husband and therefore the prescription is not good that Potest ponere retes upon the land of another upon the Custome of the Sea for prescription must be in a thing done also by him the devise is not good according to the Custome for that is that she may devise and surrender and that ought to be all at one time and that in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons as well as the Surrenderer and the words of a Custome shall be so far performed as they may be Meade contrary And that these Witnesses shall be referred to the surrender onely for a devise may be without Witnesses And he said that sometimes the latter clause shall not refer to all the precedent matter but unto the latter onely as 7. H. 7. is Where a Praecipe was brought of lands in A. B. and C. in Insula de Ely the Clause in Insula de Ely is referred onely to C. And it was said That if in the principal Case the Will were good that then the husbands are Tenants in common and then the Action of Trespass is not maintainable Pasch 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 23. THis Case was moved by Serjant Gawdy Thomas Heigham had an hundred Acres of lands called Jacks usually occupied with a house and he leased the house and forty Acres parcel of the said hundred Acres to I. S. for life and reserved the other to himself and made his Will by which he doth devise the house and all his lands called Jacks now in the occupation of I. S. to his wife for life and that after her decease the remainder of that and all his other lands pertaining to Jacks to R. who was his second son Whether the wife shall have that of which her husband died seised for her life or whether the eldest son should have it and what estate he shall have in it Meade The wife shall not have it for because that he hath expressed his Will that the wife shall have part it shall not be taken by implication that she shall have the whole or the other part for then he would have devised the same to her And therefore it hath been adjudged in this Court betwixt Glover and Tracy That if Lands be devised to one and his heirs males and if he die without heirs of his body that then the land shall remain over that he had no greater estate then to him and his special heirs viz. heirs Males and the reason was because the Will took effect by the first words Anderson Chief Justice It was holden in the time of Brown That if lands were devised to one after the death of his wife that the wife should have for life but if a man seised of two Acres deviseth one unto his wife and that I. S. shall have the other after the death of the wife she takes nothing in that Acre for the Cause aforesaid For the second matter If the Reversion shall pass after the death of the wife to the second son we are to consider what shall be said land usually occupied with the other and that is the land leased with it But this land is not now leased with it and therefore it cannot pass Windham The second son shall have the Reversion for although it doth not pass by these words Usualy Occupied as Anderson held yet because the devise cannot take other effect and it appeareth that his intent was to pass the land the yonger son shall have it Anderson Jacks is the intire name of the house and lands And that word when it hath reference unto an intire thing called Jacks and is known by the name of Jacks shall pass to the second son for words are as we shall construe them And therefore If a man hath land called Mannor of Dale and he deviseth his Mannor of Dale to one the land shall pass although it be not a Mannor And if I be known by the name of Edward Williamson where my name is Edward Anderson and lands are given unto me by the name of Edward Williamson the same is a good name of purchase And the opinion of the Court was that the Reversion of the land should pass to the second son Pasc 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 24. The Lord MOUNTJOY and the Earle of HUNTINGTON'S Case NOte by Anderson Chief Justice and Periam Justice If a man seised of any entrie Franchises as to have goods of Felons within such a Hundred or Mannor or goods of Outlaws Waifes Strares c. which are causual There are not Inheritances deviseable by the Statute of 32. H. 8. for they are not of any yearly value and peradventure no profit shall be to the Lord for three or four years or perhaps for a longer time And such a thing which is deviseable ought to be of annual value as appeareth by the words of the Statute And also they agreed that the said Franchises could not be divided and therefore if they descend to two coparceners no partition can be made of them And the words of the Statute of 32. H. 8. are That it shall be lawful c. to divise two parts c. and then a thing which canot be divided is not diviseable And they said That if a man had three Manors and in each of the three such Liberties and every Manor is of equal value that yet he cannot devise one Mannor and the Liberties which he hath to it Causá quâ supra but by them an Advowson is deviseable because it may be of annual value But the Lord Chancellor smiling said That the Case of the three Manors may be doubted And there also it was agreed by the said two Justices upon Conference had with the other Justices That where the Lord Mountjoy by deed Indented and Inrolled did bargaine and sell the Manor of â—amford to Brown in Fee and in the Indenture this Clause is contained Provided alwayes And the said Brown Covenants and Grants to and with the Lord Mountjoy his Heirs and Assigns that the Lord Mountjoy his Heirs and Assigns may digg for Ore within the land in Camford which was a great Waste and also to digg Turffe there to make Allome and Coperess without any contradiction of the said Brown his Heirs and Assigns They agreed That the Lord Mountjoy could not devide the said Interest viz. to grant to one to digg within a parcel of the said Waste And they also agreed That notwithstanding that Grant That Brown his Heirs and Assigns owners of the Soile might digg there also like to the Case of Common Sans number The Case went further That the Lord Mountjoy had devised this Interest to one Laicott for one and twenty years and that Laicott assigned the same over to two other men And whether this Assignment were good or not was the Question forasmuch that if the Assignement might be good to them it might be to twenty and that might be a surcharge to the Tenant of the soile And as to that
thing and shall he be bound by a Conveyance Anno. 16. H. 6. then in the time of Civil War Uses began and of Lands in use the Lord Chief Baron Tanfield in his Argument hath cited diverse cases where the lands in use were subject and lyable to the debt of Cestuy que use in the Kings Case and so was it untill the Statute of 27. H. 8. of Uses was made Babbington an Officer in the Exchequer had lands in the hands of Feoffees upon Trust and a Writ issued out and the lands were extended for the Debt of Babbington in the hands of his Feoffees Sir Robert Dudley having lands in other mens hands upon Trusts the lands were seized into the Kings hands for a contempt and not for debt or damages to the King And in this Case although that the â—nquisition do find the Conveyance but have not found it to be with power of Revocation yet the Land being extended it is well extended untill the contrary doth appear and untill the extent be avoided by matter of Record viz. by Plea as the Lord Chief Baron hath said before Ley Chief Justice of the Kings Bench argued the same day and his Argument in effect did agree with the other Justices in all things and therefore I have forborne to report the same at length And it was adjudged That the Extent was good and the Land well decreed accordingly Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Exchequer Chamber 417. The Lord SHEFFIELD and RATCLIFF'S Case IN a Writ of Error brought to reverse a Judgment given in a Monstrans de Droit in the Court of Pleas The Case was put by Glanvile who argued for Ratcliffe the Defendant to be this 2 E. 2. Malew being seised of the Mannor of Mulgrave in Fee gave the same to A. Bigot in tail which by divers discents came to Sir Ralph Bigot in tail Who 10 Jannarii 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment unto the use of â—is last Will and thereby after his Debts paid declared the use unto his right heirs in Fee and 9. H. 8. dyed The Will was performed Francis Bigot entred being Tenant in tail and 21 H. 8. made a Feoffment unto the use of himself and Katherine his wife and to the use of the heirs of their two bodies Then came the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. by which Tenant in tail for Treason is to forfeit the Land which he hath in tail Then the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses is made Then 28 H. 8. Francis Bigot did commit Treason And 29 H. 8. he was attainted and executed for the same Anno 31 H. 8. a private Act of Parliament was made which did confirm the Attaindor of Francis Bigot and that he should forfeit unto the King word for word as the Statute of 26 H. 8. is saving to all strangers except the Offendor and his heirs c. 3 E. 6. The heir of Francis Bigot is restored in blood Katherine entred into the Mannor and dyed seised 8 Eliz. their Issue entred and married with Francis Ratcliffe and had Issue Roger Ratcliffe who is heri in tail unto Ralph Bigot And they continue possession untill 33. Eliz. And then all is found by Office and the Land seised upon for the Queen who granted the same unto the Lord Sheffield Francis Bigot and Dorothy die And Roger Ratcliffe sued a Monstrans de Droit to remove the Kings hands from off the lands and a Scire facias issued forth against the Lord Sheffield as one of the Terre-Tenants who pleaded all this special matter and Judgment was thereupon given in the Court of Pleas for Roger Ratcliffe And then the Lord Sheffield brought a Writ of Error in the Exchequer-Chamber to reverse the said Judgment And Finch Serjeant argued for the Lord Sheffield that the Judgment ought to be reversed And now this Term Glanvile argued for Roger Ratcliffe that the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas ought to be affirmed There are two points The first If there were a Right remaining in Francis Bigot and if the same were given unto the King by the Attaindor and the Statute of 31 H. 8. Second If a Monstrans de Droit be a proper Action upon this matter which depends upon a Remitter for if it be a Remitter then is the Action a proper Action The Feoffment by Ralph Bigot 6 H. 8. was a Discontinuance and he had a new use in himself to the use of his Will and then to the use of his Heirs Then 9 H. 8. Ralph Bigot dyed And then Francis Bigot had a right to bring a Formedon in the Discendor to recover his estate tail 21 H 8. then the point ariseth Francis Bigot having a right of Formedon and an use by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 1. before the Statute of 27 H. 8. by the Feoffment he had so setled it that he could not commit a forfeiture of the estate tail When a man maketh a Feoffment every Right Action c. is given away in the Livery and Seisin because every one who giveth Livery giveth all Circumstances which belongs to it For a Livery is of that force that it excludes the Feoffor not only of all present Rights but of all future Rights and Tytles v. C. 1. par 111. and there good Cases put to this purpose 9 H. 7. 1. By Livery the Husband who was in hope to be Tenant by Courtesie is as if he were never sised 39 H. 6. 43. The Son disseiseth his Father and makes a Feoffment of the lands the Father dyeth the hope of the heir is given away by the Livery It was objected by Serjeant Finch 1. Where a man hath a right of action to recover land in Fee or an estate for life which may be conveyed to another there a Livery doth give away such a Right and shall there bind him But an estate in tail cannot be transferred to another by any manner of Conveyance and therefore cannot be bound by such a Livery given I answer It is no good Rule That that which doth not passe by Livery doth remain in the person which giveth the Livery 19 H. 6. Tenant in tail is attainted Office is found The estate tail is not in the King is not in the person attainted but is in abeyance So it is no good Rule which hath been put When Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment Non habet jus in re neque ad rem If he have a Right then it is a Right of Entre or Action but he cannot enter nor have any action against his own Feoffment 19 H. 8. 7. Dyer If Discontinuee of Tenant in tail levieth a Fine with proclamations and the five years passe and afterward Tenant in tail dyeth his issue shall have other five years and shall be helped by the Statute for he is the first to whom the right doth accrue after the Fine levied for Tenant in tail himself after his Fine with Proclamations hath not any right But if Tenant in tail be
24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 19. IN an Action upon the Case upon a Promise The consideration was Where I. S. had granted a Term to I. D. That afterwards upon the request of I. S. I. D. did make to W. an Estate for four years upon which W. brought his Action And after Verdict it was moved in stay of Judgement that there was no good consideration and a difference taken where the Promise was upon the Grant and where afterwards If it were before then the Condition was good but if it were afterwards it was not good And it was adjudged That the Plaintiffe Nihil capiat per billam Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 20. AN Action upon the Case upon a Promise was The Consideration was That in consideration that the Plaintiffe Daret diâ—m solutionis the Defendant Super se assumpsit and because he doth not say in facto that he had given day It was adjudged that no sufficient Consideration was alledged But if the Consideration were Quod cum indebitatus c. the same had been a good Consideration without any more for that implies a Consideration in it self Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 21. IT was said by Cooke That the Chancellor or any Judge of any of the Courts of Record at Westminster may bring a Record one to another without a Writ of Certiorare because one Judge is sufficiently known one to the other as 5. H. 7. 31. where a Certificate was by the Chancellor alone and to this purpose is 11. H. 4. But that other Judges of base Courts cannot do nor Justices of the Peace as 3. H. 6. where the certificate by Suitors was held void Pasch 25. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 22. SKIPWITH'S Case IT was found upon a speciall verdict in an Action of Trespass that the place where c. was Copy-hold land And that the Custome is That quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit devise lands whereof she is seised in Fee according to the custome of the Manor to her Husband and surrender it in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons And that I. S. was seised of the land where c. and had issue two Daughters and died and that they married husbands and that one of them devised her part to her husband by Will in writing in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons and afterwards at another day shee surrendred to the Husband and he was admitted and she died and her Husband continued the possession And the Husband of the other Daughter brought an Action of Trespasse Rodes Serjeant The Custome is not good neither for the Surrender nor for the Will for two causes One for the uncertainty of what estate shee might make a Devise and because it is against reason that the Wife should surrender to the Husband Where the Custome shall not be good if it be uncertain he vouched 13. E. 3. Fitz. Dum fuit infra aetatem 3. The Tenant saith that the lands are in Dorset where the Custome is that an Enfant may make a Grant or Feoffment when he can number twelve pence And it was holden that because it is uncertain when he can so do the Custome is not good 19. E. 2. in a Ravishment of Ward the defendant pleaded that the custome is that when the Enfant can measure an ell of cloth or tell twelve pence as before that he should be out of Ward and it is holden no good custom for the cause aforesaid 22. H. 6. 51. a. there a man prescribed That the Lord of D. had used to have Common for him and all his Tenants And because it is not shewed what Lord whether the Lord mediate or immediate it is adjudged no good custome And as to the Surrender it is against reason that the Wife should give to the Husband for a Wife hath not any Will but the Will of her Husband For if the Husband seised in the right of his Wife make a Feoffment in Fee and the Wife being upon the land doth disagree unto it saying that shee will never depart with it during her life yet the Feoffment is good and shall binde during the life of the Husband as it is holden in 21. E. 3. And therefore it is holden in 3. E. 3. Tit. Devise Br. 43. That a Feme covert cannot devise to her Husband for that should be the Act of the Husband to convey the land to himself And in the old Natura Brevium in the Additions of Ex gravi quaerela it is holden so accordingly And the Case in 29. E. 3. differs much from this Case For there a woman seised of lands devisable took an Husband and had issue and devised the lands to the Husband for his life and died and a Writ of Waste was brought against him as Tenant by the Courtesie and it was holden that it did lie and that he is not in by the Devise for the reason there is because he was in before by the Courtesie But as I conceive that Case will disprove the Surrender for in as much as he had it in the Right of his wife he could not take it in his own Right Also he took another Exception in the principal Case because that the wife was not examined upon the Surrender but none of the Justices spake to that Exception but when the Record was viewed it appeared that it was so pleaded Further He said That the devise was void by the Statute of 34. H. 8. Cap. 5. where it is said It is enacted That Wills and Testaments made of any Lands Tenements c. by women Coverts or c. shall not be taken to be good or effectual in Law And he said That this Statute doth extend to customary Lands And as to that all the Justices did agree That it is not within the Statute And as to the Statute of Limitations Andâ—rson chief Justice said That if a Lease for years which perhaps will not indure sixty years shall be taken strong this shall Anderson moved That if the Lord Lease Copyhold land by Word Whether the Lessee might maintain an Ejectione firme and he conceived not for in an Ejectione firmâ— there ought to be a Right in Fact And although it be by conclusion it is not sufficient for that the Jury or Judge are not estopped or concluded And he conceived That if Tenant at Will make a Lease for years that it is no good lease betwixt him and the Lessor but that he may well plead that he had nothing in the land Meade contrary but they both agreed That the Book of 14. E. 4. which saith That if Tenant at Will make a lease for years that he shall be a Disseisor is not Law Anderson said That the prescription in the principal Case was not good for it is Quod quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit c. and it ought to be that feme Coverts possunt and by the Custome have used to devise to the
