Jure proprietatis or In patrimonio imperantis that is properly or in Property or in chief or how else you please to render these Words in English Which Grotius in the same Chapter explains by a Jus regendi non aliunde pendens A Right of Government not depending upon any other humane Authority whatsoever Mer. But Sir since you have founded Empire upon a Supreme Right of Government or Power over Men how comes it to pass that we find a Right of Power and Priviledges and Government too so founded in the Possession of several Lands that the Possession of those Lands alone gives a Man several Rights and Prerogatives For example amongst us 't is said That whosoever hath the Right and Possession of the Barony of Burgaveny besides some others becomes thereby a Baron of England and enjoys those Priviledges which belong to it In France I have heard say That nothing is more common than for Men to receive their Titles according to their Lands whether Count Baron Marquess and so forth Is it not plain then That the Right of Command or Power which is Empire may be founded upon Property according to our Author's Interpretation that is the Possession of Lands Trav. I agree to what you have urg'd that is to say That several Priviledges and Right of Power are annexed to several Lordships or Terres Nobles that they have thereby haute basse Justice and their Jurisdiction extends to Life and Death Nay more in several parts of Italy and particularly in Lombardy there are several Imperial Feuds which Grotius seems to call Regna Feudalia which have almost as great Prerogatives as some other Kingdoms have They make Laws raise Taxes and mint Money as other greater Kingdoms do And yet all this makes little for our Author's Aphorism as by him interpreted Mer. The Reason if you please Trav. Because all those little Lordships or Principalities whether they were instituted at first by the Goths and Vandals or Lombards or granted afterwards by several later Emperours and Kings or both as is most probable yet they did and still do at this day depend upon a Superiour Power and pay Homage and Fealty for those Priviledges which they enjoy which is much different from Empire or a Sovereign Right of Power And yet even in this Case this subordinate Power is so far from being founded upon the Possession of all the Land belonging to the Feud which is our Author's Proposition that very often their Liberties depend only upon the old Walls of a ruinated Castie and a very inconsiderable Number of Acres which represent the whole Feud or Mannor the rest of the Land having been sold away and become the Property of others some small Rent only or Acknowledgment being reserv'd And after this manner the Supreme Power may as well tye Priviledges to a Post and grant the Possessor of that Post such Royalties as the Proprietor of such a Castle or Land Which is very far from proving that the Possession of Lands doth thereby originally create a Sovereign Right of Power Mer. Cousin I have heard and read too I think that the Sea hath formerly eaten up a considerable part of your ancient Patrimony and from thence it may be you are no Friend to Lands But for my part I will stand up for Land as long as I can and must therefore ask you Why those Rents or Acknowledgments were reserv'd if not to testifie that they came originally from the Lord and that thereby he still keeps up a kind of Sovereign Right to the Lands themselves knowing well enough that his Power according to our Author is founded upon them Trav. This yet signifies nothing for although the Reservation of these Rents or Services do preserve the Memory of the Benefactor and continue the Respect due from the Tenant yet this is personal only and hath no Relation to the publick Right of Power or Government For when this Rent was not reserv'd yet whosoever lives within the Jurisdiction of such a Fewd or Mannor is always subject to him who enjoys the Lordship So in England Services and Quit-Rents have been generally receiv'd and paid untill the late King and his present Majesty were pleas'd to dispose of them But to believe that this hath lessened his Sovereign Right of Government is a Fancy that sure cannot enter into the Head of any sober Man But let us put a plain Case Suppose the Kingdom of England were at any time obtain'd by absolute Conquest as I conceive it was more than once and that such Conquest gives the Conquerour a Sovereign Right not only to our real and personal Estates which we find to have been wholly in the hands of some of our Kings but also over our Liberties and Lives as may be fully seen in Grotius de Jur. B. P. Now Sir supposing a People in this Condition and having nothing of their own submit themselves and all they have to the Mercy of the Conquerour as the Carthaginians did to the Romans you will grant I imagine that this Conquerour is an Emperour to all Intents having an absolute Right of Power over the People and their Land also Mer. Yes certainly as long as he keeps himself and People in that Condition there cannot want any thing