5 Ed. 4. 6. Now for Authorities I confess there are great ones against me 2 Cro. fol. 335. Heath Ridley Moor. 838. Courtney versus Glanvill My Lord Coke in his Chapter of Praemunire 22 Ed. 4. fol. 37. But the greatest Authority against me is the case of Throgmorton Finch reported by my Lord Coke in his Treatise of Pleas of the Crown Chapter Praemunire But the practice has béen contrary not one person attainted of a Praemunire for that cause In King James his time the matter was referred to the Counsel who all agreed that the Chancery was not meant within the Statute which Opinions are inrolled in Chancery And the King upon the report of their Reasons ordered the Chancellor to proceed as he had done and from that time to this I do not find that this point ever came in question And so he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant Saunders As to that objection that at the time when this Statute was made there were no proceedings in Equity I answer that granting it to be true yet there is the same mischief The proceedings in one part of the Chancery are coram Domino Rege in Cancellaria but an English Bill is directed to the Lord Keeper and decreed so that there is a difference in the proceedings of the same Court But admit that Courts of Equity are the Kings Courts yet they are aliae Curiae if they hold plea of matters out of their Iurisdiction 16 Ri. 2. cap. 5. Rolls first part 381. There is a common objection that if there were no relief in Chancery a man might be ruined for the Common Law is rigorous and adheres strictly to its rules I cannot answer this Objection better then it is answered to my hand in Dr. Stud. lib. 1. cap. 18. he cited 13 Ri. 2. num 30. Sir Robert Cotton's Records It is to be considered what is understood by being impeached Now the words of another Act will explain that viz. 4 H. 4. cap. 23. by that Act it appears that it is to draw a Iudgment in question any other way then by Writ of Error or Attaint One would think this Statute so fully penned that there were no room for an evasion There was a temporary Statute which is at large in Rastall 31 H. 6. cap. 2. in which there is this clause viz. That no matter determinable at Common Law shall be heard elsewhere A fortiori no matter determined at Common Law shall be drawn in question elsewhere He cited 22 Ed. 4. 36. Sir Moyle Finch Throgmorton 2 Inst 335. and Glanvill Courtney's case He put them also in mind of the Article against Cardinal Woolsey in Coke's Jurisdiction of Courts tit Chancery So he prayed Iudgment for the Plaintiff Keeling It is fit that this cause be adjourned into the Exchequer-chamber for the Opinions of all the Iudges to be had in it We know what heats there were betwixt my Lord Coke Ellesmere which we ought to avoid Turner Benny A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment in the Common Pleas in an Action upon the Case wherein the Plaintiff declared that it was agréeed betwéen himself and the Defendant that the Plaintiff should surrender to the use of the Defendant certain Copy-hold Lands and that the Defendant should pay for those Lands a certain sum of money and then he sets forth that he did surrender the said Lands into the hands of two Tenants of the Manor out of Court secundum consuetudinem c. Exception The promise is to surrender generally which must be understood of a surrender to the Lord or to his Steward and the Declaration sets forth a surrender to two Tenants which is an imperfect surrender 1 Cro. 299. Keeling But in that case there are not the words secundum consuetudinem as in this case Jones Hill 22 Car. 1. Rot. 1735. betwixt Treburn Purchas two points were adjudged 1. That when there is an agréement for a surrender generally then such a particular surrender is naught 2. That the alledging of a surrender secundum consuetudinem is not sufficient but it ought to be laid that there was such a Custom within the Manor and then that according to that Custom he surrendred into c. accordingly is 3 Cro. 385. Coleman contra We do say that we were to surrender generally and then we aver that actually we did surrender secundum consuetudinem and if we had said no more it had béen well enough Then the adding into the hands of two Tenants c. I take it that it shall not hurt Besides we need not to alledge a performance because it is a mutual promise and he cited Camphugh Brathwait's case Hob. Twisden I remember the case of Treborne he was my Clyent And the reason of the Iudgment is in Combe's case 9th Rep. because the Tenants are themselves but Attornies And they compared it to this case I am bound to levy a Fine it may be done either in Court or by Commission but I must go and know of the person to whom I am bound how he will have it and he must direct me In the principal case the Iudgment was affirm'd Nisi c. Turner Davies AUdita Querela The point was this viz. an Administrator recovers damages in an Action of Trover and Conversion for Goods of the Intestate taken out of the possession of the Administrator himself then his Administration is revoked and the question is whether he shall have Execution of the Iudgment notwithstanding the revocation of his Administration Saunders I conceive he cannot for the Administration being revoked his Authority is gone Doctor Druries case in the 8th Report is plain And there is a President in the new book of Entries 89. Barrell I conceive he may take our Execution for it is not in right of his Administration he lays the Conversion in his own time and he might in this case have declared in his own name and he cited and urged the reason of Pakman's case 6th Report 1 Cro. Keeling He might bring the Action in his own name but the Goods shall be Assets If Goods come to the possession of an Administrator and his Administration be repealed he shall be charged as Executor of his own wrong now in this case the Administration being repealed shall he sue Execution to subject himself to an Action when done Twisden I think it hath béen ruled that he cannot take out Execution because his Title is taken away Iudgment per Cur. versus Defendentem Jordan Martin EXception was taken to an Avowry for a Rent-charge that the Avowant having distrained the Beasts of a Stranger for his Rent does not say that they were levant couchant Coleman The Beasts of a Stranger are not liable to a Distress unless they be levant couchant Roll. Distress 668. 672. Reignold's case Twisd Where there is a Custom for the Lord to seize the best Beast for a Heriot and the Lord does seize the
for an excessive Distress for it is a private matter and the party ought to bring his Action To stay Haman Truant AN Action upon the Case brought upon a bargain for Corn and Grass c. The Defendant pleads another Action depending for the same thing The Plaintiff replies that the bargains were several absque hoc that the other Action was brought for the same cause The Defendant demurs specially for that he ought to have concluded to the Country Polyxfen When there is an affirmative they ought to make the next an Issue or otherwise they will plead in infinitum 3 Cro. 755. and accordingly Iudgment was given for the Defendant Fox alii Executors of Mr. Pinsent Vide supra 47. INdebitat Assumpsit The Defendant pleads that two of the Plaintiffs are Infants and yet they all Sue per Attornatum The question is if there be two Executors and one of them under age whether the Infant must sue per Guardianum and the other per Attornatum or whether it is not well enough if both sue per Attornat Offley spake to it and cited 2 Cro. 541. Pasch 11 Car. 288. Powell's case Styles 318. 2 Cro. 577. 1 Inst 157. Dyer 338. Morton I am of Opinion that he may Sue by Attorney as Executor though if he be Defendant he must appear by Guardian Rainsford I think it is well enough and I am led to think so by the multitude of Authorities in the point And I think the case stronger when Infants joyn in Actions with persons of full age He Sues here in auter droit and I have not heard of any Authority against it Twisden concurred with the rest and so Iudgment was given Moreclack Carleton UPon a Writ of Error out of the Court of Common Pleas one Error assigned was that upon a relicta verificatione a misericordia was entred whereas it ought to have been a capiatur Twisden The Common-Pleas ought to certifie us what the practice of their Court is Monday the Secondary said it was always a Capiatur It s true in 9 Edw. 4. it is said that he shall but be amerced because he hath spared the Iury their pains and 34 H. 8. is accordingly but say they in the Common Pleas a Capiatur must be entred because dedicit factum suum So they said they would discourse with the Iudges of the Common Pleas concerning it The King versus Holmes MOved to quash an Indictment of Forcible Entry into a Messuage passage or way for that a passage or way is no Land nor Tenement but an Easement and then it is not certain whether it were a passage over Land or Water Yelv. 169. the word passagium is taken for a passage over Water Twisd You need not labour about that of the passage we shall quash it as to that but what say you to the Messunge Jones It is naught in the whole for it is but by way of recital with a quod cum he was possessed c. Et sic possessionatus c. but that Twisden said was well enough Jones Then he saith that he was possessed de quodam Termino and doth not say annorum Twisden That 's naught And the Indictment was quash'd An Action was brought against the Hundred of Stoak upon the Statute of Hue and Cry and at the Trial some House-keepers appeared as Witnesses that lived within the Hundred who being examined said they were Poor and paid no Taxes nor Parish Duties and the question was whether they were good Witnesses or not Twisden Alms-people and Servants are good Witnesses but these are neither Then he went down from the Bench to the Iudges of the Common-Pleas to know their Opinions and at his return said That Iudge Wyld was confident that they ought not to be sworn and that Iudge Tyrrell doubted at first but afterwards was of the same Opinion their reason was because when the money recovered against the Hundred should come to be levied they might be worth something Hoskins versus Robins Hill 23 Car. 2. Rot. 233. IN this case these points were spoke to in Arrest of Iudgment viz. 1. Whether a Custom to have a several Pasture excluding the Lord were a good Custom or not It was said that a prescription to have Common so was void in Law and if so then a prescription to have sole Pasture which is to have the Grass by the mouth of the Cattle is no other then Common appendant Daniel's case 1 Cro. so that Common and Pasturage is one and the same thing They say that it is against the nature of Common for the very word Common supposeth that the Lord may feed I answer if that were the reason then a man could not by Law claim Common for half a year excluding the Lord which may be done by Law But the true reason is that if that were allowed then the whole profits of the Land might be claimed by prescription and so the whole Land be prescribed for The Lord may grant to his Tenants to have Common excluding himself but such a Common is not good by prescription The second point was whether or no the prescription here not being for Beasts levant couchant were good or not for that a difference was made betwixt Common in grosse and common appendant viz. That a man may prescribe for Common in grosse without those words but not for Common appendant 2 Cro. 256. 