of 99. years is agreed to be given Secondly if there be such an imployment of this land as the Statute requireth admitting the lease was not given Thirdly if the livery upon the Queens Lessee for years be good and I hold that the Fee is not given to the Queen Secondly the land is not imployed c. admitting that it was given Thirdly that the Feofment here is not good and as to the case at Bar the Feoffees may enter I doubt not of that because there is not any thing found but that it was imployed to the uses intended for 99. years Secondly if it were not imployed according to the condition after 1. Ed. 6. yet they cannot enter for themselves were parties to the Art which did prohibit it as 34. H. 8. Dyer 52. the Queen gives licence that Belmelt shall be transported notwithstanding any Statute made or to be made if after it be prohibited the licence is determined because the Patentee himself was a partie to such Statutes Secondly it is said in Addams and Lamberts case that a superstitious devise or other estate upon condition is within the Statute because the Patentee was partie thereunto Thirdly it is said in the said case that a superstitious devise or other estate upon condition is within the Statute because it is penal and compulsorie for the maintenance of a thing prohibited by the Law and also there it is said that there is a proviso towards the end of that Act that it shall not be Lawful by reason of any remainder or condition for any man to claim any lands c. for the not doing or finding of any such Priest as to the other point which was moved at Bar I hold that the use doth not arise upon the words subsequent and if they do not re-enter that then the land shall go to the use of the four Feoffees to the intent aforesaid is not a mis-ordering nor an imployment Secondly these words to the intent do not raise any use but only a confidence and trust reposed in the Feoffees Doctor and Student 94. for the first point therefore he held that there is no superstitious gift of the Fee-simple and if there were it is not imployed c. and therefore it is not given by the Statute of 1. Ed. 6. to the Queen and touching that we are to consider the Statute Indenture and the Schedule and there is not a word that after 99. years the land shall finde a Priest but the money and the land is not given but the money as in the Dean of Pauls case 22. Eliz. Dyer 368. if land be given to finde a Priest with part of the profits thereof those profits are only given to the King by this Statute and not the land but that belongs to the Dean and Chapter also the Schedule is if then it may be lawful and therefore if it were not then lawful the money is not given and it is like to the case where I make a lease for 21. years if I do allow of it before Michaelmas and before Michaelmas do not allow of it this is a void lease and so if I give land to the use of Westminster School if the Dean will enter into a Recognizance c. and if he will not enter into a Recognizance it is no gift like to the case 15 H. 7. a grant of Annuitie if such a thing be done c. secondly as to the imployment the lease is only found to be imployed and the imployment of the lease is no imployment of the Fee which was not given until the Term was expired and if the gift be not superstitious the imployment ought not to be superstitious and yet as it is said in Adams case there ought to be an imployment to intitle the Queen as the case there is if one gives the Mannor of D. and S. to superstitious uses the Queen shall have the lands out of the hands of the Feoffee and if land be given to finde a Priest in the Church of D. for 20 years and after to finde one in S. for 21. years and before the expiration of the first Term the Statute is made it seems the Queen shall have only the first Term because there is no imployment of the second Term within the Statute 5. Ed. 4.20.15 Ed. 3. Execu 63. I agree those cases for land or rent issue from a seisin 30. Ed. 3.12 in a quare impedit 5. Ed. 6. Benlowes a devise to 8. to the uses and intent that the Feoffees with the profits shall finde a Priest whilst the Law of this Realm will suffer it and if the Law will not suffer it then to the use of three of the poorest of the Parishes adjoyning by all the Iudges this is not within the Statute and as to the last point it seems that the Feofment is good and the interest of the Queen is no impediment which if it be not then there is no question as Dyer 20. Eliz. 363. Tenant in tail makes a feofment the servants of the Lessee for years being upon the land and livery is made and after the Lessee for years agrees saving his Term this is a discontinuance 14. Ed. 4.2 3. and 4. Ph. et M. Dyer 139. possession shall not be gained from the Queen but by matter of Record 4. Assises 5.21 Assises 2.8 H. 4.16.1 H. 7. no livery upon the Kings possession it may be devised by the heir or conveyed by bargain and sale or by fine from him and the Kings estate in reversion doth not priviledge the estate in possession as it is 23. Ed. 3.7 a disseisor conveys land to the Queen who grants for life and the disseisee shall have a writ of entrie against the Queens Lessee for life by the opinion of Thorp Cook lib. 4.55 a disseisor makes a lease for life the remainder to the King a recovery of the land against Tenant for life will defeat the Kings remainder 7. Rich. 2. aide of the King 61. Tenant in tail grants the land to the King with warranty and the King makes a lease for life if the issue recover in a Formedon the Kings estate is defeated and I was of Councel in the Court of wards in a case which was Pasch 43. Eliz. betwixt Chackston and Starkey for the Wardship of the heir of Clifford and it was this the Ward at full age tendred his livery and had six moneths to sue it and within the six moneths made a Feofment and after died before livery sued in this case the livery and seisin was void and it is all one as if no tender had been made for the Queens possession was priviledged the second point was that one being in Ward to the King had a reversion in Fee expectant upon an estate for life and before livery sued made a Feofment in Fee this makes a discontinuance of the reversion notwithstanding the Kings interest which he had in reversion for the Wardship which case is like to the case
the which the Lord chief Baron Tanfield said insist not upon a labour of that kinde for it is plain enough because the Queen being partie there can be no Estoppel as to any part in that case also as to that part of his argument Mr. Walter agreed on the other side and also he said that if a grant of the Queeen were void at the Common Law for default of want of consideration this Statute aids not Walter for the Defendant and he divided the case into foure points the first whether the Tenant for life by the Kings guift by surrendring his letters Patents hath also surrendred his estate Secondly if the surrender in this case made be defective only for want of matter of circumstance as the inrolment c. whether such defects are saved by the Statute 43. Eliz. Thirdly whether in this case an actual surrender be the consideration meerly which moveth the Queen to grant or what shall be intended the consideration in this case Fourthly admitting that an actual surrender is the sole consideration in this case then whether a Patent shall be adjudg'd void for default of such consideration for a false consideration doth not avoid a Patent but a false surmise doth first when the Kings Tenant for life doth surrender or give up his Patent although without deed yet with such circumstances as the law requireth the surrender is good for although a surrender of letters Patents made by the Kings Tenant in tail will not make estate tail void or determine as it appears by the book case of 35. H. 8. title surrender and Cook 6. the Lord Chandos case yet the bare giving up of the letters Patents by a Tenant for life is a surrender of his estate so here in this case is some proportion between a Tenant for life of the Queen and a Tenant for life of a Common person to amount to a surrender and therefore it appeareth by 43. E. 3. that a Tenant for life may surrender without deed and without livery and from the land but a Tenant in tail may not do so also if a Common person hath a rent or other thing which cannot pass but by deed yet a surrender of such a rent shall be good by a bare deliverie up of the deed if he hath but an estate for life in the Rent and this also although it be but to the disseissor of the land out of which c. the same Law he took it of a particular Tenant for life of years also 32. H. 8. Brook Patents 97. it is made a doubt whether the estate tail of the Kings Donee be determined and gone by surrendring of the letters Patent and he referred that if thought worthy of a doubt whether it should be a good surrender of an estate tail they would hade held it clearly a surrender for an estate for life and it was admitted 3. Eli 2. Dyer fo 193. Mack-Williams case that if in the principal case if a Vacat or cancellation had been the surrender had been good actually without question and Sir Maurice Barkleys case cited on the other part proves the same also for there it is admitted that if the letters Patents had been given up there had been a perfect surrender And 40. H. 3. fol. 5. Belknap held that a surrender may be by word which is to be intended by giving up the Patent and that appears by Rolfs case in Dyer that a voluntary surrender needs no Conftat also where it hath been objected that the special verdict in this case hath not found in what Court the surrender was made he answered that the Law shall intend it to be made in the same Court from whence the letters Patents did issue for a surrender cannot be good being made in another Court and therefore it must needs be intended the same Court and he vouched 11. Ed. 3. fo 1. and 18. Eliz. Plinies Case and Covel and Cabels Case in Banco Regis 38. Eliz. wherein a special verdict it was holden that all things necessary for the perfecting of that the Iury hath found to be done must be necessarily intended concurrent Secondly the want of circumstances in a surrender are perfected and supplied by the Statute of 43. Eliz. for although matters of substance are not aided within this Statute yet matters of circumstances are aided And he said that all the defects in this Case are matters of circumstance and to prove that the defects in this Case are only in circumstance he said that there are three principal defects in conveyances which are meerly matters of circumstance and aided within this Statute the first is meerly want of form in a conveyance and that such a defect is aided he cited Hussies Case to be adjudged accordingly the second is where words are wanting in a conveyance and that such a conveyance is aided by this Statute he cited the opinion of Popham and Gawdy in 44. Eliz. in a cause depending in the Chancery the third matter of circumstance is where there is want of some matter concerning the executing of an estate and that such defect is only matter of circumstance and aided within this Statute he cited Morley and Whartons Case to be adjudged 7. Eliz. in the Common Pleas that the default of not inrolling is aided by this Statute and Mack-Williams and Kemps Case cited in Dyer before proves this to be but matter of circumstance and for that he thought the surrender in the principal Case wanting nothing but inrolment is aided by this Statute also in the argument of the second point he shews what defects in conveyances should be accompted matter of substance and so not aided by this Statute of 43. Eliz. and to this purpose he held that all disabilities of the person in a grant is matter of substance and so not aided within this Statute and he cited Twynes Case 32. Eliz. in the Exchequer to be accordingly Secondly he held that the nature of an assurance is not aided by this Statute and therefore if a man hath power to grant an estate by fine and he doth it by Deed this is not aided by the Statute for this is defective in matter of substance and he cited Wisemans Case and Sir Hugh Cholmleys Case in Cook l. 2. also he said if a man give land to the King and his heirs to have ten years after such grant this is not made good by the Statute Thirdly whereas it may be Collected that because it is found in the special verdict that an actual surrender was the cause which moved the Queen to grant or that it appears to be the cause he held that no consideration plainly appeareth but only by relation to a consideration before mentioned and he said that these words used by the Queen viz. modo habens et gaudens shew that the Queen took notice the state was still injoyed notwithstanding the delivery up of the letters Patents and therefore it cannot be intended by the verdict that the Queen intended