not have an Action without cause and if he were convicted then there is no cause of Action and he hath not shewed whether he was convicted or acquitted And he said that there was no difference betwixt an Action on the Case and a Conspiracie in such case but onely this That a Conspiracy ought to be by two at the least and an Action upon the Case may lie against one and he said that in both he ought to shew that he was legitimo modo acquietatus See 11. H. 7. 25. An Action of Conspiracy founded upon the Statute of 8. H 6. Cap. 10. where it is grounded upon a Writ of Trespasse brought against one onely But such a Conspiracy which is grounded upon an Indictment of Felony must be against two at the least for the same is an Action founded upon the Common Law Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 92. BONEFANT against Sir RIC. GREINFIELD BOnefant brought an Action of Trespasse against Sir Richard Greinfield The Case was this A man made his Will and made A. E. I. O. his Executors and devised his Lands to A. E. I. and O. by their speciall names and to their heirs and further willed that his Devisees should sell the Land to I. D. if he would give for the same before such a day an hundred pound and if not that then they should sell to any other to the performance of his Will scil the payment of his debts I. D. would not give the hundred pound One of the Devisees refused to entermeddle and the other three sold the Land and if the Sale were good or not was the question Cooke The Sale is not good 1. Let us see what the Common Law is At the Common Law it is a plain case that the Sale is not good because it is a speciall trust and a joynt trust and shall never survive for perhaps the Devisor who is dead reposed more confidence in him who refused then in the others Vide 2 Eliz. the Case of the Lord Bray who covenanted That if his son marry with the consent of four whom he especially named viz. A. B. C. and D. that then he would stand seised to the use of his son and his wife and to the heirs of their two bodies begotten One of the four was attainted and executed The other did consent that he should marry such a one he married her yet no estate passed because the fourth did not consent and it was a joynt trust 38. H. 8. Br. Devises 31. A man willeth that his Lands deviseable shall be sold by his Executors and makes four Executors all of them ought to sell for the trust which is put upon them is a joynt Trust But Brook conceiveth that if one of them dieth that the others may sell the Lands The Case betwixt Vincent and Lee was this A man devised That if such a one dieth without issue of his body that then his Sons in law should sell such Lands and there were five sons in law when the Testatour died and when the other man died without issue there were but three sons in law and they sold the Lands and it was holden that the Sale was good because the Land was not presently to be sold Also he said that in the principall Case here they have an Interest in the Lands and each of them hath a part therefore the one cannot sell without the other But if the devise were that four should sell they have not an Interest but onely an Authority As to the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. he said that that left our Case to the Common Law For that Statute as it appeareth by the preamble speaks onely of such Devises by which the Land is devised to be sold by the Executors and not devised to the Executors to sell And goes further and saith Any such Testament c. of any such person c. therefore it is meant of such a devise made unto the Executors and then no Interest passeth but onely an Authority or a bare Trust But in our Case they have an Interest for he who refused had a fourth part Then when the other sell the whole the same is a disseisin to him of his part If a Feoffment be made to four upon condition that they make a Feoffment over and two of them make the Feoffment it is not good Also the words of the Will prove that they have an Interest for it is that his Devisees shall sell c. Laiton contrary And he said That although the Devise be to them by their proper names and not by the name Executors yet the intent appeareth that they were to sell as Executors because it was to the performance of his last Will and that may be performed as well by the three although that the other doth refuse and the Sale of the Land doth referre to the performance of his Will in which there are divers Debts and Legacies appointed to be paid 2. H. 4. and 3. H. 6. A man devised his Lands to be sold for the payment of his debts and doth not name who shall sell the same the Lands shall be sold by his Executors 39. Ass A Devise is of Lands unto Executors to sell for the performance of his Will the profits of the Lands before the Sale shall be assets in the Executors hands 15. H. 7. 12. is That if a man devise that his Lands shall be sold they shall be sold by his Executors Also if I devise that my Executors shall sell my Lands and they sell it is an Administration and afterwards they cannot plead that they never were Executors nor never administred as Executors And although there are divers Authorities to be executed yet it is but one Trust 39. Ass 17. is our very Case A man seised of Lands deviseable devised them to his Executors to sell and died having two Executors and one of them died and the other entred and sold the Land and the Sale was good 49. E. 3. 15. Isabell Goodcheapes Case Where a man devised that after an Estate in taile determined that his Executors should sell the Lands and made three Executors and one died and another refused the third after the taile determined sold the Land and the Sale was holden good and that it should not escheate to the Lord for the Land was bound with a Devise as with a Condition as to the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. the preamble of the Statute is as it hath been recited and although for exmaple the Lands in use are only put yet the Statute is not tied only to that As in the Statute of Collusion of Malbridge Examples are put only of Feoffments and Leases for years yet there is no doubt but that a Lease for life or a gift in taile to defraud the Lord is within the Statute So the Statute of Donis Conditionalibus puts onely three manner of estate tailes But Littleton saith That there are many other estate tailes which are
Chief Justice did conceive it might be a good custome and so also was the opinion of Rodes Justice and he vouched 11 H. 7. where the Lord had Three Pound for Pound-breach Fenner It is extortion if the amercement be not for a thing which is a common Nusans and cited 11 H. 4. to prove it Periam Justice said That hee said well Pasch 28 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. Rot. 1962. 159 GILE'S and NEWTON'S Case THE Case was That the Queen seised of the Manor of Gascoigne and of the Graunge called Gascoigne Graunge in D. did grant all her Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in D. and it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Manor did not pass And so Anderson Chief Justice said it is if it were in the Case of a common person but an Advowson shall passe by the Feoffment of the Manor without Deed without the words cum pertinentiis for that is parcell of the Manor which the whole Court granted Pasch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 160 J. S. was arrested by force of a Latitat out of the King's Bench at the Suit of J. D. and the Sheriffe took an Obligation of him with two Sureties upon condition that he appear such a day in the King's Bench and also that ad tunc ibidem he answer the said J. D. in a Plea of Trespass It was moved by Rodes Serjeant That the Obligation was void by the Statute of 23. H. 6. by which Statute no Obligation shall be said to be good if not for appearance only and this Obligation is for appearance and also that he shall answer to J. D. which is another thing then is contained in the Statute and therefore it is void But all the Justices were of opinion That the Obligation was good notwithstanding that because that the words of the Writ directed to the Sheriffe are Quod capias such a man It a quod habeas corpus ejus hîc such a day ad respondendum tali in a Plea of Trespasse and so nothing is contained in the Bond which is not comprised within the Writ directed unto him but if any other collaterall thing be put into the Obligation then the Bond shall be void for the whole 31. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 161 BUCKHURST'S Case LEssee for ten years granted a rent charge unto his Lessor for the years Afterwards the Lessor granted the Remainder in Fee to the Lessee It was the opinion of the whole Court that the rent was gone and extinct because the Lessor who had the rent is a party to the Destruction of the Lease which is the ground of the Rent 29. Eliz. In the King 's Bench. 162 ALLEN and PATSHALL'S Case A Copy-holder doth surrender unto the use of a Stranger for ever and the Lord admits the Surrendree to have and to hold to him and his Heirs It was adjudged in this Case That if it were upon a devise that such a one should have the Copyhold in Fee and afterwards a surrender is made unto the Lord to grant the Copy-hold according to the Will and he grants it in Fee to him and his Heirs that the Grant is good But quaere in the first Case for it was there but a bare Surrender only Mich. 27 28. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 163 STRANGDEN and BARNELL'S Case AN Action of Trover and Conversion was brought of Goods in Ipswich the Defendant pleaded That the Goods came to his hand in Dunwich in the same County and that the Plaintiffe gave unto him the goods which came to his hands in Dunwich absque hoc that he is guilty of any Trover and Conversion of Goods in Ipswich And by the opinion of the Court the same is a good manner of Pleading by reason of the speciall Justification Vide 27. H. 6. But when the Justification is generall the County is not traversable at this day Vide 19. H. 6. 6 7. Mich. 27. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 164 BARTON and EDMOND'S Case AN Infant and another were bounden in a Bond for the Debt of the Infant The Infant at his full age did assume to save the other man harmelesse against the said Bond afterwards the Infant died It was resolved by the whole Court that upon this Assumpsit an Action upon the Case would lie against the Executors of the Infant But if a Feme Covert and another at her request had been bounden in such a Bond and after the death of her Husband she had assumed to have saved the other harmelesse against such Bond such Assumpsit should not have bound the Wife Trinit 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 165 ZOUCH and BAMPORT'S Case THis Case was moved When the Defendant pleads in Bar to the Action and the Plaintiffe replies and the Defendant doth demur specially upon the Replication and the Bar is insufficient Whether the Justices shall give Judgment upon the Replication or shall resort unto the insufficient Bar the Replication being also insufficient And the opinion of the Court was That when the Action is of such a nature that the Writ and the Count doth comprehend the Title as in a Formedon and the like then because there is a sufficient title for the demandant by the Writ and the Count so as the Judges may safely proceed to Judgement for the Plaintiffe there they shall resort to the Barr. Contrary in Cases where the Title doth commence only by the Replication as in Assize Trespass and the like 40. Eliz. in the Exchequer 166 NOte it was said by Sir Francis Bacon the King's Solicitor That it was adjudged 40. Eliz. in the Exchequer That where the King had made a Lease for life who was ousted by a Stranger that the same should be said a Disseisin of the particular estate against the common ground which is That a man cannot be disseised of lesse estate then of a Fee-Simple 40. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 167 IT was holden and adjudged by Popham Chief Justice of the Kings Bench That where a Lease was made unto the Husband and Wife for their lives the remainder to the Heirs of the Survivor that the same was a good remainder notwithstanding the uncertainty and that in that Case the Husband after the death of the Wife should have Judgement to recover the Land 33. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 168 PROCTER'S Case IT was adjudged in this Case That the Lachess of the Clark in not entring of the Kings Silver shall not prejudice the King or the Crowne 30 Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 169 HARDING'S Case IT was holden by the whole Court of Kings Bench as it was reported by Sir Robert Hitcham Knight That if a man make a Lease of Copy-hold land and of Free-hold land rendring Rent and the Copy-hold descends to one and the Free-hold to another that the rent shall be apportioned Trinit 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 1702. 170 LEONARD and STEPHEN'S Case IN Trespass the issue joyned was Whether it were a Feoffment or not and
And per Curiam a Prohibition shal be awarded And Cook chief Justice said That there were three Causes in the Bill for which a Prohibition should be granted which he reduced to three Questions 1. If a Copy-holder payeth his rent and the Lord maketh a Feoffment of the Manor Whether the Copy-holder shall be compelled to attorn 2. If a man be seised of Freehold Land and Covenants to stand seised to an use Whether in such case an Attornment be needfull 3. If a Feoffment be made of a Manor by Deed Whether the Feoffee shall compell the Tenants to attorn in a Court of Equity And for all these Questions It was said That the Tenants shall not be compelled to attorn for upon a Bargain and Sale and a Covenant to stand seised there needs no attronement And Cook in this case said That in 21. E. 4. the Justices said That all Causes may be so contrived that there needed to be no Suit in Courts of Equity and it appears by our books That a Prohibition lies to a Court of Equity when the matter hath been once determined by Law And 13. E. 3. Tit. Prohibition and the Book called the Diversity of Courts which was written in the time of King Henry the eighth was vouched to that purpose And the Case was That a man did recover in a Quare Impediâ— by default and the Patron sued in a Court of Equity viz. in the Chancery and a Prohibition was awarded to the Court of Chancery Mich. 11 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 298 Sir JOHN GAGE and SMITH's Case AN Action of Waste was brought and the Plaintiffe did declare that contrary to the Statute the Lessee had committed Waste and Destruction in uncovering of a Barn by which the timber thereof was become rotten and decayed and in the destroying of the stocks of Elmes Ashes Whitethorn and Blackthorn to his damage of three hundred pound And for title shewed That his Father was seised of the Land where c. in Fee and leased the same to the Defendant for one and twenty years and died and that the Land descended to him as his son and heir and shewed that the Waste was done in his time and that the Lease is now expired The Defendant pleaded the generall issue and it was found for the Plaintiffe and damages were assessed by the Jury to fifty pound And in this case it was agreed by the whole Court 1. That if six of the Jury are examined upon a Voyer dire if they have seen the place wasted that it is sufficient and the rest of the Jury need not be examined upon a Voyer dire but onely to the principall 2. It was agreed if the Jury be sworn that they know the place it is sufficient although they be not sworn that they saw it and although that the place wasted be shewed to the Jury by the Plaintiff's servants yet if it be by the commandment of the Sheriffe it is as sufficient as if the same had been shewed unto them by the Sheriff himselfe 4. It was resolved That the eradicating of Whitethorn is waste but not of the Blackthorn according to the Books in 46. E. 3. and 9. H. 6. but if the blackthorn grow in a hedg and the whole hedg be destroyed the same is Waste by Cook chief Justice It was holden also so that it is not Wast to cut Quick-set hedges but it shall be accounted rather good husbandry because they will grow the better 5. It was agreed That if a man hath under-woods of Hasell Willowes Thornes if he useth to cut them and sell them every ten years If the Lessee fell them the same is no wast but if he dig them up by the roots or suffereth the Germinds to be bitten with cattel after they are felled so as they will not grow again the same is a destruction of the Inheritance and an Action of wast will lie for it But if he mow the Stocks with a wood-sythe as he did in the principall Case the same is a malicious Wast and continuall mowing and biting is destruction 6. It was said That in an Action of Wast a man shall not have costs of Suit because the Law doth give the party treble damages And when the generall issue Nul Wast is pleaded and the Plaintiff counted to his damages 100l. the Court doubted whether they could mitigate the damage But 7. It was agreed That in the principal Case although the issue were found for the Plaintiff that he could not have judgment because he declared of Wast done in 8. several closes to his damage of 300l. generally and did not sever the damages And the Jury found That in some of the said Closes there was no Wast committed Wherefore the Court said he could not have judgement through his own default But afterwards at another day Hobart then chief Justice and Warburton Justice said That the verdict was sufficient and good enough and so was also the declaration and that the Plaintiffe might have judgment thereupon But yet the same was adjourned by the Court untill the next Term. Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 299 CLARK's Case NOte It was said by Cook chief Justice and agreed by the whole Court and 41. and 43. E. 3. c That if a man deliver money unto I. S. to my use That I may have an Action of Debt or account against him for the same at my election And it was agreed also That an Action of Trover lieth for money although it be not in bags but not an Action of Detinue Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 300 IRELAND and BARKER's Case IN an Action of Wast brought the Writ was That the Abbot and Covent had made a Lease for years c. And it was holden by the Court that it was good although it had been better if the Writ had been That the Abbot with the assent of the Covent made the Lease for that is the usuall form but in substance the Writ is good because the Covent being dead Sons in Law by no intendment can be said to make a Lease But the Dean and Chapter ought of necessity to joyne in making of a Lease because they are all persons able and if the Dean make a Lease without the Chapter the same is not good per curiam if it be of the Chapter Lands And in Adams and Wâ—oâ—â—stey's Case Harris Serjeant observed That the Lease is said to be made by the Abbot and Covent and it is not pleaded to be made by the Abbot with the assent of the Covent Mich. 11 Iacobi In the Common Pleas. 301 The Dean and Canons of Winsor and WEBB's Case IN this Case it was holden by the Court That if a man give Lands unto Dean and Canons and to their Successors and they be dissolved or unto any other Corporations that the Donor shall have back the Lands again for the same is a condition in Law annexed to the Gift and in such Case no Writ of
