to the use of Dennis May his Son and Heir apparant and his Heirs upon condition that the said Dennis and his Heirs should pay to one Petronell Martin for his life an annuall Rent of 10 l. which the said Thomas had before granted to the said Petronell to begin upon the death of the said Thomas And upon condition also that the said Thomas upon the payment of 10 s. by him to the said Feoffees or any of them c. might re-enter After which the said Thomas May and Dennis by their Deed dated 30. May 19 Eliz. granted a Rent-charge out of the said Mannor of 20 l. a year to one Anne May for her life after which the said Thomas May paid the said 10 s. to the said Feoffees in performance of the Condition aforesaid and therupon re-entred into the Land and enfeoffed a stranger And whether by this the Rent were defeated was the question And it was mooved by Coke Attorney-generall that it was not but that in respect that he joyned in the part it shall enure against the said Thomas by way of confirmation which shall bind him as well against this matter of Condition as it shall do against any Right which the said Thomas otherwise had And therfoâ—e by Littleton If a Disseisor make a Lease for years or grant a Rent-charge and the Disseisor confirm them and afterwards re-enters albeit Lit. there makes a Quaere of it yet Cook said That the Disseisor should not avoid the Charge or Lease which was granted by the whole Court And by him the opinion is in P. 11. H. 7. 21. If Tenant in Tail makes a Feoffment to his own use upon Condition and afterwards is bound in a Statute upon which Execution is sued and afterwards he re-enter for the Condition broken he shall not avoid the Execution no more the Rent here Fennor agreed with Cook and said further That in as much as every one who hath Title and Interest have joyned in the Grant it remains perpetually good And therfore if a Parson at Common Law had granted a Rent-charge out of his Rectory being confirmed by the Patron and Ordinary it shall be good in perpetuity and yet the Parson alone could not have charged it and the Patron and Ordinary have no Interest to charge it but in as much as all who have to intermeddle therin are parties to it or have given their assent to it it sufficeth Gawdy was of the same opinion and said That there is no Land but by some means or other it might be charged and therfore if Tenant for life grant a Rent-charge in Fee and he in the Reversion confirm the Grant per Littleton the Grant is good in property so here To which Clench also assented but Popham said That by the entry for the Condition the Charge is defeated And therfore we are to consider upon the ground of Littleton in his Chapter of Confirmation to what effect a Confirmation shall enure and this is to bind the right of him who makes the Confirmation but not to alter the nature of the Estate of him to whom the Confirmation is made And therfore in the case of a grant of a Rent-charge by the Disseisor which is confirmed by the Demisee the reason why the Confirmation shall make this good is because that as the Disseisee hath right to defeat the right and the Estate of the Disseisor by his Regresse in the same manner hath he right therby to avoid a Charge or a Lease granted by the Disseisor which Right for the time may be bound by his confirmation But when a man hath an Estate upon condition although the Feoffor or his Heirs confirm this Estate yet by this the Estate is not altered as to the Condition but it alwaies remaineth and therfore Nihil operatur by such a confirmation to prejudice the Condition And so there is a great diversity when hewho confirmeth hath right to the Land and where but a Condition in the Land And by him if a Feoffee upon condition make a Feoffment over or a Lease for life or years every one of these have their Estates subject to the Condition and therfore by a Confirmation made to them none can be excluded from the Condition And the same reason is in case of a Rent granted by a Feoffor upon Condition it is also subject to the Condition and therfore not excluded from it by the Confirmation as it shall be in case of a Right And to prove this diversity suppose there be Grand-father Father and Son the Father disseise the Grand-father and makes a Feoffment upon Condition and dies after which the Grand-father dies now the Son confirms the Estate of the Feoffee by this he hath excluded himself from the Right which descended to him by his Grand-father but not to the Condition which descended to him from his Father And of this opinion were Anderson and other Iustices at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet for the principall Case upon the Case moved there by Popham this Term And as the case is it would have made a good question upon the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances if the Avowry had been made as by the grant of Thomas May in as much as the Estate made to the use of Dennis was defeasable at the pleasure of the said Thomas in as much as it was made by the Tenant of the Land as well as by him who made the Conveyance which is to be judged fraudulent upon the Statute But this as the pleading was cannot come in question in this case And afterwards by the opinion of other three Iudges Iudgment was given that the Grant should bind the said Thomas May and his Feoffees after him notwithstanding his regresse made by the Condition in as much as the Grant of the said Thomas shall enure to the Grantee by way of confirmation And by Gawdy If a Feoffee upon Condition make a Feoffment over and the first Feoffor confirm the Estate of the last Feoffee he shall hold the Land discharged of the Condition because his Feoffment was made absolutely without any Condition expressed in his Feoffment But Popham denied this as it appeareth by Littleton Tit. Descents because he hath his Estate subject to the same Condition and in the same manner as his Feoffor hath it into whomsoever hands it hapneth to come and therfore the Confirmation shall not discharge the Condition but is only to bind the right of him who made it in the possession of him to whom it is made but not upon Condition Morgans Case 7. RObert Morgan Esquire being seised in his Demesne as of Fee of certain Lands called Wanster Tenements in Socage having Issue John his eldest Son Christopher his second Son and William his youngest Son by his last Will in writing demised to the said Christopher and William thus viz. Ioyntly and severally for their lives so that neither of them stall alienate the Lands and if they do that they shall remain to his Heirs Robert the Father
35 E. Rot. 258. And Popham said further in this case that to erect an Hospitall by the name of an Hospitall in the County of S. or in the Bishopprick of B. and the like is not good because he is bound to a place too large and incertain But a Colledge erected in Accademia Cantabrig or Oxon. is good and sâ—me are so founded because it tends but to a particular place as a City Town c. King versus Bery and Palmer 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by William King against John Bery and William Palmer Defendants for two Messuages and certain Lands in Halstead in the County of Leicester upon a Demise alledged to be made by Dorothy Pool and Robert Smith the case upon a speciall Verdict was this The said Dorothy was Tenant for life of the said Tenants the Remainder over to the said Robert Smith and his Heirs and they being so seised made the Lease in the Declaration upon which the Action was brought And per curiam the Lease found by the Verdict doth not warrant the Lease alledged in the Declaration for although they joyned in the Demise yet during the life of the said Dorothy it is her Demise and not the Demise of the said Robert Smith but as his confirmation for that time for he hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land during the life of the said Dorothy but after the death of the said Dorothy then it shall be said to be the Domise of the said Robert Smith and not before because untill this time Smith hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land And in a more strong case If Tenant for life and he in the Reversion in Fee make a Gift in tail for the life of Tenant for life it shall be said to be his Gift but after his death it shall be said the Gift of him in the Reversion and if the Estate tail had expired during the life of the said Tenant for life he shall have the Land again in his former Estate and there shal be no forfeiture in the case because he in the Reversion of the immediate Estate of Inheritance had joyned in it and therfore hath dispensed with that which otherwise had been a meer forfeiture of the Estate for life wherby it was awarded by the Court that the Plaintif take nothing by his Bill in 33 34 Eliz. Rot. And the Judgment is entred Hill 34. Eliz. Ret. 72. 3. In this Term I hapned to see a Case agreed by the Iustices in 3. 4. Eliz. which was this If a man make a Lease of two Barns rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry if the Tenant be at one of the Barns to pay the Rent and the Lessor at the other to demand the Rent and none be there to pay it that yet the Lessor cannot enter for the Condition broken because there was no default in the Tenant he being at one for it was not possible for him to be at both places together And upon this Case now remembred to the Iustices Popham Walmesley and Fennor said That perhaps also the Tenant had not money sufficient to have been ready to have paid it at either of the said places but it is sufficient for him to have and provide one Rent which cannot be at two places together And by the Case reported here also If Lands and Woods are demised together the Rent ought to be demanded at the Land and not the Woood because the Land is the more worthy thing and also more open then the Wood And therfore by the three Iustices aforesaid Rent ought not to be demanded in any private place of a Close as amongst Bushes in a Pit or the like nor in the open and most usuall passage therof as at a Stile Gate and the like 4. Vpon a Prohibition sued out of the Kings Bench the Case appeared to be this The late Lord Rich Father to the now Lord Rich devised to his Daughter for her advancement in marriage 1500. upon condition that she marry with the consent of certain friends and deviseth further that if his Goods and Chattels are not sufficient to pay his Debts and Legacies that then there shall be 200 l. a year of his Lands sold to supply it and dies making the now Lord Rich his Executor his Goods and Chattels not being sufficient to pay the Debts of the Testator as was averred the said Daughter married with a Husband against the will of those who were put in trust to give their assents and the Husband and the Wife sued in the Spirituall Court for the Legacy And it was surmised that they would not allow the proofs of the said now Lord Rich exhihited to prove the payment of the Debts of his Testator and further that they would charge him for the sale of the Land upon which matter the Prohibition was granted to the Delegates before whom the matter depended and now consultation was prayed in the case Vpon which it was affirmed by a Doctor of the Civill Law that they will allow the proofs for the payment of the Debts according to our Law and that the Legacy shall not be paid untill the Debs are satisfied But he said that by the Law if the Executor do not exhibit his Inventory but neglect it for a year or more that then if any omission or default be in the true value of the Inventory exhibited that then such on Executor for this default shall pay all the Legacies of his Testator of what value soever they are not respecting the Debts or the value of the Goods or Chattels how small soever the omission or default be in the Inventory And so he said was the case of the now Sir Richard S. who did not bring in the Inventory for four years after the death of the Testator and that in the Inventory exhibited the values of every thing were found to be too small and therfore to be charged by their Law albeit he hath not Goods and Chattels sufficient of the Testators To which it was answered that this was quite without reason for by such means every Subject of the Realm may be utterly defeated if he take upon him the charge of an Executorship And if this shall be admitted no man will take upon him the Execution of the Will of any and by such a means none will have their Wills performed which shall be too inconvenient And they said further that in as much as Debts are to be proved by the Common Law of the Realm those of the Ecclesiasticall Courts ought to admit in the proof therof such proofs as our Law allows and not according to the precisenesse of their Law And although by their Law such a Condition as before being annexed to a Legacy is void because that marriage oughr to be free without Coercion yet where we are to judge upon the point as we are here if the Execution happen to be charged because of the sale of Land and for
grants over the Reversion the first Lessee dies and the Grantee of the Reversion brings a Writ of Covenant against his Executors In which case there were two points 1. Whether these words And the said Lessee his Executors Administrators and Assigns shall from time to time c. make a Covenant or Whether Covenant lies against the Executor of a Lessee after assignment no. 2. Whether as this case is it will lye against the Executors of the Lessee As to the first point it was agreed that it is a Covenant for being by Indenture it is the words of both parties and it is more strong being in the case of the Queen Haughton laid that 25 H. 8. Tit. Covenant Covenant will lye against a Lessee after assignment but Debt lyeth not for Rent after the Lessee hath accepted the Assignee for his Tenant and therfore it seems that by the expresse words of the Covenant that the Action lies Doderidge Iustice contra for between the Queen and the Lessee there is privity of Contract and also of Estate so that the Queen her Heirs and Successors might have had an action against the Lessee or his Executors upon the privity of Contract and where the Lessee â—ssigns over the privity of Contract remains but the privity of Estate is gone to the Assignee and now when the Queen grants over the Reversion the privity of Contract is utterly determined wherby the Action of Covenant cannot be maintained against the first Lessee or his Executors who are more remote to which Mountague chief Iustice agreed see 2 H. 4. 6. 6. H. 4. 1. and Co. lib. 3. Walkers case and the Iudgments there cited Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Bennet versus Westbeck THe Case was thus Tenant for life Remainder for life Reversion in Fee he in Remainder for life gives his Deed of Demise with the assent of the first Tenant for life upon the Land to a stranger in the absence of the Lessor and said that he surrendred to him in Reversion And it was said that this Surrender being without Deed was not good to him who was absent and to confirm it the case was put out of 27 H. 8. Where Mountague chief Iustice said that if a Feoffment be made to four and Livery is made to one in the absence of the other but in name of all if it be by Deed this shall enure to all but if it be without Deed then only to him to whom the Livery was made So here this Surrender doth not enure to him in the Reversion being absent Whether Tenant for life in Remainder may surrender without Deed. But Non aliocatur for the sole point now in question was whether he in Remainder for life can surrender without Deed and as to it this Rule was taken viz. That that which cannot commence without Deed cannot be granted without Deed as a Rent Reversion common Advowson c. as 19 H. 6. 33. 14 H 7. 3. 1 2. Ph. Mar. 110. 22. Ass Pl. 16. But in this case this took effect by Livery and not by Deed and therfore might be determined without Deed. Mountague and Haughton agreed that it might be surrendred without Deed because it had its beginning without Deed but it could not be granted over without Deed. Doderidge Iustice said that it could not be surrendred without Deed but he said that Tenant in possession may or Tenant for life and he in Remainder together may surrender to him in the Reversion but this shall innure as two severall Surrenders first of him in Remainder to the Tenant for life and then by the Tenant for life to him in the Reversion Crook Iustice agreed with Doderidge for the Estate of him in Possession is an Estoppell to the Surrender so that it could not be surrendred without Deed. The same Term in the same Court. Thurman versus Cooper IN an Ejectione firmae brought by John Thurman against William Cooper upon the whole matter the case was thus Lands were given to a man and woman who afterwards inter-marry and to their Heirs and Assigns Habendum to them and to the Heirs of their two bodies engendered the remainder to them and the Survivor of them with warranty to them and their Heirs and Assigns for ever And the question was what Estate this shall be whether an Estate-tail or Fee-simple or a Fee-tail with a simple Expectant And it was said that this shall be an Estate-tail only for the Habendum qualifies the generall words precedent and with this agrees Perkins 35. b. and Co. lib. 8. 154. b. Althams case But it was answered and resolved by the whole Court that this is a Fee-tail with a Fee-simple expectant and they observed these Rules 1. That every Deed shall be taken most strong against him that made it 2. That every Deed shall be construed according to the intent of the maker so that all the parts may be effectuall if they can stand together with the Rules of Law 40 E. 3. 5 Percy saith that it is a Fee-simple 21 H. 6. 7. that it is an Estate-tail with a Fee-simple expectant Dyer 160. and Plow Paramore and Yardleys case the Law shall make an order of words where there is no order put by the parties and the words after the Remainder limited are Tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis feodi c. and therfore it ought to be a Fee-simple for if it were a Fee-tail he should hold of the Donor as it is in Co. lib. 6. Sir John Molins case and other Books And although the Warranty cannot inlarge an Estate yet this expresses his intent to passe a Fee-simple and the Law shall make a construction that the Fee-tail shall precede upon which the Fee-simple shall be expectant according to that which is before said in Paramore and Yardleys case Doderidge If the Habendum had been to a stranger the Premisses had been but a Tail as 7 H. 4. for otherwise the Habendum shall be void But if Land be given to one and his Heirs viz. In Tail or if the said Donce dye without Issue of his body this had been but an Estate-tail only because it immediatly checks and confirms the Premisses to which Haughton agreed Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Powels Case POwel an Vtter-Barister of the Temple and also Town-Clark of Plimoth brought an Action upon the Case against for these Words That he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave c. words The Defendant supposing that the Plaintiff had wronged him in the Court of Plimoth said that he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave and that he would make him answer for that which he had done in another place And after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the words were not actionable because he doth not scandalize him in his Profession by which he acquires his
that it shall be then holden as if no Adjournment had been the Essâ—ines had been the first day of Tres Trin. and the full Term had not been untill the fourth day which was the last day of the Term quod nota and so it was of the Adjournment which hapned first at Westminster and afterwards at Hertford from Michaelmas Term now last past Michaelmas Term 35 and 36 Eliz. Gravenor versus Brook and others 1. IN an Ejectione firmae by Edward Gravenor Plaintiff against Richard Brook and others Defendants the case appeared to be this Henry Hall was seised in his Demesne as of Fee according to the custom of the Mannor of A. in the County of D. of certain customary Tenements holden of the said Mannor called Fairchildes and Preachers c. In the third year of Henry the 8th before which time the customary Tenements of the said Mannor had alwaies been used to be granted by Copy of Court Roll of the said Mannor in Fee-simple or for life or years but never in Fee-tail but then the said Henry Hall surrendred his said Copy-hold Land to the use of Joane his eldest Daughter for her life the remainder to John Gravenor the eldest Son of the said Joane and to the Heirs of his body the Remainder to Henry Gravenor her other Son and the Heirs of his body the Remainder to the right Heirs of the said Henry Hall for ever wherupon in 3 H. 8. at the Court then there holden a grant was made by Copy of Court Roll accordingly and Seisin given to the said Joane by the Lord accordingly Henry Hall died having Issue the said Joane and one Elizabeth and at the Court holden within the said Mannor 4 H. 8. the death of the said Henry Hall was presented by the Homage and that the said Daughters were his Heirs and that the Surrender made as before was void because it was not used within the said Mannor to make Surrenders of Estates tails and therupon the said Homage made division of the said Land and limited Fairchilds for the purparty of the said Joane and Preachers for the purparty of the said Elizabeth and Seisin was granted to them accordingly Elizabeth died seised of her said part after which 33 H. 8. Margaret her Daughter was found Heir to her and admitted Tenant to this part after which Joane dyed seised of the said Tenements as the Law will And after the said Margaret takes to Husband one John Adye who with his said wife surrendred his said part to the use of the said John Adye and of his said wife and of their Heirs and afterwards the said Margaret died without Issue and the said John Adye held the part of his said wife and surrendred it to the use of the said Richard Brook and of one John North and their Heirs who were admitted accordingly after which the said John Gravenor died without Issue and now the said Henry Gravenor was sole Heirs to him and also to the said Henry Hall who had Issue Edward Gravenor and dyed the said Edward entred into the said Lands called Preachers and did let it to the Plaintiff upon whom the said Richard Brook and the other Defendants did re-enter and eject him And all this appeareth upon a speciall Verdict And by Clench and Gawdy an Estate tail cannot be of Copyhold Land unlesse it be in case where it hath been used for the Statute of Donis conditionalibus shall not enure to such customary Lands but to Lands which are at common Law and therfore an Estate tail cannot be of these customary Lands but in case where it hath been used time out of mind and they said that so it hath been lately taken in the Common Bench But they said that the first remainder limited to the said John Gravenor here upon the death of the said John was a good Fee-simple conditional which is well warrantes by the custom to demise in Fee for that which by custom may be demised of an Estate in Fee absolute may also be demised of a Fee-simple conditionall or upon any other limitation as if I. S. hath so long Issue of his body and the like but in such a case no Remainder can be limited over for one Fee cannot remain over upon another and therfore the Remainder to the said Henry was void But they said that for all the life of the said John Gravenor nothing was in the said Elizabeth which could descend from her to the said Margaret her Daughter or that might be surrendred by the said Margaret and her Husband and therfore the said Margaret dying without Issue in the life time of the said John Gravenor who had the Fee-simple conditionall nothing was done which might hinder the said Edward Son to the said Henry Gravenor of his Entry and therfore the said Plaintiff ought to have his Iudgment to recover for they took no regard to that which the Homage did 4th year of Hen. 8. But Fennor and Popham held that an Estate tail is wrought out of Copy-hold Land by the equity of the Statute of Donis conditionalibus for otherwise it cannot be that there can be any Estate tail of Copyhold Land for by usage it cannot be maintained because that no Estate tail was known in Law before this Statute but all were Fee-simple and after this Statute it cannot be by usage because this is within the time of limitation after which an usage cannot make a prescription as appeareth 22 23 Eliz. in Dyer And by 8 Eliz. a Custom cannot be made after Westm 2. And what Estates are of Copyhold land appeareth expresly by Littleton in his Chapter of Tenant by Copyhold c. And in Brook Title Tenant by Copyhold c. 15 H. 8. In both which it appeareth that a Plaint lyeth in Copyhold Land in the nature of a Formedon in the Descender at common Law and this could not be before the Statute of Donis conditionalibus for such Land because that before that Statute there was not any Formedon in the Descender at common Law and therfore the Statute helps them for their remedy for intailed Land which is customary by equity Add if the Action shall be given by equity for this Land why shall not the Statute by the same equity work to make an Estate intail also of this nature of the Land We see no reason to the contrary and if a man will well mark the words of the Statute of Westm 2. cap. 1. he shall well perceive that the Formedon in Descender was not before this Statute which wills that in a new case a new remedy may be given and therupon sets the form of a Formedon in Descender But as to the Formedon in the Reverter it is then said that it is used enough in Chancery and by Fitzherbert in his Natura brevium the Formedon in the Descender is founded upon this Statute and was not at Common Law before And the reason is because these Copyholds are now become by usage to be
