during the wives life which was not to be intended 15 El. Moore f. 123. n. 265. Another Case I shall make use of is a Case Paschae 15 El. A man seis'd of a Messuage and of divers Lands occupied with it time out of mind leased part of it to a stranger for years and after made his last Will in these words I will and bequeath to my wife my Messuage with all the Lands thereto belonging in the occupation of the Lessee and after the decease of my Wife I will that it with all the rest of my Lands shall remain to my younger Son The Question in that Case was Whether the wife should have the Land not leased by implication for her life because it was clear the younger Son was to have no part until the death of the wife And the Lord Anderson at first grounding himself upon that Case in Brook as it seems of 29 H. 8. twice by Brook remembred in his Title Devise n. 28. and after n. 52. was of opinion That the wife should have the Land not leased by implication But Mead was of a contrary opinion for that it was expresly devis'd That the wife should have the Land leas'd and therefore no more should be intended to be given her but the Heir should have the Land not in lease during the wives life To which Anderson mutata opinione agreed Hence perhaps many have collected That a person shall not take Land by Implication of a Will if he takes some other Land expresly by the same Will but that is no warrantable difference For vary this Case but a little as the former case was varied That the Land in lease was devis'd to the wife for life and after the death of the wife all the Devisors land was devis'd to the youngest Son as this Case was and that after the death of the wife and the youngest son the Devisors Heir should have the Land both leas'd and not leas'd it had been clear that the Heir exactly according to the Case of 13 H. 7. should have been excluded from all the Land leas'd and not leas'd until after the death of the wife and the younger son And therefore in such case the wife by necessary implication should have had the Land not leas'd as she had the Land leas'd by express devise and that notwithstanding she had the leas'd Land by express devise for else none could have the Land not leas'd during the wives life Horton vers Horton 2 Jac. Cr. f. 74. 75. Wadham made a Lease for years upon condition the Lessee should not alien to any besides his Children The Lessee deviseth the term to Humphrey his son after the death of his wife and made one Marshall and another his Executors and died The Lessor entred as for breach of the Condition supposing this a devise to the wife of the term by implication The opinion of the Judges was It was no devise by implication but the Executors should have the term until the wives death but it was said If it had been devis'd to his Executors after the death of his wife there the wife must have it by implication or none could have had it But Popham denied that Case because if the devise had been to the Executors after the wives death the Executors should when the wife died have had the term as Legatees but until her death they should have it as Executors generally which by all opinions fully confirms the difference taken That a devise shall not be good by implication when the implication is not necessary and in this Case all agreed the Case in 13 H. 7. to be good Law because the implication there was necessary Edward Clatch being seis'd of two Messuages in Soccage tenure Dyer 15 16 El. 4. 330. b. and having Issue a Son and two Daughters by three several Venters His Son being dead in his life time and leaving two Daughters who were Heirs at Law to the Father devis'd one of the Messuages to Alice his Daughter and her Heirs for ever and the other to Thomazine his Daughter and her Heirs for ever with limitation That if Alice died without Issue living Thomazine Thomazine should then have Alice's part to her and her Heirs and if Thomazine died before the Age of Sixteen years Alice should have her part in Fee also And if both his said Daughters died without Issue of their bodies then the Daughters of his Son should have the Messuages The youngest daughter of the Testator died without Issue having past her Age of sixteen years It was resolv'd That the words in the Will If his two Daughters died without Issue of their Bodies did not create by implication cross remainders in tayl to the Devisors Daughters whereby the eldest should take the part of the youngest but her part should go to the Heirs at Law according to the Limitation of the Will and those words were but a designation of the time when the Heirs at Law should have the Messuages Note That one of the Daughters dying without Issue the Heirs at Law by the Will had her part without staying until the other Daughter died without Issue 1. From these Cases I first conclude That only possible implication by a Will shall not give the Land from the right Heir but a necessary implication which excludes the right Heir shall give it 2. That the difference taken is not sound That one shall not take by implication of a Will any Land where the same person hath other Land or Goods expresly devis'd by the same Will for if the implication be necessary the having of Land or any other thing by express devise will not hinder another taking also by implication as appears in the three Cases by me made use of viz. 13 H. 7. 3 E. 6. 15 Eliz. cited out of Moore 3. Whether any thing be given expresly by Will or not a possible Implication only shall not disinherit the Heir where it may as well be intended that nothing was devis'd by implication as that it was But if any man think that to be material in this Case the Daughters had respective Portions expresty devis'd them viz. Six hundred pounds to each of them and therefore shall not have the Land also by implication only possible to disinherit the right Heir Quest 2 For the second point These words My Will is if it happen my Son George Mary and Katharine my Daughters to dye without Issue of their Bodies lawfully begotten then all my free-Free-lands shall remain and be to my said Nephew William Rose and his Heirs for ever are so far from importing a devise of the Land to the Son and Daughters for their lives with respective Inheritances in tayl by any necessary implication that both Grammatically and to common intendment they import only a designation and appointment of the time when the Land shall come to the Nephew namely when George Mary and Katherine happen to dye Issuless and not before And where
no such Case in 38 E. 3. f. 26. but the Case intended is 38 E. 3. f. 21. and he quotes the folio truly in his Littleton But the Case is not That an Assignee may rebutt or have benefit of a warranty made to a man and his Heirs only but that a warranty being made to a man his Heirs and Assigns the Assignee of the Heir or the Assignee of the Assignee though neither be Assignee of the first Grantee of the warranty shall have like benefit of the warranty as if he were Assignee of the first Grantee which hath been often resolv'd in the old Books To the same purpose he cites a Case out of 7 E. 3. f. 34. 46 E. 3. f. 4. which doth but remember that of 7. as adjudg'd That the Assignee of Tenant in tayl might rebutt the Donor whence he infers as before that the Tenant in possession might rebutt without any right to the warranty But the Inference holds not from that Case The Case of 7 E. 3. was That Land was given in tayl and the Donor warranted the Land generally to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns the Donee made a Feoffment in Fee and died without Issue and the Donor impleading the Feoffee was rebutted because he had warranted the Land to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns and the Feoffee claimed as Assignee of the Donee and therefore rebutted not because he had a bare possession But this Judgment of 7 E. 3. Sir Edward Coke denies and perhaps justly to be Law now because the Estate tayl being determin'd to which the warranty was first annex'd the whole warranty determin'd with it But however the Case no way proves what it is alledg'd for in Lincoln Colledge Case That a man may rebutt without ever shewing the warranty extended to him for the Feoffee did in that Case shew it So in the Case 45 E. 3. f. 18. the Feme who rebutted shew'd she was Grantee of the warranty To this may be added That what is delivered as before in Lincoln Colledge Case is neither conducing to the Judgment given in that Case nor is it any Opinion of the Judges but is Sir Edward Coke's single Opinion emergently given as appears most clearly in the Case To conclude When the Feoffees were seis'd to the use of William Vescy for his life and after to the use of the Defendant his wife for her life and after to the use of the right Heirs of William Vescy And when by Operation of the Statute of 27 H. 8. the possession is brought to these uses the warranty made by William Vescy to the Feoffees and their Heirs is wholly destroy'd For if before the Statute the Feoffees had executed an Estate to William for life the Remainder to his wife for life the Remainder to his right Heirs The warranty had been extinguish'd by such Execution of Estate and releas'd in Law for it could be in none but in William and his Heirs who could not warrant to himself or themselves By Littleton Sect. 743. for his Heirs in such Case take not by Purchase but Limitation because the Freehold was in him with a Remainder over to his right Heirs and so hath as great an Estate in the Land as the Feoffees had and then the warranty is gone by Littleton Litt. Sect. 744. And now the Statute executes the possession in the same manner and the warranty is in none for the time present or future but extinct If the warranty had been to the Feoffees their Heirs and Assigns it might have been more colourably question'd Whether the mean Remainder were not an Assignee of the Feoffees and so to have benefit of the warranty but the warranty being to the Feoffees and their Heirs only no Estate remaining in them no Assignee can pretend to the warranty 2. William Vescy could by no possibility ever warrant this Estate to the Defendant during his life and where the warranty cannot possibly attach the Ancestor it shall never attach the Heir as by Littleton's Case If a man deviseth Lands in Fee to another with warranty for him and his Heirs his Heirs shall not be bound to the warranty because himself could never be And though in that Case the Estate to be warranted commenc'd after the death of the Warranter and here the Remainder to the wife is in being before his death yet the reason differs not for himself could no more warrant this by any possibility than that and his Heir might as equally warrant the Estate devis'd as this Next Justice Jones in Spirt and Bences Case cites a Case 7 Eliz. the same with this Resolution resolved in the Common Pleas That the mediate Remainder could not be warranted In this Case if the Feoffees before the Statute had either voluntarily or by coercion of the Chancery after the death of the first Cestuy que use for life executed the Estate of the mean Remainder such person in Remainder could have no benefit of the warranty being but an Assignee of the Feoffees because the warranty was only to them and their Heirs No more can the person in Remainder here whose Estate is executed by the Statute be warranted more than if such Estate had been executed by the Common Law There are another sort of persons who may rebutt and perhaps vouch who are neither Heirs nor formally Assignees to the Garrantee but have the Estate warranted dispositione instituto Legis which I conceive not to differ materially whether they have such Estate warranted by the Common Law or by Act of Parliament The first of this kind I shall name Ass p. 9. 35 is Tenant by the Courtesie who as was adjudg'd 35 Ass might rebutt the warranty made to his wives Ancestor yet was neither Heir nor formal Assignee to any to whom the warranty was granted nothing is said in the Book concerning his vouching but certainly the wives Heir may be receiv'd to defend his estate if impleaded by a stranger who may vouch according to the warranty or may rebutt as the Case of 45 E. 3. f. 18. is But this difference is observable also where such a Tenant rebutts it appears what claim he makes to the warranty and so the Inconveniences avoided which follow a Rebutter made upon no other reason than because he who rebutts is in possession of the Land warranted A second Tenant of this kind is the Lord of a Villain 22 Ass p. 37. and therefore the Case is 22 Ass That Tenant in Dower made a Lease for life to a Villain which in truth was a forfeiture for making a greater Estate of Freehold than she had power to make and bound her and her Heirs to warranty the Lord of the Villain entred upon the Land in her life time and before the warranty attach'd the Heir who had right to enter for the forfeiture the Mother died and the Heir entred upon the L. of the Villain who re-entred and the Heir brought an Assise The L. of the Villain
to the King to license as he thought fit 355 2. The intent of the Act being That every man should not sell Wine that would his Majesty could not better answer the ends of the Act than to restrain the sellers to Freemen of London to the Corporation of Vintners men bred up in that Trade and serving Apprenticeships to it ibid. 13 El. c. 12 Not reading the Articles 1. Immediately upon not reading the Articles the Incumbent is by this Statute deprived ipso facto 132 2. Upon such Deprivation the Patron may present Ante 14. and his Clerk ought to be admitted and instituted but if he do not no Lapse incurrs until after Six months after notice of such Deprivation given to the Patron 132 3. Where the Incumbent subscribes the Articles upon his Admission and Institution that makes him perfect Incumbent pro tempore 133 4. But if he hath a Benefice and afterwards accepts another and doth not subscribe nor read the Articles then he never was Incumbent of the second and consequently never accepted a second Benefice to disable him from holding the first 132 133 134 1. That all Leases by Spiritual persons of Tythe c. 13 Eliz. cap. 10. Concerning Leases to be made by Ecclesiastical persons parcel of their Spiritual Promotions other than for One and twenty years or three Lives reserving the accustomed yearly Rent shall be void 2. This Statute intended that Leases in some sense might be made of Tithes for One and twenty years or three Lives and an ancient Rent Reserved but of a bare Tythe only a Rent could not be reserved for neither Distress nor Assise can be of such a Rent 203 204 3. Therefore a Lease of Tythe and Land out of which a Rent may issue and the accustomed Rent may be reserved must be good within the intent of the Statute 204 7 Jac. cap. 5.21 Jac. cap. 12. For Officers to be sued in the proper County 1. The question upon these Acts was Whether an Officer or any in their assistance that shall do any thing by colour of but not concerning their Office and be therefore impleaded shall have the benefit of these Acts. 2. Or if they are impleaded for any thing done by pretence of their Offices and which is not strictly done by reason of their Office but is a mis-seazante Whether they may have the like benefit 3. Without this Act the Action ought to be laid where the Fact was done and the Act is but to compel the doing of that where an Officer is concerned that otherwise Fieri debuit 114 4. The Statute intends like benefit to all the Defendants where the Fact is not proved to be done where the Action is laid as if the Plaintiff became Non-suit or suffered a Discontinuance viz. that they should have double costs 117 12 Car. 2. cap. 4. For granting Tonnage and Poundage to the King 1. Those Wines which are to pay this Duty according to the Act must be Wines brought into Port as Merchandise by his Majesties Subjects or Strangers 165 2. But Wines which are by their kind to pay Duty if they shall be brought into Ports or Places of this Kingdom neither by his Majesties Subjects nor Aliens they are not chargeable with this Duty ibid. 3. If they are not brought into the Ports and Places as Merchandize viz. for Sale they are not chargeable with the Duty 165 170 4. Wines coming into this Kingdom as Wreck are neither brought into this Kingdom by his Majesties Subjects nor Strangers but by the Wind and Sea 166 5. Wreck'd Goods are not brought into this Kingdom for Merchandise viz. for Sale but are as all other the Native Goods of the Kingdom for sale or other use at the pleasure of the owner ibid. 6. All Goods chargeable with the Duties of this Act must be proprieted by a natural born Merchant or Merchant Alien and accordingly the greater and lesser Duty is to be paid 166 168 7. All Goods subject to this Duty may be forfeited by the disobedience and mis-behaviour of the Merchant-proprietor or those entrusted by him 167 1. The intent of this Statute is to priviledge the Father against common Right 12 Car. 2 cap. 24. To enable the Father to devise the Guardianship of his Son to appoint the Guardian of his Heir and the time of his Wardship under One and twenty 179 2. Such a special Guardian cannot transfer the custody by Deed or Will to any other 179 3. He hath no different Estate from a Guardian in Soccage but for the time the of Wardship 179 4. The Father cannot by this Act give the custody to a Papist 180 5. If the Father doth not appoint for how long time under One and twenty years his Son shall be in Ward it is void for Uncertainty 185 6. The substance of the Statute and sense thereof is That whereas all Tenures are now Soccage and the Law appoints a Gardian till Fourteen yet the Father may nominate the Gardian to his Heir and for any time until his Age of One and twenty and such Gardian shall have like remedy for the Ward as Gardian in Soccage at the Common Law 183 Supersedeas 1. If a priviledged person as an Attorney c. or his Menial Servant is sued in any Jurisdiction forreign to his priviledge he may have a Supersedeas 155 Surplusage 1. Surplusage in a special Verdict 78 Suspension 1. A Suspension of Rent is when either the Rent or Land are so conveyed not absolutely and finally but for a certain time after which the Rent will be again revived 199 2. A Rent may be suspended by Unity for a time and afterwards restored 39 Tayl See Title Warranty 1. SEE an Exposition upon the the Statute de Donis 370 371 372 c. 2. What shall be a good Estate Tayl by Implication in a Devise 262 3. A. having Issue Thomas and Mary deviseth to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and for want of Heirs of Thomas to Mary and her Heirs This is an Estate Tayl in Thomas 269 270 4. A Copyholder in Fee surrenders to the use of F. his Son and J. the Son of F. and of the longest liver of them and for want of Issue of J. lawfully begotten the Remainder to M. here it being by Deed J. had only an Estate for Life but had it been by Will it had been an Estate Tayl by Implication 261 5. The Warranty of the Tenant in Tayl descending upon the Donor or his Heirs is no barr in a Formedon in the Reverter brought by them although it be a Collateral Warranty 364 365 6. The lineal Warranty of Tenant in Tayl shall not bind the Right of the Estate Tayl by the Statute de Donis neither with or without Assets descending 365 Tenures See Title Estates  Testament See Devise 1. A Custody as a Gardianship in Soccage is not in its nature Testamentary it cannot pay Debts nor Legacies nor be distributed as Alms 182 Title 1. When you would
is not sufficient by the Rule of the Act of 25. unless confirmed by the King It was otherwise in the Popes case before the Act. There are many Presidents in Mr. Noy's Book where in like Obj. 2 case the King after the death of a Bishop holding in Commendam after his translation to another See and after his resignation hath presented All those Presidents are since the Twentieth of the Queen which Answ 1 cannot alter the Law 2. Who knows in the cases of death whether those Presentations were not by consent of the Patrons and doubtless there are Presidents wherein the Patrons did present else this Question had been earlier But Judicandum est legibus non exemplis Vpon Translation of a Bishop holding a Commendam in the Answ 2 Retinere as long as he continued Bishop there the King ought to present for the Dispensation is determined upon his remove and then is as if it had not been and a Dispensation gives no property to the Living nor takes away any But where property is given to the Living as by Presentation Institution and Induction or by Grant as in Appropriations Hob. Colts and Glovers Case and sometimes otherwise by the King such presenting or granting for a year or six is to grant it during life As an Atturnment cannot be for a time nor a Confirmation nor a Denization or Naturalization and the like but such Acts are perfect Manwarings Case 21 Jac. Crook f. 691. as they may be notwithstanding Restriction to time as is agreed well in Manwaring's Case I shall say nothing of the case of Resignation as not being in the present Question Judgment was given by the Opinion of the whole Court That the Avoidance was by Death not by Cession Hill 19 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 1785. Baruck Tustian Tristram Plaintiff Anne Roper Vicountess Baltinglass Vidua Defendant in a Plea of Trespass and Ejectment THe Plaintiff declares That the Defendant vi Armis entred into 20 Messuages 1000 Acres of Land 200 Acres of Meadow and 500 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Thornbury Shalston Evershaw Oldwick Westbury and Looffield and into the Rectory of Thornbury which Thomas Gower Kt. and Baronet and George Hilliard to the said Baruck demis'd the First of Octob. 19 Car. 2. Habendum from the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel last past for the term of Five years next ensuing into which he the said Baruck the same day entred and was ousted and ejected by the Defendant ad damnum 40 l. To this the Defendant pleads Not Guilty And the Jury have found specially That the Defendant is not guilty in all those Tenements besides 5 Messuages 400 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow 100 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Thornbury Shalston Evershaw Oldwick and Westbury and in the Rectory of Thornbury and besides in one Messuage 100 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow and 100 Acres of Pasture cum pertinentiis in Looffield And as to the Trespass and Ejectment aforesaid in the said five Messuages c. and in the Rectory of Thornbury the Iury say upon their Oath that before the said Trespass and Ejectment suppos'd 22 Junii 12 Jac. Sir Arthur Throgmorton Kt. was seis'd in Fee of the aforesaid Rectory and Tenements last mentioned and of the said Premisses in Looffield and so seis'd A certain Indenture Tripartite was made 22 Junii 12 Jac. between him the said Sir Arthur of the first part Edward Lord Wootton Augustine Nicholls Kt. Francis Harvey Esq and Rowly Ward Esq of the second part and Sir Peter Temple and Anne Throgmorton Daughter of the said Sir Arthur of the third part To this effect That the said Sir Arthur Throgmorton did covenant and promise with the said Lord Wootton and Sir Augustine Nicholls in consideration of Marriage to be had between the said Sir Peter Temple and the said Anne and other the considerations mentioned in the said Indenture by Fine or Fines before the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel next ensuing or other good Conveyance to be levied by him and the said Dame Anne his wife to the said Lord Wootton c. The scite and precinct of the Priory of Looffield the Rectory of Thornbury and divers Mannors Lands and Tenements in the said Indenture mentioned several yearly Rents therein mentioned and all other his Lands in the Counties of Northampton Buckingham and Oxford at any time belonging to the said Priory to convey and assure To the use of himself for life without Impeachment of Waste Then to the use of Dame Anne his Wife Then to the use of the said Sir Peter Temple and the said Anne his Wife during their natural lives and the longer Liver of them and after both their Deceases To the use of the first Son of the Body of Anne by the said Sir Peter begotten and of the Heirs Males of the Body of the said first Son so to the sixth Son Then to the use of all other Sons in succession in like manner of the Body of Anne begotten by the said Sir Peter And for default of such Heirs To the use of all the Issues Female of the Body of the said Anne by the said Sir Peter begotten and the Heirs of the Bodies of the said Issues Female For default thereof To the first Son of the said Anne by any other Husband and his Heirs Males and so to the tenth In like manner to the Issues Female of the Body of Anne with divers Remainders over A Proviso That it be lawful for Sir Arthur at all times during his life to lett set and demise all or any the said Premisses aforesaid which at any time heretofore have been usually letten or demised to any person or persons for and during the term of One and twenty years or under in possession and not in Reversion or for or during any other number of years determinable upon one two or three Lives in Possession and not in Reversion reserving the Rents therefore now yielded or paid or more to be yearly due and payable during such Lease and Leases unto such person and persons unto whom the said Premises so to be demised shall come and be by virtue of these Presents if no such demise had been made so long as the same Lessees their Executors and Assigns shall duly pay the Rents and perform their Conditions according to the true meaning of their Indentures of Lease and commit no waste of and in the things to them demised The like Proviso verbatim for Sir Peter Temple and Anne his Wife to make like Leases during their Lives and the Life of the longer liver of them after the death of Sir Arthur and Dame Anne his Wife That a Fine was accordingly levied c. to the uses aforesaid They find that all the Messuages Lands Tenements and Rectory in the Declaration mentioned are compris'd in the said Indenture Tripartite They find the death of Sir Arthur Throgmorton and Anne his Wife 2. Septemb.