Slade and Morleys case a case was put which proves it to be according Snig Baron agreed that Iudgement ought to be given for the Plantiff and by Tanfield if I take your goods and detain them until I have caused you to pay me 10. l. a general Action of Trespass lieth and not an Action upon the case and it is cited 7. H. 4. or 7. E. 4. to be accordingly but yet he agreed that judgement should be entred and so it was appointed to be done but then Chibborn for the Defendant said that here is a mistrial for if this trust be not material because it is not effectually shewed in the Declaration as you have argued then the Venue shall come only from the parish where the Wares were laid upon the land and not from the parish also where the appointment or trust was made by the Plantiff and therefore the trial also being from both parishes is a mistrial and the Court agreed that this is a mistrial upon that reason for now the appointment or Trust is but an inducement and therefore needs not to be shewed within what parish it was made and therefore a new Venire facias was granted and upon that a new trial and damages more then before and judgement was given accordingly Arden against Darcie NOta a good case of Attornament which was decreed in the time of Baron Manwood betwixt Arden and Darcie and it was this one Arden was seised in fee of divers lands in the County of c. and made a lease for years and after made a feofment with words of Grant of those lands to A. and B. to the use of the feoffor and his wife for their lives the remainder to Arden his son in tail and after the feoffor said to the Lessee that he had conveyed his land which the Lessee held in lease to the uses aforesaid and the Lessee said I like it well and after he paid his rent to the feoffor generally and it was decreed in the Exchequer Chamber that this is no Attornament because the Attornament ought to be to the feoffees and it appeareth not that the Lessee had notice of the names of the feoffees and therefore it cannot be said to amount to an Attornament but notwithstanding that Decree Arden the same to whom the remainder was limited had his Action depending in the Kings Bench to trie the point again as he said to me also this Term a point concerning the said Decree was in question upon another Bill exhibited in the Exchequer Chamber by Sir Edward Darcie against Arden and the case was as followeth Sir Edward Darcie exhibited his Bill here in the nature of a scire facias against Arden to shew cause wherefore the said Edward Darcie should not have execution of a Decree made in the time of Baron Manwood and the Defendant shewed that Darcie in his first suit supposed by his Bill that he had a grant of the land then and now in question from Queen Elizabeth rendring rent as it appears by the letters Patents and in facto there was no rent reserved upon the Patent and that the Defendant gave answer to the said Bill and admitted the Iurisdiction of the Court and after a Decree was made against the Defendant and the Defendant now having shewed this special matter demurred upon this Bill in respect that by his pretence the Court had not jurisdiction to hold plea in the first suit and here it was shewed that the first decree was made upon a matter in Law not properly examinable by English Bill and that in facto the Law was therein mistaken and therefore the Defendant prayed that the decree may be re-examined Tanfield chief Baron it is usual in the office of Pleas that if an action be brought as a debtor of our Lord the King this is good although that de facto no suggestion be made thereof if it be not shewed on the other side and therefore a writ of Error for this falsity shall not cause the judgement to be reversed as it was resolved in a case in which I was of Councel and so here as it seemeth Altham Baron here we are in equity wherein we are not tied to so strickt a course as if it were in the office of pleas Brock of the Inner Temple for the Defendant in a Court of equity it is in the discretion of the Court to deny Execution of a decree if good cause be shewed and in 18. E. 4. fo 1. judgement was given against a married wife by the name of a feme sole and reversed although she did not shew in the first suit that she was married and in 8. E. 4. judgement was given in the Kings Bench in a suit and by writ of error was reversed although the Defendant had admitted the Iurisdiction of the Court and the chief Baron and all the Court inclined that Arden may exhibit a Bill to reverse this Decree made against him and may shew what point in Law the Iudges mistook in the Decree or otherwise we should not do as Law and Iustice requireth for it is not expedient to be examined by way of Bar to this Bill in the nature of a scire facias and after Arden according to the Decree of the Court and their direction did exhibit his Bill in the nature of a writ of error Comprising how the first decree was erroneously made and prayed that the said decree might be reversed and in his Bill he shewed the point in Law which was decreed and that upon divers long conveyances appears to be thus and so it was agreed by Councel on both parties that Arden the father was seised of the Mannor of Cudworth in the County of c. and was also seised of the Mannor of Parkhal in the same County and of Blackclose c. which was parcel of the Mannor of Cudworth but lying neer unto Parkhal and alwayes used and occupied with it and reputed parcel thereof but in truth it was parcel of Cudworth and that Arden the father made a Conveyance of the Mannor of Parkhal and of all the lands thereunto belonging and reputed as parcel thereof or occupied with it as part or parcel thereof and of all other his lands in England except the Mannor of Cudworth to the use of Arden his son that now is Plantiffe here and if Blackclose will pass to the son by this conveyance or if by intendment it shall be excepted by the exception made it was the question here and was decreed in the time of Baron Manwood that it is excepted by the exception but all the Barons now thought it to be a strong case that Blackclose is not excepted by the exception of the Mannor of Cudworth and so the first decree was upon a mistake out of the Law and Tanfield chief Baron said that the point is no other but that I infeoffe you of Blackacre parcel of the Mannor of D. exceyt my Mannor of D. this doth not except the King
in 1. Jacobi and no other conviction ever was and yet de facto he continued a Recusant untill his death and his Land viz. two parts thereof were seised in his life and the King answered of 200. l. thereof which incurred in the moneths contained in the Indictment and now a Writ is issued which supposeth the said Robert to be indebted to the King in 20. l. for every moneth be lived after 28. Eliz. untill 1. Jacobi for his Recusancy which amounted to 4000. l. which Writ also commands to enquire what Lands the said Robert Becket had at the time of his death and thereupon it was found that he had divers Lands c. and upon a Scire facias to the Terretenants to shew cause wherefore two parts of the Lands of the said Robert Becket should not now be seised for the debt of the Recusant aforesaid one Henry Becket as Terretenant or Tenant of the Premisses pleaded that the King is satiefied of all the 20. l. and for all the moneths that the said Robert was convicted to be a Recusant and he vouched the Constat thereof under the hand of the Deputy of the Pipe Office and for the residue he said that by 28. Eliz. cap. 6. it is amongst other things enacted that if any person which hath not repaired or shall not repaire to some Church Chappell or usuall place of Common Prayer but hath forborne or shall forbeat the same contrary to the Tenor of the Statute of 23. Eliz. cap. 1. and hath been heretofore convicted for such offence shall forfeit c. provided that it he hath made submission and been conformable according to the true meaning of the said Statute or shall fortune to dye that then no forfeiture of 20. l. for any moneth or for seisure of the Lands of the same offender from and after such submission and conformity or death and full satisfaction of all the arrerages of 20 l. monethly before such seisure due or payable shall ensue or be continued against such Offendor and traverseth without that that there is any Record besides this Writ to charge the said Robert Becket deceased of or for the summe of 4000. l. towards our said Lord the King c. and so prayeth to be discharged thereof Vpon which Plea the Kings Atturney Generall demurred and Coventry argued that the Plea is good he said that there are three Points to be considered First that if a man be convicted of Recusancy in 28. Eliz. for 10. moneths then passed and de facto continueth a Recusant untill his death in 1. Jac. without other conviction if now the King can claim 20. l. a moneth for more moueths then are contained in the Indictment whereupon he is convicted Secondly admit that the King may have the forfeiture for every moneth whereof no conviction was as well as if a conviction had been then if the King can seise the Lands for the payment thereof after his death no seisure being had for it in his life by the Stat. of the 28. Eliz. or if the power of seisure be altogether gone by the death of the Recusant Thirdly admitting that the King shall have more then is contained within the Indictment if the Debt it self be not gone by the death of the Recusant To the first Point there is no President to be found that any man convicted before 28. Eliz. was charged to the Payment of more then that which was within the Indictment and the words of the Statute of 28. Eliz. contained within this Clause which provides for the payment due since the Conviction do not inforce any construction to the contrary and in this Clause the words being do yet remain unpaid are not proper words but for a thing payable before this Statute for so many moneths whereof he was convicted of Recusancy and the words without any other conviction are to be understood for so much as was unpaid of that contained in the Indictment and the last Clause of this Branch of the Statute hath not the words without any conviction and the other Clause provides that by expresse words for the future time every person who shall be once convicted shall forfeit c without other conviction and it was resolved Hill 4. Jacobi in the Kings Bench between Grinstone and Oliver that the Statute of 28. Eliz. alters and adds three things to the Statute of 23. Eliz. 1. That all the money due for Recusancy shall be paid into the Exchequer 2. This limits a time for payment thereof yearly viz. in the four Terms of the year 3. This giveth a penalty viz. power to seise all the goods and two parts for non-payment but all that is only for that which was payable before the conviction and therefoâ—e the words in the Branch which contains our Case have apt words of construction that he shall pay all due for the paine of seisure for 23. Eliz. gives no seisure but imprisonment if payment be not made within three moneths after judgement and so in our case Conviction ought to precede the duty To the second Point it seemeth that the power of seisure within this Statute is gone by the death of the Recusant for before the Statute of 1. Jacobi the power for seisure was but a penalty that if the party fail in payment of 20. l. a moneth then c. and in all cases upon penall Laws if the party die before the penalty inflicted this shall not be inflicted at all and that this is but a penalty he vouched one Grayes case in 1. and 2. Jacobi to be adjudged accordingly Also the words in this Statute which give the seisure of Land appointeth a levying to be of the 3. part for the maintenance of the Offendor his Wife Children and Family and after his death he hath no Wife so that if it be demanded when the seisin must be the answer is then when a third part may be left for his use which cannot be but in the life of the Recusant Also it appoints that the seisure ought to be by Processe which ought to be in the life of the party by intendment Also the Proviso of the Statute of 28. Eli. saith that if any person shall dye no seisure shall insue or be continued aâ—d out case is within those words for in regard there hath been no seisure in his life therefore after his death no seisure ought to insue and the words which purport another semblance of construction viz. and satisfaction of all arrerages are to be understood only in case where there was a former seisure that is in the life of the party and have reference to the words to be continued and that the intent is so he said that the words are so that the Heir shall pay no more but so much as the Land was seised for To the third it seemeth that in this case the debt it self is gone by the death of the party At the Common Law a penalty shall never be recovered against the
declares the use to be to himself for life and after to T. B. with power of revocation and to limit new uses and if he revoke and not declare then the use shall be to the use of himself for life and after to Henry Becket with power in that indenture also to revoke and limit new uses and that then the fine shall be to such new uses and no other and after 42. Eliz. by a third Indenture he revoked the second Indenture and declared the use of the fine to be to the use of himself for life and after to Hen. Becket in taile the remainder to I. B. c. R. B. dies and T. B. his brother and heire is found a Recusant and the lands seised and thereupon comes H. B. and shews the matter as above and upon that the Kings Atturney demurreth Bromley and Altham Barons that the Declaration of the uses made by the third Indenture was good and he having power by the first to declare new uses may declare them with power of Revocation for it is not meerly a power but conjoyned with an interest and therefore may be executed with a power of Revocation and then when he by the third Indenture revokes the former uses now it is as if new uses had been declared and then he may declare uses at any time after the Fine as it appears by 4. Mar. Dyer 136. and Coke lib. 9. Downhams case and in this case they did rely upon Diggs case Cooke lib. 1. where it is said that upon such a Power he can revoke but once for that part unlesse he had a new power of Revocation of Vses newly to be limited whereby it is implyed that if he had a new power to appoint new uses he may revoke them also Snig Baron to the contrary and said that he had not power to declare 3. severall uses by the first contract which ought to Authorise all the Declarations upon that Fine and then the Revocation by the third Indenture is good and the limitation void and then it shall be to the use of R. B. and his heirs and so by the death of R. B. it doth descend to T. B. the Recusant and also he said that such an Indenture to declare uses upon uses was never made and it would be mischievous to declare infinite uses upon uses Tanfield held that the uses in the second Indenture stand unrevoked and the new uses in the third Indenture are void and then H. B. ought to have the Land again out of the Kings hands The power in the second Indenture is that he may revoke and limit new uses and that the Fine shall be to those new uses and no others and then if there be a Revocation and no punctuall limitation he had not pursued his Authority for he ought to revoke and limit and he cannot doe the one without the other Also he said that after such Revocation and limitation the fine shall be to such new uses and no other then if there be no new uses well limited in the third Indenture the former uses shall stand void Nota it seemeth that if a man make a Feoffement and declare uses and reserve a power to revoke them without saying moe he cannot revoke them and limit new for the use of the Fine being once declared by the Indenture no other use can be averred or declared which is not warranted thereby for he cannot declare the fine to be to new uses when it was once declared before Cook lib. 2.76 That no other use can be averred then that in