all Lands Tenements Meadows Tithe Corn and Grain Hay and Wool and all Profits to the said Parsonage belonging And also the Vicaridge of Hooknorton aforesaid with the Appurtenances And all Lands Tithes Profits to the said Vicaridge belonging And also a Pasture called Prestfield with the Appurtenances in Hooknorton aforesaid And all Commons of Sheep call'd by the name of their Founders Flock And the Hay of a Meadow call'd Brown-mead with the customary works thereto pertaining And the Tithe and Duty of a Mead call'd Hay-mead in Hooknorton aforesaid Except and reserved to the said Abbot and Covent and their Successors All Tenants and Tenantries then or after to be set by Copy of Court-Roll All Fines Reliefs Escheats Herriots Amerciaments Pains Forfeits and all Perquisites of Courts Barons and Leets To have and to hold the said Farm or Mannor and all other the Premisses with the Appurtenances Except before excepted to the said Croker his Executors and Assigns from the Feast of the Annunciation of our Lady last past before the Date of the said Deed Indented for the term of Eighty years rendring to the said Abbot Covent and their Successors yearly during the said term For the said Mannor and Farm 9 l. For the said Parsonage 22 l. 2 s. For the Common of Sheep Hay and Custom-works of Brown-Mead 5 l. For the Wool 12 l. For Prest-field 6 l. 13 s. 4 d. For the Vicaridge 6 l. 13 s. 4 d. of lawful mony c. at the Feasts of St. Michael the Arch-angel the Annunciation of our Lady by equal portions As by the same Deed Indented amongst divers other Covenants and Grants more plainly appeareth And where also as the said Bishop by his other Deed Indented Dated 8. October 1 Edw. 6. hath demis'd and to farm lett unto the said John Croker all that his Mannor of Hooknorton aforesaid with all Messuages Tofts Cottages Orchards Curtilages Lands Tenements Meadows Leasowes Pastures Feedings Commons waste Grounds Woods Underwoods Waters Mills Courts-Leets Fines Herriots Amerciaments Franchises Liberties Rents Reversions Services and all other Hereditaments whatsoever they be set lying and being in Hooknorton aforesaid in the said County with the Appurtenances Except certain Lands and Tenements in the said Town in the Tenure of the said John Croker for certain years then enduring To have and to hold All the said Mannor of Hooknorton and all other the Premisses with the Appurtenances Except before excepted to the said John Croker and his Assigns from the Feast of St. Michael the Arch-angel last past before the Date of the said latter Deed Indented to the full end of the term of Ninety years from thence next ensuing Rendring to the said Bishop and his Successors yearly during the said term Eleven pounds four shillings and nine pence at the Feasts of the Annunciation and St. Michael the Arch-angel by equal portions as by the said latter Deed among other Covenants and Grants more plainly appears The Reversion of all which Premisses are in the said Bishop and to him and his Successors do belong as in Right of his Church Now witnesseth That the said Bishop hath demis'd Ind. 1 Mar. and to Farm lett and by these Presents doth demise c. to the said John Croker All the said Mannor and Farm of Hooknorton together with all Messuages c. And all and singular other the Premisses with the Appurtenances in the said several Indentures specified and contain'd To have and to hold the said Premisses contain'd in the said first Indenture to the said John Croker his Executors and Assigns from the end expiration and determination of the said term specified in the said first Indenture unto the end and term of Ninety years next ensuing yielding therefore yearly to the said Bishop and his Successors for the said Premisses specified in the said first Indenture such and like Rents as in the said first Indenture are reserv'd at the same daies and times and To have and to hold All the Premisses specified in the said latter Indenture from the end expiration and determination of the said term specified in the said latter Indenture until the end and term of Ninety years then next ensuing Rendring yearly for the Premisses in the said latter Indenture specified such and like Rent as is reserv'd by the said latter Indenture and at the same days and times Then follows a Clause of Distress if the Rent be behind for a Month. And if the said several yearly Rents reserved by these Indentures or any of them be unpaid in part or in all by the space of one quarter of a year after any the said Feasts at which the same ought to be paid and be lawfully demanded and no sufficient Distress upon the Premisses whereupon the same is reserved to be found Then to be lawful for the said Bishop and his Successors into such of the Premisses whereupon such Rents being behind is or are reserved to re-enter and to have as in their former estate And the said Jurors further say That the aforesaid Indenture of Demise afterwards the Tenth of May Anno 1 Mar. aforesaid by the then Dean and Chapter of Oxford under their Common Seal was confirm'd and find the tenor of the Confirmation in haec verba They further find That the said Two hundred Acres of Pasture at the time of making the said Indenture and at the time of the Trespass and Ejectment were and yet are parcel of the said Mannor of Hooknorton They further find That the Rent for all the said demis'd Premisses reserv'd by the said Indenture for one whole half year ended at the Feast of Saint Michael the Arch-angel 1643. was behind and unpaid and that Robert late Bishop of Oxford the Nine and twentieth and Thirtieth Day of December 1643. into the Parsonage House then and by the Space of Forty or Fifty years before reputed and call'd the Mannor-house And that he then at the said Parsonage-house by the space of One hour next before the Sun-setting of both the said two daies remain'd and continued until and by the space of One hour after Sun-setting of both daies demanding and then did demand the Rent for the half of the year aforesaid They further say That there was no sufficient Distress upon the Premisses at the time of the demand of the said Rent thereupon And that the said Bishop the said Thirtieth Day of December 1643. aforesaid into the said Premisses enter'd They further say That all the Right State and Title term of Years and Interest of and in the Mannor Tenements Rectory and other the said Premisses by virtue of the said Indenture of Demise by the said late Bishop as aforesaid granted to the said John Croker by mean Assignments came to the said Thomas Wise That by virtue of the said several Assignments the said Thomas Wise afterwards the Fourth of January 1667. into the Premisses enter'd and was possessed for the Residue of the term of years prout Lex postulat That he so possessed
recited therein but in part for after as much as is recited of either Deeds respectively is said as more plainly appears among other Grants and Covenants in the said Deed. And if other Grants were in the Deed of 29 H. 8. besides those recited then the express Grant of the very Mannor of Hooknorton might be one of those Grants which is urg'd not to be granted because not recited in 29 H. 8. nominally and if so here being two former demises of the Mannor mentioned in the Indenture 1 Mar. and for different terms the one 29 H. 8. for Eighty years the other 1 E. 6. for Ninety years and so expiring at different terms it is uncertain from which Expiration the demise of the Mannor 1 Mar. shall Commence and consequently the demise having no certain Commencement will be void by the Rector of Chedington's Case 1. Rep. But admitting the Mannor not demis'd by 29 H. 8. yet the Jury finding the demise 1 Mar. Habendum à fine prioris dimissionis and not prioris dimissionis ejusdem Manerii it is uncertain still Whether the Habendum à fine prioris dimissionis as the Jury have found it shall referr to the end of the demise 29 H. 8. or to that of 1 E. 6. both of them being prior demises mentioned in the Indenture 1 Mar. for if only the demise 29 H. 8. had been mentioned in that of 1 Mar. the demise 1 Mar. for its Commencement must of necessity have referr'd to the Expiration of the demise by 29 H. 8. though the Mannor pass'd not by it and it will not then change the uncertainty because the demise 1 E. 6. is mention'd Nor shall you to this finding of the Jury suppose a different finding from their finding barely the Indenture of 1 Mar. call in aid any thing from the Recitals in 1 Mar. and so make up a Medley Verdict partly from what the Jury find expresly and partly from what is only recited and not otherwise found As for instance The Jury find the Mannor demis'd for Ninety years Habendum from the end of a former demise mention'd 1 Mar. This Verdict in it self finds no Commencement of the term by not finding from the Expiration of which term it begins nor find no Rent reserv'd But the demise of 1 Mar. as to them must be made out from the recitals of Deeds not found to be real which is a way of confounding all Verdicts When the Jury say The Mannor of Hooknorton was demis'd à fine prioris dimissionis in Indentura predict mentionat for Ninety years they do not say à fine prioris dimissionis ejusdem Manerii So as if nothing else were the former Indenture mention'd might be of the Vicaridge or any other thing and not at all of the Mannor and yet by the Indenture of 1 Mar. the demise of the Mannor was to Commence from the Expiration of such former demise whatever was demis'd by it But the Indenture of 1 Mar. demiseth all the Premisses contain'd in the first Indenture Habendum from the Expiration of the term Ergo If the Mannor be not compris'd in the first Indenture it cannot be demis'd by 1 Mar. from the Expiration of the first term in the first Indenture But admitting this Who can say the Mannor of Hooknorton is not compris'd in the first Indenture For first What if only part of the first Indenture is recited and not all in the Deed of 1 Mar. and so the Mannor omitted in the recital though it were compris'd in the Indenture of 29 H. 8. and perhaps the Jury might if that Indenture were produc'd to them see it was compris'd in the Indenture though not recited to be so 2. What if the Indenture of 29 H. 8. were mis-recited in 1 Mar. and instead of the Mannor the word Mansion recited 3. It is apparent That the Indenture of 29 H. 8. was not recited nor pretended to be recited verbatim in that of 1 Mar. Because after so much of the Indenture of 29 H. 8. as is recited in that of 1 Mar. it is said as by the said Indenture viz. 29 H. 8. among divers other Covenants and Grants more plainly appeareth So as there were other Grants in the said Indenture of 29 H. 8. than are recited in 1 Mar. and the Grant of the Mannor by name might be one of them 4. How can it appear to us but that the Jury did find the Mannor of Hooknorton to be expresly demis'd by the first Indenture if any thing were demis'd by it If then the Jury did conceive the Mannor of Hooknorton was demis'd by the first recited Indenture as most probably they did When they find That by the Indenture of 1 Mar. the said Mannor was convey'd à fine prioris dimissionis in Indentur praedict mentionat And there are mentioned in the Indenture of 1. Mar. two former demises of the Mannor viz. that of 29 H. 8. for a term of Eighty years and that of 1 E. 6. for a term of Ninety years there is no certain Commencement of the term of 1 Mar. because it is as uncertain from which of the two former demises it takes his Commencement as if ten former demises were mention'd and for different terms and then it could Commence from neither of them But admit it should be taken to Commence from the end of the term of 1 E. 6. and not from the other because in that term if any such were the Mannor is without scruple demis'd yet we must remember the present Question is not of the Mannor but of Two hundred Acres parcel of the Mannor And in the Lease of 1 E. 6. though the Mannor be demis'd yet there is an Exception of certain Lands and Tenements in the Town or Vill of Hooknorton which Croker then held for certain years enduring How doth it appear That the Two hundred Acres in question were not those Lands excepted out of the demise of 1 Mariae For though they were parcel of the Mannor they might be severally demis'd and excepted and though it be found Cok. Litt. 325. a. That at the time of the Demise and at the time of the Trespass the Two hundred Acres were parcel of the Mannor it is not found that they were not part of the Lands in the Vill of Hooknorton at the time of the demise made 1 Mar. then in Lease to Croker and excepted out of the said demise of 1 Mar. for if they were the Plaintiff makes no Title to them If the Issue be 15 Jac. B.R. between Ven◠and Howel whether by Custome of the Mannor a Copyhold is grantable to Three for the Life of Two and it be found that by the Custome it is grantable for Three Lives that is not well found for it is but an Argument Rolls 693. Title Tryal That because a greater Estate may be granted a less may and a new Venire Facias granted because the matter in Fact whereupon the Court was to judge and was the point of
Interest for the Lessee Taverner had a Lease of the House Glebe and Barn and the Tithe continued in Astly 2. This severance was equally the same as if the Tithe had been demis'd to Taverner and the House and Land had remained still in Astly's possession 3. Though the Freehold of both remained still in Astly at his death notwithstanding the divided Interest in the Land and Tithe yet the Freehold being a thing quatenus Freehold not capable in it self of Occupancy nor no natural but a legal thing which the Law casts upon him that is Occupant that will not concern the Questions either who was Occupant or of what he was Occupant Cok. Litt. f. 41. b. 4. I take it for clear That a naked Tithe granted by it self pur auter vie and the Grantee dying without assignment living Cestuy que vie is not capable of Occupancy more than a Rent a Common in gross and Advowson in gross a Fair or the like are it being a thing lying in Grant equally as those others do Coke's Littleton There can be no Occupant of any thing which lyeth in Grant and cannot pass without Deed. I cited the place at full before with other Authorities against Occupancy of a Rent 5. If a man dye seis'd of Land which he holds pur auter vie and also dies seis'd of Rent held pur auter vie or of an Advowson or Common in gross held by distinct Grants pur auter vie and the same Cestuy que vie or the several Cestuy vies for that will not differ the Case living Though the Grantee died seis'd of a Freehold in these several things I conceive that he which enters into the Land first after his death will be Occupant of the Land which was capable of Occupancy but neither of the Tithe Advowson nor Common which are not capable of Occupancy and have no more coherence with dependence upon nor relation to the Land than if they had been granted pur auter vie to another who had happen'd to dye in like manner as the Grantee of the Land did And that which hath intricated men in this matter hath been a Conception taken up as if the Occupant had for his object in being Occupant the Freehold which the Tenant died seis'd of which is a mistake for the subject and object of the Occupant are only such things which are capable of Occupancy not things which are not and not the Freehold at all into which he neither doth nor can enter but the Law casts it immediately upon him that hath made himself Occupant of the Land or other real thing whereof he is Occupant that there may be a Tenant to the Precipe But as was well observed by my Brother Wilmott No Precipe lies for setting out Tithe at Common Law and I doubt not by the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 7. though Sir Edward Coke in his Litt. f. 159. a. seems to be of opinion Coke Litt. 159. a. that a man may at his Election have remedy for witholding Tithe after that Statute by Action or in the Ecclesiastical Court by that Statute doubtless he hath for the title of Tithe as for title of Land or for the taking of them away but not perhaps for not setting them out 6. When a Severance therefore is once made of the Land and Tithe it is as much severance of them though the Tithe remain in Astly's possession as if he had leas'd the Land to Taverner and the Tithe to another if then Taverner becoming Occupant of the Land should have had nothing in the Tithe leas'd to another as the Land was to him no more shall he have the Tithe remaining in Astly himself at his death Still we must remember the ground insisted on That no Occupancy begins with the Freehold but begins by possessing the Land or other real thing which was void and ownerless and that by Act of Law the Freehold is cast upon the Possessor either entring where the possession was void or being in possession when Tenant pur auter vie died either as Lessee for years or at will to Tenant pur auter vie for the Law equally casts the Freehold upon him as was resolved in Chamberleyne and Eures Case reported by Serjeant Rolls and others Second Part. f. 151. Letter E. and in Castle and Dods Case 5 Jac. Cr. f. 200. Therefore after such Severance made by the Tenant pur auter vie the Land and Tithe are as distinct and sunder'd from each other as if Tenant pur auter vie had held them by distinct Grants or leas'd them to distinct persons In the next place I shall agree That the Occupant of a House shall have the Estovers or way pertaining to such House the Occupant of the Demesne of a Mannor or of other Land shall have the Advowson appendant or Villain regardant to the Mannor or Common belonging to the Land and the Services of the Mannor not sever'd from the Demesne before the occupancy For a Possessor of a House Land Demesne of a Mannor as Occupant doth not by such his possession sever any thing belonging to the Land House or Demesne more than the Possessor by any other title than occupancy doth and if they be not sever'd it follows they must remain as before to the Possessor of that to which they pertain So if a Mannor being an intire thing consisting of Demesnes and Services which are parts constituent of the Mannor the possessing and occupancy of the Demesns which is one part can make no severance of the Services from the intire and therefore the Occupant hath all And these things though primarily there can be no occupancy of them being things that lye in Grant and pass not without Deed yet when they are adjuncts or pertaining to Land they do pass by Livery only without Deed. Coke Litt. f. 121. 