1 Car. 1. and that Sir Peter Temple entred and was seis'd for term of his life They find he had Issue of the Body of Anne his Wife Anne the now Defendant Daughter and Heir of the Bodies of the said Sir Peter and Anne his Wife and that Anne Wife of Sir Peter died 2. Sept. 3 Car. 1. 1. They find a Demise by Sir Peter Temple to Sir Thomas Gower and Hillyard of the Rectory of Thornbury 9. Maii 23 Car. 1. for 30 l. Rent 2. They find a Demise by him to them of a Messuage in Thornbury 9. March 23 Car. 1. of Woolheads Tenement for 16 l. 13 s. 4 d. Rent 3. They find a Demise to them 9. March 23 Car. 1. of Land in Thornbury held by Roger Rogers Rent 13 l. 6 s. 8 d. 4. They find a Demise 9. March 23 Car. 1. of Nelson's Tenement in Thornbury Rent 16 l. 13 s. 4 d. at Michaelmass and Lady-day 5. They find a Demise 13. March 23 Car. 1. of Lands in Shalston Eversham and Oldwick held formerly by William Hughes Rent 15 s. 4 d. These respective Leases were made for the term of 90 Years determinable upon the Lives of the Lady Baltinglass the Defendant Sir Richard Temple's and the Life of a younger Son of Sir Peter Temple as long as the Lessees should duly pay the Rents reserved and commit no waste according to the Limitation of the Proviso in 12 Jac. which is recited in the respective Leases 6. Then the Iury find quod predicti separales reditus super praedictis separalibus Indenturis Dimissionis reservat fuerint reservat reditus de super premissis praedictis 22. dii Junii Anno Jacobi Regis 12. supradict Et quod praedict separales reditus c. in forma praedict reservat ad Festum Sancti Michaelis Arch-angeli quod fuit 1653. debit non solut sive oblat suerint super idem Festum sed quod iidem reditus infra unum mensem prox post Festum praedictum praefat Annae Roper Defend solut fuerunt 7. They find a Demise to them of the Scite and Priory of Looffield 9. March 23 Car. 1. at the Rent of 100 l. payable equally on Lady-day and Michaelmass-day demised by Sir Arthur Throgmorton and Anne his Wife 20th of May 12 Eliz. 1570. to William Hewer for 21 years Rent 100 l. Lady-day and Michaelmass with some Exceptions for the like term of 90 years and upon like Limitations as in the former Leases The Iury find quod Tenementa praedicta cum pertinentiis in Looffield supranominat tempore dict Eliz. nuper Reginae Angl. fuerint dimissa ad redditum 100 l. pro termino 21. Annorum sed dimissio terminus 21 Annorum expirati fuerunt Et dicunt quod eisdem Juratoribus non constabat quod dicta Tenementa in Looffield praedict 22 die Junii 12 Jac. aut per spatium 20 Annorum tunc antea fuerint dimissa Et dicunt ulterius quod 50 l. pro dimidio unius Anni de praedictis Tenementis in Looffield ad Festum Sancti Michaelis Arch-angeli quod fuit Anno Dom. 1653. debit oblatae fuerint Et quod praedicta Anna Roper ante Festum Annunciationis prox sequent intravit They find that Gower and Hillyard claiming the said 5 Messuages 400 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow and 100 Acres of Pasture in Thornbury Shalston Evershaw Oldwick and Westbury As also the said Messuage and other the Premisses in Looffield and the Rectory of Thornbury before the supposed Trespass and Ejectment entred upon the Possession of the Lady Baltinglass and so possessed made a Lease to the Plaintiff by virtue of which he entred and was possessed until outed by the Defendant as by the Declaration But whither the Defendant be culpable they refer to the Court. Vpon this Verdict the Questions are two 1. The first Whither the Defendants entry into the six Tenements leased to Gower and Hillyard for not payment of the Rent reserv'd upon the day of payment were lawful or not And as to that the Court is of opinion that the Defendants Entry was lawful for that the Leases were not deriv'd out of the Estate of Sir Peter Temple who was but Tenant for life and had no Reversion in him but out of the Estate of Sir Arthur Throgmorton by Limitation of the Proviso in the Deed 12 Jac. so as the Leases were not Leases upon Condition to pay the Rent at the day to which any Demand or Re-entry was requisite for Non-payment but were Leases by Limitation and determined absolutely according to the Limitation Littl. f. 235. a. For this Littleton is express that the words quamdiu dum and dummodo are words of Limitation As if a Lease be made to a Woman dum sola fuerit or dum casta vixerit or dummodo solverit talem reditum or quamdiu solverit talem reditum so are many other words there mentioned And if there be not a performance according to the Limitation it determines the Lease But it is otherwise where a Rent is reserv'd upon Condition for there is a Contract between the Lessor and Lessee and the Law evens the Agreement between them as is most agreeable to Reason and the supposition of their Intention But in the present case Sir Peter Temple had no interest in him out of which such Leases could be deriv'd but had a power only to make them by virtue of the Proviso in Sir Arthur Throgmortons Deed and the Lessees must be subject to such Limitations as are thereby made It was agreed by the Council of the Plaintiff That it was not a Condition for payment of the Rent nor could it be but they would call it a Caution A Condition to determine a Lease or a Limitation is a Caution and a material one but such a Caution as hath no more effect than if it were not at all is a thing insignificant in Law and therefore must not supplant that which in proper terms is a Limitation and hath an effect 2. The next Question is upon the Lease of Looffield which arises upon the words of the Proviso That it should be lawful for Sir Peter Temple to demise all or any the Premisses which at any time heretofore have been usually letten or demised for the term of 21 years or under reserving the Rent thereupon now yielded or paid And the Iury finding the Lands in Looffield to have been demised 12th of the Queen for 21 years for 100 l. Rent and that that term was expired and not finding them demis'd by the space of twenty years before at the time of the Indenture 12 Jac. Whither the Lease by Sir Peter Temple of them be warranted by the Proviso there being reserv'd the Rent reserv'd by the Lease in 12. Eliz. viz. 100. l. The Court is of opinion that the Lease of Looffield is not warranted by that Proviso for these Reasons 1. It is clear Sir Arthur Throgmorton intended to exclude some Lands from being demisable by that
Proviso namely Such as at any time before were not usually let and set to Farm For where a mans power is limited to lease Lands so specially qualified that is let and set usually at any time before when he could not lease at all without such special power given him he is absolutely barr'd from leasing Land which is not so qualified 2. It must be presumed Sir Arthur Throgmorton knew he had such Lands as according to his Intention were not at any time before usually set and let and had reason not to suffer them to be demiseable within that Proviso to the prejudice of those in Reversion As for example his Mansion-house Gardens Curtilages and Lands occupied in Demesne For it had been vain to provide against the leasing of Land in such manner condition'd whereof he had none so condition'd But if notwithstanding it shall be taken that any his Lands which at any time past how long soever since one two or three hundred years were demised as perhaps the scite of his House and all his Demesne were though he knew not of it shall therefore now be demiseable within this Proviso Then is the Proviso inconsistent with it self and repugnant to his meaning for he intended thereby to hinder the demising of some of his Lands But by that construction of the Proviso every part of his Land might be demised for doubtless at some time or other every part of it was demised and probably by Records or other ancient Evidence might appear so to be 3. If this were the meaning of the Proviso the word usually in it was to no purpose for it had been much clearer to say That any Lands at any time heretofore demis'd should be demiseable for 21 years by Sir Peter Temple which doubtless was not Sir Arthur's meaning and consequently this Lease of Looffield not according to his meaning 1. Now for the literal sense of the Proviso Rolls Title Power f. 261. n. 11. 2 Jac. in Banâ—o If power be to make Leases for 3 lives or 21 years of Lands usually letten Land which hath been twice letten is within the Proviso but not Land which hath been but once letten Therefore this Land of Looffield letten but once 12 Eliz. is not within the Proviso But I insist not much upon this case for the words usually demis'd may be taken in two senses The one for the often farming or repeated Acts of leasing Lands to which sense this Case doth reasonably extend But the other sense of Land usually demis'd is for the common continuance of Land in lease for that is usually demis'd and so Land leas'd for 500 years long since is Land usually demis'd that is in lease though it have not been more than once demis'd which is the more receiv'd sense of the words Land usually demis'd 2. The meaning of the words at any time is various and of contrary meaning If it be asked by way of Question Were you at any time at York It is the same as Were you ever or sometime at York So in the Question Was this Land at any time in Lease is the same as Was it ever or some time in Lease But when the words at any time are not part of a Question but of an Answer they have a different and contrary meaning As if it be asked Where may I see or speak with John Stiles and it be answered You may speak with him or see him at any time at his House There the words at any time signifie at all times and not as in the question at some time So when the words are used by way of a plain enunciation and not as part of a Question or Answer As You shall be welcome to my House at any time signifie You shall be welcome at all times So in the present Case if it-be made a Question Was such Land heretofore at any time usually letten and set to Farm imports in the Question Was this Land ever or at some time heretofore how long ago soever usually let to Farm But by way of enunciation if it be said This Land was usually let to Farm at any time heretofore it means This Land was commonly at all times heretofore let to Farm So this Land was usually in Pasture at any time heretofore signifies this Land was always or commonly in Pasture heretofore So you may lease any Land heretofore letten to Farm at any time usually is the same with heretofore letten to Farm commonly at all times And this Construction of the Proviso agrees both with the words and intention of Sir Arthur But what was not farmed at the time of this Proviso made nor 20 years before could not be said to be at any time before commonly Farmed for those 20 years was a time before in which it was not farmed But to come closer The Proviso is that Leases may be made for 21 years of any the Lands in the Deed reserving the Rents thereupon reserved at the time of the Deed made viz. 12 Jac. Which necessarily implies that the Land demiseable by that Proviso must be Land which then was under Rent for where no Rent then was the Rent then thereupon reserv'd could not be reserv'd But Looffield had then no Rent upon it for it was not let of 20 years before nor then and therefore was not demiseable by that Proviso The words or more will not at all help the Plaintiff for the words more or less are words of relation the one of addition to what was before the other of diminution for more or less must relate to something positive in the kind before and can never be a relation to nothing So more wages necessarily implies some before more meat more drink more company and in all expressions more denotes a relation to somewhat before of the kind and in the present Case reserving more Rent must imply some before reserved And therefore where none was at the time of the Deed made 12 Jac. there cannot in any congruity of speech more be reserved or intended to be reserved Quaere If the Record be mended in the point of finding the death of Sir Peter Temple and when he died In this the Chief Justice delivered the Resolution of the whole Court Hill 21 22 Car. II. Rot. 2259. C. B. Ralph Dixon Plaintiff Harts ss versus Dean Harrison Defendant In a Replevin Quare cepit Averia ipsius Radulphi ea detinuit contra vadios plegios c. Distress 21 Maii 21 Car. 2. THe Plaintiff declares That the Defendant 21 die Maii 21 Regis nunc at Sandridge in a place called Fregmorfield took three Cows of the Plaintiffs and detain'd them against Pledges quousque to his damage 40 l. The Defendant as Bailiff of Elizabeth Rooper Widow Samuel Hildersham Gent. and Mary his Wife Michael Biddulph Esq and Frances his Wife Humphrey Holden Esq and Theodosia his Wife avows and justifies the Caption for that the place in quo c. contains a Rood of
Avowry is in liew of an Action and thereto privity is requisite for the same cause he cannot have an Action of Waste nor many other Actions there mentioned and the Authorities cited and so is Littleton himself expresly Litt. Sect. 580. Section 580. Where a man by grant to himself or by descent from his Ancestor hath a Rent-charge and might once lawfully distrain and Avow for such Rent if Arrear by due Attornment made to him or his Ancestor he may still do so whenever the Rent is behind unless by Law that power be some way lost 1. That power may be lost by extinguishment of the Rent by a perpetual union of the tenancy to the rent or rent to the tenancy or in other manner the Grantee having no Heir 2. It may be lost for a time by Suspension as by such union for a time and after restored again 3. It may be lost by a Grant of the Rent upon Condition 7 H. 6.3 Br. Extinguishment p. 17. and upon performance or breach of the Condition restored again but the power of distraining is not in this Case lost by any of these ways 4. It may be principally lost by a sufficient granting over and transferring the Rent to another which way comes nearest to the Case in question And therefore I shall agree the Case so much insisted on which is said to be agreed per Curiam Andrew Ognell's Case 4. Rep. f. 49. in Andrew Ognell's Case in the fourth Rep. That if a man be seized of a Rent-service or Rent-charge in Fee and grant it over by his Deed to another and his Heirs and the Tenant Attorn such Grantor is without remedy for the Rent arrear before his Grant for distrain he cannot and other remedy he hath not because all privity between him and the Tenant is destroyed by the Attornment to the Grantee and he hath no more right than any Stranger to come upon the Land after such transferring over of the Rent I shall likewise agree another Case That if such Grantee should regrant the same Rent back to the Grantor either in fee in tail or for life and the Tenant Attorn as he must to this regrant yet the first Grantor shall never be enabled to distrain for Arrears due to him before he granted over the Rent for now the privity between him and the Tenant begins but from the Attornment to the regrant the former being absolutely destroyed and the Tenant no more distrainable for the ancient Arrears than he was upon the creation of the Rent for Arrears incurred before till first attorn'd If the Case in question prove to be the same in effect with either of these Cases then the reason of Law for these Cases must sway and determine the Case in question And I conceive that there is no likeness or parity between the Case in question and either of those Cases either for the fact of the Cases or the reason of Law I shall therefore begin with comparing this Case with the first of those Cases 1. In the first of those Cases he that is seis'd of the Rent-charge doth intend to transferr his Estate in the Rent to the Grantee and it is accordingly actually transferr'd by the Tenants Attornment to the Grant 2. The Grantee by his Grant and Attornment to it becomes actually seis'd of the Rent and may enjoy the benefit of it by perception of the Rent 3. His Wife becomes dowable of it 4. It is subject to Statutes Recognizances and Debts enter'd into by the Grantee or due from him to the King 5. It is possible to descend to his Heir 6. It may be Arrear and he hath a possibility to distrain and avow for it 1. But in the Case in question the Conizors of the Fine did never intend to transfer their Estate in the Rent to the Conizee nor that any Attornment be made to him What a man intends to pass to another he intends to be without it himself at least for some time which is not in this Case 2. The Conizee never becomes actually seiz'd of the Rent and not only doth not but never can enjoy the perception of it for there is no moment of time wherein the Conizors themselves are not actually in seisin of it and consequently may distrain if it be in Arrear and the Conizee can never have actually seisin or possibility to have Attornment or distrain his seisin being but a meer fiction and an invented form of Conveyance only 3. The Conizee's Wife is never dowable of it 4. It is not subject to any Statutes Recognizances or Debts of the Conizee 5. It is never possible to descend to his Heir for it instantly vests in the Conizors 6. It can never be Arrear to the Conizee nor hath he ever a possibility to distrain for it To this purpose what is agreed in the Lord Cromwell's Case L. Cromwell's Case 2. Rep. f. 77. 2. Rep. is applicable Then it is to be consider'd what seisin Perkins had who was the Conizee of a Fine in that Case and he had but a Seisin for an instant and only to this purpose to make a Render for his Wife shall not be endowed nor the Land subject to his Statutes or Recognizances f. 77. Therefore that first Case cited out of the Report of Andrew Ognell's Case which I admit to be good Law hath no resemblance with the present Case in any circumstance or consequent but had the Fine been to a third persons use the consequents had been the same as in the Case cited out of Ognell's Case not as to the Conizee but as to that third person to whom the rent was intended To conclude then this first part 1. That whereof the Conizors were alwaies actually and separately seiz'd the same was never by them transferr'd to the seisin of another But of this Rent the Conizors were alwaies in actual seisin for there was no moment of time wherein they were not seis'd therefore this Rent was never transferr'd to the seisin of another nor could any other for any moment of time have a separated seisin thereof for what was mine at all times could be anothers at no time 2. It is an impossibility in Law that two men severally shall have several Rights and Fee-simples in possession in one and the same Land Dyer 28 H. 8. f. 12. a. p. 51. simul semel per Fitz-herbert in the Argument of Bokenhams Case and the same impossibility is so to have of a Rent Nor hath this relation to the learning of Instants in Digbie's Case Coke 1. Rep. and Fitz-williams in the sixth Report That an old Use may be revoked and a new rais'd in the same time and an old possession ended and a new begun this is usual in all transmutation of Estates and things also For in nature a new form introduc'd doth in the same moment destroy the old according to that Generatio unius est corruptio alterius but a separate possession can never be
out of the former Premisses is That the Freehold qua Freehold is not the thing whereof there is an Occupancy for the Freehold is not a natural thing but hath its essence by the positive Municipal Law of the Kingdome it cannot abstract from the Land in this matter of Occupancy he either entred into or possessed The Freehold is an immediate consequent of the possession for when a man hath gotten the possession of Land that was void of a Proprietor or other thing capable of Occupancy the Law forthwith doth cast the Freehold upon the Possessor to make a sufficient Tenant to the Precipe Therefore As to the first Question Whether Holden the Plaintiffs Entry Quest 1 upon the Lessee Taverner's possession into the House Glebe and Barn the First of March 1666. and openly saying I enter and take possession of this House Glebe and Barn and the Ground thereto belonging and the Tithes of Woolney in my own Name and Right as Occupant upon a Lease made to Giles Astly and his Assigns for three Lives by Dr. Mallory Prebend of Woolney did make him Occupant of the House Land and Tithe or either of them the Lessee Taverner not having made any Claim as Occupant to any of them I hold clearly this Entry and Claim did not make Holden Occupant of the House Land or Tithe or of any of them To every Occupant of Land or other thing capable of Occupancy two things are requisite 1. Possession of the Land which was void and without Owner 2. The having of the Freehold to avoid an obeyance which is had as well where the possession is not void as where it is The first that is the possession is acquired by the party and his Act but the Freehold is acquir'd by the Act of Law which casts it upon the possession assoon as there is a Possessor or where it finds a Possessor when the Freehold is in none 1. This Claim and Entry was in Order to gain the first possession of the Land which was void but that was impossible to be had for the Lessee Taverner had the possession before he held it then therefore the Claim was to no end 2. Secondly A man cannot be an Occupant but of a void Possession or of a Possession which himself hath but here was no void Possession when Holden enter'd and claimed as Occupant for the Lessee was in lawful possession of the House and Barn and Land at the time of the entry and claim 3. Thirdly If this Entry and Claim should make Holden a legal Occupant which cannot be without gaining the possession then there would be two plenary legal possessors of the same thing at the same time Holden by his Entry and Claim and Taverner the Lessee by virtue of his lease but that is impossible there should be two plenary possessors of the same thing at the same time Therefore Holden can be no Occupant by such Entry and Claim Skelton Hay 17 Jac. Cr. 554. b. 4. This very Case in every point hath been resolv'd in the Case of Skelton and Hay 17 Jac. where upon an Ejectment brought a Special Verdict found That the Bishop of Worcester made a lease to Sir William Whorehood of certain land for his own and the lives of two of his Sons Sir William did let the land to John Mallett at will rendring Rent and dyed Mallett continued the possession not claiming as Occupant one of Sir William's Sons entred as Occupant and made a lease to the Plaintiff in the Action It was adjudg'd that Mallett the Defendant being in possession the Law cast the Freehold upon him without Claim and had he disclaim'd to hold as Occupant Chamberlayn Ewes C. Rolls 2. part f. 151. Lett. E. keeping the possession he must have been the Occupant for where one entred to the use of another he that entred was adjudg'd the Occupant Which Case proves one may be an Occupant against and besides his own intention and therefore a Claim to denote his intention 5. To be an Occupant is not necessary and Tenant for years as well as at will is Occupant by that Case Besides claiming to be Occupant is to claim to be in possession or to claim the Freehold or both but the Law binds not a man to claim that which he hath already and therefore he that hath possession and doth occupy the land is not to claim possession or to be Occupant of it no more is he to claim a Freehold which he already hath for the Law hath cast it where it finds the possession so having both possession and Freehold the Law binds him not to claim what he hath 6. Claim is never to make a Right which a man hath not but to preserve that which he hath from being lost As Claim to avoid a Descent whereby a man had lost his right to enter so a man makes no Claim to be remitted when by act of law he is in his Remitter As to the second Question Whether Frances Astly the Relict Quest 2 of Giles entring the Five and twentieth of March 1667. upon the Lessee Taverner's possession and claiming the House Glebe and Tithe as Occupant and the Lessee Taverner attorning to her makes her an Occupant of the House Land or Tithe The Question hath nothing in it differing from the former but only the Attornment and it is clear the Attornment of Taverner the Lessee doth not disclaim his possession but affirms it for Attornment is the Act of a Tenant by reason of his being in possession Besides admitting the Tenant a perfect Occupant he might continuing so attorn to whom he pleased as well as Astly might have done in his life time yet still continue the Estate that was in him It follows then that Taverner was the undoubted Occupant after Astly's death of the House Land and Barn but whether he had the Tithe of Woolney by such his Occupancy whereof Astly died seis'd is the difficult Question Another Question will arise when Taverner the Lessee who had by lease the House Barn and Land and so found and was Occupant certainly of those when afterwards Taverner the Lessee 12 June 1667 concessit assignavit totum statum suum de in praemissis to Holden the Plaintiff and gave him Livery and Seifin thereupon what shall be understood to pass by the word praemissis if only what was leas'd and his Estate therein as Occupant and likewise the Tithe if the Tithe accrued to him by reason of being Occupant of the land For if he were Occupant of the Tithe by Act in Law by being Occupant of the land it follows not that if he past all his Estate to Holden in the House and Land and gave him Livery that therefore he past his Estate in the Tithe nor is such passing found to be by Deed. To clear the way then towards resolving the principal Question 1. At the time of Giles Astly's death the Tithes and the House and Lands were sever'd in
