Sir Thomas claimed a Property whereupon he was ordered to amend his Return and then the Court of Common-Pleas bailed him Banson versus Offley AN Appeal of Murder was tried in Cambridgshire against three persons An Appeal of a Murder was tried not where the Stroak was given but where the Party died and the Count was that Offley did assault the Husband of the Appellant and wounded him in Huntingtonshire of which Wound he did languish and dye in Cambridgeshire and that Lippon and Martin were assisting The Iury found a special Verdict in which the Fact appeared to be that Lippon gave the Wound and that Martin and Offley were assisting The first Exception to this Verdict was that the Count and the Matter therein alledged must be certain and so likewise must the Verdict otherwise no Iudgment can be given but here the Verdict finding that another person gave the Stroak and not that person against whom the Appellant had declared 't is directly against her own shewing 2. This Fact was tried by a Iury of Cambridgshire when it ought to have been tried by a Iury of both Counties The Court answered to the first Exception that it was of no force and that the same Objection may be made to an Indictment where in an Indictment if one gives the Stroak and another is abetting they are both principally and equally guilty and an Indictment ought to be as certain as a Count in an Appeal As to the second Exception 't is a good Trial by a Iury of Cambridgshire alone and this upon the Statute of 2 3 Ed. 6. 2 3 Ed. 6. cap. 24. the Words of which Statute are viz. Where any person c. shall hereafter be feloniously striken in one County and dye of the same Stroak in another County that then an Indictment thereof found by the Jurors of the County where the death shall happen whether it be found before the Coroner upon the sight of the Body or before the Justices of the Peace or other Justices or Commissioners who shall have Authority to enquire of such Offences shall be as good and effectual in the Law as if the Stroak had been in the same County where the Party shall dye or where such Indictment shall be found 'T is true 4 Inst 49 that at the Common Law if a Man had received a mortal Wound in one County and died in another the Wife or next Heir had their Election to bring an Appeal in either County but the Trial must be by a Iury of both Counties But now that mischief is remedied by this Statute which doth not only provide that an Appeal shall be brought in the County where the Party dyed but that it shall be prosecuted which must be to the end of the Suit Adjornatur Dominus Rex versus Hinton and Brown AN Indictment was brought against the Defendants setting forth Subornation of Perjury that a Conventicle was held at a certain place and that they movebant persuadebant subornaverunt a certain person to swear that several Men were then present who really were at that time at another place They were found guilty and a Writ of Error was brought to reverse the Iudgment the Error assigned was that the Indictment doth not set forth that any Oath was made so it could not be Subornation There is a difference between the persuading of a man to swear falsly and Subornation it self for an Indictment for Subornation always concludes contra formam Statuti Curia 'T is not enough to say a Man suborned another to commit a Perjury but he must shew what Perjury it is which cannot be without an Oath for an Indictment cannot be framed for such an Offence unless it appear that the thing was false which he was perswaded to swear The Question therefore is If the person had sworn what the Defendants had persuaded him to do whether that had been Perjury There is a difference when a Man swears a thing which is true in Fact and yet he doth not know it to be so and to swear a thing to be true which is really false the first is Perjury before God and the other is an Offence of which the Law takes notice But the Indictment was quashed because the Words Per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out They held that if the Return had been right upon the File the Record should be amended by it Blaxton versus Stone THE Case was this viz. A Man seised in Fee c. What words make an Estate Tail in a Will had Issue two Sons he devised all his Land to his eldest Son and if he die without Heirs Males then to his other Son in like manner The Question was Whether this was an Estate Tail in the eldest Son Curia 'T is plain the Word Body which properly creates an Estate Tail is left out but the intent of the Testator may be collected out of his Will that he designed an Estate Tail for without this Devise it would have gone to his second Son if the first had died without Issue 'T is therefore an Estate Tail DE Termino Paschae Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687. Herbert Chief Justice Wythens Justices Holloway Justices Powel Justices Dominus Rex versus William Beal MEmorandum A Souldier executed not in the County where he wes condemned That on Saturday April 15. Mr. Attorny moved that this Court would award Execution upon the Defendant who was a Souldier for deserting of his Colours and was condemned for the same at the Affizes at Reading in Berks and reprieved and that he might be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison then was The Chief Iustice in some heat said that the Motion was irregular for the Prisoner was never before the Court. Mr. Attorny then moved for a Habeas Corpus and on Tuesday April the 18th the Souldier was brought to the Barr and Mr. Attorny moved it again But it was affirmed by the Chief Iustice and Iustice Wythens that it could not be done by Law for the Prisoner being condemned in Berks and reprieved by the Iudge to know the Kings Pleasure and now brought hither cannot be sent into another County to be executed it may be done in Middlesex by the Prerogative of this Court which sits in that County but no where else but in the proper County where the Trial and Conviction was so the Prisoner was committed to the Kings Bench and the Record of his Conviction was not filed But it was the King's Will that this Man should be executed at Plymouth where the Garrison was that by this Example other Souldiers might be deterred from running from their Colours SIR Robert Wright who was made Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the room of Sir Henry Beddingfield who died the last Term as he was receiving of the Sacrament was on Friday following being the 21st of April made Chief Justice of this Court in the place of
c. yet one Commoner may bring an Action against his Fellow besides in this Case they are not Tenants in Common for every Man is seized severally of his Freehold Adjornatur Ayres versus Huntington AScire Facias was brought upon a Recognizance of 1000 l. Amendment of the word Recuperatio for Recognitio after a Demurrer to shew cause quare the Plaintiff should not have Execution de praedictis mille libris recognitis juxta formam Recuperationis where it should have been Recognitionis praed And upon a Demurrer it was held that the words juxta formam Recuperationis were Surplusage The Record was amended and a Rule that the Defendant should plead over Mather and others versus Mills THE Defendant entred into a Bond to acquir Non damnificatus generally where 't is a good Plea discharge and save harmless a Parish from a Bastard Child Debt was brought upon this Bond and upon Non damnificatus generally pleaded the Plaintiff demurred and Tremain held the Demurrer to be good for if the Condition had been only to save harmless c. then the Plea had been good but 't is likewise to acquit and discharge c. and in such Case Non damnificatus generally is no good Plea 1 Leon. 71. because he should have shewed how he did acquit and discharge the Parish and not answer the Damnification only E contra E contra 2 Co. 3. 2 Cro. 363 364 2 Sand. 83 84. It was argued that if the Defendnat had pleaded that he kept harmless and discharged the Parish such Plea had not been good unless he had shewed how c. because 't is in the affirmative but here 't is in the negative viz. that the Parish was not dampnified and they should have shewed a Breach for though in strictness this Plea doth not answer the Condition of the Bond yet it doth not appear upon the whole Record that the Plaintiff was dampnified and if so then he hath no cause of Action Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 1 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1689. Memorandum That on the 4th day of November last past the Prince of Orange landed here with an Army and by reason of the Abdication of the Government by King James and the Posture of Affairs there was no Hillary-Term kept Coram Johanne Holt Mil ' Capital ' Justic Gulielmo Dolben Mil ' Justiciar Gulielmo Gregory Mil ' Justiciar Egidio Eyre Mil ' Justiciar Kellow versus Rowden Trin. 1 Willielmi Mariae Rotulo 796. IN Debt by Walter Kellow Where the Reversion in Fee is expectant upon an Estate Tail and that being spent it descends upon a collateral Heir he must be sued as Heir to him who was last actually seized of the Fee without naming the intermediate Remainders Executor of Edward Kellow against Richard Rowden The Case was this viz. John Rowden had Issue two Sons John and Richard John the Father being seized in Fee of Lands c. made a Settlement to the use of himself for Life the Remainder to John his eldest Son in Tail Male the Remainder to his own right Heirs The Father died the Reversion descended to John the Son who also died leaving Issue John his Son who died without Issue so that the Estate Tail was spent Richard the second Son of John the elder entred and an Action of Debt was brought against him as Son and Heir of John the Father upon a Bond of 120 l. entred into by his Father and this Action was brought against him without naming the intermediate Heirs viz. his Brother and Nephew The Defendant pleaded Quod ipse de debito praed ut filius haeres praed Johannis Rowden Patris sui virtute scripti obligatorii praed onerari non debet quia protestando quod scriptum obligatorium praed non est factum praed Johannis Rowden pro placito idem Richardus dicit quod ipse non habet aliquas terras seu tenementa per discensum haereditarium de praed Johanne Rowden patre suo in feodo simplici nec habuit die exhibitionis billae praed Walteri praed nec unquam postea hoc parat est ' verificare unde pet judicium si ipse ut filius haeres praed Johannis Rowden patris sui virtute scripti praed onerari debeat c. The Plaintiff replied that the Defendant die Exhibitionis billae praed habuit diversas terras tenementa per discensum haereditarium a praed Johanne Rowden patre suo in feodo simplici c. Vpon this pleading they were at Issue at the Assises in Wiltshire and the Iury found a special Verdict viz. that John Rowden the Father of Richard now the Defendant was seized in Fee of a Messuage and 20 Acres of Land in Bramshaw in the said County and being so seised had Issue John Rowden his eldest Son and the Defendant Richard that on the 22th of Januarii 18 Car. I. John the elder did settle the Premisses upon himself for Life Remainder ut supra c. That after the death of the Father John his eldest Son entred and was possessed in Fee-Tail and was likewise entituled to the Reversion in Fee and died in the 14th year of King Charles the II. that the Lands did descend to another John his only Son who died 35th Car. II. without Issue whereupon the Lands descended to the Defendant as Heir of the last mentionted John who entred before this Action brought and was seised in Fee c. But whether upon the whole matter the Defendant hath any Lands by by descent from John Rowden in Fee-simple the Iury do not know c. The Council on both sides did agree that this Land was chargable with the Debt but the Question was whether the Issue was found for the Defendant in regard the Plaintiff did not name the intermediate Heirs It was argued that the Defendant ought to be sued as immediate Heir to his Father and not to his Nephew for whoever claims by descent must claim from him who was last actually seised of the Freehold and Inheritance this is the express Doctrine of my Lord Coke in his first Institutes and if so Co. Lit. 11. the Defendant must be charged as he claims Seisin is a material thing in our Law for if I am to make a Title in a real Action I must lay an actual seisin in every Man 8 E. 3.13 Bro. Assise 6. F.N. B. 212. F. 't is so in Formedons in Descender and Remainder in both which you are to run through the whole Pedegree But none can be Filius Haeres but to him who was last actually seised of the Fee-simple and therefore the Brother being Tenant in Tail and his Son the Issue in Tail in this Case they were never seised of the Fee 1 Inst 14. b. for that was expectant upon the Estate Tail which being spent then John the Father was last seised thereof and
so his Son is justly and rightly sued as Son and Heir In some Cases the persons are to be named not by way of a Title but as a Pedigree as if there be Tenant for Life the Reversion in Fee to an Ideot and an Vncle who is right Heir to the Ideot levied a Fine and died living the Ideot leaving Issue a Son named John who had Issue William who entred the Question was whether the Issue of the Vncle shall be barred by this Fine It was the Opinion of two Iudges that they were not barred because the Vncle died in the life-time of the Ideot and nothing attached in him March 94. Cro. Car. 524. and because the Issue claim in a collateral Line and do not name the Father by way of Title but by way of Pedigree But Iustice Jones who hath truly Reported the Case Jones 456. was of Opinion that the Issue of the Vncle were barred because the Son must make his Conveyance from the Father by way of Title The Iury have found that the Reversion did descend to the Defendant as Heir to the last John 't is true it descends as a Reversion but that shall not charge him as Heir to the Father Jenk's Case 1 Cro. for the other was seised of the Estate Tail which is now spent and the last who was seised of the Fee was the Father and so the Defendant must be charged as his Heir 'T is likewise true that where there is an actual Seisin you must charge all but in this Case there was nothing but a Reversion Tremaine Serjeant for the Defendant In this Case the Plaintiff should have made a special Declaration for the Estate-Tail and the Reversion in Fee are distinct and seperate Estates John the Nephew might have sold the Reversion and kept the Estate Tail if he had acknowledged a Statute or Iudgment it might have been extended and if so then he had such a Seisin that he ought to have been named A Man becomes bound in a Bond and died Debt is brought against the Heir it is not common to say that he had nothing by descent but only a Reversion expectant upon an Estate Tayl. In the Case of Chappel and Lee Covenant was brought in the Common-Pleas against Judith Daughter and Heir of Robert Rudge She pleaded Riens per descent Issue was joyned before Sir Francis North then Chief Iustice and it appearing upon Evidence that Robert had a Son named Robert who died without Issue a Case was made of it and Iudgment was given for the Defendant the Plaintiff took out a new Original and then the Land was sold so the Plaintiff lost his Debt Adjornatur Afterwards in Hillary Term a Gulielmi Mariae Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff by the Opinion of three Iustices against Iustice Eyre who argued that the Defendant cannot be charged as immediate Heir to his Father 't is true the Lands are Assets in his Hands and he may be charged by a special Declaration Dyer 368. pl. 460. In this Case the intermediate Heirs had a Reversion in Fee which they might have charged either by Statute Iudgment or Recognizance they were so seised that if a Writ of Right had been brought against them they might have joyned the Mise upon the Mere right which proves they had a Fee and though it was expectant on an Estate Tail 3 Co. 42. Ratcliff's Case yet the Defendant claiming the Reversion as Heir ought to make himself so to him who made the Gift The person who brings a Formeden in Descender must name every one to whom any Right did descend 8 Co. 88. F.N.B. 220. c. Rast Ent. 375. otherwise the Writ will abate A Man who is sued as Heir or who entitles himself as such must shew how Heir The Case of Duke and Spring is much stronger than this 2 Rol. Abr. 709. 2 Cro. 161. for there Debt was brought against the Daughter as Heir of B. She pleaded Riens per descent and the Iury found that B. died seised in Fee leaving Issue the Defendant and his Wife then with Child who was afterwards delivered of a Son who died within an hour and it was adjudged against the Plaintiff because he declared against the Defendant as Daughter and Heir of the Father when she was Sister and Heir of the Brother who was last seised But the other three Iudges were of a contrary Opinion The Question is not whether the Defendant is lyable to this Debt but whether he is properly charged as Heir to his Father or whether he should have been charged as Heir to his Nephew who was last seised It must be admitted that if the Lands had descended to the Brother and Nephew of the Defendant in Fee that then they ought to have been named but they had only a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate Tail which was incertain and therefore of little value now though John the Father and Son had this Reversion in them yet the Estate Tail was known only to those who were Parties to the Settlement 'T is not the Reversion in Fee Bro. Fit Descent pl. 30.37 Ass pl. 4. but the Possession which makes the party inheritable and therefore if Lands are given to Husband and Wife in Tail the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Husband then they have a Son and the Wife dies and the Husband hath a Son by a second Venter and dies the eldest Son enters and dies without Issue and his Vncle claimed the Land against the second Son but was barred because he had not the Remainder in Fee in possession and yet he might have sold or forfeited it But here the Reversion in Fee is now come into possession and the Defendant hath the Land as Heir to his Father t is Assets only in him and was not so either in his Brother or Nephew who were neither of them chargeable because a Reversion expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1689. Young versus Inhabitants de Totnam AN Action was brought against the Hundred for a Robbery in which the Plaintiff declared that he was Robbed apud quendam locum prope Faire Mile Gate in such a Parish He had a Verdict And now Serjeant Tremaine moved in arrest of Iudgment and the Exceptions taken were these viz. 1. That it doth not appear that the Parish mentioned in the Declaration was in the Hundred 2. Neither doth it appear that the Robbery was committed in the High-way 3. The Plaintiff hath not alledged that it was done in the day time for if it was not the Hundred is not lyable by Law But these Exceptions were all disallowed because it being after a Verdict the Court will suppose that there was Evidence given of these Matters at the Trial so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Eggleston al' versus Speke alias Petit.