the Fleet because he had made Return of a Writ contrary to what he had said in the same Court the day before and 11. H. 6. was vouched by Warburton Justice That if the Sheriff do return that one is languidus in prisona whereas in truth he is not languidus the Sheriff shall be sued for his false Return which was agreed by the whole Court Quod nota Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 318 WArburton Justice asked the Pronothories this question If in Trespass the plaintiff might discontinue his action within the yeer To which the Pronothories answered That if it be before any plea be pleaded that he might But the Justices were of a contrary opinion that he could not because then costs which are given by the Statute should be lost Mich. 11. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 319 LAISTON's Case IN Trespass for a Wâ—y the Defendant pleaded a plea in bar which was insufficient and afterwards the plaintiff was Non-suit yet it was resolved by the Court that the defendant should have his costs against the plaintiff But if a default be in the originall Writ and afterwards the plaintiff is Non-suit there the defendant shall not have costs because that when the Original is abated it is as if no suit had been And so was the opinion of the whole Court Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 320 HILL and GRUBHAM's Case THe Case was this A Lease was made unto Grubham by a deed paroll Habendum to him his wife and his daughter successivè sicut scribuntur et nominantur in ordine Afterwards Grubham dyed and then his wife dyed And if it were a good estate in Remainder to his daughter was the Question Harris Serjeant The Remainder is void and not good by way of Remainder for the incertainty C. 1. part in Corbets case In all Contracts and bargains there ought to bee certainty And therefore 22. H. 6. is That if a Feoffment be made to two et haeredibus it is void although it be with warranty to them and their heirs Vide 9. H. 6 35. Where renunâ—iavit totam communiam doth not amount unto a Release because it is not shewed to whom the Release is and so in 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench in Windsmere Hulbards case Where an Indenture was to one Habendum to him and to his wife and to a third person Successive it was holden that it was void by way of Remainder to any of them And there it was Resolved 1. That they did not take presently 2. That they could not take by way of Remainder And 3. that They could not take as Occupants because that the intent of the Lessor was that they should take but as one estate But the Court was of opinion against Harris And Resolved That the daughter had a good estate in Remainder and that the same did not differ from the Case in Dyer Where a Lease was made by Indenture to one Habendum to him to another successivè sicut nominantur in Charta for that those words Sicut nominantur in Charta maketh the estate to be certain enough And so they said in this Case Sicut scribuntur et nominantur in Ordine is certain enough and shall be taken to be Sicut scribuntur et nominantur in eadem charta But they agreed according to the Case in Brooks Cases That a Lease to three Habendum 〈…〉 Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 321. TRAHERNS Case AN Assize of Nusans was brought against the Defendant because that Levavit quandam domum ad nocumentum c. And the Plaintiff shewed how that he had a Windmil and that the Defendant had built the said house so as it hindred his Mill And the Jury found that the Defendant levavit domum and that but two feet of it did hinder the Plaintiffs Mill and is ad nocumentum And how Judgment should be given was the question And the Court was of opinion That Judgment should be that but part of the house should be abated viz. That which was found to be ad nocumentum And it was said by some That the Assise is such a Writ which extends to the whole house and therefore that the whole house should be abated according to the Writ But a difference was taken betwixt the words Erexit and Levavit For Erexit is but when parcel of a house is set up ad nocumentum but Levavit is when an entire house is levied from the ground And it was said by Hobart Chief Justice That if the Defendant had not levied the house so high by two yards it had been no Nusans for the Jury find that the two yards only are ad nocumentum And therefore he conceived that the Writ was answered well enough and that but part of the house should be abated For the Writ is Quod levavit quandam domum c. And the Verdict is Quod levavit domum But that but two yards of it is ad nocumentum And therefore he said the Writ is answered well enough and that the Judgment should be given That that only should be abated which was ad nocumentum c. Quaere for the Case was not resolved And vid. Batten Sympsons Case C. par 9. to this purpose Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 322. BAGNALL and POTS Case IT was resolved by the Court in this Case That when an Issue is joyned upon Non concessit that the Issue shall be tryed where the Land is But if a Lease be in question and Non concessit be pleaded to it it shall be tryed where the Lease was made 2. It was resolved That if Copy-hold land be given to superstitious uses and the same cometh unto the King by the Statute That the Copyhold is destroyed and the Uses shall be accompted void But it was resolved That in such Case by the Statute which giveth this Land so given to superstitious uses to the King that the King hath not thereby gained the Freehold of the Copyhold but that the same remaineth in the Lord of the Mannor Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 324. JUCKS Sir CHARLS CAVENDISH's Case A Parson sued for the substraction of Predial Tythes upon the Statute of 2 E. 6. in the Spiritual Court The Defendant made his suggestion That for such a Farm upon which the Tythes did arise there was this custom That when the Tythes of the Lands were set forth that the Owners of the said Lands had used time out of mind to take back thirty sheafs of the Tythe-corn and shewed that he was the Owner of the said Farm and that according to the said custom after the Tythes were set forth that he did take back thirty sheafs thereof and thereupon prayed a Prohibition And in this Case it was said by the Court That it ought to be averred that the Farm was a great Farm for otherwise it should be the impoverishing of the Church and would take away a great part of the profit of the Parson
And it was further said by the Court That if there were but thirty Tythe-sheafs in all that the Owner should not have them for then the Custom should be unreasonable And Day was given to the other side to shew Cause why the Prohibition should not be awarded Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 325. GANDEN and SYMMON's Case NOte That where a Juror is not challenged by one party who had sufficient cause of challenge and afterwards is challenged by the other side and afterwards the party doth release his challenge in that case the first party cannot challenge the same Juror again because he did foreslow his time of challenge and he had admitted the party for to be indifferent at the first Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 326. The Bishop of CHICHESTER and STRODWICK's Case IN an Action of Trespass for taking away of Timber and the Boughs of Trees felled The Defendant as to the Timber pleaded Not guilty And as to the Boughs he made a special Justification That there is a Custom within the Mannor of Ashenhurst in the County of Sussex That when the Lord fels or sels Timber-trees that the Lord is to have only the Timber and that the poor Tenants in Coscagio parte Manerii time out of mind have used to have the Branches of the Trees for necessary Estovers to be burnt in necessario focali in terris tenementis And the Opinion of the Court was That the Custom was not well expressed to have Estovers to burn in terris tenementis for that Estovers cannot be appertaining to Lands but to Houses only And therefore whereas the Defendant in the Case did entitle himself to a house and lands and gave in Evidence that the Custom did extend to Lands it was holden that the Evidence did not maintain the Issue And the Custom was alleadged to be That the Lord should have Quicquid valeret ad maremium and that the Freeholders should have ramillos Which as Hobart Chief Justice said is to be meant all the Arms and Boughs for whatsoever is not maremium is ramillum 2. It was holden in this Case That the Non-use or Negligence in not taking of the Boughs did not extinguish nor take away the Custom as it hath been oftentimes resolved in the like case And note that in this Case to confirm the said Custom the Book-case was cited which is in 14. E. 3. Fitz. t' Bar. 277. and the same was given in and avowed for good Evidence where the Case was That the Bishop of C. which shall be intended the Bishop of Chichester brought an Action of Trespass for felling of Trees and carrying them away where the Defendant pleaded That he held a Messuage and a Verge of Land of the Bishop and that all the Tenants of the Bishop within the Manor of A. ought to have all the Windfals of Trees and all the Boughs and Branches c. Which Case as Harris Serjeant conceived was the Case of the very Mannor now in question and the Tenant there as in this Case made a special Justification and there it was holden that it was good and adjudged for the Defendant Also in that Case it was adjudged That the Lord should have Maremium and that the Tenants should have Residuum which shall be intended the Boughs and Branches And the Custom in the Case was adjudged good But because the Defendant alleadged the Custom to be to have the same as Estovers to be burned in terris and gave Evidence only to the Messuage it was found against the Defendant for that the Evidence did not maintain the Issue Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 327. VAUGHAN's Case IN a Formedon in the Discender the Tenant had been essoined upon the Summons and also upon the View And after was pleaded Ne dona pas the general issue and thereupon issue was joyned And if he might be essoined again after issue joyned was the Question And the Court was of opinion That in a real action the Tenant may be essioned after Issue joyned but not in a personal action by the Statute of Marlebridge And Hobart Chief Justice said That the Statute of Marlebridge gave not any Essoin but only did restrain Essoins and therefore in real Actions the same is left as it was at the Common Law and by the Common Law the Tenant might be Essoined after Issue joyned And note per totam Curiam That if an Essoin be not taken the first day it shall never after be taken Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 328. CLAY and BARNETS Case IN an Ejectione Firme the Case was this Sir Godfrey Foliamb had issue James his son who had issue Francis And Sir Godfrey Foliamb was seized in Fee of divers Lands as well by purchase as by discent in sundry Towns viz. Chesterfield Brampton c. in the Tenures of A. B. C. c. and dyed James Foliamb his son 7 E. 6. made a Conveyance of divers Lands to Francis Foliamb being his younger son in haec verba viz. Omnia mea Mesuagia terras tentam in Chesterfield Brampton c. modo in tenuri of the said A. B. C. quae pater meus Galfrid Foliamb perquesivit from divers men whom he named in certain And also convey a House called the Hart to the same Francis which came to him by discent by the same Conveyance which was in the occupation of one Celie and not in the Tenures of the said A. B. C. And the great Question upon the whole Conveyance was Whether all the Lands which he had by Discent in the said Towns and in the Occupations and Tenures of the said A. B. C. did pass or only the purchased Lands And it was resolved by the whole Court That the Conveyance did pass only the Lands which he had by purchase except only the said House which was precisely named and conveyed and did not pass the Lands which he had by Discent For if all the Lands which he had by Discent should pass by the general words then the special words which passed the House which he had by Discent should be idle and frivolous and that was one reason ex visceribus causae that only the purchased Lands did pass 2. It was said by Justice Warburton That if a man giveth all his Lands in D. in the Tenures of A. B. and he hath Lands in D. but not in their Tenures that in that case all his Lands in D. passeth So if a man give all his Lands in D. which he had by Discent from his son there all his Lands whatsoever shall pass Hobart acc ' and said That if a man gives all his Lands in the County of Kent if he have Lands within the County they do pass And he said that in a Conveyance every restriction hath his proper operation and in the Conveyance in the principal case there were three restrictions 1. All his â—ands in such Towns viz. Chesterfield Brampton c. 2. All his lands in the
resolved That although the Award was void as to that part yet for the residue it stood good and therefore for not performance of the same the Bond is forfeited As if J. be bounden to perform the Award of J. S. for White-Acre and that he award that I enfeoffe another of White-Acre and that he give unto me Ten pounds If I tender unto him a Feoffment of White-Acre and he refuseth it and will not give to me the 10l. I shall have an Action of Debt upon the Bond as it is adjudged in Osborn's Case C. 10. par 131. The same Law If J. S. and J. N. submit themselves unto the Award of J. D. who awardeth that J. S. shall surcease all suits and procure J. N. to be bounden with a stranger and make a Feoffment of his Mannor of D. which is a thing out of the Submission In that case there are three things enforcing the Arbitrement the first is only good the second is against the Law and the other is out of the Submission yet being in part good it ought to be performed in that otherwise the Bond is forfeited But this Case was put If J. be bounden to stand to the Award of A. ita quod it be made de super premissis and afterwards A. maketh an Award but of part of the premises there it is void in all because it is not according to the authority given unto him And afterwards in the principal Case Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 353. DOCKWARY and BEAL's Case IN an Essex Jury The opinion of the Court was That Wood will passe by the name of Land if there be no other Land whereby the words may be otherwise supplied Also it was agreed That the Tenant for Years might fell Underwoods of 25 years growth if the same hath used to be felled Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 354. WROTESIEY and CANDISH's Case ELizabeth Wrotesley did recover Dower 6 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas in which Writ she demanded tertiam partem Manerii de D. eum pertinaciis Nec non tertiam partem quarundam terrarum jacent in Hovelan And upon Ne unque seise que Dower the parties were at issue and the Venire facias awarded de Hovelan And it was found for the Plaintiffe and Judgment was given for her And Candish the Defendant brought a Writ of Error in the Kings Bench and assigned for Error That it was a Mis-trial For that the Venire facias ought to have been de Manerio and not of Hovelan 6 H. 7. 3. 11 H. 7. 20. C. 6 par â— 19 H. 6. 19. 19 E. 4. 17. Yet the Councel of the Defendant moved That the Trial was good for the Land in Hovelan And it being found that the Husband was seised of the Mannor of D. that now the Trial was good for the whole Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 355. COWLEY and LEGAT's Case COwley brought an Audita quaerela against Legat and the Case was this Cowley and Bates bound themselves in a Bond of 200l. jointly and severally to Legat And afterwards 6 Jacobi Legat brought an action of Debt upon the Bond against Bates and had Judgment and 7 Jacobi the said Legat brought Debt against Cowley in the Kings Bench upon the same Bond and obtained Judgment and afterwards he sued forth Execution upon the first Judgment by Elegit and had the Land of Bates who was Tenant thereof only for another mans life in Execution and afterwards he took forth a Capias ad satisfaciendum against Cowley upon the Judgment in the Kings Bench And thereupon Cowley brought an Audita quaerela containing in it all the whole matter And the opinion of all the Justices was That the Audita quaerela was well brought And first it was holden That when a man may plead the matter in bar he shall not have an Audita quaerela upon the matter because it was his lachess that he did not take advantage of it by way of plea. But secondly in this Case it was said That he could not have pleaded the special matter and therefore as to that point the Audita quaerela was well brought But the onely doubt in the Case was Whether Legat the Defendant might have a new Execution by Capias ad satisfaciendum after that he had Execution against one of the Obligers by Elegit and the doubt was because the Judgments upon which he grounded his Executions were given at several times and in several Courts and against several persons For it was agreed by the whole Court That a Capias doth not lie after Execution sued by Elegit against the same person but after a Capias an Elegit is grantable And the reason of the difference is because upon the prayer to have an Elegit it is entred in the Roll Elegit sibi executionem per medietatem terrae so as he is estopped by the Record to have another Execution but upon a Capias nothing at all is entred upon Record Yet Cook Chief Justice said That it is the common practice of a good Attorney to deferre the entry in the Roll of Execution upon an Elegit until the Sheriffe hath retorned it served And in such case it was agreed That if the Sheriffe retorn upon the Elegit That the party hath not Lands c. then the party may take forth a Capias Also the Elegit is in it self a satisfactory Execution and by the Common-Law a man shall have but one Execution with satisfaction And therefore at the Common-Law if after Execution the Land had been evicted the party had no remedy And Cook said If part of the Land be evicted the party shall not have remedy upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 5. to which Crook Justice agreed And the Court held it to be no difference although that the Judgments were given in several Courts against persons several and at several times and where it is but one Judgment against one person Vide the Case 43 E. 3. 27. where in Debt the Defendant said That the Plaintiffe had another Action for the same Debt depending in the Exchequer by Bill Judgment c. And by Mowbray and Finchden cleerly it is a good plea although it be in another Court And Dodderidge Justice said That in the first case the said Legat might sue the said Cowley and Bates severally and after Judgment he might choose his Execution against which of them he pleased But he could not have Execution by Elegit against them both And therefore he said That although there be an Eviction of the Land or that the Judgment be reversed by Error after that he hath Execution against one by Elegit yet Legat could not have Execution against the other for by the first Execution he had determined his Election and he could not sue the other which Cook agreed Mich. 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 356. FOX and MEDCALF's Case IN a Writ of Accompt brought in