a House Barns and Tithe of Woolney and thereof seis'd in the right of his Prebendary makes a Lease to Astly of the Prebend una cum the Glebe House Barn and Tithe for Three Lives rendring the accustomed and ancient Rent of Five pounds Twelve shillings Astly demiseth to Taverner the House Glebe and Barn for a year reserving Twenty shillings and dies the Cestuy que vies living As I concluded before Taverner is Occupant of the House Barn and Glebe-land and consequently lyable to pay the whole Rent being Five pounds twelve shillings yearly though the Land House and Barn be found of the yearly value of Twenty shillings only but because the Rent cannot issue out of Tithes or things that lye in Grant it issues only out of the House Barn and Land which may be distrain'd on 2. If Taverner being Occupant of the Land shall not have the Tithes which remain'd in Astly according to his Lease for three Lives at the time of his death and whereof by their nature there can be no direct Occupancy It follows that the Lease made by Doctor Mallory is determin'd as to the Tithe for no other can have them yet continues in force as to the Land and House and all the Rent reserv'd which seems strange the Land and Tithe being granted by the same Demise for three Lives which still continue yet the Lease to be determined as to part 3. Though the Rent issue not out of the Tithe yet the Tithe was as well a Consideration for the payment of the Rent as the Land and Houses were and it seems unreasonable that the Lessor Doctor Mallory should by act in Law have back the greatest Consideration granted for payment of the Rent which is the Tithe and yet have the Rent wholly out of the Land by act in Law too which cannot yield it 4. Though Doctor Mallory could not have reserv'd a Rent out of the Tithe only to bind his Successor upon a Lease for Lives more than out of a Fair though it were as the ancient Rent and had been usually answered for the Fair as is resolv'd in Jewel Bishop of Sarum's Case Jewell's Case 5 Rep. Yet in this Case where the Tithe together with Land out of which Rent could issue was demis'd for the accustomed Rent the Successor could never avoid the Lease either in the whole or as to the Tithe only 13 Eliz. c. 10. This seems clear by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 10. which saith All Leases made by any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical persons having any Lands Tenements Tithes or Hereditaments parcel of the Possessions of any Spiritual Promotion other than for One and twenty years or three Lives whereupon the accustomed yearly Rent or more shall be reserv'd shall be void Cokes Litt. f. 142. a. f. 144. a. Whence it is apparent this Statute intended that Leases in some sense might be made of Tithes for One and twenty years or Three Lives and an ancient Rent reserv'd but of a bare Tithe only a Rent could not be reserv'd according to Jewell's Case for neither Distress nor Assise can be of such Rent though an Assise may be de Portione Decimarum as is clear by the Lord Dyer 7 E. 6. and the difference rightly stated Therefore a Lease of Tithe and Land out of which a Rent may issue and the accustomed Rent may be reserved must be good within the intention of the Statute or Tithe could in no sense be demis'd 5. Taverner the Lessee being Occupant here by his possession becomes subject to the payment of the Rent to Waste to Forfeiture Conditions and all things that Astly the Lessee or his Assignee if he had made any had been subject to Also Coke's Litt. 41. He must claim by a que Estate from Astly he must averr the Life of Cestuy que vie so as he becomes to all intents an Assignee in Law of the first Lessee 6. Without question the Occupant being chargeable with the Rent shall by Equity have the Tithe which was the principal Consideration for payment of the Rent when no man can have the benefit of the Tithe but the Lessor Doctor Mallory who gave it as a Consideration for the Rent which he must still have Therefore I conceive the Reason of Law here ought necessarily to follow the Reason of Equity and that the Occupant shall have the Tithe not as being immediate Occupant of the Tithe whereof no occupancy can be but when by his possession of the Land he becomes Occupant and the Law casts the Freehold upon him he likewise thereby becomes an Assignee in Law of Astly's Lease and Interest and consequently of the Tithe An ancient Rent reserv'd within the Statute of 1. or 13. of the Queen upon a Lease of One and twenty years or Three Lives is by express intention of that Statute a Rent for publique use and maintenance of Hospitality by Church-men as is resolv'd in Elsemere's Case Elsmers C. 5. Rep. the 5. Rep. and therefore if the Lessee provide not an Assignee to answer the Rent to the Successors of the Lessor for the ends of that Law the Law will do it for him and none fitter to be so than the Occupant in case of a Lease pur auter vie as this is And if the Occupant being Assignee hath pass'd all his Estate and Interest to the Plaintiff hath good cause of Action for the Tithe converted by the Defendant Pasch 22 Car. II. Judgment for the Defendant Three Justices against the Chief Justice Trin. 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 2043. Harrison versus Doctor Burwell In a Prohibition for his Marriage with Jane the Relict of Bartholomew Abbot his Great Uncle The Questions are Quest 1 WHether the marriage of Thomas Harrison the Plaintiff with Jane his now wife being the Relict of Bartholomew Abbot his great Vncle that is his Grand-fathers Brother by the Mothers side be a lawful marriage within the Act of 32 H. 8. cap. 38 Quest 2 Admitting it to be a lawful marriage within the meaning of that Act Whether the Kings Temporal Courts are properly Judges of it because the unlawfulness or lawfulness of it by that Act doth depend upon its being a marriage within or without the Levitical Degrees For if within those Degrees it is not a lawful marriage by that Act. And the right knowledge of marriages within or without those Degrees must arise from the right knowledge ot the Scriptures of the Old Testament specially the Interpretation of which hath been and regularly is of Ecclesiastick Conizance and not of Lay or Temporal Conizance in regard of the Language wherein it was writ and the receiv'd Interpretations concerning it in all succession of time Quest 3 Admitting the Kings Temporal Courts have by that Act of 32. or any other special Conizance of the Levitical Degrees and of marriages within them And though this be no marriage within the Levitical Degrees it being articled in general to be an Incestuous marriage
Grantee of the Rent-charge is now dispenc'd with which was not before the Statute For if that were now requisite the Conizors could not only not distrain for the Rent due before the Fine but not for the Rent due since the Fine nor doth the Statute help the matter because the Cestuy que use is in possession of the Rent by the Statute and therefore needs no Attornment for that is true when the Conizee hath a perfect possession but without Attornment the Conizee had no perfect possession impowring him to distrain and therefore the Statute can bring no perfect possession to the uses to that end And so Sir Edward Coke agrees the Law Cok. Litt. f. 307. Sect. 55â— that since Littleton wrote If the Conizee of a Fine before Attornment by Deed indented and inroll'd bargains and sells a Seigniory to another the Bargainee shall not distrain because the Conizee that is the Bargainor could not for want of Attornment But on the other side a man perfectly seis'd of a Seigniory Rent Reversion or Remainder bargains and sells by Deed indented and inroll'd according to the Statute the Bargainee shall distrain without Attornment by vertue of the Statute And if a Fine be now levied to a man to the use of a third person the third person shall distrain without any Attornment made not only to himself by reason of the Statute but to the Conizee by the Resolution in Sir Moyle Finch his Case for otherwise the Fine were to little purpose Which Case though it make an Attornment not necessary where it is impossible to be had that the Conveyance might not be useless in effect and an intended right to be de novo introduc'd altogether hindred Shall it therefore destroy an old Attornment which cannot but be had and is still in being for no other use or end but to deprive the Conizors of a Rent and former Right justly due to introduce a general inconvenience upon all that have granted Leases for lives and are occasioned to settle their Estates And there is great difference between a Fine levied of a Reversion or of a Rent-charge to the use of a third person and to the use of the Conizors for a third person can never distrain unless either an Attornment were to the Conizee which is impossible because no possession continues in him so as to receive an Attornment or unless the construction of the Statute according to Sir Moyle Finch his Case to make the Conveyance of effect to Cestuy que use made the Attornment because it could not be had not necessary which is a great strain and violence upon the true reason of Law That a Conveyance which in reason could not be good without Attornment should be sufficient because it could not have an Attornment which was necessary to make it sufficient And this practice hath been frequent since the Statute of Uses Sir Will. Pelham's Case as in making a Recovery against his nature to be a forfeiture because taken as a Common Conveyance To make Vses declared by Indenture between the parties made a year after the Recovery to be the Vses of the Recovery Downan's Case 9. Rep. with such Limitations as are mentioned in Downan's Case the 9. Rep. L. Cromwell's Case 2. Rep. f. 72. b. To make a Rent arise out of the Estate of Cestuy que use upon a Recovery which was to arise out of the Estate of the Recoveror and his possession which is a principal point in Cromwell's Case and resolv'd because by the intention of the parties the Cestuy que use was to pay the Rent 14 Eliz. Harwell versus Lucas Moore 's Rep. f. 99. a. n. 243. Bracebridge's Case is eminent to this purpose Tho. Bracebridge seis'd of the Mannor of Kingbury in Com. Warwick made a Lease for One and twenty years of Birchin Close parcel del Mannor to Moore and another Lease of the same Close for Six and twenty years to commence at the end of the first Lease to one Curteis rendring Rent and after made a Feoffment of the Mannor and all other his Lands to the use of the Feoffees and their Heirs and Assigns upon Condition that if they paid not 10000 l. within fifteen daies to the said Tho. Bracebridge or his Assigns they should stand seiz'd to the use of Bracebridge and Joyce his Wife the Remainder to Thomas their second Son in tail with divers Remainders over The Remainder to the Right Heirs of Thomas the Father Livery was made of the Land in possession and not of Birchin Close and no Attornment the Feoffees paid not 10000 l. whereby Bracebridge the Father became seis'd and the first Tenant for years attorn'd to him Adjudg'd 1. That by Livery of the Mannor Birchin Close did not pass to the Feoffees without Attornment 2. That the Attornment of the first Lessee was sufficient Moore f. 99. n. 243. 3. Though the use limited to the Feoffees and their Heirs was determined before the Attornment yet the Attornment was good to the contingent use upon not paying the mony In the Resolution of this Case Wild Archer and Tyrrell Justices were for the Plaintiff and Vaughan Chief Justice for the Defendant Trin. 21. Car. II. C. B. Rot. 1714. The King Plaintiff in a Quare Impedit per Galfridum Palmer Atturnatum suum Generalem Robert Bishop of Worcester Thomas Jervis Esquire and John Hunckley Clerk Defendants THE King counts That Queen Elizabeth was seis'd of the Advowson of the Church of Norfield with the Chappel of Coston in gross in Fee in Jure Coronae and presented one James White her Clerk who was admitted instituted and inducted That from the said Queen the Advowson of the said Church with the said Chappel descended to King James and from him to King Charles the First and from him to his Majesty that now is who being seis'd thereof the said Church with the Chappel became void by the death of the said James White and therefore it belongs of right to him to present and the Defendants disturbe him to his damage of 200 l. which the said Attorney is ready to verifie for the King The Defendants plead severally and first the Bishop that he claims nothing in the said Church and the Advowson but as Ordinary The Defendant Jervis saith That long before the said Presentation suppos'd to be made by the late Queen one Richard Jervis Esquire was seis'd of the Mannor of Norfield with the Appurtenances in Com. praedicto to which the Advowson Ecclesiae praedictae tunc pertinuit adhuc pertinet in his Demesne as of Fee and so seis'd the said Church became void by the death of one Henry Squire then last Incumbent of the said Church and so continued for two years whereby the said late Queen praetextu lapsus temporis in default of the Patron Ordinary and Metropolitan Ecclesiae praedictae pro tempore existentis dictae nuper Reginae devolutae by her Prerogative afterward that is tertio die Decembris
afterwards the said First Day of April 21 Car. 2. at Hooknorton aforesaid demised to the said Thomas Rowe the said Mannor and Tenements Rectory and Vicaridge whereof the said Two hundred Acres are parcel To have and to hold to the said Rowe and his Assigns from the Feast of the Annunciation last past for the term of Seven years then next ensuing That by virtue thereof the said Rowe enter'd and was possessed until the said Robert Huntington the said First of April 21 of the King by Force and Arms by the command of the foresaid Robert late Bishop of Oxford into the said Two hundred Acres upon the Possession of the said Thomas Rowe to him demised by the said Wise as aforesaid for the said term not yet past enter'd and Ejected him But whether upon the whole matter the said Robert be Culpable of the said Trespass and Ejectment they refer to the Court. By this Verdict in the recited Indenture if any such were of 29 H. 8. the Farm of Hooknorton and the Mannor of Hooknorton were the same thing and the Mannor known and demis'd by the name of the Farm as well as the Farm by name of the Mannor The Mannor of Hooknorton being call'd the Farm of Hooknorton because it was lett to Farm and rented out and the Farm called the Mannor because it had the Requisits of a Mannor viz. Demesne Services Therefore where it is recited in the Deed 1 Mar. That the Abbot and Covent of Osney had by their Deed of 29 H. 8. demis'd to John Croker All that their Farm of Hooknorton it was the same as if it had been the Mannor of Hooknorton 1. For that the next words are And all that Mansion Demesne Lands Meadows Leasowes and Pastures to the said Mannor belonging and no Mannor is named before but the Farm which was known to be the Mannor 2. The Habendum of the Premisses demised is To have and to hold the said Farm or Mannor of Hooknorton which also shews they were the same 3. In the render of the Rent it is yielding and paying for the said Mannor and Farm Nine pounds 4. By the Demise of 1. Mar. subsequent the said Mannor or Farm is demis'd And the 200 Acres in question being found to be parcel of the said Mannor consequently they are recited to be demis'd by that Indenture suppos'd of 29 H. 8. But the Jury find not the Mannor and Farm to be the same The next thing to be noted is That by that recited Indenture of 29 H. 8. if any such were several Rents were reserved upon several particulars and not one intire Rent upon the whole namely 9 l. upon the Mannor or Farm Another Rent upon the Parsonage another on the Vicaridge and so upon several other particulars And by the Lease of 1 Mariae it is yielding and paying such and the like Rents in the Plural Number as are reserved by the said first Indenture So as the Rents were several in the first Indenture by the meaning of that of 1 Mar. And yielding and paying such and like Rent as is reserv'd by the latter Indenture for the Premisses therein contain'd Here it is such Rent in the singular number as is reserv'd not as are reserved as in the former Then in the Clause of Re-entry for Non-payment it is that the Re-entry should be into such of the Premisses whereupon such Rent being behind was reserv'd therefore not into all the Premisses Whence it follows That there being several Rents several Demands were respectively to be made before Re-entry as well for those reserv'd in the first Indenture as for that in the second Indenture recited And it being found That the Demand made by the Bishop at the Parsonage-house in Forty three was for the half years Rent reserved of all the Premisses demis'd by the Indenture of 1 Mar. it follows That more Rent was demanded than was payable in any one place consequently the Demand not good nor the Re-entry pursuing it and thus far the Case is clear against the Defendant For the Lease of 1 Mar. could not be avoided by that Re-entry in all nor in part if the Leases of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. were well and sufficiently found by the Jury to have been made Note The Jury finding that the Rent reserved for all the Premisses was behind for half a year ending at Michaelmas 1643. not expressing the Sum of the Rent is no more than to find That no Rent was paid for the said half year And their finding That the Bishop did demand the said half years Rent finding no Sum by him demanded is no more than to find That he demanded such Rent as was due for the said half year So as notwithstanding the Juries finding That no Rent was paid for the said half year and their finding of the Bishop's demanding of what was due for the said half year It doth not therefore follow That they find any Rent to be reserv'd by the said Lease of 1. Mar. or that there was a Demand of any Rent admitted to be so reserv'd But if the Leases of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. be not well and sufficiently found by the Jury to have been made The Consequent then is That in Law there are no such Leases for de non apparentibus non existentibus eadem est ratio ad omnem juris effectum And then it follows That the Lease of 1 Mar. of all the Premisses specified in the Indenture of 29 H. 8. and of all specified in the Indenture of 1 E. 6. for Ninety years Habendum from the respective Expirations of the terms specified and under the respective Rents reserv'd by those Indentures will be void as to the terms intended to be granted and the Rents reserv'd because the beginning of the terms and particulars of the Rents can be known but from the Demises 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. when no such Demises are because the Jury hath found no such For this the Case of 3 E. 6. reported by the Lord Brooks in his Title of Leases N. 62. is clear and in several Cases since adjudg'd is admitted for good Law The Case is Br. tit Leases N. 66. 3 E. 6. If a man Leases Land for certain years to J. S. Habendum post dimissionem inde factam to J. N. finitam and J. N. hath no Lease of the Land the Lease to J. S. shall commence immediately for the term of years granted him So in our Case the Lease of 1 Mar. of the Mannor and other the Premisses granted to Croker for Ninety years Habendum as to some particulars from the expiration of a former Lease granted 29 H. 8. And as to other particulars from the expiration of a Lease granted 1 E. 6. when no such Leases were granted because not found to be granted Therefore the Lease of 1 Mar. for Ninety years shall commence immediately from the Sealing and consequently ended about the 21 or 22 of King Charles the First
of that made in 27 H. 8. Therefore it is manifest That the sole Reason why no such lease was admitted to be in 28 H. 8. is no other than because the Jury find no such to have been made but find a suggestion of it only in Rochester's lease And it is the same exactly in our present Case The third thing deducible from the Case is That a Demise by Indenture for a term Habendum from the Expiration of another recited or mentioned term therein 35 H. 6. 34 Br. Tit. Faits p. 4. 12 H. 4. 23 Br. Faits 21. which is not or not found to be which is the same thing is no Estoppel or Conclusion to the Lessee or Lessor but that the Lessee may enter immediately and the Lessor demise or grant in Reversion after such immediate lease There is another Case resolv'd at the same time between the same Persons and concerning the same Land and published in the same Report and specially found by the same Jury Edward Earl of Oxford Son of John the Son of John Earl of Oxford by Indenture between him and Geoffry Morley Dated the Fourteenth of July 15 Elizabethae reciting That John his Father by Indenture the Thirtieth of July 35 H. 8. had demised to Robert Rochester the said Farm or Mannor of Blacon Habendum for Thirty years from the end or determination of the lease made to Anne Seaton the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. which is a false recital for the lease to Rochester was to commence from the end or determination of a lease made to Anne Seaton that is recited to be made the Tenth of February 28 H. 8. and that afterwards the said John Earl of Oxford had granted by Indenture Dated the Six and twentieth of March 35 H. 8. reciting the lease to Anne Seaton the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. to Hamlett Freer the Reversion of the said Mannor of Blacon Habendum the said Mannor and Premisses from such time as the same shall revert or come to the possession of the said Earl or his Heirs by Surrender Forfeiture or otherwise for Sixty years for so is the Case put in one part of the Report but in another part of it it seems to be That the Demise to Freer was when it should revert after the Expiration Surrender or Forfeiture omitting the words or otherwise of the Lease made to Anne Seaton which will nothing vary the Case The said Edward Earl of Oxford 〈…〉 demised the said Mannor or Farm of Blacon to the said Geoffry Morley Habendum from the end of the said Leases for Fifty years The Question was Whether any of these leases made either to Hamlett Freer or Morley be good or were in esse at the time of the lease made by Sir Randolph Crew to the Plaintiff Sir Randolph Crew claiming the Inheritance from the Earl of Oxford and Sir William Norris the Leases from Freer and Morley and under him the Defendant And Iudgment was given in Chester for the Plaintiff And upon a Writ of Error of this Iudgment brought in the Kings Bench wherein the Error assign'd was The giving of Iudgment for the Plaintiff After several Arguments at Barr and at the Bench Seriatim by the Iustices it was unanimously agreed The Iudgment in Chester for the Plaintiff should be affirmed And that neither the Lease to Freer nor that to Morley was good to avoid the Plaintiffs Title As for the lease to Freer it being a grant of a Reversion nominally and by Agreement of Parties there being no Reversion because no lease at the time of the Grant was in esse either of Seatons or Rochesters upon a point of Rasure in Rochester's Demise found in the Case and for that Land in possession could not pass by the name of a Reversion though by the name of Land a Reversion may pass for he who will grant Land in possession cannot be thought not to grant the same if only in Reversion L. Chandoes Case 6. Rep. according to the doctrine of Throgmorton's Case in the Commentaries And for that Morley's lease was to commence after the lease granted to Rochester which was to commence after that granted to Seaton the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. whereas no such lease was granted to Rochester but a lease to commence after one granted to Seaton in 28 H. 8. It was resolv'd None of those leases were in esse and that Morley's lease commenced therefore presently The words of the Resolution are these as to Morley's Lease It was Resolv'd that Morley's Lease was not in esse for that misrecites the former Leases and so hath the same Rule as the former where it recites Leases and there be none such Therefore it shall begin from the Date which being in the Fifteenth of the Queen for Fifty years ended 1623. which was before the Lease made to the Plaintiff for these Reasons Judgment was affirmed The same Conclusions are deducible from this lease to Morley as from the former to Rochester and therefore I will not repeat them But here are two Judgments in the very point of our Case and affirmed in a Writ of Error unanimously in the Kings Bench. And where it is thought material that the Jury have found a half years Rent to have been behind at Michaelmas 1643. and thence inferr'd the Jury have found the leases by which that Rent was ascertain'd namely the leases of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. Surely if a lease be for a term of years to commence from the end of a former term and for such Rent as is reserv'd upon such former Demise that never was as no term can commence from the end of another which never was so no Rent can be behind which cannot appear but by a Demise which was never made that is which is never found to be made Add further That if the Iury had found the Leases of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. to have been made as is mentioned in the lease of 1 Mar. that had not been a sufficient finding of them For a Deed is not found at all nor a last Will when only the Jury find but part of the Deed or Will for the Court cannot Iudge but upon the whole and not upon part It it be found in Assise the Defendant was Tenant and disseis'd the Plaintiff nisi verba contenta in ultima voluntate W. M. give a lawful Estate from W. M. to R. M. and find the words contain'd in the Will but not the Will at large the Court cannot judge upon this Verdict 38. 39 El. B.R. West and Mounsons C. Rolls 696. Tit. Tryal whose Office it is to judge upon the whole Will which is not found 38 39 El. B. R. West and Mounsons Case Rolls 696. Title Tryal So for the same reason finding but part of a recited Deed and not the whole is as if no part were found and it appears by the Deed of 1 Mariae that both Deeds of 29 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. are
