to the use of Dennis May his Son and Heir apparant and his Heirs upon condition that the said Dennis and his Heirs should pay to one Petronell Martin for his life an annuall Rent of 10 l. which the said Thomas had before granted to the said Petronell to begin upon the death of the said Thomas And upon condition also that the said Thomas upon the payment of 10 s. by him to the said Feoffees or any of them c. might re-enter After which the said Thomas May and Dennis by their Deed dated 30. May 19 Eliz. granted a Rent-charge out of the said Mannor of 20 l. a year to one Anne May for her life after which the said Thomas May paid the said 10 s. to the said Feoffees in performance of the Condition aforesaid and therupon re-entred into the Land and enfeoffed a stranger And whether by this the Rent were defeated was the question And it was mooved by Coke Attorney-generall that it was not but that in respect that he joyned in the part it shall enure against the said Thomas by way of confirmation which shall bind him as well against this matter of Condition as it shall do against any Right which the said Thomas otherwise had And therfoâ—e by Littleton If a Disseisor make a Lease for years or grant a Rent-charge and the Disseisor confirm them and afterwards re-enters albeit Lit. there makes a Quaere of it yet Cook said That the Disseisor should not avoid the Charge or Lease which was granted by the whole Court And by him the opinion is in P. 11. H. 7. 21. If Tenant in Tail makes a Feoffment to his own use upon Condition and afterwards is bound in a Statute upon which Execution is sued and afterwards he re-enter for the Condition broken he shall not avoid the Execution no more the Rent here Fennor agreed with Cook and said further That in as much as every one who hath Title and Interest have joyned in the Grant it remains perpetually good And therfore if a Parson at Common Law had granted a Rent-charge out of his Rectory being confirmed by the Patron and Ordinary it shall be good in perpetuity and yet the Parson alone could not have charged it and the Patron and Ordinary have no Interest to charge it but in as much as all who have to intermeddle therin are parties to it or have given their assent to it it sufficeth Gawdy was of the same opinion and said That there is no Land but by some means or other it might be charged and therfore if Tenant for life grant a Rent-charge in Fee and he in the Reversion confirm the Grant per Littleton the Grant is good in property so here To which Clench also assented but Popham said That by the entry for the Condition the Charge is defeated And therfore we are to consider upon the ground of Littleton in his Chapter of Confirmation to what effect a Confirmation shall enure and this is to bind the right of him who makes the Confirmation but not to alter the nature of the Estate of him to whom the Confirmation is made And therfore in the case of a grant of a Rent-charge by the Disseisor which is confirmed by the Demisee the reason why the Confirmation shall make this good is because that as the Disseisee hath right to defeat the right and the Estate of the Disseisor by his Regresse in the same manner hath he right therby to avoid a Charge or a Lease granted by the Disseisor which Right for the time may be bound by his confirmation But when a man hath an Estate upon condition although the Feoffor or his Heirs confirm this Estate yet by this the Estate is not altered as to the Condition but it alwaies remaineth and therfore Nihil operatur by such a confirmation to prejudice the Condition And so there is a great diversity when hewho confirmeth hath right to the Land and where but a Condition in the Land And by him if a Feoffee upon condition make a Feoffment over or a Lease for life or years every one of these have their Estates subject to the Condition and therfore by a Confirmation made to them none can be excluded from the Condition And the same reason is in case of a Rent granted by a Feoffor upon Condition it is also subject to the Condition and therfore not excluded from it by the Confirmation as it shall be in case of a Right And to prove this diversity suppose there be Grand-father Father and Son the Father disseise the Grand-father and makes a Feoffment upon Condition and dies after which the Grand-father dies now the Son confirms the Estate of the Feoffee by this he hath excluded himself from the Right which descended to him by his Grand-father but not to the Condition which descended to him from his Father And of this opinion were Anderson and other Iustices at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet for the principall Case upon the Case moved there by Popham this Term And as the case is it would have made a good question upon the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances if the Avowry had been made as by the grant of Thomas May in as much as the Estate made to the use of Dennis was defeasable at the pleasure of the said Thomas in as much as it was made by the Tenant of the Land as well as by him who made the Conveyance which is to be judged fraudulent upon the Statute But this as the pleading was cannot come in question in this case And afterwards by the opinion of other three Iudges Iudgment was given that the Grant should bind the said Thomas May and his Feoffees after him notwithstanding his regresse made by the Condition in as much as the Grant of the said Thomas shall enure to the Grantee by way of confirmation And by Gawdy If a Feoffee upon Condition make a Feoffment over and the first Feoffor confirm the Estate of the last Feoffee he shall hold the Land discharged of the Condition because his Feoffment was made absolutely without any Condition expressed in his Feoffment But Popham denied this as it appeareth by Littleton Tit. Descents because he hath his Estate subject to the same Condition and in the same manner as his Feoffor hath it into whomsoever hands it hapneth to come and therfore the Confirmation shall not discharge the Condition but is only to bind the right of him who made it in the possession of him to whom it is made but not upon Condition Morgans Case 7. RObert Morgan Esquire being seised in his Demesne as of Fee of certain Lands called Wanster Tenements in Socage having Issue John his eldest Son Christopher his second Son and William his youngest Son by his last Will in writing demised to the said Christopher and William thus viz. Ioyntly and severally for their lives so that neither of them stall alienate the Lands and if they do that they shall remain to his Heirs Robert the Father
Cleland brought a Writ of error against Baldock upon a Iudgement given in where the Plaintiff declared that the Intr. Hill 22. Iac Rot. 59â— Defendant in consideration that he would do all his commands honestly and truly for the space of a yeare assumed to pay him 10 l. and further declared that he had done all his honest and lawfull commands and this promise being found by verdict Iudgement was given against Doctor Cleland and thereupon he brought this Writ of error and Greene assigned two errors 1. The Assumpsit is that he shall doe all his commands honestly and truly and he hath declared that he hath done all his lawfull and honest commands and he may honest commands and yet not honestly 2. It is said that Jurator Assident dampna and it is not said occasione transgression predict and it is against all Presidents But Nota that there were these words ex hac parte opposita and therefore the exceptions were disallowed by the Court and the first Iudgement affirmed The same Term in the same Court. Secheverel versus Dale THis Case was sent out of Chancery to this Court â—o know the Law therein and in Trespas the case was this Henry Secheverell the Father seised in Fée levied a Fine to A. and B. in Fee to the use of himselfe for life absque impetitione vasti with power to cut and carry away the trees and to make Leases for 21 yeares or three lives the remainder to the use of John Secheverell his eldest Son for life without impeachment of waste with the same powers Henry the Father made a Lease to one under whom the Plaintiff claims for three lives rendring the ancient Rent excepting all the trees unlesse those which shall be for cropping lopping and fewell Henry the Father dyes John the Son in the next remainder cut certain trees Victorin Secheverell who clayms by the lease made by the Father brings trespas and two Questions were moved 1. Whether Lessee for life without impeachment of waste may make a Lease excepting the trees and it was objected by the Councel of the Plaintiff that he could not because this second Lease ariseth out of the first fine and out of the estate of the Conusor But the Court prima facie was of opinion that he might well make such a Lease with such an exception See Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowls his Case and Doctor and Student lib. 1. cap. 1. and by Doderidge Iustice the Lease ariseth out of both the estates Jones Iustice suppose the Lessee absque impetitione vasti assigne over all his estate might he cut the trees and it was conceived that he might for by Doderidge he hath power to dispose of the trees as it was resolved in Lewys Bowls his case Jones he hath no propriety in the Trees untill they be cut Crew ch Justice Admit a Stranger cut the trees who shall have them By all the Court the Lessee without impeachment of waste shall have them 2. Point Tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut and carry away the trees and make Leases for 21. years or three lives the remainder for life to J. S. without impeachment of waste c. Tenant for life makes a Lease for thrée lives and dyes whether he in remainder for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trées may cut the trées and take them during the Lease for thrée lives and the Court séemed to be of opinion that he might And Leving of Councell with the Plaintiff argued that when tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trees and to make Leases for 21. years or three lives makes a Lease for thrée lives excepting the trées that this is a voyd exception because he hath no interest but a bare Authority 27. H. 6. Fitz. Wast 8. Statham tit Wast 1. makes this a Quaere which Statham was once the owner of the Land in question A man makes a Lease for life without impeachment of waste a Stranger cuts trées the Lessée brings trespas he shall recover no Damages for the value of the trees because the propriety belongs to him in the reversion he may dispose of them Quaere Dyer 284. Daunsley and Southwels Case Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowles case that such a Lessee may take trées which are blown down and 3. H. 6. 45. Mich 41. and 42. Eliz. C. B. Leechford against Sanders in an Action of waste upon a Lease made to Sanders for life with a proviso that the Plaintiff might dispose of the trées during the estate and resolved that the Action lies not for notwithstanding this power the trées are demised to the Lessée also so here when the trées are excepted he hath no interest but only an authority 2. The exception is voyd for another reason because when such a Lessée makes such a Lease this is not his Lease but it hath its operation out of the originall fine and he who makes this hath but the nomination and therefore cannot adde a condition or exception to it And if the second Lease shall have its being out of the estate of the Lessee for life then there shall be an use upon an use as appears Co. lib. 1. 134. and that the Law will not allow 15. H. 7. and Co. Lib. 1. Albanyes Case If a man devise that his Executors shall fell his Land they cannot adde a condition or exception to this sale as an attornment upon a condition subsequent is voyd Co. lib. 2. Tookers case 3. This case may be resembled to the case of Copy-holds which is in Co. lib. 8. 63. b. in Swaynes Case If a Lord takes a Wife and afterwards grants Lands by Copy according to the custome and dyes his Wife shall not be endowed of this Land for albeit her title of Dower was before the Grant yet the title of Copi-hold which is the custome is elder then the title of Dower so in our case the title of the second Lessee is derived out of the estate of the Conuzées and therefore shall not be clogg'd with the Exceptions of Lessee for life without impeachment of waste 4. This priviledge to cut the trées is annexed to the estates and goes along with the estate and therefore shall not begin before the Stranger be in possession 3. E. 3. 44. 45. Idles case 28. H. 8. Dyer 10. And it may be resembled to the cases of 16. E. 4. and 27. H. 8. Tenant in taile sold the trées if he dyes before the Party takes them he shall never have them because he hath stayd out his time But it may be objected that upon such a Lease he may reserve a rent as it is in Whitlocks case Co. lib. 8. to which I will offer this difference Lessée for life with power to make Leases for thrée lives reserving rent makes a Lease for thrée lives reserving rent this reservation is good because it is but a Declaration of the Lease and of the rent
guided according to that which may be collected to be the purpose and intent of the parties And therefore if a man make an Estate of his Land without limitation of any Vse or confidence the Law shall say that it is to his own use but if it be upon confidence then it shall be to the Vse of the party to whom it is made or according to the confidence which shâ—ll be absolute or according to that which is limitted which may alter that which otherwise shall be taken upon the generall confidence as 30 H. 6. Fitz. Devise If a man devise Lands to another in Fee he hath the use and Title of it but if it be limitted to his use for his life only the use of the Fee shall be to the Heir of the Devisor for by the limitation his intent shall be taken to be otherwise then it should be taken if this limitation had not been and in as much as in this case the Earl reserves to himself but the use for years it is evident that his intent never was to have the Fee to surrender this Term which perhaps he intended to be for the benefit of his will which shall be defeated contrary to his purpose if the Fee shall be also in him by the death of the sayd Iohn without Issue Male and therefore the sayd Daughters ought to have the Land And on the other part it was argued by Glanvil Serjeant and Egerton the Attorney Generall that this limitation made to the right Heirs is void in the same manner as if a man give Lands to another for life the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Feoffor in this case the Heir shall take by descent as a Reversion remaining to the Feoffor and not as a Remainder devested out of him for the ancient right priviledge the Estate which he may take and therfore he shall take it by descent and not by purchase for the name of right Heir is not a name of purchase betwixt the Ancestor and his heir because that doth instance that he happeneth to be heir he takes it by descent and then it comes too late to take by purchase And another reason that the Daughters shall not have it is because that when Sir Iohn Russell dies without Issue Male which Estate might have preserved the Remainder if it shall be a Remainder there was not any right heir of the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford to take this Remainder because that the sayd Earl survived him And therefore it is to bee resembled to this Case Land is given in Tail the Remainder to the right Heirs of I. G. the Donee dyes without Issue in the life of I. G. in this case albeit I. G. dyes afterwards having an heir yet this heir shall never have the Loud because he was not heir in Esse to take it when the Remainder fell and for the mean Estate for years this cannot preserve a Remainder no more then when Land is given for years the Remainder to the right heirs of I. G. this Remainder can never be good if I. G. be then living because such a Remainder cannot depend but upon a Free-hold precedent at least and therefore the Inheritance here shall go to the now Earl of Bedford by the second assurance And upon consideration of the Case and severall Confirmes had upon this amongst the Iudges and Barens it was at last resolved by all but Baron Clarke that the Daughters shall not have the Mannors in the County of Doâ—set but the now Earl of Bedford and principally upon this reason because there was nor right Heir to take as Purchasor where the mean Estate Taile was determined which was by the Lord Iohn without Issue Male for they agreed that the Remainder to the right Heirs if it be a Remainder cannot be preserved by the mean Estate for years for it ought to be a Free-hold at least which ought to preserve such a Remainder untill there be one to take it by name of Purchasor as right Heir And at this day they did not think there was any diversity between the Case of a Remainder in Possession limitted to the right heir of one and of a Remainder in use so limited over to another Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz In the Kings Bench. 3. IN Ejectione firmae upon speciall verdict the case was thus A man possessed of a Term of years in right of his wife made a Lease for years of the same Land to begin after his death which was the Lessor and afterwards he dyed and his wife survived him and the question was whether the wife shall have the Land after the death of the husband or the Lessee for if the husband had devised the same Land to an estranger yet the Wife shall have it and not the Devisee as it happened in the Case of Matthew Smith who made first such a Devise of a Term of his Wife and yet the Wife had it because that by the death of the husband before which the Devise did not take effect the wife had it in her first Right not altered in the life of her Husband but it was agreed in this case by all the Court that the Lessee shall have it during his Term for as the husband during his life might contract for the Land for the whole term which the wife had in it so might he do for any part of the term at his pleasure for if he may devise the Land for one and twenty years to begin presently he also may make it to begin at any time to come after his Death if the term of the Wife be not expired but for the Remainder of the term of the husband made no disposition during his life the Wife shall have it which by Popham this Case happened upon a specialll Verdict in the County of Somerset about 20 Eli. Where he and Sergeant Baber were Practisers in the Circuit there to wit the Lands were demised to husband and wife for their lives the Remainder to the Survivor of them for years the Husband granted over this term of years and dyed and the question was whether the Wife shall have the term of years or the Grantee and adjudged that the Wife shall have it and it was upon this reason because there was nothing in the one or the other to grant over untill there was a Survivor And the same Law had been if the Wife bad dyed after the Grant and the Husband had survived yet he shall have the term against his own Grant as if a Lease were made for Life the Remainder for years to him which first cometh to Pauls if A. grant this Term for years to another and afterwards A. is the first which commeth to Pauls yet the Grantee shall not have this Term because it was not in A. by any means neither in Interest nor otherwise untill he came to Pauls As if a man make a Lease for life the Remainder to the Right heirs of J. S. J. S. hath
