for an excessive Distress for it is a private matter and the party ought to bring his Action To stay Haman Truant AN Action upon the Case brought upon a bargain for Corn and Grass c. The Defendant pleads another Action depending for the same thing The Plaintiff replies that the bargains were several absque hoc that the other Action was brought for the same cause The Defendant demurs specially for that he ought to have concluded to the Country Polyxfen When there is an affirmative they ought to make the next an Issue or otherwise they will plead in infinitum 3 Cro. 755. and accordingly Iudgment was given for the Defendant Fox alii Executors of Mr. Pinsent Vide supra 47. INdebitat Assumpsit The Defendant pleads that two of the Plaintiffs are Infants and yet they all Sue per Attornatum The question is if there be two Executors and one of them under age whether the Infant must sue per Guardianum and the other per Attornatum or whether it is not well enough if both sue per Attornat Offley spake to it and cited 2 Cro. 541. Pasch 11 Car. 288. Powell's case Styles 318. 2 Cro. 577. 1 Inst 157. Dyer 338. Morton I am of Opinion that he may Sue by Attorney as Executor though if he be Defendant he must appear by Guardian Rainsford I think it is well enough and I am led to think so by the multitude of Authorities in the point And I think the case stronger when Infants joyn in Actions with persons of full age He Sues here in auter droit and I have not heard of any Authority against it Twisden concurred with the rest and so Iudgment was given Moreclack Carleton UPon a Writ of Error out of the Court of Common Pleas one Error assigned was that upon a relicta verificatione a misericordia was entred whereas it ought to have been a capiatur Twisden The Common-Pleas ought to certifie us what the practice of their Court is Monday the Secondary said it was always a Capiatur It s true in 9 Edw. 4. it is said that he shall but be amerced because he hath spared the Iury their pains and 34 H. 8. is accordingly but say they in the Common Pleas a Capiatur must be entred because dedicit factum suum So they said they would discourse with the Iudges of the Common Pleas concerning it The King versus Holmes MOved to quash an Indictment of Forcible Entry into a Messuage passage or way for that a passage or way is no Land nor Tenement but an Easement and then it is not certain whether it were a passage over Land or Water Yelv. 169. the word passagium is taken for a passage over Water Twisd You need not labour about that of the passage we shall quash it as to that but what say you to the Messunge Jones It is naught in the whole for it is but by way of recital with a quod cum he was possessed c. Et sic possessionatus c. but that Twisden said was well enough Jones Then he saith that he was possessed de quodam Termino and doth not say annorum Twisden That 's naught And the Indictment was quash'd An Action was brought against the Hundred of Stoak upon the Statute of Hue and Cry and at the Trial some House-keepers appeared as Witnesses that lived within the Hundred who being examined said they were Poor and paid no Taxes nor Parish Duties and the question was whether they were good Witnesses or not Twisden Alms-people and Servants are good Witnesses but these are neither Then he went down from the Bench to the Iudges of the Common-Pleas to know their Opinions and at his return said That Iudge Wyld was confident that they ought not to be sworn and that Iudge Tyrrell doubted at first but afterwards was of the same Opinion their reason was because when the money recovered against the Hundred should come to be levied they might be worth something Hoskins versus Robins Hill 23 Car. 2. Rot. 233. IN this case these points were spoke to in Arrest of Iudgment viz. 1. Whether a Custom to have a several Pasture excluding the Lord were a good Custom or not It was said that a prescription to have Common so was void in Law and if so then a prescription to have sole Pasture which is to have the Grass by the mouth of the Cattle is no other then Common appendant Daniel's case 1 Cro. so that Common and Pasturage is one and the same thing They say that it is against the nature of Common for the very word Common supposeth that the Lord may feed I answer if that were the reason then a man could not by Law claim Common for half a year excluding the Lord which may be done by Law But the true reason is that if that were allowed then the whole profits of the Land might be claimed by prescription and so the whole Land be prescribed for The Lord may grant to his Tenants to have Common excluding himself but such a Common is not good by prescription The second point was whether or no the prescription here not being for Beasts levant couchant were good or not for that a difference was made betwixt Common in grosse and common appendant viz. That a man may prescribe for Common in grosse without those words but not for Common appendant 2 Cro. 256. 