the conveyauce Cooke lib. 9 10 11. Although that the first uses are determined as if a man declare the use of a Fine to be to one and his Heires upon condition that he shall pay 40. l. c. or untill he do such an Act if the first use be determined the Fine cannot be otherwise declared to be to new uses And therefore it seemes that all the uses which shall rise out of the Fine ought to spring from the first Indenture which testifieth the certain intention of the parties in the leaving thereof and then in the Case above the second Indenture and the limitation of new uses thereby are well warranted by the first Indenture and in respect that this is not a naked power only I conceive that they may be upon condition or upon a power of Revocation to determine them But the power to limit the third uses by a third indenture after revocation of the second uses in the second indenture hath not any Warrant from the first Indenture and without such Warrant there can be no Declaration of such new uses which were not declared or authorised by the first Indenture which Note for it seems to be good Law FINIS AN EXACT TABLE of the Principall Matters contained in this BOOKE A. AN Action of false impriprisonment for taking his wife in execution she appearing as a Feme sole 48 52 An Action upon the Case for conspiring to outlaw a man in a wrong County 49 Amerciament for a By-law 55 An Action upon the Case where against a Servant for breach of trust much good matter 65 66 67 68 Amerciament where well levied by the Sheriff 74 Action by an Executor against a Sheriff in the debet and deâ—â—net where good 80 81 Authority in fact and authority in Law abused a difference 90 Action for these words against I. S. spoken of the Plaintifs wife she would have out her husbands throat and did attempt to doe it 98 C. Custome for Pirates goods if payable 15 Coppy hold surrendred to the use of a younger Sonne he can have no Action before admittance 20 Churchwardens if elected by Vestry-men where good and capable to purchase Lands 21 Conspiracy see Action Collector of a fifteenth leviable upon one Township 65 Commissioners of inquiry and their power 83 84 D. DEbt against the Sheriff for an escape a good Case 20 Distresse for a By-law upon the Kings Tenant he must bring his Action in the Exchequer 55 Devise to the wife until the issue accomplish 18. years endeth not by death of the issue before 56 57 Decree where execution thereof may be stayed 68 69 E. ERror a Writ directed to an inferiour Court ought to be executed without fee paid or tendered 16 Elegit the party who sued it dieth no scire facias for the Heire 16 Equity where releviable in the Exchequer 54 Estreats where they may be discharged for insufficiency in the Indictment or not mentioning the offence 55 Estoppell in the Kings case 65 Exception in a Grant 69 Escape a difference where caused by a rescous and where by the Sherif or Bailif 70 71 Executor see Action 80 81 Erroneous judgement given in the Kings Mannor reversed in the Exchequer by Petition 98 F. A Feoffement to the use of the Husband and Wife for their lives and after to the heirs of the body of the wife begotten by the Husband what estate 17 First fruits ought
Dyer the Lord Dacres surrendred a patent of an office granted to him before Sir Nicholas Hare Master of the Rolls but the surrender was not recorded nor the patent Cancelled nor a Vacat entred upon the inrolment this is void and shall not be aided now after the death of Sir Nicholas Hare per optimam opinionem in Kemps case Dyer 195. but it will be said that it appears not there that the surrender was made in Chancery and therefore differs from our case but see 19. Eliz. Dyer 355. which is direct in the point where an exchange of land was with E. 6. by deed acknowledged to be inrolled c. but not inrolled it cannot after nor be inrolled nor vest any interest in the Queen either as heir or Purchasor so hereby it appears that before inrolment an estate vests not in the King and he said that he had heard Popham late chief Iustice say that the opinion of the Iudges was that in this case nothing vests in the King until inrolment and for that there was a private Act made in 39. Eliz. to relieve this particular case so the Memorandum makes the record and not the delivery of the patent to be cancelled but the opinion of Davers in 37. H. 6.10 may be objected against me where he saith that if a man make a feofment to the King and deliver the deed in the Exchequer or at the Kings Coffers it is good without inrolment which by the Court is intended for goods and not to a feofment made to the King for this is only the opinion of Davers which I denie to be law and also all this may be admitted for law and yet prove nothing for when the partie surrenders to the King and delivers the deed to be inrolled so that he had done all which in him is to pass the land to the King then it may aptly be said in common speech that the right of the land is in the King because he of right ought to have it after inrolment although he had not the propertie of the land before the Deed be inrolled then if nothing vest in the Queen in the principal case before the patent made in 37. Eliz. the words subsequent in the patent will not help the matter viz. quam quidem sursum redditionem acceptamus per praesentes because the King had taken nothing before and the recital in the patent concludes not the Queen it hath been said that the not making of a Memorandum is the fault of the Clark and this shall not prejudice the partie in so great a mischief but I answer that the same mischief will insue where a man sells land by indenture and delivers it to the Clark to be inrolled and he inrols it not within 6. moneths nothing shall pass by the sale yet this is only the fáult of the Clark but in this case he may have his action upon the case against the Clark if so it be that he had paid all his fees the fame law in the principal case but admitting that yet great mischief will insue if it be so that the estate shall pass to the King before inrolment for then the estate and interest shall be tried by the Countrie and not by the record and then also in what place should a man search to finde the Kings estate and perhaps for want of knowledge thereof every grant of the King will be avoided and this would be a great mischief to the subjects but admitting that this should be a good surrender without a Memorandum or Vacat yet this is not shewed in this case for it appears not here that his intent was to surrender it for although he deliver up his Letters patents yet his estate remaines and then the consideration of the patent in 37. Eliz. being of a surrender of the first patent and also of a surrender of the estate if the estate be not surrendred as well as the patent the consideration is for that false and then the patent is void and to pâ—ove that the estate remains although that the patent be surrendred it appears by Fisher 12. H. 7.12 where Tenant in tail of the gift of the King loses his letters patents his heir is not at a mischief for he may have a Constat and this shall be good in evidence but he cannot plead it and this appears by the Preamble of the Statute of 13. Eliz. cap. 6. Dean and Chapter Lease land this shall be by Deed and in this case although that the lessee redeliver his deed it is no surrender of the estate but he shall not plead it without shewing a Deed of the assent of the Chapter but he shall give it in evidence and good because he had once a Dâ—ed thereof as it appears by 32. E. 3. Monstrance of Deeds and it appears by 32. H. 8. Patents Br. 97. that if the Kings Patentee lose his letters Patents he shall have a Constat and by 32. H. 8. surender Br. 51. and 35. H. 8. tail that if the King give in tail and the Donee surrender his Patent the tail thereby is not extinct so although letters Patents are necessary for pleading of the Kings Grant yet they are not requisite for the essence and continuance of the estate also it is found that the said Patents were restored to be cancelled per mandatum Domini Seymor it is not found what manner of authoritie the Lord S. gave nor found to whom the letters Patents were delivered nor at what time and peradventure they were delivered after the second Patent made and then is the second Patent false because then there was no surrender and this is one of the reasons put it Kemps case 3. Eliz. 195. The second point admitting that there is no actual surrender if notwithstanding that the Patent of 37. Eliz. be good and as to that I say if this Patent be good it is because the Queen had recited the particular estate and therefore is not to her damage or because the second Patent is a surrender in law of the first and the rather because it appears to be the intention of the Queen that the acceptance should be a surrender by these words quam quidem sursum redditionem acceptamus per praesentes and as to the first reason it seems to me that the Queen recites this as a particular estate determined and not as an estate continuing for by these words modo habens et gaudens it appears that the meaning of the Queen was that the Lord Seymor had not an estate continuing in the intent of the Queen at the time of the making of the second Patent but the Lord Chandos case in Coo. 6. fol. 55. seems to impugne me in this opinion where the King made a gift in tail and afterward by Patent reciting the former Grant and also that the Patentee had delivered up the Patent into the Chancerie to be cancelled by vertue whereof he thought himself to be seised in demeasne as of fee
because nothing vested in the Queen nothing can vest in the King as successor for a thing cannot be vested in one as heir or successor which was never vested in the Ancestor and he vouched Bullocks case in 10. Eliz. Dyer 21. Ed. 4. of election also it cannot vest in the King Primarily because he was never partie to the Iudenture of lease and he cited a case to be adjudged accordingly betwixt Founds and 29. Eliz. 11. H. 7. that he who is not partie to the Indenture shall not be primarily bound nor shall primarily take by the same Indenture and it is inconvenient that this should be a good inrolment and where it was said of the other part that a bargain and sale is good enough although it be not inrolled in the life of the parties so that it be inrolled within 6. moneths to that he well agreed for by the bargain and sale an use passeth at the Common Law without help of the Statute and this without inrolment and the Statute of inrolments restraineth it not but that it may pass well enough at this day and so the Statute perfects it so that it be within 6. moneths indifferently and therefore it is good notwithstanding the death of the parties and he concluded with the Book of the 19. Eliz. Dyer fol. and wheras it was said to be resolved contrary in an authoritie not printed he said that he believed the printed Book and vouched also the case cited before in Butlers and Bakers Case Cook lib. 3. to the third point it seemed to him that although the inrolment be good yet that should not avoid the estate by relation for a relation is not good to avoid mean conveyances without an antient right as if the Kings Villein purchase lands the King now hath right and therefore an office found after shall relate to avoid all mean conveyances and he said that relations are not so certain wherefore a man may make a ground for every case hath his particular reason and therefore to some purposes an attornament ought to relate but to other purposes it ought not to relate and therefore an attornament cannot relate to intitle a grantee to rents due between the grant and the attornament and so in this case if the inrolment had been in the life of the Bishop and of the Queen yet it could not have given to her the mean profits between the grant and the inrolment and he vouched a case in Butlers and Bakers case and the 11. H. 7. that a relation shall never be prejudicial to a stranger for his estate lawfully executed and therefore if a feofment be made to a husband and wife and to a third person and after the husband and wife are divorced for a precontract yet they shall take but a Moitie as if they were married also it is a rule that an estate vested cannnot be made Tortious by relation see Butlers and Bakers Case and he vouched a case to be adjudged betwixt Wind gate and Hall in the Kings Bench Mich. 31. 32. Eliz. that if a Statute be acknowledged to a Common person and another Statute to the King by the same Conusor and after the Statute acknowledged to the common person is extended and the Conusee in possession and also the King sues execution of his Statute he shall not avoid the estate lawfully executed in the first Conusee as it was there holden but the Barons said una voce that if such a case should come in question before them they would hold the contrary for the King and for the fourth point viz. if the confirmation were good being made before inrolment of the lease and so upon the matter before any lease in being to which the Counsel of the one part nor of the other were provided to speak Walter said that the confirmation was not good for Littleton saith that a thing or estate which is not in being cannot be confirmed and Tanfield chief Baron said and others also that this was the principal point of the case and the great doubt is of the other part viz. that this is not good and therefore advised them to argue it at another day and Walter said that the confirmation is not good in regard it is not of record nor inrolled and he vouched the 26. of E. 3. fo 20. that the King cannot take notice of any thing without record the next Term upon the first Tuesday it was appointed to be argued again and Doddridge the Kings Serjeant observed foure points First if any inrolment be necessary in the case Secondly admitting that the inrolment be requisite if here be a good inrolment being made after the Kings death Thirdly if the confirmation of the Dean and Chapter be of necessitie to be inrolled Fourthly admit that the confirmation need not to be inrolled and that the lease ought to be inrolled then if this confirmation be good because it was before the inrolment of the lease as to the first he conceived that aswel a Chattel real as a thing personal may vest in the King without Record for it should be inconvenient that Chattels should be inrolled First for the infinitness Secondly for the small value of them in the judgement of Law and he vouched 40. Assises pla 35. of a Legacy devised to the King and 37. H. 6. fo 10. if a Chattel be given to the King there needeth no record and the 28. E. 3. fo 23. the King brings a quare impedit upon a grant of the next presentation without record and yet it was good 21. H. 7. fo 19. an obligation may be granted to the King without record 35. H. 8. Brook prerogative and 33. H. 6. the Baily shall have aid of the King and he vouched also 2. E. 6. Brook prerogative and 35. H. 6. fo 3. Fitz. villinage and Brook prerogative and the 21. H. 7. fo 8. if a man possest of a Term be outlawed this Term is in the King by outlawry without Record to the second point he thought that the inrolment was good after the Queens death for the inrolment ought to relate as it appears by 1. H. 7. fo 28. and this relation disaffirmeth the mean estate and gives also the mean profits and as to the point of relation he vouched Nichols Case Plowden where the entrie of the heir once lawful was made unlawful by relation and he vouched also 14. H. 8. fo 18. in the end of Wheelers Case and by the 4. H. 7. fo 10. a man seised of land is attainted of Treason the King grants this land to A. the person attainted commits a Trespass and is restored by Parliament the Patentee shall never have an action of Trespass because this restitution takes away the cause of action and to prove that the inrolment may be well enough after the Queens death he said that the said case put to be resolved in the 19th of Eliz. Dyer fo 355. concerning the Duke of Somerset was after adjudged contrary to