resolved by all the Iustices as he said that it shall passe and he said that himself was of this opinion also And to say that by grant of Land at Common Law the use had been raised out of the possessions of the Land which the Grantor then had and by it passe to the Bargainee and that it shall not be raised and passed to another by grant of Land in consideration of marriage which is a more valuable consideration then money is absurd and against all reason And for the solemnity Vses in such cases in respect of marriage were the cause that they alwaies were left as they were at Common Law and not restrained as the case of bargain and sale is which by Common intendment may be made more easily and secretly then that which is done in consideration of marriage which is alwaies a thing publike and notorious but it is not reasonable that every slight or accidentall speech shall make an alteration of any Vse As if a man ask of any one what he will give or leave to any of his Sons or Daughters for their advancement in marriage or otherwise for their advancement this shall be but as a bare speech or communication which shall not alter or change any Vse But where there is upon the Speech a conclusion of a Marriage between the friends of the parties themselves and that in consideration therof they shall have such Lands and for such an Estate there the Vse shall be raised by it and shall passe accordingly to the parties according to the conclusion which Fennor granted But by Popham If it may be taken upon the words spoken that the purpose was to have the Estate passe by way of making of an Estate as by way of Feoffment c. then notwithstanding the consideration expressed the use shall not change nor no Estate by it but at will untill the Livery made therupon And therfore if a man make a Deed of Feoffment with expresse consideration of marriage although the Deed hath words in it of Dedi Concessi with a Letter of Attorney to make Livery therupon there untill Livery made nothing passe but at will because that by the Warrant of Attorney it appeareth the full intent of the parties was that it shall passe by way of Feoffment and not otherwise if it be of Land in possession And if it be of Land in Lease not untill Attornment of Tenants which was granted by all the Iustices But if a man in consideration of money makes a Deed of Gift Grant Bargain and Sale of his Lands to another and his Heirs by Deed indented with a Letter of Attorny to make Livery if Livery be therupon made before Inrolement there it hath been adjudged to passe by the Livery and not by the Inrolement But by Popham where Land is to passe in possession by Estate executed two things are requisite The one the grant of the said Land the other the Livery to be made therupon for by the bare Grant without Livery it doth not passe as by way of making of an Estate And this is the cause that such solemnity hath been used in Liveries to wit if it were of a Messuage to have the people out of it and then to give Seisin to the party by the Ring of the door of the House and of Land by a Turff and a Twig and the like which may be notorious Yet I agree it shall be a good Livery to say to the party Here is the Land enter into it and take it to you and your Heirs for ever or for life or in tail as the case is And albeit Livery by the View may be made in such manner yet by the sealing of the Deed of Grant upon the Land or by grant of it upon the Land without Livery nothing passe but at will But if therupon one party saith to the other after the Grant or upon it Here is the Land enter upon it and take it according to the Grant this is a good Livery But he ought to say this or somthing which amounts to so much or otherwise it shall not passe by the bare Grant of the Land although it be made upon the Land Clench said That when Thomas said to Eustace Stand forth here I do give to thee and thine Heirs these Lands this amounts to a Grant and a Livery also and by the words of the Reservation of the Estate to himself and his wife for their lives in this the Law shall make an use in the said Thomas and his wife for their lives so that by such means it shal enure as if he had reserved the use therof to him and his wife and so it shall enure to them as it may by the Law according to his intent without doing prejudice to the Estate passed to the said Eustace And afterwards Term Mich. 36 37 Eliz. the Case was again disputed amongst the Iustices and then Popham said That the Case of Baâ—gains and Sales of Lands in Cities as London c. as appeareth in Dyer 6. Eliz. are as they were at Common Law To which all the Iustices agreed and therfore shall passe by Bargain by parole without writing And by Bayntons Case in 6 7 Eliz. it is admitted of every side that an Vse was raised out of a Possession at Common Law by Bargain and Sale by parole and otherwise to what purpose was the Statute of Inrolements and by the same case it is also admitted now to passe by parole upon a full agreement by words in consideration of Marriage or the continuance of Name or Blood For it is agreed there that the consideration of nature is the most forceable consideration which can be and agreed also that a bare Covenant by writing without consideration will not change an Vse therfore the force therof is in the consideration of which the Law hath great respect And therfore the Son and Heir apparant ex assensu patris onely may at the door of the Church endow his wife of his Fathers Land which he hath in Fee and this is good by Littleton although the Son hath nothing in it wherby an Estate passe to the wife which is more then an Vse Nature is of so strong consideration in the Law And therupon after advice Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff the Roll of this appeareth in Banco Regis 1 Hill 35. Eliz. Rot. 355. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought and the Iudgment aforesaid reversed in the point of Iudgment in the Exchequer by the Statute of 27 Eliz. Kettle versus Mason and Esterby 6. IN a second deliverance between Joh. Kettle Plaintiff and George Mason Vide this case Coke lib. 1. 146 c. and Francis Esterby Avowants the case appeared to be this Thomas May was seised of the Mannor of Sawters and Hawlin in the County of Kent in his Demesne as of Fee and being so therof seised enfeoffed Thomas Scot and John Fremling and their Heirs
dies and afterwards John his Son and Heir dies without Issue the reversion by this descends to the said Christopher who dies leaving Issue And upon this Case made in the Court of Wards the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson agreed first That upon the devise and death of the Father the said Christopher and William were joynt-Joynt-tenants of the Land and not Tenants in Common notwithstanding the word severally because it is coupled with the said word joyntly But yet they agreed also that by the descent from John to Christopher the Fee-simple was executed in the said Christopher for the Moyety in the same Mannor as if he had purchased the Reversion of the whole or of this Moyety and that it is not like to the Case where Land is given and to the Heirs of one of them in which case for the benefit of the Survivorship it is not executed to divide the Ioynture because the Estates are made at one and the same time together and therfore not like to the case where the Inheritance cometh to the particular Estate by severall and divided means And a Decree was made accordingly Trin. 36. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 1. IT was agreed by all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchequer upon an Assembly made at Serjeants-Inn after search made for the ancient Presidents and upon good deliberation taken If a man have two houses and inhabit somtimes in one and somtimes in the other if that House in which he doth not then inhabity be broken in the night to the intent to steal the Goods then being in his house that this is Burglary although no person bee then in the House and that now by the new Statute made such an Offender shall not have his Clergy for before the Statutes were made which take away Clergy in case of Burglary where any person was put in fear no mention was made in the Inditements of Burglary that any person was in the House But it was generall that the house of such a one Noctanter fregit and such Goods then there Felonice cepit And the breaking of a Church in the night to steal the Goods there is Burglary although no person be in it because this is the place to keep the Goods of the Parish And in the same manner the house of every one is the proper place to preserve his Goods although no person be there And that the Law was alwaies so it is to be collected by the course of the Statutes therof made for first the Statute of 23 H. 8. doth not take Clergy from any in case of Burglary unlesse some of the same Family be in the house and put in fear And in 5 Eliz. 6. The Offendor shall be ousted of his Clergy if any of the Family be in the house be they sleeping or waking And these Statutes were the cause that it was used of late time to put in the Inditements of Burglary that some person of the Family was then in the house to put them from their Clergy But this doth not prove that it shall not be Burglary but where some person was in the house and by 18 Eliz. Clergy is taken away in all cases of Burglary generally without making mention of any person to be there which enforce the resolution aforesaid and according to it they all agreed hereafter to put it in Execution Finch versus Riseley 2. IN this Term the case betweeen Finch and Riseley was in question before all the Iustices and Barons for this assembled at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where after Arguments heard by the Councell of the parties upon this point only If the Queen make a Lease for years rendring Rent with a Proviso that the Rent be not paid at the day limited that the Lease shall cease without making mention that it was to be paid at the receit whether the Lease shall cease upon the default of payment before Office found therof And by Periam and some of the Iustices the Lease stall not cease untill an Office be found of the default because it is a matter in Fait which determines it to wit the not-payment And by Gawdy it shall be taken as if it had been for the not-payment that the Proviso had been that the Lease shall be forfeited In which case it is not detennined untill Re-entry made for the forfeiture which in the Queens case ought alwaies to be by Office which countervails the re-entry of a common person As where the Queen makes a Lease rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry albeit the Rent be not paid yet untill Office found therof the Rent continues Popham Anderson and the greater part of the Iustices and Barons resolved that it was cleer in this case that Ipso facto upon the default of payment the Lease was determined according to the very purport of the contract beyond which it cannot have any beeing and therfore there needs no Office in the case But where it is that it shall be forfeited or that he shall re-enter there untill advantage taken of the forfeiture in the one case or untill re-entry made in the other case the Term alwaies continues by the contract And where in the case of a common person there is need of a re-entry to undo the Estate there in the case of the King there needs an Office to determine the Estate for an Office in the Kings case countervails an entry for the King in person cannot make the entry And upon this resolution of the greater part of the Iustices in Mich. Term 31 32 Eliz. the same case was in question in the Office of Pleas in the Exchequer between the said Moil Finch Plaintiff and Thomas Throgmorton and others Defendants and there adjudged by Manwood late chief Baron and all the other Barons unanimously after long argument at the Bar and Bench that the Lease was void upon default of payment of the Rent according to the Proviso of the Lease and this immediatly without Office for the reasens before remembred upon which Iudgment was given a Writ of Error was brought before the Lord Keeper of the great Seal and the Lord Treasurer of England where it long depended and after many arguments the Iudgment given in the Exchequer by the advice of Popham and Anderson was affirmed and that upon this reason for the Proviso shall be taken to be a limitation to determine the Estate and not a Condition to undo the Estate which cannot be defeated in case of a Condition but by entry in case of a common person and but by Office which countervails an entry in the case of the Queen And this Iudgment was so affirmed in Mich. Term 36 37 Eliz. Smiths Case 3 IT was found by Diem clausit extremum after the death of Richard Smith that in consideration of a marriage to be had between Margaret Smith and William Littleton a younger Son to Sir John Littleton Knight and of 1300. marks paid by the said Sir John to the said
time to come and therfore by this exposition much more to the disinherison of the Heir then it was before the making of this Statute And which is more mischievous if a Feme putein happen to be in such a house who happen to have Children in Adultery these Bastards shall have the Land against the will of the Father to the utter disinherison of the true Heirs and against the intent of him who made the limitation by which we may see the just Judgment of of God upon these who attempt by humane pollicy to circumvent the divine providence of God for the time to come and of this also I have seen an example And now to the mischief that men do not know against whom to bring their Actions to sue for their Rights and it is cleer that now by such an exposition they shall be now in much worse condition then they were before for before the Action was given against him who received the Profits which is now gone by this Statute in the cases of Free-hold and therfore if the other exposition shall hold place it is cleer that untill the Statute of 13 Eliz. men might have been by means of this Statute put out of all remedy to recover their rights by any manner of Action as some put it in practice as to make Feoffments to the use of the Feoffor and his Heirs untill any intend to bring an Action against him for this Land and then over to others upon the like limâ—tation with a Proviso to make it void at his pleasure and the like and what mischief shall then be for the time upon such an exposition such that Justice therby cannot be done to the Subject and what an absurdity shall it be to say that such an Exposition can stand with the intent of the Makers of the Law And to that which hath been argued on the other side and first to that which was said by Walmsley That the Right Estate and Possession is wholly out of the Feoffee and vested to the Vses which have their beeing by the Statute and that upon the Contingents hapning their Estates uncouple and give place to the contingent Vse then executed and that the execution therof shall be by a Possession dâ—awn to it out of the Possession which was before executed by the Statute in another I say that this Statute can by no means have such an exposition for this is as much as to say that an Vse may arise upon an Vse contrary to what is adjudged 36 H. 8. That a Bargain and Sale by a Deed indented and enrolled cannot be at this day of Land to one to the Vse of another And if a man enfeoff another to the use of I. S. and his Heirs and if I. N. pay such a summ that then the said I. S. and his Heirs shall be seised of the same Land to the use of the said I. N. and the Heirs of his body I. â— paies the money yet the Vse doth not rise out of the Possession of the said I. S. But if it had been that upon the payment the first Feoffee and his Heirs shall stand seised to the use of the said I. N. and the Heirs of his body it shall be otherwise therfore somthing remains to the first Feoffee in the Judgment of the Law And I remember that when I was a Counsellor at Law in the time of the Lord Dyer where a Feoffment was made to the Vse of one for life with Remainders over with restraint to alien and with power given to Tenant for life to make Leases for one and twenty years or three lives it was much doubted whether this power so limited to him without words in the Assurance that the Feoffee and his Heirs shall stand seised to these Vses shall be good to make such Leases or not And therfore suppose that a man bargains and sells Land to one for his life by Deed indented and inrolled and make therin a Proviso that the Tenant for life may make such Leases this is to no purpose as to power to make a Lease but the strongest case which he put was that of 30 H. 8. which I agreed to be Law as it is there put whether it were before or after the Statute of 27 H 8. for it is not there put that the Feoffment was made upon any consideration to the stranger in which case although he had no notice of the first Covenant yet in such a case he shall take the Possession subject to the Vse to which it was bound by the present Covenant But if you consider the case well you shall see that it was a case before the Statute for it followeth presently in the same case that it is there said that it is not like the case where the Feoffees in Vse fell the Land to one who hath no notice of the first Vse wherby it appeareth that it was a case before the Statute for otherwise there had been no cause to have spoken then of the Feoffees to an Vse and by the same it appeareth if the Covenantor had bargained and sold the Land to another the same Vse had never risen upon the Covenant and therfore it is cleer against the Law that the Possession shall be bound wâ—th such an Vse in whosoevers hand it comes And to that which Peâ—â—am said in the case of these Contingent Vses they shall now by the Statute be in the same degree as if Land it self had been so conveyed and that now the Land shall be in Contingency in stead of the Vse and that by such manner it shall be executed and that by such means all is utterly out of the Feoffees because the Statute was made to determine all â—â—â—ter of trust to be hereafter reposed in any Feoffee this is well spoken but not well proved for as I have said before it is an exposition quite contrary to the letter and intention of the Law And I agree as hath been said if there be none to take the Use at the time that it falleth to be in possession according to the limitation that he shall never take it afterwards no more of an Use upon the Statute then of â—n Use at Common Law As if an Use be limitted for life the remainder to the right Heirs of I. S. if the Estate for life be determined in the life of I S. the remainder shall never vest afterwards in the right Heirs of I. S. no more then if an Estate had been so made But this makes for me to wit that the Estate upon the Uses executed by the Statute shall be of the same condition as Estates in possession were at Common Law and that they being executed ought also to be such of which the Common Law makes allowance And by way of argument I agree for the time that it is as hath been said by them who maintain that an Use may be in suspence as to that which is an Use in its proper nature for it is
it shall not be taken by intendment that the Messuages had such a Curtilage to it if it be not specially named Fennors Case 5. IN Trespasse brought by Fennor in the common Bench against for breaking his Close in c. the Defendant pleads a Bar at large to make the Plaintiff assign the place in certain where he supposeth the Trespasse to be done the Plaintiff therupon alledgeth that the place where he complaineth is such c. and sheweth in certain another then that in which the Defendant justifies the Defendant avers that the one and the other are all one and known by the one name and the other and therupon the Plaintiff demurs and adjudged there for the Plaintiff because that in such a case upon such a speciall assignment it shall be taken meerly another then that in which the Defendant justifies in as much as the Plaintiff in such a case cannot maintain it upon his evidence given if the Defendant had pleaded not guilty to this new Assignment that the Trespasse was done in the place in which the Defendant justifies although it be known by the one and the other name and that the Plaintiff hath good Title to it because that by his speciall Assignment saying that it is another then that in which the Defendant justifies he shall never after say that it is the same in this Plea for it is meer contrary to his speciall Assignment And upon this a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and the Iudgment was there affirmed this Term for the same reason Quod nota Scot versus Sir Anthony Mainy 6. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 200 l. brought by John Scot Gent. against Sir Anthony Mainy Knight the Condition wherof being to perform the Covenant comprised in an Indenture of Demise made by the said Sir Anthony to the said Plaintiff of his Capitall Messuage in Holden with the Lands to it belonging c. amongst which Covenants one was that wheras by the same Indenture he had demised it to him for 21. years that the said Sir Anthony covenanted with the said John Scot that the said Sir Anthony from time to time during the life of the said Sir Anthony upon the surrender of this Demise or any other Demise hereafter to be made by the said Sir Anthony of the said Messuages and Lands and to be made by the said John Scot his Executors or Administrators and upon a new Lease to be made ready ingrossed to be sealed and offered by the said John Scot his Executors or Administrators to the said Sir Anthony for the like tearm and number of years in the aforesaid Indenture comprised for the same Rent c. to seal and deliver to the said John Scot his Executors and Administrators And the said Sir Anthony as to this Covenant pleaded did not surrender nor offer to surrender to him the said Demise nor offer to him any new Demise of the Premisses ready engrossed for to seal it for the like Term c. as it is in this Covenant And for the other Covenants he pleads performance of all To which the Plaintiff replies that the said Sir Anthony after the Obligation and before the Action brought had rendred the said Messuages and Lands by Fine to one Walter Savage and William Sheldon their Executors and Assigns for eighty years from the Feast of Easter next before the Fine which was Pasch 36 Eliz. wherby he said that the said Sir Anthony had disabled himself to renew his Lease according to the Covenant upon which it was demurred in the Commen Bench and the Iudgment given for the Plaintiff as appeareth Trin. 37. Eliz. Rot. 2573. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and agreed this Term. And it was moved that the Iudgment given was erroneous in as much as the first act was to be done by John Scot before the new Lease was to be made to wit the surrender of the former Lease and the drawing of the new one ought to have been done by the Plaintiff which not being done on his part the said Sir Anthony is not bound to make the new Lease And also it was moved that as the case is here the said John Scot might surrender to the Defendant notwithstanding the intervening of this Lease between the Lease of the Plaintiff and the Inheritance of the Defendant as if a man make a Lease for years in possession and afterwards make another Lease to a stranger to begin after the end of the former Lease this shall not hinder but that the first Lease may be surrendred to him who was the Lessor notwithstanding the said Term intervening To which it was answered by the Court that the Plaintiff here need not to make any offer of the surrender of his Term to the said Sir Anthony in as much as the said Sir Anthony hath disabled himself to take the Surrender or to take the Lease according to the purport of the Condition and by this disabling of himself the Obligation is forfeited Come per 44 E. 3. 8. and by Littleton also If a man make a Feoffment upon condition to re-enfeoff him this is not to be done untill request therof be made by the Feoffor yet if in the mean time the Feoffee suffer a fained recovery of the Land grant a Rent charge acknowledgeth a Statute taketh a Wife or the like the Feoffor may re-enter without request made to re-enfeoff him and the reason is because that by any of these the Feoffee hath disabled himself to perform the Condition in the same plight as he might have done at the time of the Feoffment in the same manner here for by this render by the Fine the Reversion passe in right so that the Termor in possession attorning to it they shall have the Rent reserved upon the first Lease and therfore the Plaintiff cannot now surrender to the said Sir Anthony but to the Grantees of the Reversion and therfore there shall be no prejudice to the Plaintiff because the Defendant was the cause of disabling the Plaintiff to make the Surrender to him And suppose it be but a Term to begin at a day to come yet by this the Obligation is forfeited because the Obligor hath therby disabled himself to perform the Condition in such a plight as he might have done it when the Obligation was made wherby the Obligation is presently forfeited albeit the Plaintiff never surrender nor offer to do it And therfore the Iudgment there was affirmed Mounson versus West 7. IN an Assise brought in the County of Lincoln before Gawdy and Owen by Thomas Mounson Esquire Demandant against Robert West Tenant for Lands in Sturton Juxta Stu. The Defendant West pleaded Nul Tenant del Frank-tenant named in the Writ and if that be not found then Nul tort nul Disseisin And the Assise found that the said Defendant was Tenant of the Tenements now in Plaint and put in view to the Recognitors of