Man from having any Office whatsoever who shall affirm the King to be a Papist 13 Car. 2. cap. 1. that is a person who endeavours to introduce Popery 2. But if the word Papist is not actionable of it self yet as coupled with his Offices 't is otherwise and the Plaintiff may well maintain this Action And of that Opinion was all the Court So the Iudgment was affirmed Malloon versus Fitzgerald ERror of a Iudgment in Ireland Where an Estate Tail shall not be determined for want of notice of a Proviso to determine it for Lands in the County of Waterford the Case upon the special Verdict was this John Fitzgerald was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who had Issue Katherine his only Daughter He by Lease and Release made a Settlement of those Lands upon the Earl of Ossory and other Trustees therein named and their Heirs to the use of himself for Life and after his Decease to the use of his Daughter Katherine in Tail Provided that she Married with the consent of the said Earl and the Trustees or the major part of them or their Heirs some worthy person of the Family and Name of Fitzgerald or who should take upon him that Name immediately after the Marriage but if not then the said Earl should appoint and raise a Portion out of the said Lands for the Maintenance of the said Katherine with a Remainder to Laetitia in Tail John Fitzgerald died his Daughter being then but two years old She afterwards at the Age of fourteen had Notice of this Settlement but not by the Direction of the Trustees That on the 20th of March in the 16th year of her Age she Married with the Plaintiff Edward Villiers Esq without the consent of the Trustees or the major part of them and that her Husband Mr. Villiers did not take upon him the Name of Fitzgerald after the said Marriage That Laetitia the Aunt was married to Franklyn who likewise did not take upon him the Name of Fitzgerald 1. The Questions were Whether the Estate limited to Katherine be forfeited without Notice given to her of the Settlement by the Trustees themselves 2. Whether her Estate be not determined by her marrying Mr. Villiers without their consent And it was argued That the Estate Tail was determined And first as to the point of Notice 't is not necessary to be given to the Daughter because the Father had not made it in the Settlement He might dispose of his Estate at his pleasure and having made particular Limitations of it there is no room now for the Law to interpose to supply the defect of Notice in the Deed. And to this purpose the Mayor of London 's Case was cited which was That George Monox Devised certain Houses to his Executors in Trust and their Heirs Cro Car. 576. Idem Jones 452. upon condition to pay mony to several Charitable uses which if not performed then he devised them over to his Heir in Tail upon the same Conditions and if not performed by him then to the * The Devise to him was void because it was a possibility upon a possibility Mayor and Commonalty of London The Trusts were not performed by the first Devisees A Stranger entered and levied a Fine with Proclamations and five Years passed Then the Mayor of London brought his Action supposing he had a right of Entry for the non performance of the Trusts but was barred by the Fine although it was argued for him that he had not notice of the Devise or breach of the Trust till after the Fine levied which shews that Notice was not necessary for if it had been so when his Title accrewed he could not have been barred by the Fine As Katherine the Daughter takes notice what Estate she hath in the Land so as to pursue a proper Remedy to recover it so she ought to take notice of the Limitations in the Settlement and hath the same means to acquaint her self with the one as with the other and the same likewise as her Aunt had to know the Remainder Suppose a Promise is made to indempnifie another from all Bonds which he should enter into for a third person 2 Cro. 432. Hob. 51. Jones 207. Pop. 164. and then an Action is brought against him wherein the Plaintiff declared that he was bound accordingly and not saved harmless but doth not shew that he gave notice of his being bound yet the Plaintiff shall recover As to the Case of a Copyholder having three Sons who surrendred to the use of his Will 2 Cro. 56. and then devised to his middle Son in Fée upon condition to pay Legacies to his Sisters at full age which were not paid Now tho' it was adjudged that his Estate was not determined upon the non-performance of this Condition without an actual demand and denial and that he was not bound to take notice of the full age of his Sisters yet this is not an Authority which can any wise prevail in this Case because 't is a * If the Devise had been to the eldest Son then it had been a Limitation annexed to his Estate and not a Condition because if it had been a Condition it would have descended upon the Heir who could not be sued for the breach 1 Ventr 199. Rep. Canc. 140. Sid. Poph. 104. Condition to pay Legacies which is a thing in its nature not to be paid without a demand which implies notice In all Cases where Conditions are annexed to Estates to pay Mony there notice is necessary but where Estates are limited upon the performance of collateral acts 't is not necessary And this has been held the constant difference So is Fry and Porter 's Case which was this The Earl of Newport had two Daughters and he devised Newport House to the Daughter of his eldest Daughter in Tail which she had by the Earl of Banbury Provided and upon condition that she marry with the consent of her Mother and two other Trustees or the major part of them if not or if she should dye without Issue then he devised the said House to George Porter in Fee who was the Son of his youngest Daughter and who had married one Thomas Porter without her Fathers consent The Lady Ann Knowles the first Devisee married Fry without the consent of her Grandmother or Trustees and it was adjudg'd against her upon point of Notice that it was not necessary because her Grandfather had not appointed any person to give notice he might have imposed any Terms or Conditions upon his own Estate and all Parties concerned had the same means to inform themselves of such Conditions The third Resolution in Frances Case 8 Co. comes nearest to this now in question it was in Replevin the Defendant avowed the taking Damage Fesant The Plaintiff pleaded in Barr to the Avowry that R. Frances was seized in Fee of the place where c. and devised it to John who was his
the Indictment for be it before or after the Offence the Iury ought to find according to the truth of the Case upon the Evidence for they are sworn ad veritatem dicendam c. This must be assigned for Error for if the contrary be said 't is against the Record the Custos Brevium having retorned that the Fine was taken 30 July which could not be in Trinity Term for that ended 8 July otherwise 't is repugnant to it self Econtra It was argued that this is not assignable for Error Dyer 220. b. 12 Co. 124. 't is true if the Party had died before the Entry of the King's Silver it had been Error but if afterwards 't is not so Thus was the Case of Warnecomb and Carril which was Husband and Wife levied a Fine of the Lands of the Wife and this was by Dedimus in the Lent Vacation she being then but 19 years of Age the King's Silver was entred in Hillary Term before and she died in the Easter week and upon a Motion made the first day of Easter Term to stay the engrossing of the Fine it was denied by the Court for they held it to be a good Fine Another reason why this is not assignable for Error 2 Cro. 11. Yelv. 33. is because 't is directly against the Record which is of Trinity Term and can be of no other Term and to prove this he cited Arundel's Case where a Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Fine taken before Roger Manwood Esq in his Circuit he being then one of the Iustices of the Common-Pleas and the Dedimus was returned per Rogerum Manwood Militem for he was Knighted and made Chief Baron the Eerm following the Fine passed and this was afterwards assigned for Trror that he who took the Caption was not a Knight but it being directly against the Record they would not intend him to be the same person to whom the Writ was directed Adjurnatur Afterwards the Fine was affirmed Lock versus Norborne UPon a Trial at Bar in Ejectment for Lands in Wiltshire Verdict shall only be given in Evidence amongst privies the Case was thus Viz. Mary Philpot in the year 1678. made a Settlement by Lease and Release to her self for Life then to Trustees to support contingent Remainders then to her first second and third Son in Tail Male c. then to Thomas Arundel in Tail Male with divers Remainders over It was objected at the Tryal that she had no power to make such Settlement because in the year 1676. her Husband had setled the Lands in question upon her for Life and upon the Issue of his Body c. and for want of such Issue then upon George Philpot in Tail Male with several Remainders over the Remainder to Mary Philpot in Fee Proviso that upon the tender of a Guinea to George Philpot by the said Mary the Limitations as to him should be void George Philpot having afterwards made a Lease of this Land to try the Title the Trustees brought an Ejectment but because the tender of the Guinea could not be proved there was a Verdict for the Defendant And now Mr. Philpot would have given that Verdict in Evidence at this Trial but was not suffered by the Court for if one Man hath a Title to several Lands and if he should bring Ejectments against several Defendants and recover against one he shall not give that Verdict in Evidence against the rest because the Party against whom that Verdict was had may be relieved against it if 't is not good but the rest cannot tho' they claim under the same Title and all make the same defence So if two Tenants will defend a Title in Ejectment and a Verdict should be had against one of them it shall not be read against the other unless by Rule of Court But if an Ancestor hath a Verdict the Heir may give it in Evidence because he is privy to it for he who produceth a Verdict must be either party or privy to it and it shall never be received against different persons if it doth not appear that they are united in Interest Therefore a Verdict against A. shall never be read against B. for it may happen that one did not make a good defence which the other may do The tender of the Guinea was now proved DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687 8. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Powis Attorny General Wm. Williams Sollicitor General THIS Vacation Sir Robert Sawyer had his Quietus and Sir Thomas Powis was made Attorny General and Sir William Williams of Greys-Inn was made Sollicitor General Rex versus Lenthal AN Inquifition was taken in the second year of this King under the Great Seal of England by which it was found that the Office of Marshal of the Kings-Bench did concern the Administration of Iustice and that Mr. Lenthal was seised thereof in Fee and that upon his Marriage he had setled the said Office upon Sir Edward Norris and Mr. Coghill and their Heirs in Truff that they should permit him to execute the same during his Life c. That the said Trustees had neglected to give their attendance or to execute the said Office themselves that this Canveyance was made by Mr. Lenthal without the notice of this Court that he received the Profits and afterwards granted the said Office to Cooling for Life That Cross and his Wife had obtained a Iudgment in this Court against Bromley and had sued forth Erecution for the Debt and Damages for which he was committed to the custody of the said Cooling and being so in Execution did go at large They find that Cooling had not sufficient to answer Cross and his Wise for the said Debt c. whereupon they impleaded Mr. Lenthal in the Common-Pleas for 121 l. 2 s. 4 d. to answer as superior that at the Trial Mr. Lenthal gave this secret Deed of Settlement in Evidence whereupon the Plaintiffs in that Action were non-suited ad dampnum c. They find that Cooling went out of the said Office and the Trustees neglecting the execution thereof Mr. Lenthal granted the same to Glover for Life that during the time he executed this Office one Wordal was convicted of Forgery and commited to his Custody and that he permitted him voluntarily to Escape by which the said Office was forfeited to the King The King had granted the Office to the Lord Hunsdon Sir Edward Norris and Mr. Coghill come in and plead that Mr. Lenthal was seised in Fee and that he made a Settlement of the Office upon his Marriage with Mrs. Lucy Dunch with whom he had 5000 l. Portion viz. upon them and their Heirs in trust prout in the Inquisition and that he did execute the Office by-their permission Mr Lenthal pleads and admits the Grant to Sir Edward Norris and the other Trustee bearing date such a day c. but saith that the next
Where an Averment may be made of another person so as it consists with the Condition of a Bond. in which Bond the said A. B. the elder and A. B. the younger were joyntly and severally bound in the penal Sum of 1000 l. conditioned that if the above bounden A. B. omitting the word younger do and shall forbear knowingly and wittingly to come to or write Letters unto C. the Wife of D. that then the Obligation to be void The Defendant pleaded that he did not come to or write Letters to the said C. knowingly c. The Plaintiff replied that he exhibited an Information against A. B. the younger shewing in what Term and that it was agreed between them that in consideration that he would forbear to prosecute the same the said A. B. the elder together with A. B. the younger should become bound to the Plaintiff in 1000 l. that the said A. B. the younger should not knowingly or wittingly come into the Company c. then sets forth the Bond and the Condition thereof at large and avers that A. B. in the Condition mentioned is A. B. the younger and farther that the said A. B. the younger did afterwards knowingly come into the Company c. The Defendant re-joyned and said that the Plaintiff ought not to averr that the aforesaid A. B. the younger is the person in the Condition of the said Bond c. And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether the Plaintiff was estopped by the words in the Condition to make such an Averment It was argued for the Plaintiff that he might make such an Averment which is to reduce a thing to a certainty which was very incertain before if it be not repugnant in it self nay sometimes an Averment doth reduce contradictory things to a certainty 'T is plain that A. B. the younger is bound in this Bond the Objection is that A. B. the elder being of the Name and being likewise bound that the Condition might referr to either 'T is agreed there are many Cases where a Man shall be estopped to averr against a Record but this Averment is not contradictory to any thing in the Record for it appears by the Pleadings that the Information was prosecuted against A. B. the younger and therefore he must be intended to be bound not to come to the said C. knowingly c. If an Estate should be devised to A. and the Name of the Testator omitted in the Will 2 Leon. 35. yet the Devise is good by averring of the Name and by proof that it was his intention to give it him by his Will So if the Plaintiff should claim a Title under the Grant of such a person Knight and the Iury find he was an Esquire Lit. Rep. 181 223. but that the Knight and the Esquire are both the same person this is a good Declaration 'T is usual to make an Allegation even against the express words of a Condition to shew the truth of an Agreement Cro. Car. 501. as if Debt be brought upon a Bond of 100 l. conditioned to pay 50 l. within six Months the Defendant pleaded the Statute of Vsury the Plaintiff replied that he lent the Mony for a year and alledged that by the mistake of the Scrivener the Bond was made paiable in six Months The Defendant rejoyned that it was lent for six Months only And upon a Demurrer this was adjudged to be a good Allegation though it was against the very words of the Condition which is a stronger Case than this at the Barr because the Averment consists with the Condition of the Bond. If a Man should levy a Fine and declare the Vses thereof to his Son William and he hath two Sons of that Name 4 Co. 71. 8 Co. 155. a. Dyer 146. then an Averment is made that he intended to declare the Vses to his youngest Son of that Name this Averment out of the Fine hath been adjudged good for the same reason given already which is because it standeth with the words thereof and 't is a good Issue to be tried It cannot be objected that the Bond is illegal being entred into for the not prosecuting of an Information because a Nolle prosequi was entred as to that Matter so 't is the Act of the Court. Lastly It was said that every Estoppel must be certain to every intent which cannot be in this Case for by the words of this Condition 't is incertain which of the Obligors shall be intended E contra It was argued that an Estoppel is as well intended by Law as expressed by Words that if an Averment can be taken yet this is not well because the Plaintiff hath absolutely averred that A. B. in the Condition is A. B. the younger he should have said that A. B. in the Condition is intended A. B. the younger which might have been traversed and Issue taken thereon No Iudgment was given for this Case was ended by Compromise Hoil versus Clerk In the Common-Pleas THIS was a special Verdict in Ejectment for Lands in Wetherfield A subsequent Will though not made pursuant to the Statute is a Revocation of a former in the County of Essex upon the demise of Abigail Pheasant The Iury find that one John Clark was seised in Fee of the Lands in question who by his last Will in writing bearing date the 14th day of September in the year 1666. devised the same to Benjamin Clark for Life so to his first and second Sons c. in Tayl Male and for default of such Issue then to his two Sisters for Life Remainder over c. This Will was attested by one Witness only They find that the said John Clark made another dated the sixth day of February 1672. which was 13 years after the making of his first Will and that by this last Will he revoked all former Wills and Testaments by him made They find an Endorsement on this Will written by the Testator himself in these words Viz. My Will and Testament dated the 6th of February 1679. and then published by me in the presence of three Witnesses They find that this last Will was so published and attested by three Witnesses in his presence but that it was not signed by the Testator in their presence They find that Benjamin Clark entred and devised the Lands to Mary Micklethwaite who made a Lease thereof to the Plaintiff for three years upon whom the Defendant entred This Case was argued at the Bar and in this Term at the Bench Seriatim The single Question was 29 Car. 2. cap. 3. whether this last Will not being duly executed according to the Statute is a Revocation of the first Will or not It was admitted by all that it was a good Will to pass the personal Estate but as to the point of Revocation the Court was divided Iustice Lutwitch argued that it was not a Revocation He agreed that if the last Will hath any respect to the first it must be as a