8. Sect. 183. Whatsoever passeth by Livery of Seisin either in Deed or in Law may pass without Deed and not only the Rent and Services parcel of the Mannor shall with the Demesns as the more principal and worthy pass by Livery without Deed but all things regardant appendant or appurtenant to the Mannor as Incidents or Adjuncts to the same shall together with the Mannor pass without Deed without saying cum pertinentiis And if they pass by Livery which must be of the Land they must likewise pass by any lawful Entry made into the Land and such the Entry of the Occupant is But as by occupancy of the demesn Lands of a Mannor the Services are not sever'd so if they be sever'd at the time when the occupancy happens that shall never of it self unite them again Now in the Case before us The Tithe is neither appendant or appurtenant or any sort of Adjunct to the Glebe or House nor are they to the Tithe nor will a lease and livery of the Glebe simply with the appurtenances pass the Tithe at all nor a Grant of the Tithe pass the Glebe nor are either
arrear and impounded them And Traverseth the Conversion and taking in other manner Vpon Demurrer to this Plea all the Court held the Plea to be bad and gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff 1. Because the Rent was determined by the death of the Grantee because no Occupant could be of it 2. Because the Feme was no Assignee by her taking of Administration 3. None can make title to a Rent to have it against the terr Tenant unless he be party to the Deed or make sufficient title under it Moore 664. p. 907. Salter vers Boteler The same Case is in Moore reported to be so adjudg'd because the Rent was determined by the death of the Grantee and Popham said That if a Rent be granted pur auter vie the Remainder over to another and the Grantee dies living Cestuy que vie the Remainder shall commence forthwith because the Rent for life determined by the death of the Grantee which last Case is good Law For the particular Estate in the Rent must determine when none could have it and when the particular Estate was determined the Remainder took place And as the Law is of a Rent so must it be of any thing which lies in Grant as a several Tithe doth whereof there can be no Occupant when it is granted pur auter vie and the Grantee dies in the life of Cestuy que vie 20 H. 6. f. 7 8. This is further cleared by a Case in 20 H. 6. A man purchas'd of an Abbot certain Land in Fee-farm rendring to the Abbot and his Successors Twenty pounds yearly Rent If all the Monks dye this Rent determined because there is none that can have it It lies not in Tenure and therefore cannot Escheat and though new Monks may be made it must be by a new Creation wholly In vacancy of a Parson or Vicar the Ordinary ex officio shall cite to pay the Tithes Fitz. N. Br. Consultation Lett. G. This Case agrees exactly with the Grant of a Rent or other thing which lies in Grant pur auter vie the Grantee dying the Rent determines though it were a good Grant and enjoyed at first yet when after none can have it it is determined So was the Rent to the Abbot and his Successors a good Rent and well enjoyed But when after all the Covent died so as none could have the Rent for the Body Politique was destroyed the Rent determined absolutely By this I hold it clear That if a man demise Land to another and his Heirs habendum pur auter vie or grant a Rent to a man and his Heirs pur auter vie though the Heir shall have this Land or Rent after the Grantees death yet he hath it not as a special Occupant as the common expression is for if so such Heir were an Occupant which he is not for a special Occupant must be an Occupant but he takes it as Heir not of a Fee but of a descendible Freehold and not by way of limitation as a Purchase to the Heir but by descent though some Opinions are that the Heir takes it by special limitation as when an Estate for life is made the Remainder to the right Heirs of J. S. the Heir takes it by special limitation if there be an Heir when the particular Estate ends But I see not how when Land or Rent is granted to a man and his Heirs pur auter vie the Heir should take by special limitation after the Grantees death when the whole Estate was so in the first Grantee that he might assign it to whom he pleas'd and so he who was intended to take by special limitation after the Grantees death should take nothing at all But to inherit as Heir a descendible Freehold when the Father or other Ancestor had not dispos'd it agrees with the ancient Law as appears by Bracton which obiter in Argument is denied in Walsinghams Case Si autem fiat donatio sic Bract. l. 2. de acquirendo rerum dominico c. 9. Ad vitam donatoris donatorio haeredibus suis si donatorius praemoriatur haeredes ei succedent tenendum ad vitam donatoris per Assisam mortis Antecessoris recuperabunt qui obiit ut de feodo Here it is evident That Land granted to a man and his Heirs for the life of the Grantor the Grantee dying in the life of the Grantor the Heirs of the Grantee were to succeed him and should recover by a Writ of Mordancester in case of Abatement which infallibly proves the Heir takes by descent who died seis'd as of a Fee but not died seis'd in Fee 1. Hence I conclude That if a man dye seis'd pur auter vie of a Rent a Tithe an Advowson in gross Common in gross or other thing whereof there can be no Occupancy either directly or by consequence as adjuncts of something else by the death of the Grantee in all these Cases the Grant is determined and the Interest stands as before any Grant made 2. If any man dye seis'd of Land pur auter vie as also of many of these things in gross pur auter vie by distinct Grant from the Land The Occupant of the Land shall have none of these things but they are in the same state and the Grants determine as if the Grantee had died seis'd of nothing whereof there could be any occupancy But I must remember you that in this last part of my Discourse where I said That if a Rent a Tithe a Common or Advowson in gross or the like lying in Grant were granted pur auter vie and the Grantee died living Cestuy que vie that these Grants were determin'd my meaning was and is where such Rent Tithe or other things are singly granted and not where they are granted together with Land or any other thing out of which Rent may issue with Reservation of a Rent out of the whole For although a Rent cannot issue out of things which lye in Grant as not distrainable in their nature yet being granted together with Land with reservation of a Rent though the Rent issue properly and only out of the Land and not out of those things lying in Grant as appears by Littleton yet those are part of the Consideration for payment of the Rent Cok. Litt. f. 142. a. 144. a. as well as the Land is In such case when the Rent remains still payable by the Occupant it is unreasonable that the Grant should determine as to the Tithe or as to any other thing lying in Grant which passed with the Land as part of the Consideration for which the Rent was payable and remain to the Lessor as before they were granted for so the Lessor gives a Consideration for paying a Rent which he enjoys and hath notwithstanding the Consideration given back again And this is the present Case being stript and singled from such things as intricate it That Doctor Mallory Prebend of the Prebendary of Woolney consisting of Glebe-land
said William Paul dyed at Oxford That after his death the Defendant was elected Bishop of Oxford and after and before the Writ purchased viz. the 27. of November 1665. Gilbert now Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of all England by his Letters of Dispensation according to the said Act and directed to the said Walter the Defendant now Bishop under his Seal then elect and upon the Bishops petition of the means of his Bishoprick Graciously dispensed with him together with his Bishoprick the Rectory of Whitney in the Diocess and County of Oxford which he then enjoyed and the Rectory of Chymer aforesaid which he by the Kings favour hoped shortly to have to receive hold retain and possess in Commendam as long as he lived and continued Bishop of Oxford with or without Institution and Induction or other solemnity Canonical and to take and receive the profits to his own use without Residence Quantum in eodem Archiepiscopo fuit jura regni paterentur The Letters of Dispensation not to be effectual without the Kings Confirmation That the King after the 28 of Novemb. 17. of his Reign under the great Seal to the said Church so void by Cession presented the Defendant then as aforesaid Bishop Elect and after that is the 28. of Novemb. 17. Car. 2. the King by his Letters Patents under the great Seal dated the same day and year and duly inrolled in the Chancery according to 25 H. 8. did confirm the Letters of Dispensation and that the said Bishop might enjoy all things contained in them according to the form and effect thereof with clauses of non obstante aliquo Statuto or other matter Then averrs that the cause of Dispensation was not contrary to the word of God and that the Pope in H. 8. time did use to grant the like Dispensations to the Kings Subjects which he is ready to averr c. The Plaintiff replys That true it is William Paul Praedict was elected Bishop of Oxford being Incumbent of Chymer but that after his election and before his creation he 2 Decemb. 1663. obtained Letters of the Archbishop under his seal of Faculties for causes therein mentioned of Dispensation to hold the Church of Brightwell and the Rectory of Chymer both which he then lawfully had and to retain the same with his Bishoprick after his consecration c. durant vita sua natural Incumbentiâ suâ in Episcopatu praedict quamdiu eidem Episcopatui praeesset The King 9. Decemb. 15. of his reign confirmed the Letters Patents under the great Seal with non obstante according to the Ordinary form 30. Decemb. 15. Car. 2. was created Bishop Vpon this Replication the Defendant demurs and the Plaintiff joyns in Demurrer Note the Defendant doth not shew to whom he was presented He doth not say that he enter'd by vertue of the Presentation of the King in Chymer In discussing the Case as it appears upon this Record I take it granted 1. If a person Incumbent of one or more Benefices with Cure be consecrated Bishop all his benefices are ipso facto void 2. Vpon such voidance the King and not the Patron is to present to the benefices so void by Cession 3. That any Dispensation after the Consecration comes too late to prevent the Voidance 4. That the Pope could formerly and the Arch-bishop now can sufficiently dispense for a Plurality by 25 H. 8. I shall therefore first make one general Question upon the Case as it appears Whither William Paul Rector of Chymer and elected Bishop of Oxford and before his Consecration dispensed with by the Archbishop to retain his said Rectory with the Bishoprick and having the said Letters of Dispensation confirmed by the King and inroll'd Modo forma prout by the Record did not by virtue of the said Dispensation and Confirmation prevent the voidance of his said Rectory by Cession upon his Consecration For if he did the Rectory became not void until his death and by his death the Plaintiff being Patron hath right to present To determine the General Question I shall make these Questions as arising out of it 1. Whether any Dispensation as this Case is be effectual to prevent an avoidance after Consecration 2. Whether the Archbishop hath power with the King's Confirmation to grant such a Dispensation 3. Whether this Dispensation in particular be sufficient to prevent a voidance of Chymer after Consecration of the late William Paul 1. This Case differs from the Bishop of Ossory's Case in Sir J. Davies's Reports who had a faculty accipere in Commendam with odd power and executed it by collating himself into a Living void by Lapse 2. It varies from the Case of Colt and Glover in the Lord Hobarts Reports and the Dispensation there to the Bishop elect of Lichfield and Coventry which was to retain one Benefice which he had and propria authoritate capere apprendere as many as he could under a certain value The defects of that Dispensation are numerous and excellently handled by the Lord Hobart in that Case of Colt and Glover But in our Case there is no affinity with the defects of those Dispensations but is barely to retain what legally was had before Obj. 1 Per Thyrning The Bp. of St. Davids Case 11 H. 4. f. 37. b. 38. a. Rolls f. 358. ob 1. 11 H. 4. f. 60. B. per Hill An Incumbent of a Church with cure being consecrated Bishop his Living was void by the Law of the Land therefore the Pope could not prevent the voidance after consecration for then the Pope could change the Law of the Land and if the Pope could not the Archbishop cannot The better opinion of that Book 11 H. 4. is contrary and Answ 1 so agreed to be in the Irish Case of Commendams and Rolls his opinion is grounded only upon 11 H. 4. If an Incumbent with cure take another Benefice with cure the first is void by the Law of the Land and the Patron hath right to present therefore the Pope could not grant a Dispensation nor the Arch-bishop now can to hold a Plurality for that were to alter the Law of the Land and to prejudice the Patron But the Law was and is otherwise therefore that reason concludes not in the case of a Bishop A second reason in that case of 11 H. 4. is that such a Dispensation Obj. 2 cannot prevent the avoidance 11 H. 4. f. 59. bi per Skreen because there is no use of it until Consecration for before the Incumbent retains his Living without any Dispensation and when consecrated his Benefices are void and then it is too late to dispense as is agreed This reason is as effectual against a Dispensation for a Plurality Answ 2 for before a man takes a second Living there can be no use of it and after by this reason it comes too late for the Patron hath right to present It was in that great Case endeavoured to avoid the pressure of
