants that Morgan shall enjoy the said Lands for thirtéen years and for ever after if the 100 l. be not paid The Assurance was not made and this was adjuged no Lease for thirtéen years because it was the intent of the Parties to make an Assurance only in the nature of a Mortgage which is but a Covenant And this appears likewise to be the intention of the Parties here because in the very Deed 't is recited that the Lands are Copihold It also sounds directly in Covenant for 't is that Peter shall or may enjoy without the lawful let or interruption of the Lessor All Agreements must be construed secundum subjectam materiam if the Matter will bear it and in most Cases are governed by the intention of the Parties and not to work a Wrong and therefore if Tenant in Tail makes a Lease for Life it shall be taken for his own Life and yet if before the Statute of Entails he made such Lease he being then Tenant in Fée-simple it had been an Estate during the Life of the Lessée but when the Statute had made it unlawful for him to bind his Heir then the Law construes it to be for his own Life because otherwise it would work a Wrong Hob. 276. Co. Lit. 42. So in this case it shall not amount to a Lease for the manifest inconveniency which would follow but it shall be construed as a Covenant and then no injury is done On the Defendants part it was argued by Serjeant Newdigate that though this was in the Case of a Copyhold Ex parte Def. that did not make any difference for the plain meaning of the Parties was to make a Lease But where the Words are doubtful and such as may admit of diverse constructions whether they will amount to a Lease or not there they shall be taken as a Covenant to prevent a Forfeiture So also if they are only Instructions as if a Man by Articles sealed and delivered is contented to demise such Lands and a Rent is reserved and Covenants to repair c. Or if one covenants with another to permit and suffer him to have and enjoy such Lands 1 Rol. Abr. 848. these and such like Words will not amount to a Lease because as hath béen said the intention of the Parties is only to make it a Covenant but here the Words are plain and can admit of no doubt But for an Authority in the Point the Lady * 2 Cro. 301. Mountagues Case was cited where it was adjudged that if a Copyholder make a Lease for a year warranted by the Custom sic de anno in annum during ten years 't is a good Lease for ten years and a Forfeiture of the Copyhold Estate Vide Hill 15 16 Car. 2. Rot. 233. the Case of Holt and Thomas in this Court The Court inclined that it was a good Lease Curia and by consequence a Forfeiture of the Copihold and that a Licence in this
one Prescription is directly contrary to the other and for that reason one must be traversed but here the Defendant hath confessed that the Plaintiff hath a Right of Common but t is not an absolute but a qualified Right against which the Defendant may Enclose and here being two Prescriptions pleaded and one of them not being confessed it must from thence necessarily follow that the other is the Issue to be tryed which in this Case is whether the Defendant can enclose or not The Chief Iustice and the whole Court were of Opinion Curia that where there are several Free-holders who have Right of Common in a Common Field that such a Custom as this of enclosing is good because the remedy is reciprocal for as one may enclose so may another But Iustice Atkyns doubted much of the Case at Bar because the Defendant had pleaded this Custom to Enclose in barr to a Freeholder who had no Land in the Common Field where he claimed Right of Common but prescribed to have such Right there as appendant to two Acres of Land he had alibi for which reason he prayed to amend upon payment of Costs Attorny General versus Sir Edward Turner in Scaccario Exposition of the Kings Grant INformation The Case was Viz. The King by Letters Patents granted several Lands in Lincolnshire by express words and then this Clause is added upon which the Question did arise Nec non totum illud fundum solum terras suas contigue adjacen ' to the Premisses quae sunt aqua cooperta vel quae in posterum de aqua possunt recuperari and afterwards a great quantity of Land was gained from the Sea and whether the King or the Patentee was intituled to those Lands was the Question Devise of a possibility good by a common person 2 Cro. 509. pl. 21. 1 Bulst 194. Sawyer for the King argued that he had a good Title because the Grant was void he having only a bare possibility in the thing granted at the time But Levins on the other side insisted that the Grant of those Lands was good because the King may Grant what he hath not in possession but only a possibility to have it But admitting that he could not make such a Grant yet in this Case there is such a certainty as the thing it self is capable to have and in which the King hath an Interest and it is hard to say that he hath an Interest in a thing and yet cannot by any means dispose of it If it should be objected that nothing is to pass but what is contigue adjacen ' to the Premisses granted and therefore an Inch or some such small matter must pass and no more certainly that was not the intention of the King whose Grants are to be construed favourably and very bountifully for his Honour and not to be taken by Inches Postea Company of Ironmongers and Naylor If there are two Marshes adjoyning which are the Kings and he grants one of them by a particular name and description and then he grants the other contigue adjacen ' ex parte australi certainly the whole Marsh will pass and 't is very usual in pleading to say a Man is seised of a House or Close and of another House c. contigue adjacen ' that is to be intended of the whole House In this Case the King intended to pass something when he granted totum fundum c. but if such construction should be made as insisted on then those words would be of no signification 'T is true the word illud is a Relative and restrains the general words and implies that which may be shewn as it were with a Finger and therefore in Doddington's Case 2 Co. 32. a Grant of omnia illa Mesuagia scituate in Wells and the Houses were not in Wells but elsewhere the Grant in that Case was held void because it was restrained to a certain Village and the Pronoun illa hath reference to the Town but in this Case there could be no such certainty because the Land at the time of the Grant made was under Water But if the Patent is not good by the very words of the Grant the non obstante makes it good which in this Case is so particular that it seems to be designed on purpose to answer those Objections of any mistake or incertainty in the value quantity or quality of the thing granted which also supplies the defects for want of right instruction given the King in all cases where he may lawfully make a Grant at the Common Law 4 Co. 34. Moor pl. 571. Bozuns Case And there is another very general Clause in the Patent viz. Damus praemissa adeo plene as they are or could be in the Kings hands by his Prerogative or otherwise * Ante Adeo plene are operative words Whistlers Case 10 Co. And there is also this Clause omnes terras nostras infra fluxum refluxum maris 'T is true Sid. 149. these words praemissis praed ' spectan ' do follow from whence it may be objected that they neither did or could belong to the Premisses and admitting it to be so yet the Law will reject those words rather than avoid the Grant in that part In the Case of the Abbot of * 9 Co. 27. b. Strata Marcella the King granted a Mannor Et bona catalla felonum dicto Manerio spectan ' now though such things could not be appendant to a Mannor yet it was there adjudged that they did pass Such things as these the King hath by his Prerogative and some things the Subject may have by Custom or Prescription as Wrecks c. and in this very Case 't is said that there is a Custom in Lincolnshire that the Lords of Mannors shall have derelict Lands and 't is a reasonable Custom for if the Sea wash away the Lands of the Subject he can have no recompence unless he should be entituled to what he gains from the Sea and for this there are some Authorities as Sir Henry Constable's Case 2 Roll. 168. 