the said resolution and he said that the case concerning parcel of the land contained in S. the Deed come in question in Parliament in the 43. Eliz. and it was then commanded that the Deed should be inrolled and also he compared it to a case put in Shelleys Case that the heir shall have land as by discent from his father although that the conveyance be not inrolled in the life of the father also he said that the Queen dieth not as to her body politick to the third point he said that the confirmation need not to be inrolled for it passeth nothing and is but a bare assent and therefore differeth from the case of Patron and Ordinary and of a disseissee for the disseisee hath right to grant end the Patron and Ordinary have interest in R. but Bishops are seised in their own right and therefore their lease wants the approbation only of the Dean and Chapter and he vouched Cook lib. 3. the Dean and Chapter of Norwiches Case and the writ of Sine Assensu Capituli in the Register proveth it for the tit confirmation pl. 30. observes and Littleton in the end of his chap. of discontinuance saith that a parson may charge the Gleab by the assent of the Patron and Ordinary and the opinion of Brook in the case of the 33. of H. 8. tit confirmation pl. 30. agreeth to this opinion and so are some opinions in the 7. H 4. fo 15. 16. and he said that this point was adjudged accordingly in the first of Ma. but he had not the record thereof and therefore he would not insist upon it and he vouched 1. and 2. of Ma. Dyer fo 106. and Cook lib 6. fo 15. Hodges Case that the acceptance of the Patron is good enough to make a confirmation to the fourth point he said that the confirmation was good notwithstanding it be before the inrolment of the lease for the lease shall stay his operation until all the Ceremonies be used for the perfection of the estate and he vouched Littleton fo 122. and 6. E. 6. Dyer fo 69. where a parson made a lease to commence after his death the Patron and Ordinary in the life of the parson confirmed it and this is good and he vouched also Anne Maiowes Case Cook lib. 1. where the father confirmed the sons grant when he had but a possibilitie and yet good and he vouched Dyer 2. 3. Eliz. fo 194. where a grant was incertain and the inception was before the confirmation after makes it good and therefore he said if disseissor and disseissee bargain land although it be but a confirmation of the disseisee which may be well enough without inrolment of the Deed by a bare delivery yet this shall hinder the operation until the inrolment of the Deed which should pass the estate from the disseisor and by Cook lib. 5. Fitz. Case it appeareth that one part of the assurance shall stay his operation until another part hath his perfection and therefore he concluded that here the confirmation in judgement of Law should stay his operation until the lease be inrolled which passed the estate see the argument of Serjeant Nichols to the contrary and also the argument of Thomas Crew in Easter Term and Trin. 7. Jac. Pasch 7. Jac. in the Exchequer Catesbies Case Pasch 7. Jac. in the Exchequer TAnfield chief Baron said that in the year 31. Eliz it was adjudged in Goar and Peers Case if Tenant for life infeoffe A. and his heirs to the use of the feoffee and his heirs during the life of the feoffor that this is a forfeiture because these words during the life of the feoffor shall be but to the use limited and he put the case which Serjeant Nichols put at the Bar of the Lady Catesby which was that a man suffered a recovery to the use of William Catesby and Anne his wife and of the longer liver of them and of the Executors of William for forty years if one Elizabeth Catesby should so long live William Catesby dies and the reversion came to the King by forfeiture and he pretended that Elizabeth Catesby being dead the estate is also determined in regard that these words if Elizabeth shall so long live refer to all the estate but Curia avisari vult It was said by the chief Baron that if a man plead a deed in writing and the other partie do not pray Oyer the same Term he shall not have Oyer in another Term in the Common Pleas but in the Kings Bench Oyer shall be granted in another Term. It was found by office that Elizabeth Bowes was convicted of Recusancy in 35. Eliz. and that a lease for years was made unto her in the year 36. Eliz. in trust and that she had conveyed this lease over according to the trust and a question was demanded if the King shall have this term or not for her Recusancy and it seemed that he shall because she is not capable nor lyable of any trust and therefore the conveyance made by the Recusant was as if it had been without any compulsion by reason of the trust If a Coppiholder of the Kings Mannor pretendeth prescription for a Modus decimandi against the Parson the right of Tithes shall be tried in the Exchequer and a prohibition was granted to the Ecclesiastical Court in this Case Owen Ratliff was lessee for years of the King rendring rent and he assigned his Term to Sir Thomas Chichley in trust for payment of the debts of the said Owen Ratliff and after the Debts were paid Chichley resigned it but in the interim between the assignment and the resignment divers rents incurred to the King and the Barons agreed that these arretages in Law may be levied upon the land of Chichley notwithstanding the trust but because the Court was informed that the Executors of Ratliff had assets and continued farmer of the farm at that time they compelled him to pay it and being present in Court they imprisoned him untill payment made and allowed him his remedy by English Bill against Chichley and that by the agreement Chichley was to have paid the rents to the King The Earl of Cumberlands Case IT was found by diem clausit extremum after the death of G. Eearl of Cumberland that King E. 2. gave to the Lord Clifford inter alia the Mannor of Skipton in Craven to him and to the heirs of his body and found further the discent in a direct line until the time of H. 6. and that the first Donee and all others to whom it descended were seised prout lex postulat without determining any estate in certain in the Donee and they found that H. 6. by sufficient conveyance concessit Revertionem nec non manerium de Skipton in Craven to Thomas Lord Clifford to whom the estate given by E. 2. was descended and his heirs by force whereof the said Thomas was seised prout lex postulat and found the discent to the
Earl of C. now dead and found that by fine and recovery he conveyed an estate in this land to the use of his brother that now is Earl of C. in tail the remainder over to c. and died having a daughter now Countess of Dorset who moved by Dodderidge the Kings Serjeant in the Court of wards that this office was insufficient for by the pretence of the said Countess the first estate given to the Cliffords by E. 2. was a general tail and then the fine levied and the recovery suffered by the last Earl her father is no Bar but that it may discend to this Countess as his heir in tail and therefore Serjeant Dodderidge said to the Lord Treasurer then present in Court that if this should be allowed that Iurors may finde generally a grant made and shew no quallitie of the conveyance nor any place or time but if this were a grant of reversion or of a possession he said that many men by such offices should have their lands given away whereunto they had no means for uncertainties to take a Traverse and as to insufficiency of this office he said that the insufficiency therein consisted first in matter Secondly in form for the insufficiency of the matter is two fold First because that the office findes only that King H. 6. by sufficient conveyance not limited any manner of conveyances nor any qualitie thereof which ought to be shewed and it is material because we may give a different answer thereunto for against letters Patents we may plead one thing and against an other conveyance we may plead another thing and so our answer differeth according to the qualitie of the conveyance Secondly it is insuffient in matter because it is found that H. 6. granted the possession and that he granted the reversion nec non manerium which is repugnant for if the King grant a reversion then no possession passeth and if he pass a possession then no reversion passeth and therefore it is repuguant to say that he granted Reversionem nec non manerium which implieth a possession also he said that his exceptions to the office as to the Mannor of it are two-fold First the office doth finde any time of the grant made by H. 6. and this is material for the grants upon Record take their force from the time of their date as appears by Ludfords Case in Plowdens Commentaries and he said that at this time the case is material to be exprest in respect that H. 6. was for part of his reign deposed and after restored and it might be in the time that he was deposed by Edward the fourth but unto that it was answered by the attorney of the wards that the office found that H. 6. granted c. that it was not in the time when he was deposed the second insufficiency in the Mannor is because it is not found at what place H. 6. made the said grant and that this is material to be found by office he vouched 36. H. 6.32 and he said that it is very requisite that in such offices all circumstances ought to be expressed in as ample certaintie as in a declaration so that the partie prejudiced by the office may know where to search for the conveyance but the Attorney general said that there needs no such express finding of all circumstances by a Iury as it ought to be in pleading for it shall be taken by intendment in divers cases but yet he said that it appears by 1. Eliz. Dyer 174. it is a good plea to say that A. granted a reversion c. to the King without shewing how much more in office which is the Act of the Iurors and therefore Serjeant Harris cited the Book of 14 15. H. 7.22 where an office found an estate tail without mention of the Donor and yet good and the Attorney general said also that it appears by the finding of the Iury in Fulwoods Case Cook lib. 4. that the Iury need not precisely to finde all circumstances for if there be convenient certaintie the residue shall be supplied by intendment as it is there said and the Attorney said that whereas it hath been objected that the issue is evil because it is found that H. 6. granted the reversion and also the Mannor and Castle aforesaid and doth not limit incertaintie that the King granted a reversion or that he granted a Mannor in possession to that he said that it is clear that the King may after recital of a particular estate grant the reversion nec non terras sive manerium and then be the land in lease or be the lease void in Law yet the land shall pass and this is his course alwayes in granting the Kings lands to others and therefore the Iury did well to finde the truth without determining what should pass for admit that there were no estate precedent in being yet by this finding it appears plainly that the Mannor and Castle should pass by the grant in the time of H. 6. to which the Lord Cook agreed for Law and so he said it was his use when he was Attorney general to which also the Lord Treasurer Flemming chief Justice and Tanfield chief Baron agreed and the Attorney general said that his use was if A. had a lease from the King of B. acre which by effluction is to determine in Anno. 1612. and the said A. doubting that this lease was not good in Law prayed to have a new lease that in this case he recited the first lease in the new letters Patents and thereby granted the land for twentie years from c. which shall be in Anno 1612. or from the sooner determination of the former lease and the Iudges allowed it to be good and Dodderidge Serjeant said that after the difference taken between the pleading and the finding of the Iury it seemed to him that there is a great difference between them but after the finding of the Iury upon an office as our case is and a pleading there is no difference for the office is a thing to which an answer may be made but a verdict given upon issue joyned between the parties hath no other proceeding but to judgement immediately and therefore such a verdict shall be divers times supplied by the construction of the Iudges but a verdict upon an office ought to be as certain as an indictment because the partie may Traverse and to prove that upon such uncertain offices there is no remedy by Traverse he vouched the case of 3. H. 4 5. upon an insufficient office after the outlawry of A. and no time is found of the outlawry and he observed out of the said book that the partie outed by the said insufficient office had no remedy by Traverse but was compelled to make a motion to the Court and after this case for difficultie was referred to the two chief Iustices and the chief Baron to consider upon who the said Term at Serjeants Inne appointed it to be