it was no breach of the Covenant Inconveniencies if the Law should be otherwise 1. A mans Covenant without necessary words to make it such is strain'd to be unreasonable and therefore improbable to be so intended for it is unreasonable a man should Covenant against the tortious acts of strangers impossible for him to prevent or probably to attempt preventing 2. The Covenantor who is innocent shall be charg'd when the Lessee hath his natural Remedy against the wrong doer And the Covenantor made to defend a man from that from which the Law defends every man that is from wrong 3. A man shall have double Remedy for the same injury against the Covenantor and also against the wrong doer 4. A way is open'd to damage a third person that is the Covenantor by undiscoverable practise between the Lessee and a stranger for there is no difficulty for the Lessee secretly to procure a stranger to make a tortious Entry that he may therefore charge the Covenantor with an Action Application of the Reason of Law to the Case in Question 1. When a man Covenants his Lessee shall enjoy his term against all men he doth neither expresly covenant for his enjoyment against tortious Acts nor doth the Law so interpret his Covenant So here when the Lessor Covenants the Lessee shall enjoy against his Assigns he doth not covenant expresly against their tortious acts nor ought the Law to interpret that he doth more than in the other Case 2. It is as unreasonable he should Covenant against the tortious Entries of his Assigns as against the tortious Entries of all other strangers For he hath no prospect who of his Assigns may wrongfully Eject his Lessee more than what other stranger may do it nor any power to prevent the tort of the one more than of the other as being equally unknown to him Nor is there any sensible difference to be found where a man Covenants his Lessee shall enjoy quietly against all the Johns and all the Thomasses in the world than where against all men for though the one Covenant be narrower than the other yet the Covenantor can no more prevent the wrongs may be done by the Johns and Thomasses than he can the wrongs may be done by any man Nor can the Covenantee fear more a wrong to be done by them than by any other person not so named 3. If the Assignee of the Lessor enters tortiously upon the Lessee he hath his proper and natural Remedy equally against him as against any other stranger that so doth 4. If the Lessee may charge the Covenantor with an Action in this Case for his Assignees tortious Entry then he may be doubly satisfied for the same Damage viz. by the Covenantor upon his Covenant and by the Assignee for his Trespass which the Law permits not but in rare Cases and upon special Reasons 5. The Lessee may as well combine with some remote Assignee of the Lessors to make a wrongful Entry to the end to charge the Covenantor therewith upon his Covenant as with any other stranger 6. Lastly by the very words of this Covenant the Lessor cannot be charg'd with breach of Covenant for the tortious Entry or Interruption of his Assignee The words are That the Lessee should lawfully legitime haberet teneret gauderet tenere gaudere potuisset the Premisses without the Lett Interruption c. of the Defendant his Executors Administrators and Assigns If the Lessor were to be charg'd with the tortious Acts of his Assigns there needed no more if those words would do it than to say That the Lessee should have hold and enjoy the Lands demis'd without interruption of the Lessor his Executors Administrators and the word lawfully was useless and sensless in the Covenant also But when it is said That he should and might lawfully have hold and enjoy it against the Lessor his Executors Administrators and Assigns What other meaning can be given the words than that he might according to Law enjoy it and that the Lessor his Executors Administrators or Assigns should not have power lawfully to hinder him For a man then is said to enjoy a thing lawfully when no man lawfully can hinder his enjoying it So as by all the Authorities cited by all the Reasons of Law anciently and modernly and by the particular words of the Covenant in question the Defendant cannot be charg'd with breach of his Covenant for the tortious Entry of his Assignee upon the Plaintiff A Replevin brought and the beasts retorn'd Elongata whereupon there was a Capias in Withernam and Nine Oxen taken the Plaintiff in the Replevin gave the Sheriff's Bailiff a Bond of Ten pounds to save him harmless for those Oxen the Defendant in the Replevin whose Beasts they were brought a Detinue against the Bailiff and thereupon he sued his Bond for his Damage in being distrain'd in the Detinue this appearing to the Court and Judgment demanded in the Action of Debt Brintsley said Quides vous que il doit Defender encounter touts le Mond non ferra ne encounter null Action aut quel vous poies aver droiturel defence sans luy per la ley per que avises vous and so was the general Opinion but it was not adjudg'd The Difference between this Covenant and a general Covenant against all men 1. It is said this is not a general Covenant to enjoy against all men wherein the Law is clear but rather a Covenant against particular men 2. That there is Authority That if a man Covenant for quiet Enjoyment against a particular person that Covenant shall extend to the tortious as well as legal Entries of such particular person The Covenant in question is no particular Covenant though it be not the most general no more is a Covenant to enjoy against all of the names of Thomas and John or against all men now living or against all claiming under the Covenantor yet no man conceives it more rational to charge the Covenantor for tortious Entries done by such than for the tortious Entries of men of any other name And it is as uncertain to the Covenanâ—or and Covenantee who are Assignees or what Assignee of the Lessor will make a tortious Entry as what other man will do it But not so of a particular person who is in the Covenantors prospect to prevent and the Covenantees to fear 1. In a Covenant for Enjoyment against all men a man Covenants for enjoyment against himself Executors Administrators and Assigns for they are a part of all men but not against their tortious Entries more than against all other mens tortious Entries If a man Covenant for enjoyment against his Executors Administrators and Assigns and all others it is not a different Covenant from that of enjoyment against all men for a mans Executors Administrators and Assigns and all others are all men So if a man Covenants for enjoyment against A. B. and C. and all others it is the same as to
it is said The Rent was granted out of the Twenty Acres being the Locus in quo by the Name of all the Grantors Lands and Hereditaments in King's Norton and that a per nomen in that Case is not good The Case of Grey and Chapman was urg'd 43 Eliz. Cro. f. 822. where by Indenture S. one Prudence Cousin let a House and Twenty Acres of Land by the Name of all her Tenements in S. But it was not alledg'd in what Vill the Acres were The Court was of Opinion in Arrest of Judgment that the naming of the Vill in the per nomen was not material Another Case to the same purpose was urg'd of Gay against Cay where a Grant in possession was pleaded 41 Eliz. Cro. f. 662. pl. 10. and not as in Reversion And upon view of the Record the Grantor had granted Tenementa praedicta per nomen of a Mesuage which A. P. held for life where the per nomen was adjudg'd not to make good the Grant The Court is of Opinion notwithstanding these Cases That in the present Case the per nomen is well enough because it is alledg'd the Grantor was seis'd of Two hundred Acres of Land in Kings Norton whereof the locus in quo being Twenty Acres is parcel By reason whereof the Rent being granted out of every parcel of the Two hundred Acres it is well enough to say it was granted out of the Twenty Acres per nomen of all his Lands in Kings Norton because the Twenty Acres are alledg'd to be parcel of all his Lands there being Two hundred Acres But in Chapman's Case It is not alledg'd that the Twenty Acres of Land demis'd were parcel of all the Tenements in S. per nomen of which the Twenty Acres were to pass As for the second Case of Gay it was not possible that Lands granted as in possession should pass per nomen of Land that was in Reversion The second Exception is Because the Clause of Entry and Distress in the Deed upon Oyer of it differs from the Clause of Entry and Distress alledg'd in the Conizance For in the Conizance it is said It should be lawful to Enter and Distrain if the rent were unpaid and behind after any of the Feasts whereon it was due that is at any Feast that should first happen after the death of Anne or Thomas Greaves for the Rent did not commence before But by the Deed If the Rent were behind at any the Feasts the Entry and Distress is made to be lawful for it during the joynt Lives of Anne and Thomas Greaves the Uncle and during their joynt lives it could not be behind for it commenc'd not till one of them were dead Scarplus Handkinson 37 El. Cro. f. 420. words repugnant and sensless to be rejected So as the sense must run That if the Rent were behind it should be lawful to distrain during the joint Lives of Anne and Thomas Greaves which was before it could be behind for it could not be behind till the death of one of them Therefore those words during their joynt natural lives being insensible ought to be rejected For words of known signification but so placed in the Context of a Deed that they make it repugnant and sensless are to be rejected equally with words of no known signification Judgment pro Defendent The Chief Justice delivered the Opinion of the Court. Trin. 16 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 2487. But Adjudg'd Mich. 20 Car. II. Bedell versus Constable BY the Act of 12 Car. 2. cap. 24. It is among other things Enacted That where any person hath or shall have any Child or Children under the Age of One and twenty years and not married at the time of his death It shall and may be lawful to and for the Father of such Child or Children whether born at the time of the decease of the Father or at that time in ventre sa mere or whether such Father be within the Age of One and twenty years or of full Age by his Deed executed in his life time or by his last Will and Testament in writing in the presence of two or more credible Witnesses to dispose of the custody and tuition of such Child or Children for and during such time as he or they shall respectively remain under the Age of One and twenty years or any lesser time to any person or persons in possession or remainder other than Popish Recusants And such disposition of the Custody of such Child or Children made since the Four and twentieth of February 1645. or hereafter to be made shall be good and effectual against all and every person or persons claiming the custody or tuition of such Child or Children as Guardian in Soccage or otherwise And such person or persons to whom the custody of such Child or Children hath been or shall be so disposed or devised as aforesaid shall and may maintain an Action of Ravishment of Ward or Trespass against any person or persons which shall wrongfully take away or detain such Child or Children for the Recovery of such Child or Children and shall and may recover Damages for the same in the said Action for the use and benefit of such Child or Children And such person or persons to whom the custody of such Child or Children hath been or shall be so disposed or devised shall and may take into his or their custody to the use of such Child or Children the profits of all Lands Tenements and Hereditaments of such Child or Children and also the custody tuition and management of the Goods Chattels and personal Estate of such Child or Children till their respective Age of One and twenty years or any lesser time according to such Disposition aforesaid and may bring such Action or Actions in relation thereto as by Law a Guardian in Common Soccage might do By the Will is devised in these words I do bequeath my son Thomas to my Brother Robert Towray of Rickhall to be his Tutor during his Minority Before this Act Tenant in Soccage of Age might have dispos'd his Land by Deed or last Will in trust for his Heir but not the Custody and Tuition of his Heir for the Law gave that to the next of Kinn to whom the Land could not descend But Tenant in Soccage under Age could not dispose the Custody of his Heir nor devise or demise his Land in trust for him in any manner Now by this Statute he may grant the Custody of his Heir but cannot devise or demise his Land in trust for him for any time directly for if he should the devise or demise were as before the Statute as I conceive which is most observable in this Case I say directly he cannot but by a mean and obliquely he may for nominating who shall have the Custody and for what time by a consequent the Land follows as an incident given by the Law to attend the custody not as an Interest devis'd or demis'd
the Statute If the Father under Age should make such a Devise it were absolutely void for the same syllables shall never give the Custody of the Heir by the Father under Age which do not give it by the Father which is of Age. But in both Cases a Devise of the Custody is effectual and there is no reason that the Custody devis'd shall operate into a Lease when a Lease devis'd shall not operate into a Custody which it cannot do If a man devise the Custody of his Heir apparent to J. S. and mentions no time either during his Minority or for any other time this is a good devise of the Custody within the Act if the Heir be under Fourteen at the death of the Father because by the Devise the Modus habendi Custodiam is chang'd only as to the person and left the same it was as to the time But if above Fourteen at the Fathers death then the Devise of the Custody is meerly void for the incertainty For the Act did not intend every Heir should be in Custody until One and twenty Non ut tamdiu sed ne diutius therefore he shall be in this Custody but so long as the Father appoints and if he appoint no time there is no Custody If a man have power to make Leases for any term of years not exceeding One hundred and he demises Land but expresseth no time shall this therefore be a Lease for One hundred years There is no Reason it should be a Lease for the greatest term he could grant more than for the least term he could grant or indeed for any other term under One hundred Therefore it is void for incertainty and the Case is the same for the Custody For if the Father might intend as well any time under that no Reason will enforce that he only intended that And to say he intended the Custody for some time therefore since no other can be it must be for that will hold as well in the Lease and in all other Cases of incertainty If a man devises Ten pounds to his Servant but having many none shall have it for the incertainty It may be demanded If the Father appoint the Custody until the Age of One and twenty and the Guardian dye what shall become of this Custody It determines with the death of the Guardian and is a Condition in Law and the same as if a man grant to a man the Stewardship of his Mannor for Ten years or to be his Bailiff It is implyed by way of Condition if he live so long A Copyholder in Fee surrenders to the Lord Dyer 8 Eliz. f. 251. pl. 90. ad intentionem that the Lord should grant it back to him for term of life the Remainder to his Wife till his Son came to One and twenty Remainder to the Son in tayl Remainder to the Wife for life The Husband died The Lord at his Court granted the Land to the Wife till the Sons full age The Remainders ut supra The Wife marries and dies Intestate The Husband held in the Land The Wives Administrator and to whom the Lord had granted the Land during the Minority of the Son enters upon the Husband This Entry was adjudg'd unlawful because it was the Wives term but otherwise it had been if the Wife had been but a Guardian or next Friend of this Land The like Case is in Hobart Balder and Blackburn f. 285. 