5 Co. Land between High-Water and Low-Water Mark may belong to a Mannor But no Iudgment was given Morris versus Philpot in B. R. Release by an Executor before Probate THE Plaintiff as Executor to T. brings an Action of Debt against the Defendant as Administrator to S. for a Debt due from the said intestate to the Plaintiffs Testator The Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff released to him all Brewing Vessels c. and all other the Estate of S. lately deceased this Release was before probate of the Will to which Plea the Plaintiff demurred and whether this Release was a good Barr to the Plaintiffs Action was the Question Ex parte Quer. It was said for the Plaintiff that it was not for if a Conusee release to the Cognisor all his right and title to the Lands of the Cognisor and afterwards sues out
Statuti if there be any other Statute which prohibits and punishes a Riot this Information is as well grounded upon such as upon this Statute of Philip and Mary for 't is expresly said that the Defendant and others did unlawfully assemble themselves together and riotose routose made an Assault upon her so that it shall be intended to be grounded upon such a Law as shall be best for punishing the Offence The Court were of Opinion Curia That notwithstanding these Exceptions the Information was good and was not like the Case of an Indictment upon the Statute for a forceable Entry That such a day by force and arms the Defendant did Enter into such a House 2 Cro. 14610 639. existen ' liberum tenementum of J. N. and if he doth not say tunc existen ' the Indictment is naught because the Iury may enquire of a thing before it is done but here the existen being added to the person carries the sense to the time of the Offence committed The Statute of 1 R. 3. saith that all Grants made by Cestui que use being of full Age shall be good against him and his Heirs and 't is adjudged 16 H. 7. that he need not shew when and where but generally existen ' of full Age and upon the Evidence it must be so proved Where a thing relates to the Condition of a Man it shall be tryed in the County where the Action is laid and 't is not necessary to say in what County he is a Knight or an Esquire any Citizen and Freeman may devise his Land in Mortmain by the Custom of London 't is enough to say in Pleading existen ' a Citizen and Freeman without setting forth when and where If a Man be Indicted for not coming to Church 't is enough to say existen ' of the Age of 16 years he did not come to Church This is an Offence punishable at Common Law 't is malum in se But admitting 't was an Offence created by the Statute there being no Negative words to prohibit this Court hath a Iurisdiction to punish this Offence if the Star Chamber had not been taken away for the Party had his election to proceed in this Court upon the prohibitory Clause and the Iustices of Assise must be intended the Iustices of Oyer and Terminer Moor 564. Whereupon the Defendant was Fined 500 l. and bound to his good Behaviour for a Year Brown versus Waite Entailed Lands forfeited for Treason Jones 57. 1 Ventr 299. UPon a Special Verdict in Ejectment The Case was viz. Sir John Danvers the Father of the Lessor of the Plaintiff was in Anno Domini 1646. Tenant in Tail of the Lands now in Question and was afterwards instrumental in bringing the late King Charles to death and so was guilty of High Treason and dyed Afterwards the Act of Pains and Penalties made 13 Car. 2. cap. 15. Enacts That all the Lands Tenements and Hereditaments which Sir John Danvers had the 25th day of March in the year 1646. or at any time since shall be forfeited to the King And whether these entailed Lands shall be forfeited to the King by force of this Act was the Question Wallop who argued for the Plaintiff said that the entailed Lands were not forfeited his Reasons were 1. These Lands entailed are not expressly named in that Act. 2. Tenant in Tail hath but an Estate for Life in his Lands and therefore by these words All his Lands those which are entailed cannot be intended for if he grant totum statum suum only an Estate for Life passeth 3. These Lands are not forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. which gives the forfeiture of entailed Lands in case of Treason hecause Sir John Danvers was not convicted of it by Process Presentment Confession Verdict or Outlawry which that Statute doth require for he dyed before any such Conviction Sir Francis Winnington the Kings Solicitor argued contra that entailed Lands are forfeited by the Act of Pains and Penalties and in speaking to this matter he considered 1. The words of that Act. 2. How Estates Tail were created and how forfeitable for Treason 1. This Act recites the Act of general Pardon which did not intend to discharge the Lands of Sir John Danvers and others from a Forfeiture 2. It recites that he was Guilty of High Treason 3. Then comes the enacting Clause Viz. That all the Lands Tenements Rights Interests Offices Annuities and all other Hereditaments Leases Chattels and other things of what nature soever of him the said Sir John Danvers and others which they had on the 25th of March 1646. or at any time since shall be forfeited to the King his Heirs and Successors 2. As to the creation of Intails there were no such Estates at the Common Law they were all Fee-simple Conditional and post prolem suscitatam the Condition was performed for three purposes Viz. To Alien Co. Lit. 19. a. 2 Inst 334. To Forfeit Or to charge with a Rent and thus the Law continued till 13 E. 1. and there having been frequent Warrs between King John and the Barons the great Men then obtained the Statute De donis to preserve their Estates lest the like occasion should happen again in which 't is only mentioned that the Tenant in Tail should not have power to alien but it was well known that if he could not alien he could not forfeit for before that Statute as he might alien post prolem suscitatam so the Iudges always construed that he might forfeit 5 Edw. 3.14 for forfeiture and alienation did always go hand in hand 1 Co. 175. Mildmay's Case And from the making of that Statute it always continued a setled and received Opinion That Tenant in Tail could not alien until by the 12th of Ed. 4. a Recovery came in by which the Estate Tail may be docked and which is now become a Common Assurance Then by the Statute of 4 H. 7. cap. 24. Tenant in Tail might bar his Issue by Fine and Proclamation and all this while it was not thought that such Lands could be forfeited for Treason which Opinion continued during all the Reign of H. 7. for though by his Marriage the Houses of York and Lancaster were united yet the Great Men in those days thought there might be some doubt about the Succession after the death of H. 7. if he should dye without Issue and thereby those differences might be again revived and therefore no endeavours were used to make any alteration in the Law till after the death of H. 7. And after his Son H. 8. had Issue those doubts were removed and being never likely to arise again then the Act of 26 H. 8. was made which gives a Forfeiture of entailed Lands in cases of Treason The inference from this will be that all the Cases put before the 26th year of H. 8. and so before entailed Lands were made forfeitable for Treason and where by the general Words