Revocation or not at all which revocation must depend upon the construction and exposition of the sixth Paragraph in the Statute of Frauds c. the words whereof are Viz. That no Devise of Lands c. or any clause thereof shall be Revoked otherwise than by some Codicil in Writing or other Writing declaring the same or by burning cancelling tearing or obliterating the same by the Testator himself or in his presence and by his direction or consent But all devises of Lands c. shall be good until burnt cancell'd torn c. by the Testator c. or unless the same be altered by some other Will or Codicil in Writing or other Writing of the Devisor signed in the presence of three Witnesses declaring the same So that the Question will be whether a Will which revokes a former Will ought to be signed by the Testator in the presence of three Witnesses 'T is clear that a Will by which Lands are devised ought to be so signed and why should not a Will which revokes another Will have the same formality The Statute seems to be plain that it should for it saies that a Will shall not be revoked but by some Will or Codicil in writing or other writing of the Devisor signed by him in the presence of three or four Witnesses declaring the same which last Clause is an entire sentence in the disjunctive and appoints that the Writing which revokes a Will must be signed in the presence of three Witnesses c. Before the making of this Act it was sufficient that the Testator gave directions to make his Will tho' he did never see it when made which mischief is now remedied not in writing the Will but that the Party himself should sign it in the presence of three Witnesses and this not being so signed but only published by the Testator in their presence 't is therefore no good Revocation Iustice Street was of a contrary Opinion that this was a good Revocation That the words in the fifth Paragraph of this Statute which altered the Law were Viz. That all Devises of Lands c. shall be in Writing and signed by the Party so devising or by some other person in his presence and by his express Directions and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the Devisor by three or four credible Witnesses In which Paragraph there are two parts 1. The act of the Devisor which is to sign the Will but not a word that he shall subscribe his Name in the presence of three Witnesses 2. The act of the Witnesses viz. that they shall attest and subscribe the Will in the presence of the Devisor or else the Will to be void But the sixth Paragraph is penn'd after another manner as to the Revocation of a Will which must be by some Codicil in writing or other Writing declaring the same signed in the presence of three Witnesses Now here is a Writing declaring that it shall be revoked not expresly but by implication and though that Clause in the disjunctive which says that the revocation must be by some Writing of the Devisor signed in the presence of three Witnesses c. yet in the same Paragraph 't is said that it may be revoked by a Codicil or Will in Writing and therefore an exposition ought to be made upon the whole Paragraph that the intention of the Law may more fully appear Such a construction hath been made upon a whole Sentence Sid. 328. 1 Sand. 58. where part thereof was in the disjunctive as for instance viz. A Man was possessed of a Lease by disseisin who assigned it to another and covenanted that at the time of the assignment it was a good true and indefeasable Lease and that the Plaintiff should enjoy it without interruption of the Disseisor Or any claiming under him in this Case the Diffeisee re-entred and though the Covenant was in the disjunctive to defend the Assignee from the Disseisor or any claiming under him yet he having undertaken for quiet enjoyment and that it was an indefeasable Lease it was adjudged that an exposition ought to be made upon the whole Sentence and so the Plaintiff had Iudgment The Chief Iustice Herbert was of the same Opinion with Iustice Street Rex versus Grimes and Thompson THE Defendants were indicted for being Common Pawn-Brokers Two are indicted for a Confederacy one is acquitted and that is the acquittal of the other and that Grimes had unlawfully obtained Goods of the Countess of c. and that he together with one Thompson per confoederationem astutiam did detain the said Goods until the Countess had paid him 12 Guineas Thompson was acquitted and Grimes was found Guilty which must be of the first part of the Indictment only for it could not be per confoederationem with Thompsom and therefore it was moved in arrest of Iudgment that to obtain Goods unlawfully was only a private injury for which the party ought not to be indicted To which it was answered that a plain Fraud was laid in this Indictment which was sufficient to maintain it and that tho one was acquitted yet the Iury had found the other guilty of the whole But the Court were of Opinion that the acquittal of one is the acquittal of both upon this Indictment and therefore it was quash'd King versus Dilliston Hill 2 3 Jacobi Rot. 494. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment in Ejectment given in the Common-Pleas Infant not bound by a Custom for one Messuage and twenty Acres of Land held of the Manor of Swafling There was a special Verdict found the substance of which was viz. That the Land in question was Copy-hold held of the said Manor of Swafling in the County of Suffolk and that Henry Warner and Elizabeth his Wife in right of the said Elizabeth were seized thereof for Life Remainder to John Ballat in Fee That the Custom of the said Manor was that if any Customary Tenant doth surrender his Estate out of Court that such Surrender shall be presented at the next Court of the said Manor and publick Proclamation shall be made three Court days afterwards for the Party to whose use the Surrender was made to come and be admitted Tenant and if he refuseth then after three Proclamations made in each of the said Courts the Steward of the said Manor issueth forth a Precept to the Bailiff thereof to seise the Copyhold as forfeited They find that Henry Warner and his Wife and John Ballat made this Surrender out of Court to the use of Robert Freeman and his Heirs who died before the next Court and that John Freeman an Infant was his Son and Heir That after the said Surrender three Proclamations were made at three several Courts held for the said Manor but that the said John Freeman did not come to be admitted Tenant thereupon the Steward of the said Manor made a Precept to the Bayliff who seized the Lands in
an Inn-keeper or common Carrier 't is usual to declare secundum legem consuetudinem Angliae for 't is not a Custom confined to a particular place but 't is such which is extensive to all the King's People The word Consuetudo might have been added 1 Inst 182. but it imports no more than Lex for Custom it self is Law If the Custom of Merchants had been left out the Defendant had then pursued his Covenant for if a Man agrees to pay Mony to such a person or his Assigns and he appoints the payment to another a tender to that person is a good performance of the Covenant But the Court were of Opinion that this was not a good Plea Panton versus the Earl of Bath A Scire Facias to have Execution of a Iudgment obtained in the Court of Oliver late Protector of England and the Dominions and Territories thereunto belonging Where the Pleading is good in substance tho' there is a small variation it will not hurt and in reciting the Iudgment 't is said that it was obtained before Oliver Protector of England and the Dominions thereunto belonging leaving out the word Territories And upon a Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen held this to be a variance Yelv. 212. Orde versus Moreton and like the Case where a Writ of Error was brought to remove a Record in Ejectment directed to the Bishop of Durham setting forth that the Action was between such Parties and brought before the said Bishop and seven other persons naming them and the Record removed was an Ejectment before the Bishop and eight others so that it could not be the same Record which was intended to be removed by the Writ E contra E contra It was said suppose the word Scotland should be left out of the King's Title would that be a variance The Iudicature in this Case is still the same and the Pleading is good in Substance and of that Opinion was the whole Court Hyley versus Hyley HYley had Issue W. Where the Reversion in Fee shall pass in a Will by the words viz. Remaining part of my Estate his eldest Son who had Issue Peter Charles John He by Will devised 1000 l. to his eldest Son and several parcels of Land to other Legatees Then he gave to Peter Lands in Tail Male To John a Mansion House now in question in Tail Male He devised another House to his Grandson Charles in like manner And all the rest and remaining part of his Estate he devised to his three Grandsons equally to be divided amongst them that only excepted which he had given to Peter Charles and John and to the Heirs of their Bodies whom he made Executors Then by another Clause he devised viz. That if either of his Executors die without Issue then the part or parts of him so dying shall go to the Survivor or Survivors equally to be divided John the youngest Grandson dyed without Issue and the question was whether the Reversion of his House shall be divided between his surviving Brothers or descend to his Heir And it was adjudged that the Exception in the Will did comprehend the Reversion in Fee and that it did not pass but without such an Exception it had passed * Allen 28. as where a Man devised his Mannor to another for years and part of other Lands to B. and his Heirs and all the rest of his Lands to his Brother in Tail it was held that by these words the Reversion of the Mannor did pass Anonymus NOTA. An Infant having entred into a Statute brought an Audita Querela to avoid it he was brought into the Court and two Witnesses were sworn to prove his Age and then his Appearance and Inspection were recorded he was bound in this Case with two other persons for 1600 l. and had no more than 200 l. for his share Lydcott versus Willows IN Ejectment A special Verdict was found viz. Devise of an Hereditament carries the Reversion in Fee that the Testator being seized in Fee of certain Houses in Bedfor-Bury and in Parker's Lane did by Will devise his Houses in Parker's Lane to charitable Vses then he gave several specifick Legacies to several persons named in the said Will and then he devised his Houses in Bedford-Bury to Edward Harris and Mary his Wife for their Lives then follow these words viz. The better to enable my Wife to pay my Legacies I give and bequeath to her and her Heirs all my Mesuages Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the Kingdom of England not before disposed of c. The Question was whether this Devise would carry the Reversion of the Houses in Bedford-Bury to his Wife Adjudged that it did not but that it ought to go to the Heir of the Testator who was Plaintiff in this Case It being found that Harris and his Wife were dead and that the Wife who was Executrix had sufficient Assets to pay the Legacies without the Reversion But Iustice Powel was of another Opinion for that the word Hereditament imports an Inheritance and if it had devised thus viz. the Inheritance not before disposed of the Reversion had passed Afterwards a Writ of Error was brought in the Exchequer-Chamber upon this Iudgment 2 Vent 285. and according to the Opinion of Iustice Powel the Iudgment was reversed Nota. A Rule of Court was made that no Certiorari should go to the Sessions of Ely without Motion in Court or signing of it by a Iudge in his Chamber But Mr. Pollexfen insisted that the Sessions there did not differ from other Courts and Franchises for the inferior Courts in London are of as large a Iurisdiction as any and yet a Certiorari goes to them and so it ought to go to Ely for 't is the Right of the Subject to remove his Cause hither Their course in the Royal Franchise of Ely is to hold the Sessions there twice a year viz. in March and September in which two Months the Iudges are seldom in Town and if this Court should deny a Certiorari the Court of Common Pleas would grant it Attorney General contra This Franchise of Ely is of greater Priviledge and Authority than any inferior Court for it hath many Regalia though 't is not a County Palatine A Certiorari will not lie to the Grand Sessions nor to a County Palatine to remove Civil Causes 't is true it lyeth to remove Indictments for Riots and this Franchise being truly called Royal hath equal priviledge with a County Palatine and therefore a Certiorari will not lie But no Rule was made Osborn versus Steward TRespass Distress for an Heriot where it may be taken The Case upon the Pleadings was this viz. A Lease was made of Land for 99 years if Margery and Dorothy Upton should so long live reserving a yearly Rent and an Heriot or 40 s. in lieu thereof after the death of either of them Provided that no Heriot shall be paid after the death of Margery living
3 Willielmi Judicium Iudgment was given for the Defendant absente Dolbin Iustice who was also of the same Opinion It was held that the Custom was well alledged both as to the manner and matter 't is true all Customs must have reasonable beginnings but it would be very difficult to assign a lawful commencement for such a Custom as this is so it would be for the Custom of Gavelkind or Burrough English which are circumscribed to particular places and since 't is sufficient to alledge a Custom by reason of the place where t is used it may be as reasonable in this Case to say that there hath been an ancient Ferry-Boat kept in this place 't is but only an inducement to the Custom which did not consist so much in having a Right to the Passage as to be discharged of Toll This might have a lawful beginning either by a Grant of the Lord to the Ancestors of the Defendant or by the agreement of the Inhabitants A Custom alledged for all the Occupiers of a Close in such a Parish to have a Foot-way Cro. Car. 419. Co. Lit. 110. b. Cro. Eliz. 746. 1 Roll. Rep. 216. c. is not good the reason is because the Plaintiff ought to prescribe in him who hath the Inheritance but where a thing is of necessity and no manner of profit or charge in the Soil of another but only a thing in discharge or for a Way to a Market or to be quit of Toll in such cases not only a particular person but the Inhabitaints of a Vill may alledge a Prescription This may be as well alledged as a Custom to turn a Plow upon another mans Land or for a Fisherman to mend his Nets there 'T is good as to the matter for 't is only an easment 't is like a Custom alledged for a Gateway or Watercourse and for such things Inhabitants of a Vill Cro. Eliz. 441. or all the Parishioners of a Parish may alledge a Custom or Vsage in the place 2. Point But as to the Plea in Bar 't is not good because the execting of a Bridge is but laying out a Way t is a voluntary act and no man by reason of his own act can be discharged of what he is to do upon the interest he hath in the Ferry If the Defendant had petitioned the King to destroy the Ferry and got a Patent to erect a Bridge and had brought a Writ ad quod dampnum and it had been found by inquisition to be no damage to the People then he might safely have built this Bridge 3. But notwithstanding the Plea is not good yet the Plaintiff can have no advantage of it because he cannot have an Action on the Case for this matter for by his own shewing 't is a common Passage Cro. Car. 132 167. 1 Inst 56. a. Cro. Eliz. 664. 13 Co. 33. Davis 57. which is no more than a common High-way now for disturbing him in such a Passage no Action on the Case will lie unless he had alledged some particular damage done to himself for if he could maintain such an Action any other person is entituled to the like and this would be to multiply Suits which the Law will not allow but hath provided a more apt and convenient remedy which is by presentment in the Leet If Toll had been extorted from him F. N. B. 94. 22 H. 6.12 then an Action on the Case had been the proper remedy but no such thing appeared upon this Declaration Prince 's Case THE Suggestion in a Prohibition was that Prince was seized of the Rectory of Shrewsby ut de feodo jure and that he being so seised de jure ought to present a Vicar to the said place but that the Bishop of the Diocess had of his own accord appointed a person thereunto This Exception was taken to it viz. He doth not say that he was Impropriator but only that he was seised of the Rectory in Fee so it not appearing that he had it Impropriate he ought no to present the Vicar Iustice Dolben replied That in several places in Middlesex the Abbots of Westminster did send Monks to say Mass and so the Vicaridges were not endowed but he put in and displaced whom he pleased That he had heard my Lord Chief Iustice Hales often say that the Abbot had as much reason to displace such Men as he had his Butler or other Servant Curia Declare upon the Prohibition and try the Cause Harrison versus Hayward Pasch 2 Gulielmi Rot. 187. AN Agreement was made to assign a Stock upon Request When a thing is to be done upon request the performance must be when the person requires it and the Defendant cannot plead that he was ready to assign after the promise made and for non-performance an Action was now brought setting forth the Agreement and that the Plaintiff did request the Defendant at such a time c. The Defendant pleaded that he was ready to assign the Stock after the promise made c. and upon a Demurrer it was ruled if the thing was not to be done upon Request then the Defendant was bound to do it in a convenient time after the promise but it being to be done upon request the time when the Plaintiff will require the performance of the Agreement is the time when the Defendant must do it Iudgment pro Quer. Thompson versus Leach WRit of Error upon a Iudgment in Ejectment given in the Common-Pleas Surrender not good without acceptance of the Surrendree 2 Vent 198. the Case upon the special Verdict was thus Viz. Simon Leach was Tenant for Life of the Lands in question with Remainder in contingency to his first second and third Son in Tail Male Remainder to Sir Simon Leach in Tail c. This Settlement was made by the Will of Nicholas Leach who was seised in Fee The Tenant for Life two months before he had a Son born did in the absence of Sir Simon Leach the Remainder man in Tail seal and deliver a Writing by which he did Grant Surrender and Release the Lands which he had for Life to the use of Sir Simon Leach and his Heirs and continued in possession five years afterwards and then and not before Sir Simon Leach did accept and agree to this Surrender and entred upon the Premisses But that about four years before he thus agreed to it Simon Leach the Tenant for Life had a Son born named Charles Lessor of the Plaintiff to whom the Remainder in contingency was thus limited The Tenant for Life died then Sir Simon Leach suffered a Common Recovery in order to bar those Remainders 1. The Question was whether this was a legal and good Surrender of the Premisses to vest the Freehold immediately in Sir Simon Leach without his Assent before Charles Leach the Son of Simon Leach the Surrenderor was born so as to make him a good Tenant to the Precipe upon which the Recovery was
first Son of the Body of the said Simon Leach my Brother lawfully to be begotten and to the Heirs Males of the Body of such first Son lawfully to be begotten with like Remainder in Tail Male to the second third fourth c. Sons and for default of such Issue to Sir Simon Leach my Kinsman being Son and Heir of Simon Leach of Cadley in the County of Devon ' Esquire deceased and to the Heirs Males of his Body lawfully to be begotten and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of me the said Nicholas Leach for ever They find that Nicholas Leach died without Issue that Simon Leach his Brother and Heir with Remainder over in Contingency as aforesaid entered and afterwards married Anne the Daughter of Unton Croke and that after the said Marriage viz. 20 August 25 Car. 2. he executed a Deed purporting a * Two months before a Son was born Surrender of the said Lands and Tenements to Sir Simon Leach in manner following viz. To all Christian People c. I Simon Leach of Elsefield in the County of Oxon Esquire send greeting Know ye that I the said Simon Leach for divers good Causes and valuable Considerations me hereunto moving have granted surrendred remised released and for ever quit claimed and confirmed and by these Presents do grant surrender remise release and for ever quit claim and confirm unto Sir Simon Leach of Cadley in the County of Devon Knight of the Bath and his Heirs and Assigns for ever all and every the Mannors c. To have and to hold the same to the said Sir Simon Leach for ever They find that Simon Leach Brother of the Testator was not compos mentis at the time of the sealing and delivery of the said Surrender That on the 10th day of November 25 Car. 2. which was two Months after this Surrender made the said Simon Leach had Issue of his Body Charles Leach who is his Son and Heir that he after the death of his Father entred and made a Lease to Tompson by vertue whereof he was possessed until the Defendant Sir Simon Leach entred upon him c. Two Questions were made upon this Special Verdict 1. Whether this Surrender by a person Non compos mentis was void ab initio and so could pass no Estate to the Surrendree for if so then though the Ideot himself is estopped by his own Act yet that can be no Barr to him in the Remainder because the Act being void the Estate in Law still remains in him 2. If it is not void in its self then whether it is voidable after the death of the Party by Charles Leach he claiming by virtue of a collateral Remainder and not as Heir at Law to the Devisor As to the first Point it was argued that the Cases of Lunaticks and Infants go hand in hand and that the same Reasons govern both that the Law is clear that a Surrender made by an Infant is void therefore a Surrender made by a person Non compos mentis is also void Fleta lib. 1. c. 11. num 10. the reason is because they know not how to govern themselves And as Fleta saith Semper judicabuntur infra aetatem F.N.B. 202. a. Regist 238. b. if he makes any Conveyance of his Land the Law hath provided a remedial Writ even for himself to avoid his own Alienation His Feoffments are void 39 H. 6.42 Bract. fol. 12. no. 5. fol. 100 120. Brit. cap. 34. fol. 88. Perk. 5. pl. 21. and if Warranties are annexed those they are also void if he granteth a Rent-Charge out of his Land that is likewise void and if the Grantee should distrain for this Rent after the death of the Grantor his Heir shall have an Action of Trespas against him and therefore by parity of Reason this Surrender must be void In Fitzherbert Tit. Grantee pl. 80. there is a Case to this purpose viz. An Assize was brought against the Tenant supposing that he had no right of Entry unless under a Disseisor by whom the Brother of the Demandant was disseised The Tenant pleaded that the supposed Disseisor was the Father of the Demandant whose Heir he then was and that his said Father made a Feoffment of the Land to the Tenant with Warranty and demanded Iudgment c. The Demandant replied that his Father at that time was Non compos mentis and the Tenant was compelled to rejoin and take Issue upon the Insanity which shews that if he was Non compos he could not have made such a Feoffment So if he maketh a Feoffment in Fee and afterwards taketh back an Estate for Life Fitz. Remitter pl. 23. the Non compos shall be remitted to his ancient Title which shews likewise that such Feoffment was void for the Remitter supposeth a former Right 'T is incongruous to say that Acts done by persons of no discretion shall be good and valid in the Law such are Infants and Lunaticks and it stands with great reason that what they do should be void especially when it goes to the destruction of their Estates Therefore 't is held that if a person Non compos releaseth his right that shall not barr the King in his Life time but he shall seize the Land and if he die his Heir may bring the Writ Dum non fuit compos mentis and may enter 'T is for this reason that a Release made by an Infant Executor is no barr because it works in destruction of his Interest 5 Co. 27. Russel 's Case 34 Ass pl. 10. the reason is the same where a person Non compos maketh a Feoffment for that likewise destroys his Estate So likewise an Infant can neither surrender a future Interest by his acceptance of a new Lease Cro. Car. 502. nor make an absolute Surrender of a Term of which he is possessed for such a Surrender by Deed is void 'T is agreed that if a Man Non compos maketh a Feoffment by Letter of Attorny 't is meerly void because 't is not delivered to the Feoffee by the hands of the Feoffor but 't is said that if it be delivered by him in person then 't is only voidable at any time by Action or Entry Finch 's Law 102. And of this Opinion was Sir Henry Finch in his Discourse of the Law who in the Margen of his Book quotes several Authorities in the Year Books to justifie this Opinion and amongst the rest he cites Sir Anthony Fitzherberts Natura Brevium 35 Ass pl. 10. who taking notice of the old Authorities seems to reject their Reasons who affirm a person Non compos shall not avoid his own Act when he recovers his memory because he cannot then tell what he did when he was in his former Condition But certainly when he recovers his Iudgment he is then of Ability to consider what was done during his Insanity and to avoid such Acts by shewing how his indisposition came by the
