Recusant may be seised after his death Thirdly if they shall be charged by the Statute of 1. Iac. as to the first it seems they are not wherein I shall endeavour to prove three things First that such land was not liable to debt by the Common Law Secondly that they are not liable to debts by the general words of the Statute Law Thirdly that they are not liable to debt by any word within the Statute of primo Iac. as to the first he observed that here is no fraud put in the case but that these lands and leases were never in the Recusant so that before that they were conveyed to the Defendants they were not liable to this debt and I alwayes observed that which the common law calleth fraud ought to be of such nature as shall be tortious and prejudicial to a third person and put him in a worse estate and condition then he was before and then he who is so prejudiced in some cases should avoid such conveyances by the common Law 22. Assises 72.43 Ed. 3.2 and 32. the Defendant in debt after judgement aliens his goods and he himself takes the profits yet the Plantiffe shall have them in execution so that if a man binde himself and his heirs in an Obligation and dies and assets descend to his heir who by Covin aliens those assets yet he shall be charged in debt for in these cases the Plantiffe had a lawful debt and such lands and goods before the alienation were liable and that former interest was intended to be defeated by those alienations and therefore they are void but of the other side where no former interest of the partie is wronged there no fraudulent conveyance was void at the Common Law and therefore if Tenant in Knights service had made a fraudulent Feofment to defraud the Lord of his wardship this was not aided by the Common Law until the Statute of Marlebridge for the title of the Lord was not prejudiced or wronged by this Feofment because it was subsequent to the Feofment also after the said Statute the Lord was without remedy for his release for it is agreed in 17. Ed. 3. fo 54. and 31. Ed. 3. Collation 29. and therefore at the Common Law if cestuy que use had bound himself and his heirs in an Obligation and died if the use descended to his heir none will say this use was assets to the heir and so was Rigler and Hunters case 25. Eliz. as to the second point it seems that the general words of a Statute shall be expounded according to the rule and reason of the Common Law and by the Common Law such confidence is not extendible therefore c. Westmin 2. cap. 18. which gives the elegit hath these words medietatem terrae and within those words an use was never extendible by that Statute 30. Ed. 3. because it was not an estate in him and so if a man be indebted for Merchandise or money borrowed and makes a gift of his lands and Chattels to defraud Creditors and takes the profits himself and flieth to the Sanctuary at Westminster or Saint Martins and there abideth by conclusion to avoid the payment of his debts it is thereby enacted that Proclamation shall be made at the Gate of the Sanctuary where such person resideth by the Sheriffe and if such person doth not thereupon appear in person or by Atturney judgement shall be given against him 2 Rich. 2. Stat. 2. cap. 3. 1. Rich. 3. cap. 1. and execution awarded aswel of those lands and goods given by fraud as of any other out of the same Franchise these words are more particular then the Statute of Westminster the second and yet it was doubted if it did extend to executions for debt as it appears by 7. H. 7. and 11. H. 7.27 and therefore in 19. H. 7. cap. 15. an Act of Parliament was made that execution for debts Recognizances and Statutes should be sued of lands in use As to the third it seems that that Statute doth not make lands in use liable to debts the words of the Statute are that the King shall seise two parts of the lands Tenements and Hereditaments leases of Farms of such offendors so that they are as general as the words of the Statute of Westminster 2. cap. 18. and here those lands and leases were not the Recusants for he had but a confidence in them the first clause of the Statute doth not extend thereunto for two causes First in regard that it never was in the Recusant and this clause extends only to such conveyances which are made by any man which hath not repaired or shall not repair to some Church for the disjunctive words do not extend throughout that branch but to the last part thereof viz. that which cometh after the word and for otherwise this would extend to conveyances made at any time without limitation which should be against the meaning of the Act. Secondly this Branch provides what shall be done concerning the King touching the levying and paying of such summes of money as any person by the Lawes of the Realm ought to pay of else to forfeit c. and by the Statutes before made nothing was forfeited but for such time as is mentioned in the Indictment which in our case is but 6. moneths but out of this branch a strong argument may be made in respect that the Statute avoids all conveyances made by Recusants in trust by express words but saith nothing to conveyances made by others to the use of Recusants and therefore this Statute doth not extend unto it if Tenant by Knights service infeoffs his heir within age and dies the Lord may enter upon the heir without suing an action but if a Feofmenche made to a stranger there he cannot enter but ought to bring his Action according to the provision of that Statute because it may be to the use of the Feoffee but no such provision is made for the heir the Statute of 3. Jac. cap. 4. provides by express words that the King shall seise two parts of all the lands Tenements and Hereditaments Leases and Faims that at the time of such seisure shall be or afterwards shall come to any of the hands of the said offendors or any other to their use or in trust for him or her or at his or her dispose or disposition or whereby wherewith or in consideration whereof such offendors or their families or any of them shall or may be relieved maintained or kept c. the different penning of these Statutes proves the diversitie of the meaning thereof this Statute is a new Law which gives to the King this penalty which he had not before and in new manner for it appoints that the partie shall be convicted by Proclamation and that being so convicted he shall alwayes pay the said penaltie until his submission without any other conviction 3. Jac. cap. 4. and also limits a manner how this new penaltie shall be levied viz.
give money to a patron to make a promise to him c. and the incumbent payes it such an incumbent is Simoniacus by the Civil Law and so if the incumbent pay the mony not knowing it untill after the induction yet he is Simoniacus and by him if a friend gives money and the Parson is thereupon presented though the Parson if he knew not of the money given yet he shall be deprived of the benefice and this difference was certified by Anderson and Gawdey to the Councel table upon a reference made to them by the King touching the filling of benefices by corrupt means and the Statute of purpose forbears to use the word Simonie for avoiding of nice construction of that word in the Civil Law and therefore the makers of the Act sets down plainly the words of the Statute that if any shall be promoted for money c. so that by these words it is not material from whom the money comes and then in such cases for the avoiding of all such grand offences a liberal construction ought to be made as hath been used in such cases and therefore he remembred the large construction which was made upon the Statute of fines in the Lord Zouches case lib. Cook 3. and so upon the Statute of usurie it hath been adjudged that if money be lent to be re-paid with use above 10. l. in the hundred at such a day if three men or one man so long live in these cases all such bargains and contracts are void within the intent of the Statute as it hath been adjudged in the Common Pleas and so it is in Gooches case Cook lib. 5. upon the Statute of fraudulent conveyances and secret Ioyntures also upon the Statute of Simonie it was adjudged although some of the Common Pleas doubted of it in regard a father is bound to provide for his son and Rogers and Bakers case in this Court was an antient case and adjudged for the Plantiffe and as to the other point it is found by the verdict that the presentation made by the Queen to Covel is not revoked nor admitted which words implie that Covel is still living in case of a special verdict and therefore to argue to that point as if it were found that Covel was living yet he conceived that the presentation without institution and Induction is determined by the Queens death and therefore in 2. Ed. 3. a license of Alienation clearly is not good in the time of another King for the license saith which are holden of us c. and by the death of the King they are not holden of him Fitzherberts natura brevium contra 16 H. 8. the nature of a presentment is explained where an Infant would avoid his presentation and in the principal case the Bishop cannot make any admission upon this presentation of Covel after the Queens death for he cannot do that in any manner according to the presentation because that is determined by the Queens death and therefore it seems clearly there needs no repeal in such a case although it appears by some presidents that repeals have been used in such cases and as to the case 17. Eliz. Dyer 339. that proveth not that there ought to be any repeal for it appears there that judgement was given upon a reason altogether different from our case and that was because a presentation was obtained of the Queen a quare impedit depending by her of which suit she had no notice and for that cause her second presentation was void and that was the true reason of that judgement as it is also put in Greens case Cook lib. 6. and I was present Mich. 17. Eliz. when this case was adjudged and the sole reason which they gave for the judgement was because the presentation by intendment could not take away the Action attached by the Queen for then the Queens grant should enure to a double intent which the Law will never tollerate without express words purporting so much but in our case there is no such double intendment and therefore c. but if there had been an admission and institution pursuing the presentation of Covel although no induction yet peradventure in such case there ought to have been an appeal because in such case it is not only the Queens Act but of the ordinary also interposing which is a Iudicial Act also without question we are out of the Statute of 6. H. 8. for here is no grant made by the Queen and a presentation clearly is not within that Statute and for that other reason the presentation of Calvert is good without recital of the Queens presentation also clearly if there ought to be a repeal in the case yet it is not examinable in this Action of Trespass which is possessorie and for the profits only but it may be examinable in a quare impedit and as to Greens case Cook lib. 6. which hath been used as an authoritie in this case that differs much from our case for there the thing which made the Queens presentation void was contained within the very Charter of the presentation and therefore differed from our case wherefore he commanded judgement should be entred for the Plantiffe and so it was Halseys case touching Recusancy THe case in the Exchequer Chamber touching the payment of the Kings Majesties debt due for the Recusancy of John Halsey as Recusant convict deceased with the lands and goods bought in the name of John Grove and Richard Cox Defendant in this Court that John Halsey was indicted and convicted for Recusancy the 18. day of July Anno 23. Eliz. and so remained convicted without submission till his death who died the last day of March 3. Iac. and after his conviction viz. after the 40. year of the Raign of the late Queen Elizabeth did purchase with his own money divers leases for years yet to come of lands in the Countie of Worcester and Warwick in the name of Richard Cocks for himself in trust and likewise did with his own money purchase certain leases for years yet to come of lands in the County of Hereford in the name of the said John Grove all which purchases were in trust for the Recusant and to his use Margaret Field is his next heir who is no Recusant Iohn Halsey hath not paid 20. l. a moneth since his conviction nor any part thereof these lands and leases were seised into the Kings hands for the satisfaction of the forfeitures due for the Recusancy of the said Halsey 14. August 5. Iac. Thomas Coventrie argued for the Defendant the question is whether these lands which were never in the Recusant but bought in the name of the Defendants in manner aforesaid be liable to the payment of his Majesties debts by the said Recusant as above said or not there are three points considerable in the case First if lands purchased by the Recusant in the name of others in trust are liable to his debt Secondly if the land of a