1 Brownl 35. Noy 145. 15 Edw. 4. fol. 28. 32. Rolls tit Common 388. Fitz. tit Prescription 51. a third point was whether or no these things are not help'd by a Verdict As to that it was alledged that they are defects in the Title appearing on Record and that a Verdict doth not help them Saunders contra In case of a Common such a prescription is not good because it is a contradiction but here we claim solam Pasturam Now what may be good at this day by grant may be claimed by prescription As to the Exception that we ought to have prescribed for Cattle levant couchant its true if one doth claim Common for Cattle levant couchant is the measure for the Common unless it be for so many Cattle in number but here we claim the whole Herbage which perhaps the Cattle levant couchant will not eat up Hales Notwithstanding this prescription for the sole Pasture yet the Soil is the Lords and he has Mynes Trees Bushes c. and he may dig for Turfes And such a grant viz. of the sole Pasturage would be good at this day 18 Edw. 3. though a grant by the Lord that he will not improve would be a void grant at this day Twisden My Lord Coke is express in the point A man cannot prescribe for sole Common but may prescribe for sole Pasture And there is no Authority against him And for levant couchant it was adjudged in Stoneby Muckleby's case that after a Verdict it was help'd And Iudgment was given accordingly Anonymus AN Action of
common right the words of reservation ought to be pursued but as to this the Court delivered no Opinion Ognell versus the Lord Arlington Guardian of Sir John Jacob. UPon a Trial at Bar the Court delivered for Law to the Iury that if there be Tenant by Elegit of certain Lands and a Fine be levied of those Lands and five years with non-claim pass that the interest of the Tenant by Elegit is bound according to Saffyn's case 5 Rep. otherwise if the Land had not been actually extended Also that if an Inquisition upon an Elegit be found the party before entry has the possession and a fine with non-claim shall bar his right for before actual entry he may have Ejectione firmae or Trespass and so not like to an interesse termini Barry Trebeswycke IF a Parson have a Pension by Prescription he may either bring an Action at the Common Law or commence a Suit in the Spiritual Court but if he brings a Writ of Annuity at the Common Law he can never after sue in the Spiritual Court for that his Election is determined Wakeman Blackwell IN a Quare impedit the Defendant pleaded a recovery in this manner viz. that John Wakeman Grandfather to the Plaintiff was seized in fee of the Mannor to which c. and that a Praecipe was brought against one Prinne Philpotts adtunc tenentes liberi tenementi c. who appeared and vouched John Wakeman c. and that this Recovery was to the use of J. S. under whom the Defendant claims Strode pro Defendente it is not necessary that the Tenant in a Common Recovery have a Freehold at the time of the purchase of the Writ if he have at the time of the return it sufficeth 7 Ed. 3. 42. 7 Ed. 3. 70. Ass of no. diss 43 Ed. 3. 21. in these Authorities the person against whom the Praecipe is brought comes in by right after the purchase and before the return of the Writ But in 26 Ed. 3. 68. there is an example where the Tenant to the Praecipe comes in by tort but there is this difference if he comes to the Land by his own act be it by right or by wrong there he makes the Writ good otherwise if he come to it by act of Law 8 Ed. 3. 22. a. Formedon 25 H. 6. 4. the reason why you shall not abate the Plaintiffs Writ by your own act is because you cannot give him a better The demandant here is estopped to say that there was not a Tenant to the Praecipe in this Recovery for the Writ is but abatable if brought against one that is not Tenant and as long as it stands not abated but is pleaded to c. it shall conclude all that are parties and privies and all claiming under them 34 Ed. 3. F. tit droit 39. here is in our case an estoppell with a recompence Wakeman the Grandfather who was the first Vouchee in this Recovery might have counterpleaded the lien and extorted the warranty but having vouched over he is past that advantage and is concluded being made a party by Voucher This being a common Recovery the Court will do all they can to make it good A Fine is levied by Dedimus potestatem by Baron and Feme The Commissioners did not return the examination of the wife and yet that is the discriminating difference upon which depends whether the wife shall be bound by the Fine or not 15 Ed. 4. 28. a. Litt. Sect. 670. 6 Ed. 3. 22. a. The Court must needs in this case intend that Prinne Philpots came in by conveyance because Wakeman came in upon the Voucher which he would not have done if there had not been a lien He cited Cro. Jac. 454. Lincoln Colledge case 3 Rep. 48. Hob. 262. Duncomb Wingfield's case To which Pemberton answered that tunc tenens is a sufficient averment in the pleading of a Recovery which is favoured in Law but it is not good alone when in the same sentence a matter is set forth that is inconsistent with it and plainly contradictory as in this case and of that opinion was the Court. The case in Hob. they said was upon a special Verdict where many things may be intended which shall not be so in pleading and in Lincoln Col ' case the Writ is said to be brought against one Edw. Chamberlain in one part of the Record and the Mother is said to be Tenant in another part of the Record and by the other party but here in the same sentence unto flatu there is a flat contradiction Burrow Haggett FOrmedon in the descender The Defendant pleaded in abatement of the Count and took these exceptions 1. That the demandant declares that the right descended to him after the death of Leonard as Brother and heir to Leon and Son and Heir of the Donee but does not alledge that Leonard died without issue 8 Rep. 88. Buckmere's case In ancient Registers the clause is eo quod the issue dyed without issue Co. Ent. 254. b. c. Rast Entr. 365. C. Yelv. 227. Glasse Gyll's case 9 Ed. 4. 36. a man that entitles himself as heir must shew how he is heir Seyse contra The presisidents are on our side and the difference is betwixt a Formedon in the descender and a Formedon in the remainder or reverter In the former they do not mention the dying without issue of him after whose death they claim for the Count there is in effect only to set out their pedigreé but in a Formedon in the Remainder or Reverter it is otherwise 39 Ed. 3. 27. Old Book of Ent ' 339. tit Formed ' bar plac ' 3. Co. Lit. Mandevile's case 26 b 7 H. 7. fol. 7. b. there our case is put in express terms the exception taken to the Count there by Keble is the same that is taken to ours here and there it is over-ruled North I have looked into presidents and find the Count in this case according to them It is a plain and reasonable difference betwixt a Formedon in the discender and a Formedon in the remainder or reverter nor could the demandant be brother and heir to Leonard if Leonard had left children c. Another exception was that the demandant does not set forth that he was Son and heir of John begotten on the body of Jane his wife for it was a gift in special tail But this was over-ruled for in the Writ that is set forth and in the Declaration after the words filio haeredi praedict Johannis came an c. which c. let the words of the Writ into the Count and so it was held good The Prothonotaries said that the forms of Counts were accordingly And Iudgment was given to answer over Nisi causa c. Term. Mich. 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco Blythe versus Hill DEbt upon an Obligation for the payment of money at a day certain The Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff being
against the Infant Sir Heneage Finch Solicitor General The Witnesses who swear that the Earl said He would give the Estate to her prove nothing to the purpose For he did so but upon a condition That they did not hear The after-consent of the Earls or the Countess ought not to make it good which consent at last perhaps was extorted by importunity or compassion For at first they disapproved the Marriage Marrying without consent and dying without issue are coupled in the same Line and the Estate shall as effectually pass over to the Defendant upon the one Limitation as the other For such consent is matter ex post facto and suspitiously to be scan'd For we ought in this Case by Law to proceéd strictly and not derogate from my Lord Newport's intent which plainly appears by the letter of his Will that his Grand-Child should ask consent of such he had thereby appointed to consent before her Marriage were solemnized the actual solemnization of which was an act so permanent that it would admit of no alteration or dissolution An act of such force and efficacy tending clearly and immediatly to the ruine of their Right and Title to the Estate in question and rendring it wholly uncapable of Reviver by any other means than what the Common and Civil Laws of this Realm do permit The post-consent therefore will not avail the Plaintiffs in this Court. Otherwise the Defendant claiming by this Limitation should have indeéd advantage but such as is inconsiderable being liable to alteration by the pleasure of this Court. And for a strict observation of the Testators words the same ought to be in Equity as well as at Law What great respect the old Heathens paid to the Wills of deceased persons may appear in these following Verses Sed Legum Servanda fides suprema voluntas Quod mandat fierique jubet parere necesse est The Countess saying likely in passion That she might marry whom she would c. did not amount to a dormant Warrant to her to marry without consent I am upon Conjecture still that the Plaintiff will insist upon these particulars for it looks as if they would because they read them Doubtless the primary intention of the Clause was in terrorem But the Secondary was that if she offended she should undergo the penalty His intention is to be gathered out of the words only and what ever they say the Earl intended does not press the Question Our Frée-hold is setled in us by vertue of an Act of Parliament I lay it down for a Foundation That a Father may settle his Estate so as that the Issue shall be deprived of it for Disobedience and not be relievable in Equity And now 't is not possible that any Council could advise a man to do it stronger than it is done in this Case And shall a Child break these Bonds and look Disobedience in the face here V. 1 Cr. 476. post 694. 