that it shall be then holden as if no Adjournment had been the Essâ—ines had been the first day of Tres Trin. and the full Term had not been untill the fourth day which was the last day of the Term quod nota and so it was of the Adjournment which hapned first at Westminster and afterwards at Hertford from Michaelmas Term now last past Michaelmas Term 35 and 36 Eliz. Gravenor versus Brook and others 1. IN an Ejectione firmae by Edward Gravenor Plaintiff against Richard Brook and others Defendants the case appeared to be this Henry Hall was seised in his Demesne as of Fee according to the custom of the Mannor of A. in the County of D. of certain customary Tenements holden of the said Mannor called Fairchildes and Preachers c. In the third year of Henry the 8th before which time the customary Tenements of the said Mannor had alwaies been used to be granted by Copy of Court Roll of the said Mannor in Fee-simple or for life or years but never in Fee-tail but then the said Henry Hall surrendred his said Copy-hold Land to the use of Joane his eldest Daughter for her life the remainder to John Gravenor the eldest Son of the said Joane and to the Heirs of his body the Remainder to Henry Gravenor her other Son and the Heirs of his body the Remainder to the right Heirs of the said Henry Hall for ever wherupon in 3 H. 8. at the Court then there holden a grant was made by Copy of Court Roll accordingly and Seisin given to the said Joane by the Lord accordingly Henry Hall died having Issue the said Joane and one Elizabeth and at the Court holden within the said Mannor 4 H. 8. the death of the said Henry Hall was presented by the Homage and that the said Daughters were his Heirs and that the Surrender made as before was void because it was not used within the said Mannor to make Surrenders of Estates tails and therupon the said Homage made division of the said Land and limited Fairchilds for the purparty of the said Joane and Preachers for the purparty of the said Elizabeth and Seisin was granted to them accordingly Elizabeth died seised of her said part after which 33 H. 8. Margaret her Daughter was found Heir to her and admitted Tenant to this part after which Joane dyed seised of the said Tenements as the Law will And after the said Margaret takes to Husband one John Adye who with his said wife surrendred his said part to the use of the said John Adye and of his said wife and of their Heirs and afterwards the said Margaret died without Issue and the said John Adye held the part of his said wife and surrendred it to the use of the said Richard Brook and of one John North and their Heirs who were admitted accordingly after which the said John Gravenor died without Issue and now the said Henry Gravenor was sole Heirs to him and also to the said Henry Hall who had Issue Edward Gravenor and dyed the said Edward entred into the said Lands called Preachers and did let it to the Plaintiff upon whom the said Richard Brook and the other Defendants did re-enter and eject him And all this appeareth upon a speciall Verdict And by Clench and Gawdy an Estate tail cannot be of Copyhold Land unlesse it be in case where it hath been used for the Statute of Donis conditionalibus shall not enure to such customary Lands but to Lands which are at common Law and therfore an Estate tail cannot be of these customary Lands but in case where it hath been used time out of mind and they said that so it hath been lately taken in the Common Bench But they said that the first remainder limited to the said John Gravenor here upon the death of the said John was a good Fee-simple conditional which is well warrantes by the custom to demise in Fee for that which by custom may be demised of an Estate in Fee absolute may also be demised of a Fee-simple conditionall or upon any other limitation as if I. S. hath so long Issue of his body and the like but in such a case no Remainder can be limited over for one Fee cannot remain over upon another and therfore the Remainder to the said Henry was void But they said that for all the life of the said John Gravenor nothing was in the said Elizabeth which could descend from her to the said Margaret her Daughter or that might be surrendred by the said Margaret and her Husband and therfore the said Margaret dying without Issue in the life time of the said John Gravenor who had the Fee-simple conditionall nothing was done which might hinder the said Edward Son to the said Henry Gravenor of his Entry and therfore the said Plaintiff ought to have his Iudgment to recover for they took no regard to that which the Homage did 4th year of Hen. 8. But Fennor and Popham held that an Estate tail is wrought out of Copy-hold Land by the equity of the Statute of Donis conditionalibus for otherwise it cannot be that there can be any Estate tail of Copyhold Land for by usage it cannot be maintained because that no Estate tail was known in Law before this Statute but all were Fee-simple and after this Statute it cannot be by usage because this is within the time of limitation after which an usage cannot make a prescription as appeareth 22 23 Eliz. in Dyer And by 8 Eliz. a Custom cannot be made after Westm 2. And what Estates are of Copyhold land appeareth expresly by Littleton in his Chapter of Tenant by Copyhold c. And in Brook Title Tenant by Copyhold c. 15 H. 8. In both which it appeareth that a Plaint lyeth in Copyhold Land in the nature of a Formedon in the Descender at common Law and this could not be before the Statute of Donis conditionalibus for such Land because that before that Statute there was not any Formedon in the Descender at common Law and therfore the Statute helps them for their remedy for intailed Land which is customary by equity Add if the Action shall be given by equity for this Land why shall not the Statute by the same equity work to make an Estate intail also of this nature of the Land We see no reason to the contrary and if a man will well mark the words of the Statute of Westm 2. cap. 1. he shall well perceive that the Formedon in Descender was not before this Statute which wills that in a new case a new remedy may be given and therupon sets the form of a Formedon in Descender But as to the Formedon in the Reverter it is then said that it is used enough in Chancery and by Fitzherbert in his Natura brevium the Formedon in the Descender is founded upon this Statute and was not at Common Law before And the reason is because these Copyholds are now become by usage to be
35 E. Rot. 258. And Popham said further in this case that to erect an Hospitall by the name of an Hospitall in the County of S. or in the Bishopprick of B. and the like is not good because he is bound to a place too large and incertain But a Colledge erected in Accademia Cantabrig or Oxon. is good and sâ—me are so founded because it tends but to a particular place as a City Town c. King versus Bery and Palmer 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by William King against John Bery and William Palmer Defendants for two Messuages and certain Lands in Halstead in the County of Leicester upon a Demise alledged to be made by Dorothy Pool and Robert Smith the case upon a speciall Verdict was this The said Dorothy was Tenant for life of the said Tenants the Remainder over to the said Robert Smith and his Heirs and they being so seised made the Lease in the Declaration upon which the Action was brought And per curiam the Lease found by the Verdict doth not warrant the Lease alledged in the Declaration for although they joyned in the Demise yet during the life of the said Dorothy it is her Demise and not the Demise of the said Robert Smith but as his confirmation for that time for he hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land during the life of the said Dorothy but after the death of the said Dorothy then it shall be said to be the Domise of the said Robert Smith and not before because untill this time Smith hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land And in a more strong case If Tenant for life and he in the Reversion in Fee make a Gift in tail for the life of Tenant for life it shall be said to be his Gift but after his death it shall be said the Gift of him in the Reversion and if the Estate tail had expired during the life of the said Tenant for life he shall have the Land again in his former Estate and there shal be no forfeiture in the case because he in the Reversion of the immediate Estate of Inheritance had joyned in it and therfore hath dispensed with that which otherwise had been a meer forfeiture of the Estate for life wherby it was awarded by the Court that the Plaintif take nothing by his Bill in 33 34 Eliz. Rot. And the Judgment is entred Hill 34. Eliz. Ret. 72. 3. In this Term I hapned to see a Case agreed by the Iustices in 3. 4. Eliz. which was this If a man make a Lease of two Barns rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry if the Tenant be at one of the Barns to pay the Rent and the Lessor at the other to demand the Rent and none be there to pay it that yet the Lessor cannot enter for the Condition broken because there was no default in the Tenant he being at one for it was not possible for him to be at both places together And upon this Case now remembred to the Iustices Popham Walmesley and Fennor said That perhaps also the Tenant had not money sufficient to have been ready to have paid it at either of the said places but it is sufficient for him to have and provide one Rent which cannot be at two places together And by the Case reported here also If Lands and Woods are demised together the Rent ought to be demanded at the Land and not the Woood because the Land is the more worthy thing and also more open then the Wood And therfore by the three Iustices aforesaid Rent ought not to be demanded in any private place of a Close as amongst Bushes in a Pit or the like nor in the open and most usuall passage therof as at a Stile Gate and the like 4. Vpon a Prohibition sued out of the Kings Bench the Case appeared to be this The late Lord Rich Father to the now Lord Rich devised to his Daughter for her advancement in marriage 1500. upon condition that she marry with the consent of certain friends and deviseth further that if his Goods and Chattels are not sufficient to pay his Debts and Legacies that then there shall be 200 l. a year of his Lands sold to supply it and dies making the now Lord Rich his Executor his Goods and Chattels not being sufficient to pay the Debts of the Testator as was averred the said Daughter married with a Husband against the will of those who were put in trust to give their assents and the Husband and the Wife sued in the Spirituall Court for the Legacy And it was surmised that they would not allow the proofs of the said now Lord Rich exhihited to prove the payment of the Debts of his Testator and further that they would charge him for the sale of the Land upon which matter the Prohibition was granted to the Delegates before whom the matter depended and now consultation was prayed in the case Vpon which it was affirmed by a Doctor of the Civill Law that they will allow the proofs for the payment of the Debts according to our Law and that the Legacy shall not be paid untill the Debs are satisfied But he said that by the Law if the Executor do not exhibit his Inventory but neglect it for a year or more that then if any omission or default be in the true value of the Inventory exhibited that then such on Executor for this default shall pay all the Legacies of his Testator of what value soever they are not respecting the Debts or the value of the Goods or Chattels how small soever the omission or default be in the Inventory And so he said was the case of the now Sir Richard S. who did not bring in the Inventory for four years after the death of the Testator and that in the Inventory exhibited the values of every thing were found to be too small and therfore to be charged by their Law albeit he hath not Goods and Chattels sufficient of the Testators To which it was answered that this was quite without reason for by such means every Subject of the Realm may be utterly defeated if he take upon him the charge of an Executorship And if this shall be admitted no man will take upon him the Execution of the Will of any and by such a means none will have their Wills performed which shall be too inconvenient And they said further that in as much as Debts are to be proved by the Common Law of the Realm those of the Ecclesiasticall Courts ought to admit in the proof therof such proofs as our Law allows and not according to the precisenesse of their Law And although by their Law such a Condition as before being annexed to a Legacy is void because that marriage oughr to be free without Coercion yet where we are to judge upon the point as we are here if the Execution happen to be charged because of the sale of Land and for
but as referring to the provision subsequent in the Statute in which case this matter shall be used but as the Proviso it self shall be and according to this it hath been commonly put in practise by all the Iustices in all places after the Statute untill now And they agreed also that it need not be shewn whether he were made a Iesuit or Priest c. either beyond Sea or within the Realm because whersoever it was it is within the Law if he were made by the pretended authority of the See of Rome But they agreed that it ought to be comprised in the Indictment that he was born within this Realm or other Dominions of the Queen but need not to shew where but generally Et quod I. S. natus infra hoc Regnum Angliae c. And the Indictment ought to comprise that he was a Iesuite or Priest c. by authority challenged or pretended from to the See of Rome because that this is in the body of the Act without such reference as in the other point and according to this resolution the proceeding was against the said Southwell Easter Term 37 Eliz. Pigots Case 1. AFter the death of Valentine Pigot Esquire a Commission was awarded in nature of a Mandamus and after the death of Thomas Pigot Father of the said Valentine a Commission was awarded in nature of a Diem clausit extremum and the said Commissions were awarded to one and the same Commissioners who by one Inquest took but one Inquisition upon these severall Commissions in this form Inquisitio indentata captâ— apud c. virtute Commiss in natura brevis de diem clausit extremum eisdem Commiss direct c. ad inquirendum post mortem Thomae Pigot Ar. nuper defuncti patris predict Valentin per sacramentum c. Qui dâ—cunt c. After which all the points of the Câ—mmission after the death of the sâ—id Valentine are enquired of but for the Commissions after the death of the said Thomas Pigot it is imperfect in some points as who is his Heir c. is not found And by Popham and Anderson this Inquisition is void as to Valentine as well as for Thomas for their authorities which are the Commissions are by severall Warrants which cannot be simul semel by one and the same Inquisition executed and satisfied but ought to be divided and severall as the Warrant is severall and yet the same Inquest which found one Inquisition by one Warrant may also find another Inquisition by the other Warrant but divided and severall and not as one for as it is made it does not appear upon which of the Commissions the Inquisition as to Valentine is taken for as it is made it may be as well upon the one as upon the other for it is said to be by vertue of both the Commissions which cannot be and therfore is not good in any part and severall Warrants ought to be severally execused and therfore although the Escheator as appeareth by 9 H. 7. 