not avoid such Acts done by their Ancestors as well as Privies in Blood because the Incapacity of the Grantor goes to both Those who argued on the other side held that the Acts of Infants and persons non compos were not void in themselves but only voidable E contra 'T is true some Deeds made by an Infant are void not meerly Cro. Car. 502. because executed by him for some are good and those only are void which are made to his prejudice Such also are void which give Authority to a third person to do an Act as if an Infant enter into a Bond Perk. Sect. 139. March 141. and give it to a Stranger to deliver to the Obligee when he shall attain his full Age this is void because the person derived his Authority from an Infant who by reason of his Nonage could not give such a Power but if the Infant himself had delivered the Bond to the Obligee it had been only voidable Lit. Sect. 259. The Father of the Demandant was an Infant when he sold his Estate 46 E. 3.34 his Son brought the Writ Dum fuit infra-aetatem against the Alienee and it was held good which would not have been allowed if the Grant had been void All the old Authorities prove that the Acts of Infants and Ideots are not void but voidable If an Infant is bound in an Obligation 't is not void Cro. Eliz. 127. 2 Inst 483. for he may agree to it when of Age he cannot plead Non est factum and he may refuse to plead his Infancy If he be entituled to a Term for years Cro. Eliz. 126. Cro. Car. 502. and maketh a Surrender by the acceptance of a new Lease 't is good if 't is for his advantage either by the lessening of the Rent or the encreasing of the Term but if he hath no benefit by it 't is voidable only So he may purchase Lands because the Law intends it for his benefit and he can receive no damage by such a Purchase for he may either perfect or avoid it at his full Age which shews that such Acts are not voidable ab intio but only voidable as the Case shall require The Statute of 23 H. 6. Enacts 23 H. 6. c. 10. That Sheriffs shall take no Bonds upon an Arrest but for the Appearance of the Party and to themselves only and that a Bond otherwise taken colore officii shall be void that is not in its self but by pleading the Statute for 't is not to be avoided by pleading Non est factum So upon the Statute of Additions 1 H. 5. c. 5. 3 Co. 59. a. where a Man is outlawed without the addition of his condition or place of abode in the original Writ such Outlawry shall be void not of its self but it may be avoided by Writ of Error In like manner there are many Authorities to prove that the Acts of a person non compos are not void but voidable So is the first Resolution in Beverly 's Case that a Deed or Feoffment made by him is to be avoided by any other person but not by himself Thus stood the Law in the time of E. 35 Ass pl. 10. 3. For in an Assize the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff had released to him by Deed who replied that at the time of the making of the Deed he was Non compos The Court of Common Pleas seemed then to be of Opinion that the Replication was not good which shews that the Deed in its self was not void 't is true the Assize was then adjourned because that Opinion was directly against the Register which is that the Writ of Dum non fuit compos may be brought by the person himself notwithstanding his own Alienation But this hath since been denied to be Law Cro. Eliz. 398. for in Debt upon Bond the Defendant pleaded that he was Non compos and upon a Demurrer the Plea was over-ruled And of this Opinion was Sir William Herle Chief Iustice of the Common Pleas in 5 E. 5 E. 3.70 3. which was long before the Book of Assize So the Law continued till the Reign of H. 35 H. 6. f. 42. 6. viz. that the person himself could not avoid his own Feoffment either by Entry or Action The Writs de Ideota inquirendo and Dum non fuit compos import the same thing viz. that Acts done by them are not void for the first recites that the Ideot alienavit and the other that the Lunatick * Dimisit is there intended where the Estate is conveyed by Livery or for life and Alienavit is a Conveiance by Feoffment 17 E. 2. Stamf. Praerog 34. Dimisit terras Now if their Acts had been void ab initio then they cannot be supposed either to alien or lease their Lands which shews that such Acts are only voidable And as a farther Argument to enforce this the Statute de Praerogativa Regis was mentioned which gives the Custody of the Ideots Lands to the King during their Lives provided that afterwards it be given to their right Heirs ita quod nullatenus per eofdem fatuos alienetur Now to what purpose were these Words added if such an Alienation was void in it self Besides the Cases of Ideots mentioned on the other side and Lunaticks are not parellel for an Ideot hath a different incapacity from one Non compos 't is perpetual in an Ideot and for that reason the Law gives the King an Interest in him But a person non compos may recover his Senses Co. Lit. 2. b. Fitz. tit Issue 53. he may purchase Lands may grant a Rent-charge out of his Estate and shall not plead his insanity to defeat his own act If therefore this Surrender was not void at the time of the execution thereof but voidable only during the Life of the Surrenderor by office found then the Question cannot properly be whether the Lessor of the Plaintiff shall avoid it for that would be to revest the Estate in some body but the Surrender was good and the Estate for Life was utterly determined so that nothing being left to support the contingent Remainders those are also destroied And to prove this Chudleigh 's Case was relied on which was Co. 120. Sir R. C. was seised in Fee of the Manor of Hescot in Devon and having Issue Christopher and three other Sons made a Feoffment to the use of himself and his Heirs on the Body of Mary then the Wife of Mr. Carew to be begotten and for default of such Issue then to the use of his last Will c. for ten years and after the Expiration of that Term then to his Feoffees and their Heirs during the Life of Christopher Remainder to the Issue Male of Christopher in Tail with like Remainder to his other Sons Remainder to his own right Heirs He died without Issue by Mrs. Carew But before Christopher had any Son born the
said Feoffees made a Feoffment of the Land in Fee without any consideration afterwards Christopher had Issue two Sons Now the Vses limited by the Feoffment of Sir R. C. being only contingent to the Sons of Christopher and they not being born when the second Feoffment was made to their Father the Question now was whether they shall be destroied by that Feoffment before the Sons had a Being in Nature or whether they shall arise out of the Estate of the Feoffees after their Births And it was adjudged in the Exchequer Chamber that the last Feoffment had divested all the precedent Estates and likewise the Vses whilst they were contingent and before they had an existence and that if the Estate for Life which Christopher had in those Lands had been determined by his death before the birth of any Son the future Remainder had been void because it did not vest whilst the particular Estate had a being or eo instanti that it determined So in this Case Mr. Leach cannot have any future Right of Entry for he was not born when the Surrender was made so that the contingency is for ever gone Suppose a Feoffment in Fee to the use of himself and his Wife and to the Heirs of the Survivor The Husband afterwards makes another Feoffment of the same Lands Cro. Car. 102. and dies and the Wife enters the Fee shall not vest in her by this Entry for she had no right the Husband has destroyed the contingent use by the last Feoffment so that it could not accrew to her at the time of his death Nay tho' the particular Estate in some Cases may revive yet if the contingency be once destroyed it shall never arise again As where the Testator being seized in Fee of Houses 2 Sand. 380. devised the inheritance thereof to such Son his Wife should have after her Life if she baptized him by his Christian and Sir-Name and if such Son dye before he attain the Age of 21 years then to the right Heirs of the Devisor He died without Issue the Widow married again then the Brother and Heir of the Testator before the birth of any Son conveyed the Houses thus Viz. To the Husband and Wife and to their Heirs and levied a Fine to those uses Afterwards she had a Son baptised by the Testator's Christian and Sir-Name Then the Husband and Wife sold the Houses to one Weston and his Heirs and levied a Fine to those Vses It was adjudged that by the Conveyance of the Reversion by the Brother and Heir of the Testator to the Baron and Feme before the Birth of the Son her Estate for Life was merged and tho' by reason of her Coverture she might waive the Joint-tenancy 2 Roll. Abr. 796. Wigg versus Villiers and reassume the Estate for Life yet that being once merged the contingent Remainders are all destroied Curia Cro. Car. 502. The Grants of Infants and of persons non compos are parallel both in Law and Reason and there are express Authorities that a Surrender made by an Infant is void therefore this Surrender by a person non compos is likewise void If an Infant grants a Rent-charge out of his Estate 't is not voidable but ipso facto void for if the Grantee should distrain for the Rent the Infant may have an Action of Trespass against him In all these Cases which have been cited where 't is held that the Deeds of Infants are not void but voidable the meaning is that non est factum cannot be pleaded because they have the form though not the Operations of Deeds and therefore are not void upon that account without shewing some special matter to make them of no efficacy Therefore if an Infant maketh a Letter of Attorny though 't is void in it self yet it shall not be avoided by pleading non est factum but by shewing his Infancy Some have endeavoured to distinguish between a Deed which giveth only authority to do a thing and such which conveys an interest by the delivery of the Deed it self that the first is void and the other voidable But the reason is the same to make them both void only where a Feoffment is made by an Infant 't is voidable because of the solemnity of the Conveyance Now if Simon Leach had made a Feoffment in Fee there had still remained in him such a Right which would have supported this Remainder in Contingency This Surrender is therefore void and all persons may take advantage of it Afterwards a Writ of Error was brought to reverse this Iudgment in the House of Lords but it was affirmed Cases Adj. 150. Hall versus Wybank THE Statute of Limitations is Statute of Limitations whether it extendeth to the Defendant being beyond Sea six years 21 Jac. cap. 16. that if any person be entituled to an Action and shall be an Infant Feme Covert Imprisoned or beyond Sea that then he shall bring the Action at full Age Discovert of saue Memory at large and returned from beyond Sea The Plaintiff brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit to which the Defendant pleaded non assumpsit infra sex Annos The Plaintiff replied that the Defendant was all that time beyond Sea so that he could not prosecute any Writ against him c. And upon a Demurrer Serjeant Tremaine argued that the Plaintiff was not barred by the Statute which was made to prevent Suits by limiting personal Actions to be brought within a certain time and it cannot be extended in favour of the Defendant who was a Debtor and beyond Sea because 't is incertain whether he will return or not and therefore there is no occasion to begin a Suit till his return 'T is true the Plaintiff may file an Original and Outlaw the Defendant and so seise his Estate but no Man is compelled by Law to do an act which is fruitless when 't is done and such this would be for if the Plaintiff should file an Original 't is probable the Defendant may never return and then if the Debt was 1000 l. or upwards he would be at a great Expence to no purpose or if the Party should return he may reverse it by Error 'T is a new way invented for the payment of Debts for if the Debtors go beyond Sea and stay there six years their Debts would by this means be all paid The words of the Statute do not extend to this Case for the Proviso is That if the Plaintiff be beyond Sea when the cause of Action doth accrew Cro. Car. 246. 333. that then he have shall liberty to continue it at his return yet 't is within the equity of Law for him to bring his Action when the Defendant returns who cannot be sued 'till then That Statutes have been expounded according to Equity is not now a new Position 2 Roll. Rep. 318. for Constructions have been made according to the sense and meaning and not according to the Letter of many Statutes
eldest Son for sixty years if he so long lived Remainder to Thomas for Life and that John made a Lease to the Plaintiff for a year The Defendant replied that after the Devise R. Frances made a Feoffment in Fee of the same Lands amongst others to the use of himself for Life Then as to the other Lands to divers Vses contained in the Deed but as to those Lands in which the Distress was taken to the same Vses as in the Will in which Conveyance there was this Priviso That if John should disturb his Executors in the quiet Enjoyment c. or if he shall not suffer them to carry away the Goods in his House then the Uses limited to him should be void He did hinder the Executors to carry away the Goods yet it was adjudged that he should keep his Estate because being a Stranger to the Feoffment he shall not lose it without notice of the Proviso But in answer to that Case notice was not the principal matter of that Iudgment it turned upon a point in Pleading for the Avowant had not shewed any special act of disturbance and a bare denial without doing any more was held to be no breach of the Condition Some other Authorities may be cited to prove notice necessary Green's Case 6 Co. 24. as where Tenant for Life of a Mannor to which an Advowson was appendant did in the year 1594. present Durston who neglecting to read the Articles was deprived nine years afterwards by the Ordinary at the Suit of the Patron who presented him who also dyed two years after the Deprivation then the Queen presented by Lapse whose Presentee was inducted and six years afterwards Durston dyed after whose death he in Remainder presented Green now though the Patron was a Party to the Suit of Deprivation and thereby had sufficient notice that the Church was vacant yet it was adjudged that a Lapse should not incurr but only after notice given by the Ordinary himself and not by any other person whatsoever But this Case may receive this Answer viz. That notice had not been necessary at Law but it was provided by a particular Act of Parliament 13 Eliz. ca. 12. that no Title by Lapse shall accrue upon any deprivation but after six months notice thereof given by the Ordinary himself to the Patron 'T is true the Law is very tender in divesting the Rights of the Subject but where an Estate is created by the Act of the Party and restrained by particular limitations without any appointment of notice there the Law will not add notice and make it necessary because the person who made such a disposition of his Estate might have given it upon what conditions he pleased Therefore it may seem hard that this Estate should be determined by the neglect or omission of the Trustees to give notice of this Proviso but 't is apparent that it was the intent of the Father it should be so for by this Limitation the Estate is bound in the Hands of an Infant the reason is because there is a Privity between an Heir and an Ancestor and therefore the Heir is bound to take notice of such Conditions which his Ancestor hath imposed on the Estate 2. This Estate is determined by the Marriage of the Daughter with Mr. Villiers because there is an express Limitation in the Deed for that very purpose she is enjoyned to marry a Fitzgerald or one who should take upon him that name which is still more extensive and she having neglected to do the one and her Husband having refused to do the other the Aunt in Remainder shall take advantage of this Non-performance And 't is this Remainder over which makes it a Limitation 1 Ventr 202. Owen 112. Goldsb 152. Lit. Sect. 723. for if it had been a Condition then the intent of the Father had been utterly defeated for none but the Heir at Law can enter for the breach of a Condition and such was Katharine in this Case The Proviso in this Deed depends upon another Sentence immediately going before 2 Co. 70. to which it hath reference and then by the express resolution in Cromwel's Case 't is a Limitation or Qualification of the Estate and not a Condition which Estate is now determined without Entry or Claim It was argued that in this Case three things are to be considered E contra 1. The Nature of the Proviso 2. That Notice is absolutely necessary 3. That the Notice given was not sufficient being not such as is required by Law As to the 1st The very nature of this Proviso is condemned by the Civil Law and because it works the destruction of Estates it hath never been favoured at the Common Law All Conditions to restrain Marriage generally are held void by both Laws so likewise are such which restrain people from marrying without the consent of particular persons because they may impose such hard terms before they give their consent that may hinder the Marriage it self and therefore a bare request of such without their subsequent assent has been always allowed to preserve the Estate 2. And which was the principal Point Notice in this Case is absolutely necessary both by the intent of the Father and by the construction of the Law There are three things of which the Law makes an equal Interpretation viz. Uses Wills and Acts of Parliament in which if the intention of the Parties and of the Law makers can be discerned the Cases which severally fall under the direction of either shall be governed by the intention without respect to the disagreeing words nay sometimes the Law will supply the defect of words themselves The Books are full of Authorites where Constructions have been made of Acts of Parliament according to the intent of the Makers and not according to the Letter of the Law As in Eyston and Stud's Case in the Commentaries Plowd Com. 2 pt 463. where the Husband and Wife levyed a Fine of the Lands of the Wife and declared the Vses to their Heirs in Tail the Remainder to the Heirs of the Wife they had Issue and the Husband died the Widow married a second Husband and he and his Wife join in a second Fine and declared the Vses thereof to themselves for Life the Remainder to the Husband and his Heirs for sixty years the Remainder in Tail to their Issue the Remainder to the Heirs of the Wife the Issue of the first Husband entred supposing the Estate had been forfeited by the Statute of H. 7. 11 H. 7. c. 20. which Enacts That if a Woman hath an Estate in Dower or in Tail jointly with her Husband or to her self of the Inheritance or Purchase of him and she doth either sole or with another Husband discontinue it shall be void and he in the Remainder may enter Now this Case was directly within the words of the Statute for the Woman had an Estate Tail in possession jointly with her first Husband