Dyer the Lord Dacres surrendred a patent of an office granted to him before Sir Nicholas Hare Master of the Rolls but the surrender was not recorded nor the patent Cancelled nor a Vacat entred upon the inrolment this is void and shall not be aided now after the death of Sir Nicholas Hare per optimam opinionem in Kemps case Dyer 195. but it will be said that it appears not there that the surrender was made in Chancery and therefore differs from our case but see 19. Eliz. Dyer 355. which is direct in the point where an exchange of land was with E. 6. by deed acknowledged to be inrolled c. but not inrolled it cannot after nor be inrolled nor vest any interest in the Queen either as heir or Purchasor so hereby it appears that before inrolment an estate vests not in the King and he said that he had heard Popham late chief Iustice say that the opinion of the Iudges was that in this case nothing vests in the King until inrolment and for that there was a private Act made in 39. Eliz. to relieve this particular case so the Memorandum makes the record and not the delivery of the patent to be cancelled but the opinion of Davers in 37. H. 6.10 may be objected against me where he saith that if a man make a feofment to the King and deliver the deed in the Exchequer or at the Kings Coffers it is good without inrolment which by the Court is intended for goods and not to a feofment made to the King for this is only the opinion of Davers which I denie to be law and also all this may be admitted for law and yet prove nothing for when the partie surrenders to the King and delivers the deed to be inrolled so that he had done all which in him is to pass the land to the King then it may aptly be said in common speech that the right of the land is in the King because he of right ought to have it after inrolment although he had not the propertie of the land before the Deed be inrolled then if nothing vest in the Queen in the principal case before the patent made in 37. Eliz. the words subsequent in the patent will not help the matter viz. quam quidem sursum redditionem acceptamus per praesentes because the King had taken nothing before and the recital in the patent concludes not the Queen it hath been said that the not making of a Memorandum is the fault of the Clark and this shall not prejudice the partie in so great a mischief but I answer that the same mischief will insue where a man sells land by indenture and delivers it to the Clark to be inrolled and he inrols it not within 6. moneths nothing shall pass by the sale yet this is only the fáult of the Clark but in this case he may have his action upon the case against the Clark if so it be that he had paid all his fees the fame law in the principal case but admitting that yet great mischief will insue if it be so that the estate shall pass to the King before inrolment for then the estate and interest shall be tried by the Countrie and not by the record and then also in what place should a man search to finde the Kings estate and perhaps for want of knowledge thereof every grant of the King will be avoided and this would be a great mischief to the subjects but admitting that this should be a good surrender without a Memorandum or Vacat yet this is not shewed in this case for it appears not here that his intent was to surrender it for although he deliver up his Letters patents yet his estate remaines and then the consideration of the patent in 37. Eliz. being of a surrender of the first patent and also of a surrender of the estate if the estate be not surrendred as well as the patent the consideration is for that false and then the patent is void and to pâ—ove that the estate remains although that the patent be surrendred it appears by Fisher 12. H. 7.12 where Tenant in tail of the gift of the King loses his letters patents his heir is not at a mischief for he may have a Constat and this shall be good in evidence but he cannot plead it and this appears by the Preamble of the Statute of 13. Eliz. cap. 6. Dean and Chapter Lease land this shall be by Deed and in this case although that the lessee redeliver his deed it is no surrender of the estate but he shall not plead it without shewing a Deed of the assent of the Chapter but he shall give it in evidence and good because he had once a Dâ—ed thereof as it appears by 32. E. 3. Monstrance of Deeds and it appears by 32. H. 8. Patents Br. 97. that if the Kings Patentee lose his letters Patents he shall have a Constat and by 32. H. 8. surender Br. 51. and 35. H. 8. tail that if the King give in tail and the Donee surrender his Patent the tail thereby is not extinct so although letters Patents are necessary for pleading of the Kings Grant yet they are not requisite for the essence and continuance of the estate also it is found that the said Patents were restored to be cancelled per mandatum Domini Seymor it is not found what manner of authoritie the Lord S. gave nor found to whom the letters Patents were delivered nor at what time and peradventure they were delivered after the second Patent made and then is the second Patent false because then there was no surrender and this is one of the reasons put it Kemps case 3. Eliz. 195. The second point admitting that there is no actual surrender if notwithstanding that the Patent of 37. Eliz. be good and as to that I say if this Patent be good it is because the Queen had recited the particular estate and therefore is not to her damage or because the second Patent is a surrender in law of the first and the rather because it appears to be the intention of the Queen that the acceptance should be a surrender by these words quam quidem sursum redditionem acceptamus per praesentes and as to the first reason it seems to me that the Queen recites this as a particular estate determined and not as an estate continuing for by these words modo habens et gaudens it appears that the meaning of the Queen was that the Lord Seymor had not an estate continuing in the intent of the Queen at the time of the making of the second Patent but the Lord Chandos case in Coo. 6. fol. 55. seems to impugne me in this opinion where the King made a gift in tail and afterward by Patent reciting the former Grant and also that the Patentee had delivered up the Patent into the Chancerie to be cancelled by vertue whereof he thought himself to be seised in demeasne as of fee
because nothing vested in the Queen nothing can vest in the King as successor for a thing cannot be vested in one as heir or successor which was never vested in the Ancestor and he vouched Bullocks case in 10. Eliz. Dyer 21. Ed. 4. of election also it cannot vest in the King Primarily because he was never partie to the Iudenture of lease and he cited a case to be adjudged accordingly betwixt Founds and 29. Eliz. 11. H. 7. that he who is not partie to the Indenture shall not be primarily bound nor shall primarily take by the same Indenture and it is inconvenient that this should be a good inrolment and where it was said of the other part that a bargain and sale is good enough although it be not inrolled in the life of the parties so that it be inrolled within 6. moneths to that he well agreed for by the bargain and sale an use passeth at the Common Law without help of the Statute and this without inrolment and the Statute of inrolments restraineth it not but that it may pass well enough at this day and so the Statute perfects it so that it be within 6. moneths indifferently and therefore it is good notwithstanding the death of the parties and he concluded with the Book of the 19. Eliz. Dyer fol. and wheras it was said to be resolved contrary in an authoritie not printed he said that he believed the printed Book and vouched also the case cited before in Butlers and Bakers Case Cook lib. 3. to the third point it seemed to him that although the inrolment be good yet that should not avoid the estate by relation for a relation is not good to avoid mean conveyances without an antient right as if the Kings Villein purchase lands the King now hath right and therefore an office found after shall relate to avoid all mean conveyances and he said that relations are not so certain wherefore a man may make a ground for every case hath his particular reason and therefore to some purposes an attornament ought to relate but to other purposes it ought not to relate and therefore an attornament cannot relate to intitle a grantee to rents due between the grant and the attornament and so in this case if the inrolment had been in the life of the Bishop and of the Queen yet it could not have given to her the mean profits between the grant and the inrolment and he vouched a case in Butlers and Bakers case and the 11. H. 7. that a relation shall never be prejudicial to a stranger for his estate lawfully executed and therefore if a feofment be made to a husband and wife and to a third person and after the husband and wife are divorced for a precontract yet they shall take but a Moitie as if they were married also it is a rule that an estate vested cannnot be made Tortious by relation see Butlers and Bakers Case and he vouched a case to be adjudged betwixt Wind gate and Hall in the Kings Bench Mich. 31. 32. Eliz. that if a Statute be acknowledged to a Common person and another Statute to the King by the same Conusor and after the Statute acknowledged to the common person is extended and the Conusee in possession and also the King sues execution of his Statute he shall not avoid the estate lawfully executed in the first Conusee as it was there holden but the Barons said una voce that if such a case should come in question before them they would hold the contrary for the King and for the fourth point viz. if the confirmation were good being made before inrolment of the lease and so upon the matter before any lease in being to which the Counsel of the one part nor of the other were provided to speak Walter said that the confirmation was not good for Littleton saith that a thing or estate which is not in being cannot be confirmed and Tanfield chief Baron said and others also that this was the principal point of the case and the great doubt is of the other part viz. that this is not good and therefore advised them to argue it at another day and Walter said that the confirmation is not good in regard it is not of record nor inrolled and he vouched the 26. of E. 3. fo 20. that the King cannot take notice of any thing without record the next Term upon the first Tuesday it was appointed to be argued again and Doddridge the Kings Serjeant observed foure points First if any inrolment be necessary in the case Secondly admitting that the inrolment be requisite if here be a good inrolment being made after the Kings death Thirdly if the confirmation of the Dean and Chapter be of necessitie to be inrolled Fourthly admit that the confirmation need not to be inrolled and that the lease ought to be inrolled then if this confirmation be good because it was before the inrolment of the lease as to the first he conceived that aswel a Chattel real as a thing personal may vest in the King without Record for it should be inconvenient that Chattels should be inrolled First for the infinitness Secondly for the small value of them in the judgement of Law and he vouched 40. Assises pla 35. of a Legacy devised to the King and 37. H. 6. fo 10. if a Chattel be given to the King there needeth no record and the 28. E. 3. fo 23. the King brings a quare impedit upon a grant of the next presentation without record and yet it was good 21. H. 7. fo 19. an obligation may be granted to the King without record 35. H. 8. Brook prerogative and 33. H. 6. the Baily shall have aid of the King and he vouched also 2. E. 6. Brook prerogative and 35. H. 6. fo 3. Fitz. villinage and Brook prerogative and the 21. H. 7. fo 8. if a man possest of a Term be outlawed this Term is in the King by outlawry without Record to the second point he thought that the inrolment was good after the Queens death for the inrolment ought to relate as it appears by 1. H. 7. fo 28. and this relation disaffirmeth the mean estate and gives also the mean profits and as to the point of relation he vouched Nichols Case Plowden where the entrie of the heir once lawful was made unlawful by relation and he vouched also 14. H. 8. fo 18. in the end of Wheelers Case and by the 4. H. 7. fo 10. a man seised of land is attainted of Treason the King grants this land to A. the person attainted commits a Trespass and is restored by Parliament the Patentee shall never have an action of Trespass because this restitution takes away the cause of action and to prove that the inrolment may be well enough after the Queens death he said that the said case put to be resolved in the 19th of Eliz. Dyer fo 355. concerning the Duke of Somerset was after adjudged contrary to
the said resolution and he said that the case concerning parcel of the land contained in S. the Deed come in question in Parliament in the 43. Eliz. and it was then commanded that the Deed should be inrolled and also he compared it to a case put in Shelleys Case that the heir shall have land as by discent from his father although that the conveyance be not inrolled in the life of the father also he said that the Queen dieth not as to her body politick to the third point he said that the confirmation need not to be inrolled for it passeth nothing and is but a bare assent and therefore differeth from the case of Patron and Ordinary and of a disseissee for the disseisee hath right to grant end the Patron and Ordinary have interest in R. but Bishops are seised in their own right and therefore their lease wants the approbation only of the Dean and Chapter and he vouched Cook lib. 3. the Dean and Chapter of Norwiches Case and the writ of Sine Assensu Capituli in the Register proveth it for the tit confirmation pl. 30. observes and Littleton in the end of his chap. of discontinuance saith that a parson may charge the Gleab by the assent of the Patron and Ordinary and the opinion of Brook in the case of the 33. of H. 8. tit confirmation pl. 30. agreeth to this opinion and so are some opinions in the 7. H 4. fo 15. 16. and he said that this point was adjudged accordingly in the first of Ma. but he had not the record thereof and therefore he would not insist upon it and he vouched 1. and 2. of Ma. Dyer fo 106. and Cook lib 6. fo 15. Hodges Case that the acceptance of the Patron is good enough to make a confirmation to the fourth point he said that the confirmation was good notwithstanding it be before the inrolment of the lease for the lease shall stay his operation until all the Ceremonies be used for the perfection of the estate and he vouched Littleton fo 122. and 6. E. 6. Dyer fo 69. where a parson made a lease to commence after his death the Patron and Ordinary in the life of the parson confirmed it and this is good and he vouched also Anne Maiowes Case Cook lib. 1. where the father confirmed the sons grant when he had but a possibilitie and yet good and he vouched Dyer 2. 