696. If it had been only provided that she should marry with the consent c. and no further it might have been somewhat But since he goes on and makes a Limitation over c. he becomes his own Chancellour and upon this difference are all the Presidents and even those of devising portions viz. devising them over or not as I have understood Infancy can be no excuse in case of the breach of a condition of an Estate in which the Infant is a Purchasor So that nothing rests now in this Case but the point of Notice And why should not the Infant be bound to take notice in this Case as he is to take notice in case of a Remainder wherein he is a Purchasor But if notice be necessary it is not to be tried here now If we had brought an Ejectment and supposing notice had been necessary we had failed in the proof thereof should we have beén har'd for ever as by this perpetual Injunction we should be and shall it be done now without proof If we are not bound to prove Notice at Law much less are we bound to prove it here This Case is Epidemical and concerns all the Parents of England that have or shall have Children that the Obligations which they lay upon their Children may not be cancelled wholly and this Court under colour of Equity protect them in it and be a City of Refuge for relief of such the foulness of whose actions deny them a Sanctuary Pecke If Infancy would excuse such a Clause would signifie nothing For most persons especially of that Sex marry before full age The Lords give no reason why they changed their Opinions Serjeant Fountain Yelverton's Case in 36 Eliz. is a President in the Point for us and Shipdam's Case is much like it This being of a devise Land and that of Money which if it were paid the Land was to go over The grand Objection is That here is an Estate vested by a settlement which is not to be avoided or defeated But I doubt whether a man can lay such a Restraint that there shall not be Relief in any case of Emergency and Contingency Part 712. 3. V. in Leo. 37. It is a part of the fundamental Iustice of the Nation that men should not make Limitations wholly unalterable as by the Common Law men cannot make a Feé unalienable You give relief every day where there are express Clauses that there shall be no relief in Law or Equity where a thing is appointed to be c. without relief in Law or Equity you relieve against them and look upon them to be void In our Case suppose she had married a great Lord or suppose a person had brought notice of the Trustees consent would you not have given relief But secondly I deny the Assumption This Case is not so I agrée it had been well done if they had askt my Lady Newports consent But is there a word in the Will that if the Plaintiff did not he should have no relief in Equity The Estate was devised to my Lady Newport during her life so that the Plaintiff could not be in possession and she might have lived till the Plaintiff was 21 years old Could not my Lady Newport have said Have a care how you marry for you forfeit the Estate if you marry without the consent of two of us three All Ingredients and Circumstances must be taken in a matter of Equity Is it an argument to say He has no Estate therefore take away his Wifes Estate then there will be nothing to maintain her It is agréed That if the Approbation had been precedent it had been well Now she had no notice before the Marriage that it was necessary and when she had that notice she got the approbation and that though subsequent is good enough because it was askt and gotten as soon as she had Notice that she ought to have it The Will is hereby sufficiently observed for the intent of the Will was that she should have such an
that he had cured her the consideration of the first promise being future and both promises found and entire damages given Twisd It is well enough for now it lies upon the whole Record whether he hath cured her or no if it had rested upon the first promise it had been nought And in the second promise there is an averment that he had cured her So that now after a Verdict it is help'd and the want of an averment is holpen by a Verdict in many cases Iudgement nisi c. Twisd If a man be in prison and the Marshal dye and the Prisoner escape there is no remedy but to take him again Twisd Pleas in abatement come too late after imparlance Hall Sebright AN Action of Trespass wherein the Plaintiff declared That the Defendant on the 24th of January did enter and take possession of his house and did keep him out of possession to the day of the exhibiting the Bill The Defendant pleads that ante praedict tempus quo sc c. the Plaintiff did licence the Defendant to enjoy the house until such a day Saunders The plea is naught in substance for a licence to enjoy from such a time to such a time is a Lease and ought to be pleaded as a Lease and not as a Licence it is a certain present Interest Twisd It is true 5 H. 7. fo 1. is That if one doth licence another to enjoy his house till such a time it is a Lease but whether it may not be pleaded as a Licence I have known it doubted Judgment nisi c. Coppin versus Hernall TWisden said upon a motion in arrest of Iudgment because an Award was not good that the Vmpirage could not be made till the Arbitrators time were out And if any such power be given to the Vmpire it s naught in its constitution for two persons cannot have a several Iurisdiction at one and the same time The Law allows the Defendant a Copy of the Pannel to provide himself for his challenges Fetyplace versus ACtion upon the Case upon a promise in consideration that the Plaintiff would affeerere instead of afferre c. it was moved in arrest of Iudgment Cr. 3 part 466. was cited Bedel Wingfield Twisd I remember districtionem for destructionem cannot be help'd so neither vaccaria instead of vicaria So the Court gave directions to see if it were right upon the Roll. Holloway THe Condition of a Bond for performance of Covenants in an Indenture doth estop to say there is no such Indenture but doth not estop to say there are no Covenants Keel The course of the Court is that if a man be brought in upon a Latitat for 20 l. or 30 l. we take the bail for no more but yet he stands bail for all Actions at the same parties suit otherwise if a stranger bring an Action against him Twisd They cannot declare till he hath put in Bail and when we take bail it is but for the sum in the Latitat perhaps 30 l. or 40 l. but when he is once in he may be declared against for 200 l. Smith versus Wheeler A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given in the Common Pleas upon a special Verdict in an Ejectione firmae The Iury found that one Simon Mayne was possest of a Rectory for a long term and having conveyed the whole term in part of it to certain persons absolutely he conveyed his term in the residue being two parts in this manner sc in trust for himself during life and afterwards in trust for the payment of the Rent reserved upon the original Lease and for several of his Friends c. Provided that if he should have any issue of his body at the time of his death then the trusts to cease and the Assignment to be in trust for such issue c. and there was another Proviso that if he were minded to change the uses or otherwise to dispose of the premisses that he should have power so to do by writing in the presence of two or more Witnesses or by his last Will and Testament They further find that he had Issue male at the time of his death but made no disposition pursuant to his power and that in his life time he had committed Treason and they find the Act of his Attainder The question was whether the rest of the term that remained unexpired at the time of his death were forfeited to the King The points made were two 1. Whether the Deed were fraudulent 2. Whether the whole term were not forfeited by reason of the trust or the power of revocation Pemberton argued that the Deed was fraudulent because he took the profits during his life and the Assignees knew not of the Deed of trust The Court hath in these cases adjudged fraud upon circumstances appearing upon Record without any Verdict the case that comes nearest to this is in Lane 42. c. The King against the Earl of Nottingham and others 2dly He argued that there was a Trust by express words and if there be a Trust then not only the Trust but the Estate is vested in the King by the express words of the Stat. of 33 Hen. 8. The King indeed can have no larger Estate in the Land then the person attainted had in the Trust and if this Conveyance were in Trust for Simon Mayne only during his life the King can have the Land no longer but he conceived it was a Trust for Simon Mayne during the whole term A Trust he said was a right to receive the profits of the Land and to dispose of the Lands in Equity Now if Simon Mayne had a right to receive the profits and a present power to dispose of the Land he took it to be a Trust for him and that consequently by his attainder it was forfeited to the King Coleman contra As for the matter of Fraud first there is no Fraud found by the Iury and for you to judge of Fraud upon Circumstances is against the Chancellor of Oxfords case 10th Rep. As for the Trust it must be agreed that if there be any either Trust or Condition by construction upon these Provisoes in Simon Mayne in his life between Mich. 1646. and the time of making the Act the Trust will be vested in the King but whether will it be vested in the King as a Trust or as an Estate For I am informed that it hath been adjudged between the King and Holland Styles Reports That if an Alien purchase Copy-hold Lands the King shall not have the Estate but as a Trust and the particular reason was because the King shall not be Tenant to the Lord of the Mannor Keeling The Act of Parliament takes the Estate out of the Trustees and puts it in the King Coleman But I say here is no Trust forfeitable By the body of the Déed all is out of him If a man makes a feoffment in Fée to the use of his