shall not alien or sell the Lands given to her from the Heirs Male of her Body lawfully to be begotten but to remain upon default of such Issue to W. and the Heirs Males of his Body to be begotten according to the true intent and meaning of this my Will Dorothy Hopkins had Issue Richard who had Issue Henry who had Issue a Daughter now the Defendant The Question was Whether the Son of Dorothy did take an Estate Tail by this Will to him and to the Heirs of his Body in general or an Estate in Tail Male This Case was argued in Michaelmas Term 36 Car. II. And in the same Term a year afterwards by Council on both sides Those who argued for the Plaintiff held that the Son had an Estate in Tail Male and this seems plain by the intention of the Testator that if Dorothy had Issue Daughters they should have no benefit for no provision is made for any such by the Will and therefore the Daughter of her Son can have no Estate who is more remote to the Testator This is like the Case of Conveyances Turnam vers Cooper 2 Cro. 476. Poph. 138. id 25 Ass pl. 14. wherein the Habendum explains the generality of the precedent words as if Lands be given to Husband and Wife and to their Heirs habendum to them and the Heirs of their Bodies Remainder to them and the Survivor to hold of the chief Lord with Waranty to them and their Heirs this is an Estate Tail with a Feé expectant So it is here tho' the first words in the Will extend to Heirs which is general yet in the Memorandum 't is particular to Heirs Males and the words Heirs and Issues are of the same signification in a Will The Memorandum is a confirmation of the Will Ex parte Def. and the construction which hath been made of it is not only inconsistent with the Rules of Law but contrary to the intent of the Testator and against the express words of his Will Cases upon Wills are different from those which arise upon Deeds because in Conveyances subsequent words may be explanatory of the former but in Wills the first words of the Testator do usually guide those which follow As if Land be devised for Life Dyer 171 a. 1 And. 8. id Golds 16. Moor 593. Remainder to F. and the Heirs Males of his Body and if it happen that he dye without Heirs not saying Males the Remainder over in Tail this was held not to be a general Tail but an Estate in Tail Male therefore the Daughter of F. could not inherit Now to construe this to be an Estate Tail Male doth not only alter the Estate of the Sons of Dorothy but of the Issue of W. and nothing is mentioned in this Memorandum of the Limitation over to Jones so that the whole Will is altered by it But this Memorandum cannot enlarge the Estate of Dorothy because 't is inconsistent with the intention of the Testator who gave her only an Estate for Life by the Will but if she should have an Estate Tail she might by Fine and Recovery bar it and so alien it contrary to his express words Besides there is no Estate limited to Dorothy by this Memorandum and she having an express Estate for Life devised to her by the Will it shall never be enlarged by such doubtful words which follow As where a Man had 100 Acres of Land 2 Leon. 226. Moor 593. called by a particular Name and usually occupied with a House which House he lett to S. with 40 Acres parcel of that Land and then devised the House and all the Lands called by that particular Name c. to his Wife Adjudged she should only have the House and the 40 Acres and that the Devise shall not be extended by implication to the other sixty Acres So that to make the design of this Will and Memorandum to be consistent the latter words must be construed only to illustrate the meaning of the Testator in the former Paragraph of the Will and must be taken as a farther declaration of his intention Viz. that the Heirs Males mentioned in the Memorandum is only a description of the Persons named in the Will The Law doth usually regard the intention of the Testator and will not imply any contradictions in his Bequests The Court was of Opinion that it was a plain Case Judicium for in the Limitation 't is clear that 't is a general Tail and it doth not follow that the Testator did not design any thing for his Grandaughters because no provision was made for Daughters For where an Estate is entailed upon the Heirs of a Man's Body if he hath a Son and a Daughter and the Son hath Issue a Daughter the Estate will go to her and not to the Aunt Now this Memorandum doth not come to make any alteration in the Limitation because it directs that the Estate shall go according to the true intent and meaning of the Will and is rather like a Proviso than an Habendum in a Deed. And therefore Iudgment was given accordingly for the Defendant DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Hicks versus Gore ON Tuesday the 17th day of November there was a Trial at the Barr by a Somerset-Shire Iury in Ejectment The Case was thus The Plaintiff claimed the Lands by virtue of the Statute of 4 5 Ph. Mar. cap. 8. by which 't is enacted That it shall not be lawful for any person to take away any Maid or Woman Child unmarried and within the Age of sixteen years from the Parents or Guardian in Soccage and that if any Woman Child or Maiden being above the Age of twelve years and under the Age of sixteen do at any time assent or agree to such person that shall make any Contract of Matrimony contrary to the Form of the Act that then the next of Kin of such Woman Child or Maid to whom the Inheritance should descend return or come after the decease of the same Woman Child or Maid shall from the time of such Assent and Agreement have hold and enjoy all such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments as the said Woman Child or Maid had in Possession Reversion or Remainder at the time of such Assent and Agreement during the Life of such person that shall so contract Matrimony and after the decease of such person so contracting Matrimony that then the said Land c. shall descend revert remain and come to such person or persons as they should have done in case this Act had never been made other than him only that so shall contract Matrimony Benjamin Tibboth being seised in Fee of the Lands in question to the value of 700 l. per annum had Issue a Son and four Daughters the Son had Issue Ruth his only Daughter who was married to the Defendant Gore her Father died in the time of her Grandfather and her Mother
day of Appearance he is to see that he appear at the day either by keeping of him in Custody or letting of him to Bail the end of the Arrest is to have his Body here If he had not been bailed then he had still remained in Custody and the Plaintiff would have his proper remedy but being once let to Bail and not appearing in Court according to the Condition of the Bond that seems to be the fault of the Defendant who had his Body before the day of Appearance Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Serjeant Hampson's Case BY the Statute of Queen Elizabeth 't is Enacted 5 Eliz. c. 23. That if the person excommunicated have not a sufficient Addition or if 't is not contained in the Significavit that the Excommunication proceeds for some cause or contempt or of some original Matter of Heresie refusing to have his Child baptized to receive the Sacrament to come to Divine Service or Errors in Matters of Religion or Doctrine Incontinency Usury Simony Perjury in the Ecclesiastical Court or Idolatry he shall not incurr the Penalties in the Act. Serjeant Hampson was excommunicated for Alimony and now Mr. Girdler moved that he might be discharged because none of the aforesaid Causes were contained in the Significavit Curia He may be discharged of the Forfeiture for that reason but not of the Excommunication Anonymus ONE who was outlawed for the Murder of Sir Edmund Bury Godfrey now brought a Writ of Error in his Hand to the Bar praying that it might be read and allowed It was read by Mr. Astry Clerk of the Crown The Errors assigned were viz. That it did not appear upon the Return of the Exigent in the first Exact ' that the Court was held pro Comitatu That the Outlawry being against him and two other persons 't is said in the last Exact ' that Non comperuit but doth not say nec eorum aliquis comperuit For these Reasons the Outlawry was reversed and he held up his Hand at the Barr and pleaded Not-guilty to his Indictment and was admitted to Bail and afterwards he was brought to his Trial and no Witness in behalf of the King appearing against him he was acquitted The Mayor and Commonalty of Norwich versus Johnson A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given for the Plaintiff in the Common-Pleas in an Action of Waste Waste lies against an Executor de son tort of a Term. The Declaration was that the Plaintiff demised a Barn to one Took for a certain Term by vertue whereof he was possessed and being so possessed died that the Defendant was his Executor who entred and made Waste by pulling down of the said Barn The Defendant pleaded that Took died intestate and that he did not administer The Plaintiff replyed that he entred as Executor of his own Wrong and to this Plea the Defendant demurred and the Plaintiff joined in the Demurrer This Case was argued by Mr. Appleton of Lincolns-Inn for the Plaintiff who said That an Action of Waste would not lie against the Defendant because the Mayor and Commonalty c. had a remedy by an Assise to recover the Land upon which the Barn stood and a Trover to recover the Goods or Materials and that such an Action would not lie against him at the Common Law because he neither was Tenant by the Curtesie nor in Dower against whom Waste only lay So that if the Plaintiff is entituled to this Action it must be by vertue of the Statute of Gloucester 6 Ed. 1. c. 5. but it will not lie against the Defendant even by that Statute because the Action is thereby given against the Tenant by the Curtesie in Dower for Life or Years and treble Damages c. But the Defendant is neither of those and this being a penal Law which not only gives treble damages but likewise the Recovery of the place wasted ought therefore not to be taken strictly but according to Equity Tenants at sufferance or at Will by Elegit or Tenants by Statute Staple 11 H. 6. c. 5. and also Pernors of Profits were never construed to be within this Statute and therefore a particular Act was made to give him in Reversion an Action of Waste where Tenant for life or years had granted over their Estates and yet took the Profits and committed Waste Then the Question will be Co. Lit. 371. what Estate this Executor de sontort hath gained by his Entry And as to that he argued that he had got a Fee-simple by Disseisin and that for this reason the Plaintiff was barred from this Action for if the Son purchase Lands in Fee and is disseised by his Father who maketh a Feoffment in Fee to another with Warranty and dieth the Son is for ever barred for though the Disseisin was not done with any intention to make such a Feoffment 1 Roll. Abr. 662. yet he is bound by this Alienation So where a man made a Lease for life and died and then his Heir suffered a Recovery of the same Land without making an actual Entry this is an absolute Disseisin because the Lessee had an Estate for life but if he had been Tenant at Will it might be otherwise But admitting that the Defendant is not a Disseisor then the Plaintiffs must bring their Case to be within the Statute of Gloucester as that he is either Tenant for life or years If he is Tenant for Life he must be so either by right or by wrong He cannot be so by right because he had no lawful Conveyance made to him of this Estate besides 't is quite contrary to the Pleading which is that he entred wrongfully Neither can he be so by wrong for such particular Estates 6 Co. 25. as for life or years cannot be gained by Disseisin and so is Heliar's Case in 6 Co. Then if this should be construed an Estate for years it must be gained either by the Act of the Party or by the Act of the Law but such an Estate cannot be gained by either of those means First it cannot be gained by the Act of the Party Moor 126. Kendrick versus Burges because an Executor de son tort cannot have any interest in a Term and for this there is an express Authority in this Court which was thus viz. A Lease in Reversion for years was granted to a man who died intestate his Wife before she had administred sold this Term to the Defendant and afterwards she obtained Letters of Administration and made a Conveiance of the same Term to the Plaintiff and Iudgment was given for the last Vendee because it was in the case of a Reversion of a Term for years upon which no Entry could be made and of which there could be no Executor de son tort though it was admitted by the Court that such an Executor might make a good sale of
the Fine and Non-claim the Substance of which was That Robert Basket was seized in Fee of the Lands in Question who by Will devised it to Philip Basket and others for 99 years with power to grant Estates for the payment hf the Debts and Legacies of the Testator the Remainder in Tail to John Basket his Brother but that if he gave Security to pay the said Debts and Legacies or should pay the same within a time limited that then the Trustees should assign the Term to him c. John Basket entred after the death of his Brother with the assent of the said Trustees and received the Profits and paid all the Legacies and all the Debts but 18 l. The Iury find that John had Issue a Daughter only by his first Wife after whose death he married another Woman and levied a Fine and made a Settlement in consideration of that Marriage upon himself for Life and upon his Wife for Life with divers Remainders over that he died without Issue by his second Wife who entred and five years were past without any claim c. And now the Heir at Law in the name of the Trustees brought this Action The Questions were 1. Whether the Term for 99 years thus devised to the Trustees was bound by this Fine and Nonclaim or not 2. Whether it was divested and turned to a Right at the time of the Fine levied For if it was not then the Fine could not operate upon it It was agreed that as a Disseisin is to a Freehold so is a divesting to a Term and that a Fine and Non-claim is no Barr but where the Party at the time of the levying thereof had a Will to enter and when the Estate of which 't is levyed is turned to a Right That in the Case at the Barr the Entry of John Basket was tortious because the legal Estate was still in the Trustees But if he had gained any Right by his Entry 't is only a Tenancy at Will to them for they took notice of the Devise and he entred by their consent and such a Right is not assignable and then a Fine levyed is no Barr. To prove this 9 Co. 106. Margaret Prodger's Case was cited where the the Lord granted a Copyhold to John Elizabeth and Mary for their Lives and afterwards by Deed enrolled sold the Land to John in Fee and levyed a Fine to him and his Heirs c. and five years passed without any Claim John dyed his Son entred and levyed another Fine to Trustees to the use of himself and Margaret his Wife for Life the Remainder to his own right Heirs the Son died and his Wife survived who having a Freehold for Life distrained and the Husband of Elizabeth brought a Replevin It was adjudged that this Fine and Nonclaim did not barr those in Remainder becase the Bargain and Sale to John did not divest their Estate and turn it to a Right for the Lord did what he might do and John accepted what he might lawfully take who being in possession by virtue of a particular Estate for Life could not by this acceptance divest the Estate of her who had the Freehold and the Fine and Nonclaim could not do it for to what purpose should he make any Claim when he was in actual possession of the thing to be demanded And he who is so in possession need not make any Claim either to avoid a Fine or a collateral Warranty Now though at the Common Law there must be Livery and Seisin to create an Estate of Freehold 3 Co. Fermer 's Case yet any thing is sufficient to make an Estate at Will in which neither the Inheritance or the Title of the Land is concerned and therefore a Fine levyed by such a Tenant is no Barr. 'T is true Sid. 458. Freeman versus Barns if a Lease be made for an hundred years in Trust to attend the Inheritance and Cestuy que Trust continues in possession and devises to another for fifty years and levies a Fine and the five years pass without Claim he being still in possession after the first Lease made is thereby become Tenant at Will and by making the second Lease the other is divested and turned to a Right though he was not a Disseisor and so 't is barred by the Fine because the Cestuy que Trust of the term of one hundred years was also Owner of the Inheritance But in the Case at the Barr John shall not be a Disseisor but at the Election of the Trustees of the Term of 99 years to prove which there are many Authorities in the Books As if Tenant at Will make a Lease for years and the Lessee enters Latch 53. 1 Leon. 121. Lit. Sect. 588. 't is not a Disseisin but at the Election of him who hath the Freehold and even in such Case if the Tenant of the Freehold should make a Grant of the Land 't is good though not made upon the Land it self for he shall not be taken to be out of possession but at his own Election 'T is like the common Case of a Mortgagee for years where the Mortgagor continues in possession twenty years afterwards and pays the Interest and in that time hath made Leases and levyed a Fine this shall not barr the Mortgagee for the Mortgagor is but Tenant at Will to him The Trustees need not make any claim in this Case because there was no transmutation of the possession so they could take no notice of the Fine 'T is true John Basket entred by their consent but still as Tenant at Will to them and the Acts done by him after his Entry will not didest this Term for though he made a Bargain and Sale of the Lands yet nothing will pass thereby but what of right ought to pass He likewise demised the Lands to Vndertenants for years but 't is not found that they entred but admitting they did enter yet that could not displace this Term for these Tenants claimed no more than for one or two years and made no pretence to the whole Term. But if by either of these Acts the Term should be divested yet still it must be at the election of those who have the Interest in it Dyer 61 62 173. The Case of * Cro. Car. 302. 1 Rol. Abr. 661. Blunden and Baugh which is grounded upon Littleton's Text Sect. 588. is an Authority to this purpose which was The Father was Tenant in Tail and his Son was Tenant at Will who made a Lease for years then both Father and Son join in a Fine to the use of the Son for Life and to Elizabeth his Wife for Life the Remainder to the Heirs Males of the Body of the Son who died without Issue Male the Lessee being in possession made a Conveyance of the Estate by Bargain and Sale to Charles Lord Effingham who was Son and Heir of the Tenant in Tail who made a Lease to the Plaintiff who was ousted by the