of Lands Tenements and Hereditaments 't was adjudged entailed Lands did not pass do not concern this Case but now since they are made forfeitable by that Statute such general words are sufficient to serve the turn By the Statute of 16 R. 2. cap. 5. entailed Lands are not forfeited in a Praemunire but during the Life of Tenant in Tail because they were not then to be forfeited for Treason 2 Inst 334. 1 Inst 3. Co. Lit. 130. If then it appears that the Crime of which Sir John Danvers was guilty was Treason and if entailed Lands are forfeited for Treason then when the Act saith That he shall forfeit all his Lands by those general Words his entailed Lands shall be forfeited And though by the Common Law there can be no Attainder in this Case the Party being dead yet by Act of Parliament that may be done and the words in this Act amount to an Attainder The intent of it was to forfeit Estates Tail which may be collected from the general Words for if a Fee-simple is forfeited though not named why not an Estate Tail especially since the word Hereditaments is very comprehensive and may take in both those Estates Spelman's Glossary 227. 2 Roll. Rep. 503. In the very Act of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. Estates Tail are not named for the Words are Every Offender convict of Treason c. shall forfeit all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments which he shall have of any Estate of Inheritance in use possession or by any Right Title or Means c. and yet a Construction hath been made thereupon in favour of the Crown so a Dignity of an Earldom intailed is forfeitable by this Statute by the Word Hereditament 7 Co. 34. Afterwards in Hillary Term Rainsford Chief Iustice delivered the Opinion of the Court Judgment That upon Construction of the Act of Pains and Penalties this Estate Tail was forfeited to the King He agreed the Series and progress of Estates Tail to have been as argued by the Solicitor and that the Question now was whether by the Act of Pains c. Estates Tail can be forfeited unless there are express Words to take away the force of the Statute de donis conditionalibus Preface to 3 Co. for by that Statute there was a settled perpetuity Tenant in Tail could neither forfeit or alien his Estate no not in Case of Treason and Forfeiture is a kind of Alienation but afterwards by the Resolution in Ed. 4. an Alienation by a Common Recovery was construed to be out of the said Statute and by the Statute of Fines 4 H. 7. which is expounded by a subsequent Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 36. Tenant in Tail notwithstanding his former restraint had power to alien the Estate Tail and barr his Issue but all this while his Estate was not to be forfeited for Treason till the Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. which gives Uses Rights Entries Conditions as well as Possessions Reversions Remainders and all other things of a person attainted of Treason by the Common or Statute Law of the Realm to the King as if such Attainder had been by Act of Parliament Then by the Statute of 5 6 Ed. cap. 11. 't is Enacted That an Offender being guilty of High Treason and lawfully convict shall forfeit to the King all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments which he shall have of any Estate of Inheritance in his own Right in Use or Possession by which Statutes that de donis conditionalibus was taken off in Cases of Treason as it had been before by the resolution in 12 E. 4. and by the Statute of Fines as to the Alienation of an Estate Tail by Fine and Recovery If therefore this Act of Pains c. will admit of such a construction as to make Estates Tail forfeit here is a Crime great enough to deserve such a great punishment a Crime for which the Parliament hath ordered an Anniversary to be kept for ever with Fasting and Humiliation to implore that the Guilt of that innocent Blood then shed may not be required of our Posterity this they esteemed as another kind of Original Sin which unless thus expiated might extend not only ad Natos sed qui nascantur ab illis And that this Act will admit of such a Construction these Reasons were given 1. From the general comprehensive Words mentioning those things which are to be forfeited viz. Messuages Lands Tenements Reversions and Interests which last Word signifies the Estate in the Land as well as the Land it self or otherwise the Word must be construed to have no effect 2. Estates Tail are not now protected by the Clause in the Statute de donis * Inst 334. Non habet potestatem alienandi but are subject to the forfeiture by the Act of H. 8. which though it extends to Attainders only yet 't is a good Rule for the Iudges to make a Construction of an Act of Parliament by especially in such a Case as this wherein 't is plain that the Law did look upon these Offenders if not attainted yet in pari gradu with such persons and therefore may be a good Warrant to make the like Construction as in Cases of Attainder 3. Because the Offenders are dead for had they béen living there might have been better reason to have construed this Act not to extend to Estates Tail because then something might be forfeited viz. an Estate for Life and therefore the Act would signifie very little if such Construction could not be made of it to reach Estates Tail of such persons who were dead at the time of the making the Law especially since 't is well known that when Men engage in such Crimes they give what Protection they can to their Estates and place them as far as they can out of danger 4. It appears by the Act that the Law-makers did not intend that the Children of such Offenders should have any benefit of their Estates because in the Proviso there is a saving of all Estates of Purchasers for Mony bona fide paid and therein also a particular Exception of the Wife and Children and Heirs of the Offenders and if the Act would not protect the Estate of the Children though they should be Purchasers for a valuable consideration it will never protect their Estate under a voluntary Conveyance made by the Ancestor especially in this Case because the Entail carries a suspicion with it that it was designed with a prospect to commit this Crime for Sir John Danvers was Tenant in Tail before and in the year 1647. levies a Fine to barr that Entail and then limits a new Estate Tail to himself in which there is a Provision to make Leases for any number of years upon what Lives soever in Possession or Reversion with Rent or without it and this was but the year before the Crime committed 5. The Proviso in the Act for saving the Estates of Purchasers doth protect all Conveyances and
