Selected quad for the lemma: land_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
land_n	hold_v	manor_n	tenure_n	1,341	5	12.5333	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A32245	The case and argument against Sir Ignoramvs of Cambridg by Robert Callis.	Callis, Robert, fl. 1634.	1648 (1648)	Wing C303; ESTC R14450	26,542	42

got never a one So I may apply this jeast to our case Here be twelve persons in the case pretend right to the avoydance of this Church and every one of the Gentlemen by great and strang chance have taken severall courses and also have held with a severall party so that now I am assured it is much expected which of the parties I shall hold to have right to the said avodyance whereupon with the merry host I do hold that never a one of the parties in the case hath right to the Church for this time but that there is a person no named in the cause hath right to the presentment whose name I mean to conceale till I grow towards the end of my argument and therefore now I meane to distinguish and divide my case into these severall points which be as followeth The points intended in my case be 1. What a Mannor is and whether a Mannor may be devided and that two Mannors may be made of one 2. Whether the advowson doth passe with the Mannor granted or doth remaine with the thing ungranted 3. Because the Advowson lieth in another Town then where the Mannor lay whether it did pass or not by words Cum Pertin. 4. When Monsieur Avidus did present dye whether the wi●e should not have her Clark advanced to the benefice the rather because the Clark presented was after refused by the Bishops elect 5. If after that Sir Monsieur Avidus became a recusant convict whether the presentment be transferred over to the Vniversity of Cambridg by the statute of 3 Jacobi so ought to be conferred upon their Clark Sir Ignoramus or that he must be put to seek out a benefice in some other place 6. Whether the Jure Patronatus be well awarded by the Bishop elect or not and whether the verdict of the Jury nas according to Law or no 7. If the refusall of the Clarkes was done upon a iust ground or no and whether notice was necessary or not 8. If it be such a Simony committed by and between Sir Simon and his Clark as that thereby the Clark lost his benefice and Sir Simon his presentment hac vice and whether the King may present by the statute XXXI Eliz or not 9. Whether the levesque eslie might present by laps 10. What is the preson to whom the presentment doth belong if none of the parties aforesaid have right according as I hold And for the Argument of the first point what a Mannor is Mr. Bracton saith quod est Capitale mesuagium ad quod possint diversa pertinere Master Plowden in Hill and Graunges case defineth a Mannor to be quoddam Compositum of demesnes and services and I doe hold that a Mannor iss a little Common-Wealth and is compounded of necessity as things and causes without the which it cannot be nor have perfect essence which three things be 1. Scitum pro habitatione Domini pourson delite demesnes for his profit 2. Services to be done by the Tennants testifying obedience 3. And a Court Baron for the execution of justice amongst the Tennants And these be all the things which be of necessity required in the essence of a perfect Mannor For if any of these be wanting there is but an Nuncupative Mannor as it is tearmed in Sir Moyle Finches case in the Lord Cooks rep or rather as I may more fitly terme it And imaginary Mannor Nomini vulgari appellatione non in re in opinione Jurisperitorum There be divers things which be not required ex rei necessitate to the making of a Mannor yet for divers respects and considerations they be necessary to appertaine thereunto as warrens of Counyes Chases and Parkes for the Lord to use for his deletation villenes regardants to doe the Lords works piscaries for provision in his House and advowsons for the advancement of men skilfull in Religion and many other things of the like nature but all these be but instrumentall adjuvants and supplements and are nothing to the essence of a Mannor and yet they be necessary to be had therewithall either for the profit or pleasure they do bring in their severall kinds So that it is holden in our books that by the grant of a Mannor the S●ite demesnes services and Court Baron do passe but the Warrens Parkes Chases Piscaries and things appendant do not passe to the Grauntee by the grant of the Mannor without the words cum pertin. as appeareth in 8. Hen. 7. sol 4. b. But whether or no an advowson appendant will passe without the words cum pertin. by the graunt of the Mannor hath been questioned in our bookes and Mr. Perkins title grants fol. and in 44. Edw. 3. fol. 40. and many other books be that will passe without the words cum pertin But 8. Hen. 7. aforesaid is to the contrary and surely I can see no perfect reason wherefore it should passe per-Nomen Manerii without the words cum pertin. more then other appendants and appurtenants will do considering it hath alwayes the word appendant with it supposing it to depend and belong to a Mannor and not to be parcell and it is also in pleading said Pertinere unlesse the old conceit hath wrought the opinion of men to be that it is parcell of the Mannor because Livery and seisin might have bene made of it but the Law in that case being altered I see no reason but that may stand in equipage and equall termes with a villeine regardant which will not passe without the words cum pertin. But generall opinion doth sway the other way and therefore I leave it where I found it and yet I intend to prove hereafter that as this case is these words cum pertin. must be materiall to passe the advowson or else the word Mannor will faile Sir Symon the wicked grauntee when he should stand most need of it It is fit in the handling of this point to dispute whether a Mannor may be made at this day or not I hold it cannot the reasons whereof are fit to be set forth and declared I confesse that the Law is taken in 33. H. 8. in Brookes Cases pl. 2 10. in 35. H. 8. plac 274. in the same Book and in Sir Moyle Finches Case That a Mannor cannot be made at this day Although a man gives divers parcells of Land Seperaliter in taile Tenandum of his chiefe Mansion-house and some men have been of opinion that Mannors might have been made untill the Statute of Westm. the third of Quia Emplores terrarum did take place because that Statute took away the Fesans of tenures Iator veray seigniour veray tenants which must be and concurre where there shall be a Mannor but I do hold for mine owne part that there be two materiall causes wherefore a Mannor cannot be made De novo at this day The first because all this Realme soon after the conquest