to make him an absolute Monarch Trav. But we will farther suppose That our Conquerour being of a more noble and more humane Temper than it may be our Author would have been orders diligent Inquisition to be made into the Value of his conquer'd Lands Which being done and enter'd into a Register such as we call Doomsday Book the Conquerour divides most of these Lands between the Conquerours and the Conquered some he returns to their former Owners upon certain Conditions or Services others he changeth To his Noblemen and Favourites he grants great Titles and Priviledges to the Gentry less and to the vulgar or common sort some small Possessions which with a little Labour and Diligence will enable them to live easily and peaceably the rest of their days All these become an Inheritance to themselves and their Heirs according to their several Tenures which the Conquerours have generally created and which we call Property These Sir being thus established and the Lands of the Kingdom setled after this manner the Conquerour or King himself reserves it may be a small part which we call Crown Lands and in Consideration of his Right of Conquest and those Benefits which he hath bestowed upon his People in granting them their Liberties Lives and Lands he continueth to himself the Power of making and abolishing Laws according as he shall think most fit and proper for the Peace Honour and Safety of his Government He creates Magistrates for the due Execution of these Laws who in his stead and by his Authority have a Power to judge between his Subjects and in some Cases between his Subjects and himself or his Attorney Besides these he retains the sole Power of making Peace and War of
Institution of a Senate composed of twenty eight of his own chiefest Friends The Kingdom he deliver'd to his Nephew assoon as he came of Age. Mer. What kind of Government do you call that Trav. Monarchy without doubt It is true their Senate had given to them a greater Right of Power than ours have who enjoy only a Right of Counsel and Consent or a subordinate Power for the Dispensation of Justice and the People had Liberty to choose their Senators But the Right of making Peace and War vvith several other Prerogatives together vvith the Right of Succession continued alvvays in the Prince Mer. I have heard much talk of the Ephori Were not they created on purpose to abate the Authority of their Kings Trav. Sir they were not created until about an Hundred and thirty years after the death of Lycurgus And then if we may believe their Kings Agis and Cleomenes whom our Author hath mention'd their Authority was only to do justice whilst their Kings were absent in the Wars and were properly the Kings Ministers they usurped indeed afterwards a Soveraign Authority and dar'd to depose the Kings themselves for which Usurpation Cleomenes who divided again the Land among the People slew them publickly as enemies to the ancient Government and present prosperity and peace of Sparta Mer. Pray Cousin what new Laws did Lycurgus institute with his new Government Trav. Many Sir but sure not much to our purpose or fit for our imitation for at first they had none Non habentibus Spartanis leges instituit c. Their Prince's will being as I have already observ'd the only rule But Lycurgus considering I imagin the greatness of the Spartan name fram'd Laws most proper for the encouraging War and educating the People from their infancy in a military kind of Discipline Amongst other Laws he totally forbad the use of Gold and Silver Auri argentique usum velut omnium scelerum materiam sustulit he forbad traffick but encourag'd idleness and stealing He commended parsimony and hardship and order'd that all the People of Sparta should always eat together that none should eat at his own house except upon great occasion That the young Women should dance and exercise publickly without any manner of covering upon them and many such too long to repeat at present Judge then how ridiculous and unpracticable and unnecessary these Laws would appear in our age and in our climate and circumstances To conclude let me refer you to two sufficient Authors concerning the Spartan Laws The first is Aristotle in his 7. Pol. cap. 14. who tells us that the cheif admirers of the Spartan Commonwealth have plac'd its sole excellency in having Laws adapted most Particularly for War and Victory 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The other is Euripides in his Andromache His Words are these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Si vis Martia Vobis lacones absit et ferri decus Spectatur ultra quid sit eximium nihil What can ye boast ye Spartans if ye cease To fight like Dogs and live like Men in Peace Add to all this single Consideration That Lacedemonia was but as a small Province in Comparison of the Kingdom of Great Britany and Sparta no more than a Corporation Town And when you have done this let their Law or Form of Government be what it will I dare undertake to make it appear that they are so far from being made an