recited therein but in part for after as much as is recited of either Deeds respectively is said as more plainly appears among other Grants and Covenants in the said Deed. And if other Grants were in the Deed of 29 H. 8. besides those recited then the express Grant of the very Mannor of Hooknorton might be one of those Grants which is urg'd not to be granted because not recited in 29 H. 8. nominally and if so here being two former demises of the Mannor mentioned in the Indenture 1 Mar. and for different terms the one 29 H. 8. for Eighty years the other 1 E. 6. for Ninety years and so expiring at different terms it is uncertain from which Expiration the demise of the Mannor 1 Mar. shall Commence and consequently the demise having no certain Commencement will be void by the Rector of Chedington's Case 1. Rep. But admitting the Mannor not demis'd by 29 H. 8. yet the Jury finding the demise 1 Mar. Habendum à fine prioris dimissionis and not prioris dimissionis ejusdem Manerii it is uncertain still Whether the Habendum à fine prioris dimissionis as the Jury have found it shall referr to the end of the demise 29 H. 8. or to that of 1 E. 6. both of them being prior demises mentioned in the Indenture 1 Mar. for if only the demise 29 H. 8. had been mentioned in that of 1 Mar. the demise 1 Mar. for its Commencement must of necessity have referr'd to the Expiration of the demise by 29 H. 8. though the Mannor pass'd not by it and it will not then change the uncertainty because the demise 1 E. 6. is mention'd Nor shall you to this finding of the Jury suppose a different finding from their finding barely the Indenture of 1 Mar. call in aid any thing from the Recitals in 1 Mar. and so make up a Medley Verdict partly from what the Jury find expresly and partly from what is only recited and not otherwise found As for instance The Jury find the Mannor demis'd for Ninety years Habendum from the end of a former demise mention'd 1 Mar. This Verdict in it self finds no Commencement of the term by not finding from the Expiration of which term it begins nor find no Rent reserv'd But the demise of 1 Mar. as to them must be made out from the recitals of Deeds not found to be real which is a way of confounding all Verdicts When the Jury say The Mannor of Hooknorton was demis'd à fine prioris dimissionis in Indentura predict mentionat for Ninety years they do not say à fine prioris dimissionis ejusdem Manerii So as if nothing else were the former Indenture mention'd might be of the Vicaridge or any other thing and not at all of the Mannor and yet by the Indenture of 1 Mar. the demise of the Mannor was to Commence from the Expiration of such former demise whatever was demis'd by it But the Indenture of 1 Mar. demiseth all the Premisses contain'd in the first Indenture Habendum from the Expiration of the term Ergo If the Mannor be not compris'd in the first Indenture it cannot be demis'd by 1 Mar. from the Expiration of the first term in the first Indenture But admitting this Who can say the Mannor of Hooknorton is not compris'd in the first Indenture For first What if only part of the first Indenture is recited and not all in the Deed of 1 Mar. and so the Mannor omitted in the recital though it were compris'd in the Indenture of 29 H. 8. and perhaps the Jury might if that Indenture were produc'd to them see it was compris'd in the Indenture though not recited to be so 2. What if the Indenture of 29 H. 8. were mis-recited in 1 Mar. and instead of the Mannor the word Mansion recited 3. It is apparent That the Indenture of 29 H. 8. was not recited nor pretended to be recited verbatim in that of 1 Mar. Because after so much of the Indenture of 29 H. 8. as is recited in that of 1 Mar. it is said as by the said Indenture viz. 29 H. 8. among divers other Covenants and Grants more plainly appeareth So as there were other Grants in the said Indenture of 29 H. 8. than are recited in 1 Mar. and the Grant of the Mannor by name might be one of them 4. How can it appear to us but that the Jury did find the Mannor of Hooknorton to be expresly demis'd by the first Indenture if any thing were demis'd by it If then the Jury did conceive the Mannor of Hooknorton was demis'd by the first recited Indenture as most probably they did When they find That by the Indenture of 1 Mar. the said Mannor was convey'd à fine prioris dimissionis in Indentur praedict mentionat And there are mentioned in the Indenture of 1. Mar. two former demises of the Mannor viz. that of 29 H. 8. for a term of Eighty years and that of 1 E. 6. for a term of Ninety years there is no certain Commencement of the term of 1 Mar. because it is as uncertain from which of the two former demises it takes his Commencement as if ten former demises were mention'd and for different terms and then it could Commence from neither of them But admit it should be taken to Commence from the end of the term of 1 E. 6. and not from the other because in that term if any such were the Mannor is without scruple demis'd yet we must remember the present Question is not of the Mannor but of Two hundred Acres parcel of the Mannor And in the Lease of 1 E. 6. though the Mannor be demis'd yet there is an Exception of certain Lands and Tenements in the Town or Vill of Hooknorton which Croker then held for certain years enduring How doth it appear That the Two hundred Acres in question were not those Lands excepted out of the demise of 1 Mariae For though they were parcel of the Mannor they might be severally demis'd and excepted and though it be found Cok. Litt. 325. a. That at the time of the Demise and at the time of the Trespass the Two hundred Acres were parcel of the Mannor it is not found that they were not part of the Lands in the Vill of Hooknorton at the time of the demise made 1 Mar. then in Lease to Croker and excepted out of the said demise of 1 Mar. for if they were the Plaintiff makes no Title to them If the Issue be 15 Jac. B.R. between Ven◠and Howel whether by Custome of the Mannor a Copyhold is grantable to Three for the Life of Two and it be found that by the Custome it is grantable for Three Lives that is not well found for it is but an Argument Rolls 693. Title Tryal That because a greater Estate may be granted a less may and a new Venire Facias granted because the matter in Fact whereupon the Court was to judge and was the point of
the Issue was not found Hill 10 Car. 1. B. R. Wilkinson and Meriams Case Rolls 700. 701. Tit. Tryal If a Jury find that J.S. was seis'd in Fee of Land and posses'd of certain Leases for years of other Land made his Will in writing and thereby devis'd his Leases to J.D. and after devis'd to his Executors the residue of his Estate Mortgages Goods c. his Debts being paid and funeral Expences discharg'd It being referred by the Jury to the Court Whether by this devise the Executor hath an Estate in Fee or not This is no perfect special Verdict because the Jury find not the Debts paid and the Funeral Expences discharg'd which is a Condition precedent to the Executors having an Estate in Fee and without finding which the Court cannot resolve the matter to them referr'd by the Jury Therefore a Venire facias de novo was awarded Judgment was given for the Defendant Trin. 22. Car. II. C. B. Rot. 461. Richard Edgcomb Knight of the Bath Executor of Pierce Edgcomb Esquire his Father is Plaintiff Rowland d ee Administrator of Charles Everard Esquire during the Minority of Charles Everard Son of the Intestate Defendant In an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit THE Plaintiff declares That the Intestate the Thirteenth of July 1664. at London in the Parish of St. Mary Bow in the Ward of Cheap in consideration that the said Pierce Edgcomb would at his request lend him 500 l. promis'd the said Pierce to repay it within Seven daies after demand with Interest after the rate of 4 l. per Centum That thereupon the said Pierce Edgcomb after at the time and place aforesaid did lend the said Intestate 500 l. That the said Pierce the Testator afterwards the Fourteenth of July 17 Car. 2. at the place aforesaid required the Intestate to pay the said 500 l. with Interest after the rate aforesaid both which amounted to the Sum of 520 l. He lays further That the said Intestate was indebted to Pierce the Testator the Fourteenth day of July 1664. in the Sum of 500 l. for mony before that time to him lent by the said Pierce And in Consideration thereof the said Fourteenth of July 1664. in the said Parish and Ward promis'd to pay when requir'd But that neither the Intestate in his life time nor the Defendant to whom the Administration of his Goods were committed during the Minority of Charles Everard Son of the said Intestate at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid did pay the said Sums nor either of them amounting to 1020 l. to the said Pierce Edgcomb in his life time nor to the said Richard the Plaintiff after his death Though required by the Intestate afterwards in his life time that is upon the First of August 17 Car. 2. And the said Defendant after the death of the Intestate viz. the Tenth day of March 18 Car. 2. and often after at the said Parish and Ward by the Testator Pierce were requir'd And the said Defendant after the death of the Testator the First day of January 21 Car. 2. was required at the place aforesaid by the Plaintiff to pay the said mony which he did not and still refuses to his damage of 800 l. The Defendant pleads payment after the Plaintiffs Writ purchas'd of several great debts due by Bond and Bills obligatory from the Intestate to several persons at his death in number One and thirty That the Intestate the Two and twentieth of December 16 Car. 2. became bound in a Recognizance in the Chancery to Sir Harbottle Grimstone Baronet Master of the Rolls and to Sir Nathaniel Hobart one of the Masters of the Chancery in 2000 l. And that the said 2000 l. is still due and unpaid and the said Recognizance in its full force unsatisfied or discharg'd He pleads the City of London is an ancient City and that within it time out of mind hath been held a Court of Record of the Kings c. before the Mayor and Aldermen of the said City in Camera Guild-hall ejusdem Civitatis of all personal Actions arising and growing within the said City That the Intestate at the time of his death was indebted apud London praedict in the Parish and Ward praedict to one William Allington in 2670 l. 17 s. 7 d. And who after the purchase of the Plaintiffs Writ the Tenth of March the Eighteenth of the King came to the said Court before Sir Thomas Bludworth then Mayor and the Aldermen in the said Chamber according to the Custome of the said City held us'd and approv'd Et praedictus Willielmus Allington tunc ibidem in eadem Curia secundum consuetudinem praedictae Civitatis affirmabat contra praedictum Rolandum Dee ut Administratorem c. quandam Billam originalem de placito debiti super demand Mille sexcentarum septuaginta librarum decem septem solidorum septem denariorum legalis monetae c. And that it was so proceeded according to the Custome of the said City that the said William Allington had Judgment to recover against the Defendant the said Debt and 85 l. 16 s. for damages c. And that after the Defendant in full satisfaction of the said Judgment paid to the said William Allington the Sum of 2670 l. and 17 s. Then pleads about Four and twenty Recoveries and Judgments thereupon in the Kings Bench in Pleas of Debt without Specialties all satisfied but one of 7000 l. and more due to one Cornwallis Then pleads Plene administravit all the Goods of the Intestate at the time of his death to be administred and that he had not die Impetrationis brevis Originalis praedicti nec unquam postea aliqua bona seu cattalla predict Car. Everard tempore mortis suae in manibus suis administrand praeterquam bona cattalla ad valentiam separalium denariorum summarum per ipsum sic ut praefertur solutarum in exonerationem separalium Judiciorum scriptorum obligatori orum billarum obligatoriarum predict Ac praeter alia bona cattalla ad valentiam decem solidorum quae executioni Recognitionis praedict ac Judicii praedicti per praefatum Carolum Cornwallis versus ipsum ut praefertur recuperat onerabilia onerata existunt Et quod ipse Rolandus modo non habet aliqua bona seu cattalla quae fuerunt praedict Caroli tempore mortis suae administrand praeter praedicta bona catalla ad valentiam praedictorum decem solidorum quae executioni recognitionis praedict ac Judicii praedict per praefatum Carolum Cornwallis recuperat sic ut praefertur onerata onerabilia existunt Et hoc paratus est c. Et petit Judicium Then Averrs the debts so as aforesaid by him paid to be bonâ fide paid pro veris justis debitis owing and unpaid by the Intestate at the time of his death And that the several Iudgments aforesaid against him recover'd were for true and just debts of
the Trespass suppos'd that is the First of August 1606. King James was seis'd in right of the Crown of the said Pool and three Gardens with the Appurtenances in St. Margarets aforesaid in his Demesue as of Fee They find again That the same First Day of August 1606. A Water-work was built in the said Gardens and the said Pool was thence us'd with the said Water-work until the Twelfth Day of March in the Eleventh year of King James That King James so seis'd the said Twelfth of March by his Letters Patents under the Great Seal of England bearing Date the said Twelfth of May 11 Jac. in consideration of 70 l. 10 s. of lawful mony of England paid by Richard Prudde and for other considerations him moving at the nomination and request of the said Richard Et de gratia sua speciali ex certa scientia mero motu for him his Heirs and Successors granted to the said Richard Prudde and one Toby Mathews Gent. and to their Heirs and Assigns among other things the said Three Gardens and Water-work thereupon erected to convey water from the River of Thames to divers houses and places in Westminster and elsewhere with all and singular the Rights Members and Appurtenances of what nature and kind soever They further find That the said King James by his said Letters Patents for the consideration aforesaid for him his Heirs and Successors granted to the said Richard Prudde and Toby Mathew their Heirs and Assigns inter alia Omnia singula stagna gurgites aquas aquarum cursus aquaeductus to the said Premisses granted by the said Letters Patents or to any of them or to any parcel of them quoquo modo spectantia pertinentia incidentia vel appendentia or being as member part or parcel thereof at any time thentofore had known accepted occupied used or reputed or being together with the same or as part parcel or member thereof in accompt or charge with any of his Officers as fully and amply as the same were formerly held by any Grant or Charter Ac adeo plene libere integre ac in tam amplis modo forma prout idem nuper Rex aut aliquis progenitorum sive predecessorum fuorum premissa praedict per easdem Litteras Patent prae-concess quamlibet seu aliquam inde partem sive parcellam habuerunt habuissent vel gavisi fuissent habuissent vel habere uti gaudere debuiffent aut debuit They further find That the said Pool was necessary for the Water-work aforesaid and that it could not work without the said Pool They further find That the King who now is by his Letters Patents dated at Westminster the Fifteenth of February the Eighteenth of his Reign inroll'd in the Exchequer in consideration that Henry Alderidge Gent. a piece of Laud and other the Premisses granted by the said Letters Patents cover'd with water and hurtful mudd would fill up at his proper charges and perform the Covenants and Agreements in the Letters Patents contain'd for him his Heirs and Successors granted the aforesaid piece of Land containing as aforesaid in length and breadth by the name of All that piece of Land or broad Ditch lying and being in the Parish of St. Margarets Westminster with particular Boundaries thereto expressed To have and to hold from the Feast of the Annunciation last past for the term of One and twenty years thence next ensuing They find That the said Henry Alderidge entred into the Premisses then in the possession of the Defendants and so possess'd made the Lease to the Plaintiff Habendum to him and his Assigns as in the Declaration That the Plaintiff entred by virtue thereof into the said piece of Land and was possess'd till the Defendants Ejected him And if upon the whole matter the Defendants be Culpable they assess damages to 12 d. and costs to 40 s. And if they be not they find them not culpable The first Question is What can pass by the name of Stagnum or Gurges for if only the water and not the soyl passeth thereby the Question is determined for the piece of Land containing such length and breadth cannot then pass Fitzh N. Br. 191. b. Lett. H. By the name of Gurges water and soyl may be demanded in a precipe 34 Ass pl. 11. Coke Litt. f. 5 6. ad finem By the name of Stagnum the soyl and water is intended 1. Where a man had granted to an Abbot totam partem piscariae suae from such a Limit to such a Limit reservato mihi Stagno molendini mei And the Abbot for a long time after the grant had enjoyed the fishing of the Pool It was adjudg'd the Reservation extended to the water and soyl but the Abbot had the fishing by reason of long usage after the Grant which shewed the Intent 1606. 4 Jac. The next Question is When the soyl may pass by the word Stagnum whether it may as belonging and pertaining to the Water-work erected 6 Jac. and granted away with the Pool as pertaining to it in 11 Jac. as it is found or to the Gardens which seems a short time especially in the Case of the King to gain a Reputation as belonging and appertaining As to this Question things may be said pertaining in Relation only to the extent of the Grant As an antient Messuage being granted with the Lands thereto appertaining and if some Land newly occupied and not antiently with that Messuage shall pass as appertaining is a proper Question but that is a Question only of the extent of the Grant and what was intended to pass and not of the nature of the Grant Four Closes of Land part of the possessions of the Priory of Lanceston came to King Henry the Eighth and after to Queen Elizabeth usually call'd by the Name of Drocumbs or Northdrocumbs A House was built 21 Eliz. as the Book is by the Farmers and Occupiers of these Closes upon part In 24 Eliz. she granted Totum illud Messuagium vocat Drocumbs ac omnia terras tenementa dicto messuagio spectantia in Lanceston After King James made a Lease of the Four Closes call'd Northdrocumbs or Drocumbs Gennings versus Lake 5 Car. 1. Crook 168. and upon question between the Queens Patentee and the Kings Iudgment was given for the Queens Patentee Because though the House was newly erected before the Queens Grant yet the Land shall be said belonging to it and it shall pass by such name as it was known at the time of the Patent and that was a stronger Case than this there being but Three or Four years to give Reputation of belonging or appertaining Another meaning of the words belonging or appertaining is when they relate not to the extent or largeness of the Grant but to the nature of the thing granted As if a man newly erect a Mill in structure and hath no Water-course to it if he grants his Mill with the Appurtenances nothing passes but the structure
meaning can be given to his Covenant Accordingly the new Authorities run grounded upon that sound and ancient Reason of Law That the Lessor shall not be charg'd with an Action upon his express Covenant for enjoyment of the term against all men where the Lessee hath his proper Remedy against the wrong doer Against this Truth there is one Book that hath or may be pretended which I will cite in the first place because the Answer to it may be more perspicuous from the Authority I shall after deliver to redargue that Case Dyer 15 16 Eliz. 328. a. pl. 8. It is the Case of Mountford and Catesby in the Lord Dyer Catesby in consideration of a Sum of mony and a Horse made a Lease to Mountford for term of years Et super se assumpsit quod the Plaintiff Mountford pacifice quiete haberet gauderet the Land demis'd durante termino sine evictione interruptione alicujus personae after Catesby's Father entred upon him and so interrupted him whereupon Mountford brought his Action upon this Assumpsit and Catesby pleaded he did not assume and found against him It was moved in Arrest of Judgment for the Defendant That the entry might be wrongful for which the Plaintiff had his Remedy but disallowed and Iudgment affirmed for the Plaintiff because saith the Book it is an express presumption and assumption that the Plaintiff should not be interrupted And this Case is not expresly denied to be Law in Essex and Tisdales Case in the Lord Hobart as being an express Assumption Though the Lord Dyers Case be an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit and out Case an Action of Covenant yet in the nature of the Obligation there seems no difference but in the form of the Action For to assume that a man shall enjoy his term quietly without interruption and to covenant he shall so enjoy it seems the same undertaking But if the reason of Law differ in an Assumpsit from what it is in a Covenant as seems implyed in Tisdales Case then this Case of the Lord Dyer makes nothing against the Case in question which is upon a Covenant not an Assumpsit Hob. f. 34 35. 1. Elias Tisdale brought an Action of Covenant against Sir William Essex and declared That Sir William convenit promisit agreavit ad cum praedict Elia quod ipse idem Elias haberet occuparet gauderet certain Lands for Seven years into which he entred and that one Elsing had Ejected him and kept him out ever since Resolv'd because no Title is laid in Elsing he shall be taken to enter wrongfully and the Lessee hath his Remedy against him Therefore adjudg'd for the Defendant Essex Here is a Covenant for enjoying during the term the same with enjoying without interruption for if the enjoyment be interrupted he doth not enjoy during the term the same with enjoying without any interruption the same with enjoying without interruption of any person which is the Lord Dyers Case but here adjudg'd the interruption must be legal or an Action of Covenant will not lye because there is remedy against the Interrupter So is there in the Lord Dyer's Case And a Rule of that Book is That the Law shall never judge that a man Covenants against the wrongful acts of strangers unless the words of the Covenant be full and express to that purpose which they are not in our present Case because the Law defends against wrong Brocking brought an Action upon an Assumpsit against one Cham and declared Brocking versus Cham Cr. 15 Jac. f. 4. 5. p. 10. That the Defendant assumed the Plaintiff should enjoy certain Lands according to his Lease without the lett interruption or incumbrance of any person and shews in Fact That this Land was extended for Debt due to the King by process out of the Exchequer and so incumbred After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment That no good breach was assigned because he did not shew that the Incumbrance was a lawful Incumbrance for else he might have his Remedy elsewhere and Iudgment was given for the Defendant This Case was upon an Assumpsit as the Lord Dyers was and by as ample words for the Land was to be enjoyed without any lett which is equivalent to the words of quiete pacifice in the Lord Dyers Case which is a Case in terminis adjudged contrary to that in the Lord Dyer and upon the same reason of Law in an Assumpsit as if it had been a Covenant viz. because the Plaintiff had his Remedy against the wrong doer Chauntfloure brought an Action of Covenant against one Pristly and Doctor Waterhouse as Executors of John Mountfitchett Cr. 45 El. f. 914. pl. 4. and declared That the Testator had sold him Nine and twenty Tuns of Copras and agreed That if the Testator faild of payment of a certain Sum of mony upon a day certain That the Plaintiff might quietly have and enjoy the said Copras that the money was not paid at the day and that he could not have and enjoy the said Nine and twenty Tuns of Copras Iudgment was given by Nihil dicit against the Defendants and upon a Writ of Enquiry of Damages 260 l. Damages given Vpon motion in Arrest of Iudgment It was resolved by the whole Court That the breach of Covenant was not well assign'd because no lawful disturbance was alledg'd and if he were illegally hindred or disturbed of having the Copras which he had bought he had sufficient remedy against the wrong doers Dod was bound in an Obligation to Hammond conditioned that Hammond and his Heirs might enjoy certain Copyhold Lands surrendred to him The Defendant pleaded the Surrender and that the Plaintiff entred and might have enjoyed the Lands To which the Plaintiff replyed That after his Entry one Gay entred upon him and outed him It was adjudg'd the Replication was naught because he did not shew that he was evicted out of the Land by lawful Title for else he had his Remedy against the wrong doer This was in an Action of Debt upon a Bond condition'd for quiet enjoyment So as neither upon Covenant upon Assumpsit or Bond condition'd for quiet enjoying unless the breach be assign'd for a lawful Entry or Eviction and upon the same reason of Law because the lessee may have his Remedy against the wrong doers an Action of Covenant cannot be maintain'd Cok. 4 Rep. Nokes's Case To these may be added a Resolution in Nokes his Case in the fourth Report where a man was bound by Covenant in Law That his Lessee should enjoy his term and gave Bond for performance of Covenants in an Action of Debt brought upon the Bond the breach was assign'd in that a stranger had recover'd the Land leas'd in an Ejectione firmae and had Execution though this Eviction were by course of law yet for that an elder and sufficient Title was not alledg'd upon which the Recovery was had