â—uaere whether it be a good Plea because it doth amount to the general issue of Not guilty Curia avisare vult And v. Tompsons Case 4 Jac. in the Kings Bench It was adjudged that it was no good Plea Hill 6 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 370. PAGINTON and HUET'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme the Case was this That the Custome of a Manor in Worcestershire was That if any Copyholder do commit Felony and the same be presented by twelve Homagers That the Tenant should forfeit his â—opyhold And it was presented in the Court of the Mannor by the Homage That Hâ—â—t the Defendant had committed Felony But afterwards at the Asâ—ises he was acquitted And afterwards the Lord seised the Copyhold And it was adjudged by the Court that it was no good Custom because in Judgment of Law before Attaindor it is not Felony The second point was Whether the special Verdict agreeing with the Presentment of the Homage That the party had committed Felony did entitle the Lord to the Copyhold notwithstanding his Acquital Quaere For it was not resolved Mich. 7 Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 371. THe Custom of a Mannor was That the Heirs which claimed Copy-hold by Discent ought to come at the first second or third Court upon Proclamations made and take up their Estates or else that they should forfeit them And a Tenant of the Mannor having Issue inheritable beyond the Seas dyed The Proclamations passed and the Issue did not return in twenty years But at his coming over he required the Lord to admit him to the Copyhold and proffered to pay the Lord his Fine And the Lord who had seised the Copyhold for a Forfeiture refused to admit him And it was adjudged by the whole Court That it was no Forfeiture because that the Heir was beyond the Seas at the time of the Proclamations and also because the Lord was at no prejudice because he received the profits of the Lands in the mean time Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 372. A Copyholder in Fee did surrender his Copyhold unto the use of another and his heirs which surrender was into the hands of two Tenants according to the custome of the Mannor to be presented at the next Court. And no Court was holden for the Mannor by the space of thirty years within which time the Surrenderor Surrenderee and the two Tenants all dyed The heir of the Surrenderor entred and made a Lease for years of the Copyhold according to the Custome of the Mannor And it was adjudged per Curiaâ—â— That the Lease was good Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 373. FROSWEL and WEICHES Case IT was adjudged That where a Copyholder doth surrender into the hands of Copy-Tenants That before Presentment the Heir of the Surrenderor may take the profits of the Lands against the Surrenderee For no person can have a Copyhold but by admittance of the Lord. As if a man maketh Livery within the view although it cannot be countermanded yet the Feoffee takes nothing before his entry But it was agreed That if the Lord doth take knowledge of the Surrender and doth accept of the customary Rent as Rent due from the Tenant being admitted that the same shall amount unto an Admittance but otherwise if he accept of it as a duty generally Mich. 5 Iacobi in the Exchequer 374. IT was adjudged in the Exchequer That where the King was Lord of a Mannor and a Copyholder within the said Mannor made a Lease for three lives and made Livery and afterwards the Survivor of the three continued in possession forty years And in that case because that no Livery did appear to be made upon the Endorsment of the Deed although in truth there was Livery made that the same was no forfeiture of which the King should take any advantage And in that case it was cited to be adjudged in Londons case That if a Copy-Tenant doth bargain and sell his Copy-Tenement by Deed indented and enrolled that the same is no forfeiture of the Copyhold of which the Lord can take any advantage And so was it holden in this Case Pasch 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench 375. FRANKLIN'S Case LAnds were given unto one and to the heirs of his body Habendum unto the Donee unto the use of him his heirs and assignes for ever In this â—ase two points were resolved 1. That the Limitation in the Habendum did not increase or alter the Estate contained in the premisses of the Deed. 2. That Tenant in Tail might stand seised to an use expressed but such use cannot be averred Hill 13 Iacobi in the Chancery 376 WINSCOMB and DUNCHES Case VVInscomb having issue two sons conveyed a Mannor unto his eldest son and to the daughter of Dunch for life for the joynture of the wife the Remainder to the 〈…〉 The son having no issue his Father-in-law Dunch procured him by Deed indented to bargain and sell to him the Manner The Bargâ—ynor being sick who died before enrolment of the Deed within the 〈…〉 Deed â—ot being acknowledged And 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 coming to be enrolled the Clark who enrolled the same did proâ—â—â—e Waâ—â—â—nt from the Master of the Rolls who under-â—â—â— upon the Deâ—◠〈◊〉 the Deed be enrolled upon Affidavit made of the delivery of the Deed by one of the Witnesses to the same And afterwards the Deed was eâ—â—â—â—d within the six moneths And the opinion of the Court wasâ— That 〈◊〉 Conveyance was a good Conveyance in Law And therefore the younger brother exhibited his Bill in Chanchery pretending the Conveyance to be made by practice without any Consideration Mich. 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 377 LUDLOW and STACIâ—S Case A Man bargained and sold Land by Deed indented bearing date 11 Junii 1 Jacobi Afterwards 12 Junii The same year Common was granted â—nto the Bargainee for all manner of Cattell commonable upon the Land 15 Junii theâ— Deed of Bargain and Sale was enrolled And it was adjudged a good grant of the Common And the Enrolment shall have Relation as to that although for collaterall things it shall not have relation Hill 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 378. NOte that it was held by Dodderidge Justice and Mountagu Chief Justice against the opinion of Haughton Justice That if Lessee for years covenanteth to repair and sustein the houses in as good plight as they were at the time of the Lease made and afterwards the Lessee assigneth over his Term and the Lessor his Reversion That the Assignee of the Reversion shall maintain an Action of Covenant for the breach of the Covenants against the first Lessee Hill 15 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 379. SMITH and STAFFORD'S Case A Man promised a Woman That if she would marry with him that if he dyed and she did survive him that he would leave unto her 100â— They entermarried and then the husband dyed not performing his promise The wife sued the Executor of her husband upon the said promise And whether the
puisne or the lesser Debt and although the Debtor be able and sufficient to pay both Debts viz. the Kings Debt and the Debt owing to the Subject yet the Kings Debt is to be first paid Now to apply these cases to the Case in question Here is a Subject who is indebted to the King And I say That the Lands which such a Debtor hath in his power and dispose although he hath not any Estate in the Lands shall be liable to pay the Debt to the King And I say That Sir Christopher Hatton had a Fee in the Mannors and Lands in this case And although he did convey them bona fide yet untill his death by reason of the Proviso of Revocation they were extendable Trin. 24. E. 3. Rot. 4. Walter de Chirton Customer who was indebted to the King for the Customs purchased Lands with the Kings monies and caused the Feoffor of the Lands to enfeoffe certain of his friends with an intent to defraud and deceive the King and notwithstanding he himself took the profits of the Lands to his own use And those Lands upon an Inquisition were found and the values of them and retorned into the Exchequer and there by Judgment given by the Court the Lands were seized into the Kings hands to remain there untill he was satisfied the Debt due unto him And yet the Estate of the Lands was never in him But because he had a power viz. by Subpena in Chancery to compell his Friends to settle the Estate of the Lands upon him therefore they were chargeable to the Debt You will say perhaps there was Covin in that Case But I say that neither Fraud Covin nor Collusion is mentioned in the Report in Dyer 160. C. 11. par 92. And that Case was a harder Case then our Case is For Walter de Chirton in that Case was never seised of the said lands But in our Case Sir Christopher Hatton himself had the lands And when he had the lands he was assured of the Office although he had not the possession of it For he was sure that no other could have it from him and no other could have it but himself And for another cause our Case is a stronger Case then the Case of Walter de Chirton For Chirton had no remedy in Law to have the lands but his remedy was only in a Court of Equity and a remedy in Consc ' onely But in our Case Sir Christopher Hatton had a time in which he might let the land to passe and yet he had a power to pull it back again at his pleasure So as he had the disposition of it but before the alteration of the uses he dyed And if he had been living being indebted to the King the King might have extended the lands because that then he had the possession of them There were two Considerations which moved Sir Christopher Hatton to Convey the Lands the first was honorable viz. For the payment of his Debts the second was natural viz. For the preferment of his Children Although the Conveyance of the Lands for payment of his Debts was but for years yet the same was too short like unto a Plaister which is too short for the sore For the Covenanters were not his Executors and so they were not liable to Debts And although he be now dead and cannot revoke the former uses yet he had the power to revoke the uses during his life And so he was chargeable for the Debt due to the King Tanfield Chief Baron agreed with Justice Dodderidge in all as before And he said That all powerful and speedy courses are given unto the King for the getting in of his Revenues and therefore he said he had the said Prerogatives as have been recited And in 25 E. 3. in libro rubro in the Exchequer there the Foundations of the said Prerogatives do appear If a common person arrest the body in Execution he shall not resort to the lands contr to Blumfields Case C. 5. par The course of the Exchequer makes a Law every where for the King If any Officer be indebted unto the King and dyeth the course of the Exchequer is For to call in his Executors or the Heir or the Terre-Tenants to answer the Debt and if he hath no lands then a Writ issueth out of the Exchequer to know what goods he had and to whose hands they be come All Inquisitions concerning Lands in the like Cases are Habuit vel seisitus and not that he was seised onely The word Habuit is a large word and in it is contained a disposing power But in this Case Sir Christopher Hatton had a power every day to revoke the uses And when he had once revoked them then was he again as before seisitus 7 H. 6. in the Exchequer the Kings Farmor had Feoffees to his use and dyed indebted to the King And upon an Inquisition it was found that Habuit for he had them in his power by compelling his Feoffees by Equity in Chancery and therefore it was adjudged that the King should have the Lands in the Feoffees hands in extent But in this case Sir Christopher Hatton might have had the Lands in him again without compulsion by a Court of Equity for that he had power to revoke the uses in the Conveyance at his pleasure Mich. 30. H. 6. rot in the Exchequer A Clark of the Court was assigned to receive monies for the King who had Feoffees of lands to his use And the lands were found and seised for the Kings monies by force of the word Habuit 32 H. 6. Philip Butler's Case who was Sheriffe of a County being indebted to the King his Feoffees were chargeable to the Kings debt by force of the word Habuit For habuit the lands in his power 6 E. 4. Bowes Case acc ' 34 H. 6. A widow being indebted to the King her Feoffees were chargeable to pay the Kings debt because she had power of the lands It being found by Inquisition that habuit 1 R. 3. the like Case And 24 Eliz. in Morgan's Case it was adjudged That lands purchased in the names of his Friends for his use were extended for a debt due by him to the King Hobart Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas argued to the same purpose and agreed with the other Justices and he said in this case it was not material whether the Inquisition find the Deed to be with power of Revocation For he said that the Land is extended and that the extent remains good untill it be avoided And he said that a revocable Conveyance is sufficient to bind the Parties themselves but not to bind the King but the Lands are lyable into whose hands soever they come When a man is said to forfeit his body it is not to be intended his life but the freedom of his body Imprisonment At the Common Law a Common person could neither take the bodie nor the Lands in Execution But yet at the Common Law
removed but if the VVrit of Error want only form but is sufficient for the matter in substance the VVrit shall not abate but the partie may have a new VVrit of Error coram vobis residet c. Trin. 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 464. MILL's Case ACtion upon the Case for these words Thou hast Coyned Gold and art a Coyner of Gold Adjudged the Action will not lie for it may be he had Authority to Coyn and words shall be taken in mitiori sensu Pasch 3 Car in the Kings Bench. 465. BROOKER's Case THe question was VVhether the Feoffee of the Land might maintain a VVrit of Error to reverse an Attaindor by Vtglary and the Case was this William Isley seised in Fee of the Mannor of Sundridge in Kent had issue Henry Isley who was Indicted of Felony 18 Eliz. and 19. Eliz. the Record of the Indictment was brought into this Court and thereupon 20 Eliz. Henry Isley was outlawed William Isley died seised Henry Isley entred into the Mannor and Land as son and heir and being seised of the same devised the Mannor and Lands to C. in Fee who conveyed the same to Brooker and Brooker brought a Writ of Error to reverse the Outlawry against Henry Isley Holborn argued for the King and said that Brooker was no way privy to the attaindor of Henry Isley but a meer stranger and therefore could not maintain a Writ of Error And first he said and took exception that he had not set himself down Terre-Tenant in possession Secondly he saith in his Writ of Error That the Mannor and Lands descended to Henry Isley as son and heir when as he was attainted The third exception was That he saith that Henry Isley did devise the Lands and that he could not do because he was a person Attainted Fourthly he said that Brooker was not Tenant so much as in posse 4 H. 7. 11. If it were not for the words of Restitution the partie could not have the mean profits after the Judgment reversed 16 Ass 16. Lessee for years pleaded to a Precipe and reversed it the question was whether he should be in statu quo vi Librum for it is obscure If this Attaindor of Henry Isley were reversed yet it cannot make the devise good For there is a difference betwixt Relations by Parliament which nullifie Acts and other Relations Vi. 3 H. 7. Sentlegers Case Petition 18. The violent Relation of Acts of Parliament If a Bargain and Sale be the Inrollment after will make Acts before good but a Relation by Common Law will not make an Act good which was before void C. 3. part Butler and Bakers Case A gift is made to the King by Deed enrolled and before the enrollment the King granteth away the Land the Grant is void yet the enrollment by Relation makes the Lands to pass to the King from the beginning Admit in this Case that Brooker were Terre-Tenant yet he is not a party privy to bring a Writ of Error to reverse the Attaindor of him who was Tenant of the Land and I have proved That although the Attaindor were reversed yet he hath nothing because the Devise was void and is not made good by Relation It is a rule in our Books that no man can bring a VVrit of Error but a partie or privy 9 E. 4. 