17 Jac. If it be insisted That this new Guardian hath the Custody not only of the Lands descended or left by the Father but of all Lands and Goods any way acquir'd or purchas'd by the Infant which the Guardian in Soccage had not That alters not the Case for if he were Guardian in Soccage without that particular power given by the Statute he is equally Guardian in Soccage with it and is no more than if the Statute had appointed Guardian in Soccage to have care of all the Estate of the Infant however he came by it Besides that proves directly that this new Guardian doth not derive his interest from the Father but from the Law for the Father could never give him power or interest of or in that which was never his The Court was divided viz. The Chief Justice and Justice Wylde for the Plaintiff Justice Tyrrell and Justice Archer for the Defendant Hill 19 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 506. Holden versus Smallbrooke IN Trover and Conversion and not Guilty pleaded Robinson the Iury gave a Special Verdict to this Effect That Doctor Mallory Prebendary of the Prebend of Wolvey founded in the Cathedral of Litchfield seis'd of the said Prebend and one Messuage one Barn and the Glebe appertaining thereto and of the Tithes of Wolvey in right of his Prebend 22 April 13 Car. 2. by Indenture demised to Giles Astly and his Assigns the said Prebend together with all Houses Barns Tenements Glebe Lands and Tithes thereto belonging for three Lives under the ancient Rent of Five pounds ten shillings Astly being one of the Lives died seis'd of the Premisses at whose death one Taverner was Tenant for one year not ended of the Demise of Astly of the Messuage Barn and Glebe Lands and in possession of them whereupon the Plaintiff entred into the Messuage and Glebe and was in the possession of the same and of the Tithes as Occupant And afterwards Frances Astly the Relict of the said Giles Astly enters upon the Messuage and claims the same as Occupant in haec verba Frances Astly Widow of Giles Astly enters upon the House and claims the same with the Glebe and Tithe as Occupant Taverner attorns to Frances Astly and afterwards grants and assigns all his Estate in the Premisses to the Plaintiff afterwards Conquest the Husband of Frances Astly took one Sheaf of Corn in the name of all the Tithes and afterwards demised the Tithes to the Defendant The Tithes are set forth and the Defendant took them whereupon the Plaintiff brought this Action Before I deliver my Opinion concerning the particular Questions before open'd arising upon this Record I shall say somewhat shortly of Natural Occupancy and Civil Occupancy First opening what I mean by those terms then briefly shewing their difference as far only as is material to the Questions now before me I call Natural Occupancy the possession either of such natural things as are immoveable fixt and permanent as Land a Pool River Sea for a Sea is capable of Occupancy and Dominion naturally as well as Land and hath naturally been in Occupancy as is demonstrated in Mr. Selden's Mare Clausum at large which lye unpossess'd and in which no other hath prior right Or of things natural and moveable either animate as a Horse a Cow a Sheep and the like without number or Inanimate as Gold precious Stones Grain Hony Fruit Flesh and the like numberless also wherein no man until the possession thereof by Occupancy had any other right than every man had which is
out of the former Premisses is That the Freehold qua Freehold is not the thing whereof there is an Occupancy for the Freehold is not a natural thing but hath its essence by the positive Municipal Law of the Kingdome it cannot abstract from the Land in this matter of Occupancy he either entred into or possessed The Freehold is an immediate consequent of the possession for when a man hath gotten the possession of Land that was void of a Proprietor or other thing capable of Occupancy the Law forthwith doth cast the Freehold upon the Possessor to make a sufficient Tenant to the Precipe Therefore As to the first Question Whether Holden the Plaintiffs Entry Quest 1 upon the Lessee Taverner's possession into the House Glebe and Barn the First of March 1666. and openly saying I enter and take possession of this House Glebe and Barn and the Ground thereto belonging and the Tithes of Woolney in my own Name and Right as Occupant upon a Lease made to Giles Astly and his Assigns for three Lives by Dr. Mallory Prebend of Woolney did make him Occupant of the House Land and Tithe or either of them the Lessee Taverner not having made any Claim as Occupant to any of them I hold clearly this Entry and Claim did not make Holden Occupant of the House Land or Tithe or of any of them To every Occupant of Land or other thing capable of Occupancy two things are requisite 1. Possession of the Land which was void and without Owner 2. The having of the Freehold to avoid an obeyance which is had as well where the possession is not void as where it is The first that is the possession is acquired by the party and his Act but the Freehold is acquir'd by the Act of Law which casts it upon the possession assoon as there is a Possessor or where it finds a Possessor when the Freehold is in none 1. This Claim and Entry was in Order to gain the first possession of the Land which was void but that was impossible to be had for the Lessee Taverner had the possession before he held it then therefore the Claim was to no end 2. Secondly A man cannot be an Occupant but of a void Possession or of a Possession which himself hath but here was no void Possession when Holden enter'd and claimed as Occupant for the Lessee was in lawful possession of the House and Barn and Land at the time of the entry and claim 3. Thirdly If this Entry and Claim should make Holden a legal Occupant which cannot be without gaining the possession then there would be two plenary legal possessors of the same thing at the same time Holden by his Entry and Claim and Taverner the Lessee by virtue of his lease but that is impossible there should be two plenary possessors of the same thing at the same time Therefore Holden can be no Occupant by such Entry and Claim Skelton Hay 17 Jac. Cr. 554. b. 4. This very Case in every point hath been resolv'd in the Case of Skelton and Hay 17 Jac. where upon an Ejectment brought a Special Verdict found That the Bishop of Worcester made a lease to Sir William Whorehood of certain land for his own and the lives of two of his Sons Sir William did let the land to John Mallett at will rendring Rent and dyed Mallett continued the possession not claiming as Occupant one of Sir William's Sons entred as Occupant and made a lease to the Plaintiff in the Action It was adjudg'd that Mallett the Defendant being in possession the Law cast the Freehold upon him without Claim and had he disclaim'd to hold as Occupant Chamberlayn Ewes C. Rolls 2. part f. 151. Lett. E. keeping the possession he must have been the Occupant for where one entred to the use of another he that entred was adjudg'd the Occupant Which Case proves one may be an Occupant against and besides his own intention and therefore a Claim to denote his intention 5. To be an Occupant is not necessary and Tenant for years as well as at will is Occupant by that Case Besides claiming to be Occupant is to claim to be in possession or to claim the Freehold or both but the Law binds not a man to claim that which he hath already and therefore he that hath possession and doth occupy the land is not to claim possession or to be Occupant of it no more is he to claim a Freehold which he already hath for the Law hath cast it where it finds the possession so having both possession and Freehold the Law binds him not to claim what he hath 6. Claim is never to make a Right which a man hath not but to preserve that which he hath from being lost As Claim to avoid a Descent whereby a man had lost his right to enter so a man makes no Claim to be remitted when by act of law he is in his Remitter As to the second Question Whether Frances Astly the Relict Quest 2 of Giles entring the Five and twentieth of March 1667. upon the Lessee Taverner's possession and claiming the House Glebe and Tithe as Occupant and the Lessee Taverner attorning to her makes her an Occupant of the House Land or Tithe The Question hath nothing in it differing from the former but only the Attornment and it is clear the Attornment of Taverner the Lessee doth not disclaim his possession but affirms it for Attornment is the Act of a Tenant by reason of his being in possession Besides admitting the Tenant a perfect Occupant he might continuing so attorn to whom he pleased as well as Astly might have done in his life time yet still continue the Estate that was in him It follows then that Taverner was the undoubted Occupant after Astly's death of the House Land and Barn but whether he had the Tithe of Woolney by such his Occupancy whereof Astly died seis'd is the difficult Question Another Question will arise when Taverner the Lessee who had by lease the House Barn and Land and so found and was Occupant certainly of those when afterwards Taverner the Lessee 12 June 1667 concessit assignavit totum statum suum de in praemissis to Holden the Plaintiff and gave him Livery and Seifin thereupon what shall be understood to pass by the word praemissis if only what was leas'd and his Estate therein as Occupant and likewise the Tithe if the Tithe accrued to him by reason of being Occupant of the land For if he were Occupant of the Tithe by Act in Law by being Occupant of the land it follows not that if he past all his Estate to Holden in the House and Land and gave him Livery that therefore he past his Estate in the Tithe nor is such passing found to be by Deed. To clear the way then towards resolving the principal Question 1. At the time of Giles Astly's death the Tithes and the House and Lands were sever'd in
unnatural For as a Husband to her the Son is both to command and correct the Mother as his wife but as a Son to be commanded and endure her Correction as Mother So between the Father and Daughter there is a Reverence from the Daughter to the Father inconsistent with the parity between man and wife and Laws give often a power over the daughter which they forbid over the wife And the reverence and obedience from the Grand-child to the Grand-mother in what degree soever is the same as to the Mother and the same consequences follow For if the Mother or Father have power absolute or in tantum over the Son or Daughter to create reverence to them the same hath the Grand-mother or Grand-father and so forwards For if B. the Father have absolute or qualified power over A. the Son and C. the Grand-father hath the same over B. the Father then hath C. the Grand-father the same over A. the Son not immediately but mediately by the Father To this purpose the Case put in Platt's Case in the Com. is most opposite A woman Guardian of the Fleet marries her Prisoner in Execution he is immediately out of Execution for the Husband cannot be Prisoner to his Wife it being repugnant that she as Jaylor should have the Custody of him and he as Husband the Custody of her To this purpose also it is remarkable what that great Scholar and Lawyer Hugo Grotius hath Eximo ab hac generalitate matrimonium parentum cujuscunque gradus cum liberis quae quo minus licita sint ratio ni fallor satis apparet Grot. de Jure belli l. 2. c. 5 Paragr 12. Nam nec maritus qui superior est lege matrimonii eam reverentiam praestare potest matri quam natura exigit nec patri filia quia quanquam inferior est in matrimonio ipsum tamen matrimonium talem inducit societatem quae illius necessitudinis reverentiam excludat But as to other Relations the same Author in the same place De Conjugiis eorum qui sanguine aut affinitate junguntur satis gravis est quaestio non raro magnis motibus agitata nam causas certas ac naturales cur talia conjugia ita ut legibus aut moribus vetantur illicita sint assignare qui voluerit experiendo discet quam id sit difficile imo praestari non possit I add only That as the mutual duties of Parents and Children consist not with their marrying one another so the Procreations between them will have a necessary and monstrous inconsistence of Relation For the Son or Daughter born of the Mother and begot by the Son as born of the mother will be a Brother or Sister to the Father but as begot by him will be a Son or Daughter So the Issue procreate upon the Grand-mother as born of the Grand-mother will be Uncles or Aunts to the Father as begot by the Son they will be Sons or Daughters to him and this in the first degrees of Kindred Besides by the Laws of England Children inherit their Ancestors without limit in the right ascending Line and are not inherited by them But in the Collateral Lines of Uncle and Nephew the Uncle as well inherits the Nephew as the Nephew the Uncle In the Civil Law the Agnati viz. the Father or Grand-fathers Brother are loco parentum and the Canons borrow it thence but that is because they were Legitimi Tutores or Guardians by Law to their Nephews with us the Lord of whom the Land is held is Guardian or the next of Kin to whom the Land cannot descend and by the same reason they should be loco parentum In a Synod or Convocation holden in London in the year 1603. of the Province of Canterbury by the Kings Writ and with Licence under the Great Seal to consent and agree of such Canons and Constitutions Ecclesiastick as they should think fit Several Canons were concluded and after ratified under the Great Seal as they ought to be among which the Ninety ninth Canon is this No person shall marry within the Degrees prohibited by Gods Law and expressed in a Table set forth by Authority Canons 1 Jac. 1603. Can. 99. in the year of our Lord 1563. and all marriages so made and contracted shall be adjudg'd incestuous and unlawful And the aforesaid Table shall be in every Church publickly set up and fixed at the charge of the Parish This Table was first publisht in Arch-bishop Parker's time in 1563. I know not by what Authority then and after made a Canon of this Convocation with the Kings Licence under the Great Seal and so confirm'd and since continually set up in Parishes By which expresly the Degrees by Gods Law prohibited are said to be expressed in that Table and is the same as No person shall marry within the Degrees prohibited by Gods Law and which are expressed in the Table Any other Exposition of the Canon will be forc'd and violent and the Table set up for the Peoples direction from Incest but a snare and a deceit to them And this marriage is not prohibited in that Table There is an Objection That by the Canon and Civil Law this Degree of Marriage in question is prohibited It is true but by the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 38. All Prohibitions by the Canon or Civil Law quatenus Canon or Civil Law are wholly excluded and unless the marriage be prohibited by the Divine Law it is made lawful But suppose the Canon or Civil Law were to be taken as a measure in the subject of marriage of what were lawful With the Canon Law of what time would you begin for it varies as the Laws Civil of any Nation do in successive Ages Before the Council of Lateran it was another Law than since for marriages before were forbid to the Seventh Degree from Cosen Germans inclusively since to the Fourth Every Council varied somewhat in the Canon Law and every Pope from the former and often from himself as every new Act of Parliament varies the Law of England more or less and that which always changeth can be no measure of Rectitude unless confin'd to what was the Law in a certain time and then no reason will make that a better measure than what was the Law in a certain other time As the Law of England is not a righter Law of England in one Kings Reign than in another yet much differing Nerva forbad it Heraclius permitted it Grot. Annot. 167. So doth the Civil Law before the marriage of Claudius the Emperour with Agrippina his Brothers daughter the marriage of the Uncle with his Neece was not allowed among the Romans But by a Law of the People and Senate upon that Occasion such marriages were permitted Many others of the like kind Nor did the Canon Law and perhaps truly take more persons to be prohibited within the Levitical Degrees than are there expressed What else is the meaning of that place