8. may take â—â— Inquisition Virtue officii and at the same day another Inquisition Virtue brevis by one and the same Inquest yet this cannot be drawn into one Inquisition And that which is found Virtue officii contrary to that which before the same day Virtute libris as that it found more Land is good for the King And this their opinion was certified to the Court of Wards Sir Rowland Haywards Case 2. THis Case was also sent to the same chief Iustices out of the Court of See this case in Coke â— Report 35. Wards Sir Rowland Hayward being seised in his Demesne as of Fee of the Mannors of D. and A. in the County of Salop and of other Lands in the same County part wherof were in Lease for years by severall Indentures rendring certain rent part in the possessions of severall Copyholders and part in Demesne in possession out of Lease by Indenture dated 2. September 34. Eliz. made mention that this was for and in consideration of a certain sum of money to him paid by Richard Warren Esquire and others demised granted bargained and sold to the said Richard Warren and the others the said Mannors Lands and Tenements and the Reversion and Remainder of them and of every part of them and the Rents and Profits reserved upon any Demise therupon for 17. years next ensuing the death of the said Sir Rowland rendring a Rose at the Feast of S. John Baptist yearly if it be demanded which Deed was acknowledged to be enrolled and afterwards by another Indenture covenanted and granted for him and his Heirs hereafter to stand seised of the said Mannors Lands and Tenements to the use of the said Sir Rowland and of the Heirs Males of his body and afterwards and before any Attornment to the said Richard Warren and his Co-lessees or any of them the said Sir Rowland died seised of the said Mannors Lands and Tenements leaving a full third part of other Lands to descend to his Heir And it was moved on the Queens part that for part to wit for that which was in possession it past to the said Richard Warren and the other by way of Demise at Common Law and therfore it doth not passe afterwards by way of Bargain and Sale as to the Remainder and that therfore for the Services of the Mannors and for the Rents reserved upon the Demise these remain to the Heir who was in Ward to the Queen and within age and therfore to the Queen by reason of the Tenure which was in Capite by Knights-service But by Popham and Anderson it is at the Election of the said Richard Warren and his Co-lessees to take it by way of Demise or by way of Bargain and Sale untill that by some act done or other matter it may appear that their intent is to take it another way for the Vse in this case may well passe without the Inrolement of the Deed because the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Inrolements extends but to where a Free-hold is to passe and the Vse so passing this shall be executed by the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Vses and therfore if the said Richard Warren and his Co-lessees after the death of the said Sir Rowland Hayward would elect to take it by way of Bargain and Sale they shall have all the Reversions Remainders Rents and Services as well as the Land in possession executed to them by the Statute of Vses And of the same opinion were all the Iustices in Trinity Term following upon their meeting at Serjeants-Inne for another great cause Trinity Term 37 Eliz. 1. VPon an Assembly of all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchecquer at Where a Justâ—ce of Peace bails one who is not bailable he shall be sined and albeit he be committed but for sufficiâ—â—â— of Felony and haâ—h no notice of his offence Serjeants-Inne in Fleetstreet this Term it was resolved by them and so agreed to be hereafter put
doth much concern the Infant in as much as by his false plea he shall be bound to â—nswer of his own Goods if he hath no Goods of his Testator and therfore in a 11 E. 4. 1. he hath remedy against his Guardian for pleading a false Pâ—ea And by Doderidge if he hath no Guardian the Court shâ—ll appoint him a Guardian And if an Infant bring an action as Executor by Attorney and hath Iudgment to recover this is not erronious because it is for his benefit so per Curiam the difference is where he is Plaintiff and where he is Defendant And there is another difference where he is Executor and where not for being Executor his Plea might have been more prejudiciall to him and Coke lib 5. Russels case was agreed for good Law for an Infant may be Executor and may take money for a Debt and make a Release and give an Acquittance but not without a true consideration and payment of the money The same Term in the same Court. Thomas Middletons Case THomas Middleton alias Strickland was condemned for a Robbery at the Where a Felon is condemned and elcapeth and is re-taken upon confession that he is the same party execution may be awarded The Sheriff of Middlesex fined for not attending the Court. Assises in Oxford after which he made an escape and being taken again he was brought to the Bar and upon his own confession that he was the same party who did the Robbery and that he was condemned for it the Court awarded execution And Mountague chief Iustice said thâ—t was no new case for it had been in experience in the time of E. 3. and 9 H. 4. and 5. E. 4. that the Court might so do upon his own confession And because the Sheriff of Middlesex did not give his attendance upon the Court in this case nor came when he was called the Court fined him 10 l And Mountage said that it shall be levied by proces out of the Court and also all other Fines there assessed and not estreated into the Exchequer for then the party might compound for a matter of 20 s. and so the King be deceived The same Term in the same Court. Gouldwells Case IOhn Gouldwell seised of Land in Socage Tenure devised them to his Wife for life the Remainder to John Gouldwell his Son and his Heirs upon Condition that after the death of his Wife he shall grant a Rent-charge to Steven Gouldwell and his Heirs and if John Gouldwell dye withâ—ut Heirs of his body that the Land shall remain to Steven Gouldwell in Tail the Wife dieth John Gouldwell grants the Rent accordingly Stephen Gouldwell grants the Rent over John Gouldwell dies without Heir of his body and the second Grantee distrains for the Rent arrear and Stephen Gouldwell brings a Replevin And it was urged by the Counsell for the Plaintiff that this Rent shall not have continuance longer then the particular Estate and cited 11 H. 7. 21. Edriâ—ks case that if Tenant in Tail acknowledge a Statute this shall continue but during his life and Dyer 48. 212. But it was agreed per Curiam that the Grantee was in by the Devisor and not by the Tenant in Tail and therfore the Grant may endure for ever But for the second point this being to him in Remainder the intent of the Demisor is therby explained that he shall have the Rent only untill the Remainder come in possession for now the Rent shall be drowned in the Land by unity of possession 3. It was agreed and resolved that by the granting of the Kent over this was a confirmation And Mountague said that it was a confirmation during the Estate Tail and shall enure as a new grant afterwards And Haughton and Doderidge said that they would not take benefit of the grant over by way of confirmation for as Haughton said this enures only ought of the Devisor and he hath power to charge the Land in what manner he pleaseth and it is like to an usuall case as if a man makes a Feoffment in Fee to the use of one for life the Remainder over with power to make Leases and after he makes a Lease this is good against Tenant for life and him in the Remainder also And I have considered what the intent of the Devisor should be in granting of this Rent and it seems to me that in as much as the Land is limited in Tail and the Rent in Fee that by this the Grantee shall have power to grant or dispose of the Rent in what manner he would but if the Land had been in Fee I should have construed his intent to have been that the Grantee should have the Rent only untill the Remainder fall to which Doderidge agreed who said that we are in the case of a Will and this construction stands with the intent of the Devisor and stands with the Statute which saies Quod voluntas Donatoris est observanda The same Term in the same Court. Baskervill versus Brook A Man became Bail for another upon a Latitat in the Kings Bench and before Iudgment the Bail let his Lands for valuable consideration Difference between baile in the Kings Bench and the Common Pleas. And how a bail shall relate And afterwards Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And now it was debated whether the Land Leased shall be liable to the Bailment and it was said by Glanvill of Councell with the Lessee that it ought not to be liable and he put a difference between a Bailment in this Court and a Bailment in the Common Pleas for there the Suit cometh by originall and the certainty of the debt or demand appeareth in the declaration and therfore then it is certainly known from the begining of the Bailement for what the Bail shall be bound But in this Court upon the Latitat there is not any certainty untill Iudgment given before which the Land is not bound and now it is in another mans hands and therfore â—ot liable and he puts Hoes case Co. lib. 5. 70. where iâ— was resolved that where the Plaintiff releaseth to the Bail oâ— the Defendant upon a Suit in the Kings Bench before Iudgment all Actions Duties and Demands that this Release shall not bar the Plaintiff for there is not any ceâ—tain duty by the Bail before Iudgment and therfore it cannot be a Release and he citeâ— the case of 21 E. 3. 32. upon an account and said that it was like to a second Iudgment in that which reduceth all to a certainty and therfor c. But it was said by Mountague and Crook that the Lessee shall be bound for otherwise many Bailments and Iudgments shall be defeated which will bring a great Inconvenience And Mountague said that it was like to the case of a bargain and sale of Land which after it is Inrolled within six moneths shall relate to the beginning of the Bargain so upon the Iudgment given relation is made from the time
as a memorandum and afterwards there is an order that the Iudgement shall not be filed if the Iudgement upon this shall be stayd and speaks to it and by him the Case of 15. E. 4. 7. is nothing to this purpose for Iustices in Eyre were Iustices by commission and they had not the custody of their Records and so it differs from this case And Jones Justice which was not denyed if a Iudgement be pronounced here and be not entered the Iudges may alter it the next Term. It was said by Noy in this case that all Franchises in England are against common Right and execution of Iustice and for the present purpose he cited one Sir John Wells Case where in a Quo Warranto the Defendant had day to plead or otherwise that judgement should be entered to seise and he failed to plead at the day and the Iudgement was not filed and yet he could not be relieved But it was sayd by some of the Iustices that this was a case of great extremity But by Hendon it was affirmed in the Exchequer in one Sandersons Case and in the principall case the matter was adjourned for a fortnight and ordered that the plea should be accorded Mich. Term 2. Car. in the Kings Bench. Sharp versus Rust IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit between Sharp Plaintiff and Walter Rust Defendant upon non-Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and it was moved in arrest of judgement upon these words in the Declaration the Defendant being Father to the Plaintiffs Wife for whom the Apparrel was bought said to the Plaintiff deliver the Apparrel to my Daughter and I will pay for them and saith not to whom the payment shall be made And it was argued by Woobrich of Grayes-Inne that this is no sufficient cause to stay the Iudgement for by necessary implication and reference of the words precedent the certainty of the pers on appeareth to whom the payment ought to be made And he observed that in our Law the time the estate the thing and the person not being sufficiently expressed Where a thing incertain may be made certain both in time estate and person yet by necessary coherence and relation to matter precedent they are sometimes made certain enough 1. For the time Perkins P. 496. puts the Rule if a condition hath relation to an act precedent and no time is limited when it shall be done yet if ought to be done when the act precedent is done and therefore if I. S. be bound to me in 20 l. upon condition that if I enfeoff him of black acre that then he wil pay me 10 l. c. in this case presently when I have enfeoffed the obligor of black acre he ought to pay the 10 l. notwithstanding there be no time limited when it should be payd 2. For the thing being put incertainly yet the communication precedent makes this certain 30. H. 8. Dyer 42. in the Case of the Executors of Greenliffe where it is agreed that albeit it is not shown what thing is granted yet it shall be the Land of which the communication was 3. For the Estate although it be incertain yet sometimes it is made certain by the matter precedent as in the Case Co. lib. 8. A Stewardship was granted for life and afterwards an Annuity was granted for the exercise of that Office without declaring what Estate he should have in that Annuity and resolved that he should have the Annuity for life because he had the Office for life 4. For the person the consideration sometimes ascertains the person and therefore if land he given to one by Deed habendum sibi una cum filia donatoris in frankmariage this shall enure to both because the Feme is Causa donationis and by intendment of law the Land and the feme shal be given together to the man for the advancement of the Feme as it is Mich. 2. 3. Ph. Mary Dyer 126. a 4. E. 3. 4. Plow Com. 158. enfeoff him another and bind him and his heirs to warrant doth not say to whom he shall warrant yet the Feoffee and his heirs shall have advantage of this warranty for it cannot have any other intendment 6. E. 2. Voucher 258. 22. E. 4. 16. Kelleway 108. Co. lib. 8. Whitlocks Case In a Lease for years reserving rent it is the surest way to make the reservation to no person in certain but to leave it to the general intendment of the Law 15. H. 7. A man deviseth that his Land shall be sold for the payment of his debts and doth not say by whom they shall be sold by his Executors because they are lyable for the payment of his debts but if one devise that his land shall be sold saith not for the payment of his debts the devise is void because the Law doth not intend in this case to make the sale 40 E. 3. 5. 4. E. 3. Fitzherbert Obligation 16. Nota if a man be bound in debt or Covenant by writing and puts such a clause in the writing Et ad majorem hujus rei securitatem invenit fidei jussores quorum unusquisque in tot in solido se obligavit that although none speak there but the principall in the writing if the others put to their seals they accept that which the principal spake so become principal 2. E 4. 20. and here in our Case it appeareth that the Deed was so therefore it is reason that the Declaration should be so for there cannot be a material difference between the Declaration the deed especially being upon an agreement which is to be ruled according to the intention of the parties as it is in Plow Com. 140. a. In our Law if any parties be agreed upon a thing and words are expressed or written to make the agreement although they be not apt words yet if they have substance in them tending to the effect intended the Law shall take Intention of parties to be observed them of the same substance as words usuall for the Law regards the intention of the parties and here the intent appeareth that the assumption shall be mâ—de to the Plaintiff although there want expresse words and therefore he prayed Iudgement for the Plaintiff And afterwards the same Term Iudgement was given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Beven versus Cowling IN an Action upon the Case Littleton mooved in arrest of Iudgment for the Defendant wherein the Case was this the Defendant assumed that if the Defendant would defer the payment of a bond in which one A. was bound to him and would not implead him upon it then he promised to pay it and he doth not say that he deferred the payment untill such a day and therefore this is no valuable consideration so that the action doth not lye for notwithstanding Action upon the Case upon a â—romise that if â—e would not sue such a