1 Brownl 35. Noy 145. 15 Edw. 4. fol. 28. 32. Rolls tit Common 388. Fitz. tit Prescription 51. a third point was whether or no these things are not help'd by a Verdict As to that it was alledged that they are defects in the Title appearing on Record and that a Verdict doth not help them Saunders contra In case of a Common such a prescription is not good because it is a contradiction but here we claim solam Pasturam Now what may be good at this day by grant may be claimed by prescription As to the Exception that we ought to have prescribed for Cattle levant couchant its true if one doth claim Common for Cattle levant couchant is the measure for the Common unless it be for so many Cattle in number but here we claim the whole Herbage which perhaps the Cattle levant couchant will not eat up Hales Notwithstanding this prescription for the sole Pasture yet the Soil is the Lords and he has Mynes Trees Bushes c. and he may dig for Turfes And such a grant viz. of the sole Pasturage would be good at this day 18 Edw. 3. though a grant by the Lord that he will not improve would be a void grant at this day Twisden My Lord Coke is express in the point A man cannot prescribe for sole Common but may prescribe for sole Pasture And there is no Authority against him And for levant couchant it was adjudged in Stoneby Muckleby's case that after a Verdict it was help'd And Iudgment was given accordingly Anonymus AN Action of
to chuse every year two Surveyors to take care that no unwholsome Victuals were sold within the Precinct of that Mannor and that they were sworn to execute their Office truly for the space of a year and that they had power to destroy whatever corrupt Victuals they found exposed to sale and that the Defendants being chosen Surveyors and sworn to execute the Office truly examining the Plaintiffs meat who was also a Butcher found a side of Beef corrupt and unwholsome and that therefore they took it away and burnt it prout eis bene licuit c. The Plaintiff demurs North. This is a case of great consequence and seems doubtful It were hard to disallow the Custom because the design of it seems to be for the preservation of mens health And to allow it were to give men too great a power of seizing and destroying other men's Goods There is an Ale-taster appointed at Leets but all his Office is to make Presentment at the Leet if he finds it not according to the Assize Wyndham Atkyns Ellis It is a good reasonable Custom It is to prevent evil and Laws for prevention are better then Laws for punishment As for the great power that it seems to allow to these Surveyors it is at their own peril if they destroy any Victuals that are not really corrupt for in an Action if they justifie by virtue of the Custom the Plaintiff may take issue that the Victuals were not corrupt But here the Plaintiff has confessed it by the demurrer Atkyns said if the Surveyors were not responsible the Homage that put them in must answer for them according to the rule of respondeat superior Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff unless c. Thredneedle Lynham's Case UPon a special Verdict the case was thus The Iury found that the Lands in the Declaration are and time out of mind had been parcel of the demesnes of the Mannor of Burniel in the County of Cornwall which Mannor consists of demesnes viz. Copy-hold tenements demisable for one two or three lives and services of divers Free-hold Tenants that within the Mannor of Burniel there is another Mannor called Trecaer consisting likewise of Copy-holds and Free-holds and that the Bishop of Exeter held both these Mannors in the right of his Bishoprick Then they find the Statute of 1. Eliz. in haec verba They find that the old accustomed yearly Rent which used to be reserved upon a demise of these two Mannors was 67 pounds 1 s. and 5 d. then they find that Joseph Hall Bishop of Exeter demised these two Mannors to one Prowse for 99 years determinable upon three lives reserving the old and accustomed Rent of 67 l. 1 s. and 5 d. that Prowse living the Cestuy que vies assigned over to James Prowse the demesnes of the Mannor of Trecaer for that afterwards he assigned over all his Interest in both Mannors to Mr. Nosworthy excepting the demesnes of Treacer then in the possession of James Prowse That Mr. Nosworthy when two of the lives were expired for a sum of money by him paid to the Bishop of Exeter surrendred into his hands both the said Mannors excepting what was in the possession of James Prowse and that the Bishop Joseph Hall's Successor redemised unto him the said Mannors excepting the demesnes of Trecaer and excepting one Messuage in the occupation of Robert and excepting one Farm parcel of the Mannor of Burniel for three