theroof by William the Conqueror was devided into Mannors So that al lands every Land was put within one Mannor or other therefore the Law was so satisfied in that as there was an end of making of Mannors when the cause ceased 2ly This word Mannor implieth in it selfe A being time out of memory which we call prescription and this appeareth to be so by the said books of 33. H. 35. H. 8. which are That a Mannor must be De tempore cuius memoria hominum non existit in contrarium So that for these two reasons I am of opinion That neither a Subject nor the King can make a new Mannor at this day Also for the absurdity It were unfitting that every petty Free-holder by giving severall parcells of his Grounds to diverse severall persons should make himselfe Lord of a Mannor at this day But the question and point in my case is not whether one might make a Mannor de novo at this day But whether of one old and perfect Mannor two Mannors may be made and whether one Mannor may be devided into two or not It is true that our Law loves entierties and rejects fraction Quar union fait unity fraction fist division Come garranty per le Ley est entter pur ceo le party que ad ceo ne puit ceo pur son act demesne devider as appeareth by Morices case in the 6. Rep of the Lord Cooke and by Mr. Litleton If one have a Rent charge and purchase parcell of the tennancy or graunt part of the Rent to another All the Rent is extinct in the one case and the distresse is lost in the other For as the Rent was an entire thing so was the distresse and Lex non patitur fractiones So in E. 4. The Office of the Chiefe Prothonotary could not be granted to two to make two severall Officers of them Quia sic centum but as Auditor Curles Case in the 11. Rep. Two Persons may be made one Officer Sed hoc per statutum So by 3. E. 4. and Dyer fol. Two Joyn-tennants cannot make partition without a Deed because it is contrary to the nature of Joyn-tennancy to have a division or partition So that we may collect that where the Law hath made an union it dislikes the contrary and so it may be well held in argumentt that one Mannor cannot be divided into two yet in 9. E. 4. fol. 17. If the Mannor of Dale be held of the Mannor of Sale and Escheat that is parcell of the Mannor of Sale So here is two Mannors made into one which proves the one derived out of the other in principio sed non licet arguere principia But that is by act in Law And so is 26. H. 8. fol. 4. that if a Mannor descend to two Coparceners and they do make partition so that either hath demesnes and services here either of them hath a Mannor Et cum hoc concordat 12. H. 4 For Coperceners are by Law compellable to make partition and then the Law which doth compell the doing of the act doth never work any injury to either party For that were torcious which cannot be presumed in the Law which in it selfe is right and justice And although that 9. E. 4. aforesaid seems to sway that two Mannors may be made one by act in Law yet by the act of the parties I find the Law contrary As in 2. E. 2. and Mr. Perkins where a man had two Mannors and he for ease of his tennants caused all his tennants to come to one Mannor to do their suit and service and that for along time yet that did not make the tennants of the other Mannor in right tennants to that Mannor they did their suit unto neither did it make both the said mannor one entire Mannor In 9. E. 4 fol. 17. It is said by Catesby that if I have a Mannor which lyeth in Dale and Sale and I grant my Mannor in Dale the Grauntee hath a Mannor and yet it shall extend but only into Dale And in Sir Moyle Finches case it is said for Law That if I have a Mannor and grant part of the demesnes and services to I. S. yet by this grant the Grauntee shall not have a Mannor Out of which two books I gather this conceit That if I have a Mannor which doth extend into Dale and Sale and there be demesnes and services in either Town and I grant my Mannor in Dale that the Grauntee hath a Mannor there and that which remaineth in Sale shall be but as things in grosse and no Mannor Sic e●converso If I grant all my Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in Sale the Grauntee shall not have a Mannor but the demesnes and services as things in grosse and the Mannor shall remaine with me in Dale So I may conclude that Sir Symon the Grauntee hath a Mannor in Wrangle and Jars passed unto him But now whether the Advowson doth passe to him in some question For things appendant or appurtenant are rather inclinable to remaine then to passe by grant Forin 33. H. 8. in Dyer fol. 48. and 44. E. 3. Fitzh quare imp plac 137. If one have an advowson appendant to a Mannour he may by expresse words make that appendant to one acre parcell of the mannour but not by these words cum pertinentiis but if these cases hereafter ensuingbe wel noted weighed they wil make he Law to appeare where these words Cum pertin. be requisite to be used to make the advowson passe and where not The first case is in 6. E. 3. 44. Fitz. h. title quare imp pla 40. which is that if the third part of a Mannour with th' appurtinances be assigned in dower to a Feme the third part of the Advowson will passe to her without naming of it in expressis verbis c. So is 9. E. 2. Fitzh. Title Breife pla 844. That if one bring a formedon of the moety of a mannour Cum pertin. he by that shal recover the moety of the Advowson and the reason thereof as I conceive is because the Feme in the first case comes in upon the best possession of her Husband and in her case and in the case of the Recoveror they both come in upon an ancient right which is as well to the advowson as to the Land And these be the reasons as I conceive wherefore the part of the Advowson was to come to them by vertue of the said words Cum pertineniiis but without the said words as I conceive by the said cases no part of the advowson had come to them There is one other pretty case in 17. E 3. Fol. 38. and in 2. H. 7. Fol. 4. and 5. If there be three Coparceners of a Mannour and of an Advowson appendant and they make partition of the Mannour and say nothing of the Advowson the