of Jerman it was held that all my Estate comprehends all my Title and Interest in the Land If a man deviseth all his Inheritance this carries the Fee-simple of his Land and the word all his Estate is as comprehensive as that Hales Wyld By a Grant or Release of totum statum suum the Fee-simple will pass if the words had been all my Tenant-right Lands it had been otherwise but the word Estate is more then so if a man deviseth all his Copy-hold Estate will not all his whole Interest pass Adjornatur Norman Foster AN Action of Debt upon a Bond to perform Covenants in an Indenture of Lease one Covenant is for quiet enjoyment and the Plaintiff assigns for breach that a Stranger entred but does not say that he had Title Hales Habens Titulum at that time would have done your business My Lord Dyer's case is that another entred claiming an Interest but that is not enough for he may claim under the Lessee himself He mentioned the cases in Moor 861. Hob. 34. Tisdale Essex If the Covenant had been to save him harmless against all lawful and unlawful Titles yet it must appear that he that entred did not claim under the Lessee himself Hales If I Covenant that I have a lawful right to grant and that you shall enjoy notwithstanding any claiming under me these are two several Covenants and the first is general and not qualified by the second And so said Wyld and that one Covenant went to the Title and the other to the possession Dyer 328. An Assumpsit to enjoy sine interruptione alicujus that is whether by Title or by Tort a quiet possession being to be intended to be the chief cause of the Contract 3 Leon. 43. 2 Cro. 425 315. 444. Adjornatur Angell convicted of Barretry produced a Pardon which was of all Treasons Murders Felonies and all Penalties Forfeitures and Offences The Court said the words all Offences will pardon all that is not capital Blackburn Graves A Copy-holder surrenders to the use of several persons for years successive the Remainder in Fee to J. S. Wyld An admittance of a particular Tenant is an admittance of all the Remainders to all purposes but only the Lords Fine and if the Custom be that the Fine paid by the first Tenant shall go to all the Remainders then the admittance of the first man is to all intents and purposes an admittance of all that come after In this case the possession of the Lessée for years is the possession of the Remainder-man In one Baker Dereham's case there was a surrender to the use of a man and his Heirs of Copy-hold Land that discended according to the Custom of Borough-English the surrenderee dyed before admittance and the Opinion of the Court was that the right would discend to the youngest according to the Custom Vpon a case moved Hales said That if a Tenant in Common bring a personal Action without his fellow joyning in the Suit the Defendant ought to take advantage of it in abatement but if he plead Not-guilty it shall be good but then he shall recover damages only for a moiety If a Tenant in Common seal a Lease of Ejectment he shall recover but a moiety A Iustice of Peace committed a Brewer for not paying the duty of Excise the Brewer was brought into Court by Habeas Corpus Sympson It ought to appear that he was a common Brewer Hales The Statute doth prohibit the bringing of a Certiorari but not a Habeas Corpus And want of averment of a matter of fact may be amended in a Return in Court and if it be not true at their peril be it So it was mended Money owing upon a Iudgment given in the Kings Court cannot be attached Term. Hill 25 26 Car. II. 1673. in B. R. Baker Bulstrode DEbt upon a Bond. The Condition was to Seal and execute a Release to the Plaintiff The Defendant demurs because the Plaintiff did not alledge in his Declaration a tender of a Release It was urged that the Condition was not to make but only to Seal and Execute c. But per Curiam he is bound to do it without a tender And the word Execute or the word Seal comprehends the making And Lamb's case was cited Warren Prideaux Trin. 24 Car. 2. Rot. 1472. A Distress and Avowry for Toll The prescription was for Toll in consideration of maintaining the Key and keeping a Bushel to measure Salt viz. That in consideration thereof he and those c. have had time out of mind c. a Bushell of Salt of every Ship that comes laden with Salt into Slipper-point For the Avowant it was alledged that the maintaining of the Key is for publick good Co. Magn. Cart. 222. Rolls 265. It s true it is not alledged that they did actually use the Weights and Measures 1 Leon. 231. but it being alledged that the Ship came within Slipper-point it is enough to charge the Plaintiff with the payment As for the Distress taken which is part of the Ships lading viz. Salt it is objected that it cannot be distrained because it is part of the thing from which the duty ariseth but I answer that this is not like to a Distress upon Land nor to be judged of according to the rules allowed in cases of such Distresses There were cited on this side 21 H. 7. 1. 3 Cro. 710. Smith Shepheard Dyer 352. Courtney contra I conceive this prescription ought to have some consideration and to be grounded on a meritorious cause to bind a Subject The keeping of the Bushell is no meritorious cause because it is presumed that the party hath the use of it himself Hales The prescription is not for a Port but a Wharfe If any man will prescribe for a Toll upon the Sea he must alledge a good consideration because by Magna Charta and other Statutes every one hath liberty to go and come upon the Sea without impediment Wyld This Custom or Prescription is laid to have a Bushell of Salt of every Ship that comes within the Slipper-point if a Ship be driven in by stress of weather and goes out again the first opportunity that presents shall that Ship pay Hales If he had said that he had a Port and was bound to maintain that Port and that he and all those whose Estate he had c. that might have been a good Prescription but in this case there must be a special inducement and compensation to the Subject by reason of those Statutes by which all Merchants and others have liberty to come in and go out They inclin'd that the Prescription was not good Anonymus A Trial at Bar concerning the River of Wall-fleet the question was whether had not the right of Fishing there exclusive of all others Hales In case of a private River the Lords having the Soil is a good evidence to prove that he hath the right of Fishing and it puts the
pleaded A special Verdict that the Lands are Copyhold Lands and surrendred to the use of one for eleven years the Remainder for five years to the Daughter the Remainder to the right heirs of the Tenant for eleven years The eleven years expire the Daughter is admitted the five years expire And there being a Son and Daughter by one Venter and a Son by another Venter the Son of the first Venter dies before admittance and the Daughter of the first Venter and her Husband bring Trover for cutting down of Trees And the question was if the admittance of Tenant for years was the admittance of the Son in Remainder Levings I conceive it is and then the Son is seized and the Daughter of the whole blood is his heir and he cited 4 Rep. 23. 3 Cro. 503. Bunny's case Wyld The Estate is bound by the Surrender Hales If a man doth surrender to the use of John Styles till admitted there is no Estate in him but remains in the Surrenderor but he hath a right to have an admittance If a surrender be to J. S. and his heirs his heir is in without admittance if J. S. dies About this hath indeed been diversity of Opinion but the better Opinion hath been according to the Lord Coke's Opinion I do not see any inconvenience why the admission of Tenant for life or years should not be the admittance of all in Remainder for Fines are to be paid notwithstanding by the particular Remainders and so the Books say it shall be no prejudice to the Lord. Twisd I think it is strong that the admission of Lessee for years is the admission of him in Remainder for as in a case of possessio fratris the Estate is bound so that the Sister shall be heir so here the Estate is bound and goes to him in Remainder Hales I shall not prejudice the Lord for if a Fine be assessed for the whole Estate there is an end of the business but if a Fine be assessed only for a particular Estate the Lord ought to have another If a surrender be to the use of A. for life the Remainder to his eldest Son c. or to the use of A. and his heirs and then A. dies the Estate is in the Son without admittance whether he takes by purchase or descent And Iudgment was given accordingly Draper versus Bridwell Rot. 320. ALL the Court held that an Action of Debt would lye upon a Iudgment after a Writ of Error brought Twisden They in the Spiritual Court will give Sentence for Tythes for rakings though they be never so unvoluntarily left which our Law will not allow of Wyld said that Actions personal transitory though the party doth live in Chester yet they may be brought in the Kings Courts Hales Shew a President where a man can wage his Law in an Action brought upon a Prescription for a duty as in an Action of Debt for Toll by Prescription you cannot wage your Law Pybus versus Mitford Postea THe Chief Iustice delivered his Opinion Wyld Rainsford and Twisden having first delivered theirs Hales I think Iudgment ought to be given for the Defendant whether the Son take by descent or purchase I shall divide the case 1 Whether the Son doth take by descent 2 Admitting he doth not whether he can take by purchase We must make a great difference betweén Conveyances of Estates by way of use and at Common Law A man cannot convey to himself an Estate by a Conveyance at Common Law but by way of Vse he may But now in our case here doth doth retorn by operation of Law an Estate to Michael for his life which is conjoyned with the Limitation to his heirs The reason is because a Limitation to the heirs of his body is in effect to himself this is perfectly according to the intention of the parties Objection The use being never out of Michael he hath the old use and so it must be a Contingent use to the heirs of his body But I say we are not here to raise a new Estate in the Covenantor but to qualifie the Estate in Fee in himself for the old Estate is to be made an Estate for life to serve the Limitation Further Objection It shall be the old Estate in Fee as if a man deviseth his Lands to his heirs the heir is in of the old Estate But I answer if he qualifie the Estate the Son must take it so as in Hutton fo So in this case is a new qualification Roll 789. 