13. 22 E. 4. 31 32. 9 H. 6. 46. b. Ass 6 C. 3. part in the Marquiss of Winchesters Case The heir of the part of the mother cannot have the VVrit of Error but the heir of the part of the father may So if erronious Judgment be given in the time of profession of the eldest son and afterwards he is dereigned he shall have the Writ of Error In 22 H. 6. 28. The heir in special taile or by Custom cannot have Error But yet M. 18 Eliz. in Sir Arthur Henninghams Case it was adjudged That the special heir in tail might have a Writ of Error The Baile cannot maintain a Writ of Error upon a Judgment given against the Principal because he was not privy unto the Judgment therefore it shall be allowed him by way of plea in a Scire facias I never find that an Executor can have Error to reverse an Attaindor but for the misawarding of the Exigent Marshes Case was cited C. 5. part 111. Fitz 104. Feoffee at the Common Law could not have an Audita Quaerela in regard he was not privy 12 Ass 8. 41. Keâ—laway 193. There the Terre-Tenant brought a Writ of Error in the name of the heir and not in his own name 24 H. 8. Dyer 1. There it is said That he who is a stranger to the Record shall have Error To that I answer That he in the Reversion and the particular Tenant are but one Tenant for the Fee is demanded and drawn out of him But in the principal Case at Barr no Land is demanded but a personal Attaindor is to be reversed Also there it is put That if the Conusee extend before the day there it is said that the Feoffee may have Error 17 Ass 24. 18 E. 3. 25. Fitz. 22. To that I answer That the Feoffee is privy to that which chargeth him for the Land is extended in his hands and if the Feoffee there should not have a Writ of Error the Law should give him no manner of remedy for there the Conusor himself cannot have Error because the Lands are not extended in his hands Also it is there said that the Feoffee brought a Scirefacias against him who had execution of the Land To that I answer That that is by special Act of Parliament Also there it is said That if the Parson of a Church hath an Annuity and recovereth and afterwards the Benefice is appropriated to a Religious house the Soveraign of the house shall have a Scirefacias I answer That in that Case he is no stranger for that he is perpetual Parson and so the Successor of the Parson who recovered 12 H. 8. 8. There a Recovery was against a Parson and there Pollard said that the Patron might have Error I answer That Pollard was deceived there for it is said before that the Parson hath but an Estate for life and then he viz. the Patron is as a Recoverer who shall have a Writ of Error Dyer 1. But the Parson hath the Fee and therefore Pollard was mistaken as it appeareth by Brook Fauxi fier de Recovery 51. 19 H. 6. 57 Newton A false verdict is had against a Parson the Patron cannot have an Attaint There is a difference if one be partie to the Writ although not partie to the Judgment Error 72. A Quare Impedit was brought by the King against the Patron and the Incumbent and Judgment only was had against the Patron and the Incumbent Parson brought a Writ of Error but if he had not been partie to the Writ he could not have maintained Error So in Attaint the partie to the Writ though not to the Judgment shall
reasonable Herbage Here the Grant is not De omnibus grossis arboribus bonis catellis Felonum and of the Goods of Felons themselves and in the former Patent these were granted and so the Grant is for the Kings benefit and to the prejudice of the Patentee Also this Patent is ad proficuum Domini Regis For here is a Rent reserved and here is a Proviso for the committing of Waste in the premisses which were not in the first Letters Patents and in these Letters Patents there are divers Covenants which were not in the former Patents and so it is in forma sequente And so the Lease of Philip and Mary is good The King seised of a Manor to which he hath a Park doth grant the Stewardship of the Manor and the Custodie of the said Park with reasonable Herbage Afterwards in the same Letters Patents hee grants the said Manor of O. and all the Lands in O. excepting grosse trees in the Park If this Grant be not good for the Manor it is not good for the Park that was the Objection It is good for the Manor and also for the Park It was objected That the King grants the custody of the Park and so not the Park it selfe for how can the King grant the custody of the Park if he grant the Park it selfe it is dangerous that upon an implication in one part of a Patent the expresse words which follow should be made void the subsequent words in this Case are The King grants the Manor and all the Lands to the same belonging now the Park doth belong to it and the King excepts only the Deer C. 10 part 64. The King at this day grants a Manor unto a man as entirely as such a one held the same before it came into his hands c. the Advowson doth passe without words of grant of the Advowson for the Kings meaning is That the Advowson shall passe The meaning of the King is manifest in our Case C. 3. Part 31 32. Carr's Case There the Rent was extinct betwixt the Parties yet for the benefit of the King for his tenure it hath continuance for a thing may be extinct as to one purpose and in esse as to another purpose 38. Ass 16. a Rent extinct yet Mortmain Dyer 58 59. The Exception ought to be of the thing demised In our Case the Park doth passe but the King shall have the liberties in it and so here the Park shall passe and the Exception is of the liberties Com. 370. the Exception ought to be of that which is contained in the former words in the former Patents the Offices were first granted and in the same Letters Patents the Manor was afterwards granted But now King James grants the Manor first and then the Offices Construction of Statutes ought to be secuncundùm intentionem of the makers of them and construction of Patents secundùm intentionem Domini Regis C. 8. part 58. You ought to make such a construction as to uphold the Letters Patents C. 8. part 56. Auditor Kings Case There the Letters Patents were construed secundùm intentionem Domini Regis and adjudged good But to make void the Patent they shall not be construed secundùm intentionem but to make a Patent good they shall be construed secundùm intentionem Domini Regis The Case was adjourned till Michaelmas Terme next Note I have heard Sir Henry Yelverton say That it was the opinion of the Judges in this Case That he had but the custody of the Park and not the interest of the Park for that by the acceptance of the custody of the Park when he had a Lease of the Park before it was a surrender of his Lease Trinit 21. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 492 SHORTRIDGE and HILL's Case SHortridge brought an Action upon the Case against Hill for ravishing of his Ward and the Writ was contra pacem without the words Vi armis Lib. Dent. 366. where three Presidents are of Actions upon the Case without Vi armis An Action upon the case for doing of any thing against a Statute must be contra pacem Ley Chief Justice Recovery in this Action may be pleaded in Barre in a Writ of Ravishment of Ward brought Dodderidge Justice The Action of Trespasse at the common Law is only for the taking away of the Ward and here he hath elected his Action at the common Law and then he shall not have an Action upon the Statute viz. a Ravishment of Ward but here the Action upon the Case is brought for the taking and detaining of the Ward so as he cannot preferr him in marriage and upon this speciall matter the Action upon the Case lieth without the words Vi armis A Writ of Ravishment of Ward ought to be brought in the Common Pleas but yet you may bring a Writ of Ravishment of Ward in this Court if the Defendant be in the custody of the Marshal of the Marshalsey for in such special Case it shall be brought in this Court if there be an extraordinary matter besides the Trespass then an Action upon the Case lieth as when A. contracts with B. to make an estate unto B. of Bl. Acre at Michaelmas if C. enter into Bl. Acre A. may have an Action upon the Case against C. for the speciall damage which may happen to him by reason that he is not able to perform that contract by reason of the entry of C. and he shall declare contra pacem but not Vi armis Trinit 21. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 493 BAKER and BLAKAMORE's Case IN Trespass the Defendant pleaded That J. S. being seised in Fee gave the Lands unto Baker and the Heirs of his body and conveyed the Lands by descent to four Daughters and Blakamore the Defendant as servant to one of the Daughters did justifie The Plaintiff did reply That the said J. S. was seised in Fee and gave the same to Baker and the Heirs Males of his Body and conveyed the Land by descent to himself as Heir Male absque hoc that J. S. was seised in Fee Henden Serjeant did demur in Law upon the Replication and took Exception to the Traverse for that here he traverseth the Seisin of J. S. whereas he ought to have traversed the gift in tail made by J. S. for the being seised is but an inducement not traverseable and therefore he ought to have traversed the gift in taile for then he had traversed the seisin for he could not give the Lands in tail if that he were not seised thereof in Fee L. 5. E. 4 9. there in Formedon the Tenant would have traversed the Seisin of the Donor but the book is ruled that the Traverse ought to be of the gift in tail and that includes the Seisin Bridgment for the Plaintiffe and said That the Serjeant is of opinion contrary to the Books when he saith positively that you ought to traverse the gift in tail and not the seisin of the Donor
of the Justices was That the Fee was executed for a moitie Manwood If the Land be to one for life the Remainder for yeers the Remainder to the first Tenant for life in Fee there the Fee is executed so as if he lose by default he shall have a Writ of Right and not Quod ei deforceat for the term shall be no impediment that the Fee shall not be executed As a man may make a lease to begin after his death it is good and the Lessor hath Fee in possession and his wife shall be endowed after the Lease And I conceive in the principall case That the term shall not be extinct for that it is not a term but interesse termini which cannot be granted nor surrendred Mounson If he had had the term in his own right then by the purchase of the Fee the Term should be extinct But here he hath it in the right of another as Administrator Dyer If an Executor hath a term and purchaseth the Fee the term is determined So if a woman hath a term and takes an husband who purchaseth the Fee the term is extinct Manwood The Law may be so in such case because the Husband hath done an act which destroyes the term viz. the purchase But if the woman had entermarried with him in the Reversion there the term should not be extinguished for the Husband hath not done any act to destroy the term But the marriage is the act of Law Dyer That difference hath some colour But I conceive in the first case That they are Tenants in common of the Fee Manwood The Case is a good point in law But I conceive the opinion of Manwood was That if a Lease for yeares were to begin after the death surrender forfeiture or determination of the first lease for yeares that it shall not begin in that part for then perhaps the term in that part shall be ended before the other should begin Pasc 20. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 3. A Man seised of Copyhold land descendable to the youngest Son by Custome and of other Lands descendable to the eldest Son by the common Law leaseth both for yeers The Lessee covenanteth That if the Lessor his wife and his heirs will have back the land That then upon a yeers warning given by the Lessor his wife or his heirs that the Lease shall be void The Lessor dieth the Reversion of the customary Land descends to the younger son and the other to the eldest who granteth it to the younger and he gives a yeers warning according to the Covenant Fenner The interest of the term is not determined because a speciall heir as the youngest son is is not comprehended under the word Heir but the heir at common Law is the person who is to give the warning to avoid the estate by the meaning of the Covenant But Manwood and Mounson Justices were cleer of opinion That the interest of the term for a moity is avoyded for the Condition although it be an entire thing by the Descent which is the act of Law is divided and apportioned and the warning of any of them shall defeat the estate for a moity because to him the moity of the Condition doth belong But for the other moity he shall not take advantage by the warning because that the warning is by the words of the Condition appointed to be done by the Lessor his wife or his heirs And in that clause of the Deed the Assignee is not contained And they agreed That if a Feoffment of lands in Borough-English be made upon condition That the heir at common Law shall take advantage of it And Manwood said that hee would put another question Whether the younger son should enter upon him or not But all Actions in right of the Land the younger son should have as a Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment Attaint and the like quod nota Pasc 22. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 4 IT was holden by Meade and Windham Justices of the Common Pleas That a Parsonage may be a Mannor As if before the Statute of Quia emptores terrarum the Parson with the Patron and Ordinary grant parcel of the Glebe to divers persons to hold of the Parson by divers Services the same makes the Parsonage a Manor Also they held That a Rent-Charge by prescription might be parcel of a Manor and shall passe without the words cum pertinentiis As if two Coparceners be of a Manor and other Lands and they make partition by which the eldest sister hath the Manor and the other hath the other Lands and she who hath the Lands grants a Rent-charge to her sister who hath the Manor for equality of partition Anderson and Fenner Srjeants were against it Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 5. THis Case was moved by Serjeant Periam That if a Parson hath Common appendant to his Parsonage out of the lands of an Abby and afterwards the Abbot hath the Parsonage appropriated to him and his Successors Whether the Common be extinct Dyer That it is Because he hath as high an estate in the Common as he hath in the Land As in the case of 2 H. 4. 19. where it is holden That if a Prior hath an Annuity out of a Parsonage and afterwards purchaseth the Advowson and then obtains an Appropriation thereof that the Annuity is extinct But Windham and Meade Justices conceived That the Abbot hath not as perdurable estate in the one as in the other for the Parsonage may be disappropriated and then the Parson shall have the Common again As if a man hath a Seignorie in fee and afterwards Lands descend to him on the part of the Mother in that case the Seignory is not extinguished but suspended For if the Lord to whom the Land descends dies without issue the Seignorie shall go to the heir on the part of the Father and the Tenancy to the heir on the part of the Mother And yet the Father had as high an estate in the Tenancy as in the Seignory And in 21 E. 3. 2. Where an Assize of Nusance was brought for straightning of a way which the plaintif ought to have to his Mill The defendant did alledg unity of possession of the Land and of the Mill in W. and demanded Judgment if c. The plaintif said that after that W. had two daughters and died seised and the Mill was allotted to one of them in partition and the Land to the other and the way was reserved to her who had the Mill And the Assize was awarded And so by the partition the way was revived and appendant as it was before and yet W. the Father had as high an estate in the Land as he had in the Way Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 6. A Man makes a Feoffment in Fee of a Manor to the use of himself and his Wife and his heirs In which Manor there are Underwoods usually to be cut every one and twenty yeers and