by the party This difference is very material for if the Father could devise the Land in trust for him until his Son came to One and twenty as he can grant the Custody then as in other Cases of Leases for years the Land undoubtedly should go to the Executor or Administrator of him whom the Father named for the tuition and the trust should follow the Land as in other Cases where Lands are convey'd in trust But when he cannot ex directo devise the Land in trust then the Land follows the Custody and not the Custody the Land and the Land must go as the Custody can go and not the Custody as the Land can go Coke Litt. f. 49. a. 1 H. 7. 28. 8 H. 7. 4. As where a House or Land belongs to an Office or a Chamber to a Corody the Office or Corody being granted by Deed the House and Land follows as incident or belonging without Livery because the Office is the principal and the Land but pertaining to it A second Consideration is That by this Act no new custody is instituted but the office of Guardian as to the duty and power of the place is left the same as the Law before had prescrib'd and setled of Guardian in Soccage But the modus habendi of that office is alter'd by this Act in two Circumstances The first 1. It may be held for a longer time viz. to the Age of the Heir of One and twenty where before it was but to Fourteen 2. It may be by other persons held for before it was the next of Kindred not inheritable could have it now who the Father names shall have it So it is as if an Office grantable for life only before should be made grantable for years by Parliament or grantable before to any person should be made grantable but to some kind of persons only The Office as to the Duty of it and its essence is the same it was But the Modus habendi alter'd If therefore this new Guardian is the same in Office and Interest with the former Guardian in Soccage and varies from it only in the Modus habendi then the Ward hath the same legal Remedy against this Guardian as was against the old But if this be a new Office of Guardianship differing in its nature from the other the Heir hath no remedy against him at all in Law For though this new Guardian be enabled to have such Actions as the old might have yet this Act enables not the Heir to have like Actions or any other against him as he might against the Guardian in Soccage The Intent of this Statute is to priviledge the Father against common right to appoint the Guardian of his Heir and the time of his Wardship under One and twenty But leaves the Heirs of all other Ancestors Wards in Soccage as before Therefore I hold 1. That such a Special Guardian cannot transferr the Custody of the Ward by Deed or will to any other 2. That he hath no different Interest from a Guardian in Soccage but for the time of the Wardship 1. When an Act of Parliament alteâ—s the Common Law the meaning shall not be strained beyond the words except in Cases of publick Vtility when the end of the Act appears to be larger than the enacting words But by the words the Father only can appoint the Guardian therefore the Guardian so appointed cannot appoint another Guardian 2. The Mother hath the same concern for her Heir as the Father hath But she cannot by the Act name a Guardian therefore much less can the Guardian named by the Father 3. The Father cannot by the Act give the custody to a Papist but if it may be transferr'd over by him whom the Father names or by Act in Law go to his Executor or Administrator it may come to a Papist against the meaning of the Act. 4. Offices or Acts of personal Trust cannot be assign'd for the Trust is not personal which any man may have Dyer 2 3 Eliz. f. 189. b. 5. At the Common Law none could have the Custody and Marriage of a mans Son and Heir apparent from the Father yet the Father could not grant or sell the Custody and Marriage of his Heir apparent though the marriage was to his own benefit as was resolved by the greater number of the Iudges in the Lord Bray's Case who by Indenture had sold for Eight hundred pounds the Custody and Marriage of his Son and Heir apparent in the time of Henry the Eighth to the Lord Audley Chancellor of England Lord Cromwell Lord Privy Seal Sir William Paulett Treasurer of the Houshold The Marquis of Winchester Lord Treasurer Dyer supra f. 190. b. pl. 19. The Reason given is That the Father hath no Interest to be granted or sold to a Stranger in his eldest Son but it is inseparably annex'd to the person of the Father Two Judges differ'd because an Action of Trespass would lye for taking away a mans Heir apparent and marrying him whence they conclude he might be granted as a Chattel 11 H. 4. f. 23. a. Fitz. N. Br. Tresp f. 90. b. Lett. G. f. 89. Lett. O. But an Action of Trespass will lye for taking away ones Servant For taking away a Monk where he was cloyster'd in Castigationem Pro Uxore abducta cum bonis Viri yet none of these are assignable West 1. c. 48. By the Statute of Westminster the First If the Guardian in Chivalry made a Feoffment of the Wards Lands in his Custody during his Minority the Heir might forthwith have a Writ of Novel Disseisin against the Guardian and Tenant and the Land recover'd should be deliver'd to the next of kinn to the Heir to be kept and accompted for to him at his full Age. This was neither Guardian in Soccage nor Chivalry Coke 2. Inst f. 260. b. By 4 5 P.M. c. 8. No woman child under 16. can be taken against his will whom the Father hath made Guardian by Deed or Will yet this is no Lease of the Custody till 16. nor is it assignable Ratcliffs C. 3. Rep. Shoplands C. 3 Jac. Cr. f. 99. but a special Guardian appointed by the Statute and such a Guardian could not assign over nor should it go to his Executors by the Express Book This Case likewise and common Experience proves That Guardian in Soccage cannot assign nor shall the Custody go to his Executors though some ancient Books make some doubt therein For expresly by the Statute of 52 H. 3. the next of kin is to answer and be accomptable to the Heir in Soccage as this special Guardian is here by Westminster the First These several sorts of Guardians trusted for the Heir could neither assign their Custody nor did it go to their Executors because the Trust was personal and they had no Interest for themselves The Trust is as personal in this new Guardian nor hath he any Interest in it for himself and
therefore he shall not assign it A Guardian in Soccage cannot transferr his Custody because it is a personal Trust but the Trust of this special Guardian is more personal therefore that he shall transferr it concludes strangely The Office of a Philizer is an Office of personal Trust to do the business of the Court and not assignable 28 H. 8. f. 7. Dyer no Execution can be upon it Sir George Reynels Case an Office of Trust and Confidence cannot be granted for years because then it might go to persons that is to Executors or Administrators never trusted or confided in So is Littleton expresly That all Offices of Trust Sect. 379. as Steward Constable Bedlary Bailiffwick must be personally occupied unless they be granted to be occupied by a Deputy and are not assignable And a more near or tenderer Trust cannot be than the Custody and Education of a mans Child and Heir and preservation of his Estate It may be said That in these Cases the Law doth particularly appoint the Guardians and therefore no others can be But in the Case at Barr the Father appoints the person not the Law It is true there is a difference in the Cases but not to make the Trust more assignable in the one Case than the other Where the Law appoints who shall be trusted the Trust cannot be refused as in the several Guardians before mentioned But where the Person names the Trustee the Trust may be refused but once accepted it cannot be transfer'd to others more than where the Law names the Trustee An Executor hath a private office of Trust for we speak not of publique and is named by the Testator not by the Law therefore he may refuse but cannot assign his Executorship But it is true an Executor may make an Executor due Circumstances observed who shall discharge the first Testators Trust but the reason is that after Debts paid and Legacies the Surplus of the Goods belongs to the Executor proprio jure An Administrator hath a private Office of Trust he cannot assign nor leave it to his Executor he is not named by the Intestate but by the Law in part for him but not peremptorily he may not claim it if he will because it must pass through the Ordinary A mans Bailiff or Receiver are Offices of personal Trust and not assignable so is the Office of every Servant An Arbitrator or one authorized to sell a mans Land to give Livery or receive it cannot assign it is a personal Confidence 1. A Custody is not in its nature Testamentary it cannot pay Debts nor Legacies nor be distributed as Alms. 2. It is not accomptable for to the Ordinary as Intestates Goods are 3. The Heir ought to have a Guardian without interruption but an Executor may be long before he proves the Will and may at length refuse An Administration long before it be granted and after may be suspended by Appeal and in these times the Ward hath no certain Guardian responsal for his Estate or Person Shopland's C. 3 Jac. Cr. f. 99. And where it may be said That these are naked Authorities and the persons have no Interest but a Guardian hath Interest he may lett and sett the Wards Land during minority Avow in his own name Grant Copy-hold Estates and the like It is an Interest conjoyned with his trust for the Ward I speak not here of equitable trusts without which Interest he could not discharge the trust but it must be an Interest for himself which is transferrable or shall go to his Executor All Executors and Administrators have Interest and Property necessary to their Trusts for they may sell the Goods or Leases of the Testator or Intestate without which they could not execute the Trust A Monk made an Executor might do the like who in his own right could have no Interest or Property But such Interest proves not that the Executors or Administrators may assign their Trust Guardian in Soccage may demise his Guardianship and grant over his Estate N. Br. f. 145. b. Letter H. quod nota or that it shall go to their Executors for it is agreed in that Case of Shopland That such Interest as a Guardian in Soccage hath shall not go to his Executor but is annexed to his Person and therefore not transferrable So as I take the sense of the Act collected in short to be Whereas all Tenures are now Soccage and the next of kinn to whom the Land cannot descend is Guardian until the Heirs Age of Fourteen yet the Father if he will may henceforth nominate the Guardian to his Heir and for any time until the Heirs Age of One and twenty and such Guardian shall have like remedy for the Ward as the Guardian in Soccage by the Common Law hath Another Exposition of this Act hath been offer'd as if the Father did devise his Land by way of Lease during the minority of the Heir to him to whom he gave the Custody in Trust for the Heir and so the Land was assignable over and went to the Executors but follow'd with the Trust 1. This is a forc'd Exposition to carry the Custody to any Stranger to the Father or to the Child or to any that may inherit the Land contrary to the ancient and excellent policy of the Law 2. By such an Exposition the Heir should have no Accompt of such a Lessee as he may against a Guardian but must sue in equity for this Statute gives Actions such as Guardians might have to him who hath the Custody but gives none against him 3. If such Lessee should give the Heirs marriage Coke Litt. f. 896. the Heir hath no Remedy but the Guardian in Soccage shall accompt for what the marriage was worth Stat. Malbridge c. 17. The Statute only saith That such person nominated by the Father may take to his Custody the Profits of all Lands Tenements and Hereditaments of such Child and Children and also the Custody Tuition and Management of the Goods Chattels and personal Estate of such Child or Children And may bring such Action in relation thereto as a Guardian in Soccage might do None of which words will charge him with the value of the Marriage if he had nothing for it Na. Br. f. 139. b Lett. H. 4. If the Heir be in custody of such a Lessee and be Guardian by nearness of kinn to another Infant The Guardian of the Heir by Law is Guardian to both but such a Lessee hath no pretence to be Guardian of the second Infant by any word of the Act For he is neither an Hereditament or Goods or Chattels of the first Infant As to the second part If the Father being of Age should devise his Land to J. S. during the Minority of his Son and Heir in trust for his Heir and for his Maintenance and Education until he be of Age. This is no devising of the Custody within this Statute for he might have done this before
the Statute If the Father under Age should make such a Devise it were absolutely void for the same syllables shall never give the Custody of the Heir by the Father under Age which do not give it by the Father which is of Age. But in both Cases a Devise of the Custody is effectual and there is no reason that the Custody devis'd shall operate into a Lease when a Lease devis'd shall not operate into a Custody which it cannot do If a man devise the Custody of his Heir apparent to J. S. and mentions no time either during his Minority or for any other time this is a good devise of the Custody within the Act if the Heir be under Fourteen at the death of the Father because by the Devise the Modus habendi Custodiam is chang'd only as to the person and left the same it was as to the time But if above Fourteen at the Fathers death then the Devise of the Custody is meerly void for the incertainty For the Act did not intend every Heir should be in Custody until One and twenty Non ut tamdiu sed ne diutius therefore he shall be in this Custody but so long as the Father appoints and if he appoint no time there is no Custody If a man have power to make Leases for any term of years not exceeding One hundred and he demises Land but expresseth no time shall this therefore be a Lease for One hundred years There is no Reason it should be a Lease for the greatest term he could grant more than for the least term he could grant or indeed for any other term under One hundred Therefore it is void for incertainty and the Case is the same for the Custody For if the Father might intend as well any time under that no Reason will enforce that he only intended that And to say he intended the Custody for some time therefore since no other can be it must be for that will hold as well in the Lease and in all other Cases of incertainty If a man devises Ten pounds to his Servant but having many none shall have it for the incertainty It may be demanded If the Father appoint the Custody until the Age of One and twenty and the Guardian dye what shall become of this Custody It determines with the death of the Guardian and is a Condition in Law and the same as if a man grant to a man the Stewardship of his Mannor for Ten years or to be his Bailiff It is implyed by way of Condition if he live so long A Copyholder in Fee surrenders to the Lord Dyer 8 Eliz. f. 251. pl. 90. ad intentionem that the Lord should grant it back to him for term of life the Remainder to his Wife till his Son came to One and twenty Remainder to the Son in tayl Remainder to the Wife for life The Husband died The Lord at his Court granted the Land to the Wife till the Sons full age The Remainders ut supra The Wife marries and dies Intestate The Husband held in the Land The Wives Administrator and to whom the Lord had granted the Land during the Minority of the Son enters upon the Husband This Entry was adjudg'd unlawful because it was the Wives term but otherwise it had been if the Wife had been but a Guardian or next Friend of this Land The like Case is in Hobart Balder and Blackburn f. 285. 17 Jac. If it be insisted That this new Guardian hath the Custody not only of the Lands descended or left by the Father but of all Lands and Goods any way acquir'd or purchas'd by the Infant which the Guardian in Soccage had not That alters not the Case for if he were Guardian in Soccage without that particular power given by the Statute he is equally Guardian in Soccage with it and is no more than if the Statute had appointed Guardian in Soccage to have care of all the Estate of the Infant however he came by it Besides that proves directly that this new Guardian doth not derive his interest from the Father but from the Law for the Father could never give him power or interest of or in that which was never his The Court was divided viz. The Chief Justice and Justice Wylde for the Plaintiff Justice Tyrrell and Justice Archer for the Defendant Hill 19 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 506. Holden versus Smallbrooke IN Trover and Conversion and not Guilty pleaded Robinson the Iury gave a Special Verdict to this Effect That Doctor Mallory Prebendary of the Prebend of Wolvey founded in the Cathedral of Litchfield seis'd of the said Prebend and one Messuage one Barn and the Glebe appertaining thereto and of the Tithes of Wolvey in right of his Prebend 22 April 13 Car. 2. by Indenture demised to Giles Astly and his Assigns the said Prebend together with all Houses Barns Tenements Glebe Lands and Tithes thereto belonging for three Lives under the ancient Rent of Five pounds ten shillings Astly being one of the Lives died seis'd of the Premisses at whose death one Taverner was Tenant for one year not ended of the Demise of Astly of the Messuage Barn and Glebe Lands and in possession of them whereupon the Plaintiff entred into the Messuage and Glebe and was in the possession of the same and of the Tithes as Occupant And afterwards Frances Astly the Relict of the said Giles Astly enters upon the Messuage and claims the same as Occupant in haec verba Frances Astly Widow of Giles Astly enters upon the House and claims the same with the Glebe and Tithe as Occupant Taverner attorns to Frances Astly and afterwards grants and assigns all his Estate in the Premisses to the Plaintiff afterwards Conquest the Husband of Frances Astly took one Sheaf of Corn in the name of all the Tithes and afterwards demised the Tithes to the Defendant The Tithes are set forth and the Defendant took them whereupon the Plaintiff brought this Action Before I deliver my Opinion concerning the particular Questions before open'd arising upon this Record I shall say somewhat shortly of Natural Occupancy and Civil Occupancy First opening what I mean by those terms then briefly shewing their difference as far only as is material to the Questions now before me I call Natural Occupancy the possession either of such natural things as are immoveable fixt and permanent as Land a Pool River Sea for a Sea is capable of Occupancy and Dominion naturally as well as Land and hath naturally been in Occupancy as is demonstrated in Mr. Selden's Mare Clausum at large which lye unpossess'd and in which no other hath prior right Or of things natural and moveable either animate as a Horse a Cow a Sheep and the like without number or Inanimate as Gold precious Stones Grain Hony Fruit Flesh and the like numberless also wherein no man until the possession thereof by Occupancy had any other right than every man had which is