lives reserving 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. with a nomine poenae and whether this second Lease was a good Lease and the 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. the old and accustomed Rent within the intention of the Statute of 1 Eliz. was the question After several arguments at the Bar it was argued at the Bench in Michaelmas Term Ann. 26 Car. 2. And the Court was divided viz. Vaughan Ellis against the Lease Atkyns Wyndham for it This Term North Chief Justice delivered his Opinion in which he agreed with Atkyns Wyndham so that Iudgment was given in maintenance of the Lease and the Iudgment was affirmed in the Kings Bench upon a Writ of Error The Chapter of the Collegiate Church of Southwell versus the Bishop of Lincoln and J. S. Incumbent c. IN a Qua. imp the Incumbents Title was under a grant made by the Plaintiffs who were seized of the Advowson ut de uno grosso in the right of their Church of the next avoidance one Esco being then Incumbent of their Presentation to Edward King from whom by mean assignments it came to Elizabeth Bley who after the death of Esco presented the Defendant Vpon a demurrer these points came in question 1. Whether the grantors were within the Statute of the 13 Eliz. or not 2. Whether a grant of a next avoidance be restrained by the Statute 3. If the grant be void whether it be void ab initio or when it becomes so And 4. Whether the Statute of 13 Eliz. shall be taken to be a general Law for it is not pleaded Serjeant Jones For the first point argued that the Grantors are within the Statute the words are Deans Chapters which he said might well be taken severally for of this Chapter there is no Dean If they were to be taken joyntly then a Dean were not within this Law in respect of those possessions which he holds in the right of his Deanry but the subsequent general words do certainly include them and would extend even to Bishops but that they are superiour to all that are expressed by name For the second he said the Statute restrains all gifts grants c. other then such upon which the old Rent c. He cited Cr. Eliz. 440. 5. Co. the case of Ecclesiastical persons 10 Co. the Earl of Salisbury's case For the third point he held it void ab initio it must be so or good for ever For here is no Dean after whose death it may become void as in Hunt Singleton's case the Chapter in our case never dies For the fourth point he argued that it is a general Law because it concerns all the Clergy Holland's case 4 Rep. Dumpor's case ibid. 120. b. Willmote contra North Chief Justice Atkyns Wyndham Ellis Iustices all agreed upon the three first points as Serjeant Jones had argued Atkyns doubted whether the 13 of Eliz. were a general Law or not but was over-ruled They all agreed that the Action should have been brought against the Patron as well as against the Ordinary and the Incumbent but that being only a plea in abatement that the Defendant has waived the benefit thereof by pleading in Bar. And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Nisi causa c. Hunt Singleton's case being mentioned Atkyns said he thought it a hard case considering that the Dean and the Chapter were all persons capable that a grant should hold in force as long as the Dean lived and determine then He thought they being a Corporation aggregate of
common right the words of reservation ought to be pursued but as to this the Court delivered no Opinion Ognell versus the Lord Arlington Guardian of Sir John Jacob. UPon a Trial at Bar the Court delivered for Law to the Iury that if there be Tenant by Elegit of certain Lands and a Fine be levied of those Lands and five years with non-claim pass that the interest of the Tenant by Elegit is bound according to Saffyn's case 5 Rep. otherwise if the Land had not been actually extended Also that if an Inquisition upon an Elegit be found the party before entry has the possession and a fine with non-claim shall bar his right for before actual entry he may have Ejectione firmae or Trespass and so not like to an interesse termini Barry Trebeswycke IF a Parson have a Pension by Prescription he may either bring an Action at the Common Law or commence a Suit in the Spiritual Court but if he brings a Writ of Annuity at the Common Law he can never after sue in the Spiritual Court for that his Election is determined Wakeman Blackwell IN a Quare impedit the Defendant pleaded a recovery in this manner viz. that John Wakeman Grandfather to the Plaintiff was seized in fee of the Mannor to which c. and that a Praecipe was brought against one Prinne Philpotts adtunc tenentes liberi tenementi c. who appeared and vouched John Wakeman c. and that this Recovery was to the use of J. S. under whom the Defendant claims Strode pro Defendente it is not necessary that the Tenant in a Common Recovery have a Freehold at the time of the purchase of the Writ if he have at the time of the return it sufficeth 7 Ed. 3. 