3. Eliz. fo 194. where a grant was incertain and the inception was before the confirmation after makes it good and therefore he said if disseissor and disseissee bargain land although it be but a confirmation of the disseisee which may be well enough without inrolment of the Deed by a bare delivery yet this shall hinder the operation until the inrolment of the Deed which should pass the estate from the disseisor and by Cook lib. 5. Fitz. Case it appeareth that one part of the assurance shall stay his operation until another part hath his perfection and therefore he concluded that here the confirmation in judgement of Law should stay his operation until the lease be inrolled which passed the estate see the argument of Serjeant Nichols to the contrary and also the argument of Thomas Crew in Easter Term and Trin. 7. Jac. Pasch 7. Jac. in the Exchequer Catesbies Case Pasch 7. Jac. in the Exchequer TAnfield chief Baron said that in the year 31. Eliz it was adjudged in Goar and Peers Case if Tenant for life infeoffe A. and his heirs to the use of the feoffee and his heirs during the life of the feoffor that this is a forfeiture because these words during the life of the feoffor shall be but to the use limited and he put the case which Serjeant Nichols put at the Bar of the Lady Catesby which was that a man suffered a recovery to the use of William Catesby and Anne his wife and of the longer liver of them and of the Executors of William for forty years if one Elizabeth Catesby should so long live William Catesby dies and the reversion came to the King by forfeiture and he pretended that Elizabeth Catesby being dead the estate is also determined in regard that these words if Elizabeth shall so long live refer to all the estate but Curia avisari vult It was said by the chief Baron that if a man plead a deed in writing and the other partie do not pray Oyer the same Term he shall not have Oyer in another Term in the Common Pleas but in the Kings Bench Oyer shall be granted in another Term. It was found by office that Elizabeth Bowes was convicted of Recusancy in 35. Eliz. and that a lease for years was made unto her in the year 36. Eliz. in trust and that she had conveyed this lease over according to the trust and a question was demanded if the King shall have this term or not for her Recusancy and it seemed that he shall because she is not capable nor lyable of any trust and therefore the conveyance made by the Recusant was as if it had been without any compulsion by reason of the trust If a Coppiholder of the Kings Mannor pretendeth prescription for a Modus decimandi against the Parson the right of Tithes shall be tried in the Exchequer and a prohibition was granted to the Ecclesiastical Court in this Case Owen Ratliff was lessee for years of the King rendring rent and he assigned his Term to Sir Thomas Chichley in trust for payment of the debts of the said Owen Ratliff and after the Debts were paid Chichley resigned it but in the interim between the assignment and the resignment divers rents incurred to the King and the Barons agreed that these arretages in Law may be levied upon the land of Chichley notwithstanding the trust but because the Court was informed that the Executors of Ratliff had assets and continued farmer of the farm at that time they compelled him to pay it and being present in Court they imprisoned him untill payment made and allowed him his remedy by English Bill against Chichley and that by the agreement Chichley was to have paid the rents to the King The Earl of Cumberlands Case IT was found by diem clausit extremum after the death of G. Eearl of Cumberland that King E. 2. gave to the Lord Clifford inter alia the Mannor of Skipton in Craven to him and to the heirs of his body and found further the discent in a direct line until the time of H. 6. and that the first Donee and all others to whom it descended were seised prout lex postulat without determining any estate in certain in the Donee and they found that H. 6. by sufficient conveyance concessit Revertionem nec non manerium de Skipton in Craven to Thomas Lord Clifford to whom the estate given by E. 2. was descended and his heirs by force whereof the said Thomas was seised prout lex postulat and found the discent to the
Sir Robert Dudley appointed and after Sir Robert Dudley by licence from the King Travelled beyond the Seas to Venice and after the Barganees made a lease to Sir Robert Lee to the intent that the Lady Dudley should take the profits of part thereof for ten years if the estate of the Barganees should continue so long unrevoked and after the King having notice of divers abuses made by the said Sir Robert Dudley in the parts beyond the Seas commanded the said Sir Robert Dudley by privy Seal delivered unto him the 10th of April in the 5th year upon pain of forfeiture of all his lands and fortunes to return again immediately c. and after a Commission issued forth to inquire what lands and Tenements c. Sir Robert Dudley had or others for him in use or upon confidence and the Iury found this special matter but found not any fraud expressy and thereupon the King exhibited his Bill here against the Barganees and also against Sir Robert Lee their Lessee who truly discovered all this special matter and that they were not knowing of the Deed until long time after making of it and that no consideration was given by them in this case for the lands so bargained and it was argued by Sir Henry Mountague Recorder of London for the King if these lands should be seised or not he conceived that there are three things considerable in the case First the contempt of Sir Robert Dudley in his not returning upon the sight of the privy Seal and of what quality this offence is Secondly what interest the King had by this offence in the land of Sir Robert Dudley being the offender Thirdly if notwithstanding these offences these lands ought to be seised for the King touching the first point he said that it is requisite to examine if a subject at the Common Law may go beyond the Seas without Licence and in what cases the Law allows a man to go out of the Realm without Licence and as to that he said that it appears by the reason in the 12th of Eliz. Dyer that at the Common Law every man may go out of the Realm but the Statute of the 5. Richard 2. restraineth all but Merchants noble men and Souldiers and as he conceived this was but an affirmance of the Common Law notwithstanding the Book before cited and to prove that he said that the opinion of Dyer in the first Eliz. fo 165. seemeth to agree also it is proved by divers Licences granted before this Statute see F. N. B. fo 85. in the writ de securitate invenienda quod Se non divertat ad partes exteras sine licentia regis according to the 12. Eliz. in Dyer and he further said that there are two reasons to prove that no man may go beyond the Sea without Licence at the Common Law for by 2. E. 3. and the 16. E. 3. and Glanvil in his Chap. of Essoynes by such means the subjects may be deprived of their suits for debt and also the King may be deprived of the attendance of his subject about the business of state and it appears by the Register fo 193. 194. that religious persons purchased licences to go beyond the Seas and it appears by Littleton in the Chap. of confirmation that a dissent takes not away an entry of him who is beyond the Sea except it be by the Kings commandment see the case intended by Littleton in the Chap. of Continual claim there it seems to be a doubt to Littleton then he argued further if the Common Law alloweth not a subject to go beyond the sea without licence but reputes it a great contempt this is a great contempt in him who will not return by the Kings command and the Law hath alwayes punished such contempt as it appears by Dyer fo 28. 177. 19. E. 2. John de Brittons Case also there is a president for seisure of all his lands for such contempt and he vouched the book what the King had done where he cited that the Prior of Oswaldshire forfeited all his lands and possessions for such contempts and so concluded the first point of the quality of the offence and spoke nothing of the licence which Sir Robert Dudley had of the King at the time the which as it seemeth was not expired nor the power which the King had to Countermand it within the time to which the Attorney general in his argument did speak to the Second point it seemeth that the contempt giveth such an interest to the King that he shall retain the land until conformity for he who dwelleth in contempt ought not to have any possessions here and he cited the 22. H. 6. and the 21. H. 7. and divers other books which are cited in Calvins Case Cook lib. 7. also he said that there is a difference where the King is offended as King of England and where as head of the Kingdome as this case is which is a greater offence in qualitie then for any offence for which men should lose their lives as if they should stand mute upon their arraignment c. also there is a great difference between this contempt and by outlawry and therefore in case of outlawry he needs no office but the King is only intitled to the profits of his lands which is but a transitory Chattel in which case an office is not necessary but where an interest coms to the King there ought to be an office and he vouched Pages Case in Cook lib. 5. and Sir William Herberts Case but he did not endeavour to prove what interest came to the King in this case for when an interest comes to the King there ought to be on office as to the second point he said that trust between parties is fraud as to the King and in this case the badges of fraud are found by the office First his purpose to go beyond the Seas Secondly his Barganees are not privy to the Deeds Thirdly no summe was paid by them Fourthly here is a power of Revocation Fifthly covenants to execute all grants as Sir Robert Dudley appointed Sixthly the subsequent Act that is viz. his staying beyond the Seas and his not returning upon the Kings command and although in this case there be no fraud in the parties who are Barganees and so the fraud is only of one partie yet it appeareth by the 19. of H. 8.12 that if an infant hath right to land and a stranger disseise the Tenant to the intent to infeoffe the infant without Covin in the infant yet the infant shall not be remitted and he vouched Delamores case in Plowden to be accordingly also there are divers cases in our books to prove the inveterate hatred which our law beareth to all Acts which are fraudulent and therefore in 44. E. 3. 41. Assise pla 28. it appears that a recovery upon a good title although it be in Dower which is favoured in Law against a Tenant who comes to the
come ceo only of foure Bullaries if this fine and the use of the estate passed thereby shall be directed by the covenant it was the question and it was moved for a doubt what Bullarie that shall be intended whereof the fine is not levied by reason of the incertaintie quaere and it was adjourned Nota that an estreate of divers fines imposed upon several indictments at the Quarter Sessions for several Riots was sent into this Court and the estreat here being mentioned not for what offences the fines were imposed and the records of the indictments were in the Crown office by a Certiorari and the chief Baron Tanfield said that the estreat was insufficient and we ought not to send out Proces upon them because they do not mention the quality of the offence for which the fines were imposed and therefore it may be discharged by Plea yet if the estreat be not warranted by the indictment so that the indictment is discharged for insufficiency in the Kings Bench the Record thereof may be certified into the Chancery and by mittimus transferred hither and we may discharge the estreat and Altham Baron agreed that the partie grieved by such fine upon an insufficient indictment may plead all this matter and spare to remove the Record and if the Kings Attorney will confess the plea to be true it is as good as if the Record had been removed which was not denied An Amercement for a by Law IT was moved for the King upon a lease holden for him that I.S. was amerced 10. l. because he received a poor man to be his Tenant who was chargable to the parish contrary to a pain made by the Township and thereupon Proces issued out of this Court and the Baily distrained and I. S. brought Trespas and it was said by the Barons and ordered that if I. S. will bring an action for the distraining for this amercement be it lawfully imposed or not yet I. S. shall be restrained to sue in any other Court but in this and here he shall sue in the office of Pleas if he will for the Bailiff levied it as an officer of this Court and for the matter Snig said that if I. S. received a poor man into his house against a by Law made in the Township there is good cause of amercement but by Tanfield it is nothing to us that they have a custome to make by-Lawes herein against a by Law made by us also a leet of it self hath no authority to make by Lawes or such an order but by custome it is good Snig and Altham Barons it is good policy to make an order with a pain in a Leet that no person shall receive any such Tenant as shall be chargable to the parish but clearly the Steward cannot amerce one for such a cause without an order with a pain made before Sir John Littletons case SIr Iohn Littletons case was that all the lands of a Monastery were granted unto one Dudley reserving 28. l. rent yearly for a Tenth of all the laid land according to the Statute and after Dudley granted the greater part of this land to Littleton and that he had used upon the agreement made between Dudley and him to pay 20. l. yearly for the Tenth of his part and Dudley had used to pay 8. l. yearly for that which he retained and after Dudley was attainted whereupon his part of the said land came to the King and now the Auditor would impose the charge for all the Tenth upon Littleton but by the Court although the Tenth was Originally chargable and leviable upon all and every part of the land yet it being apparant to them that part thereof came to the Kings hands it was ordered that the land of Sir Iohn Littleton should be discharged before the Auditor prorata and so it was and Littleton to pay only 20. l. yearly Sweet and Beal NOta that in Michaelmas Term 6. Iac. upon a special verdict this case was depending in the Exchequer viz. Anthony Brown devised a term to his wife until the issue of the body of the Devisor accomplish the age of 18. years bringing up the said child Provided that if the devisor die without issue that then the land shall go to the said wife for term of her life paying to the sister of the Devisor 6. l. 13. s. 4. d. yearly which he willed to be paid at two feasts half yearly and that if it be arrear then it shall be lawful for the sister to distrain and to detain the distress until it be paid and the Iury found that the devisor had issue at the time of his death but that the said issue died before he accomplished the age of 18. years and they found also that the rent of 6. l. 13. s. 4. d. payable to the sister was not paid at one day in which it was payable and that no demand was made for it and that Moil Beal who was the right heir entred for the condition broken and made a lease to the Plantiff who being outed by the wife brought an Ejectione firme and Chibborn of Lincolns Inne argued that the entrie of the heir is lawful first he said when he devised to his wife until his heir come to the age of 18. years bringing up the said heir if in this case the heir die within the said age the state of the wife is determined by reason that the education was the cause the land should continue to the wife and the cause being determined by the death of the heir before the said age therefore the estate is also determined and upon that he bouched a case in Mich. 3. Iac. one Collins devised that one Carpenter should have the over-sight and managing of his land until his son should attain the age of 5. years and the son died before he attained the said age and it was agreed admitting that Carpenter had by that devise an interest that it is now determined by the death of the heir to the second matter viz. when it is limited that if the devisor die without issue that then the wife shall have it by that it seems to me that the wife shall not have an estate for life by these words as our case for at the time of the death of the devisor he had issue so that it cannot be said that he died without issue although now we may say that he is dead without issue but in regard that the words of the will are not performed according to the proper intendment of them the Iudges ought not to make another construction then according to the litteral sence the litteral construction being properly the words to bear such a meaning and this as he said may be proved by Wildes case in Cook lib. 6. but more strong is our case because in a case which carrieth the land from the heir there ought to be a strong and strickt and not a favourable construction made to the prejudice of the heir