15 Jac. If a man makes a Feoffment to the use of the heirs of the body of the Feoffor the Feoffor hath an Estate Tail in him Pannel versus Fenne Moor 349. Englefield and Englefield 2 I conceive if it were not possible to take by descent this would be a Contingent use to the heirs of the body Objection It is limited to the heir when no heir in being Why I say it would have come to the heir at Common Law if no express Limitation had been and it cannot be intended that he did mean an heir at Common Law because he did specially limit it Fitz. tit Entayle 23. An Assise for the Serjeant at Mace's place in the House of Commons The Plaintiff had his Patent read The Court asked if they could prove Seisin They answered that they had recovered in an Action upon the case for the mean profits and had Execution Court For ought we know that will amount to a seisin Twisden Vpon your grant since you could not get seisin you should have gone into Chancery and they would have compelled him to give you seisin Hales A man may bring an Action upon the case for the profits of an Office though he never had seisin So the Record was read of his Recovery in an Action upon the case for the profits Hales This is but a seisin in Law not a seisin in Fact The Counsel for the Plaintiff much urged that the Recovery and Execution had of the profits was a sufficient seisin to entitle them to an Assise It was objected that the Plaintiff was never invested into the Office Hales said That an investiture did not make an Officer when he is created by Patent as this is but he is an Officer presently But if he were created an Herald at Arms as in Segars case he must be invested before he can be an Officer a person is an Officer before he is sworn Hales You are the Pernor of the profits and they have recovered them is not this a Seisin against you They shall find it specially but they chose rather to be Non-suit because of the delay by a special Verdict And the Court told them they could not withdraw a Iuror in an Assise for then the Assise would be depending The Roll of the Action sur le case fuit 19 Car. 2. Mich. Rot. 557. Term. Trin. 15 Car. II. 1663. Judge Hide 's Argument in the Exchequer-Chamber Manby versus Scott A Feme Covert departs
pleasure of the Lords no doubt that would have been an illegal Commitment against Magna Charta and the Petition of Right There the Commitment had been expresly illegal and it may be this Commitment is no less For if it had been expresly shewn and he be remanded he is committed by this Court who are to answer for his Imprisonment But secondly The duration of the Imprisonment during the pleasure of the King and of the House is illegal and uncertain for since it ought to determine in two Courts it can have no certain period A Commitment until he shall be discharged by the Courts of Kings-Bench and Common-Pleas is illegal for the Prisoner cannot apply himself in such manner as to obtain a discharge If a man be committed till further Order he is bailable presently for that imports till he shall be delivered by due course of Law and if this Commitment have not that sense it is illegal for the pleasure of the King is that which shall be determined according to Law in his Courts as where the Statute of Westm ' 1. cap. 15. declares that he is not replevisable who is taken by command of the King it ought to extend to an extrajudicial command not in his Courts of Iustice to which all matters of Iudicature are delegated and distributed 2 Inst 186 187. Wallop to the same purpose he cited Bushells case Vaughan's Rep. 137. that the general Retorn for high Contempts was not sufficient and the Court that made the Commitment in this case makes no difference for otherwise one may be imprisoned by the House of Peers unjustly for a matter relievable here and yet shall be out of all relief by such a Retorn for upon a supposition that this Court ought not to meddle where the person is committed by the Peers then any person at any time and for any cause is to be subject to perpetual Imprisonment at the pleasure of the Lords But the Law is otherwise for the House of Lords is the supream Court yet their Iurisdiction is limited by the Common and Statute Law and their excesses are examinable in this Court for there is great difference betwéen the errors and excesses of a Court betwéen an erroneous proceéding and a proceeding without Iurisdiction which is void and a meer nullity 4 H. 7. 18. In the Parliament the King would have one Attaint of Treason and lose his Lands and the Lords assented but nothing was said of the Commons wherefore all the Iustices held that it was no Act and he was restored to his Land and without doubt in the same case if the party had been imprisoned the Iustices must have made the like resolution that he ought to have been discharged It is a Sollecism that a man shall be imprisoned by a limited Iurisdiction and it shall not be examinable whether the cause were within their Iurisdiction or no. If the Lords without the Commons should grant a Tax and one that refused to pay it should be imprisoned the Tax is void but by a general Commitment the party shall be remediless So if the Lords shall award a Capias for Treason or Felony By these instances it appears that their Iurisdiction was restrained by the Common Law and it is likewise restrained by divers Acts of Parliament 1 H. 4. cap. 14. No Appeals shall be made or any way pursued in Parliament And when a Statute is made a power is implicitely given to this Court by the fundamental constitution which makes the Iudges Expositors of Acts of Parliament And peradventure if all this case appeared upon the Retorn this might be a case in which they were restrained by the Statute 4 H. 8. cap. 8. That all Suits Accusements Condemnations Punishments Corrections c. at any time from henceforth to be put or had upon any Member for any Bill speaking or reasoning of any matters concerning the Parliament to be communed or treated of shall be utterly void and of none effect Now it doth not appear but this is a correction or punishment imposed upon the Earl contrary to the Statute There is no question made now of the power of the Lords but it is only urged that it is necessary for them to declare by virtue of what power they proceed otherwise the Liberty of every Englishman shall be subject to the Lords whereof they may deprive any of them against an Act of Parliament but no usage can justifie such a proceeding Ellismeres case of the Post-nati 19. The Duke of Suffolk was impeached by the Commons of High Treason and Misdemeanors the Lords were in doubt whether they would proceed on such general Impeachment to imprison the Duke And the advice of the Iudges being demanded and their resolutions given in the negative the Lords were satisfied This case is mentioned with design to shew the respect given to the Iudges and that the Iudges have determined the highest matters in Parliament At a conference between the Lords and Commons 3 Aprilis Car. 1. concerning the Rights and Priviledges of the Subject It was declared and agreed that no Freeman ought to be restrained or committed by command of the King or Privy-Council or any other in which the House of Lords are included unless some cause of the Commitment Restraint or Deteynor be set forth for which by Law he ought to be committed c. Now if the King who is the Head of the Parliament or his Privy Council which is the Court of State ought therefore to proceed in a legal manner this solemn resolution ought to end all Debates of this matter It is true 1 Roll 129. in Russells case Coke is of Opinion that the Privy-Council may commit without shewing cause but in his more mature age he was of another Opinion And accordingly the Law is declared in the Petition of Right and no inconvenience will ensue to the Lords by making their Warrants more certain Smith argued to the same purpose and said That a Iudge cannot make a Iudgment unless the Fact appears to him on a Habeas Corpus the Iudge can only take notice of the Fact retorned It is lawful for any Subject that finds himself agrieved by any Sentence or Iudgment to Petition the King in an humble manner for Redress And where the Subject is restrained of his liberty the proper place for him to apply himself to is this Court which hath the supreme power as to this purpose over all other Courts and an Habeas Corpus issuing here the King ought to have an accompt of his Subjects Roll tit Habeas Corp. 69. Wetherlies case And also the Commitment was by the Lords yet if it be illegal this Court is obliged to discharge the Prisoner as well as if he had been illegally imprisoned by any other Court The House of Peers is an high Court but the Kings-Bench hath ever been entrusted with the Liberty of the Subject and if it were otherwise in case of Imprisonment by the Peers the power of the King were