Assurances c. of Land not being the Lands of the late King Queen Prince c. and not being Land sold for any pretended Delinquency since the first of June 1641. and all Statutes and Judgments suffered by the Offenders from being impeached from which it appears that the Parliament lookt upon entailed Lands as forfeited for if Estates made to others upon a valuable consideration had need of a Proviso to save them from Forfeiture à fortiori the Estates out of which those are derived have need of such a saving and therefore must be forfeit by the Act for which Reasons these Lands are forfeited As to the great Objection which hath been made and insisted on the other side and which is Trudgeons Case 22 Eliz. 1 Inst 130. Where Tenant in Tail was attainted in a Praemunire and it was adjudged that he should forfeit his Land but during his Life for though the Statue of 16 R. 2. cap. cap. 5. Enacts That in such Case their Lands Tenements Goods and Chattels shall be forfeited to the King yet that must be understood of such an Estate as he may lawfully forfeit and that is during his own life and therefore being general Words they do not take away the force of the Statute de donis so that his Lands in Fee-simple for life c. shall be forfeited but the Land entailed shall not during his life But the Answer is plain For in the Reign of R. 2. when the Statute of Praemunire was made Estates Tail were under a Perpetuity by the said Statute de donis which Statute is now much weakened in the Point of Alienation and the Law is quite altered since that time and 't is apparent by multitude of Presidents that such strict Constructions have not been made since that time to preserve Estates Tail from Forfeitures without special and particular Words 4 Co. 164. and therefore in the Case of Adams and Lambert which is a Case in Point the Iudges there construed Estates Tail to be forfeit for want of special Words in the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 14. to save it and that was only a Law made for suppressing of superstitious Vses upon a politick consideration but this is a much greater Offence intended to be punished by this Act in which there are demonstrations both from the Words and intent of the Law-makers to make this Estate forfeited to the Crown than in that Case so much relied on And Iudgment was given accordingly Wyld died before Iudgment was given but Iustice Twisden said he was of that Opinion and Jones Iustice concurred Basset versus Salter After an Escape the Plaintiff may have a Ca. Sa. or Sci. Fa. against the Sheriff IN an Action for an Escape the Question was whether the Plaintiff may take out a Ca. Sa. or have a Fi. Fa. against the Defendant after the Sheriff or Gaoler voluntarily suffer him to escape but the Court would not suffer it to be argued because it had been lately settled that it was at the Election of the Plaintiff to do either and upon a Writ of Error brought in the Exchequer-Chamber the Iudges there were of the same Opinion But in the Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan's time the Court of Common Pleas were divided but 't is since settled 1 Roll. Abridg. 901 902. If there be an Escape by the Plaintiffs consent though he did not intend it the Law is hard that the Debt should be thereby discharged as where one was in execution in the Kings Bench and some Proposals were made to the Plaintiff in behalf of the Prisoner who seeing there was some likelyhood of an Accomodation consented to a Meeting in London and desired the Prisoner might be there who came accordingly and this was held to be an Escape with the * If it had been by the consent of the Sheriff he could never take him again but the Plaintiff might Sid. 330. consent of the Plaintiff and he could never after be in Execution at his Suit for the same Matter Peck versus Hill In Communi Banco Bond good given in discharge of another Mod. Rep. 221. DEBT upon a Bond brought against the Defendant as Administrator who pleads that he gave another Bond in his own Name in discharge of the first Bond and upon Issue joined it was found for the Defendant and it was moved that Iudgment might not be entred hereupon because it was a bad Plea But North Chief Iustice and Wyndham and Scroggs Iustices were of Opinion that it was a good Plea because there was other Security given than what the Plaintiff had before for upon the first Bond he was only lyable de bonis Intestatoris but now he might be charged in his own Right Co. Lit. 122. b. which may be well said to be in full satisfaction of the first Obligation for where the Condition is for payment of Mony to the Party himself there if he accept any collateral thing in satisfaction 't is good If a Security be given by a Stranger it may discharge a former Bond and this in effect is given by such And 't is not like the Case in Hobert where a Bond was given by the same Party upon that very day a former Bond was payable and adjudged not a good discharge for the Obligee was in no better condition than he was before Iustice Atkins doubted but inclined that one Bond cannot be discharged by giving another though the Discharge be applied to the Condition of the Bond and for this he cited Cro. Car. 85. Cro. Eliz. 716 727. which was a Case adjudged so in Point and therefore this Plea upon Demurrer should have been over-ruled yet since Issue was taken upon it and a Verdict for the Defendant the Plea is helped by the Statute of Jeofails 32 H. 8. here being a direct Affirmative and Negative But as to that the Chief Iustice and Scroggs Iustice replied that an immaterial Issue no ways arising from the Matter is not helped as an Action of Debt upon a Bond laid to be made in London and the Defendant saith that it was made in Middlesex and this is tried 't is not aided by the Statute but there must be a Repleader But because it was sworn that the Obligor who was the intestate was alive four years after the time that the second Bond was given and for that reason it could not be given upon the accompt of the Defendants being liable as Administrator but must be intended a Bond to secure a Debt of his own therefore a new Trial was granted Cook and others versus Herle Covenant will lie in the personalty tho' the Grant be executed by the Statute of Uses which makes a Distress the proper remedy Mod. Rep. 223. IN Covenant the Case was this Charles Cook made a Iointure to Mary his Wife for life and died without Issue the Land descended to Thomas Cook his Brother and Heir who grants an Annuity or Rent Charge of 200 l. per
Heir Male of the Body of the Devisor had by this Limitation an Estate Tayl as by Purchase and that the Inheritance in Fee simple did not vest in Francis 2. If Thomas the Covenantor had no Estate executed in him yet William his Son in this Case may take by way of future springing use because the Limitation of an Estate upon a Covenant to stand seised may be made to commence after the Ancestors Death for the old Seisin of the Covenantor is enough to support it There is a great difference between a Feoffment to Vses and a Covenant to stand seised for by the Feoffment the Estate is executed presently 1 Co. 154. Rector of Cheddington's Case So if there be a Feoffment to A. for Life Remainder to B. in Fee if A. refuse B. shall enter presently because the Feoffor parted with his whole Estate but if this had been in the Case of a Covenant to stand seised if A. had refused the Covenantor should have enjoyed it again till after the death of A. by way of springing use like the Case of Parsons and Willis 2 Roll. Abr. 794. Where a Man Covenants with B. That if he doth not marry he will stand seised to the use of B. and his Heirs B. dies the Covenantor doth not marry this Vse arises as well to the Heir of B. as to B. himself if he had been living and he shall have the Land in the nature of a descent But if William cannot take it either by purchase or by descent he shall take it 3. Per formam doni as special Heir to Thomas This Case was compared to that in Littleton Sect. 23. If Lands are given to a Man and the