Dorothy Margery survived and is since dead The Question was whether upon this Reservation the Beast of any person being upon the Land may be distreined for an Heriot Mr. Pollexfen argued that it could not because the words in the Reservation ought to be taken very strictly and not to be carryed farther than the plain expression Where words are doubtful they have been always expounded against the Lessor Cro. Eliz. 217. 2 Roll. Abr. 448. Latch 99. as if a Lease be made for years reserving a Rent durante termino to the Lessor his Executors or Assigns the Lessor dies his Heir shall not have the Rent because 't is reserved to the Executors But here is no room for any doubt upon these words for if a Lease for years be made in which there is a Covenant that the Lessee shall pay the Rent without any other words this determines upon the death of the Lessee So where a Lease was made for 99 years if A. B. C. 2 Rol. Abr. 451. Hetley 58. Cro. Car. 314. or any of them should so long live reserving Rent to him and his Executors and also at or upon the death of either his or their best Beast in the name of an Heriot provided that if B. or C. die living A. no Heriot shall be paid after their deaths A. assigns his Term and the Beast of the Assignee was taken for an Heriot but adjudged that it could not for the words his or their shall not be carried farther than to the persons named in the Limitation The Books that affirm that a Man may seize for an Heriot Service cannot be brought as Authorities in this Case because they are all upon Tenures between Lord and Tenant and not upon particular Reservations as this is The old Books say that if a Tenant by Fealty and Heriot-Service Broke tit Heriot 2. made his Executor and died that the Lord might seize the best Beast of his Tenant in the Hands of the Executor and if he could not find any Beast then he might distrain the Executor Plo. Com. 95. and the reason of this seizure was because immediately upon the death of the Tenant a Property was vested in the Lord but it was held always unreasonable to put him to distrain when he might seise And it is now held that for Heriot-Service the Lord may either distrain or seise but then if he makes a seisure Cro. Car. 260. Jones 300. it must be the very Beast of the Tenant but if he distrain he may take any persons Cattle upon the Land So that admitting this to be Law yet it proves nothing to this matter because such Services being by Tenure shall not be extended to those which are created within time of memory upon particular reservations for by those ancient Tenures the Lords had many Priviledges which cannot be upon Reservations Besides the seisures in those Cases were by the Lords who continued so to be at the very time of the seisure but in our Case the Lease is determined by the death of the last Life so the Priviledge is lost and then it must stand upon the particular words in the Deed. Sed adjornatur into the Exchequer Chamber the Iudges being divided in Opinion Vid. 2 Sand. 165. Shipley versus Chappel Pasch 3 Jac. Rot. 404. THE Plaintiff Shipley as Administrator of Hannah his Wife Condition of two parts in the disjunctive and one part becomes impossible to be done yet the other must be performed according to the subsequent matter brought an Action of Debt upon a Bond against Chappel an Attorny for 140 l. The Defendant craved Dyer of the Condition which was Viz. Whereas Hannah Goddard who was Wife to the Plaintiff and Thomas Chappel of Greys-Inn in the County of Middlesex are Coparceners according to the Common-Law of one House with the Appurtenances in Sheffeild in the possession of William White and whereas the said Hannah Goddard hath paid unto Thomas Chappel the Father for the use of his Son the Sum of 72 l. in consideration that the said Thomas Chappel the Son when he attains the Age of 21 years which will be about Midsomer next do by good Conveyance in the Law at the costs and charges of the said Hannah Goddard convey his said moiety of the said House with the Appurtenances unto her and her Heirs Now the Condition of this Obligation is such That if the said Thomas Chappel the Son shall at the Age of 21 years convey his said moiety of the said House or otherwise if the said Thomas Chappel the Father his Heirs Executors or Administrators shall pay or cause to be paid the sum of 72 l. with lawful Interest for the same unto the said Hannah Goddard her Executors Administrators or Assigns that then this Obligation to be void Then he pleaded that his Son Thomas Chappel was Coparcener with Hannah Goddard as Co-heires of Elizabeth Goddard that Thomas came of Age and that before that time Hannah died without Issue The Plaintiff replied that true it is that before Thomas Chappel the Son came of Age the said Hannah died without Issue of her Body that Elizabeth Goddard before the making of the said Bond died seised in Fee of the said Messuage but that she first married with one Malm Stacy by whom she had Issue Lydia that Malm her Husband died and Elizabeth married John Goddard by whom he had Issue Hannah their only Daughter and Heir that John Goddard died and that Lydia Stacy married the Defendant Thomas Chappel by whom he had Issue Thomas Chappel his Son that Lydia died in the life-time of Elizabeth that Thomas Chappel hath not paid the 72 l. to Hannah in her life time or to John Shipley after her death The Defendant demurred and the Plaintiff joyned in Demurrer The Question was since the word Heirs in the Condition being a word of Limitation and not of any designation of the person whether the death of Hannah Goddard before Chappel the Son came of Age and who was to make the Conveyance shall excuse the Defendant from the payment of the Mony Those who argued for the Defendant 5 Co. 21. b. chiefly relied upon Laughter's Case which was viz. Laughter and Rainsford were bound that if R. after marriage with G. together with the said G. shall sell a Messuage c. if then R. do or shall in his life-time purchase for the said G. and her Heirs and Assigns Lands of as good value as the Mony by him received by the said Sale or leave her as much Mony at his decease then c. G. died R. did not purchase Lands of an equal value with that he sold and upon Demurrer it was held that where a Condition consisteth of two parts in the disjunctive and both possible at the time of the Bond made and afterwards one is become impossible by the act of God there the Obligor is not bound to perform the other part because the Condition is made for
Intratur Trin. 1 W. M. Rot. 249. THis was a Trial at the Bar A Will shall not be revoked by a subsequent Writing unless that be also a good Will by a Wiltshire Iury in an Ejectment brought by the Plaintiffs as Heirs at Law to Ann Speke who died seized in Fee of the Lands in Question Vpon not Guilty pleaded this Question did arise at the Trial Whether the Answer of a Guardian in Chancery shall be read as Evidence in this Court to conclude the Infant There being some Opinions that it ought to be read and the Defendants Council insisting on the contrary Mr Iustice Eyres being the Puisne Iustice was sent to the Court of Common-Pleas then sitting to know their Opinions who returning made this Report That the Judges of that Court were all of Opinion that such Answer ought not to be read as Evidence for it was only to bring the Infant into Court and to make him a Party Then the Plaintiffs proceeded to prove their Title as Heirs at Law viz. by several Inquisitions which were brought into Court and by the Heralds Office The Defendants Title likewise was thus proved viz. That the Lady Speke being seised in Fee c. did by Will dated in March 1682. devise the Lands to John Petit for Life Remainder to the Defendant and his Heirs for ever That the Lady Speke died so seised that John Speke the Tenant for Life and Father to the Defendant was also dead c. This Will was proved by several Witnesses one of which likewise deposed that my Lady Speke made two other Wills subsequent to this now produced and a Minister prov'd that she burnt a Will in the Month of December which was in the year 1685. Then the Plaintiffs produced another Will made by her at Christmas 1685. attested by three Witnesses but not in the presence of my Lady so that though it might not be a good Will to dispose the Estate yet the Council insisted that it was a good Revocation of the other for 't is a Writing sufficient for that purpose within the sixth Paragraph of the Statute of Frauds The Case of Sir George Sheers was now mentioned whose Will was carried out of the Chamber where he then was into a Lobby and signed there by the Witnesses but one of them swore that there was a Window out of that Room to his Chamber through which the Testator might see the Witnesses as he lay in his Bed Vpon which Evidence the Iury found this special Verdict viz. That Ann Speke being seised in Fee c. did on the 12th day of March 1682. make her Will and devised the Lands to John Pettit for Life and afterwards to George his Son and to his Heirs for ever upon condition that he take upon him the Name of Speke That the 25th of December 1685. she caused another Writing to be made purporting her Will which was signed sealed and published by her in the presence of three Witnesses in the Chamber where she then was and where she continued whilst the Witnesses subscribed their Names in the Hall but that she could not see them so subscribing They find that the Lessors of the Plaintiff are Heirs at Law and that they did enter c. This matter was argued in Easter Term following and the Question was whether this Writing purporting a Will was a Revocation of the former or not and that depended upon the Construction of the sixth Paragraph in the Act of Frauds viz. All Devises of Lands shall be in Writing and signed by the party or some other in his presence and by his express Directions and shall be attested by three or four Witnesses c. and that such devise shall not be revocable but by some other Will or Codicil in Writing or other Writing c. declaring the same Now the want of Witnesses doth not make the last Will void in it self but only quoad the Lands therein devised it hath its operation as to all other purposes It must therefore be a Revocation of the former and this is agreeable to the Resolution of the Iudges in former times for there being nothing in the Statute of Wills which directs what shall be a Revocation 32 H. 8. cap. 1. Dyer 143. the Iudges in Trevilian's Case did declare that it might be by word of mouth or by the very intention of the Testator to alter any thing in the Will for before the late Statute very few words did amount to a Revocation Moor 429. 1 Roll. Abr. 614 615 616. If Lands are devised and afterwards a feoffment is made of the same but for want of Livery and Seisin 't is defective yet this is a Revocation of the Will though the Feoffment is void The Council on the other side argued that this Will was not void by any Clause in the Statute of Frauds E contra for if this is a Revocation within that Statute then this second Writing purporting a Will must be a good Will for if 't is not a good Will then 't is not a good Revocation within that Law No Man will affirm that the latter Writing is a good Will therefore the first being a Devise of Land cannot be revoked but by a Will of Land which the second is not This Statute was intended to remedy the mischief of parol Revocations and therefore made such a solemnity requisite to a Revocation It cannot be denied but that this latter Writing was intended to be made a Will but it wanting that perfection which is required by Law it shall not now be intended a Writing distinct from a Will so as to make a Revocation within the meaning of that Act. If a Man hath a power of Revocation either by Will or Deed and he makes his Will in order to Revoke a former this is a Writing presently but 't is not a Revocation as long as the person is living Therefore a Revocation must not only be by a Writing but it must be such a Writing which declares the intention of a Man that it should be so which is not done by this Writing Vpon the first Argument Iudgment was given for the Defendant that the second Will must be a good Will in all Circumstances to Revoke a former Will Cross versus Garnet THE Plaintiff declared that on such a day and year there was a discourse between him and the Defendant concerning the Sale of two Oxen then in the possession of the Defendant and that they came to an agreement for the same that the Defendant did then sell the said Oxen to the Plaintiff and did falsly affirm them to be his own ubi revera they were the Oxen of another Man The Plaintiff had a Verdict Cro. Eliz. 44. 1 Rol. Rep. 275. 2 Cro. 474 1 Roll. Abr. 91. More 126. Yel 20. Sid. 146. and Serjeant Thompson moved in arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was not good because the Plaintiff hath not alledged that the Defendant did affirm the
Cattle to be his own sciens the same to be the Goods of another or that he sold them to the Plaintiff fraudulenter deceptive or that there was any Warranty for this Action will not lie upon a bare Communication But notwithstanding these Exceptions the Plaintiff had his Iudgment it might have been good upon Demurrer but after Verdict 't is well enough Lea versus Libb IN Ejectione firmae for Lands in Hampshire Two Witnesses to a Will and two to a Codicil one whereof was a Witness to the Will these are not three Witnesses to the Will it self the Iury found a special Verdict the substance of which was this viz. That the Lessor of the Plaintiff was Heir at Law to one John Denham his Ancestor who being seised in Fee of the Lands in question did by Will bearing date the 28th day of January in the year 1678. devise the same to the Defendant which he subscribed and published in the presence of two Witnesses and they likewise attested it in his presence They find that on the 29th day of December 1679. he made another Will or Codicil in Writing reciting that he had made a former Will and confirming the same except what was excepted in the Codicil and declared his Will to be that the Codicil should be taken and adjudged as part of his Will They find that he published this Codicil in the presence likewise of two Winesses one of which was Witness to the first Will bue the other was a new Man They find that these were distinct Writings c. The Question was whether this was a good Will attested by three Witnesses since one of the Witnesses to the Codicil was likewise a Witness to the Will so that the new Man if any must make the third Witness Serjeant Thompson argued that it was not a good Will The Clause of the Statute is That all Devises of Lands shall be in Writing and signed by the Testator in the presence of three Witnesses and they to attest it in his presence But here are not three subscribing Witnesses in the presence of the Testator so that the first Will must be void for one of the Witnesses to the Codicil did never see that Will Besides the Codicil is not the same thing with the Will 't is a confirmation of it and this being in a Case wherein an Heir is to be disinherited ought not to have a favourable Construction Attorney General contra A Will may be contained in several Writings and yet but one entire Will 'T is true if it be attested only by two Witnesses 't is not good but if the Testator call in a third person and he attests that individual Witing in his presence this is a good Will though the Witnesses were not all present together and at the same time for there is the Credit of three persons to such a Will which is according to the intent of the Statute And therefore it cannot be objected that these are distinct Wills or that the Papers are not annexed for no such thing is required by Law for a Man may make his Will in several Sheets of Paper and if the Witnesses subscribe the last Sheet 't is well enough or if he doth put up all the Sheets in a blank piece of Paper and the Witnesses attest that Sheet 't is a good Will In these Cases the intent of the Law-makers must and ought to be chiefly regarded and for what reasons and purposes such Laws were made and what Iudgments have been given in parallel Cases If a Man grants a Rent-Charge to his youngest Son for Life 2 Cro. 144. Noy 117. and afterwards devises that he shall have the Rent as expressed in the Grant Now though the Writing was no part of the Will but of another nature yet the Will referring to the Deed is a good Devise of the Rent-charge within the Statute of Wills But in this Case the Codicil is part of the Will 't is of the same nature and being made animo restandi the end of the Statute is performed for both Will and Codicil joined together make a good Devise the first was a Will to all purposes it only wanted that circumstance of a third Witness to attest it which the Testator compleated after by calling in of a third person for that purpose Curia If a Man makes a Will in several pieces of Paper and there are three Witnesses to the last Paper and none of them did ever see the first this is not a good Will Afterwards in Hillary-Term Iudgment was given that this was not a good Will Tippet versus Hawkey TIppet the Elder and his Son covenant with John Hawkey to sell and convey Land to him free from all Incumbrances and that they will levy a Fine c. and deliver up Writings Where two covenant the Action may be brought in the name of one Item 'T is agreed between the Parties that the said Hawkey shall pay to Tippet the younger so much Mony c. The Action is brought in the name of both and upon a Demurrer to the Declaration it was held ill for the Duty is vested in Tipper the younger and he only ought to have brought this Action Iudgment for the Defendant Rees versus Phelps DEBT upon a Bond conditioned for performance of an Award Award where good Vpon nullum fecerunt arbitrium pleaded the Plaintiff replied and shewed an Award that the Defendant should pay 5 l. to the Plaintiff presently and give Bond for the payment of 10 l. more on the 29th day of November following and that this should be for and towards the Charges and Expences in and about certain differences then depending between the Parties and that they should now sign general Releases And upon a Demurrer it was argued to be a void Award because mutual Releases were then to be given which would discharge the Bond payable in November following 1 Roll. Abr. 259 260. But the Court held it to be good for the Releases shall discharge such Matters only which were depending at the time of the Submission Godfrey al' versus Eversden THere was a Parish Church and a Chappel of Ease in the Parish of Hitchen Prohibition denied upon Suggestion that there was a Chappel of Ease and so ought not to repair the Parish Church the Defendant was taxed towards the Repairs of the Church and a Livel was brought against him for the refusing of the payment of that Tax He now suggests that there was a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish to which the Inhabitants do go and that they have always repaired that Chappel and so prayed a Prohibition But Serjeant Tremain moved for a Consultation because the Parishioners of common right ought to repair the Church and though there is a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish yet that ought not to excuse them from repairing of the Mother Church He produced an Affidavit that there had been no Divine Service there for