and therefore he vouched a case between Scockwood and Sear where a man devised part of his land to his wife for life and another part of his land until Michaelmas next ensuing his death and further by the said will he devised to his younger son all his lands not devised to his wife and adjudged that by the said words the younger son shall have only that parcel which was devised to the wife for life and not that which was devised unto her till Michaelmas and yet by Popham it appeareth that his intent was otherwise viz. that all that should go to his younger son so there ought not to be a strained construction made against the heir and so in our case the words being that if he die without issue c. that then it shall go to his wife herein as much as he had issue at the time of his death it cannot be said that he died without issue but that he is dead without issue and this appeareth by the pleading in the Lord Bartleys case in Plowden and he vouched also a case in the Kings Bench 4. Jac. between Miller and Robinson where a man devised to Thomas his son and if he die without issue having no son there it was holden that if the devisee had issue a son yet if he had none at the time of his death the devisee in the remainder shall have it yet he was once a person having a son and so in our case there was a person who did not die without issue and he vouched also the case of Bold and Mollineux in 28. H. 8. Dyer fo 15.3 when a man deviseth to his wife for life paying a yearly rent to his sister and that if the rent be not paid that the sister may distrain it seems to me that this is a conditional estate in the wife notwithstanding the limitation of the distress and he vouched 18. Eliz. in Dyer 348. which as he said proved the case expresly for there in such a case it is adjudged that the devisee of the rent may after demand thereof distrain and yet the heir may enter for the not payment of the rent although it were never demanded so that the subsequent words of distraining do not qualifie the force of the condition although there be there an express condition and in our case but a condition implyed and he said that it seemed reasonable that such a construction for the distress and condition also shall stand as appeareth by divers cases that upon such words the Law will allow a double remedy and therefore he vouched Gravenors case in the Common Pleas Hill 36. Eliz. Rot. 1322. where a lease was made by Magdalen Colledge to husband and wife so that if the husband alien that the lease shall be void and provided that they do not make any under-tenants and to this purpose he vouched the case of the Earl of Pembrook cited in the Lord Cromwels case Cook lib. 2. where the words amounted to a covenant and a coudition and if this word paying should not be construed to be a condition then it were altogether void and idle and such a construction ought not to be made in a will and he conceived that this rent ought to be paid by the wife without any demand upon the pain of the condition and therefore he vouched 22. H. 6. fo 57.14 E. 4 21. E. 4. by Hussey and 18. Eliz. Dyer 348. vouched before and so it was resolved as he said in the Court of Wards in Somings case where a man made a devise paying a rent to a stranger this ought to be paid without demand and he said that the Common case is proved when a feofment is made upon condition that the feoffee shall do an act to a stranger this ought to be done in convenient time without request by the stranger and so here it seemeth although a demand ought to be made by the sister yet the wife ought to give notice to the sister of the Legacy so that she may make a demand and therefore he vouched Warder and Downings case where a man devised that his eldest son upon entry should pay to the younger son such a summe of money here the eldes brother ought to give notice at what time he will enter to the intent that the younger brother may be provided to make a demand Edwards of the Inner Temple contrary First it seemeth that by this limitation the wife ought to retain the land until the issue of the devisor should have come to the age of 18. years for this a time certain and as it is construed upon such words in Borastons case Cook lib. 3. that the Executors there have an interest certain so it should be construed here to refer to a certainty which is until the time by computation that the issue should have attained to 18. years and the rather in this case in respect the devisor had otherwise disposed of the land until the son should have accomplished the said age Secondly it seemeth that the wife hath an estate for life not conditional in so much as the words are not joyned in the case the 18. Eliz. Dyer hath been vouched but that was upon an express condition but here it is by implication and then the clause of distress taketh away the force of the implication which otherwise might be thereupon inferred and therefore in 5. Eliz. Dyer it appeareth that the word Proviso annexed to other words makes it no condition in judgement of Law and so in 14. Eliz. Dyer 311. and he vouched also 18. Eliz. Dyer Greens case that if a man deviseth lands to his friends paying to his wife with a clause of distress this is no condition as it is adjudged Thirdly it seemeth that this summe to be paid to the sister is a rent and therefore ought to be demanded or otherwise in judgement of Law the condition shall not be broken and the 21. E. 4. the case of an obligation to perform covenants c. and a case between Wentworth and Wentworth 37. Eliz. that a demand ought to be made for a rent which is granted in liew of Dower for the wife brought a writ of Dower for the land of her husband the Tenant pleaded that she accepted a rent out of the land in liew of her Dower and the wife replied that the said rent was granted upon condition that if it were not paid at certain dayes that it should be void and that she should have Dower of the land and she said that the rent was not paid at the dayes c. but shewed not in her pleading any demand to be made and therefore it was holden evil pleading for such a rent ought to be demanded or otherwise the condition is not broken and so here Nota that this case was appointed to be argued again but after as I heard the Barons amongst themselves resolved to give judgement for the Defendant upon one point only which was that the estate
Executor prosecureth as Executor c. and for the Testator and there it ought to have a resemblance of the Regionall debt and although that the Statute appoints that the sayl shall be to the party as Altham Baron remembred yet here as the pleading purports the Bayl is to the aforesaid Executor which implies a legall dependency upon the first suit Then it hath been granted and the Law is so that if an Executor recover a debt which was due to the Testator and hath judgement for it now if you will have an action upon this judgement this ought to be in the detinet because it is a legall pursuance of a thing given to the Testator and not voluntary as a bond for further security or assurance and so here the Bayl being pursuant and compulsory but by 5. E. 3. if it be voluntary then it ought to be put in the Kings Bench to an Executor which is to be resembled to our case if an Executor bring debt upon a Bayl it ought to be as Executor and not as I. S. cleerely Altham the Bayl in the Kings Bench is upon the originall suit and so it is not here wherefore c. to which it was not answered but for that matter it was adjourned see H. 6. in the Kings Bench if a Feme c. take Husband and one of the Debtors of the Testator promise the husband if he will forbear his suite to pay the debt if the Husband will commence his action upon this promise it ought to be in the name of his Wife also because the action pursueth the Originall debt Williams contr it was agreed that if the Law were such that the Action ought to be in the detinet only then the bringing of it in the debet and detinet is such a Ieofaile as is not aided by the Statute of 18. Eliz. Nichols case and Chamberlains case Cook lib. 5. Tanfield chief Baron said in this case that it is proper that the Action ought to be brought in the detinet only but as our case is here is no issue joyned because here is not a negative and an affirmative for the declaration is that he oweth and detaineth and the Bar whereupon the issue is joyned is that he oweth not so where if his Action ought to be in the detinet then there is not any Nâ—gative and so no issue which was not denyed at another day they agreed that the action ought to have bin in the detinet only and therefore judgement was given that the Plaintif take nothing by his bill Sir Henry Browns case touching the Countesse of Pembrook SIR Henry Browns case wherein Hawkins and Moore were parties was this the Plaintif declared of an ejectment of the Mannor of Kiddington Dâ—le Sale and doth not mention them to be adjacent to any Ville and also of an 100. Acres of Land lying in the same Ville of S. and that upon not guilty pleaded the Iury at the Assises at Oxon were ready and then the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintif after the last continuance had entred into a Close called Well Close parcell of the Tenements mentioned with conclusion and this in the Declaration he is ready to aver and demanded judgement if it c. and this was before Yelveton Iudge of Nisi Prius there and now the Plea here was debated And 1. in this case it was upon conference with all the Iudges allowed that this plea may be pleaded at the Assises well enough and the Iudge there accepting of it had done well but as Tanfield chief Baron said the Iudges may allow it or not for if they perceive that it is Dilatory they may refuse it for it is in their discretion and therefore c. But by Dodderidge the Kings Serjeant the Iudge of Nisi prius is not Iudge thereof if it be well pleaded or not but is to give day to the Parties in Court where the Suit depends to maintain this Plea for he is only appointed Iudge to take the issué and upon such Plea he ought to discharge the Iury of the matter in issue and record the Plea and this is all his duty and by him in this case here is a Discontinuance for the parties have no day given upon the Roll as it ought to be for the day in bank in judgement of Law is all one with the day of Nisi prius and this is of course given to the Parties to hear Iudgement only concerning the matter in issue and here is other matter and therefore the Iudge c. Nota that in all Cases where a thing is pleaded triable before other Iudges the Iudge before whom it depents ought to give day to the Parties to be before the Iudges where the matter is tryable 12. E. 3. Voucher 115. and Title Day 25. and 34. and Assise pla 14. a Lord demands Cognizance of Pleas day ought to be given to the Franchises or otherwise it is a discontinuance of the Nisi prius for there ought to be a speciall day for the parties here to hear judgment in this Plea 10. H. 7. fo 26. so if at the Nisi prius a protection be cast the Iudges shall give day to the Parties in Bank to hear judgment if this protection shalve allowed or not for the Iudg of Nisi prius is no Iudg therof Also the Iudg in this case ought to have discharged the Iury it appears not here that he had done so therefore upon the whole matter it is a discontinuance but admitting that here was no discontinuance it seemeth that the plea was good and I agree that in all cases of Pleas issuable the plea ought to be expresly shewed or that which Tantamounts and here is shewed that which Tantamounts for when the Plantiffe in his Action had shewed the names of the Mannors and the Towns in which the acres lies then the Venue to try it for every parcel shall come de vicineto from all together and by consequence it is reasonable that the Venue for the trial of one particular to be parcel or not parcel shall come from all for if the plea in this case were that the Plantiff hath entred into the premises this had been good and then if it be good for the general it seemeth it should be good for every particular also it is clear that two may be parcel of all the three Mannors as in this case it is admitted to be parcel of all the premises by the demurrer if so c. Coventry the plea here is not good for the plea is to the writ and the conclusion ought to be pursuant to the premises of the plea or otherwise the plea is not good 36. H. 6. if a man plead to the writ and conclude to the Action it is evil 20. Eliz. Dyer 361. also the plea is not good because it is not shewed where the land lies wherein the entrie is alledged and therefore if the Plantiffe had denied it then is there no