come ceo only of foure Bullaries if this fine and the use of the estate passed thereby shall be directed by the covenant it was the question and it was moved for a doubt what Bullarie that shall be intended whereof the fine is not levied by reason of the incertaintie quaere and it was adjourned Nota that an estreate of divers fines imposed upon several indictments at the Quarter Sessions for several Riots was sent into this Court and the estreat here being mentioned not for what offences the fines were imposed and the records of the indictments were in the Crown office by a Certiorari and the chief Baron Tanfield said that the estreat was insufficient and we ought not to send out Proces upon them because they do not mention the quality of the offence for which the fines were imposed and therefore it may be discharged by Plea yet if the estreat be not warranted by the indictment so that the indictment is discharged for insufficiency in the Kings Bench the Record thereof may be certified into the Chancery and by mittimus transferred hither and we may discharge the estreat and Altham Baron agreed that the partie grieved by such fine upon an insufficient indictment may plead all this matter and spare to remove the Record and if the Kings Attorney will confess the plea to be true it is as good as if the Record had been removed which was not denied An Amercement for a by Law IT was moved for the King upon a lease holden for him that I.S. was amerced 10. l. because he received a poor man to be his Tenant who was chargable to the parish contrary to a pain made by the Township and thereupon Proces issued out of this Court and the Baily distrained and I. S. brought Trespas and it was said by the Barons and ordered that if I. S. will bring an action for the distraining for this amercement be it lawfully imposed or not yet I. S. shall be restrained to sue in any other Court but in this and here he shall sue in the office of Pleas if he will for the Bailiff levied it as an officer of this Court and for the matter Snig said that if I. S. received a poor man into his house against a by Law made in the Township there is good cause of amercement but by Tanfield it is nothing to us that they have a custome to make by-Lawes herein against a by Law made by us also a leet of it self hath no authority to make by Lawes or such an order but by custome it is good Snig and Altham Barons it is good policy to make an order with a pain in a Leet that no person shall receive any such Tenant as shall be chargable to the parish but clearly the Steward cannot amerce one for such a cause without an order with a pain made before Sir John Littletons case SIr Iohn Littletons case was that all the lands of a Monastery were granted unto one Dudley reserving 28. l. rent yearly for a Tenth of all the laid land according to the Statute and after Dudley granted the greater part of this land to Littleton and that he had used upon the agreement made between Dudley and him to pay 20. l. yearly for the Tenth of his part and Dudley had used to pay 8. l. yearly for that which he retained and after Dudley was attainted whereupon his part of the said land came to the King and now the Auditor would impose the charge for all the Tenth upon Littleton but by the Court although the Tenth was Originally chargable and leviable upon all and every part of the land yet it being apparant to them that part thereof came to the Kings hands it was ordered that the land of Sir Iohn Littleton should be discharged before the Auditor prorata and so it was and Littleton to pay only 20. l. yearly Sweet and Beal NOta that in Michaelmas Term 6. Iac. upon a special verdict this case was depending in the Exchequer viz. Anthony Brown devised a term to his wife until the issue of the body of the Devisor accomplish the age of 18. years bringing up the said child Provided that if the devisor die without issue that then the land shall go to the said wife for term of her life paying to the sister of the Devisor 6. l. 13. s. 4. d. yearly which he willed to be paid at two feasts half yearly and that if it be arrear then it shall be lawful for the sister to distrain and to detain the distress until it be paid and the Iury found that the devisor had issue at the time of his death but that the said issue died before he accomplished the age of 18. years and they found also that the rent of 6. l. 13. s. 4. d. payable to the sister was not paid at one day in which it was payable and that no demand was made for it and that Moil Beal who was the right heir entred for the condition broken and made a lease to the Plantiff who being outed by the wife brought an Ejectione firme and Chibborn of Lincolns Inne argued that the entrie of the heir is lawful first he said when he devised to his wife until his heir come to the age of 18. years bringing up the said heir if in this case the heir die within the said age the state of the wife is determined by reason that the education was the cause the land should continue to the wife and the cause being determined by the death of the heir before the said age therefore the estate is also determined and upon that he bouched a case in Mich. 3. Iac. one Collins devised that one Carpenter should have the over-sight and managing of his land until his son should attain the age of 5. years and the son died before he attained the said age and it was agreed admitting that Carpenter had by that devise an interest that it is now determined by the death of the heir to the second matter viz. when it is limited that if the devisor die without issue that then the wife shall have it by that it seems to me that the wife shall not have an estate for life by these words as our case for at the time of the death of the devisor he had issue so that it cannot be said that he died without issue although now we may say that he is dead without issue but in regard that the words of the will are not performed according to the proper intendment of them the Iudges ought not to make another construction then according to the litteral sence the litteral construction being properly the words to bear such a meaning and this as he said may be proved by Wildes case in Cook lib. 6. but more strong is our case because in a case which carrieth the land from the heir there ought to be a strong and strickt and not a favourable construction made to the prejudice of the heir
and therefore he vouched a case between Scockwood and Sear where a man devised part of his land to his wife for life and another part of his land until Michaelmas next ensuing his death and further by the said will he devised to his younger son all his lands not devised to his wife and adjudged that by the said words the younger son shall have only that parcel which was devised to the wife for life and not that which was devised unto her till Michaelmas and yet by Popham it appeareth that his intent was otherwise viz. that all that should go to his younger son so there ought not to be a strained construction made against the heir and so in our case the words being that if he die without issue c. that then it shall go to his wife herein as much as he had issue at the time of his death it cannot be said that he died without issue but that he is dead without issue and this appeareth by the pleading in the Lord Bartleys case in Plowden and he vouched also a case in the Kings Bench 4. Jac. between Miller and Robinson where a man devised to Thomas his son and if he die without issue having no son there it was holden that if the devisee had issue a son yet if he had none at the time of his death the devisee in the remainder shall have it yet he was once a person having a son and so in our case there was a person who did not die without issue and he vouched also the case of Bold and Mollineux in 28. H. 8. Dyer fo 15.3 when a man deviseth to his wife for life paying a yearly rent to his sister and that if the rent be not paid that the sister may distrain it seems to me that this is a conditional estate in the wife notwithstanding the limitation of the distress and he vouched 18. Eliz. in Dyer 348. which as he said proved the case expresly for there in such a case it is adjudged that the devisee of the rent may after demand thereof distrain and yet the heir may enter for the not payment of the rent although it were never demanded so that the subsequent words of distraining do not qualifie the force of the condition although there be there an express condition and in our case but a condition implyed and he said that it seemed reasonable that such a construction for the distress and condition also shall stand as appeareth by divers cases that upon such words the Law will allow a double remedy and therefore he vouched Gravenors case in the Common Pleas Hill 36. Eliz. Rot. 1322. where a lease was made by Magdalen Colledge to husband and wife so that if the husband alien that the lease shall be void and provided that they do not make any under-tenants and to this purpose he vouched the case of the Earl of Pembrook cited in the Lord Cromwels case Cook lib. 2. where the words amounted to a covenant and a coudition and if this word paying should not be construed to be a condition then it were altogether void and idle and such a construction ought not to be made in a will and he conceived that this rent ought to be paid by the wife without any demand upon the pain of the condition and therefore he vouched 22. H. 6. fo 57.14 E. 4 21. E. 4. by Hussey and 18. Eliz. Dyer 348. vouched before and so it was resolved as he said in the Court of Wards in Somings case where a man made a devise paying a rent to a stranger this ought to be paid without demand and he said that the Common case is proved when a feofment is made upon condition that the feoffee shall do an act to a stranger this ought to be done in convenient time without request by the stranger and so here it seemeth although a demand ought to be made by the sister yet the wife ought to give notice to the sister of the Legacy so that she may make a demand and therefore he vouched Warder and Downings case where a man devised that his eldest son upon entry should pay to the younger son such a summe of money here the eldes brother ought to give notice at what time he will enter to the intent that the younger brother may be provided to make a demand Edwards of the Inner Temple contrary First it seemeth that by this limitation the wife ought to retain the land until the issue of the devisor should have come to the age of 18. years for this a time certain and as it is construed upon such words in Borastons case Cook lib. 3. that the Executors there have an interest certain so it should be construed here to refer to a certainty which is until the time by computation that the issue should have attained to 18. years and the rather in this case in respect the devisor had otherwise disposed of the land until the son should have accomplished the said age Secondly it seemeth that the wife hath an estate for life not conditional in so much as the words are not joyned in the case the 18. Eliz. Dyer hath been vouched but that was upon an express condition but here it is by implication and then the clause of distress taketh away the force of the implication which otherwise might be thereupon inferred and therefore in 5. Eliz. Dyer it appeareth that the word Proviso annexed to other words makes it no condition in judgement of Law and so in 14. Eliz. Dyer 311. and he vouched also 18. Eliz. Dyer Greens case that if a man deviseth lands to his friends paying to his wife with a clause of distress this is no condition as it is adjudged Thirdly it seemeth that this summe to be paid to the sister is a rent and therefore ought to be demanded or otherwise in judgement of Law the condition shall not be broken and the 21. E. 4. the case of an obligation to perform covenants c. and a case between Wentworth and Wentworth 37. Eliz. that a demand ought to be made for a rent which is granted in liew of Dower for the wife brought a writ of Dower for the land of her husband the Tenant pleaded that she accepted a rent out of the land in liew of her Dower and the wife replied that the said rent was granted upon condition that if it were not paid at certain dayes that it should be void and that she should have Dower of the land and she said that the rent was not paid at the dayes c. but shewed not in her pleading any demand to be made and therefore it was holden evil pleading for such a rent ought to be demanded or otherwise the condition is not broken and so here Nota that this case was appointed to be argued again but after as I heard the Barons amongst themselves resolved to give judgement for the Defendant upon one point only which was that the estate