heirs Females of his Body if there be a Son the Daughter is not Heir but yet she shall take it for voluntas donatoris c. So if Lands are given to a Man and the Heirs Males of his Body the youngest Son shall have it after the death of the eldest leaving Issue only Daughters for these are descents secundum formam doni So in this Case the Estate Tail vested in Edward and when he died without Issue it comes to William per formam doni Object The Case of Greswold in 4 5 Ph. Mariae Dyer 156. seems to be express against this Opinion which was that Greswold was seised in Fee and made a Grant for Life the Remainder to the Heirs Males of his Body the Remainder to his own right Heirs he had Issue two Sons and dyed the eldest Son had Issue a Daughter and dyed and if the Daughter or her Vncle should have the Land was the question in that Case And it was adjudged that the Limitation of the Remainder was void because Greswold could not make his right Heir a Purchasor without departing with the whole Fee Postea Brittain and Charnock and therefore Iudgment was given against the special Heir in Tail for the Heir general which was the Daughter Answ Admit that Case to be Law yet the Iudges there differed in their Arguments 'T is not like this at Bar for that Case was not upon a Covenant to stand seised but upon a Deed indented and so a Conveyance at the Common Law But for an Authority in the point the Case of Pybus and Mitford was cited and relied on which was Trin. 24 Car. 2. Rot. 703. Mod. Rep. 159. 1 Ventris 372. adjudged by Hales Chief Iustice Rainsford and Wild but Iustice Twisden was of a contrary Opinion Serjeant Stroud who argued on the other side made three Points 1. Whether this Limitation be good in its creation 2. If the Estate Tail be well executed in Thomas the Covenantor 3. If it be good and well executed whether when Edward died without Issue the whole Estate Tail was not spent 1. And as to the first Point he held that this Limitation to the Heirs Males of Thomas was void in the creation because a Man cannot make himself or his own right Heir a Purchasor unless he will part with the whole Estate in Fee Dyer 309 b. If A. being seised in Fee makes a Lease for Life to B. the Remainder to himself for years this Remainder is void so if it had been to himself for Life because he hath an Estate in Fee and he cannot reserve to himself a lesser Estate than he had before 42 Ass 2. If I give Lands to A. for Life the Remainder to my self for Life the Remainder in Fee to B after the death of A. in this Case B. shall enter for the Remainder to me was void 1 H. 5. 8. 42 Edw. 3. 5. Bro. Estate 66. Dyer 69. b. 'T is true these Cases are put at the Common Law but the Statute of Vses makes no alteration for according to the Rules laid down in Chudleigh's Case by my Lord Chief Iustice Popham 1 Co. 138. 1. Vses are odious and so the Law will not favour them 2. A Rule at Common Law shall not be broke to vest an Vse and the Vses here cannot vest without breaking of a Rule in Law 3. Vses are raised so privately that he who takes them may not know when they vest and for that reason they are not to be favoured 4. The Statute annexes both the Possession and the Vse together as they vest and divest both together Moor 713. 2 Co. 91. Co. Lit. 22. Moor 284. 2. As to the second Point The Estate is not executed in Thomas and therefore William cannot take it by descent Heirs of his Body or Heirs Male are good Words of Limitation to take by Purchase from a Stranger but not from an Ancestor for there he shall take by descent and for this there is an Authority Co. Lit. 26. b. John had Issue by his Wife Roberga Robert and Mawd John dies Michael gave Lands to Roberga and to the Heirs of her Husband on her Body begotten Roberga in this Case had but an Estate for Life for the Fee Tail vested in Robert and when he died without Issue his Sister Maud was Tenant in Tail per formam Doni and in a Formedon she counted as Heir to Robert which she was not neither was she Heir to her Father at the time of the Gift yet it was held good for the Words Viz. Heirs of the Body of the Father were Words of Purchase in this Case If therefore no Vse for Life vested in Thomas then William cannot take by descent Dyer 156. Co. Lit. 22. Hob. 31. Dyer 309. 1 Co. 154. Lord Paget's Case cited in Hob. 151. 3. To the third Point Admitting both the former to be against him yet since Edward is dead without Issue the Estate Tail is spent But the whole Court were of Opinion Judgment That William should Inherit this Land in question for though at the Common Law a Man cannot be Donor and Donee without he part with the whole Estate yet 't is otherwise upon a Covenant to stand seised to Vses And if any other Construction should be made
Tenant to the Praecipe the Statute shall be so construed that the intent of the Parties shall stand 5. The Lands in the Parishes pass 1 Anders 83. because the Deed and Common Recovery make but one Conveyance and Assurance in the Law and therefore as a Construction is not to be made upon part but upon the whole Deed so not upon the Deed or Recovery alone but upon both together 2 Co. 75. Lord Cromwel's Case 6. Antea 'T is the Agreement of the Parties which governs Fines and Recoveries and Lands shall pass by such Names as are agreed between them though such Names are not proper and therefore a Fine of a lieu conus is good though neither Vill or Parish is named therein Poph. 22. 1 Cro. 270 276 693. 2 Cro. 574. So if a Fine be levied of a Common of Pasture in Dale Cro. Car. 308. Winch 122. Sid. 190 191. Antea 't is good though Dale be neither Vill or Hamlet or lieu conus out of a Vill 2 Roll. Abr. f. 19. So in Sir George Symonds his Case Lands as parcel of a Mannor were adjudged to pass though in truth they were used with the Manor but two years and the reason of all these Cases is because it was the Agreement of the Parties that they should pass Object If it be objected That all these Authorities are in Cases of Fines but the Case at Bar is in a Common Recovery which makes a great difference Answ The proceedings in both are amicable and not adversary and therefore as to this purpose there is no difference between them and for an Authority in the point the Case of Lever and Hosier was cited which was adjudged in this Court Trin. 27 Car. 2 Where the Question was Antea whether upon a Common Recovery suffered of Lands in the Town of Sale or the Liberty thereof Lands lying in Dale being a distinct Vill in the Parish of Sale should pass or not and after divers Arguments it was allowed to be well enough being in the Case of a Common Recovery And so was the Case Pasch 16 Car. 2. in B. R. In a special Verdict the Case was That Sir Thomas Thinn being seised of the Mannor of Buckland in Tail and of twenty Acres of Land called and known by a particular name which twenty Acres of Land were in Ed. the 6th's time reputed parcel of the said Mannor and always used with it Sid. 190. sold the said Mannor and all the Lands reputed parcel thereof with the Appurtenances of which he did suffer a Common Recovery and it was adjudged upon great consideration that though the Recovery did not mention the twenty Acres particularly yet it did dock the Entail thereof because the Indenture which leads the Vses of the Recovery was of the Lands reputed parcel thereof or enjoyed with it and that the shortness in the Recovery was well supplied by the Deed in which Case the Court were guided by the resolution in Sir George Symond's Case Vide 6 Co. Sir Moyle Finch's Case The Authorities against this Opinion