from the 20th of November for five years And the question upon a special Verdict was whether this were a good or a void Lease Serjeant Jones There are many cases in which the Law rejects the limitation of the commencement of a Lease if it be impossible as from the 31st of September or the like now this being altogether uncertain and since there is nothing to determine your Iudgments what November he meant whether last-past or next-ensuing it amounts to an impossible limitation Rolls tit Estate placito 7. 849. ibid. placito 10. betwixt Elmes Leaves Baldwin contra The Law will reject an impossible limitation but not an uncertain limitation Vaughan Atkyns The Law rejects an impossible limitation because it cannot be any part of the parties agreement but an uncertain limitation vitiates the Lease because it was part of the agreement but we cannot determine it not knowing how the Contract was There are many examples of Leases being void for uncertainty of commencements which could not have béen adjudged void if the limitation in this case were good Wyndham Ellis contra And that it should begin from the time of the delivery It was moved afterward and Ellis being absent it was ruled by Vaughan Atkyns against Wyndham's Opinion and Iudgment was arrested Fowle Doble's Case FOrmedon in the Remainder The case was thus There were three Sisters the eldest was Tenant in Tail of a fourth part of 140 Acres c. in thrée Villes A. B. C. the Remainder in Fee-simple to the other two the Tenant in Tail takes Husband Dr. Doble the Defendant The Husband and Wife levy a Fine sur conisance de droit to the use of them two and the heirs of the body of the Wife the Remainder in Fee to the right Heirs of the Husband and this Fine was with warranty against them and the heits of the wife The wife dies without issue living the Husband against whom Lucy and Ruth the other two Sisters to whom the Remainder in Feé was limited bring a Formedon in the Remainder The Defendant as to part of the Lands in demand viz. 100 Acres pleaded Non-tenure and that such a one was Tenant To that plea the Plaintiff demurred As to the rest of the Lands he pleaded this Fine with warranty The Plaintiffs made a frivolous replication to which the Defendants demurred The Plaintiffs Councel excepted to the Defendants plea of Non-tenure 1. That he does not express in which of the Villes the 100 Acres lie 5 Ed. 3. 140. in the old Print 184. 33 H. 6. 51. Sir John Stanley's case But this was over-ruled for the Formedon being of so many several Acres he is not obliged to shew where those lie that he pleads Non-tenure of he tells the Plaintiff who is the Tenant which is enough for him 2. Because he that pleads Non-tenure in abatement ought to set forth who was Tenant die impetrationis brevis orig c. But this was over-ruled also for he says that himself was not Tenant die impetrationis brevis origin but that such another eodem die was Tenant which is certain enough When the Tenant pleads Non-tenure to the whole he needs not set forth who is Tenant otherwise when he pleads Non-tenure of part 11 H. 4. 15. 33 H. 6. 51. At the Common Law if the Tenant had pleaded Non-tenure as to part it would have abated all the Writ 36 H. 6. 6. but by the Statute of the 25 Ed. 3. cap. 16. it was enacted that by the exception of Non-tenure of parcel no Writ should be abated but only for that parcel whereof the Non-tenure was alledged A third exception was taken to the pleading of the Fine viz. because he pleaded a Fine levied of a fourth part without saying in how many parts to be divided This was also over-ruled and 1 Leon. 114. was cited where a difference is taken betwixt a Writ and a Fine and in a Fine it is said to be good that being but a common assurance aliter in a Writ 19 Ed. 3. Fitz. br̄e 244. This exception seems level'd against the Plaintiffs own Writ in which he demands a fourth part without saying in how many parts to be divided The matter in Law was whether or no this warranty being against the husband and wife and the heirs of the wife were a bar to the Plaintiffs or survived to the Husband and it was resolved to be a bar for this warranty as to the Husband was destroyed as soon as it was created the same breath that created it put an end to it for the Husband warranted during his life only and took back as large an Estate as he warranted which destroys his warranty and this is Littleton's Text if a man make a feoffment in Feé with warranty and take back an Estate in Fee the warranty is gone But the destruction of the husbands warranty does not affect the wives 20 H. 7. 1. and Sym's case upon which Ellis said he much relyed Herberts case 3 Rep. can give no rule here for that here the husband is seiz'd only in right of the wife Vaughan said That if the Fine in this case had beén levied to a stranger for life or in Fée who had béen impleaded by another stranger that in that case the Tenant ought to have vouched the surviving husband as well as the heir of the wife or else he would have lost his warranty 2. He said if the Fine had been levied to the use of a stranger who had been impleaded by the heirs of the wife he questioned whether or no the Tenant could have rebutted them for any more then a moity and he questioned the resolution of Sym's case 8 Rep. there is a Case cited in Symme's case out of the 45 Edw. 3. 23. which is expresly against the resolution of the case it is said in the Reports that no Iudgment was given in that case which is false and that the case is not well abridged by Brook which is also false If in case of a voucher a man loseth his warranty that does not vouch all that are bound why should not one that 's rebutted have the like advantage There is a resolution quoted in Sym's case out of 5 Edw. 2. Fitz. tit garranty 78 upon which the Iudgment is said to be founded being as is there said a case in point but he conceived not for Harvey that gave the rule said le tenant poit barrer vous touts ergo un sole in the case there were several co-heirs and if all were demandants all might have been barred and if one be demandant there 's no question but she may be rebutted for her part But Sym's case is quite otherwise for there one person is co-heir to the garranty that is not heir to any part of the Land In 6 Ed. 3. 50. there is a case resolved upon the ground and reason of the 45 Ed. 3. for these reasons he said he could not rely upon Sym's case He agreed
to chuse every year two Surveyors to take care that no unwholsome Victuals were sold within the Precinct of that Mannor and that they were sworn to execute their Office truly for the space of a year and that they had power to destroy whatever corrupt Victuals they found exposed to sale and that the Defendants being chosen Surveyors and sworn to execute the Office truly examining the Plaintiffs meat who was also a Butcher found a side of Beef corrupt and unwholsome and that therefore they took it away and burnt it prout eis bene licuit c. The Plaintiff demurs North. This is a case of great consequence and seems doubtful It were hard to disallow the Custom because the design of it seems to be for the preservation of mens health And to allow it were to give men too great a power of seizing and destroying other men's Goods There is an Ale-taster appointed at Leets but all his Office is to make Presentment at the Leet if he finds it not according to the Assize Wyndham Atkyns Ellis It is a good reasonable Custom It is to prevent evil and Laws for prevention are better then Laws for punishment As for the great power that it seems to allow to these Surveyors it is at their own peril if they destroy any Victuals that are not really corrupt for in an Action if they justifie by virtue of the Custom the Plaintiff may take issue that the Victuals were not corrupt But here the Plaintiff has confessed it by the demurrer Atkyns said if the Surveyors were not responsible the Homage that put them in must answer for them according to the rule of respondeat superior Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff unless c. Thredneedle Lynham's Case UPon a special Verdict the case was thus The Iury found that the Lands in the Declaration are and time out of mind had been parcel of the demesnes of the Mannor of Burniel in the County of Cornwall which Mannor consists of demesnes viz. Copy-hold tenements demisable for one two or three lives and services of divers Free-hold Tenants that within the Mannor of Burniel there is another Mannor called Trecaer consisting likewise of Copy-holds and Free-holds and that the Bishop of Exeter held both these Mannors in the right of his Bishoprick Then they find the Statute of 1. Eliz. in haec verba They find that the old accustomed yearly Rent which used to be reserved upon a demise of these two Mannors was 67 pounds 1 s. and 5 d. then they find that Joseph Hall Bishop of Exeter demised these two Mannors to one Prowse for 99 years determinable upon three lives reserving the old and accustomed Rent of 67 l. 1 s. and 5 d. that Prowse living the Cestuy que vies assigned over to James Prowse the demesnes of the Mannor of Trecaer for that afterwards he assigned over all his Interest in both Mannors to Mr. Nosworthy excepting the demesnes of Treacer then in the possession of James Prowse That Mr. Nosworthy when two of the lives were expired for a sum of money by him paid to the Bishop of Exeter surrendred into his hands both the said Mannors excepting what was in the possession of James Prowse and that the Bishop Joseph Hall's Successor redemised unto him the said Mannors excepting the demesnes of Trecaer and excepting one Messuage in the occupation of Robert and excepting one Farm parcel of the Mannor of Burniel for three lives reserving 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. with a nomine poenae and whether this second Lease was a good Lease and the 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. the old and accustomed Rent within the intention of the Statute of 1 Eliz. was the question After several arguments at the Bar it was argued at the Bench in Michaelmas Term Ann. 26 Car. 2. And the Court was divided viz. Vaughan Ellis against the Lease Atkyns Wyndham for it This Term North Chief Justice delivered his Opinion in which he agreed with Atkyns Wyndham so that Iudgment was given in maintenance of the Lease and the Iudgment was affirmed in the Kings Bench upon a Writ of Error The Chapter of the Collegiate Church of Southwell versus the Bishop of Lincoln and J. S. Incumbent c. IN a Qua. imp the Incumbents Title was under a grant made by the Plaintiffs who were seized of the Advowson ut de uno grosso in the right of their Church of the next avoidance one Esco being then Incumbent of their Presentation to Edward King from whom by mean assignments it came to Elizabeth Bley who after the death of Esco presented the Defendant Vpon a demurrer these points came in question 1. Whether the grantors were within the Statute of the 13 Eliz. or not 2. Whether a grant of a next avoidance be restrained by the Statute 3. If the grant be void whether it be void ab initio or when it becomes so And 4. Whether the Statute of 13 Eliz. shall be taken to be a general Law for it is not pleaded Serjeant Jones For the first point argued that the Grantors are within the Statute the words are Deans Chapters which he said might well be taken severally for of this Chapter there is no Dean If they were to be taken joyntly then a Dean were not within this Law in respect of those possessions which he holds in the right of his Deanry but the subsequent general words do certainly include them and would extend even to Bishops but that they are superiour to all that are expressed by name For the second he said the Statute restrains all gifts grants c. other then such upon which the old Rent c. He cited Cr. Eliz. 440. 