42. 7 Ed. 3. 70. Ass of no. diss 43 Ed. 3. 21. in these Authorities the person against whom the Praecipe is brought comes in by right after the purchase and before the return of the Writ But in 26 Ed. 3. 68. there is an example where the Tenant to the Praecipe comes in by tort but there is this difference if he comes to the Land by his own act be it by right or by wrong there he makes the Writ good otherwise if he come to it by act of Law 8 Ed. 3. 22. a. Formedon 25 H. 6. 4. the reason why you shall not abate the Plaintiffs Writ by your own act is because you cannot give him a better The demandant here is estopped to say that there was not a Tenant to the Praecipe in this Recovery for the Writ is but abatable if brought against one that is not Tenant and as long as it stands not abated but is pleaded to c. it shall conclude all that are parties and privies and all claiming under them 34 Ed. 3. F. tit droit 39. here is in our case an estoppell with a recompence Wakeman the Grandfather who was the first Vouchee in this Recovery might have counterpleaded the lien and extorted the warranty but having vouched over he is past that advantage and is concluded being made a party by Voucher This being a common Recovery the Court will do all they can to make it good A Fine is levied by Dedimus potestatem by Baron and Feme The Commissioners did not return the examination of the wife and yet that is the discriminating difference upon which depends whether the wife shall be bound by the Fine or not 15 Ed. 4. 28. a. Litt. Sect. 670. 6 Ed. 3. 22. a. The Court must needs in this case intend that Prinne Philpots came in by conveyance because Wakeman came in upon the Voucher which he would not have done if there had not been a lien He cited Cro. Jac. 454. Lincoln Colledge case 3 Rep. 48. Hob. 262. Duncomb Wingfield's case To which Pemberton answered that tunc tenens is a sufficient averment in the pleading of a Recovery which is favoured in Law but it is not good alone when in the same sentence a matter is set forth that is inconsistent with it and plainly contradictory as in this case and of that opinion was the Court. The case in Hob. they said was upon a special Verdict where many things may be intended which shall not be so in pleading and in Lincoln Col ' case the Writ is said to be brought against one Edw. Chamberlain in one part of the Record and the Mother is said to be Tenant in another part of the Record and by the other party but here in the same sentence unto flatu there is a flat contradiction Burrow Haggett FOrmedon in the descender The Defendant pleaded in abatement of the Count and took these exceptions 1. That the demandant declares that the right descended to him after the death of Leonard as Brother and heir to Leon and Son and Heir of the Donee but does not alledge that Leonard died without issue 8 Rep. 88. Buckmere's case In ancient Registers the clause is eo quod the issue dyed without issue Co. Ent. 254. b. c. Rast Entr. 365. C. Yelv. 227. Glasse Gyll's case 9 Ed. 4. 36. a man that entitles himself as heir must shew how he is heir Seyse contra The presisidents are on our side and the difference is betwixt a Formedon in the descender and a Formedon in the remainder or reverter In the former they do not mention the dying without issue of him after whose death they claim for the Count there is in effect only to set out their pedigreé but in a Formedon in the Remainder or Reverter it is otherwise 39 Ed. 3. 27. Old Book of Ent ' 339. tit Formed ' bar plac ' 3. Co. Lit. Mandevile's case 26 b 7 H. 7. fol. 7. b. there our case is put in express terms the exception taken to the Count there by Keble is the same that is taken to ours here and there it is over-ruled North I have looked into presidents and find the Count in this case according to them It is a plain and reasonable difference betwixt a Formedon in the discender and a Formedon in the remainder or reverter nor could the demandant be brother and heir to Leonard if Leonard had left children c. Another exception was that the demandant does not set forth that he was Son and heir of John begotten on the body of Jane his wife for it was a gift in special tail But this was over-ruled for in the Writ that is set forth and in the Declaration after the words filio haeredi praedict Johannis came an c. which c. let the words of the Writ into the Count and so it was held good The Prothonotaries said that the forms of Counts were accordingly And Iudgment was given to answer over Nisi causa c. Term. Mich. 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco Blythe versus Hill DEbt upon an Obligation for the payment of money at a day certain The Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff being