are two Antea Lever and Hosie● 1. That of Stock versus Fox Cro. Jac. 120. There were two Vills Walton and Street in the Parish of Street and a Fine was levied of Lands in Street it was adjudged that the Lands in Walton did not pass by this Fine But there is another Report of this very Case by my Lord Chief Iustice Roll in his Abr. tit Grants 54. where 't is said if there be in the County of Somerset the Vill of Street and the Vill of Waltham within the Parish of Street and a Man being seised of Lands in the Vill of Street and of other Lands in the Vill of Waltham all within the Parish of Street and he Bargains and Sells all his Lands in Street and having Covenanted to levie a Fine doth accordingly levie it of Lands in Street and doth not mention either in the Indenture or in the Fine any Lands in Waltham the Lands lying there shall not pass from which Report there may be a fair Inference made That it was the Lord Rolls his Opinion that if Waltham had been named in the Indenture though not in the Fine the Lands would have passed and in this Case the Parishes are named in the Indenture of Bargain and Sale but besides in that Case the Party had Lands both in Street and Waltham and so the Conveyances were not in vain as they must be here if the Lands in the Parishes do not pass Antea 2. The other Case is that of Baker and Johnson in Hutton 106. But this Case is quite different from that because there was neither Vill or Parish named in the Indenture but here the Indenture was right for the Lands are mentioned therein to lie in the Parishes c. And for these Reasons Iudgment was prayed for the Defendant This Case was afterwards argued in Michaelmas-Term following by Serjeant Pemberton and Maynard for the Plaintiff who said Ex parte Quer. That the Government of this Nation was Ecclesiastical and Civil the Ecclesiastical runs by Parishes and the Civil by Vills That a Parish is constituted by the Ecclesiastical Power and may be altered by the King and Ordinary of the place that the Parson was superintendent of the Parish and the Constable of the Vill which was also constituted by the Civil Magistrate and from hence it is that in real Actions which are adversary Lands ought not to be demanded as lying in a Parish but within a Vill that being the place known to the Civil Iurisdiction and if a Trespass which is local be laid at Dale generally there being both the Parish and Vill of Dale the proof of the Trespass done in the Parish is not good for it must be at the Vil. They agreed that in conveying of Lands a Fine or Common Recovery of Lands in a Parish or Lieu conus was good 2 Cro. 574. But if there be both a Vill and a Parish of the same Name and severally bounded if the Vill be only named without the Parish nothing doth pass but what is in the Vill because where a place is alledged in Pleading it must be of a Vill Moor 710. 1 Inst 125. b. 2 Cro. 121. And this was the ancient way of demanding Lands in a Praecipe quod reddat because of the Notoriety of Vills from whence Visnes do arise and because the Vill is more particular and of more certainty than a Parish and therefore 't is requisite that the Demandant should be very particular in his Demand that the Tenant may know how to make his defence and the Sheriff of what to deliver possession Besides a Vill is more ancient than a Parish and Lands have been demanded within them time out of mind so that the Demand when 't is doubtful of what 't is made shall be supposed of that which is most ancient and such Construction is most conformable to the like Cases
that he was seised of a Mesuage and several Lands in the Parish of Dale and that he and all those whose Estate he hath have used to have right of Common for all Commonable Cattle Levant and Couchant upon the Premisses in a certain Meadow there called Darpmore Meadow and in a certain place called Cannock Wood. That the Defendant praemissorum non ignarus had enclosed the said places in which the Plaintiff had right of Common and likewise put in his Cattle as Horses Cows Hoggs Geese c. so that he could not in tam amplo beneficiali modo enjoy the same The Defendant as to the Inclosure and putting in of his Hoggs and Geese pleaded Not Guilty And as to the residue That the Lord Paget was seised of a Mesuage 300 Acres of Land 40 Acres of Meadow and 100 Acres of Pasture and likewise of Darpmore Meadow and Cannock Wood and being so seised did by Deed of Bargain and Sale enrolled in consideration of 2000 l. convey the said Mesuage 300 Acres of Land 40 Acres of Meadow and 100 Acres of Pasture to the Defendant and his Heirs and by the same Deed did Grant unto him all Waies Commons and Emoluments whatsoever to the said Mesuage and Premisses belonging or therewithal used occupied or enjoyed or taken as part parcel or member thereof virtute cujus the Defendant became seised of the Premisses and that the same were leased and demised for years by the said Lord Paget and all those whose Estate he had a tempore cujus contrarii memoria hominum non existit and that the Tenants or Occupiers thereof a tempore cujus c. used to have Common in Darpmore Meadow and Cannock Wood for all commonable Cattle Levant and Couchant upon the Premisses and used to put in their Cattle into the said places in which c. virtute cujus the Defendant having Right did put in his said Cattle into the said Places to take Common there and averred That there was Common sufficient both for the Plaintiff and himself To this Plea the Plaintiff Demurred This Case was argued by Serjeant Pemberton for the Plaintiff and by Serjeant Weston for the Defendant Ex parte Quer. and for the Plaintiff it was said That it was no good Plea but rather a design to introduce a new way of Common The Reasons offered why the Plea was not good were 1. Cro. Car. 419. That the Defendant could not prescribe because of the Vnity of Possession for the Lord Paget had the Premisses in and to which c. and therefore he hath prescribed by a collateral matter Viz. by alledging that the Land was usually let to Tenants for years but doth not say whether they were Tenants by Copy of Court Roll or not neither doth he make out any Title in them In some Cases where a Man is not privy to the Title he may say generally that the Owners and Occupiers used to do such a thing c. and this way of Pleading may be good but here the Defendant claiming under them ought to set forth their Title or else he can have no Right to the Common 2. By this Plea he intended that the Lord Paget had made a New Grant of this Common for he sets forth That he granted the Premisses and all Commons used with the same and so would intitle himself to a Right of Common in those two places as if Common had been expressly granted to him there which if it should 't is but argumentative and no direct affirmance of a Grant upon which the Plaintiff might have replied non concessit for no Issue can be joyned upon it 3. He ought to have set forth That the Tenants lawfully enjoyed the Common there but he lays only an usage to have Common which may be tortious 4. He doth not say That there is sufficient Common for all the Commoners but only for the Plaintiff and himself 'T is true the Owner of the Soil may feed with his Tenant who hath a Right of Common but he cannot derogate from the first by streightning the Common by a second Grant and so leave not sufficint for the Tenant 5. This Plea amounts to the General Issue Cro. Car. 157. and the Plaintiff hath specially assigned that for a Cause of Demurrer for he saith That the Defendant without any Title put in his Cattle by which the Plaintiff had not sufficient Common and the Defendant pleads he put in his Cattle rightfully and the Plaintiff had Common enough which if it signifie any thing must amount to Not Guilty Ex parte Def. But on the other side the last Objection was endeavoured to be answered first because if that hold yet if the Plea be never so good in Substance the Plaintiff would have Iudgment It was agreed that this Plea doth amount to a General Issue and no more but that every Plea that doth so is not therefore bad for if it otherwise contain reasonable matter of Law which is put upon the Court for their Iudgment rather than referred to the Iury there is is no cause of Demurrer for it is the same thing to have the doubt or question in Law before the Iudges in Pleading as to have it before them upon a Special Verdict In 2 R. 2. 