the Justices did agree that the assignement was good but that the two assignees could not work severally but together with one stock or such workmen as belonged to them both And Cook who reported the opinions of the Justices was of Counsel with the Lord Mountjoy And note in that case it was said That Proviso being coupled with other words of covenant and grant doth not create a Condition but shall be of the same nature as the other words with which it is coupled Pasch 25. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 25. WEBBE and POTTER'S Case In an Ejectione firme the Case was this JOhn Harris gave Land in Frankmarriage to one White And the words of the Deed were Dedi concessi I. W. in liberum maritagium Joannae filiae suae Habendum eidem J. W. haeredibus suis in perpetuum tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis fâ—odi c. with warranty to the Husband and his heirs Periam Justice although the usuall words of gift in Frankmarriage are not observed yet the Frankmarriage shall not be destroyed for the usuall words are In liberum maritagium cum Joanna filia mea in the ablative case And it was holden by all the Justices that notwithstanding that the Frankmarriage was good Also a gift in Frankmarriage after the espousals is good as it was holden by all the Justices And see Fitz. Tit. Taile 4. E. 3. and 2. H. 3. Dower 199. And he said That a gift in Frankmarriage before the Stat. of Donis c. was a Feesimple but now it is but a special tail and if it should not be in law a gift in Frankmarriage then the Husband and Wife have an estate but for their lives for they cannot have an estate taile for that there are not words of limitation of such estate in the gift And hee cited 4. E. 3. and 45. E. 3. 20. to prove his opinion and hee much relyed upon the intent of the Donor which ought to be observed in construction of such Gifts according to the Statute And because the Habendum is repugnant to the premisses and would destroy the Frank-marriage it is void and the premisses shall stand good and to prove that he cited 9. E. 3. 13. E. 1. 32. E. 1. Tit. Taile 25. 3. H. 4. by Hill And he took this difference Where a Remainder is limited upon a Gift in Frankmarriage to a stranger and where it is limited to one of the Donees for in the first case the Remainder is good for the benefit of the stranger but in the second case it is void And he said that if a Rent be reserved upon such a Gift that it should be void during the four degrees but afterwards the Reservation should be good And if the Donor grant the Reversion over and the Donee in Frank-marriage attourn now he shall pay rent to the Grantee for by Littleton he hath lost the Priviledg of Frankmarriage viz. the Aquitall and no privitie is betwixt the Grantee and the Donees 10. Ass 26. 4. H. 6. That it is not any taile if it be not Frankmarriage Windham Justice Although it be no estate in Frankmarriage yet is it an estate taile and he cited 8. E. 3. although there want the word Heirs Also if a man give lands to another semini suo it is good 45. E. 3 Statham taile If it be not Frankmarriage yet it is a good estate in taile 19. Ass Land was given to Husband and Wife in Frank-marriage infra annos nubiles and afterwards they are divorced the Wife hath an estate in taile Meade Justice did agree with Windham and said That although there be not any Tenure nor any Aquitall yet it may be a good Frankmarriage as if a Rent Common or Reversion be given in Frankmarriage it is good and yet there is not any Tenure nor aquitall Dyer Chief Justice conceived That it is not Frankmarriage because that the usuall words in such Gifts are not observed for he said that the gift ought to be in liberum Maritagium and not Joannae filiae suae for that is not the usuall form of the words And he said That if the word Liberum be omitted that it is not Frankmarriage for that he said is as it were a Maxime and therefore the usuall words ought to be observed And by the same reason such a Gift cannot be with a man but ought to be with a woman also such a Gift ought to be with one of the blood of the Donor who by possibilitie might be his Heir Also there ought to be a Tenure betwixt the Donor and Donee and also an Aquitall And if these grounds and ceremonies be not observed it is not Frankmarriage Also if it once take effect as a Frankmarriage and afterwards the Donor granteth the Reversion over or if the Reversion doth descend to the Donees yet it shall not be utterly destroyed but shall remaine as an estate taile and not as an estate for life because it once took effect in the Donees and their issues as a Frankmarriage 31. E. 1. taile 116. If a man give lands in Frankmarriage the remainder to the Donees and the heirs of their bodies yet it is a good Frankmarriage And if a man give Lands in Frankmarriage the Remainder to another in taile it shall not destroy the Frankmarriage because that the Donor hath the Reversion in Fee in himself and the Donees shall hold of him and not of him in the Remainder in taile but if the Remainder had been limited to another in Fee simple then it had been otherwise Also if the Donor grant the Services of the Donees in Frankmarriage reserving the Reversion to himself it is no good Grant although that the Donees attourne for that the Services are incident to the Reversion but if he grant the Reversion then they do passe And he concluded That the Husband had the whole and that the Wife had nothing for she was no purchaser of the premisses because that the Gift did not take effect as a gift in Frankmariage And he said that he doth not construe it so by the intent of the Gift for here is an expresse limitation of the Fee to the Husband and his heirs which shall not be contradicted by any intendment for an Intendment ought to give way to an expresse Limitation as a consideration implyed ought to give place to a consideration expressed And afterwards this yeer it was adjudged that it was not a Frankmarriage nor a Gift in taile but that it was a Fee simple And the Justices said that although the old books are That where it takes not effect as a Frankmarriage that yet it shall take effect as an estate taile those Books are against Law But they agreed That where once the Gift doth take effect as a Frankmarriage that by matter ex post facto it might be turned to an estate in taile Pasch 26. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 26. MEade and Windham the other Justices being absent were of opinion That a
agree in the Services Walmesley He shall have the traverse for the mischief which otherwise would follow for if he should traverse the seisin thereby he should confesse the Tenure Periam concessit and said That the difference which is commonly taken in our Books is That where they agree in the Tenure there the Seisin is traversable but where they do not agree in the Tenure there the Tenure is traversable So is 26. H. 8. 6. 7. E. 4. 27. 12. E. 4. 7. 20. E. 4. 16. And he conceived here that the payment at two dayes doth alter the tenure so as now it is another tenure then before Also he said That if Wh. acre and Bl. acre be adjoyning and are holden the one of I. S. and the other of I. D. and I. S. distrein and avow for both acres that he may well traverse the tenure Meade 8. H. 7. 5. a. It is said by Brian That if avowry be made for a tenure of two acres by twenty shillings and the Plaintiffe saith that he holdeth these two and two other acres by twelve shillings without that that he holdeth the two acres by twenty shillings that that is good for that he cannot do otherwise And it is no reason that for a false avowry the Plaintiffe should be at a mischief But the Book is not ruled for Keble is contrary Vide Librum Trinit 26 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 35 SAVELL and CORDELL's Case HEnry Savell Lessee for years of the Manor of M. grants the same Manor Habendum for so many years which should be to come after his death to Cordell Master of the Rolls if Dorothy his Wife so long should live And afterward Henry Savell and he in the Reversion levied a Fine The Case went by many Conveyances further But two points were here moved 1. If it were a good Grant for so many yeers c. Shuttleworth argued that it was But Cooke contrary And Cooke said to that which hath been said That Leases which have uncertain beginning may be by act of matter ex post facto made certain and so good As a lease for so many years as I. S. shall name if he name it is a certain lease but if the Lessor die before I. S. name and after hee name all is void as it is in the Commentaries put by Weston and granted by Dyer 273. And the reason is that it behoves that the interest passe out of the Lessor during his life and the Deed ought to have its perfection in the life of the Lessor But in our case here the Lessor or Grantor is dead before the certaintie of the beginning is known and before any perfection of interest out of him and therefore the reason in the common case 40 Ass and 16. E. 3. that there behoveth to be Attornment in the life of the Lessor proves our case for the reason of that is that it behoveth that some interest passe out of the Lessor or Grantor during his life and that perfection of his Grant be in his life or else the Grant is void Vide 31. E. 3. alb 20. and 33. E. 3. Confirmation 22. If the Chapter confirm the Grant of the Bishop after his death it is void for it ought to have perfection in the life of the Bishop otherwise it is void And upon that reason is the case put by Popham Com. 520. b. That where a man grants all his term which shall be to come after his death that it is a void Grant because no interest passeth during the life of the Grantor And to this purpose is 7. E. 6. Br. Leases 66. Temps H. 8. 339. If a man will take by Livery within the view it behoves the Feoffee to enter during the life of the Feoffor and yet that is a more strong case for by the Livery being a ceremony of the Law it is presumed that the land passed and yet there ought to be an entry to fortifie the Grant otherwise it is void The second point was If by the Fine levyed the possibilitie aswell as the right of possession of the term did passe And I conceive that it doth therefore we see in many cases a man may grant by his Deed a possibility to come As 19. H. 7. 1. where a man seised in the right of his Wife made a Feoffment in see and after they had issue and the Wife died that he should not be Tenant by the Courtesie and yet the Wife was remitted but by his own Grant he had granted from him the possibility he might have had to be Tenant by the courtesie And here If Cordell had entered and made a Feoffment in fee or levied a Fine the possibility which he had to have the term had been cleerly gone 39. H. 6. 43. If I disseise my Eather and make a Feoffment in fee and afterwards my Father dieth although that a new Right descends unto me yet I shall be barred of this possibilitie which I had at the time of the Grant But otherwise it had been if this discontinuance or grant had been defeated by entry or otherwise in my life by my Father or any other in that case I may shew the speciall matter as 15. E. 4. 5. is and so avoid my own Deed. And 44. E. 3. 4. is That tenant for years and he in the Reversion disclaim and it is holden a good Disclaimer which proves that a possibility may also pass by Disclaimer And 21. E. 3. and 35. H. 6. is That if he who hath cause to have a Writ of Error if he enter into the Land and make a Feoffment the Writ of Error is gon for ever so by these Cases it is proved and appeareth That a Possibility may passe by grant And so in the Principall Case the Possibility to have the terme is by this Fine granted and the Grant is a good Grant And it was adjourned Pasch 26. Eliz. in the Kings Beneh 36. LUDDINGTON and AMNER'S Case Intratur Mich. 25. Eliz. Rott 495. IN a Writ of Error the Case was this Perepoynt possessed of a Lease for 99 years devised the same unto his Wife for Life and that after her Decease that it should go to his Children unpreferred the Wife took Sir Thomas Fulster to her Husband and the Lease was put in Execution by Fiery facias for the Debt of Sir Thomas Fulster and afterwards Sir Thomas died and the Wife died The Administrators of Sir Thomas Fulster did reverse the Judgement upon which the Lease was taken in Execution And afterwards A. the Daughter of Perepoynt entred supposing her selfe to be the only Daughter of Perepoynt alive unpreferred by her Father in his life time And the Pleading was That the Wife of Perepoynt was his Executrix and that she entred into the Lease after the death of Perepoynt Virtute legationis donationis praedict Cook There is a difference in our Books That the Devise of the Occupation of a Term may be with the Remainder over but not a Devise
contract was determined and not in esse at the time of promise But he said it was otherwise upon a consideration of Marriage for that is alwayes a present consideration and alwayes a consideration because the party is alwayes married Windham to the same intent and compared it to the Case of 5. H. 7. If one sell an horse to another and after at another day will warâ—ant him to be good and sound of limb and member it is void warranty for it ought to have been at the same time that the horse was â—old Periâ—m Justice contrary for he said This case is not like to any of the cases which have been put because there is a great difference betwixt Contracts and this Action For in Contracts the consideration and promise and sale ought to concur because a Contract is derived of con trahere which is a drawing together so as in Contracts every thing requisite ought to concur as the consideration of the one side and the promise or sale of the other side But to maintain an Assumpsit it is not requisite for it is sufficient if there be any moving cause or consideration precedent for which cause or consideration the promise was made and that is the common practice at this day For in Assumpsit the Declaration is That the Defendant for and in consideration of ten pounds to him paid postâ—a silicet a day or two after super se assumpsit c. and that is good and yet there the consideration is executed And he said that Hunt and Baker's case which see 10. Eliz. Dyer 272. would prove it The case was this The Apprentice of Hunt was arrested when Hunt was in the Country and Baker one of Hunts neighbours to keep the Apprentice out of the Counter became his Baile and paid the debt Afterwards Hunt returning out of the Country thanked Baker for his neighbourly part and promised him to repay him the said summ Upon which Baker brought an Action upon the Case upon the promise And it was adjudged that the Action would not lie not because the consideration was precedent to the promise but because it was executed and determined long before But there the Justices held That if Hunt had requested Baker to have been surety or to pay the debt and upon that request Baker paid the debt and afterwards Hunt promiseth for that consideration the same is good for the consideration precedes and was at the instance and request of the Defendant So here Sydenham became bail at the request of the Defendant and therefore it is reason that if he be at losse by his request that he ought to satitfie him And he conceived the Law to be cleer that it was a good consideration and that the request is a great help in the Case Rodes Justice agreed with Periam for the same reasons and denyed the Case put by Anderson And he said That if one serve me for a year and hath nothing for his service and afterwards at the end of the year I promise him ten pounds for his good and faithfull service ended he may maintain an Assumpsit for it is a good consideration But if the servant hath wages given him and the Master ex abundantia as he said promiseth him ten pounds after his service ended the same promise shall not maintain an Assumpsit for there is not any new cause or consideration preceding the Assumpsit And Periam agreed to that difference and it was not denyed by the other Justices but they said that the principall Case was a good case to be advised upon and at length after good advice and deliberation had of the cause they gave Judgment for the Plaintiff that the Action would lie And note That they very much relyed upon Hunt and Bakers Case before cited See Hunt and Baker's Case in 10. Eliz. Dyer 272. Pasc 27. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 41 CARTER and CROST's Case CArter brought an Action of Detinue of a chaine against Crosts and declared That Thomas Carter his brother was thereof possessed and died Intestate for which cause the Bishop of Cork granted him Letters of Administration and that the Chain came to the Defendants hands by Trover c. And declared also That he was as Administrator thereof possessed in London To which the Defendant Crosts pleaded the Generall Issue and the Jury gave a speciall Verdict and found that the Administration was committed to Carter in London by the Bishop of Cork in Ireland here and did not find that Carter was possessed of the chain in London And upon this special Verdict first it was moved That the Bishop of Cork in Ireland being in England might commit administration of things in Ireland And it was held cleerly by the Court That he might of things within his Diocesse in Ireland because it is an Authority Power or Matter that followes his Person and wheresoever his Person is there is his Authority As the Bishop of London may commit Administration being at York but it ought to be alwaies of things within his Diocesse and therefore they held That the Declaration was good in that point That the Bishop of Cork did commit Administration in London although there be no such Bishop of England The second point was If an Aministrator made by a Bishop of Ireland might bring an Action here as Administrator and it was holden That he could not because of the Letters of the Administration granted in Ireland there could be no triall here in England although that Rodes Justice said That Acts done in Spirituall Courts in Forrain places as at Rome or elsewhere the Law saith That a Jury may take notice of them because such Courts and the Spirituall Courts here make but one Court and he proved it by the Case of the Miscreancy in 5. R. 2. Tryall 54. where a Quare Impedit was brought by the King against the Clerk of a Church within the Bishopprick of Durham and counted that the Bishop who is dead presented his Clerk and that the Clerk died and the Chapter collated a Cardinall who for Miscreancy and Schisme was deprived the Temporalties being in the Kings hands Burgh He hath counted of an Avoidance for Miscreancy at the Court of Rome which thing is not tryable here Belknap Chief Justice I say for certain That this Court shall have Conusans of the Plea and that I will prove by Reason for all Spirituall Courts are but one Court and if a man in the Arches be deprived for a Crime and appeal to Rome and is also there deprived that Deprivavation is triable in the Kings Court in the Arches And if a man be adhering unto the Kings enemies in France his Lands are forfeitable and his adherence shall be tryed where his Land is as oftentimes it hath been for adherence to the Kings enemies in Scotland And so by my faith if one be Miscreant his Land is forfeitable and the Lord thereof shall have the Escheat and that is good reason For if a man