Issue a Son which selleth this Remainder and afterwards I. S. dyed this Son being his Heir notwithstanding his Sale he shall have this Remainder not his Grantee because it was not in him at the time of his Grant but by a matter which cometh Ex post facto to wit the death of his Father and afterwards Iudgment was given in the first case that the Grantee shal have the term granted to him by the Husband and that the Wife shall not have the term during this Leese Hunt Versus Gateler Mich. 34. and 35 Eliz. in Commun Banco IN a Replevin between Hunt Plaintiff and Gateler Avowant in the Common Pleas which was adjorned for difficulty into the Exchequer Chamber the Case was thus Tenant in tail Remainder in Fee he in Remainder in Vide this case Cook lib. 1. 61. by the name of Capeâ—s case Fee grants a Rent-charge in Fee out of the same Land to begin after the Estate tail determined Tenant in Tail suffer a common Recovery with a Voucher over to the use of the sayd Hunt in Fee and dyed without Issue inheritable to the intail and whether Hunt shall now hold the Land charged with the Rent was the question and after that it had long depended and was many times argued in the Common Pleas and Exchequer Chamber at Hertford Term it was at last resolved by all the Iustices and Barons unanimously that the sayd Rent charge wss gone by the Recovery although the Estate tail was expired because that he which is in is in under this Intail And therefore Popham sayd suppose thâ—t the Tenant in tail himself before the Recovery had granted a Rent charge out of the same Land or had made a Lease for yeers or had acknowledged a Statute all those had been good and to be executed against him which cometh in under the Recovery notwithstanding that the Estate tayl had been determined for want of an heir inheritable to the intail for he which recovereth cannot lay that he against whom he recovered had but an Estate in tail and if his Lease remain yet good as all agreed it did how can the Lease a Rent granted by him in the Remainder be good also for the one and the other cannot stand together and therefore all the Leases Charges or Statutes acknowledged or made by him in the Remainder are gon and avoided by the Recovery had against Tenant in tail To which opinion all the other agreed and Popham sayd further That he in the Remainder upon an Estate tail cannot by any means plead to defend his Remainder unless the Tenant will as by vouching of him and therefore shall be bound by the Act of Tenant in Tail where the Estate it self is bound as here it is by the Voucher and then they which come in by him in the Remainder by way of Lease Charge or Statute which are not so much favoured in Law as Tenant in tail himself be in better condition then he in the Remainder himself is for he in the Remainder upon an Estate tail cannot put more into the Mouth of the Lessee or Grantee to defend their Estates then he himself could have to defend his Remainder and this is the reason that such a Termer or Grantee shall never falsifie the Recovery had against Tenant in tail as the Grantee or Termer shall do which cometh in under Tenant in tail against whom the Recovery was had for there as the Tenant in tail may plead to defend his Possession and Estate so may his Termer or Grantee of a Rentcharge do for by the Demise or Grant made the Tenant in tail hath put all the Pleas into their mouthes for their Interests which he himself had to defend his Right and Possession which they may plead for the time to defend their Possessions and Rights as well as the Tenant in tail himself may do and this is the reason that such may falsifie Recoveries against their Lessors or Grantors if they be not had upon the meer right Paramount which he that cometh in by such a Remainder as before cannot do for such a one in Remainder cannot be received to defend his Right but his mouth is meerly foreclosed to do it and by the same reason are all those which come in by such men foreclosed to defend their Interests or Estates and upon this Audgement was given in the same Tearm in the common Pleas. Gibbons versus Maltyard and Martin IN an Ejectione firmae brought in the Kings Bench by John Gibbons Vide this case in Cook lib. 8. 130 Thetford Scholies case Plaintiff upon a Demise made by Edward Peacock the Son of Lands in Croxton in the County of Norfolk against Thomas Maltyard and John Martin upon a speciall verdict the case appeared to be thus to wit that Sir Richard Fulmerston Knight was seised of the sayd Lands amongst others holden in soccage in his Demesne as of Fee and being so seised by his last Will in Writing made 9 Eliz. Ordained that a Devise shall be made by his Executors that a Preacher shall be found for ever to preach the Word of God in the Church of Saint Maries in Thetford four times in the year and to have for his Labour ten shillings for every Sermon And further he devised to his Executors and their heirs certaine Lands and Tenements in Thetford aforesaid to this intent and upon this condition that they or the Survivor of them within seven years after his decease should procure of the Queens Highness to erect a free Grammar School in Thetford for ever to be had and kept in a house by them to be erected upon part of the sayd Land that they shal assure three of the said ienements for the house and Chamber of the Schoolmaster and Vsher and their Successors for ever and for the other tonement that they shall make an assurance of it for the Habitation of font poor people two men and two women for ever And for the better maintenance of the sayd Preacher Schoolmaster Vsher and Poore people he devised amongst others his sayd tenements in Croxton to his Executors for ten years for the performance of his Will and after this he devised them to Sir Edward Cleer and Frances his Wife the Daughter and Heir of the sayd Sir Richard and to the Heirs of the sayd Sir Edward upon Condition that if the sayd Sir Edward his Heires or Assignes before the end of the sayd ten years shall assure Lands or Tenements in possession to the value of five and thirty pounds a year to the sayd Executors or the Survivor of them their Heirs and Assignes or to such persons their heirs or Successors as his sayd Executors or the Survivor of them shall name or assigne for and towards the maintenance of the sayd Preacher Schoolmaster and Vsher in the sayd School house c. and for the releif of the sayd poor people in the one of the sayd houses according to the Ordinance as he
remain good and of force against the Patentee and also to say that the Lease might have its continuance after that it is determined by the Limitation comprehended in the Writing by reason of a reservation is also too absurd for so it may be said that if the Queen make a Lease for years if J. S. shall live so long rendring rent that this Lease may have continuance after the death of J. S. which cleerly is not Law And the Patentee here shall take the advantage to avoid the Lease hapned before his Patent made because that no Office need to be found of the not payment before it passed from the Queen to make it voyd and the reason is because this Proviso as it is penned is a meer Limitation of the Estate and not any manner of Condition And therfore if the Queen make a Lease for 100. years if the Lessee shall so long lawfully pay the Rent reserved at the day of payment if he fail of payment of the Rent reserved at the day limited the Lease is ipso facto determined and it need not be found by Office And what diversity is there where the Limitation is conjoyned to the estate it self and where it cometh in by a Proviso afterwards all being in one and the same Deed and therfore spoken at one and the same time for the one and the other case manifesteth that the contract and agreement is that the Lease shall not continue longer then the default of the payment of the Rent And in this case suppose that the Queen had granted over the Land shall not the Patentee have advantage to avoid the Lease because that no Office was found before It is cleer that he shall or otherwise this is now become to be an absolute Lease for a hundred years which is not Law for it is meerly contrary to the Contract and therfore absurd to be maintained I agree with the generall rule that nothing shal passe to or from the Queen but by matter of Record but this makes nothing against me in this case for here the same Record which passeth the Estate to the party to wit the Patent of the Lease contains the time how long it shall endure longer then which it cannot continue And therfore by 9 H. 7. If the King makes a Gift in tail and the Donce dies without Issue the Land is in the King without Office so in every other case where the Estate is determined according to the limitation for he cannot be put out of possession wrongfully and now hath right to hold it against him And I say that no warrant or authority can be found throughout the whole Law where a Lease or Estate made by the King is determined by an expresse limitation comprised in the Patent it self of the Grant that there need not any Office or other thing to determine it for that which is comprised in the same Patent may determine it of it self And further wheras the Proviso is that the re-entry shall be for default of payment of the Rent and the like there the Term continues untill the re-entry be made notwithstanding the Condition be broken as appeareth by all the Iustices 28 H. 8. because it is expresly limited that it shall be defeated by the re-entry there before re-entry be made the Action of Wast shall be quod tenet And by 12 H. 7. where a common person is put to his Entry there the Queen is put to an Office with which agrees Stamford in his Book of Prerogative But in this case if it were between common persons the Lease shall be determined upon default of payment of the Rent and before any re-entry and therfore in the Queens case it shall be determined without Office But if the case had been that if the Rent had been arrear and not paid that then upon re-entry made it ought to cease there an Office had been necessary to countervail the Entry in case of the Queen or otherwise the Lease shall not cease because the Queen cannot make an Entry but by such means and therfore it ought to be by matter comprised in the Patent It hath been said that this shall be a conditionall Limitation and that therfore an Office is necessary but I say that here is not any matter or quality of a Condition but meerly of a Limitation and t is rather a contingent Limitation then any manner of Condition and this is well proued by 11 H. 7. which is that the Grantee of a Reversion shal take advantage of it at common Law the which he cannot do if it savour any way of a Condition and by 27 H. 8. a Proviso in a Deed ought alwaies to be expounded according to the purport because that it is placed in a Deed somtimes for a Condition as where a Proviso is that the Lessee shall not alien somtimes for an exception as where a Proviso is that the Lease shall not extend to such an acre or such a thing somtimes for a Limitation as here and in the like cases And in this case the release of the Rent shall make it that the Lease shall never be determined for the not payment of it because thaâ—â—â—terwards there cannot be any such default of payment and therfore in such a case the Limitation remaineth absolute and discharged of the contingent which otherwise had determined it As if a man make a Lease for a 100. years if the Lessee in the mean time do not cut such a Tree a release of all Conditions will not serve yet if the Lessor himself or any other but the Lessee cut it the Lease is become absolute for a 100. years And so upon this point my conceit appeareth But the most colourable thing which hath been alledged on the other side was by my Brother Drew which was that in counting upon an Ejectione firmae and pleading in such a Lease as here it shall be as an absolute Lease for the years comprised in the Habendum without making any mention of the Prouiso upon which he enforced it that it shall be taken to be of more efficacy then if it stood meerly upon the Contingent for he said that upon a Lease made for years if the Lessee shall so long live and the like in the count and also in the pleading mention ought to be made of the life of the Lessee I agree it to be true that the pleading shall be so for in count counting and in plea pleading if the matter of the Contingent procede the Limitation or be anncred to the Limitation there a man ought to speak to the Contingent or otherwise it is not good as by 14 H. 8. it shall be of a Condition where it is precedent But in case of a Condition it is quite otherwise for if â— man make a Lease to another for years Si tamdiu vixerit or Dummodo solverit c. or the like which are annexed to the limitation of the Estate in all these cases in counting
for the case of Sir Rob. Chester 4 Eliz. there is great diversity between that this case for it is ordained by the Act that upon the default of paym which is not limited there to be made at the receit the office shal be forfeited not that the estate in the office shall cease And of a thing forfeited it is at the election of him who is to take advantage of the forfeiture whether he will take it or not and till the advantage taken therof the party still remains an Officer And therfore if the Queen make a Lease for years and the Termer makes a Feoffment in Fee the Term by this is extinct as was agreed upon an Evidence in the Exchequer 28 El. in the case of Drayton Basset and before that in the same case in the Kings Bench and yet no reversion is drawn therby out of the Queen Suppose then that the Queen before any Office found therof grant the Land over in Fee shall not the Patentee take advantage therof by extinguishing the Term It is cleer that he shall and albeit a Termer holdeth over his Term yet the Patentee of the Queen and also the Bargainee of a common person after the Inrolement of the Bargain shall take advantage of this determination of the Term. And for the not reciting of Throgmortons Lease in the Letters Patents made to Finch and Audeley it is to no purpose to speak to it because the Estate was finished before the Grant And further because there was a Non obstante in the Patent that it shall be effectuall notwithstanding any not recitall of any Lease being of Record or not being of Record mis-recitall c. which was by all at the Bonch admitted to be good and not contradicted by any And for the Office found after the Grant made I did not speak to it because it is of no purpose to help the Patentee but yet shall serve the Queen for the mean profits as hath been said See more of this case Trin. 36 Eliz. pl. 2. Trinity Term 35 Eliz. Hughes versus Robotham 1. MEredith Hughes brought an Action upon the Case against William Robotham Executor to Ja. Robotham for that the Plaintiff in the life time of the sayd Testator to wit the 12th of Apâ—il 28 Eliz at London in such a Parish and Ward was possessed of a Messuage with the Appurtenances in the same Parish and Ward for divers years then to come And whereas also the said Testator was then possessed of the reversion therof after divers years then also to come and so possessed the said Testator the said 12th day of April at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid in consideration that the Plaintiff at the instance and request of the Testator in his life time would surrender all his Estate and Term of years which he then had to come in the said Messuage with the Appurtenances and procure one Thomas Thornell to give to the said Testator a 100. marks for a Lease therof to be made by the said Testator to the said Thornell he assumed and promised to pay to the Plaintiff 30 l. of the said 100. marks when he should be therunto required by the Plaintiff And the Plaintiff alledged in facto that he at the instance and request of the said Testator in his life time afterwards to wit the 20th day of April 28 Eliz. at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid surrendred to the said Testator all the Estate and term of years which he then had to come in the said Messuage c. and that he the same 20th day of April in the same Parish and Ward procured the sayd Thornell to give to the said Testator 100. marks for a Lease of the said Messuage c. by the Testator to the said Thornell then and there made for 19 years from the Feast of the Annunciation of our Lady then last past and that yet the said Testator in his life time nor the said Defendant after his death have not paid to him the said 30 l. albeit the said Testator in his life time to wit the 24. day of April aforesaid at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid as therunto required by the said Plaintiff and albeit the Defendant after the death of the said Testator to wit the 10th day of April 32 Eliz. in the Parish and Ward aforesaid was also therunto required by the said Plaintiff And albeit there were sufficient Goods and Chattels of the said Testator at the time of his death to pay as well the said 30 l. as all other Debts of the said Testator and also to discharge the Funerals of the said Testator which Goods and Chattels came to the said hand of the said Defendant c. And after Non assumpsit pleaded and a Verdict for the Plaintiff exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was not good 1. Because it is that the Plaintiff the 20th day of April 28 Eliz. surrendred all the Estate and term which he had then to come and this for any thing shewn may be another Term then he had the 12th day before for it is not said and so being possessed the 20th day he surrendred but generally as before And further the consideration was that he ought to surrender all the Term which he had the 12th day of April which cannot be made the 20th day for in the mean time part of the Term is incurred and therfore the purpose was that the surrender should have been made immediatly as soon as might be so as by the delay therof the â—â—d Robotham should not loose any part of the Term to come And it was further alledged that a term for years cannot be surrendred to another Termer for years Gawdy The consideration is that the Plaintiff at the request of the Testator in his life time should surrender so that it is not to be done untill he be required by the Testator and not instantly at his perill without request precedent and here it is alledged that the Plaintiff at the request of the said Testator the 20th day of April surrendred which is well done and according to the agreement and albeit it had been more formall to have said that the said Plaintiff so being possessed afterwards to wit the 20th day of April surrendres c. yet it shall not be intended that he had any other term then that which he had before if it be not shewn on the other side in his Bar and especially here where the Action is not grounded upon the Term but upon the Assumpsit and the consideration is nothing but an inducement to the Assumption which is not so formall to be made as if the Action had been grounded upon the Term it self And therfore in an Action upon the case upon an Assumpsit it sufficeth to say that wheras the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff in divers summs of money amounting in all to a 100 l. the Defendant assumed to pay him the 100