doth much concern the Infant in as much as by his false plea he shall be bound to â—nswer of his own Goods if he hath no Goods of his Testator and therfore in a 11 E. 4. 1. he hath remedy against his Guardian for pleading a false Pâ—ea And by Doderidge if he hath no Guardian the Court shâ—ll appoint him a Guardian And if an Infant bring an action as Executor by Attorney and hath Iudgment to recover this is not erronious because it is for his benefit so per Curiam the difference is where he is Plaintiff and where he is Defendant And there is another difference where he is Executor and where not for being Executor his Plea might have been more prejudiciall to him and Coke lib 5. Russels case was agreed for good Law for an Infant may be Executor and may take money for a Debt and make a Release and give an Acquittance but not without a true consideration and payment of the money The same Term in the same Court. Thomas Middletons Case THomas Middleton alias Strickland was condemned for a Robbery at the Where a Felon is condemned and elcapeth and is re-taken upon confession that he is the same party execution may be awarded The Sheriff of Middlesex fined for not attending the Court. Assises in Oxford after which he made an escape and being taken again he was brought to the Bar and upon his own confession that he was the same party who did the Robbery and that he was condemned for it the Court awarded execution And Mountague chief Iustice said thâ—t was no new case for it had been in experience in the time of E. 3. and 9 H. 4. and 5. E. 4. that the Court might so do upon his own confession And because the Sheriff of Middlesex did not give his attendance upon the Court in this case nor came when he was called the Court fined him 10 l And Mountage said that it shall be levied by proces out of the Court and also all other Fines there assessed and not estreated into the Exchequer for then the party might compound for a matter of 20 s. and so the King be deceived The same Term in the same Court. Gouldwells Case IOhn Gouldwell seised of Land in Socage Tenure devised them to his Wife for life the Remainder to John Gouldwell his Son and his Heirs upon Condition that after the death of his Wife he shall grant a Rent-charge to Steven Gouldwell and his Heirs and if John Gouldwell dye withâ—ut Heirs of his body that the Land shall remain to Steven Gouldwell in Tail the Wife dieth John Gouldwell grants the Rent accordingly Stephen Gouldwell grants the Rent over John Gouldwell dies without Heir of his body and the second Grantee distrains for the Rent arrear and Stephen Gouldwell brings a Replevin And it was urged by the Counsell for the Plaintiff that this Rent shall not have continuance longer then the particular Estate and cited 11 H. 7. 21. Edriâ—ks case that if Tenant in Tail acknowledge a Statute this shall continue but during his life and Dyer 48. 212. But it was agreed per Curiam that the Grantee was in by the Devisor and not by the Tenant in Tail and therfore the Grant may endure for ever But for the second point this being to him in Remainder the intent of the Demisor is therby explained that he shall have the Rent only untill the Remainder come in possession for now the Rent shall be drowned in the Land by unity of possession 3. It was agreed and resolved that by the granting of the Kent over this was a confirmation And Mountague said that it was a confirmation during the Estate Tail and shall enure as a new grant afterwards And Haughton and Doderidge said that they would not take benefit of the grant over by way of confirmation for as Haughton said this enures only ought of the Devisor and he hath power to charge the Land in what manner he pleaseth and it is like to an usuall case as if a man makes a Feoffment in Fee to the use of one for life the Remainder over with power to make Leases and after he makes a Lease this is good against Tenant for life and him in the Remainder also And I have considered what the intent of the Devisor should be in granting of this Rent and it seems to me that in as much as the Land is limited in Tail and the Rent in Fee that by this the Grantee shall have power to grant or dispose of the Rent in what manner he would but if the Land had been in Fee I should have construed his intent to have been that the Grantee should have the Rent only untill the Remainder fall to which Doderidge agreed who said that we are in the case of a Will and this construction stands with the intent of the Devisor and stands with the Statute which saies Quod voluntas Donatoris est observanda The same Term in the same Court. Baskervill versus Brook A Man became Bail for another upon a Latitat in the Kings Bench and before Iudgment the Bail let his Lands for valuable consideration Difference between baile in the Kings Bench and the Common Pleas. And how a bail shall relate And afterwards Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And now it was debated whether the Land Leased shall be liable to the Bailment and it was said by Glanvill of Councell with the Lessee that it ought not to be liable and he put a difference between a Bailment in this Court and a Bailment in the Common Pleas for there the Suit cometh by originall and the certainty of the debt or demand appeareth in the declaration and therfore then it is certainly known from the begining of the Bailement for what the Bail shall be bound But in this Court upon the Latitat there is not any certainty untill Iudgment given before which the Land is not bound and now it is in another mans hands and therfore â—ot liable and he puts Hoes case Co. lib. 5. 70. where iâ— was resolved that where the Plaintiff releaseth to the Bail oâ— the Defendant upon a Suit in the Kings Bench before Iudgment all Actions Duties and Demands that this Release shall not bar the Plaintiff for there is not any ceâ—tain duty by the Bail before Iudgment and therfore it cannot be a Release and he citeâ— the case of 21 E. 3. 32. upon an account and said that it was like to a second Iudgment in that which reduceth all to a certainty and therfor c. But it was said by Mountague and Crook that the Lessee shall be bound for otherwise many Bailments and Iudgments shall be defeated which will bring a great Inconvenience And Mountague said that it was like to the case of a bargain and sale of Land which after it is Inrolled within six moneths shall relate to the beginning of the Bargain so upon the Iudgment given relation is made from the time
shall take effect by Livery where by Jurolist 49 Grants of the King  Where voyd 61 H HEire Where he shall be charged where not 152 153 I JMparlance  Not before a Declaration is entred 150 Imprisonment  Where justifiable 13 Indictments 107 134 210 taken before Coroners Where quashed 202 Upon the Statute of 8. H. 9. of forcible entry of copy-hold Lands 205 Inn-keepers 128 179 may detain a Horse untill he be satisfied for his meat 127 Inquisition  by the Coroner in case of death must bee Super visum corporis per sacramentum proborem legatum hominum where not hood 210 Indiciments  for stopping a Church-way where good 206 For being a Night-walker where good 208 If good in one part shall not be quashed  Joyâ—ture  where it may be waived 88 Joynt-tâ—nants â—6 Justâ—fication 13. 161 Justices of Peace of Gaol delivery and Nisiprius and their power 17 Judgmâ—nts 211. 212 by Nihil dicit 153 Where a Judgment reversed without Errour brought where noâ— 181 Entred in the Book as a Memorandum stayed by a subsequent order of Court 181 L. Lâ—ases 99. 106. 57 Void by Acceptance 9 Where in Reversion good 9 By Tenants for life or years to begin after his death 96 By a Copyholder upon a License 105 Where determined without entry 27. 53. 64. Lessce for life without impeachment â—f Wast may make a Lease excepting the Trees 193 What interest he hath in them ib. Leeâ— 141 Libels  Where a privaâ—e Letter is punishable aâ— a Libell 139 Legacies not payable but upon demand 104 Livery of Seâ—sin 103 Where words spâ—ken upon the 〈◊〉 do amount to a Livery 47 49 Liâ—â—se  〈◊〉 couâ—termandable 151 〈◊〉 a Copâ—holder to make Leaâ—es 150 〈◊〉  〈…〉 by Bargain and Sale by word 48 Lunatick  The Action must be brought in his name 141 M. MAgis dignum continet in se minus 35 Mayhem 115 Market Overt  Where the Sale shall be good where not 48 In a Scriviners Shop of Plate void 84 What kind of Sale alters the property 84 Monstrans of Deeds 113 Melius Inquirendum  Where it shall issue where not and what to be found upon it 54 55 Misnosme 151 In Grains 57 Of a Corporation 58 N. NOtice 37. 151. Of a condition of payment where to be given 12 Taken strongly against the Party 12 Of one Sheriff to another Sheriff of the persons in Execution 85. 86 Where requisite 136. 164 Nusance 166 Errecting a Dove-coat by a Freeholder no Nusance 141 O. OBligation 165. discharged by the act of God 98 not to be avoided by the act of the Obligor himself 40 To the use of a Feme Covert shall go to her Administrator not to the Husband 106 One forfeited revived and good 16 Office and Officers  Where an Office is void Ipso facto 28 Forfeited and by what act 117 Of his own wrong 149 Office Trove 25 26 Where Lands shall be in the King without Office 19 Relates 20 helps the King to the meane profits 30 Countervailes an Entry And where no entry is requisite in case of a common person There needs no Office found for the King 53 Where an Estate shall be devested out of the King without Office 63 Where not 64. without Returne or Monstrans de droit 64 Oyer  Where of a condition where not 202 P. PAtents 16 Where the Patentee shall take advantage of a condition to avoid a Lease 27 Void for the generality in the Grant 61 Void notwithstanding the words Ex certa sciaentia 61 Perjury where not punishable 144 Pleadings 28. 42. 101. 109. 152. 150. 160. 163. 206. Void because double Plea 113. 114 Nul tiel in rerum natura no Plea in appeal of Mayhem 115 Perpetuities 97. not tollerable 80 Plenarty by Induction of a Lay-man 37. Binds not the King 133 Proviso How to be construed 27 For a Limitation 53. 117. 118 119 Where repugnant and void 87 Possessio fratris 35 Principall Accessare 107 Prisoners Must be delivered over at the Gaol 85. 86 Presentation 132 Proofs What Proofs are to be allowed in the Ecclesiasticall Court 59 Priviledges  Grant by the Pope not allowable 157 Prescription 169 For Common for Vicinage good 101 Difference betwixt it and Custome and how to be taxed 201 â—roperty 38 What kind of Sale alters the property 84 â—rohibition 59. 126. 159. 197 For a Seat in the Church 140 Severall Prohibitions in one Cause 156 Prerogative 26 Q. QViâ— juris clamat 63 〈◊〉 warrantâ— 150. 180 Quare Impedit by an Executor for a disturbance in vite Testator 189. 190 191 R. RAvishment of Ward by an Executor 190. 191 Recovery 6. 5 Releaâ—es 28. 132 Exâ—cuted where avoided by Proviso 16 Of all demands will dischaâ—ge a rest in â—uturo 136 Relation 12 Of a Baâ—l 132 Of Entry of Judgement 132 Return of the Sheriff of a Capias upon a day not Dies faci good 205 Request 160. 211. 212 Upon payment upon a Contract is not necessary 211. 212 Remainder 97 in Fee not good upon a Lease for years 4. 82 Must take effect when the particular Estate determines for life wiâ—hout impeachment of Wast whether he may cut Trees duâ—ing the life of Tenant for life 196. 74 Rents  Rent and Pension all one in a Demand in a â—ecovery 23 Where the Executor shall have the rent upon a Lease of the Wâ—ves land 145 Restitution  Of an Alderman to his place 134 Of one put out of his Office 176 Reservatâ—on 145 195. how construed 17 Revivor 167 S. SAvingâ— in an Act of Paâ—liament how construed 17 Scire 〈◊〉  Lâ—es â—â—t against the Bail till a Capiaâ— be awarded of the Principall 186 Seals 161 Scandalum Magnatum 66 Sheriffs Oâ—e Sheriff must deliver over the Prisoners to the other by Indeâ—ture 85. 86 Surplusage  shall not abate a Writ 24 Surrender 9. 31. 84. 110. 125 129 Of the Husband of the land of the Wife no discontinuance 38 39 Of an Infant Copyholder void 39 Of an Alderman of his place 134 Of Tenant for life in remainder good without Deed 137 138 T. TAles  where awarded of Aliens 36 Tender  where not good to avoid a condition 20 Title  where must be made 1 2 Trusts not abridged 8 Their difference from Uses 77 Traverse 1. 101. 103. not necessary where there are two Affirmatives but where they do not agree 67 Traverse upon a Traverse 101 Circumstances not traversable 161 Treason 122 Triall  Of the same person upon another Indictment after Attainder upon a former Indictment 107 Transporting Corn 149 Trespasse 161 Where Vi armis e contr 192 Tithes 140 Where discharged by Prescription or Priviledge 156 De animalibus inutilibus animalibus utrilibus and the difference 197 Of Sheep and their pasturing wool c. 157 V. VErdict 19 void 202 Found for thâ— Deâ—endants because no 〈…〉 â—â—tred for one of them 145 Volenti non fit injuria 9 Use and Uses  What a Use is 71 How to be construed 3 Not to be abridged 8 Void upâ—n a tender 18 Raised by word upon a good consideration where good where not 47 49 Raiâ—ed upon Contracts 48 Considerations to raise Uses 48 49 A bare Covenant writing without consideration will not raise an Use 50 What persons cannot stand seised to Uses 72 Uses contingent not executed by the Statute of 27. H. 8. 72 Uâ—es contingent destroyed by a Feoffment 72 Uses grounded upon fraud 77 Use cannot râ—â—e out of a Uâ—e 81 Uses in contingency barred by a Release of the Feoffees 83 Use upon a Bargain and Sale for years passeth without inrolement of the Deed 38 Use amerced upon a Fine upon render without a Deed 105 W. WAger of Law 127 Words  Where the King shall have a third part of the Land of the Ward and of other land setled upon a marriage 54 Wast 24. 25 47 Damages in Wast 24 Warrants  When a Warrant is returned upon Record in case of the King it is as strong as an Office found 20. 28 29 Warranty  doth bind an Infant if his Entry is not lawfull 71 cannot enlarge an Estate 138 Wills 152 Words which make a condition in Wills 8 Writ  of enquiry of damages 24 Where not abated 24 Originall shall be taken as they are written 101 FINIS
where the Plaintiff shews a speciall Title under the Possession of the Defendant As for example In trespasse for breaking of his Close the Defendant pleads that J. G. was seised of it in his Demesne as of fee and enfeoffed J. K. by virtue of which he was seised accordingly and so being seised enfeoffed the Defendant of it by which he was seised untill the Plaintiff claiming by calour of a Deed of Feoffment made by the sayd J. G. long before that he enfeoffed J. K. where nothing passed by the sayd Feoffment entred upon which the Defendant did re-enter here the Plaintiff may well traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made by the sayd J. G. to the sayd I. K. without making Title because that this Feoffment only destroies the Estate at will made by the sayd I. G. to the Plaintiff which being destroyed he cannot enter upon the Defendant albeit the Defendant cometh to the Land by Disseisin and not by the Feoffment of the sayd I. K. for the first Possession of the Defendant is a good Title in Trespasse against the Plaintiff if he cannot shew or maintain a Title Paramounâ— But the Feoffment of the sayd I. G. being traversed and found for him he hath by the acknowledgment of the Defendant himself a good Title against him by reason of the first Estate at will acknowledged by the Defendant to be to the Plaintiff and now not defeated But in the same case he cannot traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made to the sayd I. K. to the Defendant without an especiall Title made to himself for albeit that I. K. did not enfeoff the Defendant but that the Defendant disseised him or that he cometh to the Land by another means yet he hath a good Title against the Plaintiff by his first Possession not destroyed by any Title Paramount by any matter which appeareth by the Record upon which the Court is to adjudge and with this accord the opinion of 31 4. 1. That the materiall matter of the Bar ought alwaies to be traversed or other wise that which upon the pleading is become to be materiall and that which the Plaintiff traversed here to wit the Lease made by Wright to the Defendant is the materiall point of the Bar which destroyeth the Title Paramount acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the colour given in the Bar which is good without another Title made So note well the diversity where in pleading in Trespasse the first Possession is acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar and where it appeareth by the pleading to be in the Defendant and where and by what matter the first Possession acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar is avoided by the same Bar And upon this Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff as appeareth in 34. and 35. Eliz. Rol. Earl of Bedford versus Eliz. Anne Russell Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz. 2. IN tho Court of Wards the Case was thus between the now Earl of Bedford In the Court of Wards and Elizabeth and Anne the Daughters and Heirs of John late Lord Russell which was put ten times to all the Iustices to be resolved Francis late Earl of Bedford was seised of the Mannor of Baruake Chaldon c. in Commitatu Dorset in his Demesne as of see and so seised the fourth year of Queen Eliz. of it enfeoffed the Lord S. John of Bletsoe and others in see to the use of himself for forty years from the date of the sayd Deed and after to the use of the sayd John then his second Son and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue then to the use of the right Heirs of the sayd Earl the Feoffor for ever Afterwards Edward Lord Russell Son and Heir apparant to the sayd Earl dyed without Issue and after the sayd John Lord Russell dyed without Issue Male having Issue the sayd two Daughters afterwards to wit 27 Eliz. the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford by Indenture made between him and the Earl of Cumberland and others in consideration of the advancement of the Heirs Males of the body of the sayd Earl which by course of descent should or might succeed the sayd Earl in the name and dignity of the Earldome of Bedford and for the better establishment of his Lordships Mannors and Hereditaments in the name and blood of the sayd Earl covenanted and grantes with the sayd Covenantees that he and his Heirs hereafter shall stand seised of the sayd Mannors amongst others to the use of himself for life without impeachment of Waste and after his decease to the use of Francis the Lord Russell and the Heirs Males of his body for default of such Issue to the use of Sir William Russell Knight his youngest Son and the Heirs Males of his body with diverse Remainders over after which the sayd Francis Lord Russell tyed having Issue Edward the now Earl of Bedford and after this the sayd Francâ—s late Earl of Bedford dyed also and after the Daughters of the sayd John Lord Russell or the now Earl of Bedford shall have these Mannors of Barunke c. was the question and upon this it was argued by Cook Sollinton and others for the Daughters that an use at Common-law was but a confidence put in some to the benefit and behoof of others and that Conscience was to give remedy but for those for whose availe the confidence was and that was in this Case for the sayd Daughters which were the right Heirs to the sayd Francis late Earl of Bedford upon the first conveyance made 41 Eliz. for the confidence that he put in the Feoffees as to the profits that he himself was to have was but for the forty years and how can any other say that he shall have any other Estate when he himself saith that he will have it but for forty years and therefore in this case his right Heir shall take as a Purchasor by the intent of the Feoffor which hath power to make a disposition of the use at his pleasure and his pleasure as appeareth was to have it so and it is not as if the use had been limitted to be to himself for life with such a Remainder over in which Case the use of the Fee by the operation of Law ought to execuse in himself for the Free-hold which was in him before As where Land is given to one for life the Remainder to his right Heirs he hath a Fee-simple executed but here he shall have but an Estate for forty years precedent and that the Fee-simple cannot be executed by such a limitation made to the right Heirs but in case of an Estate for years only precedent such a limitation to his right Heirs afterwards is not good but in case of an use it is otherwise for it may remain to be executed to be an use in Esse where the right Heir shall be and therefore not to be resembled to an Estate made in Possession And an Vse is alwaies to be