But if any wrong be done in this Case the Party must Appeal so no Writ of Restitution was granted Rex versus Guardianum de le Fleet. AN Inquisition being found to seize the Office of Warden of the Fleet into the King's Hands Inquisition quashed the Court of Chancery assisted with three Iudges was moved that it might be Quashed The Exceptions taken were viz. 1. 'T is found that the Defendant was Warden of the Fleet but doth not say what Estate he had therein whether for Life or years or in Fee c. 2. The Offences which are the causes of the Forfeiture are laid to be committed at the Fleet by suffering Escapes and by Extortion and 't is not found where the Fleet is scituate so there being no Visne those Offences cannot be traversed 3. 39 H. 6.32 They do not find the Escape to be sine licentia contra voluntatem of the Warden the Debts being unpaid 4. Admitting it to be a Forfeiture the Office cannot go to the King but it shall go to the next who hath the Inheritance The Opinion of the Court was that there are two things which entitle the King to this Office neither of which were found by this Inquisition 1. An Estate in the Party offending 2. A cause of Forfeiture of that Estate Now here was no Estate found in the Warden but only that the Office was forfeited by suffering of Escapes c. If this had been an Office of Inheritance ◠Co. 95. then it ought to be found that such a person was seised in Fee c. and so what Estate soever he had in it ought to be expresly found But as this is found 't is void because it doth not answer the end for which the finding of Offices was provided which is to entitle the King to the Offenders Estate An Indictment is but another sort of Office and here being no Estate found 't is much like an Indictment which finds no Offence therefore it must be quashed It might have been objected that no Man can tell what Estate the Warden had in this place and that not being known no Office could be found for the King But this Objection runs to the finding of all manner of Offices in general whose very nature is to find an Estate and to divest the subject thereof and vest it in the King Besides in this Case one of the Indentures by which the Office was granted to the Warden must be enrolled in the Court of Common-Pleas This cannot be helped by a Melius Inquirendum 3 Cro. 895. 9 Co. 95. Keilw 194. which never will support a defective Inquisition and this is such because it doth not appear that the Defendant had any Seisin or Estate in the Wardenship of the Fleet. Barker Mil ' versus Damer Hill 1 Rot. 635. AN Action of Covenant was brought by Sir William Barker who was Defendant in a former Action against Mr. Damer wherein he declared that William Barker his Father was seised in Fee of the Land in Question being in Ireland and made a Lease thereof to one Page for 31 years under the yearly Rent of 200 l. in which Lease Page did Covenant for himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns to pay the Rent to Mr. Barker his Heirs and Assigns That William Barker the Father by Lease and Release convey'd the Reversion to Sir William Barker the now Plaintiff that the Term was vested in the Defendant and assigns the breach for non-payment of the Rent The Defendant pleaded to the Iurisdiction of this Court that the Lands in the Declaration mentioned lay in Ireland where they have Courts of Record c. and so properly triable there To this Plea the Plaintiff demurr'd and the Defendant joyned in Demurrer The single Question was whether an Assignee of the Reversion can bring an Action of Covenant against the Assignee of a Lessee in any other place than where the Land is Those who argued that he may said that this Action being brought upon an Express Covenant is not local but transitory 2 Inst 231. Noy 142. 2 Cro. 142. ibidem Sid. 157. 2 Roll. Ab. 571. 1 And. 82. for debitum contractus sunt nullius loci and if it is a duty 't is so every where therefore it hath been adjudged that upon a Covenant brought in one County the breach may be assigned in another Tremain Serjeant Contra. E contra He admitted that Debt upon a Lease for years upon the Contract it self and Covenant between the same Parties are transitory Actions and may be brought any where but when once that privity of Contract is gone as by assignment of the Lessee or the death of the Lessor Latch 197. and there remains only a Privity in Law there the Action must be brought in the County where the Land lieth the reason is Hob. 37. because the Party is then chargeable in respect of the possession only Therefore it was held that where an Assignee of a Reversion of Lands in Sommersetshire brought an Action of Debt in London Cro. Car. 184. Jones 83. Dyer 40 b. upon a Lease for years made there reserving a Rent payable at London which was in arrear after the Assignment that the Action was not well brought for it ought to have been laid in Sommersetshire where the Lands were because the privity of Contract was lost by the assignment of the Reversion and therefore the Party to whom that assignment was made ought to maintain the Action upon the privity in Law by reason of the Interest which he had in the Land it self and that must be in the County where it lieth Curia There is a difference between an Action of Debt for Rent brought by an Assignee and an Action of Covenant for the first is an Action at the Common Law which hath fixed the Rent to the Reversion and therefore such an Action must be maintained upon the Privity of Estate which is always local But an Assigneé of a Reversion could not bring an Action of Covenant at the Common Law 1 Sid. 402. 3 Cro. 580. 1 Sand. 240. 32 H. 8. c. 34. for 't is given to him by a particular Statute viz. of 32 H. 8. but the Statute did not transfer any Privity of Contract to the Assignee but the intent of it was to annex to the Reversion such Covenants only which concerned the Land it self as to repair the House or amend the Fences and not to anner or transfer any collateral Covenants as to pay a Sum of Mony for that is fixed by the Common Law to the Reversion 'T is true At the Common Law an Assignee of a Reversion might have maintained an Action of Covenant for any thing agreed to be done upon the Land it self Privity of Contract is not thereby transferred so as to make the Action transitory but it must be brought upon the Privity of Estate for if a Man doth covenant to do any collateral thing not in the
Mony for putting them out which must be to such who are willing to to take them for Mony 270 Arbitrament To pay 5 l. presently and give Bond to pay 10 l. more on a day following and now to sign general Releases it shall only discharge such matters which were then depending at the time of the submission and not the Bond 264 2. A person who was a Stranger to the Submission was awarded to be a Surety 't is void 272 3. Submission was so as the Award be made c. ready to be delivered to the Parties or to such of them who shall desire it the Defendant must desire the Award and plead the matter specially and the Plaintiff need not aver that it was ready to be delivered 330 Assent See Agreement Assets Reversion in Fee Expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets but when it comes into possession then and not before 't is Assets 257 Assignment See Privity of Contract 2. Executor of a Lessee for years shall be liable to an Action of Debt for Rent incurr'd after an assignment of the Term for the privity of Contract of the Testator is not determined by his Death but his Executor shall be charged with his Contracts so long as he hath Assets 326 Assizes The Method of arraigning an Assize the Title must be set forth in it 273 Attornment See Bargain and Sale Ejectment of a Manor parcel in Rents and parcel in Services the Attornment of the Tenants must be proved 36 Averment See Devise 4 The consideration of a Duty ought to be precisely alledged as in an Action on the Case for a Duty to be paid for weighing Goods it must be averred that the Goods were such which are usually sold by weight 162 2. The nature of an Averment is to reduce a thing to a certainty which was incertain before 216 3. Where it may be made against the express words of a Condition 217 4. Not allowed to be made against a Record 305 B. Bail IT was demised in a Scandalum Magnatum 4 2. Writ of Error pending in the Exchequer-Chamber the principal in the Action rendred himself the Bail are discharged 87 3. Scire Facias against Bail upon a Writ of Error who plead that the Principal rendred himself before Judgment 't is not good for the Bail are liable not only to render the Body but to pay the Debt ibid. 4. Proceedings were staied by Injunction above two Terms after the Bail was put in and before the Declaration delivered which was pleaded to a Scire Facias brought against them but held not good 274 Bankrupts An Inn-keeper is not within the Statutes of Bankrupcy 327 2. 'T is not actionable to call a Man Bankrupt unless it be laid that he was a Trader at the time of the words spoken 329 3. Inn-keeper buys and sells under a Restraint of Justices and Stewards of Leets which though for a Livelihood yet cannot be a Bankrupt 329 4. Whether a Farmer or Master of a Boarding-School be within the Statutes 330 Baretry Difference between Baretry and Maintenance 97 2. 'T is not Baretry to arrest a Man without a cause ibid. 4. If one design to oppress and to recover his own right 't is Baretry 98 5. Mony may be laid out to recover the just right of a poor man and no Baretry ibid. 6. But mony may not be expended to promote and stir up Suits ibid. Barbadoes It was gotten by Conquest and therefore to be governed by what Law the King willeth 161 Bargain and Sale What words by construction of Law shall amount to a Bargain and Sale to make the Reversion pass with the Rent without Attornment 237 Baron and Feme See Slander 7 Administrator 9 11 Sci. Fa. 7 1. Whether Sci. Fa. will lie against the Husband alone after the death of the Wife upon a Judgment had against her Dum sola 186 2. If a Judgment is recovered against her while sole then she marries and dies the Husband is not chargeable unless had likewise against him during the Coverture ibid. 3. A Debt is due to her whilst sole she marries and dies before 't is recovered it shall not go to the Husband by virtue of the marriage but he may have it as Administrator to his Wife ibid. 4. Judgment is obtained against her whilst sole she marries and a Sci. Fa. is brought against Husband and Wife and Judgment quod habeat executionem the Wife dies a Scire Fa. may be brought against the Husband alone 189 5. The Recovery upon a Sci. fa. is against both and is therefore joynt against both 188 6. Husband may have Execution of a Judgment recovered by him and his Wife after the Death of his Wife without a Sci. fa. 189 7. Devastavit against both the Wife being an Executrix and Judgment that the Plaintiff have Execution de bonis propriis the Wife dies the Goods of the Husband are liable ibid. 8. A Woman who had a Term for years married the Rent is arrear she died the Husband shall be liable because by the Marriage he is entituled to the Profits of the Land ibid. 9. Feme Covert Copy-holder her Husband made a Lease for years without Licence of the Lord 't is a Forfeiture during the Coverture 222 9. Feme Covert Heir to a Copyhold Estate her Husband after three Proclamations will not be admitted 't is a Forfeiture during Coverture 226 10. The Husband hath a Lease in Right of his Wife who was an Executrix and he grnats all his Right and title therein the Right which he had by his Wife passeth 278 12. A. Feme Sole had a Lease and Married then Husband and Wife Surrender in consideration of a new Lease to be granted to the Wife and to her Sons the Estate vests immediately in her without the assent of her Husband for the Law intends it her Estate till he dissassent 300 13. Feme Covert and another joint-Tenant for Life she and the Husband Lease their Moiety reserving a Rent during Life and the Life of her Partner the Wife died 't is a good Lease against the Surviving joint-Tenant till disagreement 300 14. The Husband made a Feoffment in Fee to the use of himself and Wife and to the Heirs of the Survivor he afterwards made another Feoffment of the same Lands and died the Wife entred but the Fee was not vested in her by the first Conveyance because the contingent right was destroyed by the last 310 Barr. Recovery in a personal Action is a Barr to an Action of the like nature where the same Evidence supporteth both Actions 2 Judgment in Trespass is no Barr to an Action of Detinue 2 Bill of Exchange The Drawer and Endorsers are all liable to payment but if Recovery be against one 't is a good Bar to an Action which may be brought against the rest 86 By-Law See Corporation 12. Trade 8. Where 't is too general and where not 193 C. Carrier See Pleading 11. Certainty See Custom Grants Certiorari
of setting of so many Letters together but filling up the Blanks makes them of another nature Grants of things of less moment have been adjudged Monopolies 2 Rol. Abr. 215. pl. 5. as a Patent for the sole making of all Bills Pleas and Briefs in the Council of York for by the same reason a like Patent might be granted to make all Declarations in the Courts of Westminster Hall Curia The King hath a Prerogative to Grant the sole Printing to a particular person all the Cases cited for the Plaintiff do not reach the reason of this Case for there is a difference between things of a publick Vse and those which are publick in their Nature even Almanacks have been used to ill purposes as to foretel future Events yet they are of publick Vse to shew the Feasts and Fasts of the Church The Court enclined that the Patent was not good Jackson versus Warren A Motion was made in arrest of Iudgment Amendment for that the day when the Assises were to be held and the place where were left out of the Distringas and so a mis-tryal But the Court were of another Opinion 1 Roll. Abr. 201. for if there had been no Distringas the Tryal had been good because they Jurata is the Warrant to try the Cause which was right and therefore the Distringas was ordered to be amended by the Roll. Dominus Rex versus Sparks 'T IS Enacted by the Statute of 1 Eliz. Where a Punishment is directed by a Statute the Judgment must be pursuant 1 Eliz. cap. 2.13 14 Car. 2. cap. 4. That every Minister shall use the Church-Service in such Form as is mentioned in the Book of Common-Prayer and if he shall be convicted to use any other Form he shall forfeit one whole Years profit of all his Spiritual Promotions and suffer six Months Imprisonment And by the Statute of King Charles the II. All Ministers are to use the publick Prayers in such Order and Form as is mentioned in the Common-Prayer-Book with such Alterations as have been made therein by the Convocation then sitting The Defendant was indicted at the Quarter-Sessions in Devonshire for using alias Preces in the Church alio modo than mentioned in the said Book and concludes contra formam Statuti He was found Guilty and fined 100 Marks and upon a Writ of Error brought Mr. Polexfen and Mr. Shower argued for the Plaintiff in Error that this Indictment was not warranted by any Law and the Verdict shall not help in the case of an Indictment for all the Statutes of Jeofails have left them as they were before Now the Fact as 't is said in this Indictment may be no offence because to use Prayers alio modo than enjoyn'd by the Book of Common-Prayer may be upon an extraordinary occasion and so no Crime But if this should not be allowed the Iustices of Peace have not power in their Sessions to enquire into this matter or if they had power they could not give such a Iudgment because the punishment is directed by the Statute and of this Opinion was the whole Court The Chief Iustice said that the Statute of the 23 Eliz. 23 Eliz. cap. 1. could have no influence upon this Case because another Form is now enjoyned by later Statutes but admitted that Offences against that Statute were enquitable by the Iustices The Indictment ought to have alledged that the Defendant used other Forms and Prayers instead of those enjoyned which were neglected by him for otherwise every Parson may be indicted that useth prayers before his Sermon other than such which are required by the Book of Common-Prayer Clerk versus Hoskins DEbt upon a Bond for the performance of Covenants in certain Articles of Agreement in which it was recited That whereas the now Defendant had found out a Mystery in colouring Stuffs and had entred into a Partnership with the Plaintiff for the term of seven Years he did thereupon Covenant with him that he would not procure any person to obtain Letters Patents within that Term to exercise that Mystery alone The Defendant pleaded that he did not procure any person to obtain Letters Patents c. The Plaintiff replied and assigned for breach that the Defendant did within that term procure Letters Patents for another person to use this Mystery alone for a certain time Et hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam And upon a Demurrer to the Replication these Exceptions were taken 1. That the Plaintiff hath not set forth what Term is contained in the Letters Patents 2. That he had pleaded both Record and Fact together for the procuring is the Fact and the Letters Patents are the Record and then he ought not to have concluded to the Country Prout patet per Recordum To which it was answered That the Plaintiff was a Stranger to the Term contained in the Letters Patents and therefore could not possibly shew it but if he hath assigned a full breach 't is well enough Then as to the other Exception viz. the pleading of the Letters Patents here is not matter of Record here is a plain negative and affirmative upon which the Issue is joyned and therefore ought to conclude hoc petit c. Curia There is a Covenant that the Defendant shall not procure Letters Patents to hinder the Plaintiff within the seven Years of the Partnership Now this must be the matter upon which the breach ariseth and not the Letters Patents so that it had been very improper to conclude prout patet per Recordum Iudgment for the Plaintiff Rex versus Hethersal THE Defendant was Felo de se Melius inquireddum not granted but for misdemeanor of the Jury and the Coroners Inquest found him a Lunatick and now Mr. Jones moved for a Melius inquirendum but it was denied because there was no defect in the Inquisition but the Court told him that if he could produce an Affidavit that the Iury did not go according to their Evidence or of any indirect Proceedings of the Coroner then they would grant it But it was afterwards quashed because they had omitted the year of the King Friend versus Bouchier Trin. 34 Car. 2. Rot. 920. EJectment upon the Demise of Henry Jones What words in a Will make a general Tail of certain Lands in Hampshire The Iury found this Special Verdict following Viz. That William Holms was seised in Fee of the Lands in question who by his last Will dated in the year 1633. devised it to Dorothy Hopkins for Life Remainder to her first Son and to the Heirs of the Body of such first Son c. and for default of such Issue to his Cousin W. with several Remainders over And in default of such Issue to Anne Jones and to her Heirs who was the Lessor of the Plaintiff That before the sealing and publishing of this Will he made this Memorandum Viz. Memorandum that my Will and Meaning is That Dorothy Hopkins
the King may be seized in Fee of an Hundred and that he may grant Retorna Brevium the Statutes are plain in it 14 E. 3. c. 9. for otherwise how came any Lords to have Hundreds in Fee but by the Kings Grants And 't is as plain that Hundreds may be divided from the County 2 E. 3. c. 12. for else to what purpose was the Statute of Lincoln made which adjoins Hundreds and Wapentakes to the Counties and provides that they shall never be separated again this shews that they were divided at that time The Objections which have been made are viz. That the Defendant cannot have a Title to this Office by Grant and he hath not made any Prescription to it The Reasons given why he could not have it by Grant were because ancient Hundreds which were united to the Counties by the Statute of Ed. 3. could never afterwards be divided from them by any Grant of the King and those which were excepted in that Statute as being granted in Fee by the King or his Ancestors when they come again to the Crown cannot be regranted because they are merged in it In answer to which it was said that such ancient Liberties which were created by the Crown and did subsist by the King 's Grant before the Statute of Ed. 3. when afterwards they came to the King were not merged but remained a distinct Interest in him The Hundred of Gartree in the County of Leicester was such a Liberty it was an ancient Hundred and granted by Ed. 2. Cole versus Ireland Raym. 360. to John Sedington not in Fee but durante bene placito Regis this Grant was long before the making of the Statute of Ed. 3. and yet afterwards this very Hundred was granted to several other persons by the suceeding Kings of England which shews it was merged in the Crown when it came to the King The other Objection was that Retorna Brevium doth not lie in Prescription Now as to that though it be true that no Title by Prescription can be made to such Franchises and Liberties which cannot be seized as forfeited before the cause of Forfeiture appears on Record because Prescription being an Vsage in pais doth not extend to such things which cannot be had without matter of Record 1 Inst 114. b. Yet my Lord Coke is clear that a good Title may be made to hold Pleas Leets Hundreds c. by Prescripteon only without Matter of Record But notwithstanding what was said to maintain this Plea Iudgment was given against the Defendant Rex versus Griffith THE Defendant was convicted of Manslaughter at the Old-Bayly Indictment for Murder the Party was found guilty of Manslaughter and pleaded his Pardon and afterwards the Indictment was quashed to save the Forfeiture of his Goods and the Record being removed into this Court by Certiorari he pleaded his Pardon and had Iudgment Quod eat inde sine die But being once convicted the Dean and Chapter of Westminster did seize his Goods as forfeited by that Conviction who thereupon although he was out of the Court by that Iudgment yet he moved by his Council to quash the Indictment The Exceptions taken were viz. That the Indictment was Per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum jurat ' onerat ' praesentat ' existit modo forma sequen ' Midd. ss Juratores pro Domino Rege praesentant c. That there was no President to warrant such an Indictment for this may be the Presentment of another Iury it being very incoherent to say that it was presented by the Oaths of twelve Men that the Iury do present It ought to be praesentat ' existit quod c. and so is the form of this Court as the Clerk of the Crown inform'd them 2. They present that Griffith and two others did make an Assault on the Body of the deceased and that quidam Johannes in nubibus did wound him with a Gun so that 't is uncertain who did shoot and what Gun was discharged which ought to be certainly laid in the Indictment Vaux 's Indictment for Poisoning Ridley was 4 Co. 44. b. that the said Ridley not knowing the Beer to be poyson'd but being perswaded by Vaux recepit bibit but did not say venenum praedictum and so it not appearing what thing he did drink which ought to have been expresly alledged the Indictment was held insufficient And the reason is plain for an Indictment for Felony being a Declaration for the King against the Life of a Subject ought to set forth a sufficient certainty of the Fact which shall not be supplied either by Argument or any intendment whatsoever And therefore in Long 's Case the Defendant was indicted for discharging a Gun upon Long 5 Co. 122. b. Dans eidem Henrico Long mortale vulnus and doth not say percufsit for which reason that Indictment was also held insufficient because in all Indictments for Murder they ought expresly to alledge a stroke given For these Reasons the Indictment was quashed and a new Roll was made on which this Indictment and Certiorari were both entred and Iudgment quod exoneretur and this was done to avoid the seizure And afterwards in Michaelmas Term primo Will. Mar. it was said by the Chief Iustice that it must be intended these were two persons for no Court would justifie such a Iudgment Anonymus IN Assault and Battery After a Traverse you must not conclude to the Country the Defendant pleaded a Release of all Actions c. The Plaintiff replied that the Release was gotten by duress c. The Defendant rejoyned and shewed cause why it was not gotten by duress but that he sued forth a Capias and did Arrest him c. and that the Release was voluntary c. The Plaintiff surrejoyns and saith that it was gotten by duress absque hoc that it was voluntary Et hoc petit quod inquiratur per patriam Vpon this Issue the Cause was tryed Dyer 353. a. 1 Inst 126. a. Cro. Car. 316. Sid. 341. 2 Cro. 588. 2 Rol. Rep. 186. and the Plaintiff had a Verdict and now it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment that he ought not to conclude to the Country after a Traverse because a Traverse it self is Negative and therefore the Defendant ought to have joyned issue in the Affirmative 't is true if issue had been joyned before the Traverse it might have been helped by the Statute of Ieofails but it was not so in this Case and therefore the Iudgment was Arrested Hitchins versus Basset Mil ' IN Ejectment upon the Demise of Mr. Nosworthy The Iury found a special Verdict A subsequent Will which doth not appear shall not be a Revocation of the former the substance of which was Viz. That Sir Henry Killigrew was seised in Fee of the Lands in question in the County of Cornwal and being so seised did in the year 1644. devise the