5. Co. the case of Ecclesiastical persons 10 Co. the Earl of Salisbury's case For the third point he held it void ab initio it must be so or good for ever For here is no Dean after whose death it may become void as in Hunt Singleton's case the Chapter in our case never dies For the fourth point he argued that it is a general Law because it concerns all the Clergy Holland's case 4 Rep. Dumpor's case ibid. 120. b. Willmote contra North Chief Justice Atkyns Wyndham Ellis Iustices all agreed upon the three first points as Serjeant Jones had argued Atkyns doubted whether the 13 of Eliz. were a general Law or not but was over-ruled They all agreed that the Action should have been brought against the Patron as well as against the Ordinary and the Incumbent but that being only a plea in abatement that the Defendant has waived the benefit thereof by pleading in Bar. And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Nisi causa c. Hunt Singleton's case being mentioned Atkyns said he thought it a hard case considering that the Dean and the Chapter were all persons capable that a grant should hold in force as long as the Dean lived and determine then He thought they being a Corporation aggregate of
feigned names The first cause thereof was the ignorance of Sheriffs who being to make a return looked into some Book of Presidents for a form and finding the names of John Doo and Rich. Roo put down for examples made their return accordingly and took no care for true Sumners and true Manucaptors For Non-appearance at the return of the great Distress in a plea of Quare Impedit final Iudgment is to be given and our right bound for ever which ought not to be suffered unless after Process legally served according to the intention of the Statute In a case Mich. 23. of the present King Iudgment was entred in this Court in a plea of Quare impedit upon non-appearance to the great Distress but there the party was summoned and true Summoners returned upon non-appearance an Attachment issued and real Sumners return'd upon that but upon the Distress it was return'd that the Defendants districti fuerunt per bona catalla manucapti per Joh. Doo Rich. Roo and for that cause the Iudgment was vacated Cur ' The design of the Statute of Marlebridge was to have Process duly executed which if it were executed as the Law requires the Tenant could not possibly but have notice of it For if he do not appear upon the Summons an Attachment goes out that is a command to the Sheriff to seize his body and make him give Sureties for his appearance if yet he will not appear then the great distress is awarded that is the Sheriff is commanded to seize the thing in question if he come not in for all this then Iudgment final is to be given Now the issue of this Process being so fatal that the right of the party is concluded by it we ought not to suffer this Process to be changed into a thing of course It is true the Defendant here had notice of the Suit but he had not such notice as the Law does allow him And for his fourching in essoyn the Law allows it him Accordingly the Iudgment was set aside Anonymus FAlse Judgment out of a County Court the Record was vitious throughout and the Iudgment reversed and ordered that the Suitors should be amerced a Mark but the Record was so imperfectly drawn up that it did not appear before whom the Court was held and the County Clark was fined Five pounds for it Cessavit per biennium the Defendant pleads Non-tenure He commenceth his plea quod petenti reddere non debet but concludes in abatement Serjeant Barrell He cannot plead this plea for he has imparled Cur̄ Non-tenure is a plea in bar the conclusion indeed is not good but he shall amend it Barrell Non-tenure is a plea in abatement The difference is betwixt Non-tenure that goes to the tenure as when the Tenant denies that he holds of the demandant but says that he holds of some other person which is a plea in bar and Non-tenure that goes to the Tenancy of the Land as here he pleads that he is not Tenant of the Land and that goes in abatement only The Defendant was ordered to amend his plea. Addison versus Sir John Otway TEnant in tail of Lands in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marleston in the Towns of A. B. C. Tenant in Tail makes a Deed of bargain and sale to J. S. to the intent to make J. S. Tenant to the Praecipe in order to the suffering of a common Recovery of so many Acres in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marlestone Now in those Parishes there are two Towns called Rippon Kirby-Marlestone and the Recovery is suffered of Lands in Rippon Kirby-Marlestone generally all this was found by special Verdict and further that the intention of the parties was that the Lands in question should pass by the said recovery and that the Lands in question are in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marlestone but not within the Townships and that the bargainor had no Lands at all within the said Townships The question was whether the Lands in question should pass by this Recovery or not Shaftoe They will pass The Law makes many strained constructions to support common Recoveries and abates of the exactness that is required in adversary Suits 2 Rolls 67. 5 Rep. Dormer's case Eare Snow Plo. Com. Sir Moyle Finche's case 6 Rep. Cr. Jac. 643. Ferrers Curson In Stork Foxe's case Cr. Jac. 120 121. where two Villes Walton Street were in the Parish of Street and a man having Lands in both levied a Fine of his Lands in Street his Lands in Walton would not pass but there the Conusor had Lands in the Town of Street to satisfie the grant but in our case it is otherwise He cited also Rolls Abridgm Grants 54. Hutton 105. Baker Johnson The Deed of bargain and sale and the Recovery make up in our case but one assurance and construction is to be made of both together as in Cromwells case 2 Report The intention of the parties Rules Fines and Recoveries and the intention of the parties in our case appears in the Deed and is found by the Verdict Rolls Abridgm 19. 2 part Winch. 122. per Hob. Cr. Car. 308. Sir George Symond's case betwixt which last case and ours all the diffreence is that that case is of a Fine and ours of a Common Recovery betwixt which Conveyances as to our purpose there is no difference at all He cited Jones Wait's case Trin 27 Car. 2. in this Court and a case 16 Reg. nunc in B. R. when Hide was Chief Iustice betwixt Thynne Thynne North. The Law has always stuck at new niceties that have been started in cases of Fines and Common Recoveries and has gotten over almost all of them I have not yet seen a case that warrants the case at Bar in all points Nor do I remember an Authority expresly against it and it seems to be within the reason of many former resolutions But we must be cautious how we make a further step Wyndham I think the Lands in question will pass well enough and that the Deed of bargain and sale which leads the uses of the Recovery does sufficiently explain the meaning of the words Rippon Kirby Marlestone in the recovery I do not so much regard the Iuries having found what the parties intention was as I do the Deéd it self in which he expresses his own intention himself and upon that I ground my Opinion Atkyns agreed with Wyndham Indeed when a place is named in legal proceedings we do prima facie intend it of a Ville if nothing appears to the contrary stabitur praesumptio donec probetur in contrarium In this case the Evidence of the thing it self is to the contrary The reason why prima facie we intend it of a Ville is because as to civil purposes the Kingdom is divided into Villes He do not intend it of a Parish because the division of the Kingdom into Parishes is an Ecclesiastical distribution to Spiritual purposes
is 24 Ed. 3. 30. Pl. 27. which is our very case The King brings a Quare Impedit for a Church appendant to a Mannor as a Guardian the Defendant makes a Title and traverseth the Title alledged by the King in his Count viz. the appendancy the King replies and Traverses the Defendants Title For this cause the Defendant demurs and Iudgment was for the King In this case it doth not appear in the pleading that the King was in by matter of Record and so it is our very case For the King may be in by possession by virtue of a Wardship without matter of Record by Entry c. Stamf. Prerog 54. I rely upon these two Cases But 7 H. 8. Keil 175. is somewhat to the purpose Per Fitz. In a Ravishment of Ward by the King if the Defendant make a Title and traverse the Kings Title the Kings Attorney may maintain the Kings Title and Traverse the Defendants Title I think there is no difference betwéen the Kings being in possession by matter of Record and by matter of Fact Again If matter of Record be necessary here is enough viz. The Queens Presentation under the Great Seal of England And here is a descent which is and must be Jure Coronae It is unreasonable that a Subject should turn the King out of possession by him that hath no Title This is a Prerog Case As to the Statutes objected by my Brother Archer they concern not this case The first enables the Patron to counterplead But here the Patron pleads The rest concern the Kings Presenting En auter droit But here it is in his own Right I think the King in our case may fly upon the Defendants Title and there is no inconvenience in it For the Kings Title is not a bare suggestion For it is confessed by the Defendant that the Quéen did Present But he alledges it was by Lapse For another reason I think Iudgment ought to be for the King viz. because the Defendant has committed the first fault For his Bar is naught in that he has traversed the Queens Seisin in Grosse whereas he ought to have traversed the Queens Presentment modo forma For where the Title is by a Seisin in Grosse it is repugnant to admit the Presentment and deny the Seisin in Grosse because the Presentment makes it a Seisin in Grosse 10 H. 7. 