Heir except that judgement be given against the Ancestor and for that see 40. E. 3. Executors 74. and 41. Ass pl. 15. and 15. Eliz Dyer 322. And also if a Recusant had been convicted upon the Sat. of 23. Eliz. and dyed before judgement cleerely this forfeiture shall never be charged upon the Heir for the words are that a Recusant shall forfeit 20. l. a moneth and if he doe not pay it then appoints the recovery by Bill Plaint or Information and this ought to be alwaies in the life of the party then the Stat. of 28. Eliz. maketh not a new debt or Forfeiture but gives a penalty for the non-payment of that which was a debt within 23. Eliz. and that the intent of the Stat. of 28. Eli. was but such this is proved by the Title of the Act. viz. for the more speedy and due execution c. 2. It is proved by the first words of the Act for the avoiding of all delaies c. so that it appears that this Act is but as a penalty meerly Also he said that this Stat. of 28. Eliz. dispenceth with the conviction as to the penalty but doth not take away the Conviction also he said that conviction without Iudgement maketh not a Debt Also he who is convicted by proclamation and dieth is discharged Also he said that our Case hath been compared to a Debt upon an Obligation but this is not like for the Stat. stands not indefinite but hath reference to 23. for otherwise a Recusant may be doubly charged that is upon both the Statutes for there is no means to recover the Debt but by this Statute of 23. Eliz. See Sir Edward Walgraves case Dyer 231. Wentworth and others against Stanley WEntworth and his Wife and Rich and his Wife brought an Ejectione firmae against Stanley and shewed in their Declaration how one Edward Stanley was seised in Fee and infeoffed the Earl of Darby others to the use of himself for life the remainder to the use of the Plantiffs wife for 100. years and died and the Plantiffs entred and the Defendant ejected them c. and this Feofment was made in 40. Eliz. the Defendant saith that long before one Richard Stanley was sesed in Fee and gave it to the said Edward Stanley in tail and that he so seised made a Feefment to the uses as is alledged and died and the Plantiffs entred and the Defendant as issue of the Feoffor re-entred and so by his pretence his is remitted whereupon it was demurred and upon the opening this case the Barons were clear of opinion that the issue in tail is remitted and came paramount the lease and so the lease for years is gone also by the chief Baron and Baron Snig there needs no Traverse to be alledged by the Plantiffe because it was but of a fee gained in an instant by the feofment of a Tenant in tail and a fee-simple gained in an instant needeth not to be Traversed 5. H. 7. and 2. E. 4. wherefore the Court said that judgement ought to be given against the Plantiffs but yet at the desire of the some the Court gave day to the Councel on both parts to argue the case at which day came Heneag Finch for the Plantiffs and he argued to the matter in Law and therein he said that by the feofment of Tenant in tail the use to himself for life the remainder to his daughters for years without limiting the residue of the use that in this case the residue of the use shall be in the feoffes and not in the feoffor for by him there is a difference between a feofment by him who had a fee with limitation of an use as above and a feofment made by him who derives an estate out of a fee for when Tenant for life or Tenant in tail makes a feofment and limits an use for part of the estate as above there the residue of the issue shall be to the feoffee and he vouched Castle and Dods case adjudged in the Common Pleas 8. Iac. that if Tenant for life grant over his estate without limiting of an use it shall be to the use of the grantee more strong here in a tortious act as our case is but if Tenant in tail will levy a fine with limitation of uses as above there the residue of the use shall be to the use of the Conusor Secondly admit that the residue of the use in this case shall he to the feoffor yet he shall not be remitted to the use as it seemeth the words of the Statute of 27. H. 8. are that cestuy que use shall have like estate in the land as he had in the use and therefore it is clear that the first taker of the use shall not be remitted as it is resolved in Amy Townsends case in Plowden and although the words of the Statute mention not heirs or issues yet by the intent of the Statute they are in equal degree but the Books which are against this opinion are two viz. 33. H. 8. Dyer fo 51. but there it is not expresly said that the issue is remitted but 34. H. 8 Br. remitter 49. is expresly against me but the same year in Dyer fo 54. it is there made a quere and in Bevils case it is only said that the first taker of the use cannot be remitted but of my opinion was Baldwin and Shelley in 28. H. 8. Dyer 23 24. and in Sanages case and 29. H. 8. it is resolved that if a man hath land by Act of Parliament there shall be no remitter and so here wherefore c. and he said if Tenant in tail be the remainder in fee and Tenant in tail makes a feofment to the use of himself in tail the remainder to him in remainder in fee in this case he in the remainder in fee shall not be remitted for then the first taker should be remitted to the pleading it seemeth that the bar is not good and first the general demurrer here doth not confess the matter of fact no more then in Gawins case in 29. H. 8. fo 40. by Brown a demurrer upon account in an appeal is no confession of the fact and in 44. Eliz. in Crisp and Byrons case accordingly see Sir Henry Browns case before a good case to this purpose then as to the Bar it seems it is not sufficient for want of a Traverse of a seisin in fee alledged in the feoffor who was Edward Stanley for it is a rule that two affirmatives cannot be allowed in a Declaration and the Bar without Traverse of that which is mentioned in the Declaration is not good except there be cause of some impossibilitie or inconvenience but yet this is to be understood where the affirmatives are express and not by implication as in Moiles case if the Defendant in his Bar confess a fee determinable he needs not Traverse the fee alledged by the Plantiffe but in our case here is an allegation made by the
words of a fee to be in the feoffor and the Bar confesseth only as of a fee gained in an instant but I agree that if the Bar had been that the Feoffor was Tenant for years and made a Feofment this had been good without Traverse but when Tenant in tail makes a Feofment it shall not be intended that he gained a Fee because it may be he hath purchased the remainder and thereby had lawfully acquitted it as an addition to his estate and here the saying in the Deelaration that Edward Stanley was seised in Fee as a thing material and of necessitie and not superfluous as the pleading in a Declaration for debt upon an Obligation to say that the Obligor was of full age or as a Repetition of the writ which needs not be Traversed and that it appears in 15. Ed. 4. in some case a Surplusâ—ge ought to be Traversed and 7. Ed. 6. Title Formedon the Declaration as in our case ought to be special and 21. H. 7. if a man will maintain debt upon a lease he ought to shew how he was in titled to make the lease also although that in our case the lease for years is the effect of the suit yet I say that the seisin in Fee is the effect of the plea 27. H. 8.50 H. 7.14 in a replevin the Defendant avows as seised in Fee the Plantiffe sayes that he was seised for life and doth Traverse c. and 14. and 15. Eliz. was our very case Dyer 312. and there it is said that the sure way is to take a Traverse as it is also said in 11. Eliz. Dyer also where the Bar saith that one R. was seised in Fee and gave it to the Father of the Feoffor and the heirs of his body he ought to say that the land descended to the Feoffor as son and heir of the body c. also where the Plantiffe declareth of a lease for years made by force of a feofment made the 30. day of August 6. Iac. the Bar saith generally that the 30. day of August 6. Iac. the said Feoffor made a Feofment of the same land to the same persons c. but he doth not say that it is one and the same with the Feofment mentioned in the Declaration so he answereth not our title and for that cause not good and therefore he prayed Iudgement for the Plantiffe Jones of Lincolns Inne to the contrary it seemeth as to the first matter moved that in this case the resioue of the use shall result back to the Feoffor 34. Eliz. Balfores case if Tenant in tail make a Feofment to the use of himself for life without more by Popham the residue of the use shall be to the Feoffee for otherwise the estate for life would be drowned but otherwise it is when a remainder of an use is limited to another in Fee for this saves the drowning or confounding of the estate for life as to the point of remitter it seemeth that it is no other but that Tenant in tail makes a Feofment to the use of himself and his heirs and dies if the issue shall be remitted or not and as to that he said that the Statute of 27. H. 8. cap. 10. hath by express words a saving of all antient rights and therefore the antient right of the estate tail is saved and therefore the issue shall be thereunto remitted and so should the Tenant in tail himself if he had not been within the words of the Statute as it is resolved in Amy Townsends case in Plowden and the authorities of my part are 33. H. 8.54 in Dyer expresly with me and without any quere as to the point of remitter but there it is said that he ought to avoid the lease by entrie as in our ease it is pleaded and as to the pleading it seems there needs no Traverse First because it is matter in Law Secondly we have confessed a Fee in an instant as to the first reason the Declaration is generally of a seisin in Fee and not expresly of a Fee simple and therefore it is matter in Law 5. H. 7. and 11. H. 7.21 the Fee not Traversed 46 Ed. 3.24 in Dower the Defendant pleads a special tail made by one who was seised in Fee the other saith that the Dower had but an estate tail at the time of the gift without Traversing that he was seised in Fee 2. Ed. 4.11 that a seisin in Fee tail is sufficient to maintain an allegation of a seisin in Fee to the second reason it is not alledged expresly that he was seised in Fee but quod cum talis seisitus fuit c. and 34. H. 6.48 he needed not in his Declaration to say that he was seised in Fee Pasch 34. et 35. Eliz. Taylors case if the Plantiffe in a quare impedit alledgeth seisin in Fee and the Defendant confess the seisin by Vsurpation this is a sufficient confession of the seisin in Fee Fitzherbert Title Travers 154. a good case to this purpose and in Moils case cited before on the other side the Plantiffe doth not mention in his Declaration a seisin in Fee absolute and the Defendant saith that A. was seised and gave to the Plantiffe as long as A. had issue of his body he needs not Traverse the absolute Fee Pasch 33. Eliz. in the Common Pleas where there was a stronger case to the replication the Defendant said that the Countess of Devon was seised and leased for life the remainder to her self for life the other saith that the Countess was seised in tail and Traverseth that she was not seised in Fee it is there said that the Countesses estate in Fee need not to be Traversed and yet it was there agreed that in regard it was but matter of form it was aided by the Statute of Jeoffales for that was moved in arrest of judgement Tanfield chief Baron in the principal case the issue of the Feoffor is remitted without entrie notwithstanding the lease because it is not in possession but a lease in remainder and therefore the title of the Lessees is distrained before entrie by the Defendant and therefore the Defendant hath not answered the entrie upon the Lessees for you by your plea destroy the title to this Term which you have allowed them before they were ever in possession thereof and the Declaration is that they were possessed of a Term for years and that you ejected them and to this you give no answer upon the matter for clearly if Tenant in tail make a lease to commence at a day to come and dieth before the day this is meerly void by his death ad quod non fuit responsum see Plowden in Smith and Stapletons case for there it is made a quere and notwithstanding that Tanfield chief Baron with the assâ—nt of the whole Court pronounced that judgement should be entred against the Plantiffe immediately and so it was done Bents case IN a suit depending in this Court between
give money to a patron to make a promise to him c. and the incumbent payes it such an incumbent is Simoniacus by the Civil Law and so if the incumbent pay the mony not knowing it untill after the induction yet he is Simoniacus and by him if a friend gives money and the Parson is thereupon presented though the Parson if he knew not of the money given yet he shall be deprived of the benefice and this difference was certified by Anderson and Gawdey to the Councel table upon a reference made to them by the King touching the filling of benefices by corrupt means and the Statute of purpose forbears to use the word Simonie for avoiding of nice construction of that word in the Civil Law and therefore the makers of the Act sets down plainly the words of the Statute that if any shall be promoted for money c. so that by these words it is not material from whom the money comes and then in such cases for the avoiding of all such grand offences a liberal construction ought to be made as hath been used in such cases and therefore he remembred the large construction which was made upon the Statute of fines in the Lord Zouches case lib. Cook 3. and so upon the Statute of usurie it hath been adjudged that if money be lent to be re-paid with use above 10. l. in the hundred at such a day if three men or one man so long live in these cases all such bargains and contracts are void within the intent of the Statute as it hath been adjudged in the Common Pleas and so it is in Gooches case Cook lib. 5. upon the Statute of fraudulent conveyances and secret Ioyntures also upon the Statute of Simonie it was adjudged although some of the Common Pleas doubted of it in regard a father is bound to provide for his son and Rogers and Bakers case in this Court was an antient case and adjudged for the Plantiffe and as to the other point it is found by the verdict that the presentation made by the Queen to Covel is not revoked nor admitted which words implie that Covel is still living in case of a special verdict and therefore to argue to that point as if it were found that Covel was living yet he conceived that the presentation without institution and Induction is determined by the Queens death and therefore in 2. Ed. 3. a license of Alienation clearly is not good in the time of another King for the license saith which are holden of us c. and by the death of the King they are not holden of him Fitzherberts natura brevium contra 16 H. 8. the nature of a presentment is explained where an Infant would avoid his presentation and in the principal case the Bishop cannot make any admission upon this presentation of Covel after the Queens death for he cannot do that in any manner according to the presentation because that is determined by the Queens death and therefore it seems clearly there needs no repeal in such a case although it appears by some presidents that repeals have been used in such cases and as to the case 17. Eliz. Dyer 339. that proveth not that there ought to be any repeal for it appears there that judgement was given upon a reason altogether different from our case and that was because a presentation was obtained of the Queen a quare impedit depending by her of which suit she had no notice and for that cause her second presentation was void and that was the true reason of that judgement as it is also put in Greens case Cook lib. 6. and I was present Mich. 17. Eliz. when this case was adjudged and the sole reason which they gave for the judgement