Interest for the Lessee Taverner had a Lease of the House Glebe and Barn and the Tithe continued in Astly 2. This severance was equally the same as if the Tithe had been demis'd to Taverner and the House and Land had remained still in Astly's possession 3. Though the Freehold of both remained still in Astly at his death notwithstanding the divided Interest in the Land and Tithe yet the Freehold being a thing quatenus Freehold not capable in it self of Occupancy nor no natural but a legal thing which the Law casts upon him that is Occupant that will not concern the Questions either who was Occupant or of what he was Occupant Cok. Litt. f. 41. b. 4. I take it for clear That a naked Tithe granted by it self pur auter vie and the Grantee dying without assignment living Cestuy que vie is not capable of Occupancy more than a Rent a Common in gross and Advowson in gross a Fair or the like are it being a thing lying in Grant equally as those others do Coke's Littleton There can be no Occupant of any thing which lyeth in Grant and cannot pass without Deed. I cited the place at full before with other Authorities against Occupancy of a Rent 5. If a man dye seis'd of Land which he holds pur auter vie and also dies seis'd of Rent held pur auter vie or of an Advowson or Common in gross held by distinct Grants pur auter vie and the same Cestuy que vie or the several Cestuy vies for that will not differ the Case living Though the Grantee died seis'd of a Freehold in these several things I conceive that he which enters into the Land first after his death will be Occupant of the Land which was capable of Occupancy but neither of the Tithe Advowson nor Common which are not capable of Occupancy and have no more coherence with dependence upon nor relation to the Land than if they had been granted pur auter vie to another who had happen'd to dye in like manner as the Grantee of the Land did And that which hath intricated men in this matter hath been a Conception taken up as if the Occupant had for his object in being Occupant the Freehold which the Tenant died seis'd of which is a mistake for the subject and object of the Occupant are only such things which are capable of Occupancy not things which are not and not the Freehold at all into which he neither doth nor can enter but the Law casts it immediately upon him that hath made himself Occupant of the Land or other real thing whereof he is Occupant that there may be a Tenant to the Precipe But as was well observed by my Brother Wilmott No Precipe lies for setting out Tithe at Common Law and I doubt not by the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 7. though Sir Edward Coke in his Litt. f. 159. a. seems to be of opinion Coke Litt. 159. a. that a man may at his Election have remedy for witholding Tithe after that Statute by Action or in the Ecclesiastical Court by that Statute doubtless he hath for the title of Tithe as for title of Land or for the taking of them away but not perhaps for not setting them out 6. When a Severance therefore is once made of the Land and Tithe it is as much severance of them though the Tithe remain in Astly's possession as if he had leas'd the Land to Taverner and the Tithe to another if then Taverner becoming Occupant of the Land should have had nothing in the Tithe leas'd to another as the Land was to him no more shall he have the Tithe remaining in Astly himself at his death Still we must remember the ground insisted on That no Occupancy begins with the Freehold but begins by possessing the Land or other real thing which was void and ownerless and that by Act of Law the Freehold is cast upon the Possessor either entring where the possession was void or being in possession when Tenant pur auter vie died either as Lessee for years or at will to Tenant pur auter vie for the Law equally casts the Freehold upon him as was resolved in Chamberleyne and Eures Case reported by Serjeant Rolls and others Second Part. f. 151. Letter E. and in Castle and Dods Case 5 Jac. Cr. f. 200. Therefore after such Severance made by the Tenant pur auter vie the Land and Tithe are as distinct and sunder'd from each other as if Tenant pur auter vie had held them by distinct Grants or leas'd them to distinct persons In the next place I shall agree That the Occupant of a House shall have the Estovers or way pertaining to such House the Occupant of the Demesne of a Mannor or of other Land shall have the Advowson appendant or Villain regardant to the Mannor or Common belonging to the Land and the Services of the Mannor not sever'd from the Demesne before the occupancy For a Possessor of a House Land Demesne of a Mannor as Occupant doth not by such his possession sever any thing belonging to the Land House or Demesne more than the Possessor by any other title than occupancy doth and if they be not sever'd it follows they must remain as before to the Possessor of that to which they pertain So if a Mannor being an intire thing consisting of Demesnes and Services which are parts constituent of the Mannor the possessing and occupancy of the Demesns which is one part can make no severance of the Services from the intire and therefore the Occupant hath all And these things though primarily there can be no occupancy of them being things that lye in Grant and pass not without Deed yet when they are adjuncts or pertaining to Land they do pass by Livery only without Deed. Coke Litt. f. 121. 8. Sect. 183. Whatsoever passeth by Livery of Seisin either in Deed or in Law may pass without Deed and not only the Rent and Services parcel of the Mannor shall with the Demesns as the more principal and worthy pass by Livery without Deed but all things regardant appendant or appurtenant to the Mannor as Incidents or Adjuncts to the same shall together with the Mannor pass without Deed without saying cum pertinentiis And if they pass by Livery which must be of the Land they must likewise pass by any lawful Entry made into the Land and such the Entry of the Occupant is But as by occupancy of the demesn Lands of a Mannor the Services are not sever'd so if they be sever'd at the time when the occupancy happens that shall never of it self unite them again Now in the Case before us The Tithe is neither appendant or appurtenant or any sort of Adjunct to the Glebe or House nor are they to the Tithe nor will a lease and livery of the Glebe simply with the appurtenances pass the Tithe at all nor a Grant of the Tithe pass the Glebe nor are either
the words of a Will are of ambiguous and doubtful construction they shall not be interpreted to the disinheriting of the right Heir as is already shew'd This being clear That there is no devise by this Will of the Land by implication in any kind to the Son and Daughters it follows that Katherine the surviving Daughter of the Testator and Lessor of the Plaintiff had no Title to enter and make the Lease to the Plaintiff Gardner and then as to the Case in question before us which is only Whether the Defendants be culpable of Ejecting the Plaintiff It will not be material whether The devise to the Nephew William Rose be void or not and if not void how and when he shall take by the devise which may come in question perhaps hereafter But to that point ex abundante and to make the Will not ineffectual in that point of the devise to the Nephew if no Estate for lives or other Estate be created by this Will by Implication to the Son and Daughters it follows That the Nephew can take nothing by way of Remainder for the Remainder must depend upon some particular Estate and be created the same time with the particular Estate Cok. Litt. f. 49. a. The Remainder is the residue of an Estate in Land depending upon a particular Estate and created together with the same and the Will creating no particular Estate the consequent must be That the Land was left to descend in Fee-simple to the heir at law without creating either particular Estate or Remainder upon it Sir Edward Coke hath a Case Cok. Litt. f. 18. a. but quotes no Authority for it If Land be given to H. and his heirs as long as B. hath heirs of his body the Remainder over in Fee the Remainder is void being a Remainder after a Fee-simple though that Fee-simple determines when no heirs are left of the body of B. whether that case be law or not I shall not now discuss in regard that when such a base Fee determines for want of Issue of the body of B. the Land returns to the Grantor and his heirs as a kind of Reversion and if there can be a Reversion of such Estate I know not why a Remainder may not be granted of it but for the former reason this can be no Remainder because no particular Estate is upon which it depends and if the Lord Coke's Case be law it is the stronger Cok. Litt. f. 18. a. Sect. 11. that no Remainder is in this Case But without question a Remainder cannot depend upon an absolute Fee-simple by necessary reason For when all a man hath of Estate or any thing else is given or gone away nothing remains but an absolute Fee-simple being given or gone out of a man that being all no other or further Estate can remain to be given or dispos'd and therefore no Remainder can be of a pure Fee-simple To this purpose is the Case of Hearne and Allen in this Court 2 Car. 1. Cr. f. 57. Richard Keen seis'd of a Messuage and Lands in Cheping-Norton having Issue Thomas his Son and Anne a Daughter by the same Venter devis'd his Land to Thomas his Son and his heirs for ever and for want of heirs of Thomas to Anne and her heirs and died It became a Question Whether Thomas had an Estate in Fee or in Tayl by this Will for he could not dye without heir if his Sister outlived him who was to take according to the intent of the Devisor Two Judges held it and with reason to be an Estate tayl in Thomas and the Remainder to the Daughter who might be his heir shew'd That the Devise to him and his heirs could be intended only to be to him and the heirs of his body But three other Judges held it to be a devise in Fee but all agreed if the Remainder had been to a Stranger it had been void for then Thomas which is only to my purpose had had an absolute Estate in Fee after which there could be no Remainder which is undoubted law The Case out of Coke's Littleton and this Case are the same to this purpose That a Remainder cannot depend upon a Fee-simple yet in another respect they much differ For in this last Case after an Estate in Fee devis'd to Thomas and if he died without heir the Remainder to a Stranger or Sister of the half blood not only the Remainder was void as a Remainder but no future devise could have been made of the land by the Devisor for if Thomas died without heir the land escheated and the Lords Title would precede any future devise But in that Case of Sir Edward Coke which he puts by way of Grant if it be put by way of devise That if land be devised to H. and his heirs as long as B. hath heirs of his body the Remainder over such later devise will be good though not as a Remainder yet as an Executory devise because somewhat remain'd to be devis'd when the Estate in Fee determin'd upon B. his having no Issue of his Body And as an Executory Devise and not as a Remainder I conceive the Nephew shall well take in the present Case And the intention of the Testator by his Will will run as if he had said I leave my Land to descend to my Son and his Heirs according to the Common Law until he and both my Daughters shall happen to dye without Issue And then I devise my Land to my Nephew William Rose and his Heirs Or as if he had said my Son shall have all my Land To have and to hold to him and his Heirs in Fee-simple as long as any Heirs of the bodies of A.B. and c. shall be living and for want of such Heirs I devise my Land to my Nephew William Rose and his Heirs The Nephew shall take as by a future and Executory Devise And there is no difference whether such devise be limited upon the contingent of three Strangers dying without Heirs of their bodies or upon the contingent of three of the Devisors own Children dying without Heirs of their Bodies for if a future devise may be upon any contingent after a Fee-simple it may as well be upon any other contingent if it appear by the Will the Testator intended his Son and Heir should have his Land in Fee-simple This way of Executory devise after a Fee-simple of any nature was in former Ages unknown as appears by a Case in the Lord Dyer 29 H. 8. f. 33. concerning a Devise to the Prior of St. Bartholomew in West-Smithfield by the clear Opinion of Baldwin and Fitz herbert the greatest Lawyers of the Age. But now nothing more ordinary The Cases are for the most part remembred in Pell and Browns Case that is Dyer f. 124. Ed. Clatch his Case f. 330. b. 354. Wellock Hamonds Case cited in Borastons Case 3. Rep. Fulmerston Stewards Case c. I shall instance two Cases
The first is Haynsworths and Prettyes Case Where a man seis'd of Land in Soccage having Issue two Sons and a Daughter devis'd to his youngest Son and Daughter Twenty pounds apiece to be paid by his eldest Son and devis'd his Lands to his eldest Son and his Heirs upon Condition if he paid not those Legacies that his Land should be to his second Son and Daughter and their Heirs The eldest Son fail'd of payment After Argument upon a Special Verdict It was resolv'd by the Court clearly That the second Son and Daughter should have the Land 1. For that the devise to his Son and his Heir in Fee Hill 41. El. Cr. 833. a. being no other then what the Law gave him was void 2. That it was a future devise to the second Son and Daughter upon the contingent of the eldest Sons default of payment 3. That it was no more in effect than if he had devis'd That if his eldest Son did not pay all Legacies that his land should be to the Legatories and there was no doubt in that Case but the land in default of payment should vest in them Which Case in the reason of law differs not from the present Case where the land is devis'd by devise future and executory to the Nephew upon a contingent to happen by the Testators Son and Daughters having no issue 18 Jac. Pell Browns C. Cro. f. 590. The second Case is that of Pell and Brown the Father being seis'd of certain land having Issue William his eldest Son Thomas and Richard Brown devis'd the land to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and if Thomas died without Issue living William then William should have the lands to him his Heirs and Assigns 1. This was adjudg'd an Estate in Fee-simple in Thomas 2. That William by way of Executory devise had an Estate in Fee-simple in possibility if Thomas died without Issue before him And it being once clear That the Estate of Thomas was a Fee-simple determinable upon a contingent and not an Estate tayl and so in the present case it being clear'd that George the Testators Son had the land descended to him in Fee from the Testator and took no Estate tayl expresly or by implication from the Will it will not be material whether the Contingent which shall determine that Fee-simple proceeds from the person which hath such determinable Fee or from another or partly from him and partly from another as in Haynsworth's Case the Son determined his Fee-simple by not paying the Legacies in Pell and Brown's Case Thomas his Fee-simple determined by his dying without Issue living William the Fee-simple vested in George the Son by descent determines when he and his two Sisters dye without Issue and upon such determination in every of these Cases the future and executory devise must take effect But the great Objection is That if this should be an executory devise to the Nephew upon the contingent of George the Son and both his Sisters dying without Issue It will be dangerous to introduce a new way of perpetuity for if a man have several Children and shall permit his Estate to descend or by his Will devise it to his Heir so as he may therein have an unquestionable Fee-simple which is the same with permitting it to descend he may then devise it futurely when all his Children shall dye without Issue of their bodies to J. S. and his Heirs as long as A. B. and C. strangers shall have any Heirs of their bodies living and then to a third person by like future devise For if he should devise it futurely to J. S. and his Heirs as long as J. S. had any Heirs of his body it were a clear Estate tayl in J. S. upon which no future devise could be but it would be a Remainder to be docked This Objection was in some measure made by Doderidge in Pell and Browns Case and the Iudges said there was no danger Vid. Stiles Rep. Gay Gaps Case 258 275. because the Estate in Fee of Thomas did not determine by his dying without Heir of his body generally but by dying without Issue living William for if the land had been given to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and if he died without Heirs of his body then to William and his Heirs Thomas his Estate had been judg'd an Estate tayl with the Remainder to William and not a Fee upon which no future or executory devise can be So was it adjudg'd in Foy and Hinds Case 22 Jac. Cr. f. 695. 6. and anciently 37 Ass p. 18. 5. H. 5. f. 6. and to be within the reason of Mildmay and Corbets Case of Perpetuities But in Pell and Browns Case the Iudges said it was more dangerous to destroy future devises than to admit of such Perpetuities as could follow from them any way by determinable Fee-simples which is true for a Fee simple determinable upon a contingent is a Fee-simple to all intents but not so durable as absolute Fee-simples And all Fee-simples are unequally durable for one will escheat sooner than another by the failer of Heirs An Estate of Fee-simple will determine in a Bastard with his life if he want Issue An Estate to a man and his Heirs as long as John Stiles hath any Heir which is no absolute Fee-simple is doubtless as durable as the Estate in Fee which John Stiles hath to him and his Heirs which is an absolute Fee-simple Nor do I know any Law simply against a Perpetuity but against Intails of Perpetuity for every Fee-simple is a perpetuity but in the accident of Alienation and Alienation is an incident to a Fee-simple determinable upon a contingent as to any more absolute or more perdurable Fee-simple The Chief Justice Justice Archer and Justice Wylde for the Defendant Justice Tyrrell for the Plaintiff Judgment for the Defendant Hill 21 22 Car. II. C. B. Craw versus Ramsey Philip Craw is Plaintiff and John Ramsey Defendant In an Action of Trespass and Ejectment THE Plaintiff declares That Lionel Tolmach Baronet and Humphrey Weld Esquire January the Twentieth the Sixteenth of the King demis'd to the Plaintiff the Mannor of Kingston with the appurtenances in the County of Surrey one Messuage two Barns one Dove-house two Gardens eighty Acres of Land and ten Acres of Meadow with the appurtenances in Kingston aforesaid and other places and also the Rectory of Kingston aforesaid To have and to hold to the said Philip and his Assignes from the Feast of the Nativity last past for five years next ensuing By virtue whereof he entred into the Premisses and was possessed until the Defendant the said Twentieth of January in the Sixteenth year of the King entred upon him and Ejected him with force to his Damage of Forty pounds To this the Defendant pleads he is not Culpable Vpon a Special Verdict it appear'd That Robert Ramsey Alien Antenatus had Issue 1. Robert 2. Nicholas 3. John 4. George Antenatos
the first Cestuy que use nor his Heir the last Cestuy que use in the Case could nor can have any benefit of this warranty because William the first Cestuy que use nor his Heir could not nor can warrant to himself but as to William and his Heirs the warranty is clearly extinct The Argument And as to the first Question I conceive the Law to be that the warranty of William the Tenant in tayl descending upon Elizabeth and Sarah the Demandants his Heirs at Law is no barr in the Formedon in Reverter brought by them as Heirs to William their Grandfather the Donor though it be a Collateral warranty I know it is the perswasion of many professing the Law That by the Statute of Westminster the second De donis conditionalibus the Lineal warranty of Tenant in tayl shall be no barr in a Formedon in the Descender but that the Collateral warranty of Tenant in tayl is at large as at the Common Law unrestrain'd by that Statute Sir Edward Coke in his Comment upon Section 712. Sect. 712. of Littleton A lineal warranty doth not bind the right of an Estate tayl for that it is restrain'd by the Statute de donis Conditionalibus And immediately follows A lineal warranty and assets is a barr of the right in tayl and is not restrain'd But the reason why the warranty of Tenant in tayl with Assets binds the right of the Estate tayl is in no respect from the Statute de donis but is by the Equity of the Statute of Glocester by which the warranty of Tenant by the Courtesie barrs not the Heir for the Lands of his Mother if the Father leave not Assets to descend in recompence And therefore it was conceived after the Statute de donis was made That if Tenant in tayl left Assets to descend in Fee-simple his warranty should bind the right of the Issue in tayl by the equity of that preceding Statute of Glocester Whereas if the Statute of Glocester had not been the Lineal warranty of Tenant in tayl had no more bound the right of the Estate tayl by the Statute de donis with Assets descending than it doth without Assets For the better clearing therefore of the Law in the Case in question I shall preparatorily assert some few things and clear what I so assert without which the truth of the Conclusion I hold will not appear so naked to the Hearers as it should Ass 1. The first is That at the Common Law the distinction of a lineal and collateral warranty was useless and unknown For though what we now call a Collateral and a lineal warranty might be in speculation and notionable at the Common Law as at this day a Male warranty or a Female warranty may be yet as to any effect in Law there was no difference between a Lineal warranty and a Collateral but the warranty of the Ancestor descending upon the Heir be it the one or the other did equally bind And this as it is evident in it self so is it by Littleton whose words are Litt. Sect. 697. Before the Statute of Glocester all warranties which descended to them who are Heirs to those who made the warranties were barrs to the same Heirs to demand any Lands or Tenements against the warranties except the warranties which commence by disseisin Therefore if a Question had been at the Common Law only Whether in some particular Case the Ancestors warranty had bound the Heir It had been a sensless Answer to say it did or did not because the warranty was Lineal or Collateral for those warranties were not defined at the Common Law nor of use to be defined But the proper Answer had been That the warranty did bind the Heir because it commenc'd not by disseisin for every warranty of the Ancestor but such descending upon the Heir did bind him So if after the Statute of Glocester Tenant by the Courtesie had aliened with warranty had it been demanded if the Heir were barr'd by that warranty it had been an absurd Answer That he was not because it was a Collateral warranty of his Father without Assets For all Collateral warranties of the Father were not restrained but his warranty in that Case which could be no other than Collateral was restrained by the Statute Therefore The adequate Answer had been That the Fathers warranty bound not in that Case without Assets because the Statute of Glocester had so restrained it My second Assertion is Ass 2. That the Statute de Donis restrains not the warranty of Tenant in tayl from barring him in the Remainder in tayl by his warranty descending upon him 1. For that the mischief complained of and remedied by the Statute is That in omnibus praedictis casibus therein recited post prolem suscitatam habuerunt illi quibus Tenementum sic conditionaliter datum fuit hucusque potestatem alienandi Tenementum sic datum exhaeredandi exitum eorum contra voluntatem Donatoris But the warranty of the Donee in tayl descending upon him in the Remainder who regularly claims by purchase from the Donor and not by descent from the Donee in tayl could be no disinheriting of the Issue of the Donee claiming by descent from him against which disinheriting only the Statute provides which is evident by the Writ of Formedon in the Descender framed by the Statute in behalf of such Issue of the Donee whom the Statute intends 2. The Statute did not provide against Inconveniences or Mischiefs which were not at the time of making the Statute but against those which were But at the making of it there could be no Remainder in tayl because all Estates which are Estates tayl since the Statute were Fee-simples Conditional before the Statute upon which a Remainder could not be limited So is Sir Edward Coke in his Comment upon the Statute de Donis The Formedon in Reverter did lye at Common Law Cok. part 2. f. 336. but not a Formedon in Remainder upon an Estate tayl because it was a Fee-simple Conditional whereupon no Remainder could be limited at Common Law but after the Statute it may be limited upon an Estate tayl in respect of the Division of the Estates 3. The Statute formed a Writ of Formedon in the Descender for the new Estate tayl created by the Statute and mentions a Formedon in the Reverter as already known in the Chancery for the Donor for whom the Statute likewise intended to provide but formed or mentioned none for the Remainder in tayl And the Cases are common in Littleton Litt. Sect. 716 718 719. and in many other Books that the warranty of Donee in tayl is Collateral to him in the Remainder in tayl and binds as at the Common Law But thence to conclude That therefore the warranty of the Donee in tayl shall barr the Donor of his Reversion because it is a Collateral warranty also is a gross Non sequitur for the Donees warranty doth not therefore barr