pleasure of the Lords no doubt that would have been an illegal Commitment against Magna Charta and the Petition of Right There the Commitment had been expresly illegal and it may be this Commitment is no less For if it had been expresly shewn and he be remanded he is committed by this Court who are to answer for his Imprisonment But secondly The duration of the Imprisonment during the pleasure of the King and of the House is illegal and uncertain for since it ought to determine in two Courts it can have no certain period A Commitment until he shall be discharged by the Courts of Kings-Bench and Common-Pleas is illegal for the Prisoner cannot apply himself in such manner as to obtain a discharge If a man be committed till further Order he is bailable presently for that imports till he shall be delivered by due course of Law and if this Commitment have not that sense it is illegal for the pleasure of the King is that which shall be determined according to Law in his Courts as where the Statute of Westm ' 1. cap. 15. declares that he is not replevisable who is taken by command of the King it ought to extend to an extrajudicial command not in his Courts of Iustice to which all matters of Iudicature are delegated and distributed 2 Inst 186 187. Wallop to the same purpose he cited Bushells case Vaughan's Rep. 137. that the general Retorn for high Contempts was not sufficient and the Court that made the Commitment in this case makes no difference for otherwise one may be imprisoned by the House of Peers unjustly for a matter relievable here and yet shall be out of all relief by such a Retorn for upon a supposition that this Court ought not to meddle where the person is committed by the Peers then any person at any time and for any cause is to be subject to perpetual Imprisonment at the pleasure of the Lords But the Law is otherwise for the House of Lords is the supream Court yet their Iurisdiction is limited by the Common and Statute Law and their excesses are examinable in this Court for there is great difference betwéen the errors and excesses of a Court betwéen an erroneous proceéding and a proceeding without Iurisdiction which is void and a meer nullity 4 H. 7. 18. In the Parliament the King would have one Attaint of Treason and lose his Lands and the Lords assented but nothing was said of the Commons wherefore all the Iustices held that it was no Act and he was restored to his Land and without doubt in the same case if the party had been imprisoned the Iustices must have made the like resolution that he ought to have been discharged It is a Sollecism that a man shall be imprisoned by a limited Iurisdiction and it shall not be examinable whether the cause were within their Iurisdiction or no. If the Lords without the Commons should grant a Tax and one that refused to pay it should be imprisoned the Tax is void but by a general Commitment the party shall be remediless So if the Lords shall award a Capias for Treason or Felony By these instances it appears that their Iurisdiction was restrained by the Common Law and it is likewise restrained by divers Acts of Parliament 1 H. 4. cap. 14. No Appeals shall be made or any way pursued in Parliament And when a Statute is made a power is implicitely given to this Court by the fundamental constitution which makes the Iudges Expositors of Acts of Parliament And peradventure if all this case appeared upon the Retorn this might be a case in which they were restrained by the Statute 4 H. 8. cap. 8. That all Suits Accusements Condemnations Punishments Corrections c. at any time from henceforth to be put or had upon any Member for any Bill speaking or reasoning of any matters concerning the Parliament to be communed or treated of shall be utterly void and of none effect Now it doth not appear but this is a correction or punishment imposed upon the Earl contrary to the Statute There is no question made now of the power of the Lords but it is only urged that it is necessary for them to declare by virtue of what power they proceed otherwise the Liberty of every Englishman shall be subject to the Lords whereof they may deprive any of them against an Act of Parliament but no usage can justifie such a proceeding Ellismeres case of the Post-nati 19. The Duke of Suffolk was impeached by the Commons of High Treason and Misdemeanors the Lords were in doubt whether they would proceed on such general Impeachment to imprison the Duke And the advice of the Iudges being demanded and their resolutions given in the negative the Lords were satisfied This case is mentioned with design to shew the respect given to the Iudges and that the Iudges have determined the highest matters in Parliament At a conference between the Lords and Commons 3 Aprilis Car. 1. concerning the Rights and Priviledges of the Subject It was declared and agreed that no Freeman