the words of a Will are of ambiguous and doubtful construction they shall not be interpreted to the disinheriting of the right Heir as is already shew'd This being clear That there is no devise by this Will of the Land by implication in any kind to the Son and Daughters it follows that Katherine the surviving Daughter of the Testator and Lessor of the Plaintiff had no Title to enter and make the Lease to the Plaintiff Gardner and then as to the Case in question before us which is only Whether the Defendants be culpable of Ejecting the Plaintiff It will not be material whether The devise to the Nephew William Rose be void or not and if not void how and when he shall take by the devise which may come in question perhaps hereafter But to that point ex abundante and to make the Will not ineffectual in that point of the devise to the Nephew if no Estate for lives or other Estate be created by this Will by Implication to the Son and Daughters it follows That the Nephew can take nothing by way of Remainder for the Remainder must depend upon some particular Estate and be created the same time with the particular Estate Cok. Litt. f. 49. a. The Remainder is the residue of an Estate in Land depending upon a particular Estate and created together with the same and the Will creating no particular Estate the consequent must be That the Land was left to descend in Fee-simple to the heir at law without creating either particular Estate or Remainder upon it Sir Edward Coke hath a Case Cok. Litt. f. 18. a. but quotes no Authority for it If Land be given to H. and his heirs as long as B. hath heirs of his body the Remainder over in Fee the Remainder is void being a Remainder after a Fee-simple though that Fee-simple determines when no heirs are left of the body of B. whether that case be law or not I shall not now discuss in regard that when such a base Fee determines for want of Issue of the body of B. the Land returns to the Grantor and his heirs as a kind of Reversion and if there can be a Reversion of such Estate I know not why a Remainder may not be granted of it but for the former reason this can be no Remainder because no particular Estate is upon which it depends and if the Lord Coke's Case be law it is the stronger Cok. Litt. f. 18. a. Sect. 11. that no Remainder is in this Case But without question a Remainder cannot depend upon an absolute Fee-simple by necessary reason For when all a man hath of Estate or any thing else is given or gone away nothing remains but an absolute Fee-simple being given or gone out of a man that being all no other or further Estate can remain to be given or dispos'd and therefore no Remainder can be of a pure Fee-simple To this purpose is the Case of Hearne and Allen in this Court 2 Car. 1. Cr. f. 57. Richard Keen seis'd of a Messuage and Lands in Cheping-Norton having Issue Thomas his Son and Anne a Daughter by the same Venter devis'd his Land to Thomas his Son and his heirs for ever and for want of heirs of Thomas to Anne and her heirs and died It became a Question Whether Thomas had an Estate in Fee or in Tayl by this Will for he could not dye without heir if his Sister outlived him who was to take according to the intent of the Devisor Two Judges held it and with reason to be an Estate tayl in Thomas and the Remainder to the Daughter who might be his heir shew'd That the Devise to him and his heirs could be intended only to be to him and the heirs of his body But three other Judges held it to be a devise in Fee but all agreed if the Remainder had been to a Stranger it had been void for then Thomas which is only to my purpose had had an absolute Estate in Fee after which there could be no Remainder which is undoubted law The Case out of Coke's Littleton and this Case are the same to this purpose That a Remainder cannot depend upon a Fee-simple yet in another respect they much differ For in this last Case after an Estate in Fee devis'd to Thomas and if he died without heir the Remainder to a Stranger or Sister of the half blood not only the Remainder was void as a Remainder but no future devise could have been made of the land by the Devisor for if Thomas died without heir the land escheated and the Lords Title would precede any future devise But in that Case of Sir Edward Coke which he puts by way of Grant if it be put by way of devise That if land be devised to H. and his heirs as long as B. hath heirs of his body the Remainder over such later devise will be good though not as a Remainder yet as an Executory devise because somewhat remain'd to be devis'd when the Estate in Fee determin'd upon B. his having no Issue of his Body And as an Executory Devise and not as a Remainder I conceive the Nephew shall well take in the present Case And the intention of the Testator by his Will will run as if he had said I leave my Land to descend to my Son and his Heirs according to the Common Law until he and both my Daughters shall happen to dye without Issue And then I devise my Land to my Nephew William Rose and his Heirs Or as if he had said my Son shall have all my Land To have and to hold to him and his Heirs in Fee-simple as long as any Heirs of the bodies of A.B. and c. shall be living and for want of such Heirs I devise my Land to my Nephew William Rose and his Heirs The Nephew shall take as by a future and Executory Devise And there is no difference whether such devise be limited upon the contingent of three Strangers dying without Heirs of their bodies or upon the contingent of three of the Devisors own Children dying without Heirs of their Bodies for if a future devise may be upon any contingent after a Fee-simple it may as well be upon any other contingent if it appear by the Will the Testator intended his Son and Heir should have his Land in Fee-simple This way of Executory devise after a Fee-simple of any nature was in former Ages unknown as appears by a Case in the Lord Dyer 29 H. 8. f. 33. concerning a Devise to the Prior of St. Bartholomew in West-Smithfield by the clear Opinion of Baldwin and Fitz herbert the greatest Lawyers of the Age. But now nothing more ordinary The Cases are for the most part remembred in Pell and Browns Case that is Dyer f. 124. Ed. Clatch his Case f. 330. b. 354. Wellock Hamonds Case cited in Borastons Case 3. Rep. Fulmerston Stewards Case c. I shall instance two Cases
by the Verdict 7 Car. afore the Act by which it is found he died seised of the Rectory of Kingston in Reversion and of the Advowson of the Vicaridge and died without Heir and that the same escheated to the King and if all the lands in question were held of the King it being found he died without Heir the proviso will save all to the King 3. Whether Nicholas Ramsey under whom the Plaintiffs claim be the person who had title to the lands in question if any had Because 1. The death of Robert the elder Brother is not sufficiently found before the Act of Naturalization for then he and not Nicholas was heir to John 2. Because if Robert the elder were dead before yet he left Issue three Daughters who were naturalized as well as Nicholas by the Act and are the heirs to the Earl being the Issue of his elder Brother If Robert had died after the Irish Act made this Verdict had been as true as now it is Therefore it is not sufficient to find him dead before the Act. Et Juratores ulterius dicunt quod praedictus Robertus filius primogenitus natu maximus praedicti Roberti patris postea obiit tempore mortis suae habens relinquens tres filias de corpore ipsius Roberti filii legitime procreatas viz. Margaret Isabel Janam Alienigenas natas in Regno Scotiae ante accessionem praedict Quae quidem Margaret Isabella Jana primo die Octobris Anno Regni Domini Caroli nuper Regis Angliae primi quarto decimo in plena vita fuerant habent exitus de carum corporibus exeuntes modo superstites in plena vita existentes apud Kingston super Thames praedict As to the second part in the Case of Aliens nothing interrupts the common course of Descents but Defectus Nationis as Bracton terms it Therefore that being taken away by naturalization they shall inherit as if it had not been and then the eldest Brothers Issue had inherited before the second Brother 1. It is admitted and will easily appear That one naturalized in Scotland since the Union cannot inherit in England 2. Ireland then differs from Scotland in a common difference with Gernsey Jersey Isle of Man Berwick and all the English Plantations for that they are Dominions belonging to the Crown of England which Scotland is not 3. If this difference which was never discussed in Calvin's Case alter not the Case from a naturalizing in Scotland it remains whether by Act of Parliament of England though not extant Ireland in this matter be not differenc'd from other Dominions belonging to England 1. He that is priviledg'd by the law of England to inherit there must be a Subject of the Kings 2. He must be more than a local Subject either in the Dominion of England or out of the Dominion of England for meer Aliens when locally in England or any other Dominions of the Kings are local Subjects 3. He must be otherwise a Subject than any Grant or Letters Patents of the King can make him 7 Rep. Calvins C. f. 7. a. 36 H. 6. Tit. Deniz Br. 9. Therefore a Denizen of England by Letters Patents for life in tayl or in fee whereby he becomes a Subject in regard of his person will not enable him to inherit in England but according to his Denization will enable his Children born in England to inherit him and much less will his Denization in any other Dominion Whence it follows That no Laws made in any other Dominion acquired by Conquest or new Plantation by the King's Lieutenants Substitutes Governours or People there by vertue of the King's Letters Patents can make a man inherit in England who could not otherwise inherit For what the King cannot do by his Letters Patents no delegated power under him can do by his Letters Patents It follows likewise upon the same reason That no tenure of Land by Homage Fealty or other Service in any other Dominion of the Kings acquired by Conquest or otherwise by any Grant or Letters Patents can make a man inherit in England who could not otherwise inherit Calvins Case f. 6. b. for that is not Homagium ligeum but Feodale as is rightly distinguished 4. A man born a Subject to one that is King of England cannot therefore inherit in England for then the Antenati in Scotland had inherited in England they were born Subjects to King James who was King of England but not born when he was King of England 5. A Subject born in any Dominion belonging to the Crown of England is inheritable in England as well as native Englishmen So the natural born Subjects of Ireland Gernsey Jersey Berwick and all the English Plantations inherit but the specifique reason of their inheriting in England is not because they are born in Dominions belonging to the Crown of England for if so none could inherit who wanted that and then the Postnati of Scotland should not inherit for Scotland is not a Dominion belonging to the Crown of England but to the King of England It remains then according to the Resolution and Reasons of Calvin's Case That the specifique and adequate cause why the Kings Subjects of other his Dominions than England do inherit in England is because they are born his natural Subjects as the English are he being actually King of England at the time of their birth when their subjection begins Cok. Rep. Calvins Case and so are born Liege-men to the same King But then since all Liegeance and Subjection are acts and obligations of Law for a man owes no liegeance excluding all Civil Law but a man is said a natural Subject because his Subjection begins with his birth that is as soon as he can be subject and a King is said to be a mans natural Prince because his Protection begins as soon as the Subject can be protected and in the same sense that a Country where a man is born is his natural Country or the Language he first speaks is his natural Tongue why should not an Act of Law making a man as if he had been born a Subject work the same effect as his being born a Subject which is an effect of law 1. The Reason is That naturalization is but a fiction of Law and can have effect but upon those consenting to that fiction Therefore it hath the like effect as a mans Birth hath where the Law-makers have power but not in other places where they have not Naturalizing in Ireland gives the same effect in Ireland as being born there so in Scotland as being born there but not in England which consents not to the fiction of Ireland or Scotland nor to any but her own 2. No fiction can make a natural Subject for he is correlative to a natural Prince and cannot have two natural Soveraigns but may have one Soveraign as a Queen Soveraign and her Husband in two persons no more than two natural Fathers or two natural
convert part of their Wood-land into Arable 35 H. 8. c. 17. contrary to the Statute of 35 H. 8. and contrary also to the Common Law I have a Note of a Charter of King John to an Abbot and his Covent by which they had Licence Nemora sua pertinentia Domui suae redigere in culturam 5. A Licence to erect some Cottages upon their Waste or other Lands 31 El. c. 7. contrary to the Statute of 31 Eliz. c. 7. 6. A Licence to erect a Fair or Market 7. A Licence to an Abbot and his Covent Pl. Com. Grendons C. to appropriate a Rectory In all these Cases the King hath no knowledge of the persons themselves or of their number to whom he grants his Licence or Dispensation Therefore that can be no reason to avoid the Charter of the Corporation of Vintners A Dispensation or Licence properly passeth no Interest nor alters or transfers Property in any thing but only makes an Action lawful which without it had been unlawful As a Licence to go beyond the Seas to hunt in a mans Park to come into his House are only Actions which without Licence had been unlawful But a Licence to hunt in a mans Park and carry away the Deer kill'd to his own use to cut down a Tree in a mans Ground and to carry it away the next day after to his own use are Licences as to the Acts of Hunting and cutting down the Tree but as to the carrying away of the Deer kill'd and Tree cut down they are Grants So to licence a man to eat my meat or to fire the wood in my Chimney to warm him by as to the actions of eating fireing my wood and warming him they are Licences but it is consequent necessarily to those Actions that my Property be destroyed in the meat eaten and in the wood burnt so as in some Cases by consequent and not directly and as its effect a Dispensation or Licence may destroy and alter Property Trin. 2. Jac. To the Presidents of Wright versus Horton alios Of Norris versus Mason Trin. 2 Jac. Both which were the same Cases with the present upon the Letters Patents of Queen Elizabeth the Ninth of her Reign to the Vintners of London Of Young versus Wright Mich. 12 Car. 2. No Answer hath been given but that which is none viz. That the two first Judgments were without Argument which is not essential to a Judgment and Judgments are frequently given when the Cause is conceiv'd clear as it seems these were conceiv'd if there were no Argument which is but a Non liquet The Answer to the last President is That the Judgment upon the Roll is torn off That some of the Judges are living who gave the Judgment and many more who know it to have been given Other Presidents of Licences to Corporations 6 H. 8. 1. A Special Licence to the Fraternity of Corvisors London to exercise their Callings notwithstanding a penal Statute to the contrary 1 R. 3. 1 E. 6. 4. Inhabitantibus in Com. Norf. Civitat Norwic. authoritat barganizare pro Lanis non obstante Statuto 37 H. 8. 2 E. 6. 3. Mercatoribus de Venice Licenc Special emere in aliquo Com. hujus regni Angl. 500 Saccas Lanarum ac illas operare sic operat in partes exteras transmarinas carriare absque impedimento non obstante Statut. 