18. A Retainer was pleaded specially by an Administrator which is no more than Plene Administravit yet no Demurrer but the Book saith that the Court ought to be moved 2. The Plea is good as to the matter of it for the Defendant claims the same Common by his Grant which had been used time immemorial and alledges it to be of all Common used with the Premisses and this was a Common so used In Trespass the Defendant justified that Godfrey was seised in Fee of a House and of 20 Acres of Land and that he and all those c. had Common in the place where c. to the said Messuage belonging and that he made a Feoffment to Bradshaw of the same who made a Lease thereof to the Defendant with all Profits and Commodities thereunto belonging vel occupat vel usitat cum praedicto Mesuagio It was adjudged that though the Common was gone and extinct in the Hands of the Feoffor by the unity of the Possession yet those Words were a good Grant of a New Common for the time granted in the Lease and that it was quasi a Common in the Hands of Godfrey the Feoffor Cro. Eliz. 570. Godfrey versus Eyre And though it hath been objected That this Plea is not formally pleaded because it ought to have been direct in alledging a Grant whereas it was only argumentative and brought in by a side Wind he said That as bad as it was 't was drawn by that Serjeant who argued against him and who did very well know that the Averment of sufficiency of Common was needless Curia The Court were all of Opinion That though the Plea did amount to the general Issue yet for that
particular Estate to support it for it shall descend to the Heir till the Contingency happen 't is not like a Remainder at the Common Law which must vest eo instanti that the particular Estate determines but the Learning of Exeecutory Devises stands upon the Reasons of the old Law wherein the intent of the Devisor is to be observed For when it appears by the Will that he intends not the Devisee to take but in futuro and no disposition being made thereof in the mean time it shall then descend to the Heir till the Contingency happen but if the intent be that he shall take in praesenti and there is no incapacity in him to do it he shall not take in futuro by an executory Devise Sid. 153. pl. 2. A Devise to an Infant in ventre sa mere is good and it shall descend to the Heir in the mean time for the Testator could not intend he should take presently he must first be in rerum natura 3 Co. 20. a. 1 Inst 378. a. If an Estate be given to A. for Life the Remainder to the right Heirs of B. this is a contingent Remainder and shall be governed by the Rules of the Law for if B. dye during the Life of A. 't is good but if he survive 't is void because no Body can be his right Heir whilst he is living and there shall be no descent to the Heir of the Donor in the mean time to support this contingent Remainder that so when B. dies his right Heirs may take In this Case a Fée did vest in Benjamin presently and therefore after his death without Issue the Defendant is his Heir and hath a good Title if not as Heir at Law yet she may take by way of Executory Devise as Heir of the Body of her Father which though it could not be whilst he was living because nemo est haeres viventis yet after his death she was Heir of his Body and was then of Age at which time and not before she was to take by the Will That Elizabeth the general Heir had only an Estate for years till Benjamin should or might be of Age And so by the Opinion of the whole Court Iudgment was given for the Defendant Evered versus Hone. SPecial Verdict in Ejectment wherein the Case was thus viz. A Man hath Issue two Sons Thomas his eldest and Richard his youngest Son Thomas hath Issue John Richard hath Issue Mary The Father devised Lands to his Son Thomas for Life Constructi-of Words in a Devise and afterwards to his Grandson John and the Heirs Males of his Body and if he die without Issue Male then to his Grandaughter Mary in Tail and charged it with some Payments in which Will there was this Proviso viz. Provided if my Son Richard should have a Son by his now Wife Margaret then all his Lands should go to such first Son and his Heirs he paying as Mary should have done Afterwards a Son was born and the Question was whether the Estate limited to Thomas the eldest Son was thereby defeated And the Court were all clear of Opinion that this Proviso did only extend to the Case of Mary's being intituled and had no influence upon the first Estate limited to the eldest Son Anonymus IN the Exchequer Chamber before the Lord Chancellor Executor of an Executor de son tort not liable at Law the Lord Treasurer and two Chief Iustices the Case was thus viz. The Plaintiff had declared against the Defendant as Executor of Edward Nichols who was Executor of the Debtor The Defendant pleads that the Debtor died intestate and Administration of his Goods was granted to a Stranger absque hoc that Edward Nichols was ever Executor but doth not say or ever administred as Executor for in truth he was Executor de son tort The Plaintiff replies that before the Administration granted to the Stranger Edward Nichols possessed himself of divers Goods of the said Debtor and made the Defendant Executor and dyed and the Defendant demurred and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff but reversed here for an Executor of an Executor de son tort is not lyable at Law though the Lord Chancellor said he would help the Plaintiff in Equity But here Administration of the Goods of the Debtor was granted before the death of the Executor de son tort so his Executorship vanished and nothing shall survive The Lady Wyndham's Case IF Flotsam come to land and is taken by him who hath no Title the Action shall not be brought at the Common Law and no Proceedings shall be thereon in the Court of Admiralty for there is no need of Condemnation thereof as there is of Prizes By the Opinion of the whole Court of Common Pleas. Rose versus Standen Action where misconceived by the Plaintiff and Verdict against him no Barr to a new Action IN Accompt for Sugar and Indigoe the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit a quantum meruit and an insimul computasset for 100 l. due to him for Wares sold to which he pleaded Non assumpsit and that there was a Verdict against him and then averrs that the Wares mentioned in that Action are the same with those mentioned here in the Action of Accompt The Plaintiff demurred and it was said for him that he had brought his former Action on the Case too soon for if no Accompt be stated the Action on the Case on the Insimul computasset will not lye and so the former Verdict might be given against him for that Reason Ex parte Def. But on the contrary the