who is out of the Faith of the King shall forfeit his Land for the same à forâ—iori he who is out of the faith of God and that he swore to be Law Whereupon Burgh said Respondes ouster And so saith Fitzherbert Tryal 54. by that Plea and Judgement Miscreancy and Deprivation at Rome shall bee tryed here And there the Venire facias was awarded to the Sheriffe where the Church was and not to the Bishop of Durham and so the Miscreancy and Deprivation shall bee tryed where the Church is The third Point was Whether an Administrator might count of his own Possession although he was never possessed and the whole Court were of Opinion that he might if the Intestate at the time of his death was possessed The Administrator may declare of Goods taken out of his owne Possession although he was never possessed for of transitory things the Law casts upon him a sufficient possession to maintain an Action Possessory as the Lord before seisin may have a Ravishment of Ward c. But otherwise it is if one take the Goods of the Intestate out of his Possession before he dieth for then but only a bare right comes to the Administrator And that is to bee meant when the Goods are taken Transgressivè and not Destrictivè The fourth Point was Whether the Jury might find matter done out of the Realme and if that should abate the Writ or not And they held also cleerly That upon a generall Issue the Jury may find a Forrain matter as a thing done out of the Realme but it shall not abate the Writ if it be not matter of substance and pleaded before But here the finding of the Letters of Administration is more then they had in Issue and also is but matter of Evidence for the substance in this Case was the Possession and not the Administration for he might have an Action of his Possession without shewing the Letters of Administration And afterwards Judgement was given for Carter the Plaintiffe Mich. 27. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 42. FUTTER aud BOOROMES Case THE Case was that the Queen by her Letters Patents anno 12. of Reign ex certa scientia mero motu c. did grant to B. totam illam portionem decimarum Garbarum in L. in Com. Norf. unà cum omnibus aliis decimis suis cujuscunque generis speciâ—i fuâ—rint in L. nuper in possessione Johannis Corbet or his Assigns nuper Abath dâ— Wenly pertinent c. And in facto the Parsonage of L. was parcell of the Abby of Wenly and out thereof was a portion appertaining to another Church And this Rectorie came unto the Queen by the Statute of dissolution of Abbyes The question was whether the Rectorie do pass by the Grant totam illam portionem there being also words in the Patent viz. Non obstante any misnosmer misrecital or other such things which are recited in the Statute for confirmation of Patents Hamon the Grant is good for this word portion shall not be said a thing severed from the Church and Rectorie And all the Tythes are parcel of the Rectorie for as 44. E. 3. 5. is before the Councel of Lateran a man might give his Tythes to what Church he pleased And when any thing is given to the Church it is a portion belonging to the Church as the Glebe is which is but a clod of Earth which is parcel of the Rectorie and a portion of it And a case in this Court in the time of this Queen was argued and there in a Rectorie there were many Priests and each of them knew his portion so as they were called portionary Priests which was in respect they had each of them interest in the Church and not because their portions were severed each from the other And 22. E. 4. 24. by Pigot it is said If a Parson hath any Tythes in another Parish as appertaining to his Church it is called a portion so as portion is not meant that which is severed by it self as in gross But by portion is meant all the Tythes appertaining to the Rectorie or the Rectorie it self For as 22. Ass 9. is If the King have Tythes of those Lands which lie out of any Parish if he grant totam portionem decimarum c. I conceive that the Tythes shall pass thereby And yet it is a thing severed from other Tythes but it doth contain all the qualitie of Tythes in that place And also if the King grant his Rectorie of D. to J. S. saving to him the Tythes and afterwards grants totam portionem Decimarum c. I conceive cleerly under correction that the Tythes shall pass And in the principal case If the Tythes shall not pass by this word portion yet the Non obstante in the Letters Patents de male nominando c. shall make it to be a good grant and that so the Tythes shall pass thereby We are also to consider if by any words subsequent in the Patent the grant be not good viz. by these words cum omnibus aliis Decimis c. in tenura occupatione Johannis Corbet c. Whereas in truth John Corbet was never Occupier of them And as to that I conceive That the words before cumâ—omnibus c. passe the Tithes And that the words after shall not abridge or controle the largeness of the precedent words and to that purpose is the Case 39. E. 3. 9. of the Grant of the King to the Earle of Salisbury c. In the end of which Grant were these words Quas nuper concessimus patri c. although that the thing granted was never granted to the Father yet the Grant was good and not restreined by those words coming after 2. E. 4. A Release was pleaded of a right which the party had in Lands of the part of his Father c. there although he had the Land from the part of his Mother yet the Release was good In the Case of the Bishop of Bath and Wells which was lately argued in the Exchequer Chamber There it was agreed That if the King grant a Faire in such a place or elsewhere in the County of Somerset if he mistake the County in putting one County for another yet the Grant is good and all that coming after the alibi shall be void He further argued That all the matter appearing by speciall Verdict is not well found for the Jury find That no Tithes were in the Occupation of John Corbet at the time of the Grant and no mention is in it that they were not in his Occupation nor in the Occupation of his Assignes for they might be in the Occupation of his Assigns although that they were not in his own Occupation For in a Verdict if it strongly imply any thing not expressed as in the Case of Trivilian where the Jury found a devise of Land without saying That the Land was holden in Socage it is a good finding of the Jury for no devise
any remedy in this Court. Also he saith That he hath paid but doth not shew where and the other may say nâ—n solvit and so an issue shall be and no place from whence the Visne shall come Godfrey contrary If one be a lay man and the other a spirituall man then the tryall shall be at the common Law as it is holden 31. H 6. and 2. E. 4. And the defendant here is a lay man who makes prescription of a Modus decimandi for the discharge of Tithes in kind As to that which Cook said That he prescribes that he hath used to pay to the Parson and doth not say That it was due to the Parson and if he pay the Vicars Tithes to the Parson he doth wrong to the Vicar He saith That he hath paid and used to pay 4d. to the Parson in full satisfaction c. and reddâ—ndo singula singâ—lis it is good enough As to the doublenesse or repugnancy of the Prescription he said That the prescription is set forth according to the truth of the matter As to the place for that no issue can be taken upon it he answered That he conceived the issue will bee upon the Custome or Modus decimandi And Gawdy Justice agreed to that Suit Justice There is no Modus decimandi alledged for when he saith That he hath paid to the Parson that which the Vicar demands that is no answer Gaudâ— Justice The prescription is repugnant as Cook said and he said That the herbage is for all Kine as well for those which have Calves as those which have not No Prohibition granted Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 64. WINDSMORE and HULBORD's Case THe Case was this A man gave lands to J. S. Habendum to him and to three other for their lives â—t eorum diutius viventi successivè The question was What estate J. S. had and if after his life there were any occupancy in the Case Cooke That J. S. had an estate but for his life onely because he cannot have an estate for his life and for the life of another where the interest commenceth both in praesenti but he may have an estate for his own life in present interest and the remainder thereof for anothers life But this Habendum by no means can create a Remainder And he said that as a Lease to one for life Habendum to him primogâ—nito filio suo was no Remainder primogenito filio although some held to the contrary So a Lease for years Habendum to him and to another was no Remainder to the other Also the word successivè doth not make a Remainder as 30. H. 8. Br. Joynâ—ts 53. where a Lease for life to three or for yeers to three Habendum successivè yet they have a joynt estate and successivè is void for he said It is uncertain who shall have it first and who secondly Also one cannot have an estate for his own life and for the life of another at the same time in present interest for the greater will drown the lesser But if the greater be in praesenti and the lesse in futuro as a lease for his own life the Remainder to him for another mans life it is otherwise As a lease for his own life the Remainder for yeers is good But if I make a lease to you for your own life and 100 years both to begin at the same time the Lease for yeers is drowned and an estate for his own life is greater then an estate for anothers life and shall drown the estate for anothers life Vide 19. E. 3. Surr. 8. where Tenant for life of a Manor did surrender to Tenant for life in Reversion And 12. H. 7. 11. and Perkins 113. That if there be a Lease for life to one the Remainder to another for life and the Lessee for life doth surrender to him in the Remainder it is good So Dyers Reports A lease is made to one for the term of another mans life without impeachment of Waste the Remainder to him for his own life he is now punishable for waste for the first estate is surrendred Gaudy Justice If a lease be made to one for his life and so long as another man shall live quaere what estate he hath 2. If there can be any Occupancy in the Case for if the estate be void the limitation upon the estate is void therefore if the estate for the other mans life be drowned in the estate for his own life that can be no Occupancy Also the Occupancy is pleaded That such a one entred and doth not say claiming as occupant For if one come hawking upon the land he shall not by such entry be an Occupant and in the book of Entries it is pleaded that he entred clayming as Occupant Clenche Justice Every Occupancy ought to be in possession for otherwise the Law casts the interest of it upon him in the Reversion But Gaudy and Suit Justices were utterly against him in that for then they said there should be no occupancy if the party were not in by Lease or such like means Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 65. DIKE and DUNSTON'S Case IN an Action of Trespasse brought the defendant did justifie as Lessee to the Lord Mountagu and said that the Lord Mountagu for him and his Farmors had used to have a way over the land in which the trespass is supposed to be done And that by rooting of a cart wheel the way was so digged and drowned that he could not so wel use his way as before and that therefore he did fill up the cart roots and digged a trench to let out the water upon which the plaintiffe did demur in law For 15. H. 7. is that a Commoner cannot meddle with the soil so is 12. 13. H. 8. So he who hath Warren in the land of another man cannot meddle with the soile and as to that that he could not use his way so well as before it is not good for he ought to have said That he could not use his way at all otherwise the plea is not good As 6. E. 4. One is to lop his tree and he cannot do it unless it fall upon the Land of another there he may well justifie the felling of it upon the others Land because otherwise he could not lop it at all So if I give to one all the fish in my Pond he cannot dig a Trench to draw out the water unlesse he cannot otherwise take the fish as with Nets c. Also he justifies by reason that the Lord Mountagu for him and his Farmors c. And he was a Lessee and paid no rent therefore no Farmor Cowper contrary He shall not have an Action of Trespass for it is no losse or hinderance unto him but it is for his profit for the Land is the worse being drowned with water If a man do disseise me and fells trees upon the Land and doth repair the houses in an
Assize brought against him the same shall be recowped in damages because that which was done was for his Commodity also it is incident to one who hath a way for to mend it All Prescriptions at the first did begin by Grants And if one grant to me his trees the Law saith That I may come upon the Land to fell them and carry them away off from the Land and I shall not be a Trespassor And by 9. E. 4. and Perkins If one grant to me liberty to lay a Conduit Pipe in his Land I may afterwards mend it toties quoties it shall want mending 32. E. 3. If one grant to me a way if he will interrupt me in it I may resist him and if he dig Trenches in the way to my hinderance in my way I may fill them up again The books of 12 13. H. 8. are not adjudged If Lessee for years be of a Meadow he may dig to avoid the water and may justifie so doing in Waste brought against him But it was said That in that Case the Lessee hath an interest in the soil so hath not he who claims the way in this Case Clenche Justice held That he could not dig the Soile Then the Defendant demanded What remedy he should have Suit Justice If he went that way before in his shooes let him now pluck on his boots Gawdy The pleading is not good for he saith That he could not use his way so well as before which is not good but he ought to plead that he could not use the way at all Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 58 IN an Ejectione firme The party ought to set forth the number of the Acres for although he give a name to the Close as Green Close or the like it is not sufficient because an habere facias seisinam shall be awarded But in Trespasse the same may be Quare clausum suum fregit c. without naming the number of the Acres And so it was said it was adjudged in a Shropshire Case Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 67. IN an Action upon the Case because that the Defendant had made a Gate in one Towne for which he could not go to his Close in another Town Cook took Exception that the Writ was Vi armis and it was agreed per curiam that for that cause it was not good Also the Visne was of one Towne only whereas it should have been of both for he said That in Hankford and Russels Case The Nusance was laid in one Town per quod his Mill in another Town could not grinde and upon Not guilty pleaded the Visne came from one Town only and it was adjudged that it was not good Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King Bench. 68 JOHN JOYCE'S Case AN Action upon the Case was brought against John Joyce Inn-keeper of the Bell at Maidstone in Kent for not scowring of a Ditch which ran betwixt the house of the said John Joyce and of another man and Judgement was given for the Plaintiffe against the Defendant Joyce and a Writ of Error was brought to reverse the Judgement and divers Errors were assigned The first Error which was assigned was That the Plaintiffe doth prescribe That all the Inhabitants of the Bell c. had used to scowre the Gutter c. And it was said That that was no good forme of prescription as in 12. H. 4. 7. Br. Presâ—ription 16. Where the Plaintiffe said That the Defendant omnes alii tenuram illam priushabentes mundare debuere consuevere talem fossatam and therefore the Writ was abated for it ought to have been quod ipsi praedecessores sui de tempere cujus contrarium c. Or that such a one and his Ancestors or Predecessors whose Estate the Defendant hath c. Also if a Copy-holder prescribe That he and all his Tenants tenementi praedict ' have used to have estovers in such a Wood c. it is not good but he ought to prescribe in the Manor The second Error was That the Prescription was uncertain for it is That all Tenants c. which extendeth to Tenants in Fee in Taile for Life or years and the Prescription is the foundation and ground of the Action and therefore it ought to be certain As if one make Title for entry for Mortmaine he ought to shew that he hath entred within the year and day 7. E. 6. Br. Prescription 69. It is holden That Tenant for years or at will cannot prescribe for common for the prescription ought to be alledged in the Tenant of the Free hold or to alledge a Corporation or the like In reason Tenant for years cannot prescribe for his Estate hath a certain beginning and a certain end therefore it is not of long continuance The third Error was That the Plaintiffe hath not alledged That the Defendant was Tenant at the time of the Action brought as in the Case of Clerkenwell and Black-Friâ—rs where the Plaintiffe brought his Action upon the Case for that the Defendant had turned the course of the water of a Conduit Pipe and the Declaration was Quod cum querens seisâ—â—us existat and doth not say existitit and so the Plaintiffe was not supposed Owner of the Scite and Messuage of Black-Friers but only at the time of the Action brought and not at the time of the diversion of the Water But Judgement was given and Error brought upon it The fourth Error was Because it was for scowring a Gutter betwixt the houses c. and doth not say That the house was contigue adjacens to his house 22. H. 6. Where Cattell escape into the Plaintiffs Close and thereupon Trespasse brought the Defendant said That it was for want of Fence of the Plaintiffs Close and it was holden no Plea if he do not say that the Plaintiffes Close was adjacens Clench Justice The Prescription ought to be That such a one and all those whose Estate he hath c. have used for them and their Farmors to repair the Gutter Cowper When the Prescription runs with the Land then he may prescribe in the Land as all those who have holden such Lands have used to scowre such a ditch and the same is good Gawdy Justice If he had said All those who had occupied such a house had used to scowre it had been good Godfrey If a man will alledge a Prescription or Custome he ought to set forth That it was put in use within time of memory In the Prescription of Gavelkind the party ought to shew that the Land is partable and so hath been parted Also he prescribed That omnâ—â— illi qui tenuerunt and doth not alledge a Seisin but by way of Argument Suit Justice held the pleading not good because the words were not contigue adjacens And for these causes the first Judgment was reversed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 69 GOMERSALL and GOMERSALLS Case IN an Action of Account the Plaintiffe charged