4 H. 7. 7 E. 6. 6. Mercatoribus transeuntibus Licenc asportare pecun contra formam Statuti 1 E. 6. 7. Johanni Gale Mil. Licenc pro omnibus suis servis sagittare in vibrell non obstante Act. Parliament Cons Tho. Com. South 2 R. 3. 1. A Proclamation dispensing with a penal Statute touching Cloth-making 1 R. 3. 9 Eliz. 3. Henr Campion al. Brasiator de Lond. Westm licenc retinere alienos in servitiis suis 27 H. 8. 2. Major Civitat Heref. Licenc perquirere terram ad Annuum valorem 40 Marcarum non obstante Statuto 36 Eliz. 3. Ballivis c. de Yarmouth magna Licenc transportare 40000 quarter frument gran infra 10 Ann. 26 Eliz. 7. President c. Mercatorum Hispaniae Portugal infra Civitat Cestr Licenc transportare 10000 Dickers of Leather per 12 Ann. 1 M. 2. Mercatoribus de le Stillyard Licence for three years to Export any manner of Woollen Cloth at 6 l. and under unrowed unbarbed and unshorn without forfeiture 1 M. 11. Mercatoribus periclitan a Licence to transport all manner of Woollen Cloth non obstante Stat. Roberto Heming alios Licence to sell Faggots within London and Westminster non obstante Stat. 2 Jac. 22. A Licence to the Gun-makers of London to transport Guns 4 Eliz. 2. A Licence to the Mayor c. of Bristoll that they may lade and unlade their Ships c. of their Goods and lay the same on Land and from Land to transport them Non obstante Statut. 6 Eliz. 11. Mercatoribus Periclitan Licence to transport their Merchandises in strange Ships Non obstante Statut. 5 Car. 1. Mercatoribus de le East-Indies Licence to transport 10000 l. in English Gold Objections against the Patent 9 Jac. Obj. 1 That by this Patent every Freeman of London and of the Corporation of Vintners which freedom the City and Corporation gives to whom they please is dispens'd with So in effect the City of London and Corporation of Vintners give Dispensation to sell Wine The Case of penal Laws Seventh Rep. Answ 1. which by Law none but the King can grant as is resolved in the Seventh Report The King Incorporates a Town by name of Mayor and Burgesses with power to the Burgesses annually to choose a New Mayor Brook Commission n. 5. and grants that every Mayor at the end of his Majoralty shall be a Justice of the Peace in that Corporation It is no Inference because the Burgesses elect the Mayors that therefore they make Justices of Peace for they are made so by the King 's Great Seal and not by them The Case is in Brook Title Commission N. 5. Nor is that Case of penal Laws so generally true perhaps if not understood where the King governs in person and not by his Lieutenant as in Ireland or by Governours as in the Plantations of the Western Islands The City of London grants Dispensations in this Case no more than the Burgesses make Justices of the Peace in the other Obj. 2 Another Objection made is That the King cannot dispense with a man to buy an Office contrary to the penal Statute of 5 E. 6. nor with one Simoniacally presented to hold the Living nor with any of the House of Commons not to take the Oath of Allegiance according to the Statute 7 Jac. c. 6. nor to Sue in the Admiralty for a Contract on the Land contrary to the Statute 2 H. 4. First It is against the known practise since the Statute of Answ 1 7 E. 6. That the King cannot dispense for selling of
to dispense with a Corporation as it seems K. James had in this Case when the Patent was granted but by Law cannot his Power and consequently his Prerogative is less than if he could 1. Malum prohibitum is that which is prohibited per le Statute Per le Statute is not intended only an Act of Parliament but any obliging Law or Constitution as appears by the Case For it is said The King may dispense with a Bastard to take Holy Orders or with a Clerk to have two Benefices with cure which were mala prohibita by the Canon Law and by the Council of Lateran not by Act of Parliament 2. Many things are said to be prohibited by the Common Law and indeed most things so prohibited were primarily prohibited by Parliament or by a Power equivalent to it in making Laws which is the same but are said to be prohibited by the Common Law because the Original of the Constitution or prohibiting Law is not to be found of Record but is beyond memory and the Law known only from practical proceeding and usage in Courts of Justice as may appear by many Laws made in the time of the Saxon Kings of William the First and Henry the First yet extant in History which are now received as Common Law So if by accident the Records of all Acts of Parliament now extant none of which is elder than 9 H. 3. but new Laws were as frequent before as since should be destroyed by fire or other casualty the memorials of proceeding upon them found by the Records in Iudicial proceeding would upon like reason be accounted Common Law by Posterity 3. Publique Nusances are not mala in se but mala politica introducta though in some passages of Coke's Posthuma's they are termed mala in se because prohibited at Common Law which holds not for the reasons before given For liberty of High-ways strangers have not in Forreign Territories but by permission therefore not essential to Dominion because it may be lawfully prohibited 2. Liberty of the High-ways is prohibited with us in the night by the Statute of Winchester in some seasons of the year and in times of warr and for apprehension of Thieves in time of Peace c. The Assise of Bread and Ale is constituted by Statute and may be taken away Forestalling the Market and ingrossing hath like institution the first was prohibited by Athelstans Laws and William the First 's and may be permitted by a Law the second is allowed by the late Laws when Corn is at a certain low price quaere the Law tempore Car. 2. the pulling down of Bridges wholly or placing them in other places may be done by a Law and what may be or not be by a Law is no malum in se more than any other prohibitum by a Law is Judgment was given by the Advice of the Judges in the Kings Bench Quod Quaerens nil Capiat In a formedon in the Reverter Mich. 25 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 253. John Bole Esquire and Elizabeth his wife and John Ely Gent. and Sarah his wife Demandants against Anne Horton Widow Tenant of _____ The Writ ONe Messuage Thirty Acres of Land Fifteen Acres of Meadow Twenty Acres of Pasture and of the third part of One Messuage One hundred and forty Acres of Land Four and forty Acres of Meadow Eighty three Acres of Pasture with the Appurtenances in Tickhill and Wellingly which William Vescy Gent. Grand father of the said Elizabeth and Sarah whose Coheirs they are gave to John Vescy during the life of the said John and after the decease of the said John to the heirs males of the body of the said John begotten and for default of such issue to Robert Vescy and the heirs males of his body begotten and for default of such issue to William Vescy son of the said William the Grandfather and to the heirs males of his body begotten and for default of such issue to Matthew Vescy and the heirs males of his body begotten And which after the death of the said John Robert William the Son and Matthew to the said Elizabeth and Sarah Cosins and Coheirs of the said William the Grandfather that is to say Daughters and Coheirs of the said John Son and Heir of the said William the Grandfather ought to revert by form of the said gift for that the said John Robert William the Son and Matthew are dead without heirs males of their bodies lawfully begotten Then counts that The Count. William the Grandfather was seis'd of the Premisses in demand in his Demesne as of Fee and held the same in Soccage of the late King Charles as of his honour of Tickhill in the said County in free Soccage by fealty only and so seis'd the Eight and twentieth day of November 1628. at Tickhill aforesaid made his last Will in writing and thereby devised the said Lands to the said John Vescy for life and after to the heirs males of his body begotten And for default of such issue to Robert Vescy and the heirs males of his body and for default of such issue to William Vescy the Son and the heirs males of his body and for default of such issue to Matthew Vescy and the heirs males of his body and after the Six and twentieth of December 1628. at Tickhill aforesaid died so seis'd And the said John after his death entred and was seis'd by force of the said gift and died so seis'd without heir male of his body After the death of John Robert entred by vertue of his said Remainder and was seis'd accordingly and so seis'd died without heir male of his body after whose death William entred by vertue of his said Remainder and was seis'd accordingly and he being so seis'd Matthew died without heir male of his body and after the said William died seis'd of the premisses without heir male of his body After the death of which William the Son for that he died without heir male of his body begotten the right of the Premisses reverts to the said Elizabeth and Sarah who together with their said Husbands demand as Cosens and Coheirs of the said William the Grandfather that is to say Daughters and Coheirs of the said John Son and Heir of the said William the Grandfather and which after the death of the said John Robert William and Matthew for that they died without any heir male of their bodies ought to revert to them The Tenant Anne for Plea saith That the said William The Barr. whose Cosens and Coheirs the said Elizabeth and Sarah are by his Deed dated the Seventh of November 1655. in consideration of a marriage to be solemnized between him and Anne the now Tenant then by the name of Anne Hewett and of 1200 l. marriage Portion and for a Ioynture for the said Anne and in satisfaction of all Dower she might claim out of his Lands And for setling the said Lands upon the issue and heirs of
no such Case in 38 E. 3. f. 26. but the Case intended is 38 E. 3. f. 21. and he quotes the folio truly in his Littleton But the Case is not That an Assignee may rebutt or have benefit of a warranty made to a man and his Heirs only but that a warranty being made to a man his Heirs and Assigns the Assignee of the Heir or the Assignee of the Assignee though neither be Assignee of the first Grantee of the warranty shall have like benefit of the warranty as if he were Assignee of the first Grantee which hath been often resolv'd in the old Books To the same purpose he cites a Case out of 7 E. 3. f. 34. 46 E. 3. f. 4. which doth but remember that of 7. as adjudg'd That the Assignee of Tenant in tayl might rebutt the Donor whence he infers as before that the Tenant in possession might rebutt without any right to the warranty But the Inference holds not from that Case The Case of 7 E. 3. was That Land was given in tayl and the Donor warranted the Land generally to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns the Donee made a Feoffment in Fee and died without Issue and the Donor impleading the Feoffee was rebutted because he had warranted the Land to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns and the Feoffee claimed as Assignee of the Donee and therefore rebutted not because he had a bare possession But this Judgment of 7 E. 3. Sir Edward Coke denies and perhaps justly to be Law now because the Estate tayl being determin'd to which the warranty was first annex'd the whole warranty determin'd with it But however the Case no way proves what it is alledg'd for in Lincoln Colledge Case That a man may rebutt without ever shewing the warranty extended to him for the Feoffee did in that Case shew it So in the Case 45 E. 3. f. 18. the Feme who rebutted shew'd she was Grantee of the warranty To this may be added That what is delivered as before in Lincoln Colledge Case is neither conducing to the Judgment given in that Case nor is it any Opinion of the Judges but is Sir Edward Coke's single Opinion emergently given as appears most clearly in the Case To conclude When the Feoffees were seis'd to the use of William Vescy for his life and after to the use of the Defendant his wife for her life and after to the use of the right Heirs of William Vescy And when by Operation of the Statute of 27 H. 8. the possession is brought to these uses the warranty made by William Vescy to the Feoffees and their Heirs is wholly destroy'd For if before the Statute the Feoffees had executed an Estate to William for life the Remainder to his wife for life the Remainder to his right Heirs The warranty had been extinguish'd by such Execution of Estate and releas'd in Law for it could be in none but in William and his Heirs who could not warrant to himself or themselves By Littleton Sect. 743. for his Heirs in such Case take not by Purchase but Limitation because the Freehold was in him with a Remainder over to his right Heirs and so hath as great an Estate in the Land as the Feoffees had and then the warranty is gone by Littleton Litt. Sect. 744. And now the Statute executes the possession in the same manner and the warranty is in none for the time present or future but extinct If the warranty had been to the Feoffees their Heirs and Assigns it might have been more colourably question'd Whether the mean Remainder were not an Assignee of the Feoffees and so to have benefit of the warranty but the warranty being to the Feoffees and their Heirs only no Estate remaining in them no Assignee can pretend to the warranty 2. William Vescy could by no possibility ever warrant this Estate to the Defendant during his life and where the warranty cannot possibly attach the Ancestor it shall never attach the Heir as by Littleton's Case If a man deviseth Lands in Fee to another with warranty for him and his Heirs his Heirs shall not be bound to the warranty because himself could never be And though in that Case the Estate to be warranted commenc'd after the death of the Warranter and here the Remainder to the wife is in being before his death yet the reason differs not for himself could no more warrant this by any possibility than that and his Heir might as equally warrant the Estate devis'd as this Next Justice Jones in Spirt and Bences Case cites a Case 7 Eliz. the same with this Resolution resolved in the Common Pleas That the mediate Remainder could not be warranted In this Case if the Feoffees before the Statute had either voluntarily or by coercion of the Chancery after the death of the first Cestuy que use for life executed the Estate of the mean Remainder such person in Remainder could have no benefit of the warranty being but an Assignee of the Feoffees because the warranty was only to them and their Heirs No more can the person in Remainder here whose Estate is executed by the Statute be warranted more than if such Estate had been executed by the Common Law There are another sort of persons who may rebutt and perhaps vouch who are neither Heirs nor formally Assignees to the Garrantee but have the Estate warranted dispositione instituto Legis which I conceive not to differ materially whether they have such Estate warranted by the Common Law or by Act of Parliament The first of this kind I shall name Ass p. 9. 35 is Tenant by the Courtesie who as was adjudg'd 35 Ass might rebutt the warranty made to his wives Ancestor yet was neither Heir nor formal Assignee to any to whom the warranty was granted nothing is said in the Book concerning his vouching but certainly the wives Heir may be receiv'd to defend his estate if impleaded by a stranger who may vouch according to the warranty or may rebutt as the Case of 45 E. 3. f. 18. is But this difference is observable also where such a Tenant rebutts it appears what claim he makes to the warranty and so the Inconveniences avoided which follow a Rebutter made upon no other reason than because he who rebutts is in possession of the Land warranted A second Tenant of this kind is the Lord of a Villain 22 Ass p. 37. and therefore the Case is 22 Ass That Tenant in Dower made a Lease for life to a Villain which in truth was a forfeiture for making a greater Estate of Freehold than she had power to make and bound her and her Heirs to warranty the Lord of the Villain entred upon the Land in her life time and before the warranty attach'd the Heir who had right to enter for the forfeiture the Mother died and the Heir entred upon the L. of the Villain who re-entred and the Heir brought an Assise The L. of the Villain