Example for our Imitation that our own Government as distemper'd as our Author would have it even at this time while we are discoursing is a more excellent Form and the Laws more just and reasonable and conducing more to the Safety and Perpetuity of the Government and Peace and happy Subsistence of the People than either Sparta or Athens ever enjoyed or any other part of Greece or Government in the World except that Monarchy which God himself was pleas'd to institute and which above any other ours does most particularly imitate And this I hope is a sufficient Answer to whatsoever our Author hath offer'd concerning Greece Mer. Dear Cousin You have more than perform'd your Promise and that my Pleasure as well as Profit may be compleat pray let us proceed with our Author Trav. Assoon as you please Mer. What say you then to the first Day Trav. Very little save only that I never knew a Day worse spent in my Life nothing being more nauseous than to read the impertinent Complements of three Fools extolling one anothers great Parts and Learning when if we may believe the Publisher who comes in like Sapientum octavus the eighth wise Man the whole Triumvirate or if you will Quatrumvirate are included in the politick individuum of the English Gentleman Mer. Really I was almost deceiv'd at first and did begin to fancy that I knew the Physician Trav. It was without doubt his Design to deceive all Men. Mer. To what Purpose Trav. That he might make the credulous Reader believe that there were more learned Men of his Opinion besides himself But truly I think that neither the State of Venice nor Colledge of Physicians are much oblig'd to him for picking out two of their Societies to make up so ridiculous a Comedy Mer. Is that way of writing Ancient or Modern Trav. Dialogue was oftentimes very properly used among the Ancients but they seldom introduc'd more than two if the Subject of their Discourse were grave and serious Mer. Why then hath our Author made choice of three Trav. I suppose the noble Venetian wanted Learning enough to comprehend so profound a Discourse and the Physician we must imagine had not anatomiz'd or studied the Body Politick so throughly as he had done the Body Natural and so could not see so far into a Milstone as a Venetian Statesman can who as our Nobleman tells us will sometimes discover a State Marasmus breaking out two hundred Years after the passing an indigested Law and this without the help of any Telescope both therefore possessing separately these eminent Qualifications became joyntly an Auditory worthy of Sir Politick Wouldbee's Doctrine Besides you know the number Three is most perfect But had I been advis'd withall I could have shewn our Author this Number of Three so ingeniously and politically plac'd that our Medicopolitico-Venetian Publisher might have born a better part than he does in his Book without either altering the Number or spoiling the Figure But to be serious I must confess Cousin that I have sometimes heard two or three Fools cogâ—â—onaring one another as our Author calls it and it hath been pleasant enough But that one Coglione should presume to coglionare three Kingdoms impose upon His Majesty despise the Wisdom of the Lords and Commons His Majesty's Privy Council and Learned Judges of the Land and last of all to give the Fool to all our Worthy Ancestors who have liv'd within the Compass of four hundred years according to his Account
disposing of the Treasury whether it be his own particular Revenue or such as may be granted for the Defence and Security of the Kingdom and such other Prerogatives as Sovereign Princes generally pretend to And after all he obligeth all his Subjects generally and in particular to pay him Homage and Fealty for the Land and Priviledges which they hold or have receiv'd from him and to bind themselves and their Heirs for ever to become true and faithful Subjects unto him their Liege Lord his Heirs and Successors for ever as may be seen at large in the Form of our general Oath of Allegiance and this under no less Penalty than the loss of our Lives Honour and Estates whatever they be Now Cousin after the Disposition of the Lands as hath been here suppos'd and this Establishment of the Government according to the good Will and Pleasure of him who is Master of all and the Consent and Confirmation of the People who have receiv'd those Lands and Priviledges can you believe that our Conquerour is less an Emperour than he was when he kept all the Lands in his own Hands and undistributed Mer. Methinks in good Reason in Justice and in Gratitude he should lose nothing of the Power which he hath reserv'd by reason of the Graces and Priviledges which he hath granted Trav. No sure Sir he rather acquires another Right and becomes doubly their Soveraign that is to say both King and Father of his Country for since Government is agreed even by our Author to have been instituted for the Good of Man certainly that Governour who doth the greatest Good is by consequence the greatest Emperour So Josephus in the Speech