Defendant had nothing to do there the Defendant shall be excused But here it is expresly alledged that it fell by the weight put upon it which ought to be answered As if a man take an Estate for life or years in a ruinous house if he pull it down he shall be charged in Wast but if it fall of it self he shall be excused in Wast so there is a diversity where default is in the party and where not so here the Defendant ought to have taken good care that he did not put upon such a ruinous floor more then it might well bear if it would not bear any thing he ought not to put any thing into it to the prejudice of a third person and if he does he shall answer to the party his damages Collard versus Collard 5. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Constantine Collard against Richard Collard the case appeared to be this Thomas Collard was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of Lands in Winkle in the County of Devon called the Barton of Southcote And having two Sons to wit Eustace the eldest and Richard the now Defendant the youngest and the eldest being to be married the said Thomas in consideration of this marriage being upon the said Barton said these words Eustace stand forth I do here reserving an Estate for my own life and my wives life give unto thee and thy Heirs for ever these my Lands and Barton of Southcote after which the said Thomas enfeoffed his youngest Son of Barton with warranty from him and his Heirs the eldest Son enter and let it to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant re-enter upon which re-entry the Action was brought and upon a speciall Verdict all this matter appeared But it was not found by the Verdict that the said Thomas Collard the Father was dead and therfore the Warranty was not any thing in the Case And it was moved by Heale that the Plaintiff ought to be barred because it did not passe by way of Estate in as much as a man cannot passe a Freehold of a Land from himself to begin at a time to come and by it to create a particular Estate to himself and in use it cannot passe because that by a bare parole and Vse cannot be raised and by giving my Land to my Son Cosin and the like nothing will passe without Livery for there is not consideration to raise an Vse Fennor The words shall be taken as if he had said here I give you this Barton reserving an Estate for my life although the words of reservation have priority in their time from the speaking of them because a reservation cannot be but out of a thing granted and therfore the reservation shall be utterly void or otherwise ought to be taken according to their proper nature to wit to be in their operation subsequent and so shall not hurt the Grant and therfore are not to be compared to the case where a man grant that after the death of I. S. or after his own death a stranger shall have his Land which Popham granted And Fennor said further that these words being spoken upon the Land as before amount to a Livery Gawdy said That the words as they are spoken amount to a Livery if the words are sufficient to passe the Estate but he conceived that the words are not sufficient to make the Estate to passe to the said Eustace because his intent appeareth that Eustace was not to have the Land untill after the death of him and his wife and therfore of the same effect as if he had granted the Land to the said Eustace after his death and as an Vse it cannot passe because by a bare word an Vse cannot be raised as appeareth in divers Reports Mich. 12 13 Eliz. which is a good case to this purpose But to say generally that an Vse cannot be raised or charged upon a perfect Contract by words upon good consideration cannot be Law and therfore it is to be considered what the Law was before the Statute of 27 H. 8. And I thinke that none will deny but that by grant of Land for money before this Statute an Vse was raised out of the same Land for a bargain and sale of Land for money and a grant of Land for money is all one and no difference between them And is not a grant of Land made in consideration of marriage of my Son and Daughter as valuable as a grant of it for money It is cleer that it is and much more valuable as my blood is more valuable to me then my money and therfore it is absurd to say that the consideration of money raise or change an Vse at Common Law and not such a consideration of marriage And in such a case at Common Law there was not any diversity that the party who so grant or hargain for the one or the other considerations was fâ—ised of the Land granted or bargained in use or possession but that the Vse by the Contract was transferred according to the bargain in both cases where there is a consideration And where through all the Law shall it be seen that of any thing which might passe by contract there need any other thing then the words which make the contract as writing or the like testifying it And that the Law was so it appeareth by the Statute of Inrolements of bargains and sales of Land made 27 H. 8. which enacts that no Freehold nor Vse therof shall passe by bargain and sale only unlesse it be by deed indented and enrolled according to the Statute Ergo if this Statute had not been it had passed by the bargain and sale by bare words and in as much as the Statute enacts this in case of bargain and sale only the other cases as this case here are as it was before at Common Law And by an exception at the end of the same Statute London is as it was at Common Law and therfore now Lands may passe there at this day by bargain and sale by word without deed for it is out of the Statute And how can we say that the Statute of Vses does any thing to alter the Common Law in this point by any intent of the makers therof wheras at the same Parliament they made an especiall Law in the case of bargain and sale of Lands And at this day for the Lands in London notwithstanding the Statute of Vses the Law hath been put in practice and alwaies holden as to the Lands there to be good if sold by bare Parole as it were at Common Law And I have heard it reported by Manwood late chief Baron of the Exchequer that it was in question in the time of King Edw. the 6th whether the use of a Freehold of Land will passe upon a Contract by Parole without Deed in consideration of marriage upon which all the then Iustices were assembled upon a doubt rising in a case hapning in the Star-chamber and then
resolved by all the Iustices as he said that it shall passe and he said that himself was of this opinion also And to say that by grant of Land at Common Law the use had been raised out of the possessions of the Land which the Grantor then had and by it passe to the Bargainee and that it shall not be raised and passed to another by grant of Land in consideration of marriage which is a more valuable consideration then money is absurd and against all reason And for the solemnity Vses in such cases in respect of marriage were the cause that they alwaies were left as they were at Common Law and not restrained as the case of bargain and sale is which by Common intendment may be made more easily and secretly then that which is done in consideration of marriage which is alwaies a thing publike and notorious but it is not reasonable that every slight or accidentall speech shall make an alteration of any Vse As if a man ask of any one what he will give or leave to any of his Sons or Daughters for their advancement in marriage or otherwise for their advancement this shall be but as a bare speech or communication which shall not alter or change any Vse But where there is upon the Speech a conclusion of a Marriage between the friends of the parties themselves and that in consideration therof they shall have such Lands and for such an Estate there the Vse shall be raised by it and shall passe accordingly to the parties according to the conclusion which Fennor granted But by Popham If it may be taken upon the words spoken that the purpose was to have the Estate passe by way of making of an Estate as by way of Feoffment c. then notwithstanding the consideration expressed the use shall not change nor no Estate by it but at will untill the Livery made therupon And therfore if a man make a Deed of Feoffment with expresse consideration of marriage although the Deed hath words in it of Dedi Concessi with a Letter of Attorney to make Livery therupon there untill Livery made nothing passe but at will because that by the Warrant of Attorney it appeareth the full intent of the parties was that it shall passe by way of Feoffment and not otherwise if it be of Land in possession And if it be of Land in Lease not untill Attornment of Tenants which was granted by all the Iustices But if a man in consideration of money makes a Deed of Gift Grant Bargain and Sale of his Lands to another and his Heirs by Deed indented with a Letter of Attorny to make Livery if Livery be therupon made before Inrolement there it hath been adjudged to passe by the Livery and not by the Inrolement But by Popham where Land is to passe in possession by Estate executed two things are requisite The one the grant of the said Land the other the Livery to be made therupon for by the bare Grant without Livery it doth not passe as by way of making of an Estate And this is the cause that such solemnity hath been used in Liveries to wit if it were of a Messuage to have the people out of it and then to give Seisin to the party by the Ring of the door of the House and of Land by a Turff and a Twig and the like which may be notorious Yet I agree it shall be a good Livery to say to the party Here is the Land enter into it and take it to you and your Heirs for ever or for life or in tail as the case is And albeit Livery by the View may be made in such manner yet by the sealing of the Deed of Grant upon the Land or by grant of it upon the Land without Livery nothing passe but at will But if therupon one party saith to the other after the Grant or upon it Here is the Land enter upon it and take it according to the Grant this is a good Livery But he ought to say this or somthing which amounts to so much or otherwise it shall not passe by the bare Grant of the Land although it be made upon the Land Clench said That when Thomas said to Eustace Stand forth here I do give to thee and thine Heirs these Lands this amounts to a Grant and a Livery also and by the words of the Reservation of the Estate to himself and his wife for their lives in this the Law shall make an use in the said Thomas and his wife for their lives so that by such means it shal enure as if he had reserved the use therof to him and his wife and so it shall enure to them as it may by the Law according to his intent without doing prejudice to the Estate passed to the said Eustace And afterwards Term Mich. 36 37 Eliz. the Case was again disputed amongst the Iustices and then Popham said That the Case of Baâ—gains and Sales of Lands in Cities as London c. as appeareth in Dyer 6. Eliz. are as they were at Common Law To which all the Iustices agreed and therfore shall passe by Bargain by parole without writing And by Bayntons Case in 6 7 Eliz. it is admitted of every side that an Vse was raised out of a Possession at Common Law by Bargain and Sale by parole and otherwise to what purpose was the Statute of Inrolements and by the same case it is also admitted now to passe by parole upon a full agreement by words in consideration of Marriage or the continuance of Name or Blood For it is agreed there that the consideration of nature is the most forceable consideration which can be and agreed also that a bare Covenant by writing without consideration will not change an Vse therfore the force therof is in the consideration of which the Law hath great respect And therfore the Son and Heir apparant ex assensu patris onely may at the door of the Church endow his wife of his Fathers Land which he hath in Fee and this is good by Littleton although the Son hath nothing in it wherby an Estate passe to the wife which is more then an Vse Nature is of so strong consideration in the Law And therupon after advice Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff the Roll of this appeareth in Banco Regis 1 Hill 35. Eliz. Rot. 355. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought and the Iudgment aforesaid reversed in the point of Iudgment in the Exchequer by the Statute of 27 Eliz. Kettle versus Mason and Esterby 6. IN a second deliverance between Joh. Kettle Plaintiff and George Mason Vide this case Coke lib. 1. 146 c. and Francis Esterby Avowants the case appeared to be this Thomas May was seised of the Mannor of Sawters and Hawlin in the County of Kent in his Demesne as of Fee and being so therof seised enfeoffed Thomas Scot and John Fremling and their Heirs
Richard he made assurance by Fine of his Lands being 174 l. a year viz. Of part therof of the value of 123 l. a year of which part was holden of the Queen by Knights Service in Capite to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use of the said William and Margaret and the Heirs of the body of the said William begotten on the body of the said Margaret and for default of such Issue to the use of the right Heirs of the said William And of the residue therof being also holden in Capite of the Queen to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use of the first Issue Male of the said Richard and to the Heirs Males of his body and then to other Issues of his body and for default of such Issue to the said William and Margaret and the Heirs of the body of the said William on the body of the said Margaret lawfully begotten and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of the said William with this Prouiso That it shall be lawfull for the said Richard to make a Joynture to his wife of the Lands limited to his Issue Males and for making of Leases for 21. years or three lives for any part of the said Land rendring the ancient Rent except of certain parcels and that William died without Issue and that Gilbert Littleton was his Brother and Heir and that the said Margaret married the said George Littleton youngest brother to the said William which are yet living And that the said Richard married Dorothy and made her a Joynture according to the Proviso And that the said Richard had Issue Iohn Smith and died the said Iohn being his Son and Heir and within age After which a Melius inquirendum issued by which it was found that the said Margaret was the Daughter of the said Richard and that the said Land was of the value of 12000 l. at the time of the assurance And how much of the Land shall be in ward and what Land and what the Melius inquirendum makes in the case was the question put to the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson who agreed that the Queen now shall have the third part as well of that which was assured to William and Margaret immediatly after the death of the said Richard as of that which was limited to Dorothy for the life of the said Margaret for although money were paid yet this was not the only consideration why the Lands were assured but the advancement of the Daughter and now by the surviving of the said Margaret shee shall be said to be in the whole which was assured to her by her Father and for her advancement and the Land as it appears was of greater value then the money given and may as well be thought to be given for the Remainder of the Fee And agreeable to this was the case of Coffin of Devonshire about the beginning of the Raign of the now Queen which was that the said Coffin for moneys paid by one Coffin his Cosin having but Dâ—ughters himself conveyed his Land to the use of himself and his wife and to the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue to the use of his said Cosin and his Heirs for which his said Cosin was to give a certain sum of money to the Daughters for their marriage Coffin dies his said Daughters being his Heirs and within age and were in ward to the Queen the Lands being holden by Knights Service in Capite And the third part of the Land was taken from the wife of Coffin for the life of the said wife if the Heirs continue so long in Ward And it was also agreed by them and the Councell of the Court that the Melius inquirendum was well awarded to certifie that the said Margaret was the Daughter of the said Richard of which the Court could not otherwise well take Conusance for they thought that it was not matter to come in by the averment of the Attorney-generall as Dyer hath reported it But now by the Statute it ought to be found by Inquisition and being a thing which stands with the former Inquisition it ought to be supplied by the Melius inquirendum for the same Statute which gives the Wardship in case where Land is conveyed for the advancement of the Wife or Infants or for the satisfaction of Debts and Legacies of the party by the implication of the same Statute this may be found by Inquisitton and if it be omitted in the Inquisition it ought to be found by a Melius inquirendum but not to come in by a bare surmise And therfore if in the Inquisition it be found that the Ancestor had conveyed his Land by the Melius inquirendum it may be found that it was for the payment of his Debts or Legacies or that the party to whom or to whose use it was made was the Son or Wife of the party that made it and that by the very purport of the Statutes 32. 34 H. 8. as by Fitzherbert if it be surmised that the Land is of greater value then it is found a Melius inquirendum shall issue and so shall it be if it be found that one is Heir of the part of the Mother but they know not who is Heir of the part of the Father so if it be not found what Estate the Tenant had or of whom the Land was holden so upon surmise made that he is seised of some other Estate or that he held it by other Services by Fitzherbert a Melius inquirendum shall Issue and upon this order given it was decreed accordingly this Term. Morgan versus Tedcastle 4. IN the same Term upon matter of Arbitrement between Morgan and Tedcastle touching certain Lands at Welburn in the County of Lâ—ncoln put to Popham Walmesley and Ewens Baron of the Exchequer Wheras Morgan had granted to Tedcastle a 100. acres of Land in such a field and 60 in such a field and 20. acres of Meadow in such a Meadow in Welburn and Hanstead in which the acres are known by estimations or limits there be shall take the acres as they are known in the same places be they more or lesse then the Statute for they passe as they are there known and not according to the measure by the Statute But if I have a great Close containing 20. acres of Land by estimation which is not 18. And I grant 10. acres of the same Close to another there he shall have them according to the measure by the Statute because the acres of such a Close are not known by parcels or by meets and bounds and so it differeth from the first case And upon the case then put to Anderson Brian and Fennor they were of the same opinion Quod nota Humble versus Oliver 5. IN Debt by Richard Humble against William Oliver for a Rent reserved upon a Lease for years the case was