ratione be tryed in the County next adjoyning whereof there is no Vestigium for the one or the other nor sorts it any way with the rule of the Law 2. This Ordinance of Parliament extended not to all Wales but only to the Lordships Marchers there nor any way comprehended the ancient Shires of Wales or Body of the Principality to which the Ordinance of the Statute of Rutland only extended For Lordships Marchers were out of the Shires as appears by Statute 27 H. 8. 3. It appears by the Case that Gower was not within any County at that time Another Case to the same purpose is in Fitz herbert Fitz. Jurisdiction 13 E. 3. pl. 23. Title Jurisdiction and not in any other Reports 13 E. 3. in a Writ of Cosenage the Demand was of Castle of K. and Commot of J. the Defendant pleaded the Castle and Commot were in Wales where the King 's Writ runs not and it was said that the word was not intelligible in the Courts of England and Judgment was prayed if the Court would take Conizance To give the Court Jurisdiction it was urged pressingly 1. That they had given the Court Jurisdiction by alledging the Court knew not what was meant by Commot which the Court was to determine whether it did or not Therefore Jurisdiction was admitted therein 2. Parning pressed they had demanded the view which gave the Court Jurisdiction 3. For that the Original was directed to the Sheriff of Hereford who by his Retorn had testified the Summons and the Tenant had appeared and so affirmed the Summons 4. For that the view was had Notwithstanding all which to give the Court Jurisdiction it was said to Parning He must say more before the Court would have Jurisdiction Which evidently proves that the Court had no Jurisdiction generally of Land in Wales as I observed from the former Case And no act of the party gives Jurisdiction to the Court by elapsing his time to plead to the Jurisdiction if it appear by the Record the Court hath no Jurisdiction as in this Case it did Then Woodstock said Though the Castle and Commot were in Wales the Court ought not to be outed of Jurisdiction for by Commot a great Signiory was demanded consisting of Lands Rents and Services and that the Castle and Commot were held in Capite of the King as of his Crown and said those so held were to be impleaded here and not elsewhere 7 H. 6. f. 36. b. so is 7 H. 6. f. 36. b. And said the King by his Charter had granted the Castle and Commot to the Tenant in tayl and thereupon pray'd aid of the King and it was granted hereupon But before this was shew'd and that it was a great Signiory and held of the King in Capite by which it was no part of the Principality nor held under it the Court would own no Jurisdiction but when that appeared the Case was the same with the former in 18 E. 2. and the Defendant had no remedy but in the Kings Courts This Case was cited by Sir Edward Coke in the Case before cited 11 Jacobi concerning the Sheriff of Radnor but the difference not observ'd of its being a Lordship in Wales held immediately of the King in Capite nor that the Court owned no Jurisdictions generally concerning Lands in Wales by the Summons and view of the next adjoyning Sheriff William de Cosington and Elizabeth his Wife brought a Writ of Dower of the third part of the Land in Gower against the Earl of Warwick as Tenant and the Writ was Quod reddat ei rationabilem dotem de libero tenemento quod fuit Jo. Moubray quondam viri sui in terra de Gowre in Wallia It appears not in the Case to what Sheriff the Writ was directed though this Case be in the Book at large but it appears that those of the Chancery and the Judges of the Kings Bench had been consulted with concerning the Writ in bringing it for Dower in terra de Gower in Wallia therefore it must issue from the High Court of Chancery and must be directed consequently to the Sheriff of Glocester as the Assise was in 18 E. 2. Br. abridging this Case saith The Action was against the Earl of Warwick as being Lord of the intire Signiory of Gower and then he was to be impleaded by Writ out of the Chancery here equally and upon the same reason for a third part of the Signiory as for the whole according to the Case of 18 E. 2. first cited for the Lord could no more make a Precipe to summon himself to his own Minister or to make Execution against himself for a third part of the Royalty than for the whole And therefore the Ordinance of Parliament then mentioned equally extended to this Case as to that of 18 E. 2. This is not strange that Acts of Parliament are lost sometimes Note the Act of 3 E. 1. by which old Customes were granted not extant but clear proofs of it remain These three last Cases therefore wherein the Tenants were impleaded in the Courts here for Land in Wales and Summons and Execution made by the Sheriff of the next adjoyning County are well warranted by an Act of Parliament not extant being for either the Lordships Marchers themselves or some part of them and against the Lord himself as that Case of 18 E. 2. expresly resolves All these were real Actions The first an Assise of Novel Disseisin the second a Writ of Cosenage the third a Writ of Dower The like Case is cited 19 H. 6. 19 H. 6. f. 12. A. That when the Mannor of Abergavenny was demanded the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Hereford as Newton urged for this was a Lordship Marcher and held of the King in Capite as appears by Moore 's Reports in Cornwals Case in that the Barony of Abergavenny was held by the Lord Hastings of the King in Capite to defend it at his charge ad utilitatem Domini Regis Exactly agreeing with this Doctrine is the Book of 21 H. 7. f. 33. b. if a Signiory in Wales be to be tryed 21 H. 7. f. 33. B. it shall be tryed here by the Course of the Common Law but if Lands be held of a Signiory in Wales it shall be tryed within the Mannor and not elsewhere As for that expression by the Course of the Common Law 19 H. 6. f. 12. A. it is also in the Book 19 H. 6. that Deeds and all other things alledged in Wales shall be tryed in the adjoyning Countries at the Common Law otherwise there would be a failer of Right And of this opinion seemed most of the Iustices arguendo obiter the Case before them not concerning Wales but the County Palatine of Lancaster Of Churches in Wales a Quare Impedit shall be brought in England yet the Land and other things in Wales 30 H. 6. f. 6. B. shall be determined before the Stewards of
the Lords of Wales if it be not of Lands between the Lords themselves There is an ancient Book remarkable to the same purpose 8 E. 3. Term. Mich. 59. speaking of the Common Pleas This Court hath more Conuzance of Pleas of the Welch Shires than it hath of Pleas of the County of Chester for the Pleas of Quare Impedits and of Lands and Tenements held of the King in chief in Wales shall be pleaded here and they shall not be so of the County of Chester Fitz. Jurisdiction p. 34. 6 H. 5. Land in Wales immediately held of the King is pleadable in England per Haukford 6 H. 5. no such Book at large The Law and doubtless the Ordinance made by Parliament mentioned in 18 E. 2. concerning Lordships Marchers was the same concerning Land held in chief of the King and are mentioned in the Books as synonimous and were so for all Lordships Marchers were held from the Crown in chief nor could the King probably have other Lands in chief in Wales beside the Lordships Marchers for all was either of Lordships Marchers or Lands belonging to the Principality and held from it and not from the Crown in chief To this purpose there is an ancient Statute 28 E. 3. very convincing 28 E. 3. c. 2. All the Lords of the Marches of Wales shall be perpetually Attendants and annexed to the Crown of England as they and their Ancestors have been at all times before this in whose hands soever the same principality be or shall come And they being no part of the Principality and consequently not under the Statute and Ordinance of Wales 12 E. 1. It was provided by a Law That they should be impleaded in England and the Summons and Tryal to be by the Sheriff of and in the next adjoyning County Accordingly you find the practice was by many ancient Cases remembred but the Year-Books of E. 2 being never printed wherein only that Statute is mentioned otherwise than in Fitz-herbert's Abridgment and the Statute it self not extant gave occasion to men obiter in the time of H. 6. H. 7. long after to say that such impleading for matters arising in Wales in the Courts of England and the Tryals to be in the adjacent Counties because they knew not it came to pass by Act of Parliament was by the Common Law on which had they reflected with seriousness they had found it impossible For that Tryals concerning Lands in Wales quatenus particularly Wales after it became of the Dominion of England should by the Common Law be differing from other Tryals in England and in the adjacent Counties could not possibly be for Wales was made of the Dominion of England within time of memory viz. 12 E. 1. and whatever Tryal was at Common Law must be beyond all memory Therefore no such Tryal for Land in Wales particularly could be by the Common Law It remains then That if such were at Common Law it must be for Lands in all Dominions of the Acquisition of England consequently for Ireland Garnsey and Jersey Gascoign Guyen Calais Tournay as well as Wales but it was never in practice or pretence that any such Tryals should be for any Land in these places Therefore it is evident That it was and it could be no otherwise than by Act of Parliament that Wales differed from the other Dominions belonging to England in these Tryals Nor was it by any new Law made by E. 1. or any his Successors by the Clause in the end of the Statute of Rutland which hath nevâ—r been pretended For by that Clause power was given to change Laws simply for Wales but this way of Tryals changes the Law of England in order to Tryals for Land in Wales which that Clause neither doth nor could warrant Besides this new way of Tryals concerning Lordships Marchers held in chief from the King the Books are full that in Quare Impedits for disturbance to Churches in Wales the Summons and Tryal must be by the Sheriff of and in the adjacent Counties which is often affirmed and agitated in the Books but with as much confusion and as little clearness as the other concerning Land To this purpose is the Case before 8 E. 3. the Pleas of Quare Impedits 8 E. 3. 59. and of Land and Tenements held in chief of the King in Wales shall be pleaded there A Quare Impedit brought by the King against an Abbot 15 E. 3. Fitz. Jurisdiction p. 24. exception taken that the Church was in Wales where the Kings Writ runs not non allocatur for the King was party by the Book as a reason A Quare impedit cannot be brought in Wales 11 H. 6. f. 3. A B. because a Writ to the Bishop cannot be awarded for they will not obey it and so was the Opinion in that Case of Danby Morton and Newton that Quare Impedits for Churches in Wales must be brought only in the Kings Courts and the Opinion is there that the Prince could not direct a Writ to the Bishops in Wales upon Quare Impedits there brought So is the Book of 30 H. 6. of Churches in Wales 30 H. 6. f. 6. B. a Quare Impedit shall be brought in England the Case was cited before concerning Tryals of Lands in Wales A Quare Impedit was brought in the County of Hereford of a disturbance in Wales to present to a Church 35 H. 6. f. 30. A B. exception was taken by Littleton only to this that the Plaintiff did not shew in his Count or Writ that Hereford was the next adjoyning County but by the Book it was well enough for if Hereford were not the next adjoyning County the Defendant might shew it but no exception was taken to the bringing of the Writ into the County of Hereford if it were the next County 36 H 6. f. 33. A B. Quare Impedits shall be brought here of Churches in Wales and shall be sued in the Counties adjoyning for that the Justices read it Bishops will not obey any man there If a Quare Impedit be brought here of a Church in Wales it shall be tryed in the County adjoyning The reason there given is the same as in many other Books Car nous avomus power ad escrier al Evesque mes ils voylont parront ceo disobeyer It is manifestly mis-printed Car nous navomus power ad escrier al Evesque mes ils voylont parront ceo disobeyer which is not sense By these Books and many other it is clear Quare Impedits were formerly brought in England for Churches in Wales as real Writs were for Land and the Tryal was in the next adjoyning English County But as those Tryals for Land were only for Lordships Marchers held of the King in chief or part of them and that by special Act of Parliament as hath been opened So the Quare Impedits brought in England and Tryals there had upon them were not for all Churches in Wales
presentation makes no Usurpation when the Kings Presentation gains a Title by Usurpation 14 2. If a man in time of Vacancy present his Clerk who is admitted instituted and inducted he gains a good Title to present by Usurpation when the Church becomes next void 10 11 12 15 57 Wager of Law 1. A Man can never wage his Law for a Demand which is uncertain because he cannot swear he paid that which consisted of Damages only 101 2. Debt lies against an Executor for Attorneys Fees because there the Testator could not wage his Law 99 Wales See Title Statute 7 9 15. 1. Wales after the Conquest of it by Edward the First was annexed to England Jure Proprietatis 300 2. It received Laws from England as Ireland did and differs nothing from it but only in Irelands having a Parliament 300 301 3. Wales before the Conquest of it by England was governed by its own Laws 399 4. When Wales came to be of the Dominion of the Crown of England and what Laws they were then obliged to 399 400 402 415 5. Process in Wales differs from Process in England 400 412 6. That the Summons of Inhabitants in Wales and the Tryal of an Issue arising there should be by the Sheriff of the next adjoyning County was first ordained by Parliament and not at the Common Law 404 408 412 7. This Ordinance extended not to all Wales but only to the Lordships Marchers there neither did it extend to the Body of the Principal ty of Wales to which the Statute of Rutland only extended 405 408 411 412 8. Where the Land is part of the Principality of Wales it was subject to the Laws of Wales but when it is held of the King then there was no remedy but in the Kings Courts 405 406 408 9. If a Signiory in Wales was to be tryed it should be tryed by the Common Law but if Lands were held of the Signiory it should be tryed within the Mannor 407 10. All Quare Impedits for disturbance to Churches in Wales within the Lordships Marchers only were tryable in England and not in Wales 409 410 11. The Bishops of Wales were originally of the Foundation of the Prince of Wales 411 12. By the 26 H. 8. Power is given to Indict Outlaw and Proceed against Traytors and Felons c. within the Lordships Marchers of Wales and to be indicted in the adjoyning County but not against Offenders within the Principality 413 13. What alterations have since been made by the 27 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. cap. 10. 414 415 416 c. 14. The uniting and incorporating of Wales to England doth not thereby make the Laws used in England extend to Wales without more express words 415 15. Since the Act of 27 Hen. 8. the Courts at Westminster have less Jurisdiction in Wales than they had for as they before had Jurisdiction in all the Lordships Marchers they now have only in these four Counties therein particularly mentioned but none over the rest 417 16. No Fieri Facias Capias ad satisfaciendum or other Judicial Process did run into Wales but only an Outlawry and an Extent had gone 397 412 414 17. A Judgment given in Wales shall not be executed in England 398 18. The Lordships Marchers did lye betwixt the Shires of England and the Shires of Wales 415 19. To what Counties and Places the Lordships Marchers in Wales are now annext by the 27 H. 8. 