Defendant shall not be twice troubled for the same thing and if the Verdict had been for the Plaintiff that might have been pleaded in Barr to him in a new Action Curia 2 Cro. 284. But the Court were of another Opinion that this Plea was not good and that if the Plaintiff had recovered it could not have been pleaded in Barr to him for if he misconceives his Action and a Verdict is against him and then brings a proper Action the Defendant cannot plead that he was barred to bring such Action by a former Verdict Antea Putt and Roster Postea Rosal and Lamper Ante. because where 't is insufficient it shall not be pleaded in Barr as in Debt upon Bond the Defendant pleaded another Action upon the same Bond and the Iury found Non est factum the Entry of the Verdict was that the Defendant should recover damages eat inde sine die but not quod Querens nil capiat per Breve so no Iudgment to barr him 2 Cro. 284. But pending one Action another cannot be brought for they cannot both be true If no Accompt be stated the Action on the Case upon an Insimul computasset would not lye the Insimul computasset implies an Accompt and upon Non assumpsit pleaded the Defendant might have given payment in Evidence and for that
Habens legale jus titulum need not shew what Title the disturber had after Verdict 213 In a Bond to pay 40 l. when an Accompt is stated by two Attornies to be chosen between the Parties 't is a Covenant and not a solvendum 266 Breach is assigned relating to three Covenants and concludes sic Conventionem fregit 't is good 311 Where an Agreement to pay will amount to a Covenant 269 Covenants reciprocal cannot be pleaded in bar to each other 34 75 76 309 Breach where assigned and not necessary to aver performance on the part of the Plaintiff 309 Court Inferiour the cause of Action must arise within the Jurisdiction 30 Judgment therein arrested because the Damages were laid to 30 l. 101 102 For not saying that the Jurors were electi ad triand ' 102 Taliter processum fuit and the proceedings not set forth at large well enough in a Plea but not in a Writ of Error 102 195 Vi armis contra pacem whether good or not 102 Cannot hold Plea for work done without the Jurisdiction though the Promise be made within 141 Cause of Action must appear to be within the Jurisdiction to oust the Courts above 197 Where it doth not appear that the Court was held either by Grant or Prescription good 197 198 If the cause of Action doth not appear to be within the Jurisdiction though there is a Judgment recovered below yet an Action of Trespass will lye and false Imprisonment upon the taking out of that Judgment 197 If upon Evidence it appear that the cause of Action did arise extra Jurisdictionem the Plaintiff must be non-suit 273 If Jurisdiction be admitted in pleading and Verdict and Judgment thereon t is too late for a Prohibition Ibid. Court Ecclesiastical In what Case a Bishop shall administer an Oath in Temporal Matters 118 Custom One cannot be pleaded in bar to another 105 In pleading it must be strictly alledged 41 Where 't is a reasonable Custom for the Lord to have derelict Lands 107 D. Day Vide Plea WHere 't is excluded being alledged in the Declaration it makes the Plea ill 146 'T is but punctum temporis and of no consideration in the Law 281 Release of all demands usque 26 April a Bond dated that day is not released 281 Debt Upon the Sheriffs Bond will be good though the Statute be not pleaded 36 Will lye upon the Contract where the whole Term is assigned 174 175 176 Whether it will lye for a Fine set by a Steward for 't is ex quasi contractu 230 It must be upon the Contract or ex quasi contractu 262 Deed. Where 't is lost the Party must make Oath of it to entitle himself to a Bill in Equity to have it performed in Specie 173 Demand Must be made where an Interest is to be determined 264 Devise To a Man and his Heirs if the Devisee die in the Life time of the Devisor his Heir takes nothing 313 Republication makes it a new Will ibid. To the Heir at Law makes a Limitation and not a Condition 7 To an Infant in ventre sa mere if there is a sufficient description of him 't is good 9 Where the word paying makes a Fee where not 26 To him till he be of Age then to him in Fee he dyed within Age yet a Free-hold vested in him presently 289 To him in Fee when of Age if he dye before then to the Heirs of the Body of R. and their Heirs he died living R. within Age his Sister and Heir shall take by way of Executory devise 289 Executory devise how it differs from a contingent Remainder at Common Law ibid. Construction of words therein 290 Departure From his Plea 31 Disability By a Statute where it ought to be removed by the Party to enable himself to execute an Office 299 Discharge By Parol good before the breach of promise but not afterwards 259 Discontinuance Where amendable 316 In pleading the Plaintiff declared of taking several things the Defenant justifies as to part and saith nothing of the residue 259 In the Adjournment of a Court where a day certain is not given 59 Distress Cannot be of Sheaves of Corn in Shocks for Rent 61 Distribution Shall be equally made amongst the Children of the whole and half Blood 204 205 206 Disturbance Coactus fuit to pay is a sufficient Disturbance 55 E. Escape THE Plaintiff declared upon Process in an Inferiour Court and the Bond was not made infra Jurisdictionem the Action would not lye 29 30 Debt thereon lies against the Warden of the Fleet as Superior where the Grantee for Life is insufficient 119 After an Escape the Plaintiff may have a Capias ad satisfaciendum or Scire facias at his Election 136 Whether it will lye against the Sheriff for taking insufficient Bail 181 Election In disjunctive Conditions where the Election is in the Obligor 201 304 'T is at the Plaintiffs Election to have a Ca. Sa. or Scire facias after an Escape 136 Enclosure Where a Custom is good to Enclose in a Common Field 105 Entry Not necessary to avoid an Estate in case of a Limitation 7 Error Where a Writ of Error will lye upon a Fine in the Old Bayly 219 Error in Fact cannot be assigned in the Exchequer-Chamber 194 If one be dead after the Judgment he must be named in a Writ of Error 285 Where a Judgment shall be avoided by a Plea without a Writ of Error 276 Estate Where the word Body makes an Estate for Life and no Tail 16 Estoppel Good by a Fine levied by a Remainder man in Tail 90 No Uses can be declared of a Fine by Estoppel 90 One who has no Estate levies a Fine 't is good by Estoppel 115 Evidence A Decree in Chancery or Sentence in in the Ecclesiastical Court read as Evidence of the fact 231 232 Excuse If one Man doth not perform his Covenant 't is no Excuse for the breach on the other side 75 76 What is a good Plea by way of Excuse and what not 27 28 29 Executor De son tort cannot retain 51 Where the Judgment shall be de bonis Testatoris 108 What is requisite to make an Executor 147 What must be done when he refuseth Ibid. De son tort where he may be of a Term but not of a Term in futuro because he cannot enter 175 Cannot plead non detinet where the Testator could not plead nil debet 266 Executor of an Executor de son tort where not liable at Law 293 294 Where he pleads a Judgment kept on Foot by fraud 36 Explain A Man grants Tenementa praedicta then follows totum quicquid habet whether these subsequent words shall explain or enlarge the Grant 112 113 c. Execution Payment of the Mony to the Marshal the Defendant may be taken again in Execution at the Suit of the Plaintiff 212 213 Executory Decree Is of no force in Equity 232 Existen