was because the presentation by intendment could not take away the Action attached by the Queen for then the Queens grant should enure to a double intent which the Law will never tollerate without express words purporting so much but in our case there is no such double intendment and therefore c. but if there had been an admission and institution pursuing the presentation of Covel although no induction yet peradventure in such case there ought to have been an appeal because in such case it is not only the Queens Act but of the ordinary also interposing which is a Iudicial Act also without question we are out of the Statute of 6. H. 8. for here is no grant made by the Queen and a presentation clearly is not within that Statute and for that other reason the presentation of Calvert is good without recital of the Queens presentation also clearly if there ought to be a repeal in the case yet it is not examinable in this Action of Trespass which is possessorie and for the profits only but it may be examinable in a quare impedit and as to Greens case Cook lib. 6. which hath been used as an authoritie in this case that differs much from our case for there the thing which made the Queens presentation void was contained within the very Charter of the presentation and therefore differed from our case wherefore he commanded judgement should be entred for the Plantiffe and so it was Halseys case touching Recusancy THe case in the Exchequer Chamber touching the payment of the Kings Majesties debt due for the Recusancy of John Halsey as Recusant convict deceased with the lands and goods bought in the name of John Grove and Richard Cox Defendant in this Court that John Halsey was indicted and convicted for Recusancy the 18. day of July Anno 23. Eliz. and so remained convicted without submission till his death who died the last day of March 3. Iac. and after his conviction viz. after the 40. year of the Raign of the late Queen Elizabeth did purchase with his own money divers leases for years yet to come of lands in the Countie of Worcester and Warwick in the name of Richard Cocks for himself in trust and likewise did with his own money purchase certain leases for years yet to come of lands in the County of Hereford in the name of the said John Grove all which purchases were in trust for the Recusant and to his use Margaret Field is his next heir who is no Recusant Iohn Halsey hath not paid 20. l. a moneth since his conviction nor any part thereof these lands and leases were seised into the Kings hands for the satisfaction of the forfeitures due for the Recusancy of the said Halsey 14. August 5. Iac. Thomas Coventrie argued for the Defendant the question is whether these lands which were never in the Recusant but bought in the name of the Defendants in manner aforesaid be liable to the payment of his Majesties debts by the said Recusant as above said or not there are three points considerable in the case First if lands purchased by the Recusant in the name of others in trust are liable to his debt Secondly if the land of a
Recusant may be seised after his death Thirdly if they shall be charged by the Statute of 1. Iac. as to the first it seems they are not wherein I shall endeavour to prove three things First that such land was not liable to debt by the Common Law Secondly that they are not liable to debts by the general words of the Statute Law Thirdly that they are not liable to debt by any word within the Statute of primo Iac. as to the first he observed that here is no fraud put in the case but that these lands and leases were never in the Recusant so that before that they were conveyed to the Defendants they were not liable to this debt and I alwayes observed that which the common law calleth fraud ought to be of such nature as shall be tortious and prejudicial to a third person and put him in a worse estate and condition then he was before and then he who is so prejudiced in some cases should avoid such conveyances by the common Law 22. Assises 72.43 Ed. 3.2 and 32. the Defendant in debt after judgement aliens his goods and he himself takes the profits yet the Plantiffe shall have them in execution so that if a man binde himself and his heirs in an Obligation and dies and assets descend to his heir who by Covin aliens those assets yet he shall be charged in debt for in these cases the Plantiffe had a lawful debt and such lands and goods before the alienation were liable and that former interest was intended to be defeated by those alienations and therefore they are void but of the other side where no former interest of the partie is wronged there no fraudulent conveyance was void at the Common Law and therefore if Tenant in Knights service had made a fraudulent Feofment to defraud the Lord of his wardship this was not aided by the Common Law until the Statute of Marlebridge for the title of the Lord was not prejudiced or wronged by this Feofment because it was subsequent to the Feofment also after the said Statute the Lord was without remedy for his release for it is agreed in 17. Ed. 3. fo 54. and 31. Ed. 3. Collation 29. and therefore at the Common Law if cestuy que use had bound himself and his heirs in an Obligation and died if the use descended to his heir none will say this use was assets to the heir and so was Rigler and Hunters case 25. Eliz. as to the second point it seems that the general words of a Statute shall be expounded according to the rule and reason of the Common Law and by the Common Law such confidence is not extendible therefore c. Westmin 2. cap. 18. which gives the elegit hath these words medietatem terrae and within those words an use was never extendible by that Statute 30. Ed. 3. because it was not an estate in him and so if a man be indebted for Merchandise or money borrowed and makes a gift of his lands and Chattels to defraud Creditors and takes the profits himself and flieth to the Sanctuary at Westminster or Saint Martins and there abideth by conclusion to avoid the payment of his debts it is thereby enacted that Proclamation shall be made at the Gate of the Sanctuary where such person resideth by the Sheriffe and if such person doth not thereupon appear in person or by Atturney judgement shall be given against him 2 Rich. 2. Stat. 2. cap. 3. 1. Rich. 3. cap. 1. and execution awarded aswel of those lands and goods given by fraud as of any other out of the same Franchise these words are more particular then the Statute of Westminster the second and yet it was doubted if it did extend to executions for debt as it appears by 7. H. 7. and 11. H. 7.27 and therefore in 19. H. 7. cap. 15. an Act of Parliament was made that execution for debts Recognizances and Statutes should be sued of lands in use As to the third it seems that that Statute doth not make lands in use liable to debts the words of the Statute are that the King shall seise two parts of the lands Tenements and Hereditaments leases of Farms of such offendors so that they are as general as the words of the Statute of Westminster 2. cap. 18. and here those lands and leases were not the Recusants for he had but a confidence in them the first clause of the Statute doth not extend thereunto for two causes First in regard that it never was in the Recusant and this clause extends only to such conveyances which are made by any man which hath not repaired or shall not repair to some Church for the disjunctive words do not extend throughout that branch but to the last part thereof viz. that which cometh after the word and for otherwise this would extend to conveyances made at any time without limitation which should be against the meaning of the Act. Secondly this Branch provides what shall be done concerning the King touching the levying and paying of such summes of money as any person by the Lawes of the Realm ought to pay of else to forfeit c. and by the Statutes before made nothing was forfeited but for such time as is mentioned in the Indictment which in our case is but 6. moneths but out of this branch a strong argument may be made in respect that the Statute avoids all conveyances made by Recusants in trust by express words but saith nothing to conveyances made by others to the use of Recusants and therefore this Statute doth not extend unto it if Tenant by Knights service infeoffs his heir within age and dies the Lord may enter upon the heir without suing an action but if a Feofmenche made to a stranger there he cannot enter but ought to bring his Action according to the provision of that Statute because it may be to the use of the Feoffee but no such provision is made for the heir the Statute of 3. Jac. cap. 4. provides by express words that the King shall seise two parts of all the lands Tenements and Hereditaments Leases and Faims that at the time of such seisure shall be or afterwards shall come to any of the hands of the said offendors or any other to their use or in trust for him or her or at his or her dispose or disposition or whereby wherewith or in consideration whereof such offendors or their families or any of them shall or may be relieved maintained or kept c. the different penning of these Statutes proves the diversitie of the meaning thereof this Statute is a new Law which gives to the King this penalty which he had not before and in new manner for it appoints that the partie shall be convicted by Proclamation and that being so convicted he shall alwayes pay the said penaltie until his submission without any other conviction 3. Jac. cap. 4. and also limits a manner how this new penaltie shall be levied viz.
last matter it seems that the Statute of 1. Jac. cap. 4 hath discharged this Land admitting that it was not discharged before wherein the words are and if any Recusant shall hereafter die his Heir being no Recusant That in every such Case every such Heire shall be freed and discharged of all and singular the penalties charges and incumbrances happening upon him or her in respect or by reason of his or her Ancestors recusancy and as to Walter de Chirtons Case who being an Accomptant to the Ring purchased Lands of A. with the Kings money by Covin and took the profits neverthelesse upon Inquisition it was adjudged that they should be seised into the Kings hands for his debt I agree that to be good Law because A. when he received the said money of Walter de Chirton that being the Kings monie A. immediately thereby became a Debtor and an Accemptent to the King and then into whose hands soever these Lands do after come they are still chargable for that money and therefore c. Sawyer against East AN Ejectione firme was brought by Sawyer against East for certain Mills in East-Smithfield in the County of Middlesex the Case upon a speciall Verdict was this Queen Eliz. 28. of her raign demised two Mills one Messuage and one Curtilage to Potter for 40. years Potter makes Mary his Wife Executrix and dies Mary marries one Burhill who in 33. Eliz. did demise one Messuage and one Curtilage to Wilkenson for 20. years and dies and Mary intermarries one Hitchmore who by deed inrolled in Chancery 20. Marcii 44. Eliz. reciting the originall Lease and that he had the whole Right State and Interest and term of years which Potter had and that he surrendred the estate and term of years aforesaid to the Queen reciting the matter mentioned in the surrender and that the Interest and Term which Potter had is come to Hitchmore and that Hitchmore had surrendred the whole right aswell for 30. l. as for that that Hitchmore did assume at his proper charges to repaire and new build the said Mills being in great decay and to give security for the same did demise the Mills Messuage and Curtilage for 40 years to the said Hitchmore rendring rent with a Covenant to be void for not payment c. and after the King demised the premisses to Ferrers and Philips two contractors who enter and demise to Sawyer who was possessed untill ejected by East who claimed under the lease to Hitchmore and the Iury found that in the Letters Patents to Hitchmore were contained ordinary Covenants to repaire the Mills and to leave them in good repair and the Iury also found that Hitchmore had not given any security for the building and repairing of the Mills and that the Mills were not new built nor repaired and that Hitchmore had pulled down one of the Mills and that the Term of twenty years is yet in being and if upon the whole matter c. Bromley the Puisne Baron saies that it seemed to him that judgement ought to be given for the Plaintiff First the suggestion or surmise in the Patent being false in matter of value and in such a thing which is proper for the information of the Lessee causeth the Lease to be void as in 18. Eliz. Dyer 352. An Abbot makes a Lease for 60. years the Lessee demiseth to I. S. for 80. years the reversion comes to the Queen the 60. years expire the second Lessee surrenders to the Queen his Term and Interest which was nothing in substance to the intention that the Queen should re-grant to him for 20. years this falsitie avoids the Lease and yet it is no such Lease which of necessity ought to be recited and so is 8. H. 7. fo 3. by Vavisor if the King at the suit of I. S. grants the Mannor of D. of the value of 50. marks and this is of the value of 100. marks and this upon the information of the party in this case the grant is void and so is 8. H. 6.28 by Juine if the King be informed by petition that such Land is but of the value of 8. l. a year which in truth is of greater value the patent is void 11. Ed. 4.1 The Patentee suggests that a surrender was made whereas in deed there was no Surrender at all there also the Patent is void and so is 3. H. 7. the Prior of Norwich his case but there it is expressed in the Patent that the party had informed the Queen of a thing which is false and this is not expressed in our case yet it seems to me that there is no diversitie between that case and the case in question for it is plaine that in our case that the surrender and consideration are the information of the party which was the motive to induce the Queen to her grant for the suggestion is grounded upon the surrender the which surrender is fraudulent and deceptive and therefore the Patent is void Altonwoods case Cooke Lib. 1.40 The King grants the Mannor of Riton and Condor where in truth they were two Manners there neither of them passe Fitzh Grants 58. and so here the suggestion is grounded upon the words of the Surrender which are false and deceptive and therefore the Patent is void also it seems that when the Queen grants in consideration that the Grancee did assume to repair and it is found that he had not repaired this not performing of the consideration avoids the Patent and this is proved by Barwicks case Cook lib. 5. if the King will make a Patent for a consideration which is for the Kings benefit be it Executory or executed of Record or not if it be not true or duly performed the Patent is thereby void And here the Covenant or assumption not being performed according to the Queens intention and the consideration of the Grant will also make void the Patent And it may be construed as a Proviso in an Indenture within some Cases doth amount to a Covenant and condition also as it was in the case of Simpson and Titterell and also in the case of the Earl of Pembrook vouched in Cook lib. 2. in the Lord Cromwels case and therefore I conceive that the words super se Assumpsit aedificare is parcell of the consideration aswell as if it had been pro eo quod aedificabit and so avoids the Patent by the not performance thereof Altham Second Baron saies it seems to me that the Iudgement ought to be given for the Planthere are three things considerable in the Case First whether the Lease made to Hitchmore were ever good or not in respect of a false suggestion Secondly whether in that the consideration that he did assume upon himself to repair and the Queen indeed never had any precedent information made of the want thereof do avoid the Patent in the foundation Thirdly admit it be good in the foundation whether the Lease become void afterwards for not repasting And first I