415 Warrantia Chartae 1. No man shall have a Warrantia Chartae who is not privy to the Estate that is who hath not the same Estate as well as the Land to which the warranty was annexed 384 Warranty See Title Statutes 5 6. 1. Dedi Concessi is a warranty in Law 126 2. Where there is a warranty in Law and an express warranty it is at the election of the party to take advantage of either 126 127 3. At the Common Law the distinction of a lineal and collateral warranty was useless and unknown and as to any effect of Law there was no difference between a lineal and collateral warranty but the warranty of the Ancestor descending upon the Heir be it the one or the other did equally bind 366 4. The warranty of Tenant Tayl descending upon the Donor or his Heirs is no barr in a Formedon in Reverter brought by them although it be a collateral warranty 364 365 368 5. The warranty of Tenant by the Courtesie barrs not the Heir if the Father leave not Assets to descend in Recompence 365 6. The lineal warranty of Tenant in Tayl shall not bind the right of the Estate Tayl by the Statute de Donis neither with or without Assets descending 365 366 7. The Statute de Donis restrains not the warranty of Tenant in Tayl from barring him in the Remainder in Tayl by his warranty descending upon him 367 As to him in Remainder in Tayl the warranty of the Donee is collateral and binds as at the Common Law 367 377 379 381 8. No Issue in Tayl is defended from the warranty of the Donee or Tenant in Tayl but such as are inheritable to the Estates intended within that Statute and no Estates are so intended but such only as had been Fee-simples conditional 369 9. The Statute de Donis preserves the Estate Tayl for the Issue or the Reversion for the Donor against the alienations of the Donee or Tenant in Tayl with or without warranty but not absolutely against all warranties that might barr them for it hath not restrained the collateral warranty of any other Ancestor 369 370 377 379 381 10. An alienation with warranty which shall hinder the Land from reverting to the Donor or his Heirs is expresly forbidden by the Statute de Donis 374 11. No mans warranty doth bind directly à priori because it is lineal or collateral for no Statute restrains any warranty under those terms from binding nor no Law institutes any warranty in those terms but those are restraints by consequent only from the restraints of warranties made by Statute 375 12 The Statute de Donis makes no difference between a Donor stranger and a Donor privy in blood to the Donee but the warranties are the same in both Cases 378 13. The Tenant in possession may Rebutt the Demandant without shewing how he came to the possession which he then hath when impleaded be it by disseisin or any other tortious way but he must shew how the warranty extended to him 385 386 14. If a man will be warranted by a Rebutter he must make it appear how the warranty extends to him but he need not have the like estate in the Land upon a Rebutter as upon a Voucher 385 15. The Tenant in possession shall not rebut the Demandant by the warranty without he first make it appear that the warranty did extend to him as Heir or Assignee 385 386 387 388 16. Where a man is once entituled to the warranty whatsoever Estate he had when
Heirs is expresly forbidden by the Statute de Donis 374 Right See Title Action 1. Where there can be presumed to be no remedy there is no right 38 Seisin 1. THe profits of all and every part of the Land are the Esplees of the Land and prove the Seisin of the whole Land 255 2. In an Entry sur Disseisin or other Action where Esplees are to be alledged the profits of a Mine will not serve 254 Spoliation 1. The Writ of Spoliation lyes for one Incumbent against the other where the Patrons right comes in question 24 Statute See Recognizance 1. A Recognizance taken before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the nature of a Statute Staple 102 Statutes in general 1. Where an Act of Parliament is dubious long usage is a just medium to expound it by and the meaning of things spoken and written must be as hath been constantly received by common acceptation 169 2. But where usage is against the obvious meaning of an Act by the vulgar and common acceptation of words then it is rather an oppression then exposition of the Act 170 3. When an Act of Parliament alters the Common Law the meaning shall not be strained beyond the words except in cases of publick utility when the end of the Act appears to be larger than the words themselves 179 4. Secular Judges are most conizant in Acts of Parliament 213 5. When the words of a Statute extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening but doth to those which often happen it is good reason not to strain the words further than they will reach by saying it is casus omissus and that the Law intended quae frequentius accidunt 373 6. But where the words of a Law do extend to an inconvenience seldom happening there it shall extend to it as well as if it happens more frequently 373 7. An Act of Parliament which generally prohibits a thing upon a penalty which is popular or only given to the King may be inconvenient to diverse particular persons in respect of person place time c. For this cause the Law hath given power to the King to dispense with particular persons 347 8. Whatsoever is declared by an Act of Parliament to be against Law we must admit it so for by a Law viz. by Act of Parliament it is so declared 327 9. Where the Kings Grant is void in its creation a saving of that Grant in an Act of Parliament shall not aid it 332 10. How an Act of Parliament may be proved there hath been such an Act where the Roll is lost 162 163 404 405 407 11. An Act of Parliament in Ireland cannot effect a thing which could not be done without an Act of Parliament in England 289 12. Distinct Kingdoms cannot be united but by mutual Acts of Parliament 300 13. A repealed Act of Parliament is of no more effect than if it had never been made 325 Statutes 1. Merton cap. 4. The Statute of Merton which gave the owner of the Soyl power to approve Common did not consider whether the Lord was equally bound to pasture with his Tenants or not but it considered that the Lord should approve his own Ground so as the Commoners had sufficient 256 257 2. The inconveniences before the making of the Statute and the several remedies that were provided by it 257 1. Westm 1. 3 E. 1. The Antiquae Custumae upon Woolls Woolfells and Leather were granted to E. 1. by Parliament and therefore they are not by the Common Law 162 163 1. Westm 1. cap. 38. Attaints in Pleas real were granted by this Statute 146 1. Westm 2. cap. 24. The Quare Ejecit infra terminum is given by this Statute for the recovery of the Term against the Feoffee for an Ejectment lay not against him he coming to the Land by Feoffment 127 Statute of Glocester 1. Restrained warranties from binding as at Common Law 366 377 2. Before this Statute all Warranties which descended to the Heirs of the Warrantors were barrs to them except they were Warranties which commenced by Disseisin 366 3. The reason why the warranty of Tenant in Tayl with assets binds the right of the Estate Tayl is in no respect from the Statute de Donis but by the equity of the Statute of Glocester by which the Warranty of the Tenant per Curtesie barrs not the Heir for his Mothers Land if his Father leaves not assets to descend 365 4. If this Statute had not been made the lineal Warranty of Tenant in Tayl had no more bound the right of the Estate Tayl by the Statute de Donis with assets descending than it doth without assets ibid. Westm 2. De Donis 1. All Issues in Tayl within this Statute are to claim by the Writ purposely formed there for them which is a Formedon in the Descender 369 2. it intended not to restrain the alienation of any Estates but such as were Fee-simples at the Common Law 370 3. This Statute intended not to preserve the Estate for the Issue or the Reversion for the Donor absolutely against all Warranties but against the alienation with or without Warranty of the Donee and Tenant in Tayl only 369 4. Therefore if Tenant for life alien with Warranty which descended upon the Reversioner that was not restrained by the Statute but left at the Common Law 370 5. By this Statute the Warranty of Tenant in Tayl will not barr the Donor or his Heir of the Reversion ibid. 6. The Donee in Tayl is hereby expresly restrained from all power of alienation whereby the Lands entayled may not revert to the Donor for want of issue in Tayl 371 7. See a further Exposition upon this Statute from fol. 371 to 393 1. Wales Statute de Rutland 12 E. 1. after the Conquest of it by Edward the First was annext to England Jure proprietatis and received Laws from England as Ireland did Vide postea 9 17 18. and had a Chancery of their own and was not bound by the Law of England until 27 H. 8. 300 301 399 400 2. Although Wales became of the Dominion of England from that time yet the Courts of England had nothing to do with the Administration of Justice there in other manner than now they have with the Barbadoes Jersey c. all which are of the Dominions of England and may be bound by Laws made respectively for them by an English Parliament 400 See for a further Exposition 401 402 c. Acton Burnell 13 E. 1. 1. Recognizances for Debt were taken before this Statute by the Chancellor two Chief Justices and Justices Itinerants neither are they hindred by this Statute from taking them as they did before 102 28 E. 3. c. 2. concerning Wales 1. Tryals and Writs in England for Lands in Wales were only for Lordships Marchers and not for Lands within the Principality of Wales Vide ante 7. pòstea 17 18. for the Lordships and Marchers were of the Dominion of England and held of
the King in Capite 411 31 E. 3. cap. 11. Concerning Executors 1. Though Executors and Administrators are not compelled by the Common Law to answer Actions of Debt for simple Contracts yet the Law of the Land obligeth payment of them 96 2. Upon committing Administration Oath is taken to administer truly which cannot be without paying the Debts 96 3. Oath is likewise taken to make a true account to the Ordinary of what Remains after all Debts Funerals and just Expences deducted 96 1. 34 E. 3. c. 7. of Attaints This Statute granted Attaints in personal Actions 146 1. 2 H. 6. cap. 4. Those born in Ireland are subject to and bound by the Laws of England as those of Calais Gascoign and Guien were 293 1. 7. H. 8. c. 4. of Recoveries If a Common Recovery had been to Uses of Lordships and Mannors before the Statute of the 27 H. 8. the Recoverors had no remedy to make the Tenants Attorn for a quid Juris clamat would not lye upon a Recovery before the Statute of 27 H. 8. which did give remedy 48 1. If a man have a Benefice with Cure 21 H. 8. c. Dispensations whatever the value be and is admitted and instituted into another Benefice with Cure Postea 15. of what value soever having no Qualification or Dispensation the first is ipso facto void and the Patron may present another 131 2. But if the Patron will not present then if under value no Lapse shall incurr until Deprivation of the first Benefice and notice Postea 22. but if of the value of Eight pounds the Patron at his peril must present within the six Months 131 25 H. 8. cap. 21. of Dispensations 1. The Pope could formerly and the Arch-bishop now can sufficiently dispense for a plurality by this Statute Ante. 14. 20 2. A Rector of a Church dispensed with according to this Statute before he is consecrated Bishop remains Rector as before after Consecration 24 25 H. 8. c. 22. 28 H. 8. c. 7. 28 H. 8. c. 16. 32 H. 8. c. 38. of Marriages 1. Neither by this Act or 28 H. 8. cap. 7. no Marriage prohibited before either by Gods Law or the Canon Law differenced from it is made lawful 216 325 2. That the Marriages particularly declared to be against Gods Law cannot be dispensed with but other Marriages not particularly declared to be against Gods Law are left Statu quo prius as to the Dispensations 216 325 3. That neither of these Acts gave Jurisdiction to the Temporal Courts concerning Marriages more than they had before but were Acts directory only to the Ecclesiastical proceedings in matters of Marriage 216 4. Neither of these Acts declare That the Degrees rehearsed in the said Acts thereby declared to be prohibited by Gods Law are all the Degrees of Marriage prohibited by Gods Law ibid. 5. The Levitical Degrees quatenus such are set forth by no Act of Parliament but Marriages which fall within some of those Degrees are said to be Marriages within the Degrees prohibited by Gods Law by 28 H. 8. c. 7. and 28 H. 8. c. 16. 319 6. The 32 H. 8. c. 38. prohibits the impeaching of Marriages only which are absolutely within the Levitical Degrees leaving all other to Spiritual Jurisdiction as before that Act 320 7. A Marriage with the Grandfathers brothers wife by the mothers side is a lawful Marriage by the 32 H. 8. c. 38. 206 207 8. The marriage of the Husband with the Wives sister or the Wives sisters daughter is prohibited within the Levitical Degrees 322 323 9. The 28 H. 8. cap. 16. makes invalid all Licenses Dispensations Bulls and other Instruments purchased from Rome 217 10. This Statute of 25 H. 8. is Repealed by the 28 H. 8 but not for the matter of Marriages there prohibited 215 11. The Statute of 1 2 Phil. Mar. doth not Repeal the 28 H. 8. cap. 7. entirely but only one Clause of it 324 327 12. Some parts of 32 H. 8. c. 38. are Repealed 218 1. 26 H. 8. Concerning Wales By this Statute power was given to the Kings President and Council in the Marchers of Wales Ante 7 9. Postea 18. in several Causes as to Indict Outlaw Proceed against Traytors Clippers of Mony Murtherers and other Felons within the Lordships Marchers of Wales to be indicted in the adjoyning County But this did not extend to the Principality of Wales 413 27 H. 8. concerning Wales 1. The alteration which was made by this Statute as to Wales 414 415 2. To what Counties the Lordships Marchers of Wales are now annext by this Statute Ante 7 9 18. 415 27 H. 8. of Uses 1. A Use cannot arise where there is not a sufficient Estate in possession 49 2. This Statute is properly to give the possession to him who had not the possession but the use only viz. the possession which he wanted before to the use which he had before in such manner as he hath the use 42 3. It was never the intent of the Statute to give the possession to fictitious Conuzees in order to a form of Conveyance but the Statute brings the new uses raised out of a feigned possession in the Conuzee to the real possession which operates according to their intent to change their Estate 42 4. If an Estate for life had been granted to the use of a man and his Heirs an Estate in Fee could not rise out of it by this Statute 49 5. The principal use of this Statute especially upon Fines levied is not to bring together a possession and a use but to introduce a general form of Conveyance by which the Conuzors in the Fine may execute their purposes at pleasure by transferring to Strangers enlarging or diminishing their Estates without observing the strictness of Law for the possession of the Conuzee 50 6. The Conuzee of a Rent granted by Fine to uses cannot have any actual seisin or be in possession of such Rent since this Statute 49 7. A. makes a Feoffment with Warranty to the use of himself for life Remainder to his wife for life Remainder to the use of his right Heirs when by this Statute the possession is brought to these uses the Warranty made by A. to the Feoffees and their Heirs is wholly destroyed 389 1. 32 H. 8. c. 32. concerning Executors This Statute gives Remedy for recovery of such Debts by Executors as were due to the Testator and for which there was no remedy before viz. the Tenants did retain in their hands arrearages of Rents whereby the Executors could not pay the Testators Debts 48 7 E. 6. cap. 5. selling of Wines 1. This Statute never intended that no Wine should be sold nor that it should be with great restraint sold but every man might not sell it And since it restrains not the Kings power to license the selling of Wine it is clear the King may license as if the Act had absolutely prohibited the selling of Wine and left it