ought to be restrained or committed by command of the King or Privy-Council or any other in which the House of Lords are included unless some cause of the Commitment Restraint or Deteynor be set forth for which by Law he ought to be committed c. Now if the King who is the Head of the Parliament or his Privy Council which is the Court of State ought therefore to proceed in a legal manner this solemn resolution ought to end all Debates of this matter It is true 1 Roll 129. in Russells case Coke is of Opinion that the Privy-Council may commit without shewing cause but in his more mature age he was of another Opinion And accordingly the Law is declared in the Petition of Right and no inconvenience will ensue to the Lords by making their Warrants more certain Smith argued to the same purpose and said That a Iudge cannot make a Iudgment unless the Fact appears to him on a Habeas Corpus the Iudge can only take notice of the Fact retorned It is lawful for any Subject that finds himself agrieved by any Sentence or Iudgment to Petition the King in an humble manner for Redress And where the Subject is restrained of his liberty the proper place for him to apply himself to is this Court which hath the supreme power as to this purpose over all other Courts and an Habeas Corpus issuing here the King ought to have an accompt of his Subjects Roll tit Habeas Corp. 69. Wetherlies case And also the Commitment was by the Lords yet if it be illegal this Court is obliged to discharge the Prisoner as well as if he had been illegally imprisoned by any other Court The House of Peers is an high Court but the Kings-Bench hath ever been entrusted with the Liberty of the Subject and if it were otherwise in case of Imprisonment by the Peers the power of the King were
against the Infant Sir Heneage Finch Solicitor General The Witnesses who swear that the Earl said He would give the Estate to her prove nothing to the purpose For he did so but upon a condition That they did not hear The after-consent of the Earls or the Countess ought not to make it good which consent at last perhaps was extorted by importunity or compassion For at first they disapproved the Marriage Marrying without consent and dying without issue are coupled in the same Line and the Estate shall as effectually pass over to the Defendant upon the one Limitation as the other For such consent is matter ex post facto and suspitiously to be scan'd For we ought in this Case by Law to proceéd strictly and not derogate from my Lord Newport's intent which plainly appears by the letter of his Will that his Grand-Child should ask consent of such he had thereby appointed to consent before her Marriage were solemnized the actual solemnization of which was an act so permanent that it would admit of no alteration or dissolution An act of such force and efficacy tending clearly and immediatly to the ruine of their Right and Title to the Estate in question and rendring it wholly uncapable of Reviver by any other means than what the Common and Civil Laws of this Realm do permit The post-consent therefore will not avail the Plaintiffs in this Court. Otherwise the Defendant claiming by this Limitation should have indeéd advantage but such as is inconsiderable being liable to alteration by the pleasure of this Court. And for a strict observation of the Testators words the same ought to be in Equity as well as at Law What great respect the old Heathens paid to the Wills of deceased persons may appear in these following Verses Sed Legum Servanda fides suprema voluntas Quod mandat fierique jubet parere necesse est The Countess saying likely in passion That she might marry whom she would c. did not amount to a dormant Warrant to her to marry without consent I am upon Conjecture still that the Plaintiff will insist upon these particulars for it looks as if they would because they read them Doubtless the primary intention of the Clause was in terrorem But the Secondary was that if she offended she should undergo the penalty His intention is to be gathered out of the words only and what ever they say the Earl intended does not press the Question Our Frée-hold is setled in us by vertue of an Act of Parliament I lay it down for a Foundation That a Father may settle his Estate so as that the Issue shall be deprived of it for Disobedience and not be relievable in Equity And now 't is not possible that any Council could advise a man to do it stronger than it is done in this Case And shall a Child break these Bonds and look Disobedience in the face here V. 1 Cr. 476. post 694. 