guided according to that which may be collected to be the purpose and intent of the parties And therefore if a man make an Estate of his Land without limitation of any Vse or confidence the Law shall say that it is to his own use but if it be upon confidence then it shall be to the Vse of the party to whom it is made or according to the confidence which shâ—ll be absolute or according to that which is limitted which may alter that which otherwise shall be taken upon the generall confidence as 30 H. 6. Fitz. Devise If a man devise Lands to another in Fee he hath the use and Title of it but if it be limitted to his use for his life only the use of the Fee shall be to the Heir of the Devisor for by the limitation his intent shall be taken to be otherwise then it should be taken if this limitation had not been and in as much as in this case the Earl reserves to himself but the use for years it is evident that his intent never was to have the Fee to surrender this Term which perhaps he intended to be for the benefit of his will which shall be defeated contrary to his purpose if the Fee shall be also in him by the death of the sayd Iohn without Issue Male and therefore the sayd Daughters ought to have the Land And on the other part it was argued by Glanvil Serjeant and Egerton the Attorney Generall that this limitation made to the right Heirs is void in the same manner as if a man give Lands to another for life the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Feoffor in this case the Heir shall take by descent as a Reversion remaining to the Feoffor and not as a Remainder devested out of him for the ancient right priviledge the Estate which he may take and therfore he shall take it by descent and not by purchase for the name of right Heir is not a name of purchase betwixt the Ancestor and his heir because that doth instance that he happeneth to be heir he takes it by descent and then it comes too late to take by purchase And another reason that the Daughters shall not have it is because that when Sir Iohn Russell dies without Issue Male which Estate might have preserved the Remainder if it shall be a Remainder there was not any right heir of the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford to take this Remainder because that the sayd Earl survived him And therefore it is to bee resembled to this Case Land is given in Tail the Remainder to the right Heirs of I. G. the Donee dyes without Issue in the life of I. G. in this case albeit I. G. dyes afterwards having an heir yet this heir shall never have the Loud because he was not heir in Esse to take it when the Remainder fell and for the mean Estate for years this cannot preserve a Remainder no more then when Land is given for years the Remainder to the right heirs of I. G. this Remainder can never be good if I. G. be then living because such a Remainder cannot depend but upon a Free-hold precedent at least and therefore the Inheritance here shall go to the now Earl of Bedford by the second assurance And upon consideration of the Case and severall Confirmes had upon this amongst the Iudges and Barens it was at last resolved by all but Baron Clarke that the Daughters shall not have the Mannors in the County of Doâ—set but the now Earl of Bedford and principally upon this reason because there was nor right Heir to take as Purchasor where the mean Estate Taile was determined which was by the Lord Iohn without Issue Male for they agreed that the Remainder to the right Heirs if it be a Remainder cannot be preserved by the mean Estate for years for it ought to be a Free-hold at least which ought to preserve such a Remainder untill there be one to take it by name of Purchasor as right Heir And at this day they did not think there was any diversity between the Case of a Remainder in Possession limitted to the right heir of one and of a Remainder in use so limited over to another Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz In the Kings Bench. 3. IN Ejectione firmae upon speciall verdict the case was thus A man possessed of a Term of years in right of his wife made a Lease for years of the same Land to begin after his death which was the Lessor and afterwards he dyed and his wife survived him and the question was whether the wife shall have the Land after the death of the husband or the Lessee for if the husband had devised the same Land to an estranger yet the Wife shall have it and not the Devisee as it happened in the Case of Matthew Smith who made first such a Devise of a Term of his Wife and yet the Wife had it because that by the death of the husband before which the Devise did not take effect the wife had it in her first Right not altered in the life of her Husband but it was agreed in this case by all the Court that the Lessee shall have it during his Term for as the husband during his life might contract for the Land for the whole term which the wife had in it so might he do for any part of the term at his pleasure for if he may devise the Land for one and twenty years to begin presently he also may make it to begin at any time to come after his Death if the term of the Wife be not expired but for the Remainder of the term of the husband made no disposition during his life the Wife shall have it which by Popham this Case happened upon a specialll Verdict in the County of Somerset about 20 Eli. Where he and Sergeant Baber were Practisers in the Circuit there to wit the Lands were demised to husband and wife for their lives the Remainder to the Survivor of them for years the Husband granted over this term of years and dyed and the question was whether the Wife shall have the term of years or the Grantee and adjudged that the Wife shall have it and it was upon this reason because there was nothing in the one or the other to grant over untill there was a Survivor And the same Law had been if the Wife bad dyed after the Grant and the Husband had survived yet he shall have the term against his own Grant as if a Lease were made for Life the Remainder for years to him which first cometh to Pauls if A. grant this Term for years to another and afterwards A. is the first which commeth to Pauls yet the Grantee shall not have this Term because it was not in A. by any means neither in Interest nor otherwise untill he came to Pauls As if a man make a Lease for life the Remainder to the Right heirs of J. S. J. S. hath
Issue a Son which selleth this Remainder and afterwards I. S. dyed this Son being his Heir notwithstanding his Sale he shall have this Remainder not his Grantee because it was not in him at the time of his Grant but by a matter which cometh Ex post facto to wit the death of his Father and afterwards Iudgment was given in the first case that the Grantee shal have the term granted to him by the Husband and that the Wife shall not have the term during this Leese Hunt Versus Gateler Mich. 34. and 35 Eliz. in Commun Banco IN a Replevin between Hunt Plaintiff and Gateler Avowant in the Common Pleas which was adjorned for difficulty into the Exchequer Chamber the Case was thus Tenant in tail Remainder in Fee he in Remainder in Vide this case Cook lib. 1. 61. by the name of Capeâ—s case Fee grants a Rent-charge in Fee out of the same Land to begin after the Estate tail determined Tenant in Tail suffer a common Recovery with a Voucher over to the use of the sayd Hunt in Fee and dyed without Issue inheritable to the intail and whether Hunt shall now hold the Land charged with the Rent was the question and after that it had long depended and was many times argued in the Common Pleas and Exchequer Chamber at Hertford Term it was at last resolved by all the Iustices and Barons unanimously that the sayd Rent charge wss gone by the Recovery although the Estate tail was expired because that he which is in is in under this Intail And therefore Popham sayd suppose thâ—t the Tenant in tail himself before the Recovery had granted a Rent charge out of the same Land or had made a Lease for yeers or had acknowledged a Statute all those had been good and to be executed against him which cometh in under the Recovery notwithstanding that the Estate tayl had been determined for want of an heir inheritable to the intail for he which recovereth cannot lay that he against whom he recovered had but an Estate in tail and if his Lease remain yet good as all agreed it did how can the Lease a Rent granted by him in the Remainder be good also for the one and the other cannot stand together and therefore all the Leases Charges or Statutes acknowledged or made by him in the Remainder are gon and avoided by the Recovery had against Tenant in tail To which opinion all the other agreed and Popham sayd further That he in the Remainder upon an Estate tail cannot by any means plead to defend his Remainder unless the Tenant will as by vouching of him and therefore shall be bound by the Act of Tenant in Tail where the Estate it self is bound as here it is by the Voucher and then they which come in by him in the Remainder by way of Lease Charge or Statute which are not so much favoured in Law as Tenant in tail himself be in better condition then he in the Remainder himself is for he in the Remainder upon an Estate tail cannot put more into the Mouth of the Lessee or Grantee to defend their Estates then he himself could have to defend his Remainder and this is the reason that such a Termer or Grantee shall never falsifie the Recovery had against Tenant in tail as the Grantee or Termer shall do which cometh in under Tenant in tail against whom the Recovery was had for there as the Tenant in tail may plead to defend his Possession and Estate so may his Termer or Grantee of a Rentcharge do for by the Demise or Grant made the Tenant in tail hath put all the Pleas into their mouthes for their Interests which he himself had to defend his Right and Possession which they may plead for the time to defend their Possessions and Rights as well as the Tenant in tail himself may do and this is the reason that such may falsifie Recoveries against their Lessors or Grantors if they be not had upon the meer right Paramount which he that cometh in by such a Remainder as before cannot do for such a one in Remainder cannot be received to defend his Right but his mouth is meerly foreclosed to do it and by the same reason are all those which come in by such men foreclosed to defend their Interests or Estates and upon this Audgement was given in the same Tearm in the common Pleas. Gibbons versus Maltyard and Martin IN an Ejectione firmae brought in the Kings Bench by John Gibbons Vide this case in Cook lib. 8. 130 Thetford Scholies case Plaintiff upon a Demise made by Edward Peacock the Son of Lands in Croxton in the County of Norfolk against Thomas Maltyard and John Martin upon a speciall verdict the case appeared to be thus to wit that Sir Richard Fulmerston Knight was seised of the sayd Lands amongst others holden in soccage in his Demesne as of Fee and being so seised by his last Will in Writing made 9 Eliz. Ordained that a Devise shall be made by his Executors that a Preacher shall be found for ever to preach the Word of God in the Church of Saint Maries in Thetford four times in the year and to have for his Labour ten shillings for every Sermon And further he devised to his Executors and their heirs certaine Lands and Tenements in Thetford aforesaid to this intent and upon this condition that they or the Survivor of them within seven years after his decease should procure of the Queens Highness to erect a free Grammar School in Thetford for ever to be had and kept in a house by them to be erected upon part of the sayd Land that they shal assure three of the said ienements for the house and Chamber of the Schoolmaster and Vsher and their Successors for ever and for the other tonement that they shall make an assurance of it for the Habitation of font poor people two men and two women for ever And for the better maintenance of the sayd Preacher Schoolmaster Vsher and Poore people he devised amongst others his sayd tenements in Croxton to his Executors for ten years for the performance of his Will and after this he devised them to Sir Edward Cleer and Frances his Wife the Daughter and Heir of the sayd Sir Richard and to the Heirs of the sayd Sir Edward upon Condition that if the sayd Sir Edward his Heires or Assignes before the end of the sayd ten years shall assure Lands or Tenements in possession to the value of five and thirty pounds a year to the sayd Executors or the Survivor of them their Heirs and Assignes or to such persons their heirs or Successors as his sayd Executors or the Survivor of them shall name or assigne for and towards the maintenance of the sayd Preacher Schoolmaster and Vsher in the sayd School house c. and for the releif of the sayd poor people in the one of the sayd houses according to the Ordinance as he
Saint Michael next ensuing rendring the ancient Rent and 25. Octob. 21. Eliz they did let the same Messuage to the same Standish for twenty years from the Feast of Saint Michaeâ— then next ensuing rendring also the ancient Rent and 31 August 30. Eliz. The President and Schollers made a new Lease of the same Messuage to Sir George Carew Knight for twenty years from making of the Lease rendring the ancient Rent which Lease was conveyed by mean Assignments to the Plaintiff upon which the Action was brought against the sayd Trafford which had the Interest of the sayd Standish by mean Assignments Popham said that Ipso facto upon the last Lease made and annexed by Standish the first Leass was determined and gone for this last contract dissolves the first when the one and the other cannot stand together as they cannot here because the one intermix with the other and so was the opinion in the Common Bench about 1 Eliz. in the case of the Abby of Barking of which I have seen a Report And here Standish before Michaelmas next after the second Lease made to him could not grant over his first term to be good to the Grantee for if this should be the second term shall not be good to Standish but for the remnant of the years after the first term finished which cannot be because it standeth in the power of the Grantor with the assent and acceptance of the Grantee to make the second Grant good for the whole term to wit from Michaelmas and this cannot be but by a determination in Law of the first term immediatly which is made by his own acceptance and therefore a prejudice to none but himself and Volenti non fit injuria and the first Term cannot have his continuance untill Mich. but is gone presently by the acceptance of the second Lease in the whole for the first contract which was entyre cannot be so dissolved in part but in the whole as to that which the party hath and therefore the first Term as the case is here is gone in the whole to which Clench and Gaudy agreed And if so then this last Lease to Standish was but as a Lease made to begin at a time to come which is made good by the Stat. of 14 Eliz. if it do not exceed the time of 40 years from the making of the Lease for the purpose of this Act was that Colledges and the like shall not make Grants in Reversion albeit it be for a year and the reason was because that by such Grants in Reversion they shall be excluded to have their Rent of the particular Tenants for the time And therfore in the case of the Countesse of Sussex who had a Ioynture assured to her for her life by Act of Parliament with a Provise that the Earle her Husband might demise it for one and twenty yeares rendring the usuall Rent where the sayd Earle had made a Lease for one and twentie yeares according to the Statute within a yeare before the end of the same Lease the said Earle made a new Lease of the same Land to Wroth his Servant for one and twentie yeares to begin after the end of the former Lease rendring the usuall Rent and died the said Countesse avoided this last Lease by Iudgement given in this Court because it shall be intended to be a Lease in Possession which he ought to make by the Proviso from the time of the making of it otherwise by such perverse construction the true intent of the Statute shall be utterly defrauded But here to make a Lease for twentie yeares to one in Possession and to make another Lease to another for twentie yeares to begin after the end of the former Lease is good because that the one and the other do not exceed the fortie yeares comprised in the Statute And the Iustices of the Common Bench the same day at Sergeants Inn agreed to the opinion of Popham for the determination of the whole first Term by the taking of the second Term by Standish Ward versus Downing 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Miles Word against Robert Downing the case was thus Oâ—e Robert Brown was seised of certain Lands in in the County of Norfolk in his Demesne as of Fee which were of the nature of Gavelkinâ— and had Issue George his eldest Son William his middlemost Son and Thomas his youngest Son and being so seised 6 Decem. 1559. made his Testament in writing by which he devised the sayd Tenements in these words Item I give unto Alice my wife the use and occupation of all my Houses and Lands as well free as copy-hold during her naturall life Item I will that George my Son shall have after the decease of his Mother all those my Houses and Lands wherof the use was given to his sayd Mother for the term of her life To have and to hold to him and his Heirs for ever and if the sayd George dye without Issue of his body lawfully begotten then I will my sayd Lands shall in like manner remain unto William my Son and his Heirs for ever And I will that all such money as shall be payd of any Legacy by the sayd George shall be allowed by the sayd William to whom the sayd George shall appoint Item I will that if the sayd George and William depart the world before they have Issue of their bodies lawfully Then I will that all my sayd Houses and Lands shall remain unto Thomas my Son and to his Heirs for ever Item That if the sayd George shall enjoy my sayd Houses and Lands then I will the sayd George shall pay out of the sayd Lands to William and Thomas his Brother 26 l. 13 s. 4 d. that is to say at his first entry into the sayd Lands to pay unto the sayd William his Brother 40 s. and so to pay yearly untill the summ of 13 l 6 s. 8 d. be fully answered and payd and then immediatly to pay unto Thomas his Brother 13 l 6 s. 8 d. to be payd unto the sayd Thomas when the sayd William shall be fully answered by 40 s. a year in like proportion as is aforesayd And if my sayd Son George shâ—ll refuse to pay unto William and Thomas his Brother the summs of 26 l 13 s. 4 d in manner and form as is before limitted Then I will that all my Houses Lands and Tenements with the Appurtenances remain to Willâ—am my Son and his Heirs for ever paying therfore 26 l. 13 s. 4 d. viz. 13 l. 6 s. 8 d. to George my Son and 13 l. 6 s. 8 d. to Thomas my Son in such manner and sort as the sayd George shall pay if he should enjoy the sayd Lands And if it fortune the sayd William to enjoy the sayd Lands then the sayd William shâ—ll pay unto Thomas his Brother the whole summ of 26 l. 13 s. 4 d. as is â—foresayd After which the sayd Robert dyed seised of the sâ—yd Tenements in
Defendant had nothing to do there the Defendant shall be excused But here it is expresly alledged that it fell by the weight put upon it which ought to be answered As if a man take an Estate for life or years in a ruinous house if he pull it down he shall be charged in Wast but if it fall of it self he shall be excused in Wast so there is a diversity where default is in the party and where not so here the Defendant ought to have taken good care that he did not put upon such a ruinous floor more then it might well bear if it would not bear any thing he ought not to put any thing into it to the prejudice of a third person and if he does he shall answer to the party his damages Collard versus Collard 5. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Constantine Collard against Richard Collard the case appeared to be this Thomas Collard was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of Lands in Winkle in the County of Devon called the Barton of Southcote And having two Sons to wit Eustace the eldest and Richard the now Defendant the youngest and the eldest being to be married the said Thomas in consideration of this marriage being upon the said Barton said these words Eustace stand forth I do here reserving an Estate for my own life and my wives life give unto thee and thy Heirs for ever these my Lands and Barton of Southcote after which the said Thomas enfeoffed his youngest Son of Barton with warranty from him and his Heirs the eldest Son enter and let it to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant re-enter upon which re-entry the Action was brought and upon a speciall Verdict all this matter appeared But it was not found by the Verdict that the said Thomas Collard the Father was dead and therfore the Warranty was not any thing in the Case And it was moved by Heale that the Plaintiff ought to be barred because it did not passe by way of Estate in as much as a man cannot passe a Freehold of a Land from himself to begin at a time to come and by it to create a particular Estate to himself and in use it cannot passe because that by a bare parole and Vse cannot be raised and by giving my Land to my Son Cosin and the like nothing will passe without Livery for there is not consideration to raise an Vse Fennor The words shall be taken as if he had said here I give you this Barton reserving an Estate for my life although the words of reservation have priority in their time from the speaking of them because a reservation cannot be but out of a thing granted and therfore the reservation shall be utterly void or otherwise ought to be taken according to their proper nature to wit to be in their operation subsequent and so shall not hurt the Grant and therfore are not to be compared to the case where a man grant that after the death of I. S. or after his own death a stranger shall have his Land which Popham granted And Fennor said further that these words being spoken upon the Land as before amount to a Livery Gawdy said That the words as they are spoken amount to a Livery if the words are sufficient to passe the Estate but he conceived that the words are not sufficient to make the Estate to passe to the said Eustace because his intent appeareth that Eustace was not to have the Land untill after the death of him and his wife and therfore of the same effect as if he had granted the Land to the said Eustace after his death and as an Vse it cannot passe because by a bare word an Vse cannot be raised as appeareth in divers Reports Mich. 12 13 Eliz. which is a good case to this purpose But to say generally that an Vse cannot be raised or charged upon a perfect Contract by words upon good consideration cannot be Law and therfore it is to be considered what the Law was before the Statute of 27 H. 8. And I thinke that none will deny but that by grant of Land for money before this Statute an Vse was raised out of the same Land for a bargain and sale of Land for money and a grant of Land for money is all one and no difference between them And is not a grant of Land made in consideration of marriage of my Son and Daughter as valuable as a grant of it for money It is cleer that it is and much more valuable as my blood is more valuable to me then my money and therfore it is absurd to say that the consideration of money raise or change an Vse at Common Law and not such a consideration of marriage And in such a case at Common Law there was not any diversity that the party who so grant or hargain for the one or the other considerations was fâ—ised of the Land granted or bargained in use or possession but that the Vse by the Contract was transferred according to the bargain in both cases where there is a consideration And where through all the Law shall it be seen that of any thing which might passe by contract there need any other thing then the words which make the contract as writing or the like testifying it And that the Law was so it appeareth by the Statute of Inrolements of bargains and sales of Land made 27 H. 8. which enacts that no Freehold nor Vse therof shall passe by bargain and sale only unlesse it be by deed indented and enrolled according to the Statute Ergo if this Statute had not been it had passed by the bargain and sale by bare words and in as much as the Statute enacts this in case of bargain and sale only the other cases as this case here are as it was before at Common Law And by an exception at the end of the same Statute London is as it was at Common Law and therfore now Lands may passe there at this day by bargain and sale by word without deed for it is out of the Statute And how can we say that the Statute of Vses does any thing to alter the Common Law in this point by any intent of the makers therof wheras at the same Parliament they made an especiall Law in the case of bargain and sale of Lands And at this day for the Lands in London notwithstanding the Statute of Vses the Law hath been put in practice and alwaies holden as to the Lands there to be good if sold by bare Parole as it were at Common Law And I have heard it reported by Manwood late chief Baron of the Exchequer that it was in question in the time of King Edw. the 6th whether the use of a Freehold of Land will passe upon a Contract by Parole without Deed in consideration of marriage upon which all the then Iustices were assembled upon a doubt rising in a case hapning in the Star-chamber and then