27. Pl. 7. in point and so is my Lord Buckhurst's Case in 1 Leonard 154. The traverse here is a matter of substance But if it be but Form it is all one For the King is not within the Statute 27 El. cap. 5. So he concluded that Iudgment ought to be given for the King Doctor Lee's Case A Motion was made by Raymond for a Writ of Priviledge to be discharged from the Office of Expenditour to which he was elected and appointed by the Commissioners of Sewers in some part of Kent in respect of some Lands he had within the Levell He insisted that the Doctor was an Ecclesiastical person Archdeacon of Rochester where his constant attendance is required Adding that the Office to which he was appointed was but a mean Office being in the nature of that of a Bayliff to receive and pay some small sums of money and that the Lands in respect whereof he is elected were let to a Tenant V. 1. Cr. 585. Abdy's case It was objected against this that this Archdeacons Predecessors did execute this Office and the Court ordered that notice should be given and cause shewn why the Doctor should not do the like Afterward Rainesford Morton only being in Court it was ruled he should be priviledged Because he is a Clergy-man F. B. 175. r. But I think for another reason viz. because the Land is in Lease and the Tenant if any ought to do the Office Take the Writ Lucy Lutterell vid. versus George Reynell Esq George Turbervile Esq John Cory Ann Cory THe Plaintiff as Administratrix to Jane Lutterell durante minori aetate of Alexander Lutterell the Plaintiffs second Son declared against the Defendants in an Action of Trespass for that they simul cum John Chappell c. did take away 4000 l. of the moneys numbred of the said Jane upon the 20th day of October 1680. and so for seven days following the like sums ad damnum of 32000 l. Upon a full hearing of Witnesses on both sides the Iury found two of the Defendants guilty and gave 6000 l. damages and the others not guilty A new Trial was afterwards moved for and denied At the Trial Mr. Attorney General excepted against the Evidence that if it were true it destroyed the Plaintiffs Action inasmuch as it amounted to prove the Defendants guilty of Felony and that the Law will not suffer a man to smooth a Felony and bring Trespass for that which is a king of Robbery Indeed said he if they had been acquitted or found guilty of the Felony the Action would lye and therefore it may be maintained against Mrs. Cory who was as likewise was William Maynard acquitted upon an Indictment of Felony for this matter but not against the rest But my Lord Chief Baron declared and it was agreed that it should not lye in the mouth of the party to say that himself was a Thief and therefore not guilty of the Trespass But perhaps if it had appeared upon the Declaration the Defendant ought to have been discharged of the Trespass Quaere what the Law would be if it appeared upon the pleading or were found by special Verdict My Lord Ch. Baron did also declare and it was agréed that whereas W. Maynard one of the Witnesses for the Plaintiff was guilty as appeared by his own Evidence together with the Defendants but was left out of the Declaration that he might be a Witness for the Plaintiff that he was a good and legal Witness but his credit was lessened by it for that he swore in his own discharge For that when these Defendants should be convicted and have satisfied the Condemnation he might plead the same in Bar of an Action brought against himself But those in the simul cum were no Witnesses Several witnesses were received and allowed to prove that William Maynard did at several times discourse and declare the same things and to the like purpose that he testified now And my Lord Chief Baron said though a hear-say was not to be allowed as a direct Evidence yet it might be made use of to this purpose viz. to prove that William Maynard was constant to himself whereby his Testimony was Corroborated One Thorne formerly Mr. Reynell's Servant being Subpoened by the Plaintiff to give Evidence at this trial did not appear But it being sworn by the Exeter Waggoner that Thorne came so far on his Iourney hitherward as Blandford and there fell so sick that he was not able to travel any further his Depositions in Chancery in a Suit there between these parties about this matter were admitted to be read
tail and the remainder over is so too and both these parties are in aequali gradu to the Devisor and therefore their being both in a parity it would be hard to take the Estate from him to whom and in whose Scale the Law hath thrown the advantage 3 It appears by the body of the Will that the Earl did as really intend it should go over if she married without consent as if she died without Issue for they are both in the same clause There may be as much reason to turn it into a Fee-simple in case as she had died without Issue as in this case For so I doubt the penning of this decretal Order does And 4 I rest upon this It is a Case without a President I remember after that Lanyett's Case had been adjudged that 6 Car. there was a Case I suppose Saunders versus Cornish of a Limitation in Tail Cro 3 part fo 230 it was of a Lease for years and so was adjudged void and then a devise over and it was adjudged void And the Iudges said so far it is gone and we will go no further because we do not know where it will rest I know there is no intrinsical difference in Cases by Presidents But there is a great difference in a Case wherein a man is to make and where a man sees and is to follow a President in the one Case a man is more strictly bound up but in the other he may take a greater liberty and Latitude For if a man be in doubt in aequilibrio concerning a Case whether it be equitable or no in prudence he will determine according as the Presidents have been especially if they have been made by men of good authority for Learning c. and have been continued and pursued Here must be some boundary or we shall go we know not whither It were hard a Court of Equity should do that that is not fit to be done in any Court below a Parliament The Presidents do not come home to the Case Most of them are in case of money Legacies and in some of those Cases we may give allowance in respect of the Law of another forum to which they belong But this is in case of Land only vid ' Swynborne 4. Co. 12. chap. indeed he is no authority but there is a very good Exemplification of this matter 5 I shall consider the allays and circumstances which are observed and offered to qualifie this Case and induce relief 1 'T is said that this clause was only in terrorem and some Witnesses have been examined to prove it But I am not satisfied how collateral averments can be admitted in this case For then how can there be any certainty 2 Cro 145. A Will will be any thing every thing nothing The Statute appointed the Will should be in writing to make a certainty and shall we admit collateral averments and proofs and make it utterly uncertain 2 'T is said in this Case the effect of the Proviso has beén obtained for the Trustees have now declared their consent I must say it is not full for they do not say they would have consented but that possibly such reasons might have been offered as they should have done it And possibly I say not They like good men have only declined the shewing an ineffectual contradicting of a thing which is done and cannot now be recalled undone or altered Besides if there had been but a circumstantial variation the consent afterwards might have been somewhat But here it is in the very substance In the Case before cited at the Bar by Mr. Serjeant Ellis where the consent was to be had in writing and it was had only by Paroll there was great Equity that it should be relieved because it was only a provident circumstance and wisdom of the Devisor viz. for the more firme obliging the party to ask consent which the Devisor considered might be pretended to be had by slight words in ordinary and not solemn Communication or else in passion and heat as in this case when the Plaintiff would not consent to the approved Marriage with the Lord Morpeth the Countess said she might marry where she would Which words imported a neglect of care for the future over the Plaintiff because she would not be ruled by the Countess in accepting the tender of so commendable a Marriage as also for the benefit of the Devisee in the Case aforesaid That in case the Devisee did marry with the consent of the Trustee he might not after through prejudice c. avoid it by denial of such consent and so defeat or perplex the Devisee for want of proof of such his consent 3 'T is said the party is an Infant Why an Infant is bound by a Condition in Fact by Law 't is true we are now in Equity But in Equity since this refers to an Act which she though an Infant is capable of doing viz. to marry it were unreasonable that she should be able to do the Act and not be obliged by Equity to observe the Conditions and Terms which concern and relate to that Act. So that it is all one as if she had been of full age The Statute of Merton cap. 5. provides that Usury shall not run against Infants and yet the same Statute cap. 6. appoints That if an Infant marry without the Licence of his Lord c. he shall forfeit double the value of his Marriage and it is reasonable because Marriage is an Act which he may do by Law while he is under age 4 As to the point of Notice 1 Whether Notice be requisite or no in point of Law I will not determine But I must needs say that it must be referred to Law But 2 If it be not requisite in Law how far a Court of Equity might relieve for want of it I will not now take upon me to determine I will not trench upon matters Gratis of which I know not what will be the consequence But I conceive in this case the Fact is not yet settled whether there were notice or not and it were a hard matter That because no Notice is here proved it should be taken for granted there was none For here are several circumstances that seem to shew there might be Notice and a publick voice in the House or an accidental Intimation c. may possibly be sufficient Notice I shall therefore leave it as a fit thing to be tryed and till that the case in my understanding is not ripe And therefore I will add no more I think this Decree ought to be altered if not set aside But as this Case is there ought to be no relief Vaughan Chief Justice I shall conclude as my Lord Chief Baron did That as this case is there ought to be no relief I will single out this case from several things not material to it as my Lord Chief Baron did c. I think if Land be devised on Condition to pay