certain place from whence the Venue should come c. Walter of the Inner Temple it seemeth that the plea is good First this plea although it is but to the writ yet it is peremptory as other pleas to writs are see l. 5. E. 4. fol. as to the conclusion of the plea it is but matter of form which the Clark ought to amend and therefore upon your general demurrer you shall not take advantage of it and by the Court this is but matter of form and not being alledged for one of the special causes agreed that notwithstanding the demurrer be special yet the Court ought to apply the conclusion alwayes as the matter of pleading will bear it and therefore if a man plead to the Iurisdiction of the Court and demand judgement of the writ yet it is good by Newton 7. H. 6. for if the Bar be good the writ is not maintainable and it was said by Popham in a case in the Kings Bench 34. Eliz. that one c. had two issues in one plea. First if one thing be once repeated in a plea repetition thereof will supplie all the residue for avoiding infiniteness in repetitions Secondly one c. will serve to supplie the defect in matter of form as here and as to the Objection that the plea is not good because no certaintie is shewed where the entrie was it seems to me the plea therein is good because here is no need in our case to mention the certainty in the Declaration for here by our plea we offer two things issuable viz. the entrie or not entrie Secondly if it be parcel of the premises or not and when divers things issuable are specified it is not necessary to shew the place of any for it is time enough to shew it in the rejoynder 3. H. 7.11.3 H. 6.8.41 E. 3.8.10 H. 6.1.14 H. 6.31 And therefore it was agreed in the Kings Bench that if one pleads in Bar divers matters issuable the Replication ought not to take issue upon any of them but leave it to the rejoynder to the intent that the place may be shewed therein and so here Secondly here a place is sufficiently shewed by awarding of a venire facias for it is certain enough to shew it to be parcel of the Mannors as it was resolved in Bailies case Trin. 7. Iac. in the Court of Wards then by the same reason it is good enough to shew it to be parcel of all the three Mannors for the Venue shall come from all as it shall be to trie the issue of all and by the demurrer here it is admitted to be parcel of all and therefore c. Thirdly he said that the omission of the place is but matter of form and such a thing is within the Statute of 27. Eliz. and ought to be specially set down or otherwise the partie who demurreth shall take no advantage thereof and to prove that it is but matter of form he vouched the case of Hall and Goodwin in the Kings Beuch Hill 31. Eliz. and he said that a Replication makes not the plea good which is evil in matter of substance and yet a Replication made to a Bar which wanteth a place maketh the plea good which proveth it to be but form also he vouched the case of 34. H. 6.2 in debt the Defendant pleads the receipt of parcel hanging the writ and 34. Eliz. in the Kings Bench between Noy and Midldeton such a plea was in Bar. Stephens the plea is not good in matter for the place where the entrie was made after the last continuance ought to be shewed for alwayes the most certainty ought to be observed for the Venue to arise as 6. H. 7. if Trespass be brought upon the Statute of R. 2. for entring into the Mannor of D. in D. the Venue shall come from the Ville and so here if the place be not parcel of any Mannors yet if it lieth in any Towns mentioned in the Declaration the Venue shall come from the Ville and not from the Mannor 32. H. 6.15 three several places are mentioned and one pleaded a deed dated at the place aforesaid it is not good also here it seemeth if the party will plead and not demur the want of place ought to be shewed in the rejoynder as it hath been conceived on the other side but if he will not replie but demur upon the Bar the plea in Bar is not good Trin. 40. Eliz. in B. R. Rot. 1023. an Action of Covenant was brought by a Bishop of a Lessee and no place alledged where the assignment was made and a demurrer thereupon and adjudged that the plea was not good and there it was also agreed that it was not matter of form and so here see after Tanfield chief Baron excepted to the form of an entrie for the King which was that Postea the Iustices of Assise Deliberaverunt Tenorem placiti c. for by him the Presidents in the Kings Bench are quod deliberaverunt recordum praedictum which as he thought was the best but after upon the view of a President shewed where an exception was taken in Baron Manwoods case upon a writ of error in the Exchequer Chamber after judgement given here and the entrie then allowed to be good and upon the view also of divers Presidents shewed by Turner Master of the pleas the chief Baron and all the Court agreed and resolved that the entrie of Tenorem placiti or Tenorem recordi is as good or better then recordum praedictum c. and therefore nothing was spoken to that exception see the President of pleading in Stradling and Morgans case Plowden where it is Tenorem placiti Sir Anthony Ashleys case IT was agreed by all the Court in Sir Anthony Ashleys case that if the King be intitled to the profits by an outlawry and after B. assigns a debt to the King and the King had granted the profits which accrued by the outlawry to Ashley yet the lands of Ashley may be extended for this debt for the King had no interest in the land but only the profits for the outlawry and therefore it may be extended for debt per Curiam quaere if so for a common person Hill 8. Jac. in the Exchequer Ewer against Moil Hill 8. Jac. in the Exchequer THe case was this that a Commission issued out of the Chancery to Baron Sotherton and others and this was in 7. Iac. to inquire what lands and Tenements the late Prior of Bister in Com. Oxon. had in Caversfield in the County of Bucks and to inquire if a rent reserved upon a grant made to Banbury of the lands of the Priory be arrere or not and by vertue thereof the Iury of the County of Bucks found that the Church of Bister in the County of Oxon. was founded by the name of the Church of Saint Mary and Saint Egbert and that Thomas Banbury Prior in the year c. made a lease to one Banbury of the moitie of
convicted of the intrusion and Moil said that he ought to shew matter sufficient whereupon he upon the intrusion aforesaid ought to be convicted so that a thing is demanded of us to give out judgement in which is not in question before us and therefore no judgement at all may be given here wherefore it is not needful for us to dispute other matters in the case and as to the questions in Law which were argued by George Crook and others Tanfield chief Baron nor Altham spoke not at all because they might come before them again to be adjudged upon a better office but Bromley and Snig Barons spoke to the matters in Law and their opinions were as follow and upon the plea of Moil the case was this that the Tenant pleaded protestando that the Priory of Bister was not founded by the name of the Priory of Saint Mary and Saint Egbert of Bister as the inquisition supposeth for plea he saith that one Thomas Banbury Prior of the Church of Saint Mary and Saint Egbert of Bister infeoffed him of the Mannor of Caversfield by the name of the Moity of his Mannor of Caversfield as also by the name of all his lands and Tenements in Caversfield and that the said feofment was made by the name of the Prior of Saint Egbert of Bister and that it was known aswel by the name of Saint Egbert as Saint Mary and that the Mannor of Caversfield was well known by the name of the Moity of the Mannor of Caversfield and that the Prior had no other land in Caversfield and shewed also that there is another in Caversfield which is called Langstons Mannor the which heretofore was the Priors and allotted as a Moitie of a Mannor in the same Mannor of Caversfields and those and other circumstances he used in his plea to the intent to shew that all the land of the Prior shall pass to him and he shewed that this Mannor sold to him was known by the name of Langstons Mannor Bromley Baron the Corporation is mis-named in the Grant because it is a thing material viz. the omission of the word Saint Mary for the name of assent in a body politick is as the name of Baptisme in a body natural and the name of Baptisme cannot be missnamed as it appears 3. H. 6. and 1. H. 7 if Iohn by the name of Thomas make an Obligation this shall not binde him if he doth not admit it and therefore it shall not conclude the King see the 11. Eliz. Dyer 279. where in some cases the estate shall pass by livery and seisin by what name soever it be made but a Corporation cannot pass an estate from them but by Charter and it may be conceived that the founder intended two things the one was Religion or more properly superstition the other was that it may remain to posterity as a Monument of the piety of his Ancestors and then if the name should be altered the remembrance would also decay and therefore what name soever is first imposed ought alwayes to be observed and that the omission of Saint is material and he vouched Eaton Colledge case 3. and 4. Ma. Dyer and 35. H. 6.31 the case of the foundation of Saint Peter and Paul c. but he agreed the case in 11. Eliz. Dyer 278. that omission of the word undivided is not prejudicial because no material variance Secondly it seemed that all the Priors Mannor of Caversfied passed by this grant for by 20. H. 6. and 22. H. 6. it appears that a feofment of 20. Acres by the name of a Mannor is good and 6. and 7. E. 6. Dyer if a man grant his Mannor in S. containing 10. Acres yet if it contain 20. Acres it is good and the word Omnia greatly inforceth the case as it seemeth wherefore c. Snig Baron said that the mis-naming is a material variance which avoids the grant also it seemeth that Omnia alia shall not be intended to refer to more then was granted by the other words except there were other lands besides the Mannor and therefore he thought that only a Moity of the Priors Mannor passed super totam materiam Sir Henry Browns case before HObert Attorney general it seems to me that the plea is not good for divers causes see the beginning before fol. he said that first every issuable plea ought to express a place but if the issue be triable by the Record or witnesses a place is not necessary 11. H. 7. fo 1. if there be no place there is no plea and therefore if it be beyond the Sea it is no plea. Secondly in our case there is no place alledged from whence the venue should come to trie the entrie in this case to be of all the premises for it is to trie the entrie but in one particular parcel but I agree as it hath been said of the other part if the entry had been alledged to be in the premises then the venue shall come from all the premises for here the plea of the entrie pleaded by the Defendant is double and yet it is good because of necessitie it cannot be otherwise intended in this case but I cannot plead in this case that I have not entred into two Closes parcel of the premises for that is Negative preignans as is in 9. H. 6. fo 44. in debt upon a bond where the Defendant was bound to require a house the Defendant said that A. by the command of the Plantiffe disturbed him the Plantiffe shall not be admitted to replie that A. did not disturb him by his command but by protestation that A. did not disturb him for plea that the Plantiffe did not command him c. 6. H. 6. fo 9. in a writ of entrie the Tenant pleads that the demandant confirmed after the last continuance the demandant shall not say that he did not confirm after the last continuance 5. E. 3. fo 1. in a per quae servitia of the grant to the husband and wife the Defendant said that the wife released while she was sole the other cannot replie that she did not release when she was sole but ought to deny the deed and so in our case if you will say by protestation that the place where the entrie is supposed is not parcel c. for plea that you have not entred after the last continuance then the issue ought to be joyned if we please or not and this shall not have any reference to the premises but only to the two Closes and then the venue shall come from the two Closes wherefore c. also by this plea so uncertain the Plantiffe is prejudiced for admit that in this case Hawkins the Defendant had re-entred before the day of nisi prius this had made our writ good again as appears by 26. H. 8. fo 10. and 36. H 6. and 8. H. 7. and then if here the Defendant will say that the Plaintiff had entred before the issue now it shall not be