Richard he made assurance by Fine of his Lands being 174 l. a year viz. Of part therof of the value of 123 l. a year of which part was holden of the Queen by Knights Service in Capite to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use of the said William and Margaret and the Heirs of the body of the said William begotten on the body of the said Margaret and for default of such Issue to the use of the right Heirs of the said William And of the residue therof being also holden in Capite of the Queen to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use of the first Issue Male of the said Richard and to the Heirs Males of his body and then to other Issues of his body and for default of such Issue to the said William and Margaret and the Heirs of the body of the said William on the body of the said Margaret lawfully begotten and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of the said William with this Prouiso That it shall be lawfull for the said Richard to make a Joynture to his wife of the Lands limited to his Issue Males and for making of Leases for 21. years or three lives for any part of the said Land rendring the ancient Rent except of certain parcels and that William died without Issue and that Gilbert Littleton was his Brother and Heir and that the said Margaret married the said George Littleton youngest brother to the said William which are yet living And that the said Richard married Dorothy and made her a Joynture according to the Proviso And that the said Richard had Issue Iohn Smith and died the said Iohn being his Son and Heir and within age After which a Melius inquirendum issued by which it was found that the said Margaret was the Daughter of the said Richard and that the said Land was of the value of 12000 l. at the time of the assurance And how much of the Land shall be in ward and what Land and what the Melius inquirendum makes in the case was the question put to the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson who agreed that the Queen now shall have the third part as well of that which was assured to William and Margaret immediatly after the death of the said Richard as of that which was limited to Dorothy for the life of the said Margaret for although money were paid yet this was not the only consideration why the Lands were assured but the advancement of the Daughter and now by the surviving of the said Margaret shee shall be said to be in the whole which was assured to her by her Father and for her advancement and the Land as it appears was of greater value then the money given and may as well be thought to be given for the Remainder of the Fee And agreeable to this was the case of Coffin of Devonshire about the beginning of the Raign of the now Queen which was that the said Coffin for moneys paid by one Coffin his Cosin having but Dâ—ughters himself conveyed his Land to the use of himself and his wife and to the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue to the use of his said Cosin and his Heirs for which his said Cosin was to give a certain sum of money to the Daughters for their marriage Coffin dies his said Daughters being his Heirs and within age and were in ward to the Queen the Lands being holden by Knights Service in Capite And the third part of the Land was taken from the wife of Coffin for the life of the said wife if the Heirs continue so long in Ward And it was also agreed by them and the Councell of the Court that the Melius inquirendum was well awarded to certifie that the said Margaret was the Daughter of the said Richard of which the Court could not otherwise well take Conusance for they thought that it was not matter to come in by the averment of the Attorney-generall as Dyer hath reported it But now by the Statute it ought to be found by Inquisition and being a thing which stands with the former Inquisition it ought to be supplied by the Melius inquirendum for the same Statute which gives the Wardship in case where Land is conveyed for the advancement of the Wife or Infants or for the satisfaction of Debts and Legacies of the party by the implication of the same Statute this may be found by Inquisitton and if it be omitted in the Inquisition it ought to be found by a Melius inquirendum but not to come in by a bare surmise And therfore if in the Inquisition it be found that the Ancestor had conveyed his Land by the Melius inquirendum it may be found that it was for the payment of his Debts or Legacies or that the party to whom or to whose use it was made was the Son or Wife of the party that made it and that by the very purport of the Statutes 32. 34 H. 8. as by Fitzherbert if it be surmised that the Land is of greater value then it is found a Melius inquirendum shall issue and so shall it be if it be found that one is Heir of the part of the Mother but they know not who is Heir of the part of the Father so if it be not found what Estate the Tenant had or of whom the Land was holden so upon surmise made that he is seised of some other Estate or that he held it by other Services by Fitzherbert a Melius inquirendum shall Issue and upon this order given it was decreed accordingly this Term. Morgan versus Tedcastle 4. IN the same Term upon matter of Arbitrement between Morgan and Tedcastle touching certain Lands at Welburn in the County of Lâ—ncoln put to Popham Walmesley and Ewens Baron of the Exchequer Wheras Morgan had granted to Tedcastle a 100. acres of Land in such a field and 60 in such a field and 20. acres of Meadow in such a Meadow in Welburn and Hanstead in which the acres are known by estimations or limits there be shall take the acres as they are known in the same places be they more or lesse then the Statute for they passe as they are there known and not according to the measure by the Statute But if I have a great Close containing 20. acres of Land by estimation which is not 18. And I grant 10. acres of the same Close to another there he shall have them according to the measure by the Statute because the acres of such a Close are not known by parcels or by meets and bounds and so it differeth from the first case And upon the case then put to Anderson Brian and Fennor they were of the same opinion Quod nota Humble versus Oliver 5. IN Debt by Richard Humble against William Oliver for a Rent reserved upon a Lease for years the case was
be avoided and in the same manner here But Popham took a diversity where the Possession or the Estate of the Queen is determined and where not for where the Estate is determined there the Subject may enter into the Land without Office or ouster le main But where the Possession continues there the party shall not come to it unlesse by petition Monstrans de droit officio or the like and therfore hee said that if the Queen had an Estate pur auter vie or depending upon any other Limitation if it be determined according to the Limitation the party who hath interest may enter so in the case of the Devise put before And if a Lease be made for life the Remainder in Tail the Reversion in Fee and he in the Remainder in Tail levy a Fine Sur conusance de droit come ceo que il ad de son done to a stranger with proclamations according to the Statute and afterwards the stranger convey the Remainder to the Queen her Heirs and Successors and after the Tenant for life dies and after he in the Remainder in tail dies without Issue now may he in the Remainder in Fee enter because the Estate of the Queen is determined But here the Queen hath a Fee-simple in her self but determinable upon the Estate-tail which yet remaineth which Fee-simple in Reversion cannot be divested out of the possession of the Queen but by matter of Record of so high nature as it is in her to wit by Petition Monstrans de droit or the like As if a Reversson or Remainder be alienated in Mortmain the claim of the Lord sufficeth therâ— to vest the Reversion in the Lord for the Alienation but if the Reversion or Remainder of which such a claim was made be conveyed to the King his remedy is now by Office Monstrans de droit or Petition for claim will not now serve him for this shall be to divest the possession out of the Queen which by such means cannot be done no more then where a Reversion or Remainder is granted to the Queen upon Condition but he ought to have an Office to find the performance of it if it be to be performed by matter in pais and without Monstrans de droit or otherwise it shall not be divested out of the Queens possession yet in the case of a common person a claim will divest it out of them but not so of the Queen And these cases Gawdy agreed but he conceived that in the case in question the claim made determines the Estate of the Queen which is made by means of the Fine upon the Statute And Popham denied the case put in 7 H. 6. to be Law as it is put upon the opinion of Strange there for it is cleer that the claim there does not divest any possession which was in the King by means of the Wardship and if this be not therby defeated the claim does not help the Disseisee against the Descent and this appeareth fully by Littleton who saith so of a Claime which avoids a Descent to wit that it ought to be such upon which the Disseisee may upon every such Claim made have an Action of Trespasse or Assise against the Dissessor or him who is in possession if he continue his possession after such Claim made which cannot be in this case where the possession is in the King which cannot be defeated by such a Claim And in the Lord Dyer where the Feoffee or Mortgagee of Lands holden of the Queen in Capite by Knights Service died before the day of Redemption his Heir being within age wherby upon Office found the Queen had the Wardship of the body and land of the Heir after which the Mortgagee at the day of redemption made payment and of this also an Office was found yet he could not enter either before or after Office but upon Monstrans de droit therupon he had his Ouster le main And the reason why a Claim shall serve in this case between common persons is because that by such Claim the thing it self is devested out of him who had it before and therby actually vested in him who made the claim As where a Villain purchase a Reversion by the Claim of the Lord the Reversion is actually in him as it is of a Possession by Entry But where he is put to his Claim to devest any thing out of a common person he is put to his Suit to devest it out of the Queen Aad to say that Bret should not take advantage of this Conveyance made to make it good by the Fine I think the Law to be clear otherwise as to this point for the Statute of Fines was made tor the security of Purchasors and Possessors of Land and therfore taken more strongly against them who pretend Right or Title and for the greatest advantage that may be for the Possessors of Lands and therfore the Possessor by what ever means he can may make his Fine to be forceable And therfore the Fine upon this Statute differeth much from a Fine at Common Law for where at Common Law an Infent being a Disseisor was disseised by one who levies a Fine and the year and the day passe without claim of the first Disseisee now was the first Disseisee barred yet if afterwards the Infant who was not bound by the Fine enter the first Disseisee may enter upon him because that by this entry the Fine at Common Law was utterly defeated But now by the Statute such a Fine being levied with Proclamations the first Disseisee not pursuing according to the Statute is barred for ever And although the Infant enter at full age and undoes the Fine as to himself yet this Fine remains alwaies to bar the first Disseissee and makes that the Infant hath now Right against all the world and so now takes advantage therof And this is the intent of the Statute for the repose of Controversies and Suits and the quiet of the people And if I procure a Fine to be levied on purpose to bar another of his Action which he may have against me for the Land yet I shall take advantage of this Fine and the other shall have no advantage against me because of this Covin for if this should be admitted it will countervail the benefit which is intended to be by means of the Statute of Fines And if a Disseisor enfeoffee another upon Condition to the intent that a Fine with Proclamations shall be levied to the Feoffee to bar the Disseisee and after the Disseisee is barred the Disseisor enter for the Condition he shall yet take advantage of the Fine against the Disseisee And Popham put a case which was in this Court 23 Eliz. upon a speciall Verdict which was between Okes Plaintiff upon the Demise of John late Lord Sturton of Cottington which was this The Lord Sturton was Tenant for life of certain Lands in Lighe in the County of Somerset the remainder in Tail
If the Tenant for life had made a Feoffment in Fee and he in the Remainder had released to the Feoffee the Vse had been gone for ever so in all these cases of contingent Vses at this day for he who cometh to the possession of Land by Disseisin or wrong done to the Possessor who is seised to anothers use shall never be seised to anothers use And the case being so that it is out of the letter of the Statute to execute such contingent Vses it is more strong for them out of the meaning of the Statute to execute then before they happen to be in Esse for this shall be to make all mischiefs comprehended in the Preamble of this Statute and against which the Statute intended to provide sufficient remedy in a worse mischief then they were before the making of the same Statute and this shall be but a perverse instruction of the Statute And they said that the subtleties used from time to time by means of those Vses to the great deceit and trouble of the people were the cause of the making of this Statute 27 H. 8. and by all the Statutes formerly made touching Vses it appeareth that they were all taken to be grounded upon fraudulent and crafty devises and therfore this Law had no great purpose to favour them but a Fortiorari not to make them in worse case by means of the Statute then they were before and therfore it shall not be taken that the Vse is executed by the Statute which stands upon a contingency of which a greater mischief will ensue then there was in such a case before the Statute and therfore by the Feoffment made in the interim before the birth of the Infants which otherwise ought to have preserved the Vse this Vse was utterly destroyed and although the Feoffee of Christopher had notice of the Vse yet this doth not now help in the case because the Feoffment did wrong to the Estate first setled which was subject to the Vse and extinct in the same possibility which had been otherwise in the Feoffees to have given livelyhood to the said Contingent Vse And therfore the Iudgment by them ought to be that the Plaintiff shall be barred Walmesley That the great mischief which was at Common Law upon these Feoffments to Uses was that none could know upon the occupation of the Land who was true Owner of the Land for Cestay que Vse was the Pernor of the Profits but in whom the Freehold or Inheritance of the Land was there were not many which knew wherby great mischief came to the assurances which men had of Land which they purchased and by it men knew not against whom to bring their Actions to recover their Rights and by it Wives lost their Dowers Husbands their Tenancy by the Curtesie Lords their Escheats Wardships and the like And this mischief hapned by reason that one had the profit and another the estate of the Land And the Statute was made to put the Land and the Estate quite out of the Feoffee who before did not meddle with the Land to Cestay que Use who before had but the occupation and profits of the Land and to this intent the letter of the Law serves very well which sayes that the Estate of the Feoffee shall be cleerly in Cestuy que Use and therfore nothing by the intent and letter of the Law is now to remain in the Feoffee no more then a Scintilla juris nemor'd in Brents Case in my Lord Dyer Eliz. and the whole Estate in the interim untill the contingent happen shall be in them who have their Vses in Esse and when the Contingent happen the Statute gives place to this Contingent Vse and by the execution therof comes between the Estates before executed and as out of these by the Statute but nothing is now after the Statute in the Feoffees for the purpose of the Statute was as I have said to take away all from the Feoffee for all was devested from him because that betwixt the Feoffor the Feoffee was all the fraud before the Statute and the very letter of the Statute is to extinguish and extirpate the assurances fraudulently made which was alwaies by reason of assurances made between the Estate of the Land in one and the possession therof in another and to cause that now that the Estate shall be to the use where the occupation was before And this Statute was not made to extinguish or discredit Vses but to advance them as by bringing the very Estate in possession to the Vse and by it the trust now taken from all others who were trusted with it before so the Statute doth not condemn the uses but the fraud which was by reason of them before And the Statute being that the Estate Right and Title of the Feoffees shall go to the uses therfore nothing remaineth in the Feoffees but all by authority of Parliament adjudged to be in Cestay que use which is the highest Iudgment that can be given in any Court and the words Stand and be seised at any time refer as well to the future as present uses and the Statute intended as well to help the uses which shall be upon any Contingent as those which are at present for a future or contingent Vse is to be said an Vse according to its nature or quality and it shall be executed according to its quality when it happen And the words are that the Estate which was in the Feoffee shall be in Cestay que use and not the Estate which is and therfore when the use hapneth to be in an instant the Estate which at the first Livery was in the Feoffee to this use shall now be executed in possession to this contingent use albeit it self was altogether executed as I said before in the Vses which were in Esse and if so it followeth that nothing which is done in the mean time by the Feoffee or can be done by any other can prejudice or hurt the execution of this Vse in contingency when the contingency happen And for the case of Brook 30 H. 8. it is plain in paint which is this A Covenant with B. that if B. enfeoff him of three acres of Land in D. that then the said A. and his Heirs and all others seised of such Lands shall stand therof seised to the use of the said B. and his Heirs after which A enfeoffed a stranger of this Land after which B. enfeoffed the said A of the said three acres now the use shall be to the said B. and his Heirs of the said other Land for the Statute so binds the Land to this Contingency when it happens that by no means it can be defeated and this is the cause that Leases made by force of Provisoes comprised in assurances are good and cannot be avoided for the Interests to these Leases is wrought by the first Livery and the Statute atd therfore upon the matter I conceive that Judgment ought
to be given for the Plaintiff Gawdy conceived that it is executed by the intent but not by the letter of the Statute for the purpose was to remove all the Estate from the Feoffee and to put it in Cestay que use wholly to wit in possessions to the Vses which were in Esse and in aleyance as to the Vses which were to come and contingent and now by the same Statute the contingency of the possession shal go in licence of the contingent Vse and now an Vse limited to one for life with Remainder over to the Heirs of the body of I. S. or to the first Son of I. S. shall be in the same manner as if Land at this day had been letten to one for life with Remainder over to the Heirs of the body of I. S. or to the first Son of I. S. and not otherwise for the quality which he had in the Vse the same by the very letter of the Statute he shall now have in the possession and Estate of the Land and the Statute is not to undo any Vse but to transfer an Estate in the Land to the Vse But he said That by the Feoffment made to Christopher the Contingent remainder which was devested in Stretchly and Iohn Chudleigh depending upon the Estate which Sir Iohn Saintleger and his Co-feoffees had for the life of Christopher is utterly gone and destroyed in the same manner as where a Lease is made for life the remainder to the right Heirs of I. S. or to the Heirs of the body of I S. if the Tenant for life dies or aliens wherby he makes a forfeiture and determines his Estate in the life of the said I. S. his Heir shall never have the Land by the remainder afterwards because he was not in Esse as an Heir at the time when the Estate ended for there cannot be a remainder without a particular Estate neither can it stand or be preserved And as in this case without a particular Estate of Free-hold a Remainder cannot be no more in the case now in question being now become by means of the Statute as if it had been an Estate executed in possession and for this cause only he conceived that Judgment ought to be given against the Plaintiff And Clench agreed with this opinion in all and both of them agreed if there be none to take the Vse according to the limitation at the time when it falleth to be in Possessions that he shall never take it although it happen to be in Esse afterwards Clark said that Uses were not at Common Law but grew by sufferance of time as appeareth by the words of the Statute it self and the mischief and subtlety which was before this Statute was not in the Fine Feoffment or other Assurances of Land but by means oâ— the Uses limitted therupon contrary to that which was used in the ancient course oâ— the Common Law and the Statute was made to reduce the Common Law to its ancient force and course and therfore ought to conceive such a construction as may agree with the purpose of the makers of the Statute and therfore the best construction of this Statute is not to execute other manner of Uses but in some cases to extinguish them as where it is such as will make the case in as ill or worse condition then it was before the making of the Statute It hath been agreed by all that the Statute doth not execute any Use which was suspended at the time of the making of the Statute as by reason of a Disseisor or the like hapning before and if it doth not execute the Use which is in suspence for the right which he had in the Use how can it execute the Use which hath not any being for in such cases of Infants not born as here untill they be in Rerum natura the Use cannot have any being And in the same manner in all cases where the Vse is not to rise but upon a future contingent And what good shall this Statute do if these leaping Vses shall arise without being impeached Nothing but alwaies nourish a Viper in the bosom of the Law which is quite against the intent of the makers of the Statute The Law was made to preserve peace amongst the Subjects and to assure their Possessions as many other Statutes did that were made about this time as the Statutes of Fines Wills and others But if the exposition of this Statute shall be as the other side hath taken it it will make the confusion which will happen therupon intollerable and much worse then it was before the Statute was made and as Walsh said if no assurance can be made to be forcible against such a contingent Use this will make it worse then it was before And hesaid that it was not to be compared to the interest of Lands to begin at a time to come nor to the case where a man devise that his Land shal be sold in which case be shall not be impeached by any manner of assurance to be made in the mean time by the Heir and the reason is because the Vendee takes by the Will under the Estate of the Heir and not by the sale and therfore upon the matter he conceived that the Plaintiff ought to be barred Periam said that Uses were at Common Law and to prove it he vouched 24 H. 8. abridged in Brook And he said that there have been alwaies trusts Ergo Uses ab initio but they had not such estimation at the beginning as they have had by continuance of time and so it was of Copyholds And these Uses at Common Law bind but in privity according to the trust but do not bind in the possession of him who cometh to the Land in the Post But now by the Statute all trusts are gone and the Estate of the Land it self transferred to the Use and now the Use guides the Land and not the Land the Use And the Statute did not intend to destroy any Use but to bring it back to the Possession according to the course of the common Law and to avoid the fraud And as before the Statute the Use it self in such a case of Contingency was in obeyance for the time so now the Estate it self is in obeyance by the Statute which wills that he shall now have an Estate in the Land it self of such a quality as he had before in the Use for the Statute puts all cleerly out of the Feoffees and it is not inconvenient to have a Possession so to a Contingent Use and if it had not been in the words of the Statute yet as hath been sayd it shall be so taken by the intent of the Statute for it never was the intent of the makers of the Statute to do wrong to any by means of the Statute And therfore he put the case of Cramner who made a Feoffment to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use