same to Mrs. Berkley for Life remainder over to Henry Killigrew in Tail and that he made Mrs. Berkley Executrix of his Will which was found in haec verba That afterwards in the year 1645. the said Sir Henry Killigrew made aliud Testamentum in Writing but what was contained in the said last mentioned Will juratores penitus ignorant They find that Sir Henry Killigrew in the year 1646. died seised of those Lands and that Mrs. Berkley conveyed the same to Mr. Nosworthy 's Father whose Heir he is and that the Defendant Sir William Basset is Cosin and Heir to Sir Henry Killigrew c. The Question upon this special Verdict was whether the making of this last Will was a revocation of the former or not It was argued this Term by Mr. Finch and in Michaelmas Term following by Serjeant Maynard for the Plaintiff that it was not a revocation In their Arguments it was admitted that a Will in it's nature was revocable at all times but then it must be either by an express or implied revocation That the making of this latter Will cannot be intended to be an implied revocation of the former for if so then the Land must also be supposed to be devised contrary to the express disposition in the first Will and that would be to add to the Record which finds Viz. that what the last Will was penitus ignorant It is possible that a subsequent Will may be made so as not to destroy but consist with a former for the Testator may have several parcels of Land which he may devise to many persons by divers Wills and yet all stand together A man may likewise by a subsequent Will revoke part and confirm the other part of a former Will and therefore admitting there was such a Will in this case 't is still more natural that it should confirm than revoke the other If the Testator had purchased new Lands and had devised the same by a subsequent Will no person will affirm that to be a revocation of the former Will When a Man hath made a disposition of any part of his Estate 't is a good Will as to that part so is likewise the disposal of every other part they are all several Wills tho' taken altogether they are an intire disposition of the whole Estate Nothing appears here to the contrary but that the latter Will may be only a devise of his personal Estate or a confirmation of the former which the Law will not allow to be destroyed without an express revocation The Case of Coward and Marshal is much to this purpose Cro. Eliz. 721. which was a devise in Fee to his younger Son and in another Will after the Testators Marriage to a second Wife he devised the same Lands to his Wife for Life paying yearly to his younger Son 20 s. It was the Opinion of Anderson and Glanvil that both these Wills might stand together and that one was not a revocation of the other because it appeared by the last Will that he only intended to make a Provision for his Wife but not to alter the Devise to his Son So where a Man had two Sons by several Venters Cro. Car. 24. Hodgkinson vers Whood Co. Lit. 22. b. 1 Co. 104. a. 319. b. and devises the Lands to his eldest Son for Life and to the Heirs Males of his Body and for default of such Issue to the Heirs Males of his second Son and the Heirs Males of their Bodies Remainder to his own right Heirs and then made a Lease of 30 years to his youngest Son to commence after the death of the Testator the youngest Son entred and surrendred the Term to his elder Brother who made a Lease to the Defendant and then dyed without Issue afterwards the youngest Brother entred and avoided this Lease made by his Brother It was held that the Lease thus made to him was not a revocation of the devise of the Inheritance to his Brother tho' it was to commence at the same time in which the devise of the Inheritance was to take effect but it was a revocation quoad the Term only that the elder Brother should not enter during that time for the devise shall not be revoked without express words and that tho' the Testator had departed with the whole Fee without reserving an Estate for Life to himself yet the Law created such an Estate in him till the future Vse should commence and in such case the right Heirs cannot take by Purchase but by Descent so that here the Inheritance in Fee simple was not vested in the elder Brother by Descent for then the Lease which he made would be executed out of the Feé and the younger Brother would be bound thereby But in the Case at the Bar there is no colour of a Revocation 1. Vpon the nature of the Verdict to which nothing can be added neither can it be diminished for whatever is found must be positive and not doubtful because an Attaint lies if the Verdict be false Therefore the Court cannot take notice of that which the Iury hath not found Now here the entry of the Iudgment is Viz. Quibus lectis auditis per Curiam hic satis intellectis c. But what can be read or heard where nothing appears That Case in the Year-Book of the 2 R. 3. 2 R. 3. f. 3. comes not up to this question it was an Action of Trespass for the taking of his Goods The Defendant pleaded that the Goods did appertain to one Robert Strong who before the supposed Trespass devised the same to him and made him Executor c. The Plaintiff replied that the said Strong made his last Will and did constitute him Executor And upon a Demurrer to this Replication because he had not traversed that the Defendant was Executor it was argued for the Plaintiff that this last Will was a Revocation of the former for tho' there were no express words of Revocation yet by the very making another the Law revoked the former and to prove this two Instances were then given viz. That if a Man devise his Lands to two and by another Will gives it to one of them and dies he to whom 't is devised by the last Will shall have it So likewise if the Testator by one Will giveth Lands to his Son and by another Will deviseth the same again to his Wife then makes an Alienation and taketh back an Estate to himself and dieth and in an Assise brought between the Widow and the Son he was compelled by the Court to shew that it was his Father's intention that he should have the Land otherwise the last Devisee will be entituled to it Now both these Instances are not sufficient to evince that the last Will in this Case was a revocation of that under which the Plaintiff claims because those Wills were contradictory to each other for by one the Land was devised to the Son and by the other to
question as forfeited to the Lady who entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant re-entred The single Question upon this special Verdict was whether this was a Forfeiture and so a good seisure to bind the right of an Infant It was argued for the Plaintiff in the Action that it was a good Seisure and a Forfeiture till the Infant should come of Age for as a Copyhold is established by Custom so likewise 't is Custom which obligeth the Infant to the Conditions thereof and therefore where one under Age hath an Estate upon a Condition to be performed by him 8 Co. 44. b. Whittingham 's Case Latch 199. Jones 157. and that Condition is broken during his Minority the Estate is lost for ever In this Case the Custom obligeth the Heir to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine which if he should lose because his Tenant is an Infant then that priviledge of Infancy works a wrong which the Law will not permit 'T is true an Infant shall not be prejudiced by the Laches of another but shall be answerable for himself and therefore if he is Tenant of Lands and the Rent should be unpaid for two years and no Distress can be found a Cessavit lies against him and the Lord shall recover the Land because of the Non-performance which arises by his own default So if one under Age be a Keeper of a Gaol and suffer a Prisoner to escape out of Execution 2 Inst 382. an Action of Debt will lie against him upon the Statute of W. 2. It was agreed that such a Custom and Non-claim will not foreclose an Heir 8 Co. 100. Sir Rich. Letchford 's Case who is an Infant and beyond Sea at the time of his Ancestors Death though he is bound by the Custom to claim it at the next Court but that if he will come over and tender himself though after a Seisure he shall be admitted and so shall the person in this Case if after his Minority he offer himself to be admitted But it cannot be denied 2 Cro. 226. but that the Lord may seize when the Heir is beyond Sea till he return and tender himself to be admitted and by the same reason he may also seize in this case during the Minority A Temporary Forfeiture is no new thing in the Law Cro. Car. 7. for if a Feme Covert be a Copyholder and marrieth and her Husband makes a Lease for years without License of the Lord 't is a Forfeiture and shall bind her during the Coverture So the Law is Cro. El. 351. that the Lord may seize the Land till a Fine is paid for 't is a reasonable Custom so to do It hath been a good Custom for the Lord to assign a person to take the Profits of a Copyhold Estate descended to the Infant during his Minority without rendring an Accompt when he came of Age. 1 Leon. 266. 2 Leon. 239. So that all taht is to be done in this Case is to enforce the Infant to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine The Inheritance is not bound but the Land is only seized quousque E contra It was argued that here is a general Seizure E contra which cannot extend to an Infant for he is not bound in a Writ of Right much less in an inferior Court after three Proclamations but if this had been a Temporary Seisure the Iury ought to have found it so which is not done There are many Authorities in the Books which affirm that an Infant is not obliged to be admitted during his Non-age 1 Leon. 100. 3 Leon. 221. or to tender the Fine in order to an Admittance that the Law was settled in this Point and therefore without any further Argument he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant Afterwards in Hillary-Term 1 Willielmi Mariae this Case was argued seriatim at the Bench three Iudges being of a contrary Opinion to the Chief Iustice for the affirming of the Iudgment Iustice Eyre premised two things 1. That he could not intend but that this Verdict had found an absolute Forfeiture the Iury having no way qualified it as to a certain time and therefore he would give a Iudgment upon the whole Record 2. He agreed that a Feoffment of an Infant was no Forfeiture at the Common Law and that as a particular Custom may bind an Infant for a time so it may barr him for ever but whether this Custom as 't is found in general words shall bind an Infant after three Proclamations is now the Question he not coming then to be admitted And he held that it shall not and that for these reasons 1. The Right of Infants is much favoured in the Law and their Laches shall not be prejudicial to them as to Entry or Claim upon a Presumption that they understand not their Right 1 Inst 380. 2 Inst 401. and therefore in a Cessavit per biennium which is a remedy given by the Statute of W. 2. and which extends to Infants Westm 2. c. 31. who have not the Land by descent for if a Cesser be in that Case the Infant shall have his Age because the Law intends that he doth not know what Arrerages to tender 'T is admitted that if an Infant doth not present to a Church within six Months or doth not appear within a year that his Right is bound but this is because the Law is more tender of the Church and the life of a Man than of the Priviledges of Infancy So if an Office of Parkship be given or descends to an Infant if the Condition in Law annexed to such an Office which is skill be not observed the Office is forfeited But that a Proclamation in a base Court should bind an Infant when he is not within the reason of the Custom is not agreeable either to Law or Reason 2. Cro. Jac. 80. Cro. El. 879. Noy 42. 1 Rol. Abr. 568. All Customs are to be taken strictly when they go to the destruction of an Estate and therefore a Custom was that if a Copyholder in Fee surrender out of Court and the Surrendree doth not come in after three Proclamations the Lord shall seize it A Copyholder in Fee surrendred to another for Life the Remainder over in Fee if the Tenant for Life will not come in he in the Remainder shall not be barred for the Custom shall be intended to extend only to those in possession But the Infant in this Case is not within the Letter of the Custom for 't is found that the Surrender was made to one Freeman who died before the next Court-day and that John Freeman the Infant was his Son and Heir so they have found a Title in him for the word Heir is not here a word of Purchase but of Limitation 3. Jones 157. Noy 92. Infants are not bound by other Customs like this as a Custom that every Copyholder
who makes a Lease of his Land shall forfeit it but this doth not conclude an Infant 4. There is not any necessity to construe an Infant to be within this Custom for 't is not found that the Lord was to have a Fine upon admittance and 't is no consequence to say that the Lord shall have a Fine because usually Fines are taken upon admittances 1 Leon. 100. 3 Leon. 221. for an Infant may be admitted to a Copyhold but not be bound to tender his Fine at any time during his Non-age Justice Gregory was of the same Opinion which he chiefly grounded upon Sir Richard Letchford's Case between which and the Case at the Barr he said there was no material difference only in that Case the Heir was beyond Sea and in this at the Barr 2 Cro. 226. Latch 199. Godb. 364. Jones 391. Dyer 104. he was an Infant 'T is very true that the Books mention a Seisure quousque 't is so said by Iustice Williams in Croke but he gives no reason for it 't is only an Opinion obiter but it is clear by many Authorities that Infants may be bound by Acts of necessity and so they may by a Custom Iustice Dolben of the same Opinion which he said was agreeable to the reason of the Law in parallel Cases An Infant is priviledged in a Fine for he is excepted by the Statute because he knows not how to make his Claim He said this was likewise agreeable to the Custom of 26 Mannors of which he was formerly Steward for in such Cases he always marked the Court Roll Nulla Proclamatio quia Infans It cannot be a Forfeiture quousque because an Infant is wholly exempted by the Custom and therefore 't is no Forfeiture at all 'T is an Objection of no moment to say that the Lord by this means will lose his Fine and that he hath no remedy to make the Infant when of Age to be admitted for no Fine is due to him before admittance But this Objection will be of less weight if the loss of the Infant be compared to that of the Lord who looseth only the Interest of a Fine before Admittance and shall this Infant who is now but three years of Age loose the Profits of his Estate for 18 years But there may be a way found out that neither may loose for if it should be that when the Infant comes of Age his Estate should be then forfeited if he doth not tender himself to be admitted after three Proclamations Now upon his admittance the Lord may set a reasonable Fine having respect to the length of time in which it was deteined from him Stowel's Case was no more but this viz. Pl. Com. 356. A Disseisor levied a Fine with Proclamations and lived three years his Heir being under Age and the five years incurred after the said Heir came of Age and then he entred within a year and his Entry was adjudged unlawful But that will not concern this Case because it was a Iudgment upon the Statute of H. 7. 4 H. 7. c. 24. for the five years being once attached and begun in the life of his Ancestor shall incurr and go on and bind the Infant if he do not pursue his Claim within that time after he comes of Age but 't is to be observed that my Lord Dyer in the Argument of that Case said nothing of a Seisure quousque The Chief Iustice was of a contrary Opinion from the other three Iustices and that the Iudgment ought to be reversed Because until the Infant is admitted the Estate remains in the Surrenderor and without an Admittance he cannot enter but by a special Custom to warrant it and for this reason 't is that the Surrenderor shall have an Action of Trespass against any person who enters because he shall be intended still in possession till the Admittance of another If so 2 Cro. 368. Yelv. 16. then Infancy cannot protect an Estate to which the Infant hath no Title till Admittance for till then he hath neither Jus in re nor Jus ad rem This is a Condition annexed to the Estate to be performed by the Infant by which he is bound notwithstanding his Non-age otherwise his Estate is forfeited The Custom which obligeth him to be admitted is to entitle the Lord of the Mannor to a Fine to which he hath a right Now Infancy was never yet extended to endanger that remedy which Men have to recover their Rights it has been often so far extended as to delay such a remedy but never to destroy it for if the Infant should die the Lord looseth the Fine and then another person is to be admitted but he cannot encrease the Fine upon him who is a Stranger for the neglect of the Infant 'T is true Bridg. 83. Yelv. 144. Poph. 127. where an Infant hath a Right it shall be preserved though a Fine be levied and the five years pass but in this Case he hath no Right before Admittance If a Feme Covert be an Heir to a Copyhold Estate where the like Custom is and she marrieth and the Husband after three Proclamations will not come and be admitted 't is a Forfeiture during the Coverture Now the reason in the Cases of Coverture and Infancy is the same for if there shall be a Seisure during the time the woman is Covert why not during the Infancy As to Sir Richard Letchford's Case the Heir was beyond Sea but when he came into England he desired to be admitted but this Infant never yet desired to be admitted he stands upon his Priviledge of Infancy But upon the Opinion of the other three Iustices the Iudgment was affirmed that the Custom doth not bind the Infant Carter versus Dowrich A Covenant to pay so much Mony to the Plaintiff or his Assigns as should be drawn upon the now Defendant by a Bill of Exchange Custom of Merchants where it must be particularly set forth c. The Breach was assigned in Non-payment The Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff secundum legem Mercatorum did assign the Mony to be paid to A. who assigned it to B. to whom he paid 100 l. and tendred the rest drawn upon by Bill of Exchange c. And upon a Demurrer Mr. Pollexfen insisted that this was not a good Plea because the Defendant had not set forth the Custom of Merchants without which all these Assignments are void of which Custom the Court cannot take any judicial notice but it must be pleaded and 't is not sufficient to say that the Assignment was made secundum legem Mercatoriam but it must be secundum consuetudinem Mercatoriam otherwise 't is not good E contra E contra Litt. 182. It was argued that the Custom of Merchants is not a particular Custom and local but 't is of an universal extent and is a general Law of the Land The pleading it as 't is here is good for if an Action is brought against