696. If it had been only provided that she should marry with the consent c. and no further it might have been somewhat But since he goes on and makes a Limitation over c. he becomes his own Chancellour and upon this difference are all the Presidents and even those of devising portions viz. devising them over or not as I have understood Infancy can be no excuse in case of the breach of a condition of an Estate in which the Infant is a Purchasor So that nothing rests now in this Case but the point of Notice And why should not the Infant be bound to take notice in this Case as he is to take notice in case of a Remainder wherein he is a Purchasor But if notice be necessary it is not to be tried here now If we had brought an Ejectment and supposing notice had been necessary we had failed in the proof thereof should we have beén har'd for ever as by this perpetual Injunction we should be and shall it be done now without proof If we are not bound to prove Notice at Law much less are we bound to prove it here This Case is Epidemical and concerns all the Parents of England that have or shall have Children that the Obligations which they lay upon their Children may not be cancelled wholly and this Court under colour of Equity protect them in it and be a City of Refuge for relief of such the foulness of whose actions deny them a Sanctuary Pecke If Infancy would excuse such a Clause would signifie nothing For most persons especially of that Sex marry before full age The Lords give no reason why they changed their Opinions Serjeant Fountain Yelverton's Case in 36 Eliz. is a President in the Point for us and Shipdam's Case is much like it This being of a devise Land and that of Money which if it were paid the Land was to go over The grand Objection is That here is an Estate vested by a settlement which is not to be avoided or defeated But I doubt whether a man can lay such a Restraint that there shall not be Relief in any case of Emergency and Contingency Part 712. 3. V. in Leo. 37. It is a part of the fundamental Iustice of the Nation that men should not make Limitations wholly unalterable as by the Common Law men cannot make a Feé unalienable You give relief every day where there are express Clauses that there shall be no relief in Law or Equity where a thing is appointed to be c. without relief in Law or Equity you relieve against them and look upon them to be void In our Case suppose she had married a great Lord or suppose a person had brought notice of the Trustees consent would you not have given relief But secondly I deny the Assumption This Case is not so I agrée it had been well done if they had askt my Lady Newports consent But is there a word in the Will that if the Plaintiff did not he should have no relief in Equity The Estate was devised to my Lady Newport during her life so that the Plaintiff could not be in possession and she might have lived till the Plaintiff was 21 years old Could not my Lady Newport have said Have a care how you marry for you forfeit the Estate if you marry without the consent of two of us three All Ingredients and Circumstances must be taken in a matter of Equity Is it an argument to say He has no Estate therefore take away his Wifes Estate then there will be nothing to maintain her It is agréed That if the Approbation had been precedent it had been well Now she had no notice before the Marriage that it was necessary and when she had that notice she got the approbation and that though subsequent is good enough because it was askt and gotten as soon as she had Notice that she ought to have it The Will is hereby sufficiently observed for the intent of the Will was that she should have such an
tail and the remainder over is so too and both these parties are in aequali gradu to the Devisor and therefore their being both in a parity it would be hard to take the Estate from him to whom and in whose Scale the Law hath thrown the advantage 3 It appears by the body of the Will that the Earl did as really intend it should go over if she married without consent as if she died without Issue for they are both in the same clause There may be as much reason to turn it into a Fee-simple in case as she had died without Issue as in this case For so I doubt the penning of this decretal Order does And 4 I rest upon this It is a Case without a President I remember after that Lanyett's Case had been adjudged that 6 Car. there was a Case I suppose Saunders versus Cornish of a Limitation in Tail Cro 3 part fo 230 it was of a Lease for years and so was adjudged void and then a devise over and it was adjudged void And the Iudges said so far it is gone and we will go no further because we do not know where it will rest I know there is no intrinsical difference in Cases by Presidents But there is a great difference in a Case wherein a man is to make and where a man sees and is to follow a President in the one Case a man is more strictly bound up but in the other he may take a greater liberty and Latitude For if a man be in doubt in aequilibrio concerning a Case whether it be equitable or no in prudence he will determine according as the