judgement ought to be given for the Defendant for he laid that the Patent made to Hitchmore proveth that it was not made by reason of any suggestion of the partie for it is expressed to be made ex mero motu c. and then the not surrendring of the other Term doth not vitiate also if the lease be forfeited to the Queen for not repairing then the Queen should have a title before the lease made to the contractors under which the Plaintiffe claims and that not being found by office the contractors shall have no benefit thereof and as to the cases 9. H. 6. and Torringtons case cited Cook lib. 1. Altonwoods case the words of the Patent which express that the Patent should be good so that it be not ad nocumentum c. which is not in our case doth not prove the case in question also if the consideration be smal and recited as executed it doth vitiate the Patent although it be false and it is said in Sir Thomas Wrothes case in Plowden that it is not honourable for the King to construe his Patent to be void by colour of deceipt upon an inference except it be upon a manifest deceipt and in Barwicks case Cook lib. 5. the consideration was a surrender of all the estate and therefore it differed from the case in 18. Eliz. Dyer because there it was in consideration of an estate which in truth was never in being and the cases whereupon he relied for the proofe of this matter is the principal case of Altonwoods and the Lord Chandos case that if a violent intendment might be admitted in the Kings grants upon an inference it might be here inferred that the King should have the estate by this particular surrender but the Book is resolved that no such inference shall be admitted to avoid the Kings patent or otherwise but in that case of the Lord Chandos it appeared that the information of the partie was true and so it was not here because it was informed that all the right which Potter had is devolved to Hitchmore which is not so and therefore a difference between those two cases Nota that the course of this Court is that if A. be indebted or be an accomptant to the King and A. hath another debtor which debtor hath a third person indebted unto him in such case A. may by English Billin the Exchequer pray that the estate of the debtor of his debtor Pasch 9. Jac. in the Exchequer may be extended for the debt of the said A. and it shall be granted Clerk against Rutland IN 6. Jac. in Ejectione firme between Clerk and Rutland it appeared that a feme sole possessed of a Term of years assigns this to A. in trust and after entermarries with him in reversion and after the husband being in quiet possession he and his wife joyn in a Bargaine and sale to B. upon valueable consideration and after the wife dies and the assignee doth set on foot the lease and if this shall be void against the Bargainee was the question upon evidence and it seemeth not because the Bargainee claimeth nothing by conveyance from the wife and also this trust in the Term doth not belong to the husband after the death of the wife for Tanfield said that it was decreed in the Chancery and the opinion of the Iudges was in one Denies case if a feme sole assign a lease in trust and after taketh husband and dieth that the administrator of the wife should have this trust and that the Administration shall be granted for this Term although there be no other thing for which the Administration ought to be granted also it was touched in this case that if the father make a lease for fortie years to a stranger and continue in possession and after conveys the land to a younger son who for a valuable consideration conveyeth it over it was doubted if the purchasor should avoid this lease or not but it was said that if in that case the father after the making of such a lease had suffered the land to descend to his eldest son who had been privie to this trust that then the Purchasor of the eldest son should avoid this lease as it was ruled in Burwels case Cook lib. 6. Upon a motion made by Prideaux that Robert winter one of the Powder Traitors made a lease for years 1. Jac. to one Gower and that after 3. Jac. the Lessor was attainted of Treason by Parliament which attainder related to a time before the conveyance of the Fee and if in this case the Term be saved or lost it was the question Pasch 9 Jac. in the Exchequer Wickham against Wood Pasch 9. Jac. in the Exchequer EDward Wickham declared in an Ejectione firme that Skreen 17. April 6. Jac. at Framlingham in Suffolk demised to him 30. Acres of pasture to have for three years c. and upon the general issue pleaded the Iury found that Thomas Cooper and three others were seised of the lands in question and the fifth of February 24. H. 8. infeoffed by Indenture M. B. and five others to the uses and intents mentioned in a Schedul annexed and that was upon condition that if they aliened to any other uses or purposes that the Feoffor should re-enter and the Iury also found the Schedule which in effect was this viz. that the Feoffees and their heirs should take the profits and therewith finde an honest priest by them or the greater number of them to be hired and competently paid to say Mass for the soules of the Feoffor and his friends and that by the space of 99. years then ensuing and at the end of the said years the Feoffees their heirs and assigns who then should be seised should sell the lands and with the money finde a Priest to Chaunt for the soules aforesaid and with the said moneys or lands also to make further provision for a competent poor honest Priest for the timr being if then it could be by a Amortization or otherwise as they should think best for the sure and long continuance of the said honest Priest if so it could be continued by order of Law the Iury found all things executed accordingly and the finding of a Priest from the 24th of H. 8. untill the first of Ed. 6. by which Act the King was entituled prout lex postulat and that Queen Eliz. granted to Mildmay for 21. years upon whom Fuller the heir of the surviving Feoffee entred and made a Feofment to Wilbey and Skreen by force whereof they were seised and Mildmay re-entred and his Term expiring he obtained a new lease 43. Eliz. and made a lease to Wood and Skreen survived Wilbey and made a lease to Wickham who entred and being outed by Wood brought this Action Bromley puisne Baron upon all the matter I observe three things First if the Fee-simple in this case by the letter or meaning of the Statute be given to the Crown for the lease
above mentioned of a lease for years and also it was there said that if Tenant for life be the remainder to the King for years the remainder to another in Fee and the Tenant for life makes a Feofment in Fee this drawes the Kings remainder out of him and so he held that here is no gift Secondly that here is no imployment and so the Feofment is made good Altham second Baron contra I will consider only two points First if it be a gift for years or for ever and I say that it is a gift for ever for here is no intent in the Donor to determine the superstitious use because he doth not limit any other use to which it should revert but only that the Priest should be maintained for ever and as that which hath been said that it was not imployed he answereth that out of the Book of 22. Assises 52. where 12. d. is reserved for three years and after 100. s. seisin of 12. d. is seisin of the 100. s. because it is issuing out of the freehold as the case is in Littleton in the Chapter of Atturnement Tenant for life the remainder in Fee the Lord shall not avow upon the remainder but shall have it by way of Escheat for all the estates together are holden of the Lord but if land be given to finde a Priest in D. and one is maintained in S. this is a mis-imployment but in our case I conceive that the Feoffees have power to dispose the land as to them seems best and therefore it is uncertain and then given to the King as it was in Dales case land was given to the intent that a Priest should be maintained as I. S. and I. D. thought fit so that he had not less then 8. marks yearly the King shall have all for the Feoffees may give all to the Priest if they please and in Turners case land was devised to a Priest and divers poor men all is given to the King by the superstitious imployment and as to the words if by the Law it may be they are idle for id possumus quod de Jure possumus and therefore 9. Ed. 6. an office was given to one if he were able to exercise it these words are idle for the Law saith that he shall not have it if he be not able to execute it 30. Ed. 3.8 a gift to two and to the longer liver of them that the Survivor shall have it are idle words 10. H. 7. a Condition that c. and here it the condition had been until an Act of Parliament prohibit it they are Idle words for if land be given to I. S. and his heirs upon condition that if he die without heirs c. this is a void condition and Repugnant to Law Lastly I hold the feofment good by way of Admittance and that the livery takes effect notwithstanding the Queens interest 4. H. 6.19 the Kings Tenant for life is disseised he shall have an Assise and yet there is no intrusion upon the King 17. H. 7.6 the Kings Lessee makes a feofment the King enters and so he held that the judgement should he given for the Defendant Snig Baron argued much to the same intent that Bromley had done and that the Schedule is so circumspect that nothing is given after the 99. years and that a spirit of Divination forwarned him of the alteration and he agreed the Feofment to be good with this difference where the King is in possession actually and where the Reversion is in the King and the book of 2 H. 4.9 that none shall enter upon the Kings Farmor is to be understood of the Kings under Tenants and not of his Lessees Tanfield chief Baron said that neither by the intent of the Statute nor of the parties the fee is given to the Queen but it is apparant that during the 99. years the parties intent is in suspence for fear of alteration and that they would see the difference of the times and leave the disposing thereof to his Feoffees and if they had sold the land and with the money maintained a Priest as many stocks of money have used to do without doubt it had been forfeited to the King and not the land and it would be in vain to speak of an Amortization if it be for a stipendary Priest only for this would not be necessary to have a foundation incorporated and to make an Amortization for such a Priest and therefore it seems to him that there is no determination of his will after the 99. years but that all is left to the determination and disposition of the feoffees who then should be and after the intent of the Statute which was penned by Hales Iustice of the Common Pleas. I observe four words given appointed limited and assigned and I do not conceive that our case is within the compass of any of them for as I said before it is in suspence until the end of 99. years and the parties who should have the interest are not known untill the time come nor the estate setled until that time but if it had been conveyed to superstitious uses after it had been given to the Queen notwithstanding the conveyance had not been sufficient if he who did convey had power in respect of the abilitie of his person and the estate in him and therefore Pasch 22. Eliz. the case was this Sir William Say before the Statute of 32. H. 8. of Wills was seised of lands in fee not devisable and before the said Statute he devised it to finde a Priest and notwithstanding that the devise was not good yet it was adjudged that the land was given to the Queen by 1. Ed. 6. but if it were a feme covert or an infant who are disabled in Law or a Tenant in tail who is disabled in respect of his estate there it had not been given to the Queeen but in all cases there ought to be an assignment or otherwise nothing is given and there is a difference where one grants land to the intent with the profits thereof to finde a Priest there all the land is given to the Queen and where he grants a rent for the maintenance of a Priest for there the King shall have but the Rent and he said that the Case cited 5. Ed. 6. Benlos is good Law and as to that which hath been said That because the power of the Feoffees is uncertain it should be given to the Queen true it is where the power is uncertain to bestow the profits but if their power be certain it is otherwise and as to the imployment there is none because there is no gift but the imployment of the particular estate is an imployment of the Remainder and a small thing will make an imployment James case was of the Greyhound in Fleetstreet which was given to finde a Priest and the White Horse for the maintenance of another and the Feoffees of the White-horse maintained the Priest of the