in 1. Jacobi and no other conviction ever was and yet de facto he continued a Recusant untill his death and his Land viz. two parts thereof were seised in his life and the King answered of 200. l. thereof which incurred in the moneths contained in the Indictment and now a Writ is issued which supposeth the said Robert to be indebted to the King in 20. l. for every moneth be lived after 28. Eliz. untill 1. Jacobi for his Recusancy which amounted to 4000. l. which Writ also commands to enquire what Lands the said Robert Becket had at the time of his death and thereupon it was found that he had divers Lands c. and upon a Scire facias to the Terretenants to shew cause wherefore two parts of the Lands of the said Robert Becket should not now be seised for the debt of the Recusant aforesaid one Henry Becket as Terretenant or Tenant of the Premisses pleaded that the King is satiefied of all the 20. l. and for all the moneths that the said Robert was convicted to be a Recusant and he vouched the Constat thereof under the hand of the Deputy of the Pipe Office and for the residue he said that by 28. Eliz. cap. 6. it is amongst other things enacted that if any person which hath not repaired or shall not repaire to some Church Chappell or usuall place of Common Prayer but hath forborne or shall forbeat the same contrary to the Tenor of the Statute of 23. Eliz. cap. 1. and hath been heretofore convicted for such offence shall forfeit c. provided that it he hath made submission and been conformable according to the true meaning of the said Statute or shall fortune to dye that then no forfeiture of 20. l. for any moneth or for seisure of the Lands of the same offender from and after such submission and conformity or death and full satisfaction of all the arrerages of 20 l. monethly before such seisure due or payable shall ensue or be continued against such Offendor and traverseth without that that there is any Record besides this Writ to charge the said Robert Becket deceased of or for the summe of 4000. l. towards our said Lord the King c. and so prayeth to be discharged thereof Vpon which Plea the Kings Atturney Generall demurred and Coventry argued that the Plea is good he said that there are three Points to be considered First that if a man be convicted of Recusancy in 28. Eliz. for 10. moneths then passed and de facto continueth a Recusant untill his death in 1. Jac. without other conviction if now the King can claim 20. l. a moneth for more moueths then are contained in the Indictment whereupon he is convicted Secondly admit that the King may have the forfeiture for every moneth whereof no conviction was as well as if a conviction had been then if the King can seise the Lands for the payment thereof after his death no seisure being had for it in his life by the Stat. of the 28. Eliz. or if the power of seisure be altogether gone by the death of the Recusant Thirdly admitting that the King shall have more then is contained within the Indictment if the Debt it self be not gone by the death of the Recusant To the first Point there is no President to be found that any man convicted before 28. Eliz. was charged to the Payment of more then that which was within the Indictment and the words of the Statute of 28. Eliz. contained within this Clause which provides for the payment due since the Conviction do not inforce any construction to the contrary and in this Clause the words being do yet remain unpaid are not proper words but for a thing payable before this Statute for so many moneths whereof he was convicted of Recusancy and the words without any other conviction are to be understood for so much as was unpaid of that contained in the Indictment and the last Clause of this Branch of the Statute hath not the words without any conviction and the other Clause provides that by expresse words for the future time every person who shall be once convicted shall forfeit c without other conviction and it was resolved Hill 4. Jacobi in the Kings Bench between Grinstone and Oliver that the Statute of 28. Eliz. alters and adds three things to the Statute of 23. Eliz. 1. That all the money due for Recusancy shall be paid into the Exchequer 2. This limits a time for payment thereof yearly viz. in the four Terms of the year 3. This giveth a penalty viz. power to seise all the goods and two parts for non-payment but all that is only for that which was payable before the conviction and therefoâ—e the words in the Branch which contains our Case have apt words of construction that he shall pay all due for the paine of seisure for 23. Eliz. gives no seisure but imprisonment if payment be not made within three moneths after judgement and so in our case Conviction ought to precede the duty To the second Point it seemeth that the power of seisure within this Statute is gone by the death of the Recusant for before the Statute of 1. Jacobi the power for seisure was but a penalty that if the party fail in payment of 20. l. a moneth then c. and in all cases upon penall Laws if the party die before the penalty inflicted this shall not be inflicted at all and that this is but a penalty he vouched one Grayes case in 1. and 2. Jacobi to be adjudged accordingly Also the words in this Statute which give the seisure of Land appointeth a levying to be of the 3. part for the maintenance of the Offendor his Wife Children and Family and after his death he hath no Wife so that if it be demanded when the seisin must be the answer is then when a third part may be left for his use which cannot be but in the life of the Recusant Also it appoints that the seisure ought to be by Processe which ought to be in the life of the party by intendment Also the Proviso of the Statute of 28. Eli. saith that if any person shall dye no seisure shall insue or be continued aâ—d out case is within those words for in regard there hath been no seisure in his life therefore after his death no seisure ought to insue and the words which purport another semblance of construction viz. and satisfaction of all arrerages are to be understood only in case where there was a former seisure that is in the life of the party and have reference to the words to be continued and that the intent is so he said that the words are so that the Heir shall pay no more but so much as the Land was seised for To the third it seemeth that in this case the debt it self is gone by the death of the party At the Common Law a penalty shall never be recovered against the
words of a fee to be in the feoffor and the Bar confesseth only as of a fee gained in an instant but I agree that if the Bar had been that the Feoffor was Tenant for years and made a Feofment this had been good without Traverse but when Tenant in tail makes a Feofment it shall not be intended that he gained a Fee because it may be he hath purchased the remainder and thereby had lawfully acquitted it as an addition to his estate and here the saying in the Deelaration that Edward Stanley was seised in Fee as a thing material and of necessitie and not superfluous as the pleading in a Declaration for debt upon an Obligation to say that the Obligor was of full age or as a Repetition of the writ which needs not be Traversed and that it appears in 15. Ed. 4. in some case a Surplusâ—ge ought to be Traversed and 7. Ed. 6. Title Formedon the Declaration as in our case ought to be special and 21. H. 7. if a man will maintain debt upon a lease he ought to shew how he was in titled to make the lease also although that in our case the lease for years is the effect of the suit yet I say that the seisin in Fee is the effect of the plea 27. H. 8.50 H. 7.14 in a replevin the Defendant avows as seised in Fee the Plantiffe sayes that he was seised for life and doth Traverse c. and 14. and 15. Eliz. was our very case Dyer 312. and there it is said that the sure way is to take a Traverse as it is also said in 11. Eliz. Dyer also where the Bar saith that one R. was seised in Fee and gave it to the Father of the Feoffor and the heirs of his body he ought to say that the land descended to the Feoffor as son and heir of the body c. also where the Plantiffe declareth of a lease for years made by force of a feofment made the 30. day of August 6. Iac. the Bar saith generally that the 30. day of August 6. Iac. the said Feoffor made a Feofment of the same land to the same persons c. but he doth not say that it is one and the same with the Feofment mentioned in the Declaration so he answereth not our title and for that cause not good and therefore he prayed Iudgement for the Plantiffe Jones of Lincolns Inne to the contrary it seemeth as to the first matter moved that in this case the resioue of the use shall result back to the Feoffor 34. Eliz. Balfores case if Tenant in tail make a Feofment to the use of himself for life without more by Popham the residue of the use shall be to the Feoffee for otherwise the estate for life would be drowned but otherwise it is when a remainder of an use is limited to another in Fee for this saves the drowning or confounding of the estate for life as to the point of remitter it seemeth that it is no other but that Tenant in tail makes a Feofment to the use of himself and his heirs and dies if the issue shall be remitted or not and as to that he said that the Statute of 27. H. 8. cap. 10. hath by express words a saving of all antient rights and therefore the antient right of the estate tail is saved and therefore the issue shall be thereunto remitted and so should the Tenant in tail himself if he had not been within the words of the Statute as it is resolved in Amy Townsends case in Plowden and the authorities of my part are 33. H. 8.54 in Dyer expresly with me and without any quere as to the point of remitter but there it is said that he ought to avoid the lease by entrie as in our ease it is pleaded and as to the pleading it seems there needs no Traverse First because it is matter in Law Secondly we have confessed a Fee in an instant as to the first reason the Declaration is generally of a seisin in Fee and not expresly of a Fee simple and therefore it is matter in Law 5. H. 7. and 11. H. 7.21 the Fee not Traversed 46 Ed. 3.24 in Dower the Defendant pleads a special tail made by one who was seised in Fee the other saith that the Dower had but an estate tail at the time of the gift without Traversing that he was seised in Fee 2. Ed. 4.11 that a seisin in Fee tail is sufficient to maintain an allegation of a seisin in Fee to the second reason it is not alledged expresly that he was seised in Fee but quod cum talis seisitus fuit c. and 34. H. 6.48 he needed not in his Declaration to say that he was seised in Fee Pasch 34. et 35. Eliz. Taylors case if the Plantiffe in a quare impedit alledgeth seisin in Fee and the Defendant confess the seisin by Vsurpation this is a sufficient confession of the seisin in Fee Fitzherbert Title Travers 154. a good case to this purpose and in Moils case cited before on the other side the Plantiffe doth not mention in his Declaration a seisin in Fee absolute and the Defendant saith that A. was seised and gave to the Plantiffe as long as A. had issue of his body he needs not Traverse the absolute Fee Pasch 33. Eliz. in the Common Pleas where there was a stronger case to the replication the Defendant said that the Countess of Devon was seised and leased for life the remainder to her self for life the other saith that the Countess was seised in tail and Traverseth that she was not seised in Fee it is there said that the Countesses estate in Fee need not to be Traversed and yet it was there agreed that in regard it was but matter of form it was aided by the Statute of Jeoffales for that was moved in arrest of judgement Tanfield chief Baron in the principal case the issue of the Feoffor is remitted without entrie notwithstanding the lease because it is not in possession but a lease in remainder and therefore the title of the Lessees is distrained before entrie by the Defendant and therefore the Defendant hath not answered the entrie upon the Lessees for you by your plea destroy the title to this Term which you have allowed them before they were ever in possession thereof and the Declaration is that they were possessed of a Term for years and that you ejected them and to this you give no answer upon the matter for clearly if Tenant in tail make a lease to commence at a day to come and dieth before the day this is meerly void by his death ad quod non fuit responsum see Plowden in Smith and Stapletons case for there it is made a quere and notwithstanding that Tanfield chief Baron with the assâ—nt of the whole Court pronounced that judgement should be entred against the Plantiffe immediately and so it was done Bents case IN a suit depending in this Court between
last matter it seems that the Statute of 1. Jac. cap. 4 hath discharged this Land admitting that it was not discharged before wherein the words are and if any Recusant shall hereafter die his Heir being no Recusant That in every such Case every such Heire shall be freed and discharged of all and singular the penalties charges and incumbrances happening upon him or her in respect or by reason of his or her Ancestors recusancy and as to Walter de Chirtons Case who being an Accomptant to the Ring purchased Lands of A. with the Kings money by Covin and took the profits neverthelesse upon Inquisition it was adjudged that they should be seised into the Kings hands for his debt I agree that to be good Law because A. when he received the said money of Walter de Chirton that being the Kings monie A. immediately thereby became a Debtor and an Accemptent to the King and then into whose hands soever these Lands do after come they are still chargable for that money and therefore c. Sawyer against East AN Ejectione firme was brought by Sawyer against East for certain Mills in East-Smithfield in the County of Middlesex the Case upon a speciall Verdict was this Queen Eliz. 28. of her raign demised two Mills one Messuage and one Curtilage to Potter for 40. years Potter makes Mary his Wife Executrix and dies Mary marries one Burhill who in 33. Eliz. did demise one Messuage and one Curtilage to Wilkenson for 20. years and dies and Mary intermarries one Hitchmore who by deed inrolled in Chancery 20. Marcii 44. Eliz. reciting the originall Lease and that he had the whole Right State and Interest and term of years which Potter had and that he surrendred the estate and term of years aforesaid to the Queen reciting the matter mentioned in the surrender and that the Interest and Term which Potter had is come to Hitchmore and that Hitchmore had surrendred the whole right aswell for 30. l. as for that that Hitchmore did assume at his proper charges to repaire and new build the said Mills being in great decay and to give security for the same did demise the Mills Messuage and Curtilage for 40 years to the said Hitchmore rendring rent with a Covenant to be void for not payment c. and after the King demised the premisses to Ferrers and Philips two contractors who enter and demise to Sawyer who was possessed untill ejected by East who claimed under the lease to Hitchmore and the Iury found that in the Letters Patents to Hitchmore were contained ordinary Covenants to repaire the Mills and to leave them in good repair and the Iury also found that Hitchmore had not given any security for the building and repairing of the Mills and that the Mills were not new built nor repaired and that Hitchmore had pulled down one of the Mills and that the Term of twenty years is yet in being and if upon the whole matter c. Bromley the Puisne Baron saies that it seemed to him that judgement ought to be given for the Plaintiff First the suggestion or surmise in the Patent being false in matter of value and in such a thing which is proper for the information of the Lessee causeth the Lease to be void as in 18. Eliz. Dyer 352. An Abbot makes a Lease for 60. years the Lessee demiseth to I. S. for 80. years the reversion comes to the Queen the 60. years expire the second Lessee surrenders to the Queen his Term and Interest