Presidents have been especially if they have been made by men of good authority for Learning c. and have been continued and pursued Here must be some boundary or we shall go we know not whither It were hard a Court of Equity should do that that is not fit to be done in any Court below a Parliament The Presidents do not come home to the Case Most of them are in case of money Legacies and in some of those Cases we may give allowance in respect of the Law of another forum to which they belong But this is in case of Land only vid ' Swynborne 4. Co. 12. chap. indeed he is no authority but there is a very good Exemplification of this matter 5 I shall consider the allays and circumstances which are observed and offered to qualifie this Case and induce relief 1 'T is said that this clause was only in terrorem and some Witnesses have been examined to prove it But I am not satisfied how collateral averments can be admitted in this case For then how can there be any certainty 2 Cro 145. A Will will be any thing every thing nothing The Statute appointed the Will should be in writing to make a certainty and shall we admit collateral averments and proofs and make it utterly uncertain 2 'T is said in this Case the effect of the Proviso has beén obtained for the Trustees have now declared their consent I must say it is not full for they do not say they would have consented but that possibly such reasons might have been offered as they should have done it And possibly I say not They like good men have only declined the shewing an ineffectual contradicting of a thing which is done and cannot now be recalled undone or altered Besides if there had been but a circumstantial variation the consent afterwards might have been somewhat But here it is in the very substance In the Case before cited at the Bar by Mr. Serjeant Ellis where the consent was to be had in writing and it was had only by Paroll there was great Equity that it should be relieved because it was only a provident circumstance and wisdom of the Devisor viz. for the more firme obliging the party to ask consent which the Devisor considered might be pretended to be had by slight words in ordinary and not solemn Communication or else in passion and heat as in this case when the Plaintiff would not consent to the approved Marriage with the Lord Morpeth the Countess said she might marry where she would Which words imported a neglect of care for the future over the Plaintiff because she would not be ruled by the Countess in accepting the tender of so commendable a Marriage as also for the benefit of the Devisee in the Case aforesaid That in case the Devisee did marry with the consent of the Trustee he might not after through prejudice c. avoid it by denial of such consent and so defeat or perplex the Devisee for want of proof of such his consent 3 'T is said the party is an Infant Why an Infant is bound by a Condition in Fact by Law 't is true we are now in Equity But in Equity since this refers to an Act which she though an Infant is capable of doing viz. to marry it were unreasonable that she should be able to do the Act and not be obliged by Equity to observe the Conditions and Terms which concern and relate to that Act. So that it is all one as if she had been of full age The Statute of Merton cap. 5. provides that Usury shall not run against Infants and yet the same Statute cap. 6. appoints That if an Infant marry without the Licence of his Lord c. he shall forfeit double the value of his Marriage and it is reasonable because Marriage is an Act which he may do by Law while he is under age 4 As to the point of Notice 1 Whether Notice be requisite or no in point of Law I will not determine But I must needs say that it must be referred to Law But 2 If it be not requisite in Law how far a Court of Equity might relieve for want of it I will not now take upon me to determine I will not trench upon matters Gratis of which I know not what will be the consequence But I conceive in this case the Fact is not yet settled whether there were notice or not and it were a hard matter That because no Notice is here proved it should be taken for granted there was none For here are several circumstances that seem to shew there might be Notice and a publick voice in the House or an accidental Intimation c. may possibly be sufficient Notice I shall therefore leave it as a fit thing to be tryed and till that the case in my understanding is not ripe And therefore I will add no more I think this Decree ought to be altered if not set aside But as this Case is there ought to be no relief Vaughan Chief Justice I shall conclude as my Lord Chief Baron did That as this case is there ought to be no relief I will single out this case from several things not material to it as my Lord Chief Baron did c. I think if Land be devised on Condition to pay