Reversion shall stand hereafter seised and adjudged in lawfull Estate and Possessions of the Lands c. of such an Estate as he had in the Use The words then in the Statute being so precise as they stand to wit that in such case he who hath such an Vse shall have the possession executed of such an Estate as he had in the Vse excludes all other who are not in it to have it to be executed untill that they happen to be in the same case as of that which the Statute speaks And if they had intended to have the Possession to be executed and transferd from the Feoffees to these contingent Vses they would have made some mention therof as well as they did of Reversions and Remainders and they did not leave there but mention this again to wit that the Estate Right Title and Possessions which was in such person or persons which were seised to the use of any such person or persons shall be hereafter cleerly adjudged in him or those who had or have such Vse according to such quality manner form and condition as he had before the use which was in them by which it appeareth plainly that the Right and Possession of the Feoffee shall not be vested in or to any untill that he hath the use it self for it is said that it shall be in him therfore they ought to have somthing in the Vse by the very expresse letter of the Statute before any thing of the Possession shall be executed or transferred by this Statute from the Feoffee to Cestay que use And how can this be said to be within the letter of the Statute which hath so many and so precise words and branches against it And therfore it is cleer that if the Feoffee to use were seised at the time of making of this Statute that the use shall not be executed by this Statute untill there be a regresse made by the Feoffee or in his right to revive the former use and it had been out of the letter of the Statute But to this I say that how precise soever the letter is against the execution of these contingent uses the intent therof is yet more strong precise against them which I will prove cleerly by the Statute it self which is of greater authority then the particular opinion or conceit of any Iudge whomsoever for it is the Iudgment of all the Iudges and all the Realm also which ought to bind all and to which all ought to give credit And to take the intent the Statute was full that it was made as is rehersed for the Disinherison which before was to true Heirs for the defect which before was in the assurance of Purchases for the mischiefs in regard before men did not know by reason of these Vses against whom to bring their Actions to recover their Rights To avoid perjury that it should not be so common as it was by reason of the maintenance and support of these secret Vses for the releif of the King other Lords as to their Escheats Forfeitures Wardships Releases and the like for the mischief which before hapned to Tenants by the Curtesie and in Dower by reason of these Estates in Vse and finally for the great Incoveniencies which hapned by reason of them to the great trouble and unquiet of the People These were the great mischiefs that were before the making of the Statute and these were the things for which the Statute intended to provide remedy and if the exposition shall be as hath been on the other side these mischiefs shall be on every part more mischievous by much then it was before the making of the Statute and that in such a a manner that it shall be impossible to help any of them but by Parliament wheras alwaies the good and true construction of a Statute is to constrain it so that it shall give remedy to the mischief which was before and not to make it more mischievous and therfore examine it by parts And as to the disinherison of two Heirs it appears now that by such exposition more incoveniences will arise and that in a more dangerous degree then before the Statute for before for the Vse the Heir had his remedy in conscience according to the trust and he might have made a disposition of the Land it self by the Statute of Rich. 3. as an Owner for the advancement of his Wife and his Children and for payment of his debts and the like But as the case is now used by means of these perpetuities as they are called if the exposition of the other side shall hold place the true Heir shall not only be continually in danger to loose his Inheritance but by them the very bowels of nature it self shall come to be divided and as rent in peeces for by reason of these the Inheritants themselves cannot make any competent provision for the advancement of their Wives Daughters or youngest Sons as every one according to the course of nature ought to do nor by reason of this can he redeem himself if he were taken Prisoner And this will make disobedience in Children to their Parents when they see that they shall have their Patrimony against their will wherby such Children oftentimes become unnaturall and dissoluts of which I in my time have seen many unnaturall dangerous and fearfull consequences not convenient to be spoken of And it staies not there but it causeth mortall debate as to blood between Cosin and Cosin Brother and Brother and not so only but between the Father himself and his Children of which every one of us have seen the experience for the one ought to be as a watch upon the other to see when any thing happen to be done to give him advantage to disinherit the very true Owner And I say that it is impossible that any can keep his Possessions which hath them tyed with these perpetuities if the exposition of the Statute should hold place which the other side hath made And I affirm precisely that there is not any one in England who hath had such Possessions so bound by descent of Inheritance by five years of any value but that he hath lost all or part of his said Land at this time let him be never so precise in making his Assurances and yet he is not sure to have one skilfull in the Law alwaies at his elbow when he is to meddle with his Land And therfore I put but this Case One who hath such a perpetuity with power to make Leases rendring the ancient Rent or more hath two Farms either of them of the ancient Rent of 20 s. a year but the one is worth 60 l. a year and the other but 20 l. these are in hand to be better together rendring 53 s. 4 d. for both together therfore he hath lost all or part of his Land according to that of which the perpetuity is so it is evident that it will happen to be more mischievous in
in execution in all Circuits That if a man taken for Felony be examined by a Justice of Peace it appeareth that the Felon is not bailable by the Law and yet the Justices commit him to Goal but as upon suspition of Felony not making mention for any cause for which he is not bailable wherby he is brought before another Justice of Peace not knowing of any matter why he ought not to be bailed wherupon they bail him these Justices ought to be fined by the Statute of 1 2. Phil. Mar. for they offend if they bail him who by the Statute of Westm 1. is not bailable and therfore they at their peril ought so to inform themselves before the bail taken of the matter that they may be well satisfied that such a one is bailable by Law and therfore observe well the Statute of Westm 1. cap. 18. who is bailable and who not by the Law And it seems that no Justice of Peace could have bailed any one for Felony before the Statute of 1 Rich. 3. cap. 3. which is made void by 3 H. 7. cap. 3. for before this he ought to have been bailed by the Sheriff or other Keeper of the Prison where he was in Ward or by the Constable and by no other Officer unlesse Justices of the Kings Bench Justices in Eyre or Justices of Goal-delivery Herbin versus Chard and others 2. IN Trespasse by William Herbin Plaintiff against Chard and others Defendants for a Trespasse made at Pynon Farm in Netherbury and Loder in the County of Dorset the Case upon the Demurrer appeared to be this The Lord Mordant was seised of the Farm in his Demesne as of Fee and so seised demised it to Philip Fernam Elizabeth his wife and Iohn Fernam the eldest Son of the said Philip for term of their lives and of the Survivor of them and the said Eliz. died after which the said Philip his Father demised his part of the Farm by his Deed indented dated 13. Mart. 32. Eliz. to Philip his Son and Toby Fernam his Son for eighty years immediatly after the death of the said Philip the Father if the said Iohn Fernam shal so long live with divers remainders over for years depending upon the life of the said Iohn after which the said Philip the Father died and Iohn survived him and demised the said Farm to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendants entred in right of the said Philip and Toby and whether their entry were congeable was the question And it was moued by Goodridge of the Middle-Temple that the entry of the Defendant was not lawfull because the said John was now in by the Lessor and not by his joynt Companion And further he had no power to dispose therof beyond his own life for suppose that he makes a Lease therof for years and afterwards grant over his Estate to a stranger and dies the Lease for years is therby determined albeit his joynt Companion be yet living and that his Estate continues And yet he agreed that if had made a Lease for years to begin at a day to come as at Michaelmas following or the like that this had been good for it is an Interest in the Grantee to be granted over for the presumption that it might be executed in his life but in the other case there is not any possibility that he who hath not but for his life can demise it to begin after the Estate made to him is determined But on the other part it was moved that the Demise remains in force for the life of the said John for at the first every one had an interest for the life of the other also and therfore if one Ioynt-tenant for life make a Lease for years in possession and dies the Lease yet continues And Crook the younger alledged that it was adjudged at last Hartf Term If a man possessed of a Term for years in right of his Wife makes a Lease for years of the same Lands to begin after his death dies during the Term without other alteration of it and the Wife survives him that now the Lease made by the Husband is good and that the like case as this by the opinion of Clench and Walmsley was decreed to be good in the Chancery Arton versus Hare 3. IN a second deliverance between Francis Arton Plaintiff and Henry Hare Avowant the case appeared to be this William Cocksey Esquire was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of the Mannor of Wolverton in the County of Worcester and so seised in Octab. Mich. 7 Eliz. levied a Fine of the said Mannor to certain persons to the use of the said William and Alice his Wife and the Heirs of William untill a marriage had between Martin Croft and Anne Wigstone and after this marriage to the use of the said William and Alice his Wife and the Heirs of the body of the said William and for defualt of such Issue to the use of the said Martin Crofts and Anne and the Heirs Males of the body of the said Martin upon the body of the said Anne begotten untill the said Martin should go about to alien sell grant or give the said Mannor or any parcell therof or to suffer any Recovery or levy any Fine therof or make any discontinuance c. And after the Estate of the said Martin and Anne and of the Heirs Males of their bodies to the Premisses by any such attempts determined and finished then to the use of the said Anne for her life and after to the use of the Heirs Males of the body of the said Martin upon the body of the said Anne lawfully begotten and for default of such Issue to the use of the Heirs of the body of the said Martin and for default of such Issue to the use of Giles Croft brother of the said Martin and the Heirs Males of his body untill c. as before and after to the use of the Heirs of the body of the said Giles and for default of such Issue to the use of Edmund Crofts the third brother of the said Martin and of the Heirs Males of his body as is before limited to the said Giles with remainders over afterwards the marriage was had between the said Martin and Alice after which the said Martin and Giles died without Issue without any thing done by the said Martin to determine his Estate or by the said Giles to determine his Estate if any had been And it was agreed by all the Court that as this case is no remainder can enure over to the said Giles without an attempt precedent by the said Martin to determine his Estate because the Estate of Giles is not limited to begin but upon such an attempt precedent And in the same manner Edmund shall have nothing untill the Estate of Giles determine by some attempt made by him if the said Giles had an Estate because the Estate of Edmund depends upon the attempt made by Giles
precedent to it which not being done the Estate of Edmund never hapned to be and therfore he who cometh in under a Discontinuance made by the said William Cocksey after the death of Martin and Giles without Issue notwithstanding the Remitter of the said Alice in the case is to have the Land against those who come in by the said Edmund and upon this point only Iudgment was given accordingly in the Kings Bench. Grenningham versus the Executors of Heydon 4. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 200. marks by Richard Grenningham Plaintiff against the Executors of one Ralph Heydon Defendants the case appeared to be this upon Demurrer The said Heydon was bound to the Plaintiff in 200. marks the Condition wherof recites that wheras the said Heydon had received of the said Grenningham 76 l. 6 s 8 d. before the date of the said Obligation of 200. marks in payment and satisfaction of certain Obligations and Bills of debt remaining in the hands of the said Heydon and specified in the Condition what they were in certain and the which said Bills Obligations the said Heydon is to deliver or cause to be delivered to the said Grenningham his heirs or assigns before the Feast of S. Michael next ensuing the date of the said Obligation or otherwise the said Heydon his Executors Administrators or Assigns or some of them before the same Feast shall make or cause to be made and delivered to the said Plaintiff his Heirs and Assigns such good and sufficient Acquittances for the payment of the said summs of money formerly mentioned as the said Plaintiff his Heirs Executors or Assigns shall devise or cause to be devised by the Counsel of the said Plaintiff his Heirs or Assigns before the Feast without fraud or deceit that then the said Obligation shall be void c. And before the Feast the said Plaintiff did not devise any acquittance Whether now the Obligation be saved by the Disjunctive without delivering the Obligations and Bills before named before the Feast of S. Michael Rot. 36 37. Eton and Monney versus Laughter 5. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 400 l. by Thomas Eton and Roger See this Case Coke lib. 5. 21. by the name of Laughters case Monney Plaintiff against Thomas Laughter Defendant who was bound together with one Richard Rainford to the said Plaintiffs the Condition of which Odligation was That if the said Richard Rainford after marriage had between him and Jane Gilman Widow together with the said Jane alienate in Fee or Fee-tail all that great Messuage of the said Jane in London in the Tenure of William Fitz Williams Esquire if then the said Richard Rainford in his life time purchase to the said Iane her Heirs and Assigns Lands and Tenements of good Right and Title and of as good value as the money raised upon the alienanation of the said Messuage amounts unto or leave to the said Iane after his decease as Executrix or by Legacy or other good assurance so much money as he shall receive or have upon the said Sale that then the Obligation shall be void after which the said Richard Rainford married with the said Jane and the said Richard and Jane sold the said Messuage in Fee by Fine for 320 l. received by the said Richard Rainford after which the said Iane died no Lands being purchased to the said Iane by the said Richard and the said Richard yet living Michaelmas Term 37 38. Eliz. Sawyer versus Hardy 1. IN an Ejectione firmae by Christopher Sawyer Plaintiff against Edmund Hardy Defendant for a Messuage in S. Martins upon a Demurrer the case was this A Lease was made of the said Messuage to one Margaret Sawyer for 40. years upon Condition that if the said Margaret should so long continue a Widow she should dwell and stay in the same Messuage the said Margaret continued a Widow and dwelt in the same house all her life and died during the said Term of 40. years making the Plaintiff her Executor and by award the Plaintiff had Judgment to recover For by Popham Gawdy and Clench this now was no Condition nor Limitation for it hath no certain conclusion upon the that if to wit that then the Term shall continue or that she shall pay so much or otherwise what the conclusion shall be none can imagine As if such a Lease be made upon condition that if the Lessee does such a thing without other conclusion it is a good Lease for 40. years for none can imagine what the conclusion shall be in such a case or that then the Lease shal be void or that he shall re-enter or that the Lessee shall forfeit so much or what shall happen upon it for which incertainty it shall be taken as a void Clause But by Popham if it had been Sub conditione si tamdiu vixerit it had been good to determine the Lease but it is otherwise of the word quod si for the incertainty as before And they all agreed that if the Lease had been for 40. years Si tamdiu sols viveret inhabitaret in eodem Messuagio that the Lease had been determined by her marriage or death In the same manner as if it had been Si tam diu vixerit And so in truth had been the case if it had been well pleaded but by pleading the advantage therof was lost and the truth not disclosed But by Popham If a Lease be made for 40. years if he shall dwell in the same for his life there it is good for 40. years upon performance of the Condition the diversity appeareth to wit where it is if he shall dwell there during the Term and where it is if he shall inhabit there during his life Goodale versus Wyat. 2. IN an Ejectione firmae by Cuthbert Goodale Plaintif against John Wyat See this Case Coke lib. 5. fol. 95 96. by the name of Goodales case Defendant for a Meadow in Aylesbury in the County of Buck. called Diggelmore upon a speciall Verdict the case was this Sir Iohn Packington Knight enfeoffed therof one Ralph Woodliff to have and to hold to him and his Heirs upon condition that if the said Sir Iohn within a year after the death of the said Ralph pay to the Heirs Executors or Administrators of the said Ralph the summ of a 100. marks of lawfull money that then the said Feoffment and Seisin made therupon shall be void Ralph Woodliff made a Feoment over to others therof and died intestate and Administration was committed to Anne his Wife and Drew Woodliff his Son and Heir who gave a Warrant of Attorney to Thomas Goodale then seised of the said Meadow by mean conveyances for the receit of the said 100. marks with Covenant that none of them shall do any act or thing that shall be preâ—udiciall or hurtfull to the said Thomas Goodale for the receiving and enjoying of the said summ after which it was certified to the said Sir Iohn Packington by