which was nothing in substance to the intention that the Queen should re-grant to him for 20. years this falsitie avoids the Lease and yet it is no such Lease which of necessity ought to be recited and so is 8. H. 7. fo 3. by Vavisor if the King at the suit of I. S. grants the Mannor of D. of the value of 50. marks and this is of the value of 100. marks and this upon the information of the party in this case the grant is void and so is 8. H. 6.28 by Juine if the King be informed by petition that such Land is but of the value of 8. l. a year which in truth is of greater value the patent is void 11. Ed. 4.1 The Patentee suggests that a surrender was made whereas in deed there was no Surrender at all there also the Patent is void and so is 3. H. 7. the Prior of Norwich his case but there it is expressed in the Patent that the party had informed the Queen of a thing which is false and this is not expressed in our case yet it seems to me that there is no diversitie between that case and the case in question for it is plaine that in our case that the surrender and consideration are the information of the party which was the motive to induce the Queen to her grant for the suggestion is grounded upon the surrender the which surrender is fraudulent and deceptive and therefore the Patent is void Altonwoods case Cooke Lib. 1.40 The King grants the Mannor of Riton and Condor where in truth they were two Manners there neither of them passe Fitzh Grants 58. and so here the suggestion is grounded upon the words of the Surrender which are false and deceptive and therefore the Patent is void also it seems that when the Queen grants in consideration that the Grancee did assume to repair and it is found that he had not repaired this not performing of the consideration avoids the Patent and this is proved by Barwicks case Cook lib. 5. if the King will make a Patent for a consideration which is for the Kings benefit be it Executory or executed of Record or not if it be not true or duly performed the Patent is thereby void And here the Covenant or assumption not being performed according to the Queens intention and the consideration of the Grant will also make void the Patent And it may be construed as a Proviso in an Indenture within some Cases doth amount to a Covenant and condition also as it was in the case of Simpson and Titterell and also in the case of the Earl of Pembrook vouched in Cook lib. 2. in the Lord Cromwels case and therefore I conceive that the words super se Assumpsit aedificare is parcell of the consideration aswell as if it had been pro eo quod aedificabit and so avoids the Patent by the not performance thereof Altham Second Baron saies it seems to me that the Iudgement ought to be given for the Planthere are three things considerable in the Case First whether the Lease made to Hitchmore were ever good or not in respect of a false suggestion Secondly whether in that the consideration that he did assume upon himself to repair and the Queen indeed never had any precedent information made of the want thereof do avoid the Patent in the foundation Thirdly admit it be good in the foundation whether the Lease become void afterwards for not repasting And first I
judgement ought to be given for the Defendant for he laid that the Patent made to Hitchmore proveth that it was not made by reason of any suggestion of the partie for it is expressed to be made ex mero motu c. and then the not surrendring of the other Term doth not vitiate also if the lease be forfeited to the Queen for not repairing then the Queen should have a title before the lease made to the contractors under which the Plaintiffe claims and that not being found by office the contractors shall have no benefit thereof and as to the cases 9. H. 6. and Torringtons case cited Cook lib. 1. Altonwoods case the words of the Patent which express that the Patent should be good so that it be not ad nocumentum c. which is not in our case doth not prove the case in question also if the consideration be smal and recited as executed it doth vitiate the Patent although it be false and it is said in Sir Thomas Wrothes case in Plowden that it is not honourable for the King to construe his Patent to be void by colour of deceipt upon an inference except it be upon a manifest deceipt and in Barwicks case Cook lib. 5. the consideration was a surrender of all the estate and therefore it differed from the case in 18. Eliz. Dyer because there it was in consideration of an estate which in truth was never in being and the cases whereupon he relied for the proofe of this matter is the principal case of Altonwoods and the Lord Chandos case that if a violent intendment might be admitted in the Kings grants upon an inference it might be here inferred that the King should have the estate by this particular surrender but the Book is resolved that no such inference shall be admitted to avoid the Kings patent or otherwise but in that case of the Lord Chandos it appeared that the information of the partie was true and so it was not here because it was informed that all the right which Potter had is devolved to Hitchmore which is not so and therefore a difference between those two cases Nota that the course of this Court is that if A. be indebted or be an accomptant to the King and A. hath another debtor which debtor hath a third person indebted unto him in such case A. may by English Billin the Exchequer pray that the estate of the debtor of his debtor Pasch 9. Jac. in the Exchequer may be extended for the debt of the said A. and it shall be granted Clerk against Rutland IN 6. Jac. in Ejectione firme between Clerk and Rutland it appeared that a feme sole possessed of a Term of years assigns this to A. in trust and after entermarries with him in reversion and after the husband being in quiet possession he and his wife joyn in a Bargaine and sale to B. upon valueable consideration and after the wife dies and the assignee doth set on foot the lease and if this shall be void against the Bargainee was the question upon evidence and it seemeth not because the Bargainee claimeth nothing by conveyance from the wife and also this trust in the Term doth not belong to the husband after the death of the wife for Tanfield said that it was decreed in the Chancery and the opinion of the Iudges was in one Denies case if a feme sole assign a lease in trust and after taketh husband and dieth that the administrator of the wife should have this trust and that the Administration shall be granted for this Term although there be no other thing for which the Administration ought to be granted also it was touched in this case that if the father make a lease for fortie years to a stranger and continue in possession and after conveys the land to a younger son who for a valuable consideration conveyeth it over it was doubted if the purchasor should avoid this lease or not but it was said that if in that case the father after the making of such a lease had suffered the land to descend to his eldest son who had been privie to this trust that then the Purchasor of the eldest son should avoid this lease as it was ruled in Burwels case Cook lib. 6. Upon a motion made by Prideaux that Robert winter one of the Powder Traitors made a lease for years 1. Jac. to one Gower and that after 3. Jac. the Lessor was attainted of Treason by Parliament which attainder related to a time before the conveyance of the Fee and if in this case the Term be saved or lost it was the question Pasch 9 Jac. in the Exchequer Wickham against Wood Pasch 9. Jac. in the Exchequer EDward Wickham declared in an Ejectione firme that Skreen 17. April 6. Jac. at Framlingham in Suffolk demised to him 30. Acres of pasture to have for three years c. and upon the general issue pleaded the Iury found that Thomas Cooper and three others were seised of the lands in question and the fifth of February 24. H. 8. infeoffed by Indenture M. B. and five others to the uses and intents mentioned in a Schedul annexed and that was upon condition that if they aliened to any other uses or purposes that the Feoffor should re-enter and the Iury also found the Schedule which in effect was this viz. that the Feoffees and their heirs should take the profits and therewith finde an honest priest by them or the greater number of them to be hired and competently paid to say Mass for the soules of the Feoffor and his friends and that by the space of 99. years then ensuing and at the end of the said years the Feoffees their heirs and assigns who then should be seised should sell the lands and with the money finde a Priest to Chaunt for the soules aforesaid and with the said moneys or lands also to make further provision for a competent poor honest Priest for the timr being if then it could be by a Amortization or otherwise as they should think best for the sure and long continuance of the said honest Priest if so it could be continued by order of Law the Iury found all things executed accordingly and the finding of a Priest from the 24th of H. 8. untill the first of Ed. 6. by which Act the King was entituled prout lex postulat and that Queen Eliz. granted to Mildmay for 21. years upon whom Fuller the heir of the surviving Feoffee entred and made a Feofment to Wilbey and Skreen by force whereof they were seised and Mildmay re-entred and his Term expiring he obtained a new lease 43. Eliz. and made a lease to Wood and Skreen survived Wilbey and made a lease to Wickham who entred and being outed by Wood brought this Action Bromley puisne Baron upon all the matter I observe three things First if the Fee-simple in this case by the letter or meaning of the Statute be given to the Crown for the lease
of 99. years is agreed to be given Secondly if there be such an imployment of this land as the Statute requireth admitting the lease was not given Thirdly if the livery upon the Queens Lessee for years be good and I hold that the Fee is not given to the Queen Secondly the land is not imployed c. admitting that it was given Thirdly that the Feofment here is not good and as to the case at Bar the Feoffees may enter I doubt not of that because there is not any thing found but that it was imployed to the uses intended for 99. years Secondly if it were not imployed according to the condition after 1. Ed. 6. yet they cannot enter for themselves were parties to the Art which did prohibit it as 34. H. 8. Dyer 52. the Queen gives licence that Belmelt shall be transported notwithstanding any Statute made or to be made if after it be prohibited the licence is determined because the Patentee himself was a partie to such Statutes Secondly it is said in Addams and Lamberts case that a superstitious devise or other estate upon condition is within the Statute because the Patentee was partie thereunto Thirdly it is said in the said case that a superstitious devise or other estate upon condition is within the Statute because it is penal and compulsorie for the maintenance of a thing prohibited by the Law and also there it is said that there is a proviso towards the end of that Act that it shall not be Lawful by reason of any remainder or condition for any man to claim any lands c. for the not doing or finding of any such Priest as to the other point which was moved at Bar I hold that the use doth not arise upon the words subsequent and if they do not re-enter that then the land shall go to the use of the four Feoffees to the intent aforesaid is not a mis-ordering nor an imployment Secondly these words to the intent do not raise any use but only a confidence and trust reposed in the Feoffees Doctor and Student 94. for the first point therefore he held that there is no superstitious gift of the Fee-simple and if there were it is not imployed c. and therefore it is not given by the Statute of 1. Ed. 6. to the Queen and touching that we are to consider the Statute Indenture and the Schedule and there is not a word that after 99. years the land shall finde a Priest but the money and the land is not given but the money as in the Dean of Pauls case 22. Eliz. Dyer 368. if land be given to finde a Priest with part of the profits thereof those profits are only given to the King by this Statute and not the land but that belongs to the Dean and Chapter also the Schedule is if then it may be lawful and therefore if it were not then lawful the money is not given and it is like to the case where I make a lease for 21. years if I do allow of it before Michaelmas and before Michaelmas do not allow of it this is a void lease and so if I give land to the use of Westminster School if the Dean will enter into a Recognizance c. and if he will not enter into a Recognizance it is no gift like to the case 15 H. 7. a grant of Annuitie if such a thing be done c. secondly as to the imployment the lease is only found to be imployed and the imployment of the lease is no imployment of the Fee which was not given until the Term was expired and if the gift be not superstitious the imployment ought not to be superstitious and yet as it is said in Adams case there ought to be an imployment to intitle the Queen as the case there is if one gives the Mannor of D. and S. to superstitious uses the Queen shall have the lands out of the hands of the Feoffee and if land be given to finde a Priest in the Church of D. for 20 years and after to finde one in S. for 21. years and before the expiration of the first Term the Statute is made it seems the Queen shall have only the first Term because there is no imployment of the second Term within the Statute 5. Ed. 4.20.15 Ed. 3. Execu 63. I agree those cases for land or rent issue from a seisin 30. Ed. 3.12 in a quare impedit 5. Ed. 6. Benlowes a devise to 8. to the uses and intent that the Feoffees with the profits shall finde a Priest whilst the Law of this Realm will suffer it and if the Law will not suffer it then to the use of three of the poorest of the Parishes adjoyning by all the Iudges this is not within the Statute and as to the last point it seems that the Feofment is good and the interest of the Queen is no impediment which if it be not then there is no question as Dyer 20. Eliz. 363. Tenant in tail makes a feofment the servants of the Lessee for years being upon the land and livery is made and after the Lessee for years agrees saving his Term this is a discontinuance 14. Ed. 4.2 3. and 4. Ph. et M. Dyer 139. possession shall not be gained from the Queen but by matter of Record 4. Assises 5.21 Assises 2.8 H. 4.16.1 H. 7. no livery upon the Kings possession it may be devised by the heir or conveyed by bargain and sale or by fine from him and the Kings estate in reversion doth not priviledge the estate in possession as it is 23. Ed. 3.7 a disseisor conveys land to the Queen who grants for life and the disseisee shall have a writ of entrie against the Queens Lessee for life by the opinion of Thorp Cook lib. 4.55 a disseisor makes a lease for life the remainder to the King a recovery of the land against Tenant for life will defeat the Kings remainder 7. Rich. 2. aide of the King 61. Tenant in tail grants the land to the King with warranty and the King makes a lease for life if the issue recover in a Formedon the Kings estate is defeated and I was of Councel in the Court of wards in a case which was Pasch 43. Eliz. betwixt Chackston and Starkey for the Wardship of the heir of Clifford and it was this the Ward at full age tendred his livery and had six moneths to sue it and within the six moneths made a Feofment and after died before livery sued in this case the livery and seisin was void and it is all one as if no tender had been made for the Queens possession was priviledged the second point was that one being in Ward to the King had a reversion in Fee expectant upon an estate for life and before livery sued made a Feofment in Fee this makes a discontinuance of the reversion notwithstanding the Kings interest which he had in reversion for the Wardship which case is like to the case