not properly said an Use untill that it be said in Esse to take the Profits themselves But I am to turn this Argument against him who made it for if it be so the Use can never be in suspence and iâ— so it follows that no Possession by means of any such Use can be in suspence but staies where it was before to be executed when the Use happens to be in beeing But as to that that a Reversion or Remainder may be of that which we call an Use so also may such a Use be in suspence in the same manner as the Possession it self but not otherwise And as to Cramners Case formerly put the Law is so because nothing appeareth in the case to be done to the disturbance of this contingent Vse in the interim before it happen But upon the Case put of the Lady Bray upon which it hath been so strongly relied it was thus The Lord Bray made an assurance of certain Lands to the use of certain of his Councell untill the Son of the said Lord Bray should come to the age of 21. years for the livelyhood of the said Son and of such a Wife as he shall marry with the assent of the said Councell and then to the use of the said Son and of the said Wife and of the Heirs of the body of the said Son The Father dies the Son was become in Ward to the King after which one of the said Councellors dies the King grants over the Wardship of the said Son after which the said Lord Bray by the assent of his Guardian and of the surviving Councellors marries the Daughter of the then Earl of Shrewsbury after which the Husband aliens the same Land to one Butler and dies and upon Action brought by the said Lady against the said Butler for the same land she was barred by Judgment and upon what reason because she was not a person known when the Statute was made which must be in every case of a Freehold in Demesne as well in case of an Use as in case of a Possession And therfore a Lease for years the Remainder to the Heirs of I. S. then living is not good and the same Law of an Vse And so it was agreed by all the Iustices very lately in the case of the Earl of Bedford but in these Cases it remaineth to the Feoffor and because it doth not appear at the time of the assurance who shall be the Wife of the said Son so that there was not any to take the present Free-hold by name of the Wife of the Son she takes nothing by the assurance but this reason makes for our side to wit That if there were none to take the Free-hold in Demesne from the Use when it falleth he shall never take it The other reason in this Case was because she was not married by the consent of all the Counsellors for that one was dead nor according to the power given by the agreement but by the authority of the Guardian that the power which the Father had upon his Son was ceased And Nota That by a Disseisin the contingent Use may be disturbed of his Execution but there by the regresse of the Feoffee oâ— his Heirs when the Contingent happen it may be revived to be executed But by the release of the Feoffee or his Heirs the Contingent in such a case by Popham iâ—â—â—â—red oâ— all possibility at any time to be executed And to that which hath been said that the generall and universall Assurances of men throughout all the Realm at this â—ay arâ— by means of Vses and that it shall be a great deal of danger and inconvenience to draw them now in question or doubt and that it now trembleth upon all the Possessions of the Realm and therfore it shall be too dangerous to pull up such Trees by the roots the Branches wherof are such and so long spread that they overshadow the whole Realm Popham said That they were not utterly against Uses but only against those and this part of them which will not stand with the publike Weal of of the Realm and which being executed shall make such an Estate which cannot stand with Common Law of the Realm or the true purport of the Statute and therfore he said that it was but to prune and cut off the rotten and corrupt branches of this Tree to wit that those which had not their substance from the true Sap nor from the ancient Law of the Realm nor from the meaning of the Statute and so to reduce the Tree to its beauty and perfection The same reason he said might have been made in the time of Edw. 4. against those Arguments which were made to maintain the common Recoveries to bar Estates-tail But if such a reason had been then made it would have been taken for a bare conceit and meer trifle and yet Vses were never more common then Estates-tail were between the Statute of Donis conditionalibus and the said time of Edw 4. But the grave Iudges then saw what great trouble hapned amongst the people by means of Intails and what insecurity happened by means therof to true Purchasors for whose security nothing was before found as we may see by our Books but collaterall Warranty or infinite delay by Voucher and thus did the Iudges of this time look most deeply into it wherupon upon the very rules of Law it was found that by common Recovery with Vouchers these Estates-tail might be barred which hath been great cause of much quiet in the Land untill this day that now it begins to be so much troubled with the cases of Vses for which it is also necessary to provide a lawfull remedy But he said plainly That if the Exposition made on the other side shall take place it will bring in with it so many mischiefs and inconveniencies to the universall disquiet of the Realm that it will cast the whole Common-wealth into a Sea of troubles and endanger it with utter confusion and drowning And to that which was said That a Remainder to the right Heirs of I. S. or to the Heirs of the body of I S. or to the first Son as here are so in the custody of the Law that they cannot be drawn out that therfore no forfeiture can be made by the Feoffment made by him who hath the particular Estate To that he said That a Disseisin made to the particular Estate for life draws out such Remainders to the right Heirs as is proved expresly by 3 H. 6 where it is holden that a collaterall Warranty bars such a Remainder in obeyance after a disseisin And by Gascoigne 7 H. 4. If such a Tenant for life makes a Feoffment in Fee it is a Forfeiture but he conceived that in the life time of I. S. none can enter for it but this is not Law and when by the Feoffment the particular Estate is quite gone in possession and in right also the remainder shall never take
in his custody and offered to the said Sheriff to put him in the Indenture amongst his other Prisoners delivered to the new Sheriff but would hâ—ve had the said old Sheriff to have sent for the said new Sheriff to have taken him into his custody but the new Sheriff refused to receive him unlesse Dabridgecourt would deliver him into the common Gaol of the County which was in the Town of Warwick wherupon afterwards the Prisoner escaped And Dabridgecourt was charged with this Escape and not the new Sheriff for he is not compellable to take the Prisoners of the delivery of the old Sheriff but in the common Goal of the County and the old Sheriff remains chargeable with the Prisoner untill he be lawfully discharged of him and if the Sheriff dies the party shall be rather at a prejudice then the new Sheriff without cause charged with him And in such a case the party who sued the execution may help himself to wit by the remaining of the body by a Corpus cum causa wherby he may be brought to be duly in execution and this under a due Officer And Anderson Periam and other Iustices were also of opinion that the said Skinner and Catcher are to be charged with the escape in the principall case wherupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff which was entred Hillar 34 Eliz. Rot. 169. in the B. R. Fulwood versus Ward 2. IN a Writ of Annuity brought in the Common Pleas by George Fulwood Plaintiff against William Ward Defendant the Case was thus The Queen was seised of a Barn and Tithes of Stretton in the County of Stafford for the life of the Lord Paget and being so seised demised it by Letters Patents dated 21. June 29 Eliz. to the said William Ward for 21. years wherupon the said Ward by Writing dated 30. Iune 29 Eliz. granted to the said Plaintiff an Annuity or yearly Rent of 10 l. out of the said Barn and Tithes for 15. years then next ensuing payable yearly upon the 8. day of November with clause of Distresse The Lord Paget died the first day of March 32 Eliz. and for the Arrearages after his death the Plaintiff brought this Writ of Annuity and for the difficulty therof in the Common Pleas the Case came this Term to be argued before all the Iustices and Barons at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where it was agreed by Walmsley Fennor and Owen that the Annuity was gone by the determination â—â— his Estate in the Land who made the Grant for they said that presently upon the Grant made as before it was a Rent-charge for by such a Rent granted in Fee the Fee shall be in his Heirs albeit the Grantee dies before any Election made and such a Rent is payable from the beginning at the Land as appeareth by 12 E. 4. And by grant of Omnia terras tenementa hereditamenta such â— Rent will passe ergo it is a Rent-charge and not an Annuity untill the Election made and by the determination therof in the nature of a Rent the Election is gone as by Babington and Martin 9 H. 6. by the recovery of Lâ—nd charged with such a Rent by elder Title the Annuity is gone as it seeâ—s by their opinion and by them and by Littleton upon a Rent-charg◠〈◊〉 with Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor 〈…〉 exclude the charge of the person which proves that the Land is charâ—â—â— Originally and not the person for otherwise the Proviso would be void for the repugnancy And if so whensoever the Land is discharged as by 〈…〉 â—â—â—cent or the like the person therby is also discharged and therfore â—he Iuâ—gment here shall be that the Plaintiff shall be barred But by the chief Iustices chief Baron and all the other Iustices and Barons the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment in this case to recover the Annuity for the Law gives him at the beginning an Election to have it as a Rent or an Annuity which matter of election shall not be taken from him but by his own Deed and folly as in case where he purchase part of the land charged in which case by his own Act he hath excluded himself of his Election But if a Feoffee upon condition grant a Rent-charge and presently break the Condition wherupon the Feoffor re-enter shall not the Feoffee be charged by Writ of Annuity surely it shall be against all reason that he by his own act without any folly of the Grantee shall exclude the Grantee of his Election which the Law gives at the beginning And they denied the opinion of 9 H. 6. to be Law But if the Disseisor grant a Rent-charge to the Disseisee out of the Land which he had by the Disseisen by his re-entry before the Annuity brought the Annuity is gone for this was his own act yet in effect all of them agreed that Prima facie it shall be taken as a Rent-charge of which the Wife shall be endowed as hath been said which passe by grant of Omnia hereditamenta and which is payable at the Land but the reason is because it is expresly granted out of the Land and also for the presumption of Law that it is more beneficiall for the Grantee to have it in such a degree then in the other But neither the presumption of Law nor the expresse Grant therof as a Rent shall not take away from the Grantee the benefit of his Election where no default was in him but that upon his Election he may make it to be otherwise as ab initio And therfore by Popham If a Rent-charge be granted in tail the Grantee may bring a Writ of Annuity and therby prejudice his Issue because that then it shall not be taken to be an Intail but as a Fee-simple conditionall ab initio And if a Termer for two years grant a Rent-charge in fee this as to the Land is but a Rent charge for two years and if he avow for it upon the determination of the Term the Rent is gone but by way of Annuity it remains for ever if it be granted for him and his Heirs and assets descend from him who granted it And if a Rent-charge be granted in fee and doth not say for him and his Heirs if the Grantee brings his Writ of Annuity the Heir shall never be charged therwith yet if he had taken it as a Rent-charge the Land had been charged with it in perpetuity And by him the cause why the Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor upon the grant of a Rent-charge is good is because the person is not expresly charged by such a Grant but by operation of Law But in such a case a Proviso that he shall not charge his Land is meerly void for the repugnancy because there the Land is expresly charged by precised words and therfore if it be expresly comprised in such a Grant that the Grantee may charge the Land or the person of the
it was not an immediate descent in Deed but upon the operation of Law which gave Wardship and the like but not to prejudice any third person And he said that although the Queen or other Lord upon eviction of the Land descended or the determination of the Estate therof may resort to Lands devised or assured and take a third part therof yet therby the Devise or Assurance remains effectuall against the Heir but this is by a speciall clause in the Statute of 34 H. 8. which gives it to them but no such remedy is given to the Devisee to help him if his part be abridged or evicted And the words are precise to wit If the part left or assigned to the King or to any Lord at any time during their Interest therin be evicted c. that they shall have so much oâ— the two parts residue as shall make a full third part of the remainder not evicted c. Wherby it appeareth that this is given only for the benefit of the Lords and not of the Heir nor of the Devisee fâ—r if after the Interest of the Queen or other Lord be determined this which was left he evicted from the Heir it shall not be helped against the devise but the Devise remains good to the Devisee against the Heir for the whole Land devised wherby it appeareth that it was the very purport and intent of the Statute that the Devise remain as it was at the time of the death of the Devisor without having regard to that which hapneth Ex post facto unlesse for this point helped by this speciall clause of the Statute and this is for the Lord and his Interest only and for no other And by him also cleerly the Statute which is an explanatory Law shall never be taken by equity in the precise point explained to impugne the point of explanation as here the Statute wills that the Estate of Inheritance comprised in the former Statute shall be explained to be Fee-simple it cannot now by any equity be as to the power to make a Devise which is meerly given by the authority of the Statute said to be of any other Estate then Fee-simple of which a Devise may be made And therfore if Land be given to another and his Heirs for the term of another mans life a Devise cannot be made of this because it is not an Inheritance in Fee-simple but only the limitation of a Free-hold And where the Statute saith having a sole Estate we cannot by any equity that it shall be taken of any joynt Estate as to make any disposition of that which she had in Ioynture and therupon the greater part resolved that Iudgment shall be given against the Plaintiff for the Defendants Southwell versus Ward 4. IN a second deliverance between Richard Southwell Esquire Plaintiff and Miles Ward Avowant by Demurrer upon the Avowry the Case appeared to be this That Iohn Prior of the Church of Saint Faiths in Horsham in the County of Norfolk was seised in his Demesne as of fee in the right of his said Priory of 8. Messuages 300. acres of Land 30. acres of Meadow 60. acres of Pasture and 200. acres of Wood with their Appurtenances in Horsham aforesaid And so seised the said Prior with the assent of his Covent by their Deed indented shewn forth bearing date the first day of Ianuary 13 E. 4. and by licence of the King aforesaid granted to William then the Master of the Hospitall of St. Giles in Norwich and to the Brothers of the same Hospitall and to their Successors 200. Fagots and 200. Focalls called