the Remainder because it is a Collateral warranty but because the Statute de Donis doth not restrain his warranty from barring him in the Remainder as hath been clear'd but leaves it as at Common Law but it doth restrain his warranty from barring him in the Reversion as shall appear There is one Case in Littleton remarkable for many Reasons where the warranty of Tenant in tayl is lineal and not collateral to the person in Remainder and therefore binds not if the Case be Law as may be justly doubted as Littleton is commonly understood Litt. Sect. 719. Land is given to a man and the heirs males of his body the Remainder to the heirs females of his body and the Donee in tayl makes a Feoffment in Fee with warranty and hath Issue a Son and a Daughter and dieth this warranty is but a lineal warranty to the Son to demand by a Writ of Formedon in the Descender and also it is but lineal to the Daughter to demand the same Land by a Writ of Formedon in the Remainder unless the Brother dieth without Issue male because she claimeth as Heir female of the body of her Father engendred But if her Brother release to the Discontinuee with warranty and after dye without Issue this is a collateral warranty to the daughter because she cannot conveigh the right which she hath to the Remainder by any means of descent by her brother 1. Here the warranty of the Father Donee in tayl is but lineal to the Daughter in Remainder in tayl But she claims saith the Book her Remainder as heir female of the body of the Donee in tayl which differs the Case from other persons in Remainder of an Estate tayl But of this more hereafter 2. And by the way in this Case Sir Edward Coke though he hath commented upon it hath committed an over-sight of some moment by using a Copy that wanted a critical emendation For where it is said That the warranty of the Father is but lineal to the Daughter to demand the Land by a Formedon in the Remainder unless the Brother dye without Issue-male because she claims as Heir female of the body of her Father By which reading and context the sense must be That if the Son dye without Issue male of his body then the warranty of the Father is not lineal to the Daughter cujus contrarium est verum for she can claim her Remainder as heir female of the body of her Father and thereby make the Fathers warranty lineal to her but only because her Brother died without Issue male That which deceived Sir Edward Coke to admit this Case as he hath printed it was a deprav'd French Copy thus Si non frere devyast sans Issue male which truly read should be Si son frere devyast and the Translation should be Not unless the Brother dye without Issue male but If her Brother dye without Issue male Another reason is that his French Copy was deprav'd Because the French of it is Si non frere devyast sans Issue male which is no Language for that rendred in English is Vnless Brother dye For it cannot be rendred as he hath done it unless the Brother dye without the French had been Si non le frere devyast and not Si non frere devyast Sir Edward Coke's first Edition of his Littleton and all the following Editions are alike false in this Section I have an Edition of Littleton in 1604. so deprav'd which was long before Sir Edward Coke publisht his but I have a right Edition in 1581. which it seems Sir Edward Coke saw not where the Reading is right Si son frere devyast sans Issue male Therefore you may mend all your Littletons if you please and in perusing the Case you will find the grossness of the false Copies more clearly than you can by this my Discourse of it And after all I much doubt whether this Case as Littleton is commonly understood that is That this lineal warranty doth not bind the Daughter without Assets descending be Law my Reason is for that no Issue in tayl is defended from the warranty of the Donee or Tenant in tayl but such as are inheritable to the Estates intended within that Statute and no Estates are so intended but such as had been Fee-simples Conditional at the Common Law And no Estate in Remainder of an Estate tayl that is of a Fee Conditional could be at Common Law All Issues in tayl within that Statute are to claim by the Writ there purposely formed for them which is a Formedon in the Descender not in Remainder 3. A third thing to be cleared is That the Statute de Donis did not intend to preserve the Estate tayl for the Issue or the Reversion for the Donor absolutely against all warranties that might barr them but only against the Alienation with or without warranty of the Donee and Tenant in tayl only for if it had intended otherwise it had restrain'd all Collateral warranties of any other Ancestor from binding the Issue in tayl which it neither did nor intended though well it might such warranters having no title 4. The Statute de Donis did not intend to restrain the Alienation of any Estates but Estates of Inheritance upon Condition expressed or implyed such as were Fee-simples Conditional at Common Law And therefore if Tenant for life aliened with warranty which descended upon the Reversioner such Alienation or Warranty were not restrained by this Statute but left at Common Law 1. Because the Estate aliened was not of Inheritance upon Condition within that Statute 2. He in the Reversion had his remedy by entring for the forfeiture upon the Alienation if he pleas'd which the Donors of Fee-simples Conditional could not do These things cleared I think it will be most manifest by the Statute de Donis and all ancient Authority That the warranty of Tenant in tayl though it be a Collateral warranty will not barr the Donor or his Heir of the Reversion After the Inconvenience before recited That the Donees disinherited their Issue against the form of the Gift then follows Et praeterea cum deficienti exitu de hujusmodi Feoffatis Tenementum sic datum ad donatorem vel ad ejus haeredes reverti debuit per formam in Charta de dono hujusmodi expressam licet exitus si quis fuerit obiisset per factum tamen Feoffamentum eorum quibus Tenementum sic datum fuit sub conditione exclusi fuerunt hucúsque de Reversione eorundem Tenementorum quod manifeste fuit contra formam doni Hitherto the Inconveniences and Mischiefs which followed the Issue of the Donees and to the Donor when they fail'd by the Donees power of Alienation are only recited in the Statute without a word of restraint or remedy The follows the remedy and restraint in these words only and no other Propter quod Dominus Rex perpendens quod necessarium utile est in praedictis casibus which
comprehends both Inconveniences apponere remedium Statuit quod voluntas donatoris secundum formam in Charta Doni sui manifeste expressam de caetero observetur ita quod non habeant illi quibus Tenementum sic datum fuit sub conditione potestatem alienandi Tenementum sic datum quo minus ad exitum illorum quibus Tenementum sic fuerit datum remaneat post eorum obitum vel ad donatorem vel ad ejus haeredes si exitus deficiat revertatur Per hoc quod nullus sit exitus omnino vel si aliquis exitus fuerit per mortem deficiet haerede de corpore hujusmodi exitus deficiente 1. By these words the Donee or Tenant in tayl is restrained from all power of alienation whereby the Lands intail'd may not descend to the Heir in tayl after his death Therefore By these words he is restrained from alienation with warranty which doubtless would hinder the Land so to descend if it were not restrained by the words of the Statute 2. By the same words the Donee in tayl is restrained from all power of alienation whereby the Lands intail'd may not revert to the Donor for want of Issue in tayl Therefore By those words he is restrained from such alienation with warranty whereby the Lands may not revert to the Donor or his Heirs for want of Issue in tayl For the same words of the Statute must be of equal power and extent to restrain the Donees alienation from damaging the Donor as from damaging the Issue in tayl Otherwise 3. Words in an Act of Parliament That A. should have no power to hurt the right of B. nor the right of C. must signifie that A. shall have no power to hurt the right of B. but shall have some to hurt the right of C. which is that A. by his warranty shall not harm B. but may by his warranty harm C. 4. If it be said The Statute restraining not the alienation by warranty as to the Issue in tayl the Issue would have no benefit by the Statute For it is as easie for the Donee or Tenant in tayl to alien with warranty and so to deprive the Issue of all benefit of the Statute as to alien without warranty But his warranty can seldom descend upon the Donor and therefore cannot be so hurtful to him as to the Issue in tayl How doth this satisfie the equal restraint of the Statute from harming the Donor or the Issue in tayl For This Logick and Reasoning is the same as to say A. by express words is restrained from beating B. or beating C. but A. hath more frequent opportunities of beating B. than of beating C. Therefore the same words restrain A. from beating B. at all But not from beating C. when opportunity is offered 5. In the next place admit the words of restraint in the Statute de donis had been Rex Statuit quod voluntas donatoris in Charta doni sui expressa de cetero observetur ita quod non habeant illi quibus Tenementum sic fuit datum sub Conditione potestatem alienandi Tenementum sic datum per Warrantiam vel aliter quo minus ad exitum eorum remaneat vel ad donatorem revertatur It had then been clear to every understanding That the warranty of the Donee or Tenant in tayl by the express words of the Statute did neither barr the Donor nor the Issue in tayl for words more express were not inventable to restrain the Donees warranty from barring them and then observe what consequents had been rightly deduc'd from such restraint made by the Statute The Statute expresly restrains the warranty of Tenant in tayl from barring his Issue whence it follows That by the Statute the Issue in tayl is not barr'd by the Lineal warranty of Tenant in tayl because his warranty upon the Issue in tayl cannot possibly be any other than a Lineal warranty It might be said in like manner the Statute de donis restrains the warranty of Tenant in tayl from barring the Donor or his Heir of the Reversion the consequent thence deducible had been That the Statute had restrain'd the Collateral warranty of Tenant in tayl from barring the Donor or his Heirs because his warranty falling upon the Donor or his Heir could be no other than a Collateral warranty Now it is true the word warranty is not in syllables within the restraint of the Statute but is necessarily implyed in it else the Issue in tayl would be barr'd by the warranty of Tenant in tayl without Assets contrary to all the Current of our Books from the making of the Statute But those general words of the Statute restraining the Donees power of alienation in express terms equally pari passu for the benefit of the Donor as for the benefit of the Issue in tayl can never be understood to restrain the warranty of Tenant in tayl only for the benefit of the Issue in tayl but not at all for the benefit of the Donor but the Statute must necessarily restrain his warranty indefinitely from hurting either and by consequent his Lineal warranty is restrained from hurting the Issue and his Collateral warranty from hurting the Donor to whom his warranty can never be but Collateral as it can never be but Lineal to the Issue in tayl And if it be necessarily understood and implyed in the Statute the operation must be the same as if it had been syllabically inserted in the Statute Then to say by the restraint of the Statute the Donees have not power to alien the Land intayl'd quo minus ad exitum illorum remaneat post eorum mortem but they have power to alien quo minus ad donatorem revertatur deficiente exitu is to make the Statute contradictory to it self which saith Non habeant de caetero potestatem alienandi quo minus ad exitum illorum remaneat vel ad donatorem vel ejus haeredes revertatur deficiente exitu 6. Again if the Statute had provided only for indempnity of the Issue in tayl omitting the Donor and his Heirs by the words Non habeant de caetero potestatem alienandi quo minus Tenementum sic datum ad exitum illorum remaneat post obitum eorum The Donees warranty had been restrain'd as it is to barr the Issue And if it had only provided for the Indempnity of the Donor and his Heirs omitting the Issue by the words Non habeant potestatem alienandi quo minus Tenementum sic datum ad Donatorem vel ad ejus haeredes revertatur deficiente exitu must not his warranty have been restrain'd from barring the Donor and his Heirs in like manner Why then the restraint reaching to both Issue and Donor must not both have like benefit of it And for further Answer to that thin Objection That the Statute did not provide against the Donees warranty falling on the Donor or his Heirs because it can fall on them but seldome and that
Laws provide against ills quae frequentius accidunt It is true when the words of a Law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening and do to those which often happen it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach by saying it is casus omissus and that the Law intended quae frequentius accidunt But it is no reason when the words of a Law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently because it happens but seldom For By that Reason if Lands be given to a man and the Heirs of his body his warranty should not barr the Issue in tayl within the meaning of the Statute because there his warranty must always fall upon the Issue in tayl but if given to him and the Heirs females of his body it should barr because it falls less frequently upon such Heir female which is absurd 7. The Statute further commands That the Donors Will be observ'd according to the form of his Gift expressed in his Charter which was that if the Donee died without Issue the Land should retorn to the Donor or his Heirs Therefore such alienation is forbid which hinders the retorn of it according to the Charter and consequently alienation with warranty is forbid I add That the makers of the Statute well understood the use of restraining the Donees warranty from hurting the Donor or the Issue in tayl but not possibly the use of restraining his Lineal or Collateral warranty which were terms then useless and unknown and therefore not in their prospect at all I shall now a little resume my former reasoning for more clearing of this point If immediately after the Statute de Donis Tenant in tayl had made a Feoffment in Fee with warranty which descended upon the Issue in tayl if it had been demanded Whether that warranty barr'd the Issue in a Formedon in the Descender it had been an unintelligible Answer to have said in that Age That it did not barr the Issue in tayl because it was a Lineal warranty for that had been to answer an Ignotum per multò ignotius than which nothing is more irrational But the clean Answer had been That the Donees power of Alienation was restrained in general by the Statute de Donis and therefore his Alienation by warranty and consequently his warranty could not barr the Issue in tayl In like manner if Tenant in tayl had been with the Remainder over soon after the Statute as then it might be and he had made a Feoffment in Fee with warranty and dyed and the warranty had descended upon him in the Remainder If it had been demanded then Whether that warranty did barr him in the Remainder It had been an Answer not to be understood to have said That it did barr him because it was a Collateral warranty But the right Answer had been That it was the warranty of the Ancestor descending upon the Heir and was not restrained within the Statute de Donis and therefore must bind him in the Remainder of Common Course So as the Doctrine of the binding of Lineal and Collateral warranties or their not binding is an Extraction out of mens brains and Speculations many scores of years after the Statute de Donis And if Littleton whose memory I much honour had taken that plain way in resolving his many excellent Cases in his Chapter of warranty of saying the warranty of the Ancestor doth not bind in this Case because it is restraind by the Statute of Glocester or the Statute de Donis and it doth bind in this Case as at the Common Law because not restrain'd by either Statute for when he wrote there were no other Statutes restraining warranties there is now a third 11 H. 7. his Doctrine of warranties had been more clear and satisfactory than now it is being intricated under the terms of Lineal and Collateral for that in truth is the genuine Resolution of most if not of all his Cases For no mans warranty doth bind or not directly and a priori because it is Lineal or Collateral for no Statute restrains any warranty under those terms from binding nor no Law institutes any warranty in those terms but those are restraints by consequent only from the restraints of warranties made by Statutes Objections On the other side was urg'd Sir Edward Coke's Opinion upon Sect. 712. of Littleton and his Comment upon the Statute de Donis which is but the quoting of his Littleton where his words are The warranty of the Donee in tayl Cok. Litt. Sect. 712. which is Collateral to the Donor or him in Remainder being heir to him doth bind them without any Assets For though the Alienation of the Donee after Issue doth not barr the Donor which was the Mischief provided for by the Act yet the warranty being Collateral doth barr both of them because the Act restrains not that warranty but it remaineth at Common Law These words may have a double meaning though the alienation of the Donee doth not barr the Donor which was the Mischief provided for by the Act yet the warranty being Collateral doth barr If the meaning be That the warranty is a thing Collateral to the Alienation against which provision was made and therefore the warranty was not restrained but the Alienation was By the same reason and in the same words it may be said The Alienation of the Donee doth not barr the Issue in tayl which was the Mischief provided for by the Act yet his warranty which is a thing Collateral to the Alienation doth barr because it remains at Common Law So as this Reason concludes equally That the Lineal warranty of Donee in tayl should barr his issue as that his Collateral warranty should barr the Donor Another meaning of his words may be having first asserted that the Collateral warranty of the Donee doth barr the Donor descending upon him and giving the reason of it he gives no other but this For though the Alienation of Donee in tayl doth not barr him yet the warranty being a Collateral warran y doth barr him which is idem per idem and the same as if he said The Collateral warranty of Donee in tayl doth barr the Donor and him in Remainder for the warranty being Collateral doth barr both of them which is no reason of his Assertion but the same Assertion over again And where it follows For the Act restraineth not that warranty viz. the Collateral no more doth the Act restrain the Lineal warranty in express terms or by any Periphrasis more than it doth the Collateral but restrains all power of Alienation in prejudice of the Issue or Donor and consequently the power of Aliening with warranty to the hurt of either 2. The second thing objected was Littleton's own Authority in the same Sect. 712. his words are He that demandeth Fee-tayl by Writ of Formedon in Descender shall not be barr'd by Lineal
then Vous saves bien que de ley cestuy que demand per Formedon in Reverter ne serra barr per le garranty cestuy à que les Tenements fuerunt done in tayl sil ne eyt per descent tout soit il heire à luy le quel Roy ad per descent ou non ne poiomus enquire And on this Case Sir Edward Coke makes an Observation That the King was not bound by a Collateral warranty for the Reversion of an Estate in tayl no more is any other Donor by that Case So as Sir William Herle's Iudgment who was then Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in three several years and several Cases was directly contrary to what Finchden 41 E. 3. said it was upon Report Besides the contrary of what my Brother Ellis urg'd from this Case may be thus inferr'd out of it This Case admits that the Statute restrains the warranty of the Donee from barring some Donor viz. a Donor stranger in blood as was said for it restrains Alienation without warranty against all Donors but the Statute did not restrain the Donees warranty from barring such a Donor for his warranty could never descend upon a stranger and the Statute did not restrain a thing which could not be Therefore ex concesso the Statute restrained the Donees warranty from barring the Donor of blood to the Donee 7 E. 3. 34. p. 44. 5. The fifth Objection was a Case 7 E. 3. that Tenant in tayl made a Feoffment in Fee and died issuless and the Feoffee rebutted the Donor by the warranty This Case rightly understood is not to the purpose for the Donor was not rebutted by the warranty of Tenant in tayl which is the present question but by the Donors own warranty The Case was That A. gave Land to W. and E. his wife Habendum praedictis W. E. haeredibus inter se legitime procreatis and warranted those Tenements to the said W. E. haeredibus eorum seu assignatis The Heir in tayl made a Feoffment in Fee and died leaving no Issue inheritable and the Donor was rebutted in his Formedon in Reverter by his own warranty having warranted to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns and the Feoffee claimed as Assignee And it was adjudg'd against the Donor after in the same year as appears 46 E. 3. f. 4. b. and there admitted good Law 46 E. 3. f. 4. b. But Sir Edward Coke denies this Case to be Law now saying That the warranty determined with the Estate tayl to which it was first annexed and doubtless it did so as to Voucher but whether as to Rebutter of the Donor the party rebutting having the Land though another Estate in it and deriving the warranty to himself as Assignee is not clear 6. A sixt Objection was made from a Case 27 E. 3. f. 83. of a Formedon in Reverter brought 27 E. 3. f. 83. pl. 42. and the Deed of Tenant in tayl Ancestor to the Demandant shewed forth but the Book mentions no warranty but it is like it was a Deed with warranty and the Plaintiff durst not demurr but traversed the Deed as any would avoid demurring upon the validity of an Ancestor's Deed when he was secure there was no such Deed of the Ancestor 7. 4 E. 3. f. 56. pl. 58. The last Objection was a Case 4 E. 3. f. 56. p. 58. where Tenant in tayl made a Feoffment with warranty and the warranty descended upon him in the Remainder in tayl which barr'd him which is a Case agreed as before For the Statute of Westminster the second provides not at all for hâ—m in Remainder but as to him Tenant in tayls warranty is left as at Common Law In 4 E. 3. a Formedon in the Descender was brought by the Issue in tayl and the Release of his elder Brother 4 E. 3. f. 28. pl. 57. with warranty was pleaded by the Tenant Stoner who gave the Rule in the Case Le statute restraynes le power del Issue in tayl to alien in prejudice of him in the Reversion by express words and à Fortiori the power of the Issue in tayl is restrain'd to alien in prejudice of the Issue in tayl Whereupon the Tenant was rul'd to answer and pleaded Assets descended Here it was admitted 10 E. 3. f. 14 pl. 53. the Issue in tayl could not alien with warranty in prejudice of the Reversioner And in 10 E. 3. soon after a Formedon in Reverter being brought and the warranty of Tenant in tayl pleaded in barr Scot alledg'd the restraint of the Statute as well for the Reversioner as for those claiming by descent in tayl The same Stoner demanding if the Ancestor's Deed was acknowledg'd and answered it was His Rule was That the Iudgment must be the same for the Reversioner as for the Issue in these words Ore est tout sur un Judgment which can have no other meaning considering Scot's words immediately before that the Law was the same for the Reversioner as for the Issue in tayl and Stoner's Opinion in the Case before to the same effect 4 E. 3. Objections from Modern Reports Moore f. 96. pl. 239. In Moore 's Reports this Case is A man seis'd of Land having Issue two Sons devis'd it to his youngest Son in tayl and the eldest Son died leaving Issue a Son the youngest aliened in Fee with warranty and died without Issue the Son of the eldest being within age If this Collateral warranty shall bind the Son within age without Assets notwithstanding the Statute of Westminster the second was the question And the Opinions of Plowden Bromley Solicitor Manwood and Lovelace Serjeants and of the Lord Dyer and Catlin Chief Iustice were clear That it is a Collateral warranty and without Assets did barr notwithstanding his Nonage for that his Entry was taken away And this was the Case of one Evans 12 13 of the Queen as it was reported to me This Opinion makes against me I confess but give it this Answer 1. This Case is not reported by Sir Francis Moore but reported to him non constat in what manner nor by whom 2. It was no Judicial Opinion for Plowden Bromley Solicitor two Serjeants Manwood and Lovelace are named for it as well as Dyer and Catlin who were then Chief Iustices of the several Courts which proves the Opinion not only extra-judicial but not given in any Court 3. The motive of their Opinion was because the warranty was Collateral which is no true reason of the binding or not of any warranty 4. An extra-judicial Opinion given in or out of Court is no more than the Prolatum or saying of him who gives it nor can be taken for his Opinion unless every thing spoken at pleasure must pass as the speakers Opinion 5. An Opinion given in Court if not necessary to the Judgment given of Record but that it might have been as well given if no such or a contrary Opinion had