declares the use to be to himself for life and after to T. B. with power of revocation and to limit new uses and if he revoke and not declare then the use shall be to the use of himself for life and after to Henry Becket with power in that indenture also to revoke and limit new uses and that then the fine shall be to such new uses and no other and after 42. Eliz. by a third Indenture he revoked the second Indenture and declared the use of the fine to be to the use of himself for life and after to Hen. Becket in taile the remainder to I. B. c. R. B. dies and T. B. his brother and heire is found a Recusant and the lands seised and thereupon comes H. B. and shews the matter as above and upon that the Kings Atturney demurreth Bromley and Altham Barons that the Declaration of the uses made by the third Indenture was good and he having power by the first to declare new uses may declare them with power of Revocation for it is not meerly a power but conjoyned with an interest and therefore may be executed with a power of Revocation and then when he by the third Indenture revokes the former uses now it is as if new uses had been declared and then he may declare uses at any time after the Fine as it appears by 4. Mar. Dyer 136. and Coke lib. 9. Downhams case and in this case they did rely upon Diggs case Cooke lib. 1. where it is said that upon such a Power he can revoke but once for that part unlesse he had a new power of Revocation of Vses newly to be limited whereby it is implyed that if he had a new power to appoint new uses he may revoke them also Snig Baron to the contrary and said that he had not power to declare 3. severall uses by the first contract which ought to Authorise all the Declarations upon that Fine and then the Revocation by the third Indenture is good and the limitation void and then it shall be to the use of R. B. and his heirs and so by the death of R. B. it doth descend to T. B. the Recusant and also he said that such an Indenture to declare uses upon uses was never made and it would be mischievous to declare infinite uses upon uses Tanfield held that the uses in the second Indenture stand unrevoked and the new uses in the third Indenture are void and then H. B. ought to have the Land again out of the Kings hands The power in the second Indenture is that he may revoke and limit new uses and that the Fine shall be to those new uses and no others and then if there be a Revocation and no punctuall limitation he had not pursued his Authority for he ought to revoke and limit and he cannot doe the one without the other Also he said that after such Revocation and limitation the fine shall be to such new uses and no other then if there be no new uses well limited in the third Indenture the former uses shall stand void Nota it seemeth that if a man make a Feoffement and declare uses and reserve a power to revoke them without saying moe he cannot revoke them and limit new for the use of the Fine being once declared by the Indenture no other use can be averred or declared which is not warranted thereby for he cannot declare the fine to be to new uses when it was once declared before Cook lib. 2.76 That no other use can be averred then that in the conveyauce Cooke lib. 9 10 11. Although that the first uses are determined as if a man declare the use of a Fine to be to one and his Heires upon condition that he shall pay 40. l. c. or untill he do such an Act if the first use be determined the Fine cannot be otherwise declared to be to new uses And therefore it seemes that all the uses which shall rise out of the Fine ought to spring from the first Indenture which testifieth the certain intention of the parties in the leaving thereof and then in the Case above the second Indenture and the limitation of new uses thereby are well warranted by the first Indenture and in respect that this is not a naked power only I conceive that they may be upon condition or upon a power of Revocation to determine them But the power to limit the third uses by a third indenture after revocation of the second uses in the second indenture hath not any Warrant from the first Indenture and without such Warrant there can be no Declaration of such new uses which were not declared or authorised by the first Indenture which Note for it seems to be good Law FINIS AN EXACT TABLE of the Principall Matters contained in this BOOKE A. AN Action of false impriprisonment for taking his wife in execution she appearing as a Feme sole 48 52 An Action upon the Case for conspiring to outlaw a man in a wrong County 49 Amerciament for a By-law 55 An Action upon the Case where against a Servant for breach of trust much good matter 65 66 67 68 Amerciament where well levied by the Sheriff 74 Action by an Executor against a Sheriff in the debet and deâ—â—net where good 80 81 Authority in fact and authority in Law abused a difference 90 Action for these words against I. S. spoken of the Plaintifs wife she would have out her husbands throat and did attempt to doe it 98 C. Custome for Pirates goods if payable 15 Coppy hold surrendred to the use of a younger Sonne he can have no Action before admittance 20 Churchwardens if elected by Vestry-men where good and capable to purchase Lands 21 Conspiracy see Action Collector of a fifteenth leviable upon one Township 65 Commissioners of inquiry and their power 83 84 D. DEbt against the Sheriff for an escape a good Case 20 Distresse for a By-law upon the Kings Tenant he must bring his Action in the Exchequer 55 Devise to the wife until the issue accomplish 18. years endeth not by death of the issue before 56 57 Decree where execution thereof may be stayed 68 69 E. ERror a Writ directed to an inferiour Court ought to be executed without fee paid or tendered 16 Elegit the party who sued it dieth no scire facias for the Heire 16 Equity where releviable in the Exchequer 54 Estreats where they may be discharged for insufficiency in the Indictment or not mentioning the offence 55 Estoppell in the Kings case 65 Exception in a Grant 69 Escape a difference where caused by a rescous and where by the Sherif or Bailif 70 71 Executor see Action 80 81 Erroneous judgement given in the Kings Mannor reversed in the Exchequer by Petition 98 F. A Feoffement to the use of the Husband and Wife for their lives and after to the heirs of the body of the wife begotten by the Husband what estate 17 First fruits ought
Earl of C. now dead and found that by fine and recovery he conveyed an estate in this land to the use of his brother that now is Earl of C. in tail the remainder over to c. and died having a daughter now Countess of Dorset who moved by Dodderidge the Kings Serjeant in the Court of wards that this office was insufficient for by the pretence of the said Countess the first estate given to the Cliffords by E. 2. was a general tail and then the fine levied and the recovery suffered by the last Earl her father is no Bar but that it may discend to this Countess as his heir in tail and therefore Serjeant Dodderidge said to the Lord Treasurer then present in Court that if this should be allowed that Iurors may finde generally a grant made and shew no quallitie of the conveyance nor any place or time but if this were a grant of reversion or of a possession he said that many men by such offices should have their lands given away whereunto they had no means for uncertainties to take a Traverse and as to insufficiency of this office he said that the insufficiency therein consisted first in matter Secondly in form for the insufficiency of the matter is two fold First because that the office findes only that King H. 6. by sufficient conveyance not limited any manner of conveyances nor any qualitie thereof which ought to be shewed and it is material because we may give a different answer thereunto for against letters Patents we may plead one thing and against an other conveyance we may plead another thing and so our answer differeth according to the qualitie of the conveyance Secondly it is insuffient in matter because it is found that H. 6. granted the possession and that he granted the reversion nec non manerium which is repugnant for if the King grant a reversion then no possession passeth and if he pass a possession then no reversion passeth and therefore it is repuguant to say that he granted Reversionem nec non manerium which implieth a possession also he said that his exceptions to the office as to the Mannor of it are two-fold First the office doth finde any time of the grant made by H. 6. and this is material for the grants upon Record take their force from the time of their date as appears by Ludfords Case in Plowdens Commentaries and he said that at this time the case is material to be exprest in respect that H. 6. was for part of his reign deposed and after restored and it might be in the time that he was deposed by Edward the fourth but unto that it was answered by the attorney of the wards that the office found that H. 6. granted c. that it was not in the time when he was deposed the second insufficiency in the Mannor is because it is not found at what place H. 6. made the said grant and that this is material to be found by office he vouched 36. H. 6.32 and he said that it is very requisite that in such offices all circumstances ought to be expressed in as ample certaintie as in a declaration so that the partie prejudiced by the office may know where to search for the conveyance but the Attorney general said that there needs no such express finding of all circumstances by a Iury as it ought to be in pleading for it shall be taken by intendment in divers cases but yet he said that it appears by 1. Eliz. Dyer 174. it is a good plea to say that A. granted a reversion c. to the King without shewing how much more in office which is the Act of the Iurors and therefore Serjeant Harris cited the Book of 14 15. H. 7.22 where an office found an estate tail without mention of the Donor and yet good and the Attorney general said also that it appears by the finding of the Iury in Fulwoods Case Cook lib. 4. that the Iury need not precisely to finde all circumstances for if there be convenient certaintie the residue shall be supplied by intendment as it is there said and the Attorney said that whereas it hath been objected that the issue is evil because it is found that H. 6. granted the reversion and also the Mannor and Castle aforesaid and doth not limit incertaintie that the King granted a reversion or that he granted a Mannor in possession to that he said that it is clear that the King may after recital of a particular estate grant the reversion nec non terras sive manerium and then be the land in lease or be the lease void in Law yet the land shall pass and this is his course alwayes in granting the Kings lands to others and therefore the Iury did well to finde the truth without determining what should pass for admit that there were no estate precedent in being yet by this finding it appears plainly that the Mannor and Castle should pass by the grant in the time of H. 6. to which the Lord Cook agreed for Law and so he said it was his use when he was Attorney general to which also the Lord Treasurer Flemming chief Justice and Tanfield chief Baron agreed and the Attorney general said that his use was if A. had a lease from the King of B. acre which by effluction is to determine in Anno. 1612. and the said A. doubting that this lease was not good in Law prayed to have a new lease that in this case he recited the first lease in the new letters Patents and thereby granted the land for twentie years from c. which shall be in Anno 1612. or from the sooner determination of the former lease and the Iudges allowed it to be good and Dodderidge Serjeant said that after the difference taken between the pleading and the finding of the Iury it seemed to him that there is a great difference between them but after the finding of the Iury upon an office as our case is and a pleading there is no difference for the office is a thing to which an answer may be made but a verdict given upon issue joyned between the parties hath no other proceeding but to judgement immediately and therefore such a verdict shall be divers times supplied by the construction of the Iudges but a verdict upon an office ought to be as certain as an indictment because the partie may Traverse and to prove that upon such uncertain offices there is no remedy by Traverse he vouched the case of 3. H. 4 5. upon an insufficient office after the outlawry of A. and no time is found of the outlawry and he observed out of the said book that the partie outed by the said insufficient office had no remedy by Traverse but was compelled to make a motion to the Court and after this case for difficultie was referred to the two chief Iustices and the chief Baron to consider upon who the said Term at Serjeants Inne appointed it to be