Astle-wood yearly to be taken of all the Lands and Tenements of the said Prior and Covent in Horsham aforesaid by the Servants of the said Prior and Covent and their Successors yearly to be carried to the said Hospitall at the costs and expences of the said Prior and Covent and their Successors at the Feast of St. Michael or 20 s. of lawfull money for them at the election of the said Master and Brethren and their Successors to take yearly in the same Lands and Tenements in Horsham to the use of the poor and infirm persons there being or coming So that if it happen the said Fagots and Focalls or the said 20 â— for them to the said Master and Freres in form aforesaid to be arrear in alâ—o part c. then they may distrain in the said Lands and Tenements and the Distresse detain until they be fully satisfied of the said Fagots and Focals or of the said 20 s. for them as is aforesaid with this Proviso further That if at any one or more times the said Master and Brethren have chosen to have the Fagots and Focals yet at any other time they make the 20 s. for them and although they have taken the 20 s. for them once or oftner yet at any other time they may take the Fagots and Focals themselves and that they may so vary tâ—ties quâ—ties and dâ—strain for them accordingly reasonable notice being given of their Election in form aforesaid And the said Master and Brethren granted by the same Deed to the said Prior and Covent and their Successors that they or others sufficiently warranted by them would give sufficient notice of their election yearly the first Sunday of April in the Church of the said Hospital to some Officer of the said Prior and Covent and their Successors if they send any thither for this cause By force of which Grant the said Master and Brethren were seised of the said yearly rent of the said 200. Fagots and 200. Facals called Astlewood accordingly and so being seised they by their sufficient Writing enrolled of Record in the Chancery in the first year of the late King Ed. 6. gave and granted to the same King the said Hospitall all the Lands Tenements and Hereditaments of the said Hospitall To have and to hold to him and his Heirs and Successors for ever wherby the said King was therof and of the said annuall Rent seised accordingly and so seised the 7. day of May in the same year the said King Edw. by his Letters Patents bearing date the same day and year granted the said Hospitall and the rent of the said Fagots and Focals and other the Premisses to the Major Sheriff Citizens and Commons of the City of Norwich and to their Successors for ever and for 1600. Fagots and 1600. Focals of the said annuall rent of 200. Fagots and 200. Focals being arrear at the Feast of S. Michael the Arch-angel 23 Eliz. the said Ward took the Distresse and made Conusance as Bailiff to the said Major Sheriff c. And it was moved that the Avowry was not good first because it being matter of Election which was granted to the Master and Brethren and their Successors to wit the Fuell or the 20 s. it doth not appear that they ever made any election of the one or the other and untill it appeareth that they have
Co. lib. 8. Baspoles case and 7 H. 6. 40. accordingly The same Term in the same Court Vaughans Case THomas Dedham had to Apprentice one Holland who got his Main with Child and afterwards departed from his Masters Service and staid a whole night with Vaughan his Kinsman and Dedham procured a Warrant from S. Stephen Soame a Iustice of Peace that the Constable should bring the said Apprentice to order according to Law and because that Vaughan perswaded him to withdraw himself so that he should not be taken by virtue of the Warrant he was indited And it was agreed that it was lawfull for Vaughan to lodge and relieve him albeit he knew his misdeeds they being no Treason or Felony But Haughton Iustice took exception to the Inditement because no place appeared where he perswaded him to withdraw himself from the Warrant or in truth that he did hide himself from the Warrant for if he did not so the perswasion was nothing And Doderidge took another exception to the Warrant because the Statute saith that two Iustices of which one of them shall be of the Quorum shall proceed in such cases against the Malefactor and that they shall compell the party to allow means for the education of the Infant or otherwise the Offendor shall suffer corporall punishment and so this Warrant not being speciall according Pasch 16. Jac. In the Star Chamber Wrennums Case SIr Henry Yelverton Attorney-generall exhibited an Information in the Star Chamber against one Wrennum Ore tenus because he had divers times petitioned the King against Sir Francis Bacon Lord Chancellor pretending that the said Lord Bacon had done great Injustice to him in granting an Injunction and awarding Possession of Land against him for which he had two decrees in the time of the former Chancellor And also he made a Book of all the proceedings in the said cause between him and one Fisher and dedicated and delivered it to the King in which he notoriously traduced and scandalised the said Chancellor saying that for this unjust decree he his Wife and Children were murthered and by the worst kind of death by starving And that now he having done unjustly he must maintain it by speaking untruths and that he must use his authority Wit Art and Eloquence for the better maintenance therof with other such like scandalous words And the Attorney cited a president 2 Jac. Where one Ford for an offence in the like manner against the late Chancellor was censured in this Court that he should be perpetnally imprisoned and pay the fine of 1000 l. and that he should ride upon a Horse with his face to the tail from the Fleet to Westminster with his fault written upon his head and that he should acknowledge his offence in all the Courts at Westminster and that he should stand there a reasonable time upon the Pillory and that one of his ears shall be cut off and from thence shall be carried to Prison again and in the like manner should go to Cheapside and should have his other ear cut off c. And because they conceived that the said Wrennum had wronged the said Lord Chancellor in the said suggestion they all agreed in his censure according to the said President See for such matter 19. Ass 5. 9 H. 8. Sir Rowland Heywards case and 21 H. 8. Cardinall Wolseys case The same Term in the Kings Bench. Mingies Case AWrit of Annuity was brought by Mingy which was granted Pro Consilio impenso impendendo the Defendant pleaded in Bar that he carried a Bill to the Plaintiff to have him set his hand to it and because he refused Annuity pro Consil impenso c. he detained the said Annuity And per Curiam this is no plea for he is bound to give advice but not to set his hand to every Bill for this may be inconventent to him The same Term in the same Court THe Case was this A Lessee for years was bound in a Bond to give up the possession of the Land demised to the Lessor or his Assigns at the end of the Term the Lessor assigns over his Interest and the Assignee requires the Lessee to perform the Condition who answers that he knew not Notice where requisite whether he were the Assignee and therupon refuseth And the question was whether he had broken the Condition and it was adjudged that he had for he hath taken upon him so to do and it is not like a Condition annexed to an Estate as Co. lib. 5. Mallories case or Co. lib. 6. Greens case where the Patron presented his Clark to a deprivation yet the Ordinary ought to give the Patron notice of the deprivation for it is a thing Spirituall of which a Lay-man shall not be bound to take notice It was moved that a man riding upon a Horse through the water was Dead and. drowned and by the Coroners Inquest it was found that his death was caused Per cursum aquae and the Horse was not found a Deodand and per Curiam they did well for the water and not the Horse was the cause of his death The same Terme in the same Court. Wooton versus Bye THe case was this A man made a Lease for years rendring Rent and upon payment of the Rent the Lessor made an Acquittance by a release of all Actions Duties and Demands from the beginning of the World to Release of all Demands bars a future Rent the day of the date And whether the Rent to come were released by it was the question And it was moved by Crook at the Bar that it was not for a Covenant in future shall not be released by such words yet a release of all Covenants will be good in such a case as the Book is in Dyer 57. so Hoes case Co. lib. 5. 70. b. such a release will not discharge a Bail before Iudgment But it was answered and resolved by the Court that such a Release will discharge the Rent to come for this word Demand is the most large and ample word in a Release that may be as Littleton saith and in Co. lib. 8. Althams case and in Hoes case Co. lib. 5. one was Bail for the Defendant the words wherof are conditionable Scil. Si contigerit predict defendent debit damna illa prefat Quer. minime solvere c. So that before Iudment it is altogether incertain and therfore cannot be released but in the case at the Bar he hath Jus ad rem though not in re as Crook Iustice said The same Term in the same Court. Bret versus Cumberland IN a Writ of Covenant the case was thus Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents made a Lease of certain Mills rendring Rent in which Lease were these words to wit That the said Lessee his Executors Administrators and Assigns should from time to time repair the Mills and so leave them at the end of the Term the Lessee assigns over his Term the Queen also
grants over the Reversion the first Lessee dies and the Grantee of the Reversion brings a Writ of Covenant against his Executors In which case there were two points 1. Whether these words And the said Lessee his Executors Administrators and Assigns shall from time to time c. make a Covenant or Whether Covenant lies against the Executor of a Lessee after assignment no. 2. Whether as this case is it will lye against the Executors of the Lessee As to the first point it was agreed that it is a Covenant for being by Indenture it is the words of both parties and it is more strong being in the case of the Queen Haughton laid that 25 H. 8. Tit. Covenant Covenant will lye against a Lessee after assignment but Debt lyeth not for Rent after the Lessee hath accepted the Assignee for his Tenant and therfore it seems that by the expresse words of the Covenant that the Action lies Doderidge Iustice contra for between the Queen and the Lessee there is privity of Contract and also of Estate so that the Queen her Heirs and Successors might have had an action against the Lessee or his Executors upon the privity of Contract and where the Lessee â—ssigns over the privity of Contract remains but the privity of Estate is gone to the Assignee and now when the Queen grants over the Reversion the privity of Contract is utterly determined wherby the Action of Covenant cannot be maintained against the first Lessee or his Executors who are more remote to which Mountague chief Iustice agreed see 2 H. 4. 6. 6. H. 4. 1. and Co. lib. 3. Walkers case and the Iudgments there cited Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Bennet versus Westbeck THe Case was thus Tenant for life Remainder for life Reversion in Fee he in Remainder for life gives his Deed of Demise with the assent of the first Tenant for life upon the Land to a stranger in the absence of the Lessor and said that he surrendred to him in Reversion And it was said that this Surrender being without Deed was not good to him who was absent and to confirm it the case was put out of 27 H. 8. Where Mountague chief Iustice said that if a Feoffment be made to four and Livery is made to one in the absence of the other but in name of all if it be by Deed this shall enure to all but if it be without Deed then only to him to whom the Livery was made So here this Surrender doth not enure to him in the Reversion being absent Whether Tenant for life in Remainder may surrender without Deed. But Non aliocatur for the sole point now in question was whether he in Remainder for life can surrender without Deed and as to it this Rule was taken viz. That that which cannot commence without Deed cannot be granted without Deed as a Rent Reversion common Advowson c. as 19 H. 6. 33. 14 H 7. 3. 1 2. Ph. Mar. 110. 22. Ass Pl. 16. But in this case this took effect by Livery and not by Deed and therfore might be determined without Deed. Mountague and Haughton agreed that it might be surrendred without Deed because it had its beginning without Deed but it could not be granted over without Deed. Doderidge Iustice said that it could not be surrendred without Deed but he said that Tenant in possession may or Tenant for life and he in Remainder together may surrender to him in the Reversion but this shall innure as two severall Surrenders first of him in Remainder to the Tenant for life and then by the Tenant for life to him in the Reversion Crook Iustice agreed with Doderidge for the Estate of him in Possession is an Estoppell to the Surrender so that it could not be surrendred without Deed. The same Term in the same Court. Thurman versus Cooper IN an Ejectione firmae brought by John Thurman against William Cooper upon the whole matter the case was thus Lands were given to a man and woman who afterwards inter-marry and to their Heirs and Assigns Habendum to them and to the Heirs of their two bodies engendered the remainder to them and the Survivor of them with warranty to them and their Heirs and Assigns for ever And the question was what Estate this shall be whether an Estate-tail or Fee-simple or a Fee-tail with a simple Expectant And it was said that this shall be an Estate-tail only for the Habendum qualifies the generall words precedent and with this agrees Perkins 35. b. and Co. lib. 8. 154. b. Althams case But it was answered and resolved by the whole Court that this is a Fee-tail with a Fee-simple expectant and they observed these Rules 1. That every Deed shall be taken most strong against him that made it 2. That every Deed shall be construed according to the intent of the maker so that all the parts may be effectuall if they can stand together with the Rules of Law 40 E. 3. 5 Percy saith that it is a Fee-simple 21 H. 6. 7. that it is an Estate-tail with a Fee-simple expectant Dyer 160. and Plow Paramore and Yardleys case the Law shall make an order of words where there is no order put by the parties and the words after the Remainder limited are Tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis feodi c. and therfore it ought to be a Fee-simple for if it were a Fee-tail he should hold of the Donor as it is in Co. lib. 6. Sir John Molins case and other Books And although the Warranty cannot inlarge an Estate yet this expresses his intent to passe a Fee-simple and the Law shall make a construction that the Fee-tail shall precede upon which the Fee-simple shall be expectant according to that which is before said in Paramore and Yardleys case Doderidge If the Habendum had been to a stranger the Premisses had been but a Tail as 7 H. 4. for otherwise the Habendum shall be void But if Land be given to one and his Heirs viz. In Tail or if the said Donce dye without Issue of his body this had been but an Estate-tail only because it immediatly checks and confirms the Premisses to which Haughton agreed Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Powels Case POwel an Vtter-Barister of the Temple and also Town-Clark of Plimoth brought an Action upon the Case against for these Words That he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave c. words The Defendant supposing that the Plaintiff had wronged him in the Court of Plimoth said that he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave and that he would make him answer for that which he had done in another place And after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the words were not actionable because he doth not scandalize him in his Profession by which he acquires his