which Judah makes in the Behalf of his Brother Benjamin to his unknown Brother Joseph chief Minister of the Egyptian Kingdom observes That Power was given Men to do Good And by how much we extend our Bounty by so much we enlarge our Empire Ad servandos homines potentiam datam existimare quô pluribus salutem dederis hôc te ipsum illustriorem fore Mer. Cousin all this is very fine and seems indeed most reasonable and most just But I perceive we are not yet come to a right Understanding of the Case For if a Prince or Sovereign Monarch shall out of a Principle of Goodness or what you please entrust Part of his Power in the hands of the People let the Conditions be what they will when they are once possessed of that Power most likely they will think it reasonable to share the Government also or to use our Author's Expression p. 45. if the People have the greatest Interest in the Property they will and must have it in the Empire So if a Master of a Family shall think fit to arm his Servants to the Intent only and upon the express Condition that they shall never use them but in Defence of their Master and Family and that only according to his own Commands yet nevertheless if in process of Time the Servants shall believe that the Master doth not govern his Family for their mutual Advantage and Security it is ten to one but that having the Power in their Hands they will pretend to govern the Family as well as the Master nay and if the Master prove too obstinate turn even himself out of the Government and Family too Trav. Very well I did indeed expect that at last we should come to Club Law and that your convincing Arguments would end in the invincible Force of Powder Ball and Musket Pardon me Sir I do not speak this of your self for I know that according to our Agreement and for the Support of our Discourse you only personate our Author whose Words are They will and must have it in the Empire Now though will and must are not proper Terms amongst civiliz'd and reasonable Men yet nevertheless since we know that Deformity in some Countries and when in Vogue passeth for Beauty and a Disease grown Epidemical assumes the Name of Health according to that of Seneca Recti locum tenet error ubi fit publicus I shall endeavour to pull off the ugly Vizard and unmask our ignorant State-Physician and demonstrate first That it is not reasonable that those who have the greatest Interest in the Property or the Possession of the Lands according to our Author's Interpretation should have any Right of Power in the Government otherwise than what is subordinate and deriv'd from the Supream Magistrate Secondly That by having this Interest in the Property they have not thereby more Right no nor more Power than if they had it not Thirdly That all Sovereign Princes have a Right of Power over the Lands themselves notwithstanding the Property be divided amongst the People Fourthly That most Kings who have had the Sovereign Power have yet had many Companions and Sharers in the Possession of the Land And lastly I shall give an Answer to your Instance which you have produc'd concerning a Master and his Servant Mer. Dear Cousin Excuse the Liberty I take since you know we at first granted it to each other Besides the deciding these main Points will be in a great measure ending the Trouble which I give you And being confident that you will be able to make good what you have promis'd I shall reap the Advantage of your Pains and you the Honour and Satisfaction of confirming me and it may be many others in an Opinion which we were rather willing to believe than able to justifie Trav. Sir not to lose Time I shall begin with the first That it is not reasonable that those who have the greatest Interest in the Property should have any Right of Power in the Government except what is subordinate and deriv'd from the supream Magistrate To prove this we must make these two general Distinctions which are and ever were in all Governments whatever That is to say between the Governour and the Governed which must of necessity be two different Persons for as Plutarch observes in his Introduction to the Lives of Agis and Cleomenes one Man cannot be Master and Servant nor can he who commands be able at the same Time to obey So Grotius tells us Quod cogens coactum requirunt distinctas personas neque sufficiunt distincti respectus I never heard but that the People were always taken for the Governed To moderate and regulate whose unruly Passions and inclinations Government it self has been hitherto continued in the World and they are generally call'd the Body of the Kingdom The Governour has been ever understood to be a single Person or Counsel or more who are likewise properly call'd the Head Both form the Body Politick Right of Power is like the Soul and is seated in the Head whence dispersing itsvital Heat through proper Arteries and Veins it nourisheth and gives Motion to all the Body and every part of it The Body thereby is enabled to preserve the Head from Violence The Head alone commands and the Body performs