the said Goodale that this Warrant was made to him After which it was agreed between the said Sir Ioh Packington Drew Woodale that the said Tho. Drew shall have but 32 l. of the said 100. marks wherupon the said Sir Iohn Packington within a year after the death of the said Ralph Woodliff paid to the said Drew Woodliff the 100. marks and presently the said Drew delivered to the said Sir John all the 100. marks but 32 l. And the Verdict stands upon this point whether the 100. marks were well paid or not And by Popham and Gawdy this was meerly a fraud which shall never prejudice a third person for if it be agreed between the Disseisee and I. S. that a stranger shall disseise the Tenant of the Land and enfeoff the said I. S. to the intent that the Disseisee shall recover against him this Recovery shall bind the said I. S. but not him who was disseised and yet he who recovered had a good Title and paramount the other but he shall not come to that to which he had good cause of Action and Title by fraudulent means to the prejudice of a third person not party to this fraud And it was said further that to pay money and take it away again presently before that it is pursed up by re-delivery is not properly a payment but rather a colour of payment And by Fennor and Popham the force of a Deed of Feoffment once effectuall cannot become void or of no effect nor the Livery therupon by such manner of words And it is not like a Bargain of Goods or an Obligation or a Lease for years which by such words may be dissolved and made to be of no force or effect because that as by the sealing a bare Contract it may be made perfect and effectuall without other circumstances so may it be defeated by such bare means without other circumstance But so it is not in case of an Inheritance or Free-hold which cannot be effectual by the bare delivery of a Deed unlesse that Livery be made therupon And all agreed that as this case is notwithstanding the Feoffment made over by the Father the money might have been paid to the Heir to perform the Condition if they had been duly paid and without Covin and that the words had been apt to have defeated the Estate But by Popham and Clench If a Feoffment be made to one upon condition In which case a Condition shall be performed to an Assignee and not to the Heir of payment of money to the Feoffee his Heirs or Assignes and the Feoffee makes a Feoffment over and dies the money ought to be paid to the Feoffee who is the Assignee and not to the Heir for there Heir is not named but in respect of the Inheritance which might be in him but here he is named as a meer stranger to it Bartons Case 3. IN a Writ of Error sued in the Kings Bench by Randall Barton upon a Fine levied at Lancaster 7 Eliz. of Land in Smithall and else where in the County of Lancaster by Robert Barton Esquire to Leven and Browndo where this Writ was brought by the said Randall as Heir in tail to the said Robert to wit Son of Ralph Brother of the said Robert The Defendant plead a Recovery in Bar therof had after the Fine in which the said Robert was vouched who vouched over the common Vouchee And by all the Court this common Recovery with such double Voucher which is the common assurance of Lands is a Bar by reason of the Voucher to every manner of right which the Vouchee or his Heir by means of him is to have to this land which is paramount the Recovery And so it is of every manner of way wherby they are otherwise to come to the Land before the Recovery And if the recovery be erroneous it remains a good Bar untill it be avoided by error But if the Recovery be void or the Voucher not warranted to be pursuing the appearance of the Tenant but precedent to it as was pretended and so no Tenant to warrant the Voucher when the Voucher was made the Recovery shall be no bar in such a case and the case here was informed to be this for the Writ of Entry bears date 1. Mart. 7 Eliz. returnable Die Lunae in 4. septimana quadragessimae propter futur and the Voucher was made in 4. septimana quadragessimae 7 Eliz. the said first day of March being the first week of this Lent 7 Eliz. And upon this it was inferred that the Tenant was not to appear untill Munday in the fourth week of Lent 8 Eliz. which is a long time after that the Voucher appeared and vouched over But by the whole Court the Original Writ shall be taken as it is written to be returnable on Munday in the fourth week of the same Lent 7 Eliz for it shall be taken as it is written shortly most beneficially that it can be to make the Recovery good And if it had been written Proxâ—me it should refer to the week before and so good And if the word Futur had been written at large Futura it also shall refer to Septimana and therfore being written briefly it shall refer as it may best do to make the Recovery good But if it had been in Quarta septimana proximae quadragessimae at large then the word Proxime shall refer to Quadragessimae because of the case But if it had been Proxima it shall refer to Septimana because also of the case But here as the case is it shall be a good reference to make the words Tunc proxima futur to shew what fourth week of Lent to wit that next ensuing the first day of March. As if a man be bound by Obligation bearing date the first day of March to pay the 10. day of March then next ensuing this shall be taken the 10. day of this March because this is next ensuing the first day Paramor versus Verrald 4. IN Trespasse of Assault and false Imprisonment by Robert Paramor against John Verrold and others supposed to be done at such a Parish and Ward in London the 20. day of May 35 Eliz The Defendants justifie by reason of an Erecution upon a Recovery in the Court of Sandwich within the Cinque-Ports Debt and traverse Absque hoc in that they were guilty in London c. The Plaintiff reply and maintain the Assault and Imprisonment as it is said and traverses Absque hoc quod habetur aliquod tale Recordum loqueâ—ae prout the Defendants have alledged Et hoc paratus est verificare per Recordum illud and upon this the Defendants demurred in Iudgment And per Curiam the Defendants plea Prima fâ—cie was good because it was a speciall manner of Iustification which cannot be pleaded and alledged to be in any other place then where it was done in the same manner as if they had justified by force of a Capias directed to the
to attend and be assistant to the Iustices Sheriffs or other Ministers of the King in the doing of it 3. AT the same time it was also resolved by them all except Walmsley Fennor and Owen in the Case of one Richard Bradshaw and Robert Burton who with others lately by word entred themselves into an agreement one with another to rise and put themselves into Armes and so to go from one Gentlemans house to another and so from house to house to pull down Inclosures generally that this so appearing by their own confession or by two Witnesses according to the Statute is high Treason by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 1. The words of which Statute are That if any intend to levy War against the Queen and this maliciously advisedly and expresly declare or utter by any words or sayings that this shall be high Treason For all agreed that Rebellion of Subjects against the Queen hath Rebellion of Subjects high Treason been alwaies high Treason at the Common Law for the Statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 1. is that levying of War within the Realm against the King is Treason and Rebellion is all the War which a Subject can make against the King But Walmsley and the others with him said that the Statute of 1 Mar cap. 12. 10. That if any to the number of twelve or more assemble themselves to the intent to pull down Inclosures Pales and the like with force and continuing together after proclamation according to the Statute to go away by the space of an hour or do any of the Offences mentioned in the Statute that this is Felony So that if these Actions had been Treason at the Common Law it had been to no purpose to have made it Felony And it seemed to them that the resistance ought to be with force to the Queen before that such Acts shall be said Treason But all the other Iustices agreed and so it was put in ure lately in the case of the Prentices of London that if any assemble themselves with force to alter the Laws or to set a price upon Victualls or to lay violent hands upon the Magistrate as upon the Major of London and the like and with force attempt to put it in action that this is Rebellion and Treason at Common Law and yet this Statute of 1 Mariae makes it in such a case but Felony And they put a diversity between the cases of pulling down Inclosures Pales c. comprised in the Statute of 1 Mar. for those are to be understood where diverse to the number of twelve or more pretending any or all of them to be injured in particular as by reason of their common or other Interest in the Land inclosed and the like and assembling to pull it down forcibly and not to the cases where they have a generall dislike to all manner of Inclosures and therfore the assembling in a forcible manner and with Armes to pull them down where they have any Interest wherby they were in any particular to be annoyed or grieved is not Treason but the case here tending to a generality makes the act if it had been executed to be high Treason by the câ—uâ—se of the Common Law And therfore the intention appearing as the case is here it is Treason by the Stâ—tute of 13. aforesaid Periam in some manner doubted of the principall case but to intend to rise with force to alter the Laws to set price upon any Victuals or to use force against a Magistrate for executing his Office of Iustice and the like he said that they were cleerly Treason by the Statute of 13. aforesaid if it may appear by expresse words or otherwise as the said Statute mentions for all these tend against the Queen her Crown and Dignity and therfore shall be as against the Queen her self And if it had been put in practice it had been Treason at the Common Law Here ends the LORD POPHAM'S REPORTS An addition of certain Select CASES in the time of KING JAMES and KING CHARLES Trin. 15. Jac. In the Kings Bench entred Hill Jac. Rot. 194. Brooks Case IN an Ejectione firmae brough by one Brook against Brook the Case was thus Iohn Wright a Copyholder in Fee 10 Eliz. surrendred his Land into the hands of the Lord by the hands of Tenants according to the Custom c. without saying to whose use the Surrender should be And at the next Court the said Iohn Wright was admitted Habendum to him and his Wife in Tail the remainder to the right Heirs of Iohn Wright and the Wife of Iohn Wright now Defendant was seised from the time of Where upon surrender of Copyhold land no use is limited to whole use iâ— shall be the admittance untill this day And it was objected by the Counsell of the Plaintiff that the surrender was void because no use was limitted and therfore by constitution of Law ought to be to the use of the Surrender as if a Feoffment be made and no Use limited it shall be to the Use of the Feoffor or as it is in Sir Edward Cleers Case Coke lib. 6. 18. If a Feoffment be made by one to the use of his last Will he hath the use in the mean time 2. That the admittance was not available to passe an Estate to the Wife for she was not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and the Office of an Habendum is to limit the Estate and not the person and therfore it is said in Throgmorten and Tracies Case in Plowd com That if one be named to take an Estate in the Habendum where he was not named at all in the Premisses this is not good But it was resolved by the whole Court for the first point that the subsequent Act shâ—ll explain the Surrender for Quando abest Provisio partis adest provisio legis And when the Copyholder accepts a new admittance the Law intends that the Surrender generally made was to such an Vse as is specified in the admittance and the Lord is only as an Instrument to convey the Estate and as it were put in trust to make such an admittance â—s he who surrenders would hâ—ve him to make And Crook Iustice said Fides adhibita fidem obligat For the second point it was also agreed by the Court that the Wife shall take by this admittance albeit she were not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and they agreed that in Feoffments and Grants the party that is not named in the Premisses shall not take by the Habendum and therfore Throgmorton and Tracies Case as to this point is good Law But this case of a Copyhold is like to the case of a Will or to the case of Frank-marriage in which it is sufficient to passe an Estate albeit the party be only named in the Habendum and if it should be otherwise the Estates of many Copyholders would be subverted And so they resolved that Iudg-should be
thing that is uncertain certain but shall serve as a Predict yet the words import that he had a Master and that his Master had a Cook to which all the Court agreed and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And another Action was brought for these words Scil. Thou hast sacrificed Thou hast sacrificed thy child to the Devill thy Child to the Devill and adjudged that the words were actionable Mich. 15. Iac. In the Kings Bench. Lee versus Brown IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Lee against Brown the Case was this Whether copyhold Lands may be intailed Tenant in Tail of Copyhâ—ld Land surrendred the same into the hands of the Lord to the use of I. S. wherupon two points did arise 1. Whether Copyhold Land be within the Statute of Donis conditionalibus so that iâ— may be intailed 2. Whether the Intail may be cuâ— off by the surrender Doderidge Iustice said as to the first point that it hath been a great doubt whether it may be intailed but the common and better opinion was that by the same Statute co-operating with the custom it may be intailed and with this agrees Heydons case in my Lord Cokes 3. Report and so was the opinion An Intail of copyhold lâ—nd nâ—t to be cut off by â—urrender unlesse by speciall custom of the Court. And for the second point their opinion also was that it could not be cut off by surrender unlesse it were by speciall custom and they directed the Iury accordingly And it was said to maintain this custom it ought to be shewn that a Formedon had been brought upon such a Surrender and Iudgment given that it doth not lye yet it was agreed that it was a strong proof of the custom that they to whose use such Surrenders had been made had enjoyed the Land against the Issues in Tail And it was said by the Counsell of the Defendant that there was a Verdict for them before in the same case which they could prove by witnesses but the Court would not allow such a proof because it was matter of Record which ought to be shewn forth In the same Term in the Common Pleas. May versus Kett. AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz. Thou hast Words Thou hast stoln my Corn out of my Earn stoln my Corn out of my Barn And it was moved in Arrest of Iuâ—gment because he had not said how much he had stoln and perhaps it was of small value and yet it was adjudged that the Action would lye for it is at least petit Larceny But if he had said that he had stoln his Corn generally it had not been actionable for it might have been growing and then it had been but a Trespasse The same Term in the Star Chamber Riman versus Bickley and others IOhn Riman exhibited a Bill in the Star Chamber against Thomas Bickley and Anne his Wife Dr. Thorn Mr Goulding and others Defendants the said Anne was first married to Devenish Riman the Plaintiffs Son and between them were many â—ars and disâ—greemâ—nts and the said Devenish was much given to drinking and other Vices and divers times did beat and abuse his Wife and was also jealous of the saiâ— Thomas Bickley and his Wife being at a certain time at Supper with Dr. Thorn Goulding and others spake such words as these having communication thâ—t her Husband did beat and abuse her to wit That she heard that his Father had that quality and being once whipt for it was the better ever after and that if she thought it would do her Husband any goâ—d she would willingly bestow 40 s. on some body to give him a whipping wherupon Gâ—ulding said that he would give him a Medâ—cine for his Mâ—lâ—dy and within two daies after he came in the night in womâ—ns apparrell with a Weapon under his Cloak and with a Rod and wenâ— into the House and Chamber of the said Devenish and would have whipped him and in striving together there was some hurt done on either side but Gâ—ulding not being able to effect his purpose fled and this was conceived to be by the procurement of Anne his wife And not long after Devenish fell sick and sent to his said wife for certain necessaries which she would not send him and presently after Devenish died and she refused to come to his buriall And although it were much disliked that Devenish should abuse his Wife in such uncivill manner as to strike and beat her and as Coke late chief Iustice said it is not lawfull by the Act Military for one man to strike another in the presence of Ladies yet it was resolved by the whole Court that it was a great misde meanor in the Wife and uncivill and undutifull carriage in her to do so to her Husband as they use to do to Children or fools to wit to give them the Whip and so to disgrace and take away the good name of her Husband which viz. A mans good name and his Childrens are the two things which make a man live to Posterity as was said by Sir Francis Bacon Lord keeper and the Court fiâ—ed the Wife 500 l. and it was said that Thomaâ— Bickley her noâ— Husband well deserved to pay this Fine because he was too familiar with her in the time of his Predecessor and as the Bishop of London said Devenish Rimon lay upon her hands and Thomas Bickley upon â—eâ— heart And to aggravate this matter a Letter was shown whiâ—h Devenish Rimon wrote to his Wife in which he called her Whoor and told her somwhat roundly of her faults and she wrote back to him in the Margeâ—t that he lyed and wished him to get a better Scribe for his next Lâ—â—ter for he was a Fool that wrote that wherin she called him Fool by craft And Goldings offence was accâ—vnted the greater because he was a Minister so that he was fined 500 l. also And Coke said that the course of this Court was that if any were fined who is not able to pay it Respondeat superior he that is the principall and chief agent therin must answer it for otherwise poor men might be made Instruments of great mischief who are not able to answer and the greater Offenders shall escape which the Lord Keeper confirmed And as to Doctor Thorn he was acquitted by all And the Bishop of London said that they had thought to have troad upon a Thorn and they gat a Thorn in their foot And by Coke if Devenish Rimon had died upon it it had been capitall in the Wife who procured it for it was an unlawfull Act. The same Term in the Kings Bench. Wescot versus Cotton THe case was this An Infant Executor upon an Action brought against Where an Infant Executor may declare by Attorney but not defend by Attorney but by Guardian him appeared by Attorney where he ought to appear by Guardian and it was resolved by the Court that this was Error for this
Execution shall be sued against him as Ter-tenant 2. There is not any lien as Heir for the Iudgment doth not mention the Heir and therfore he cannot be charged unlesse he be expresly bound and in the Record of the Recovery it doth not appear that the first lien shall bind the Heir for he declares that he bound himself and not that he bound himself and his Heirs 3. If the Heir were bound in the Obligation so that he were once bound as Heir yet the Iudgment determines the specialty so that now he is not bound and in the Iudgment the Heir is not mentioned as in 10 H. 4. 21. 24. If an Abbot contract to the use of the house without consent of the Covent this shall bind if he dies but if he takes an Obligation of the Abbot and then he dies this shall not bind the house for the Contract is determined by the Obligation and this is the reason that in the time of E. 3. in a recovery upon debt the Obligation was cancelled 4. Here he cannot be charged as Heir for it appeareth by the Record Where a debt is recorded upon bond the Obligation was cancelled that his Father is living for it is brought against him as Heir apparant which he cannot be but during the life of his Father And as to the objection that in this case he shall have his age and therfore shall be charged as Heir Non sequitur for if execution be sued against the Heir of a Purchasor he shall have his age and yet he is not Heir neither can charged as Heir to the Conusor But because it is a rule in Law that the Heir which hath by discent shall not answer where his Inheritance may be charged during his Nonage Whitlock to the same intent because the Heir is not charged here as Heir but as Ter-tenant wherby his false Plea shall not hurt him with which Jones also agreed and said that he here considered three things 1. That the lien of the Ancestor binds the Heir 2. How the Heir shall behave himself in pleading 3. Our point in question For the first there are two things requisite to bind one as Heir 1. A lien expresse for if one bind himself and not his Heir this shall not bind his Heir in any case 2. A discent of Inheritance for without this he shall not be bound by the act of his Ancestor and he is bound no longer then Assets discend for he alien before the Writ purchased the lien is gone 2. He ought to behave himself truly and plead truly and confesse the assets discended to him when debt is brought against him as heir otherwise his own Lands shall be charged with the debt as it is in Pepys case in Plow Com. But where it is said in Pepys case that upon a Nihil dicit or Non sum informatum c. If the Iudgment passe upon them that it shall be generall I am not of that opinion for the common experience of the Courts is that such a generall Iudgment shall not be given against the Heir unlesse it be upon a false plea pleaded with which agrees Lawsons case Dyer 81. and Henninghams case Dyer 344. where the Iudgment passed by Nihil dicit so that the saying in Plow 440. a. that what way soever the Heir be condemned in debt if he do not confesse the Assets c. that it shall be his proper debt is not now taken for Law And I also hâ—ld that if the Heir plead falsly and there is found more Assets Where upon a false plea by an Heir the Plaintiff may elect to take the Assets in execution or an Elegit of all his Land that yet it is in the election of the Plaintiff to charge him and to take execution of the Assets only or to take an Elegit of all his Land and he is not bound to take an Elegit of all his Land in this case for otherwise this inconvenience may arise If the Heir hath a 100. acres by discent and two by purchâ—se if upon the false Plea of the Heir the Plaintiff cannot have any other execution but an Eligit of the Moyety of his Lands then he by this is prejudiced for otherwise he might have all he Assets in execution and so the Heir by this way shall take advantage of his false plea. 3. He held as Whitlock before and for the same reason Doderidge Iustice How the Heir shall be bâ—und by the act of his Father is worthy of consideration upon which Prima facie the Books seem to disagree but being well considered accord with excellent harmony I have considered this case it was moved at Reading Term and because my Notes are not here I will speak more briefly and will consider 1. Hâ—w an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father and as to that in debt against an Heir he is charged as Heir so that at this day it is taken as his proper debt wherby the Writ is in the Debet and Detinet How an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father but in the Detinet only against Executors But in former time from the 18. of Ed. 2. till 7 H. 4. if an Executor had Assets the Heir was not chargable but in 7 H. 4. the Law changed in this point for now it is accounted his own debt and debt will lye against his Executor as it is said in Plow Com and so against the Heirs of the Heir to many generations albeit of this Plowden makes a doubt and his plea that he had nothing at the day of the Writ purchased nor ever after is good for if he alien the Assets he is discharged of the debt in regard he is not to wait the action of the Obligee 2. The Heir shall be châ—â—ged upon or Recognisance not as Heir but as Ter-tenant for he is not bound in the Recognisance but only the Conusor grant that the debt shall be levied of all his Lands and Tenements but not against his Heirs And here he is not meerly as Ter-tenant for he shall not have contribution agâ—â—st â—her ter-Ter-tenants but only against those who are Heirs as himself is but to all other intents he is Ter-tenant and so charged Why an Heir is not chargable for debt after he hath fold the assets as 32 E. 3. and 27 H. 6. aâ—â— 3. That upon a Iudgment as our case is the Heir shall be charged as Ter-tenant and not otherwise The Book which hath been cited viz 33 E. 3. Execution 162. is expresse in the point the broken years of Fitzherbert are obsâ—urely reported but by comparing of cases it will appear to be our case exâ—resly 4. That albeit an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Ancestor where he is particularly bound yet upon his false plea no execution shall be but upon the assets So it seems to me that in the principall case the Iudgment shall be speciall and it seems to be a