Execution shall be sued against him as Ter-tenant 2. There is not any lien as Heir for the Iudgment doth not mention the Heir and therfore he cannot be charged unlesse he be expresly bound and in the Record of the Recovery it doth not appear that the first lien shall bind the Heir for he declares that he bound himself and not that he bound himself and his Heirs 3. If the Heir were bound in the Obligation so that he were once bound as Heir yet the Iudgment determines the specialty so that now he is not bound and in the Iudgment the Heir is not mentioned as in 10 H. 4. 21. 24. If an Abbot contract to the use of the house without consent of the Covent this shall bind if he dies but if he takes an Obligation of the Abbot and then he dies this shall not bind the house for the Contract is determined by the Obligation and this is the reason that in the time of E. 3. in a recovery upon debt the Obligation was cancelled 4. Here he cannot be charged as Heir for it appeareth by the Record Where a debt is recorded upon bond the Obligation was cancelled that his Father is living for it is brought against him as Heir apparant which he cannot be but during the life of his Father And as to the objection that in this case he shall have his age and therfore shall be charged as Heir Non sequitur for if execution be sued against the Heir of a Purchasor he shall have his age and yet he is not Heir neither can charged as Heir to the Conusor But because it is a rule in Law that the Heir which hath by discent shall not answer where his Inheritance may be charged during his Nonage Whitlock to the same intent because the Heir is not charged here as Heir but as Ter-tenant wherby his false Plea shall not hurt him with which Jones also agreed and said that he here considered three things 1. That the lien of the Ancestor binds the Heir 2. How the Heir shall behave himself in pleading 3. Our point in question For the first there are two things requisite to bind one as Heir 1. A lien expresse for if one bind himself and not his Heir this shall not bind his Heir in any case 2. A discent of Inheritance for without this he shall not be bound by the act of his Ancestor and he is bound no longer then Assets discend for he alien before the Writ purchased the lien is gone 2. He ought to behave himself truly and plead truly and confesse the assets discended to him when debt is brought against him as heir otherwise his own Lands shall be charged with the debt as it is in Pepys case in Plow Com. But where it is said in Pepys case that upon a Nihil dicit or Non sum informatum c. If the Iudgment passe upon them that it shall be generall I am not of that opinion for the common experience of the Courts is that such a generall Iudgment shall not be given against the Heir unlesse it be upon a false plea pleaded with which agrees Lawsons case Dyer 81. and Henninghams case Dyer 344. where the Iudgment passed by Nihil dicit so that the saying in Plow 440. a. that what way soever the Heir be condemned in debt if he do not confesse the Assets c. that it shall be his proper debt is not now taken for Law And I also hâ—ld that if the Heir plead falsly and there is found more Assets Where upon a false plea by an Heir the Plaintiff may elect to take the Assets in execution or an Elegit of all his Land that yet it is in the election of the Plaintiff to charge him and to take execution of the Assets only or to take an Elegit of all his Land and he is not bound to take an Elegit of all his Land in this case for otherwise this inconvenience may arise If the Heir hath a 100. acres by discent and two by purchâ—se if upon the false Plea of the Heir the Plaintiff cannot have any other execution but an Eligit of the Moyety of his Lands then he by this is prejudiced for otherwise he might have all he Assets in execution and so the Heir by this way shall take advantage of his false plea. 3. He held as Whitlock before and for the same reason Doderidge Iustice How the Heir shall be bâ—und by the act of his Father is worthy of consideration upon which Prima facie the Books seem to disagree but being well considered accord with excellent harmony I have considered this case it was moved at Reading Term and because my Notes are not here I will speak more briefly and will consider 1. Hâ—w an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father and as to that in debt against an Heir he is charged as Heir so that at this day it is taken as his proper debt wherby the Writ is in the Debet and Detinet How an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father but in the Detinet only against Executors But in former time from the 18. of Ed. 2. till 7 H. 4. if an Executor had Assets the Heir was not chargable but in 7 H. 4. the Law changed in this point for now it is accounted his own debt and debt will lye against his Executor as it is said in Plow Com and so against the Heirs of the Heir to many generations albeit of this Plowden makes a doubt and his plea that he had nothing at the day of the Writ purchased nor ever after is good for if he alien the Assets he is discharged of the debt in regard he is not to wait the action of the Obligee 2. The Heir shall be châ—â—ged upon or Recognisance not as Heir but as Ter-tenant for he is not bound in the Recognisance but only the Conusor grant that the debt shall be levied of all his Lands and Tenements but not against his Heirs And here he is not meerly as Ter-tenant for he shall not have contribution agâ—â—st â—her Ter-tenants but only against those who are Heirs as himself is but to all other intents he is Ter-tenant and so charged Why an Heir is not chargable for debt after he hath fold the assets as 32 E. 3. and 27 H. 6. aâ—â— 3. That upon a Iudgment as our case is the Heir shall be charged as Ter-tenant and not otherwise The Book which hath been cited viz 33 E. 3. Execution 162. is expresse in the point the broken years of Fitzherbert are obsâ—urely reported but by comparing of cases it will appear to be our case exâ—resly 4. That albeit an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Ancestor where he is particularly bound yet upon his false plea no execution shall be but upon the assets So it seems to me that in the principall case the Iudgment shall be speciall and it seems to be a
there ought to be a dislike of the Father also and in the Declaration it is also said that she dis-agreed Doderidge agreed with Jones that â—he Declaration is not good and that it is not warranted by the Covenant and that the breach is not well assigned The case is grounded upon the second covenant which consists upon a contingency which contingency is if there happen any discord between the Father and the Son c. the words are joynt and all ought to disagree True it is that in some cases a conjunctive shall be taken for a disjunctive but this is according to the matter and circumstances of the fact but in our case it shall not be taken disjunctively If the Father the Son and the Wife had disagreed then it is cleer that an Action of covenant lies but this is casus omissus and no provision for it Also it is only alledged in the Declaration that she disagreed whereas a mutuall disagreement between all ought to be alledged and therefore Judgement was given Quod quaerens mil. capiat per bellam But all agreed that the Wife might have boarded with Tooker the Father if she would but her new Husband could not AT thowe Sergeant took divers exceptions to an Inditement of forcible entry upon the Stat. of 8. H. 6. against Ployden and others for expelling one Syms from his Copi-hold and the principall exception was because disseisivit was not in the Inditement and in truth it cannot for albeit the Stat. of 21. Jac. cap. 15. gives power to Iudges and Iustices of Peace to give restitution of possession to Tenants for yeares and Copy-holders in which there shal be an entry or detainer by force yet the Stat. does not give an Inditement of forcible entry of copy-hold Noy a Copy-holder shal now have an Iditement of forcible entry but disseisivit shal not be in it for no Iury will find that because it is not possible because a Copy-holder hath no Frée-hold and yet a Copy-holder shall have a Plaint in nature of an Assize against a stranger but not against the Lord And at last the opinion of the Court was that the Inditement was good UPon a Capias directed to the Sheriff of London to take the body of J. S. the Capias was returnable die Jovis which was the day of All-souls and thereupon the Sheriff took the party but he returned that because the return of the Writ was upon a day that was not Dies Juridicus he suffered the party to go at large And the return was holden insufficient for by Doderidge the Writ was good and the taking and detaining of the party by vertue thereof was lawfull but yet he could not have the party there at the sayd day and therefore the Sheriff was compelled to bring the party into Court which the same day he did accordingly The same Term in the same Court A Man granted a Rent charge of 12 l. to one of his Sons out of the Mannor of D. by Déed and died the Grantée lost his Deed the Land is extended to I. D. by vertue of a Recognizance acknowledged by the eldest Son of the Grantor the Grantée sue for his Annuity before the Councell of York to be relieved in equity for that in respect of the losse of the Déed he could not have remedy at the common-Law and J. D. the Conuzée obtained a prohibition out of this Court upon this surmize that although the Councel of York should make a Decree that he should pay the said Annuity yet it should be no discharge for so much against the Conuzor because their Decrée was no legall eviction Now came Smith of the Temple and prayed a Precedendo for the Grantée to the Councel of York and the opinion of the whole Court was that a Decrée there being no legall eviction shall not be a discharge for so much against the Conuzor Doderidge the Grantée of the Rent-charge having now lost his Déed can have no remedy in equity for in this case Equitas sequitur legem and of the same opinion were Jones and Whitlock but by Doderidge which was not denied if the Grantee had lost the Deed by a casuall losse as by firâ— c. in such a case he shall have remedy in equity and he sayd that in the beginning of King James when Egerton was Lord Chancellor there was such a Case in Chancery A Grantee of a rent-seck had seisen of it so that he might have an assize and he devised it to J. S. the Devisée sued in Chancery to have his Rent and seizen of it and he could have no remedy for it in Chancery And this was one Malleryes case The same Term in the same Court ONe Hebborne was indited for stopping a way c. and it was mooved that the inditement was insufficient because it is not layd that it was communis via but only that it was a way to the Church and per Curiam it was good enough and by Jones Iustice the Inditement is good enough although there wants vi armis because he who is supposed to stop the way is owner of the Land The same Term in the same Court AN Action upon the Case upon a promise was brought in the Town of Northampton and the Consideration alledged was that if the Defendant here in the Writ of Errour would discharge Bagnot of Execution c. that then the Plaintiff here in this Writ of Errour promised to pay him eleven pounds and there the Defendant pleaded quod exoneravit illum de Executione relaxavit And Bolstred for the Plaintiffe moved this for Errours that the Plaintiffe in the inferiour Court did not shew by what manner of release it was nor that it was by writing for this being the Consideration upon which the Action is grounded ought to be put in certain Mich. 15. Iac. Staple and King Execution of a consideration ought to be shown 35 H. 6. 19. a discharge ought to be shown in certain 22 E. 4. 43. the Lord Lisles Case and Mich. 16. Iac. in this Court Liverel and Rivets Case which was entred Trin. 16. Iac. Rot. 32â— in an Action upon the Case upon a promise upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiffe and it was moved in arrest of Judgement because the Consideration was that the Plaintiffe should discharge one Ogle and he declares that he did discharge him and thereupon he brought this Action and because he declared but generally quod exoneravit the Judgement for that very cause was stayed and 36 Eliz. one covenanted to make an assurance and pleaded generally that he had assured and resolved that it was not good and in Rosse and Harvies Case this Term which was entred Trin. 2 Car. Rot. 1408. In Covenant the Defendant covenanted to give security the Defendant pleaded that he offered security and resolved that it was not good per que c. Jermy for the Defendant that the plea is good enough for a Release by Peroll is sufficient I
dies and afterwards John his Son and Heir dies without Issue the reversion by this descends to the said Christopher who dies leaving Issue And upon this Case made in the Court of Wards the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson agreed first That upon the devise and death of the Father the said Christopher and William were Joynt-tenants of the Land and not Tenants in Common notwithstanding the word severally because it is coupled with the said word joyntly But yet they agreed also that by the descent from John to Christopher the Fee-simple was executed in the said Christopher for the Moyety in the same Mannor as if he had purchased the Reversion of the whole or of this Moyety and that it is not like to the Case where Land is given and to the Heirs of one of them in which case for the benefit of the Survivorship it is not executed to divide the Ioynture because the Estates are made at one and the same time together and therfore not like to the case where the Inheritance cometh to the particular Estate by severall and divided means And a Decree was made accordingly Trin. 36. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 1. IT was agreed by all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchequer upon an Assembly made at Serjeants-Inn after search made for the ancient Presidents and upon good deliberation taken If a man have two houses and inhabit somtimes in one and somtimes in the other if that House in which he doth not then inhabity be broken in the night to the intent to steal the Goods then being in his house that this is Burglary although no person bee then in the House and that now by the new Statute made such an Offender shall not have his Clergy for before the Statutes were made which take away Clergy in case of Burglary where any person was put in fear no mention was made in the Inditements of Burglary that any person was in the House But it was generall that the house of such a one Noctanter fregit and such Goods then there Felonice cepit And the breaking of a Church in the night to steal the Goods there is Burglary although no person be in it because this is the place to keep the Goods of the Parish And in the same manner the house of every one is the proper place to preserve his Goods although no person be there And that the Law was alwaies so it is to be collected by the course of the Statutes therof made for first the Statute of 23 H. 8. doth not take Clergy from any in case of Burglary unlesse some of the same Family be in the house and put in fear And in 5 Eliz. 6. The Offendor shall be ousted of his Clergy if any of the Family be in the house be they sleeping or waking And these Statutes were the cause that it was used of late time to put in the Inditements of Burglary that some person of the Family was then in the house to put them from their Clergy But this doth not prove that it shall not be Burglary but where some person was in the house and by 18 Eliz. Clergy is taken away in all cases of Burglary generally without making mention of any person to be there which enforce the resolution aforesaid and according to it they all agreed hereafter to put it in Execution Finch versus Riseley 2. IN this Term the case betweeen Finch and Riseley was in question before all the Iustices and Barons for this assembled at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where after Arguments heard by the Councell of the parties upon this point only If the Queen make a Lease for years rendring Rent with a Proviso that the Rent be not paid at the day limited that the Lease shall cease without making mention that it was to be paid at the receit whether the Lease shall cease upon the default of payment before Office found therof And by Periam and some of the Iustices the Lease stall not cease untill an Office be found of the default because it is a matter in Fait which determines it to wit the not-payment And by Gawdy it shall be taken as if it had been for the not-payment that the Proviso had been that the Lease shall be forfeited In which case it is not detennined untill Re-entry made for the forfeiture which in the Queens case ought alwaies to be by Office which countervails the re-entry of a common person As where the Queen makes a Lease rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry albeit the Rent be not paid yet untill Office found therof the Rent continues Popham Anderson and the greater part of the Iustices and Barons resolved that it was cleer in this case that Ipso facto upon the default of payment the Lease was determined according to the very purport of the contract beyond which it cannot have any beeing and therfore there needs no Office in the case But where it is that it shall be forfeited or that he shall re-enter there untill advantage taken of the forfeiture in the one case or untill re-entry made in the other case the Term alwaies continues by the contract And where in the case of a common person there is need of a re-entry to undo the Estate there in the case of the King there needs an Office to determine the Estate for an Office in the Kings case countervails an entry for the King in person cannot make the entry And upon this resolution of the greater part of the Iustices in Mich. Term 31 32 Eliz. the same case was in question in the Office of Pleas in the Exchequer between the said Moil Finch Plaintiff and Thomas Throgmorton and others Defendants and there adjudged by Manwood late chief Baron and all the other Barons unanimously after long argument at the Bar and Bench that the Lease was void upon default of payment of the Rent according to the Proviso of the Lease and this immediatly without Office for the reasens before remembred upon which Iudgment was given a Writ of Error was brought before the Lord Keeper of the great Seal and the Lord Treasurer of England where it long depended and after many arguments the Iudgment given in the Exchequer by the advice of Popham and Anderson was affirmed and that upon this reason for the Proviso shall be taken to be a limitation to determine the Estate and not a Condition to undo the Estate which cannot be defeated in case of a Condition but by entry in case of a common person and but by Office which countervails an entry in the case of the Queen And this Iudgment was so affirmed in Mich. Term 36 37 Eliz. Smiths Case 3 IT was found by Diem clausit extremum after the death of Richard Smith that in consideration of a marriage to be had between Margaret Smith and William Littleton a younger Son to Sir John Littleton Knight and of 1300. marks paid by the said Sir John to the said