recovered in Damages 101 Debt 1. Debts by simple contracts were the first Debts that ever were and are more noble than Actions on the Case upon which only damages are recoverable 101 2. Actions in the debet detinet are actions of property which is not in an action on the Case ibid. 3. Actions upon Bond or Deed made in Wales Ireland Normandy c. where to be tryed 413 4. Wheresoever the Debt grew due yet the Debtor is indebted to the Creditor in any place where he is as long as the Debt is unsatisfied 92 5. It lies not for a Solicitor for his soliciting Fees but for an Attorney it well lies and there shall be no ley Gager in it 99 Declaration See Pleading 1. The Plaintiff must recover by his own strength and not by the Defendants weakness 8 58 60 2. When the Plaintiff makes it appear to the Court that the Defendants Title is not good yet if the Plaintiff do not make out a good Title for himself he shall never have Judgment 60 3. The form of a Declaration in London according to their custome 93 4. The King may vary his Declaration but it must be done the first Term 65 5. In a Quare Impedit the Plaintiff must in his Declaration alledge a presentation in himself or those from whom he claims 7 57 Demand See Request 1. A Demand of Rent is not requisite upon a Limitation because Non-payment avoids it 32 2. But where there is a condition there must be a demand before entry ibid. 3. Where there are several Rents the demands must be several 72 4. If more Rent is demanded than is payable the demand is void ibid. Devastavit See Executors  Devise Devisor Devisee 1. The Law doth not in Conveyances of Estates admit Estates to pass by Implication regularly but in Devises they are allowed with due restrictions 261 262 c. 2. If an Estate given by Implication in a Will be to the disinheriting of the Heir at Law it is not good if such Implication be only constructive and possible but not a necessary Implication 262 263 267 268 3. The necessary Implication is that the Devisee must have the thing Devised or none else can have it 262 263 4. A. deviseth his Goods to his wife and after her decease his Son and Heir shall have the House where they are this is a good Devise of the House to the wife by Implication because the Heir at Law is excluded by it and then no person can claim it but the wife by Implication of the Devise 263 264. 5. A. having issue Thomas and Mary devises to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and for want of Heirs of Thomas to Mary and her Heirs This is an Estate tayl in Thomas 269 270 6. My will is if it happen my Son George Mary and Katherine my Daughters to dye without issue of their bodies lawfully begotten then all the Freehold Lands I am now seized of shall remain and be to my Nephew A. B. The construction and meaning of these words quid operatur by them 260 261 262 263 264 c. 7. If Land is devised to H. and his heirs as long as B. hath heirs of his body the remainder over such latter Devise will be good not as a Remainder but as an Executory Devise 270 8. My son shall have my Land to him and his heirs so long as any heirs of the body of A. shall be living and for want of such heirs I devise it to B. here B. shall take by future and Executory Devise 270 9. A Devise to the son and heir in Fee being no other than what the Law gave him is void 271 10. A Devise that if the son and heir pay not all the Legacies then the Land shall go to the Legatories upon default of payment this shall vest in the Legatories by Executory Devise 271 11. A. had issue W. T. and R. and devises to T. and his heirs for ever and if T. died without issue living W. that then R. should have the Land this is a good Fee in T. and R had a good Estate in possibility by Executory Devise upon the dying of T. without issue 272 12. An Executory Devise cannot be upon an Estate tayl 273 13. I bequeath my son Thomas to my Brother R to be his Tutor during his minority here the Land follows the custody and the Trust is not assignable over to any person 178 179 c. 14. A Devise of the Land during the minority of the Son and for his maintenance and education until he come of age is no devising of the Guardianship 184 Discent 1. Children inherit their Ancestors Estates without limit in the right ascending Line and are not inherited by them 244 2. In the collateral Lines of Uncle and Nephew the Uncle as well inherits the Nephew as the Nephew the Uncle 244 3. In the case of Aliens nothing interrupts the common course of Discents but Defectus Nationis 268 Disclaimer 1. In a Quare Impedit upon the Bishops Disclaimer there is a Judgment with a Cessat Executio quousque c. Dismes See Tythes  Disseisor 1. A Disseisor Tenant in possession may Rebut the Demandant without shewing how he came to the possession which he then hath but he must shew how the warranty extended to him 385 386 Dispensation See Title Statutes 14. 1. The Pope could formerly and the Arch-bishop now can dispense for a plurality 20 23 2. How many Benefices a Bishop may retain by Dispensation 25 3. A Dispensation for years and good 24 4. A Dispensation after the Consecration of a Bishop comes too late to prevent the Voidance 20 5. If a man hath a Benefice with cure and accepts another without a Dispensation or Qualification the first becomes void and the Patron may present 131 132 6. No Dispensation can be had for marrying within the Levitical Degrees 214 216 239 7. A Dispensation obtained doth jus dare and makes the thing prohibited lawful to be done by him who hath it 333 336 8. Freedom from punishment is a consequent of a Dispensation but not its effect 333 9. What penal Laws the King may dispense with and what not 334 335 336 c. 10. Where the Suit is only the Kings for the breach of a penal Law and which is not to the damage of a third person the King may dispense 334 336 339 340 11. Where the Offence wrongs none but the King he may dispense with it 344 12. Where the Suit is the Kings only for the benefit of a third person there he cannot dispense 334 336 339 340 13. Offences not to be dispensed with 342 14. A Dispensation to make lawful the taking from a man any thing which he may lawfully defend from being taken or lawfully punish it if it is taken must be void 341 15. Dispensations void against Acts of Parliament for maintaining Native Artificers 344 16. Where the exercise of a Trade is generally prohibited
matter of the Law 239 14. A man hath no Right to any thing for which the Law gives no remedy 253 15. The effect of Law can do more than an act of Law 280 16. How things become natural by custome 224 17. What natural Laws are 226 227 18. Of transgressing Natural Laws and in what sense that is to be understood 226 227 228 19. It is not safe in case of a publick Law as between the Spiritual and Temporal Jurisdiction to change the Received Law 220 20. The Law of the Land cannot be altered by the Pope 20 21 132 21. Many Laws made in the time of the Saxon Kings are now received as Common Law 358 Lease Lessor Lessee See Title Statute 23. 1. A Demise having no certain commencement is void 85 2. In what cases the Lessee shall bring an Action against his Lessor for breach of Covenant upon a Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment without the lawful disturbance of himself c it being a full exposition of that Covenant when it is either by Law or Express and general or particular from 118 to 128 3. A Demise of Tythe with Land is good within the 13 El. but a Demise of Tythe barely is not good 203 204 4. A man leases Lands for certain years habendum post dimissionem inde factum to J. N. and J. N. hath no Lease in esse the Lease shall commence immediately from the Sealing 73 74 80 81 83 84 5. A power is granted to Demise Lands usually letten Lands which have been twice letten are within this Proviso 38 6. Which at any time before have been usually letten that which was not in lease at the time of the Proviso nor twenty years before is not within the Proviso 34 35 by the Demise of the Farm of H. the Mannor of H. will pass 71 7. Proviso that the Plaintiff may lease for One and twenty years reserving the ancient Rents so long as the Lessees shall pay the Rents these are words of limitation and the Non-payment of the Rent determines the term without a Demand 32 License See Title King Dispensation  Limitation 1. A Limitation determines a Lease without demand of the Rent 32 2. What words shall be taken to be a Limitation and no Condition 32 Livery and Seisin 1. Where a Rectory is granted Una cum Decimis de D the Tythe which alone cannot pass without Deed doth pass by the Livery of the Rectory and without Livery the Tythe will not pass because it was intended to pass with the Rectory by Livery 197 198 London 1. The Customes of London are confirmed by Act of Parliament 93 2. How Declarations are in London according to their Custome ibid. Marriages See Title Statute 16. 1. Incest was formerly of Spiritual Conizance 212 2. The Judges of the Temporal Courts have by several Acts of Parliament full conizance of Marriages within or without the Levitical Degrees 207 209 210 3. They have full conizance of what Marriages are Incestuous and what not according to the Law of the Kingdom and may prohibit the Spiritual Courts from questioning of them 207 209 210 305 4. The Interdicts of Marriage and carnal Knowledge in the Levitical Law were directed to the men not to the women who are interdicted by a consequent For the woman being interdicted to the man the man must also be interdicted to the woman for a man cannot marry a woman and she not marry him 305 5. A man married his Grand-fathers Brothers wife by the Mothers side and held lawful 206 207 6. A man married his first Wives sisters daughter and held unlawful and after a Prohibition a Consultation granted 247 321 322 7. For a man to marry his wives sister is a Marriage expresly prohibited within the Eighteenth of Leviticus 305 8. What Marriages are lawful and what not 210 218 219 305 306 307 308 309 9. How the words No Marriages shall be impeached Gods Law except shall be understood 211 10. What Marriages are prohibited within the Levitical Degrees 214 215 306 307 308 11. What Marriages are by Gods Law otherwise prohibited 220 221 12. Marriages contrary thereunto ought not to be dispensed with 214 216 13. Marriages with Cosen Germans lawful 218 219 14. All Marriages are lawful which are not prohibited within the Levitical Degrees or otherwise by Gods Law 219 240 242 305 15. In what sense any Marriages and Copulations of man with woman may be said to be natural and in what not 221 16. Marriages forbidden in Leviticus lawful before 222 17. Marriages lawful after restoring the world in Noah ibid. 18. Concerning Universal Obligation to the Levitical Prohibitions in cases of Matrimony and Incest 230 19. What Marriages were usual in old times 237 20. How simple Fornication was satisfied in the time of Moses ibid. 21. Who shall be said to be the near of kin which are prohibited Marriage 307 308 309 310 311 22. What Marriages are by the Matrimonial Table of England interdicted 315 316 317 318 23. Marriages within the Levitical Prohibitions were always unlawful but Marriages within the Levitical Degrees were not always unlawful 319 320 321 24. How the Levitical Degrees are to be reckoned 320 25. All Marriages prohibited by the Table are declared to be within the Degrees prohibited by Gods Law 328 26. In what the Parochial Matrimonial Table used in England agrees with the Karait Rabbins 311 312 27. The primitive Christian Church could punish Incestuous Marriages no otherwise than by forbidding them the Communion 313 28. By what Law the primitive Christian Churches conceived themselves obliged in the matter of Marriage to observe the Levitical prohibitions strictly and indispensibly 314 29. Amongst the Hebrews there was no Divorce for Incest but the Marriage was void and the Incest punished as in persons unmarried 313 Master and Servant 1. Although there is no Master or Servant originally in Nature but only parity yet after Laws have constituted those Relations 242 2. A Father cannot be Servant to his Son 243 Metropolitan See Arch-bishop Ordinary  Misrecital See Lease 1. Where a Lease is misrecited in the date and the habendum is to be from the date which is misrecited there the Lease shall commence from the Sealing 73 Monopoly 1. If Exportation or Importation of a Commodity or Exercise of a Trade is prohibited generally by Act of Parliament and no cause thereof expressed a license may be granted to one or more persons with a Non obstante for by such general Restraint the Law intended to limit the over-numerous Importers and Traders and such general Licenses shall not be accounted Monopolies 345 2. To avoid a Monopoly the Kings Dispensation upon all prohibitory Laws must generally be limited by Law 346 Naturalization See Title Alien  Non obstante 1. IT is a license to do a thing which at the Common Law might be done without it but now being restrained by some Act of Parliament cannot be done without it 345 356 2. Where a
whole Record but to say That in such a Court such a Judgment was obtained 92 10. In pleading of a Judgment it may be as well pleaded quod recuperaret as recuperet 93 11. An erroneous Judgment is a good barr until reversed by Error 94 12. How a Recognizance or Statute ought to be pleaded 102 13. Every Defendant in a Quare Impedit may plead Ne disturba pas 58 14. The pleading of a Seisin in gross Appendancy and Presentation in a Quare Impedit 15 15. The Tenant shall never be received to Counter-plead but he must make to himself by his plea a Title to the Land and so avoid the plaintiffs Title alledged by a Traverse 58 16. A Commoner prescribes for Common for Cattel levant and couchant antiquo Messuagio which is not good because Cattel cannot to a common intent be levant upon a Messuage only 152 153 17. See the form of pleading a Custome to have solam separalem pasturam for the Tenant against the Lord 252 253 18. The pleading of per nomen in a Grant and how it shall be taken 174 175 Pluralities See Title Statute 14 22. 1. If a man have a Benefice with Cure whatever the value is and is admitted and instituted into another Benefice with Cure having no Qualification or Dispensation the first Benefice is void and the Patron may present 131 Pope 1. The Pope could not change the Law of the Land 20 2. He could formerly grant a Dispensation for a plurality 20 23 24 3. He did formerly grant Faculties Dispensations for Pluralities Unions Appropriations Commendams c. 23 Prerogative See King 1. By the Common Law all Wrecks did belong to the King 164 2. The extent of the Kings Prerogative is the extent of his power and the extent of his power is to do what he hath a will to do according to that Ut summae potestatis Regis est posse quantum velit sic magnitudinis est velle quantum potest 357 3. The King may take Issue and afterwards Demurr or first Demurr and afterwards take Issue Or he may vary his Declaration but all this must be done in one Term 65 4. He may choose whether he will maintain the Office or traverse the Title of the party and so take traverse upon traverse 62 64 Prebend and Prebendary 1. What a Prebendary or Rectory is in the eye of the Law 197 2. A Prebend or Church-man cannot make a Lease of their Possessions in the right of the Church without Deed 197 Prescription See Modus Decimandi Custome 1. What Prescriptions for Commons are good and what not 257 2. How Copyholders shall prescribe for Common 254 3. The Tenant a Commoner prescribes against his Lord to have Solam separalem pasturam this is a void prescription 354 355 356 4. Inhabitants not Corporate cannot prescribe in a Common 254 5. One Commoner may prescribe to have Solam separalem pasturam against another Commoner 255 Presentation See Advowson Ordinary Parson Quare Impedit 1. In a Quare Impedit the Plaintiff must alledge a presentation in himself or in those under whom he claims 7 8 57 2. So likewise must the Defendant ibid. 8 3. What a bare presentation is 11 4. A void presentation makes no usurpation 14 5. When the presentation shall make an usurpation ibid. 6. Where the King presents by Lapse without Title and yet hath other good Title the presentation is void ibid. 7. Where a Parson is chosen a Bishop his Benefices are all void and the King shall present 19 20 21 8. Where a Benefice becomes void by accepting another without a Dispensation the Patron is bound to present without notice and where not 131 Presidents 1. An extrajudicial Opinion given in or out of Court is no good president 382 2. Presidents without a Judicial decision upon Argument are of no moment 419 3. An Opinion given in Court if not necessary to the Judgment given of Record is no Judicial Opinion nor more than a gratis dictum 382 4. But an Opinion though erroneous to the Judgment is a Judicial Opinion because delivered under the Sanction of the Judges Oath upon deliberation which assures it is or was when delivered the Opinion of the Deliverer 382 5. Presidents of Fact which pass sub silentio in the Court of Kings Bench or Common Pleas are not to be regarded 399 6. New presidents are not considerable 169 7. Presidents are useful to decide Questions but in Cases which depend upon fundamental principles from which demonstrations may be drawn millions of Presidents are to no purpose 419 8. Long usage is a just medium to expound an Act of Parliament 169 Privity See Estate 1. A privity is necessary by the Common Law to distrain and avow between the Distrainor and Distrained 39 2. Such privity is created by Attornment ibid. 3. Where a new Estate is gained the privity of the old Estate is lost 43 4. Where it is not lost between Grantor and Grantee of a Rent after a Fine levied by the Grantee to his own use ibid. 5. Where an Estate in a Rent may be altered and no new Attornment or privity requisite 144 Priviledge 1. Priviledge lies only where a man is an Officer of the Court or hath a prior Suit depending in the Common Pleas and is elsewhere molested that he cannot attend it 154 2. All Officers Clerks Attorneys of the Common Pleas and their Menial Servants shall have their Writ of Priviledge 155 Process 1. No Process shall issue from hence into Wales but only Process of Outlawry and Extent 396 397 2. A Fieri Facias Capias ad satisfaciendum or other Judicial Process shall not go from hence thither 397 3. Process in Wales differ from Process in England 400 Prohibition See Title Marriage 1. Prohibitions for encroaching Jurisdiction are as well grantable in the Common Pleas as Kings Bench 157 209 2. A man was sued in the Spiritual Court for having married with his Fathers brothers wife and a Prohibition was granted 206 207 c. 3. The Judges have full conizance of Marriages within or without the Levitical Degrees 207 220 4. They have conizance of what Marriages are incestuous and what not and may prohibit the Spiritual Court from questioning of them ibid. 5. How the suggestion upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. concerning Marriages must be drawn to bring the matter in question 247 Proof See Witnesses Evidence 1. A witness shall be admitted to prove the Contents of a Deed or Will 77 Property 1. In Life Liberty and Estate every man who hath not forfeited them hath a property and right which the Law allows him to defend and if it be violated it gives an Action to redress the wrong and to punish the wrong-doer 337 2. To violate mens properties is never lawful but a malum in se 338 3. But to alter or transfer mens properties is no malum in se ibid. Proviso 1. A power is granted to make Leases of Lands
Heirs is expresly forbidden by the Statute de Donis 374 Right See Title Action 1. Where there can be presumed to be no remedy there is no right 38 Seisin 1. THe profits of all and every part of the Land are the Esplees of the Land and prove the Seisin of the whole Land 255 2. In an Entry sur Disseisin or other Action where Esplees are to be alledged the profits of a Mine will not serve 254 Spoliation 1. The Writ of Spoliation lyes for one Incumbent against the other where the Patrons right comes in question 24 Statute See Recognizance 1. A Recognizance taken before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the nature of a Statute Staple 102 Statutes in general 1. Where an Act of Parliament is dubious long usage is a just medium to expound it by and the meaning of things spoken and written must be as hath been constantly received by common acceptation 169 2. But where usage is against the obvious meaning of an Act by the vulgar and common acceptation of words then it is rather an oppression then exposition of the Act 170 3. When an Act of Parliament alters the Common Law the meaning shall not be strained beyond the words except in cases of publick utility when the end of the Act appears to be larger than the words themselves 179 4. Secular Judges are most conizant in Acts of Parliament 213 5. When the words of a Statute extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening but doth to those which often happen it is good reason not to strain the words further than they will reach by saying it is casus omissus and that the Law intended quae frequentius accidunt 373 6. But where the words of a Law do extend to an inconvenience seldom happening there it shall extend to it as well as if it happens more frequently 373 7. An Act of Parliament which generally prohibits a thing upon a penalty which is popular or only given to the King may be inconvenient to diverse particular persons in respect of person place time c. For this cause the Law hath given power to the King to dispense with particular persons 347 8. Whatsoever is declared by an Act of Parliament to be against Law we must admit it so for by a Law viz. by Act of Parliament it is so declared 327 9. Where the Kings Grant is void in its creation a saving of that Grant in an Act of Parliament shall not aid it 332 10. How an Act of Parliament may be proved there hath been such an Act where the Roll is lost 162 163 404 405 407 11. An Act of Parliament in Ireland cannot effect a thing which could not be done without an Act of Parliament in England 289 12. Distinct Kingdoms cannot be united but by mutual Acts of Parliament 300 13. A repealed Act of Parliament is of no more effect than if it had never been made 325 Statutes 1. Merton cap. 4. The Statute of Merton which gave the owner of the Soyl power to approve Common did not consider whether the Lord was equally bound to pasture with his Tenants or not but it considered that the Lord should approve his own Ground so as the Commoners had sufficient 256 257 2. The inconveniences before the making of the Statute and the several remedies that were provided by it 257 1. Westm 1. 3 E. 1. The Antiquae Custumae upon Woolls Woolfells and Leather were granted to E. 1. by Parliament and therefore they are not by the Common Law 162 163 1. Westm 1. cap. 38. Attaints in Pleas real were granted by this Statute 146 1. Westm 2. cap. 24. The Quare Ejecit infra terminum is given by this Statute for the recovery of the Term against the Feoffee for an Ejectment lay not against him he coming to the Land by Feoffment 127 Statute of Glocester 1. Restrained warranties from binding as at Common Law 366 377 2. Before this Statute all Warranties which descended to the Heirs of the Warrantors were barrs to them except they were Warranties which commenced by Disseisin 366 3. The reason why the warranty of Tenant in Tayl with assets binds the right of the Estate Tayl is in no respect from the Statute de Donis but by the equity of the Statute of Glocester by which the Warranty of the Tenant per Curtesie barrs not the Heir for his Mothers Land if his Father leaves not assets to descend 365 4. If this Statute had not been made the lineal Warranty of Tenant in Tayl had no more bound the right of the Estate Tayl by the Statute de Donis with assets descending than it doth without assets ibid. Westm 2. De Donis 1. All Issues in Tayl within this Statute are to claim by the Writ purposely formed there for them which is a Formedon in the Descender 369 2. it intended not to restrain the alienation of any Estates but such as were Fee-simples at the Common Law 370 3. This Statute intended not to preserve the Estate for the Issue or the Reversion for the Donor absolutely against all Warranties but against the alienation with or without Warranty of the Donee and Tenant in Tayl only 369 4. Therefore if Tenant for life alien with Warranty which descended upon the Reversioner that was not restrained by the Statute but left at the Common Law 370 5. By this Statute the Warranty of Tenant in Tayl will not barr the Donor or his Heir of the Reversion ibid. 6. The Donee in Tayl is hereby expresly restrained from all power of alienation whereby the Lands entayled may not revert to the Donor for want of issue in Tayl 371 7. See a further Exposition upon this Statute from fol. 371 to 393 1. Wales Statute de Rutland 12 E. 1. after the Conquest of it by Edward the First was annext to England Jure proprietatis and received Laws from England as Ireland did Vide postea 9 17 18. and had a Chancery of their own and was not bound by the Law of England until 27 H. 8. 300 301 399 400 2. Although Wales became of the Dominion of England from that time yet the Courts of England had nothing to do with the Administration of Justice there in other manner than now they have with the Barbadoes Jersey c. all which are of the Dominions of England and may be bound by Laws made respectively for them by an English Parliament 400 See for a further Exposition 401 402 c. Acton Burnell 13 E. 1. 1. Recognizances for Debt were taken before this Statute by the Chancellor two Chief Justices and Justices Itinerants neither are they hindred by this Statute from taking them as they did before 102 28 E. 3. c. 2. concerning Wales 1. Tryals and Writs in England for Lands in Wales were only for Lordships Marchers and not for Lands within the Principality of Wales Vide ante 7. pòstea 17 18. for the Lordships and Marchers were of the Dominion of England and held of