same time nothing works by the Livery for the reason before given by Jones For the matter of Law he conceived that the unity of possession doth not extinguish the Water-course and that for two reasons 1. For the necessity of the thing 2. From the nature of the thing being a Water-course which is a thing running 1 For the necessity and this is the reason that common appendant by the unity of possession shall not be extinguished for it is appendant to ancient Land-hide and gain arable Land which is necessary for the preservation of the Common-wealth and as in this case there is a necessity of bread so in our case there is a necessity of water And for the case of a way Distinguendum est for if it be a way which is only for easement it is extinguished by unity of possession but if it be a way of necessity as a way to Market or Church there it is not extinguished by unity of possession and accordingly was the opinion of Popham chief Iustice which I take for good Law and the case of 11 H. 7. 25. is a notable case and there a reason is given why a Gutter is not extinguished by unity of possession because it is matter of necessity 2. From the nature of water which naturally descends it is alwais current Et aut invenit aut facit viam and shall such a thing be extinguished which hath its being from the Creation Co. lib. 4. Luttrels case a Mill is a necessary thing and if I purchase the Land upon which the streams goes which runs to this Mill and afterwards I alien the Mill the Water-course remains So if a man hath a Dye-house and there is a water running to it and afterwards he purchase the Land upon which the water is current and sell it yet he shall have the Water-course Dyer Dame Browns case and the principall case in Luttrels case a Fulling-mill made a Water-mill this shall not alter the nature of the Mill but yet it remains a Mill so the water hath its course notwithstanding the unity and he concluded for the Plaintiff Crew chief Iustice I agree that the Declaration is good and also that the Bar is good for the manner but for the matter in Law I conceive that it is not good In our Law every case hath its stand or fall from a particular reason or circumstance For a Warren and Tithes they are not extinguished by unity because they are things collaterall to the Land And for the case of 13 Eliz. in Dyer of an Inclosure I conceive that by the unity the Inclosure is destroyed for the Prescription was interrupted and in Day and Drakes case 3 Jac. in this Court it was adjudged that in the same case the Prescription was gone It may be resembled to the case of Homage Ancestrell 57 E. 3. Fitzherbert Nusans And for our case it is not like to the cases of Common or a Way because the Water-course is a thing naturall and therfore by unity it shal not be discharged also there is a linement out of which every man shall have a benefit and therfore he concluded that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff And Iudgment was commanded to be entred for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Welden versus Vesey AN action of Debt was brought by Welden Sheriff of the City of Coventry against Vesey upon the Statute of 29 Eliz. cap. 4. and declares that it is provided by this Statute that no Sheriff or Minister c. shall take for an execution if the summ doth not exceed 100 l. but 12 d. for every 20 s. and being above the summ of 100 l. 6 d. for every 20 s. and shews that wheras the said Vesey had judgment against one in an action of Debt that the Plaintiff by virtue of a Capias directed to him took the body of the said person condemned and that it was delivered to the Plaintiff and that he for levying of the money had brought this action The Defendant by way of Bar saith that it is provided by this act that it shall not extend to Executions in Towns Corporate and that this was within Coventry and so demurred upon the Declaration And Whitwick argued for the Plaintiff two things are considerable in this case 1. Whether where the summ exceeds 100 l. the Sheriff shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. of the 100 l. and 6 d. for that which is over or 6 d. only for every 20 s. for all the summ 2. Whether this Statute extend to Iudgments in Towns Corporate For the first the letter of the Statute is cleer that he shall have 12 d. for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for the residue for the Statute is that if it be above 100 l. Whether a Sheriff or c. shall have 12 d. in the pound for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for the rest upon an Execution that he shall have but 6 d. therfore if it be under a 100 l. he shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. And the meaning of the Statute is plain also for otherwise the Sheriff shall have a lesser Fee where it is above a 100 l. as where it is a 199 l. then he shall have for 100 l. but this was not the intent of the Statute but the greater the Execution the greater the Fee It was adjudged in one Gores case 10 Jac. that an action of Debt lies upon this Law Pasch 14 Jac. Rot. 351. Brole and Tumblerson Sheriffs of the City of London brought Dabt against Nathanael Michell for execution of 400 l. for 12 l. 10 s. scil 5 l. for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for every 20 1. after But I confesse that the principall question there was whether an action of Debt lies for the money and it was resolved that it did and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff 2. To the Proviso that this doth not extend to Fees in a Town Corporate whether this extend to executions which go out of Iudgments in this Court or in the Common Pleas into Towns Corporate The Statute shews that before that time the Sheriff had taken great Fees which the Parliament considering restrained them to a certainty The words of the Proviso are generall Provided that this Act shall not extend to any Fees to be taken for any Execution within any City or Town Corporate and although the words be generall yet the exposition shall be according to reason as it is said in Fulmerston and Stewards case in Plow Expesition shal be made against the words if the words be against reason 5 H. 7. 7 38 H. 3. Broo. Livery 6. The King shall have primer Seisen of all Lands of his Tenant which he holds of him in Capite but if one holds of the King in Capite in Socage he shall pay no primer Seisen to the King and this Statute shall have this intendment that this Proviso shall extend only to Executions upon Iudgments
as a memorandum and afterwards there is an order that the Iudgement shall not be filed if the Iudgement upon this shall be stayd and speaks to it and by him the Case of 15. E. 4. 7. is nothing to this purpose for Iustices in Eyre were Iustices by commission and they had not the custody of their Records and so it differs from this case And Jones Justice which was not denyed if a Iudgement be pronounced here and be not entered the Iudges may alter it the next Term. It was said by Noy in this case that all Franchises in England are against common Right and execution of Iustice and for the present purpose he cited one Sir John Wells Case where in a Quo Warranto the Defendant had day to plead or otherwise that judgement should be entered to seise and he failed to plead at the day and the Iudgement was not filed and yet he could not be relieved But it was sayd by some of the Iustices that this was a case of great extremity But by Hendon it was affirmed in the Exchequer in one Sandersons Case and in the principall case the matter was adjourned for a fortnight and ordered that the plea should be accorded Mich. Term 2. Car. in the Kings Bench. Sharp versus Rust IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit between Sharp Plaintiff and Walter Rust Defendant upon non-Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and it was moved in arrest of judgement upon these words in the Declaration the Defendant being Father to the Plaintiffs Wife for whom the Apparrel was bought said to the Plaintiff deliver the Apparrel to my Daughter and I will pay for them and saith not to whom the payment shall be made And it was argued by Woobrich of Grayes-Inne that this is no sufficient cause to stay the Iudgement for by necessary implication and reference of the words precedent the certainty of the pers on appeareth to whom the payment ought to be made And he observed that in our Law the time the estate the thing and the person not being sufficiently expressed Where a thing incertain may be made certain both in time estate and person yet by necessary coherence and relation to matter precedent they are sometimes made certain enough 1. For the time Perkins P. 496. puts the Rule if a condition hath relation to an act precedent and no time is limited when it shall be done yet if ought to be done when the act precedent is done and therefore if I. S. be bound to me in 20 l. upon condition that if I enfeoff him of black acre that then he wil pay me 10 l. c. in this case presently when I have enfeoffed the obligor of black acre he ought to pay the 10 l. notwithstanding there be no time limited when it should be payd 2. For the thing being put incertainly yet the communication precedent makes this certain 30. H. 8. Dyer 42. in the Case of the Executors of Greenliffe where it is agreed that albeit it is not shown what thing is granted yet it shall be the Land of which the communication was 3. For the Estate although it be incertain yet sometimes it is made certain by the matter precedent as in the Case Co. lib. 8. A Stewardship was granted for life and afterwards an Annuity was granted for the exercise of that Office without declaring what Estate he should have in that Annuity and resolved that he should have the Annuity for life because he had the Office for life 4. For the person the consideration sometimes ascertains the person and therefore if land he given to one by Deed habendum sibi una cum filia donatoris in frankmariage this shall enure to both because the Feme is Causa donationis and by intendment of law the Land and the feme shal be given together to the man for the advancement of the Feme as it is Mich. 2. 3. Ph. Mary Dyer 126. a 4. E. 3. 4. Plow Com. 158. enfeoff him another and bind him and his heirs to warrant doth not say to whom he shall warrant yet the Feoffee and his heirs shall have advantage of this warranty for it cannot have any other intendment 6. E. 2. Voucher 258. 22. E. 4. 16. Kelleway 108. Co. lib. 8. Whitlocks Case In a Lease for years reserving rent it is the surest way to make the reservation to no person in certain but to leave it to the general intendment of the Law 15. H. 7. A man deviseth that his Land shall be sold for the payment of his debts and doth not say by whom they shall be sold by his Executors because they are lyable for the payment of his debts but if one devise that his land shall be sold saith not for the payment of his debts the devise is void because the Law doth not intend in this case to make the sale 40 E. 3. 5. 4. E. 3. Fitzherbert Obligation 16. Nota if a man be bound in debt or Covenant by writing and puts such a clause in the writing Et ad majorem hujus rei securitatem invenit fidei jussores quorum unusquisque in tot in solido se obligavit that although none speak there but the principall in the writing if the others put to their seals they accept that which the principal spake so become principal 2. E 4. 20. and here in our Case it appeareth that the Deed was so therefore it is reason that the Declaration should be so for there cannot be a material difference between the Declaration the deed especially being upon an agreement which is to be ruled according to the intention of the parties as it is in Plow Com. 140. a. In our Law if any parties be agreed upon a thing and words are expressed or written to make the agreement although they be not apt words yet if they have substance in them tending to the effect intended the Law shall take Intention of parties to be observed them of the same substance as words usuall for the Law regards the intention of the parties and here the intent appeareth that the assumption shall be mâ—de to the Plaintiff although there want expresse words and therefore he prayed Iudgement for the Plaintiff And afterwards the same Term Iudgement was given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Beven versus Cowling IN an Action upon the Case Littleton mooved in arrest of Iudgment for the Defendant wherein the Case was this the Defendant assumed that if the Defendant would defer the payment of a bond in which one A. was bound to him and would not implead him upon it then he promised to pay it and he doth not say that he deferred the payment untill such a day and therefore this is no valuable consideration so that the action doth not lye for notwithstanding Action upon the Case upon a â—romise that if â—e would not sue such a
Cleland brought a Writ of error against Baldock upon a Iudgement given in where the Plaintiff declared that the Intr. Hill 22. Iac Rot. 59â— Defendant in consideration that he would do all his commands honestly and truly for the space of a yeare assumed to pay him 10 l. and further declared that he had done all his honest and lawfull commands and this promise being found by verdict Iudgement was given against Doctor Cleland and thereupon he brought this Writ of error and Greene assigned two errors 1. The Assumpsit is that he shall doe all his commands honestly and truly and he hath declared that he hath done all his lawfull and honest commands and he may honest commands and yet not honestly 2. It is said that Jurator Assident dampna and it is not said occasione transgression predict and it is against all Presidents But Nota that there were these words ex hac parte opposita and therefore the exceptions were disallowed by the Court and the first Iudgement affirmed The same Term in the same Court. Secheverel versus Dale THis Case was sent out of Chancery to this Court â—o know the Law therein and in Trespas the case was this Henry Secheverell the Father seised in Fée levied a Fine to A. and B. in Fee to the use of himselfe for life absque impetitione vasti with power to cut and carry away the trees and to make Leases for 21 yeares or three lives the remainder to the use of John Secheverell his eldest Son for life without impeachment of waste with the same powers Henry the Father made a Lease to one under whom the Plaintiff claims for three lives rendring the ancient Rent excepting all the trees unlesse those which shall be for cropping lopping and fewell Henry the Father dyes John the Son in the next remainder cut certain trees Victorin Secheverell who clayms by the lease made by the Father brings trespas and two Questions were moved 1. Whether Lessee for life without impeachment of waste may make a Lease excepting the trees and it was objected by the Councel of the Plaintiff that he could not because this second Lease ariseth out of the first fine and out of the estate of the Conusor But the Court prima facie was of opinion that he might well make such a Lease with such an exception See Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowls his Case and Doctor and Student lib. 1. cap. 1. and by Doderidge Iustice the Lease ariseth out of both the estates Jones Iustice suppose the Lessee absque impetitione vasti assigne over all his estate might he cut the trees and it was conceived that he might for by Doderidge he hath power to dispose of the trees as it was resolved in Lewys Bowls his case Jones he hath no propriety in the Trees untill they be cut Crew ch Justice Admit a Stranger cut the trees who shall have them By all the Court the Lessee without impeachment of waste shall have them 2. Point Tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut and carry away the trees and make Leases for 21. years or three lives the remainder for life to J. S. without impeachment of waste c. Tenant for life makes a Lease for thrée lives and dyes whether he in remainder for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trées may cut the trées and take them during the Lease for thrée lives and the Court séemed to be of opinion that he might And Leving of Councell with the Plaintiff argued that when tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trees and to make Leases for 21. years or three lives makes a Lease for thrée lives excepting the trées that this is a voyd exception because he hath no interest but a bare Authority 27. H. 6. Fitz. Wast 8. Statham tit Wast 1. makes this a Quaere which Statham was once the owner of the Land in question A man makes a Lease for life without impeachment of waste a Stranger cuts trées the Lessée brings trespas he shall recover no Damages for the value of the trees because the propriety belongs to him in the reversion he may dispose of them Quaere Dyer 284. Daunsley and Southwels Case Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowles case that such a Lessee may take trées which are blown down and 3. H. 6. 45. Mich 41. and 42. Eliz. C. B. Leechford against Sanders in an Action of waste upon a Lease made to Sanders for life with a proviso that the Plaintiff might dispose of the trées during the estate and resolved that the Action lies not for notwithstanding this power the trées are demised to the Lessée also so here when the trées are excepted he hath no interest but only an authority 2. The exception is voyd for another reason because when such a Lessée makes such a Lease this is not his Lease but it hath its operation out of the originall fine and he who makes this hath but the nomination and therefore cannot adde a condition or exception to it And if the second Lease shall have its being out of the estate of the Lessee for life then there shall be an use upon an use as appears Co. lib. 1. 134. and that the Law will not allow 15. H. 7. and Co. Lib. 1. Albanyes Case If a man devise that his Executors shall fell his Land they cannot adde a condition or exception to this sale as an attornment upon a condition subsequent is voyd Co. lib. 2. Tookers case 3. This case may be resembled to the case of Copy-holds which is in Co. lib. 8. 63. b. in Swaynes Case If a Lord takes a Wife and afterwards grants Lands by Copy according to the custome and dyes his Wife shall not be endowed of this Land for albeit her title of Dower was before the Grant yet the title of Copi-hold which is the custome is elder then the title of Dower so in our case the title of the second Lessee is derived out of the estate of the Conuzées and therefore shall not be clogg'd with the Exceptions of Lessee for life without impeachment of waste 4. This priviledge to cut the trées is annexed to the estates and goes along with the estate and therefore shall not begin before the Stranger be in possession 3. E. 3. 44. 45. Idles case 28. H. 8. Dyer 10. And it may be resembled to the cases of 16. E. 4. and 27. H. 8. Tenant in taile sold the trées if he dyes before the Party takes them he shall never have them because he hath stayd out his time But it may be objected that upon such a Lease he may reserve a rent as it is in Whitlocks case Co. lib. 8. to which I will offer this difference Lessée for life with power to make Leases for thrée lives reserving rent makes a Lease for thrée lives reserving rent this reservation is good because it is but a Declaration of the Lease and of the rent
the Causa Matrimonii prolocuti which as they pretend ought to prove that there was a trust at Common Law And the other the Statute of Marlbridge that the Lord in case of Wards against Feoffments made by Collusion which Feoffments they alledge prove that a trust then was To which it was said that the gift made by a woman to another to the intent that he shal marry her hath in it a Condition more properly implied to wit that if he doe not marry her that she shall have her land back againe for which the Common Law gives her remedy by the Action aforesaid for if it had been but a trust no remedy had been by the Common Law And for the Statute of Marlbridge the contrary therunto is manifestly proved for the Statute speaks but of Feoffments made to Heirs apparants or upon Condition or to the intent to enffeoff the Heir at his full age or the like in which cases the use alwayes goes with the Possessions and is not to the Feffor And the Statute of 4. H. 7. was made in vaine which gives the Wardship of Cestuy que use where no Will is declared which had not been needfull if Feoffments within the Statute of Marlbridge had been said to have been to Uses And without doubt if those who made the Statute of Marlbridge had then had knowledge of these Feoffments to Uses which were so mischievous and more then the other Feoffments by Collusion they then would have provided remedy for these cases of Uses Also the Statute de Religiosis ordains that Nec arte nec ingenio Lands shal not be conveyed in Mortmain and therby it was conceived that a full provision had been made against these Mortmains and yet in 15 Rich. 2. Provision was made against Uses conveyed in Mortmain to Religious or other Corporations of which they took the Profits And without doubt those who were so precise in the making of the Statute of Religiosis against Mortmains would also have made provision for the uses if they had then been known But to cleer this point without all controversie the Statute it self of uses 27 H. 8. makes it plain which saith expresly that by the Common Law of the Realm Lands or Tenements ought not to passe from one to another without solemn Livery matter of Record or writing and that these Feoffments to uses were Errors used and accustomed within the Realm to the Subversion of the ancient Laws therfore it stands not with the ancient Common Law of the Realm as all the Parliment took it which is more to be regarded then any Book vouched But see how and when they began and crept in at Common Law and it shall be easily perceived as it hath been well said by some of those who argued to this point at the beginning that they began by two means to wit by fraud and by fear And he said that the first Book which he had seen in all the Books of the Law which tend to an use is the case of 8. Assise which makes mention that the Counsee of a Fine entred into the Land in the right of another which is to be taken to anothers use And in the Quadragessimâ—s of Edw. 3. mention is made of the Feoffees of the Lord Burglash who sued to the King by petition and by the Statute of 50 Ed. 3. cap. 6. mention is made that divers gave their Lands to their Friends to have the profits and afterwards fled to priviledged places and lived there to the hinderance of their Creditors And therfore it was provided that in such a case execution shall be made as if no such assurance had been made And by 2 Rich. 2. these are called Feoffments to uses and made by craft to deceive Creditors and there is the first mention which is made in any Statute of the word Use So fraud hath been alwaies the chief foundation of these Vses yet in time they began to have some credit in the Law And this was when men saw that the Court of Conscience gave remedy in these cases against such who had not the conscience themselves to perform the trust put in them and to take away the danger which hapned to an infinite number of good Subjects upon the Garboyls which hapned between the time of E. 3. and that of King H. 7. caused that in effect all the Possessions of the Realm were put in Feoffments to uses And the first case in the Law which speaks of this word Use which he ever saw was as he said in 5 H. 4. And in the like case by Gascoign 7 H. 4. no remedy is given by the Law for Cestay que use and afterwards it crept into the Law as appeareth yet as an Error of long time used And if before the Statute of 27 H 8. a Lease had been made for life the remainder in Fee to the use of B. for life the remainder to the use of the first Son of the said B. and so further as here If the Tenant for life had made a Feoffment in Fee to a stranger and had not given the stranger notice of the Use and all this were without consideration and afterwards he in the Remainder in Fee to the Use had released all his Right to the said stranger every one of them had been hereby without remedy for their Uses Were the Son of B. born before or after this wrong done So if it were at Common Law before this Statute as hath been weâ—l said and the Law being so before this Statute then he said it was to be seen what was to be done in the case after the Statute which will stand altogether upon this what will become of these contingent Vses to the Sons not born at the time of the said Feoffment made by Sir John Saintleger and his Co-feoffees by this Statute of 27 H. 8. and it seems to him cleerly that no possession is executed to any contingent use by this Statute untill it comes in being and that as the case is here and in some other speciall cases it shall never be executed And one cause why such a contingent Vse shall not be executed is because it doth not stand with the letter of the Law but rather is against the letter Another cause is because it is utterly against the intent of the Law to execute it as the case is here It doth not stand with the Letter of the Statute for this is Where any person or persons stand seised to the use of any other person or persons c. And it is cleer that none can stand seised to the use of him who is not neither can he who is not in rerum natura have any use therfore the case here doth not stand with the letter of the Statute to be now executed And further the words following are that in every such case every person who hath such an Use in Fee-simples Fee-tail for life for years c. or otherwise in Remainder or