Bench. 70 GILE'S Case A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Judgement given in an Action upon the Case The Action upon the Case was brought against one Quare exaltavit stagnum per quod suum pratum fuit inundatum and he pleaded Not guilty and the Jury found Quod erexit stagnum and if Errectio be Exaltatio then the Jury find that the Defendant is guilty and thereupon Judgement was given for the Plaintiffe Glanvile alledged the generall Error That Judgement was given for the Plaintiffe where it ought to have been given for the Defendant And he said That erigere stagnum est de novo facere Exaltare est erectum majoris altitudinis facere Deexaltare is ad pristinam altitudinem adducere prosternere stagnum est penitus tollere And the precise and apt word according to his Case in an Action upon the Case ought to be observed that he may have Judgement according to his damage and his complaint viz. either Deexaltare or Posternere c. 7. E. 3. 56. An Assize of Nusans Quare exaltavit stagnum ad nocumentum liberi tenementi sui The Defendant pleaded That he had not inhaunced it after it was first levyed And by Trew There is not any other Writ in the Chancery but Quare exaltavit stagnum Herle said That he might have a Writ Quare levavit stagnum and there by that book Levare stagnum exaltare stagnum do differ And therefore he conceived That the Writ should abate for using one word for another 8. E. 3. 21. Nusans 5. by Chauntrell In a Writ of Nusans Quare levavit if it be found that it was tortiously levied the whole shall be destroyed But in a Writ Quare exaltavit nothing shall be pulled down if it be found for the Plaintiffe but the inhauncing shall be abated only So 8. Ass 9. Br. Nusans 17. the same Case and difference is put and 16. E. 3. Fitz. Nusans 11. If the Nusans be found in any other forme then the Plaintiffe hath supposed he shall not recover And in 48. E. 3. 27. Br. Nusans 9. The Writ was Quare divertit cursum aquae c. and shewed that he had put Piles and such things in the water by which the course of the water was streitned wherefore because he might have had a Writ Quare coarctavit cursum qquae the Writ was holden not to be good Cook took another Exception viz. That the Assize of Nusans ought to be against the Tenant of the Free-hold and therefore it cannot be as it was here brought against the Workmen and it is not shewed here that the Defendant was Tenant of the Soil for 33. H. 6. 26. by Moile If a way be streitned and impaired an Action upon the Case lieth but if it be altogether stop'd an Assize of Nusans lieth But Prisoit said If the stopping be by the Terr-Tenant an Assize of Nusans lieth but if it be by a Stranger then an Action upon the Case but for common Nusanses no Action lieth but they ought to be presented in the Leet or Turne Drew We have shewed That he who brought the Assize of Nusans hath a Free-hold in the Land and if the Tenant be named it is sufficient although it be not shewed that he is Tenant of the Free-hold And to that all the Justices seemed to incline But then it was shewed to the Court that one of the Plaintiffes in the Writ of Error had released And if that should bar his Companions was another question And it was holden That the Writ of Error shall follow the nature of the first Action and that Summons and Severance lieth in an Assize of Nusans and therefore it was holden that it did the like in this Action therefore the Release of the one was the Release of the other But then it was asked by Glanvile What should become of the Damages which were entire Note Pasch 29. Eliz. the Case was moved again and Drew held exaltare and erigere all one and that erigere is not de novo facere for that is Levare But the Justices were against him who all held That erigere is de novo facere and exaltare is in majorem altitudinem attollere and at length the Judgment was affirmed That Erectio and Exaltatio were all one For the Chief Justice had turned all his Companions when he came to be of Opinion that it was all one And so the Case passed against Glanviles Client Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 71 THE Lady Gresham was indicted for stopping the High-way and the Indictment was not laid to be contra pacem And Cook said That for a mis-feasance it ought to be contra pacem but for a non-feasance of a thing it was otherwise and the Indictment was for setting up a gate in Osterly Park And Exception also was taken to the Indictment for want of Addition for Vidus was no Addition of the Lady Gresham and also Vi armis was left out of the Indictment And for these causes she was discharged and the Indictment quashed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 72. IN an Ejectione firme Exception was taken because the Plaintiffe in his Declaration did not say Extratenet For in every Case where a man is to recover a possession he ought to say extra tenet And in Debt he ought to say Debet dâ—tinet And in a Replevin Averia cepit injustè detinet But all the Justices agreed That in an Ejectione firme those words were not materiall For if the Defendant do put out the Plaintiff it is sufficient to maintain this Action And Kempe Secondary said that so were all the ancient Presidents although of late times it hath been used to say in the Declaration Extra tenet and the Declaration was holden to be good without those words Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 73 IN a Case for Tithes the Defendant did prescribe to pay but ob q for the Tithes of all Willows cut down by him in such a Parish Cooke It is no good prescription for thereby if he cut down all the Willows of other men also but ob q. should be paid for them all But he ought to have prescribed for all Willows cut down upon his own land and then it had been good But as the prescription is it is unreasonable and of that opinion was the whole Court Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 74 DEIGHTON and CLARK'S Case IN an Action of Debt upon a Bond the Condition of the Bond was That whereas the Plaintiff was in possession of such Lands If I. S. nor I. D. nor I. G. did disturb him by any indirect means but by due course of Law that then c. The Defendant pleaded That nec I S. nec I. D. nec I. G. did disturb him by any indirect means but by due course of Law Godfrey The plea in Bar is not good for it is a Negative pregnans viz. such a Negative
not recited in the Statute So here our Case is within the Mischiefe of the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. although it be not within the Example So the Statute of West 1. is That if the Gardien or Lessee for years maketh a Feoffment in Fee Tam Feofator quam feofatus habeantur pro disseisoribus yet 22. Ass is That if Tenant by Elegit make a Feoffment it is within the Statute Also it may be a doubt Whether Land devisable onely by custome bee intended in the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. And whether Land devisable by the Statute of 32. H. 8. be within it or not viz. If a Statute of a puâ—sne time shall be taken by Equity within a more Ancient Statute and I conceive it may as 12. H. 7. the Statue of 4. H. 7. which sayes that the heire of Cestuy que use shall be in Ward shall extend to the Statute of Praerogativa Regis for if he be in Ward to the King he shall have Prerogative in the Lands to have other Lands by reason thereof Gaudy Justice did rely very much upon the word Devisees viz. that they have an Interest and that the Sale was not good Suit Justice They are both Executors and Devisees of the Lands Devisees of the Lands and Executors to performe the Will Cook he who refused to sell cannot waive the Freehold which is in him by a refusall in pars as 7. H. 2. and 7. E. 4. but ought to waive it in a Court of Record therefore he hath an Interest remaining in him Clenche Justice What if he had devised the Lands to four and made one of them his Executors and willed that he should sell could not he sell All the Court agreed that he might Cook When a man deviseth that his Executors shall sell the Fee descends to the heir yet they may sell that which is in another but the same is not like to our Case It was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 93. A Judgement was given upon a Bond for four thousand pound And the Scire facias was sued for three thousand pound and he did not acknowledge satisfaction of the other thousand pound Haughton moved That the Scire facias should abate As if a man brings Debt upon a Bond of twenty pound and shews a Bond for forty pound and doth not acknowledge satisfaction for 20l l it is not good The Justices would advise of it And at another day it was moved againe Whether the Scire facias was good because it doth recite Quod cum nuper such a one recuperasset four thousand pound and doth not shew in what Action or at what day the Judgment was given or the Recovery had Piggot That is not material for such is the Form in an Audita querela or Redisseisin As to the other That he doth not acknowledge satisfaction as in the Case before cited by Haughton which Case is in 1. H. 5. That is not like to an Execution for an Execution is joint or severall at the will of him who sues it forth as in 19. R. 2. Execution 163. hee may have part of his Execution against one in his life time and if he dieth other part against his Heir or Executor Note the Execution was of the whole but because the Defendant had not so much he had but part against him who had no more and therefore of the residue he had Execution against the Heir Gawdy Justice I conceive that he cannot have an Execution unlesse he acknowledge Satisfaction There is no difference as to that betwixt the Action of Debt upon a Bond and a Scire facias and the intendment viz. that it shall be intended that he was paid because he sued but for Three thousand Pound will not help him Piggot as to that vouched a Case out of 4 5. Mary in Dyer which I cannot find Suit Justice said That if the Defendant in the Scire facias say nothing by such a day that Judgement should be entred for the Plaintiffe Quod executio fiet Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 94 JUdgement was given against an Infant by default in a reall Action of Land And a Writ of Error was thereupon brought and it was argued That it is not error for in many cases an Infant shall be bound by a Judicious act as 3. E. 3. Infant 14. Where an Infant and a Feme Covert bring a Formedon and the woman was summoned and severed And it was pleaded That where the Writ doth suppose the woman was Sole she was Covert and Judgment was demanded of the Writ and that the Infant could not gainsay it but confessed it this Confession of the Plea which abated his Writ was taken And 3. H. 6. 10. Br. Saver Default 51. An Infant shall not save his default for he shall not wage his Law See there that the Default shall not be taken against him therefore that book seems rather against it then for it Vide 6. H. 8. Br. Saver Default 50. That Error lieth upon a Recovery by default against an Infant otherwise if it be upon an Action tried so is 2 Mar. Br. Judgment 147. It was said That a generall Act of Parliament shall bind an Infant if he be not excepted The Justices did seem to incline That if Judgement be given by default that it shall bind an Infant but there was no rule given in the Case Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 95 A Clark of the King's Bench sued an Officer of the Common Pleas and he of the Common Pleas claimed his Priviledge and could not have it granted to him for it is a generall rule That where each of the persons is a person able to have Priviledge he who first claimes it viz. the Plaintiffe shall have it and not the Defendant As if an Atturney of the Common Pleas sueth one of the Clarks of the Kings Bench yet he of the Kings Bench shall not have Priviledge although the Kings Bench be a more high Court because the other is Plaintiffe and first claimeth it Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 96 AM Action upon the Case upon a Promise was brought but the Case was so long that I could not take it But in that Case Tanfield who argued for the Defendant said That it is not lawfull for any man to meddle in the cause of another if he have not an Interest in the thing for otherwise it will be Maintenance But if a Custome be in question betwixt the Lord of the Manor and Copy-holder all the other Copy-holders of the Manor may expend their money in maintenance of the other and the Custome and the Master may expend the money of the servant in maintenance of the servant So he in the Remainder may maintain him who hath the particular Estate Maintenance is an odious thing in the Law for it doth encrease troubles and Suites He argued also How that Bonds Obligations and Specialties might be
assigned over how not 34. H. 6. 30. Br. Maintenance 8. If J. S. be indebted to me and I be indebted to J. D. I may assign that Debt to J. D. with the assent of J. S. otherwise not as I conceive And there also another difference is taken That Damages which are to be recovered for Trespass Battery c. cannot be assigned over because they are as yet uncertain and perhaps the Assignee may be a man of great power who might procure a Jury to give him the greator Damages If a Bond be for performance of Covenants contained in an Indenture of Lease if he assign the Lease he may assign the Bond also because they are concomitants and he hath an Interest in the Lease and therefore he may sue the Bond But if the Covenants be first broken and afterwards he assign over the Lease if the Assgnee sue the Bond it is directly Maintenance but if he assign over the Lease and afterwards the Covenants are broken if he sue there it is no Maintenance But if he assign over the Bond and reserve the Lease in his own hands and then the Covenants are broken and the other sue the Bond for the performance of Covenants it is Maintenance And to all that Cook agreed The second Point An Elegit is awarded to the Sheriffe and he extends the Lands and doth not returne it Whether it be a lawfull Execution to the party or not is the question It is a good Execution unlesse the words of the Writ be conditionall for then there must be a returne of the Writ as a Fieri facias must be returned otherwise the Execution is not well done for it is conditionall viz. Ita quod habeas pecuniam in curia c. So is it of a Capias ad satisfaciendum Ita quod habeas corpus hîc But an Elegit is not conditionall Yet Kemp the Secondary said That in the end of the Elegit is Et de eo quod inde feceris nobis in dicta cancellaria tali die ubicunque tunc fuerit sub Sigillo distinctè apertè constare facias c. And so is the forme of the Writ in Fitz. Nat. Br. 266. Tanfield That is true but it doth not make the Writ conditionall but that is the Entry of the Court and the Sheriffe and not the Entry of the Party and the Sheriff 11. H. 4. 59. by Hankford who was a man of great knowledge and lived in learned times If the Recognisee of a Statute Merchant sueth Execution of it although the Writ be not returned and the Recognisee hath Execution and afterwards the Recognisor purchaseth other Lands and afterwards the Recognisee comes and saies That the Writ is not returned and sues forth another Writ the Recognisor shall have an Audita querela in that Case and shall surmise in Fact how that execution was done by the first Writ and yet there is no Record that execution was done by the first Writ So 19. E. 3. Briefe 370. A Writ issued to have Execution in forty Towns and an Extent was made and delivered of Lands in forty Towns and the Return made mention but of Execution in eight Towns and therefore the Party would have had a new Writ and the other Party was received to averre against the Record of the Returne that the Extent was in forty Towns 12. E. 3. Scire facias 117. Upon an Elegit the Sheriffe returned extendi feci and did not say deliberavi and in truth he did deliver the Lands in extent and therefore he could not have a new Execution 20. Eliz. betwixt Colsill and Hastings Colsill had an extent upon the Lands of Hastings and the Sheriffe being a friend to Hastings did not deliver full Possession to Colsill but gave him Possession in one part in the name of all the others Hastings continued Possession of all the rest and being upon Election of new Sheriffs Colsill was not over hasty to put him out for he was in hope to have a more favourable Sheriffe and the first Writ was not returned and there being a new Sheriff he sued forth a new Writ to have Execution The Defendant said That he had before sued forth the like Writ and had Execution And Colsill said That the first Writ was not returned and yet the Opinion of the whole Court was That it was a good Execution and so it was ruled but the Case was overthrown afterwards upon another Point So the Earle of Leicester had a Statute extended upon the Land of Mr. Tanfields Mother and it was not returned and yet when he would have sued forth another Execution he could not have it allowed him by the rule of the Court because the first Execution was a good Execution although it were not returned 15 Eliz. It was the Case of the Countesse of Derby who married the Earle of Kent in an Habere facias seisinam in a Writ of Dower Execution was served but not returned and therefore she prayed a new Writ but could not obtain it because the first was well executed although it was not returned So also was the Lord Morleyes Case in the Kings Bench in 28. Eliz. the Writ was not returned and yet the Execution was well done And therefore he concluded That the Execution was good although the Writ was not returned Cook contrary An Elegit ought to be returned and it is void if it be not returned As to the Case before cited of 19. E. 3. which began 9. E. 3. 450. And all the other Cases put out of the old Books They are upon extents of Statutes and there is a great difference betwixt an Elegit and Extents upon Statutes as 15. H. 7. 14. It was agreed That where a man recovers Debt or Damages or hath a Recognisance forfeit unto him his Executors shall not have Execution without a Scire facias first sued contrary upon a Statute Staple or Merchant and the like if the Defendant dieth the Plaintiffe shall not have an Execution by Fieri facias against his Executors but he must first have a Scire facias So if the Court change as if the Record cometh into the Kings Bench by Error and Judgement be affirmed the Plaintiffe who recovered shall not have a Fieri facias against the Defendant but must first have a Scire facias But otherwise it is of a Statute like the Case of 14. H. 7. 15. Br Execution 59. The Case of 12. E. 3. doth not speak of Elegit but of Statutes and Extents Also the Elegit and the Extent differ in the Entrie for the Elegit hath a speciall and precise Entry as Elegit sibi executionem c. And a man shall not have a Capias after an Elegit as 15. H. 7. is And being a speciall Entry of Record it ought to be returned for otherwise it doth not appear that Execution is done and so there shall be great mischiefe because infinite Executions may issue forth There is not any Book in the Law directly
in the Point But I will put you as strong a Case A Judgement is given upon an Exigent by the Coronor yet by 28. Ass 49. If there be no Returne of the Exigent it is no sufficient Out-lawry and one Pleaded the same in the plainplaintiffe and said that it appeared by the Record and vouched the Record and because the Exigent was not returned it was not allowed And so was the Case of Procter and Lambert 4 5. Philip and Marie adjudged As to the Reports which are not printed vouched by Tanfield eâdem facilitate negantur quâ affirmantur Upon an Elegit if there be goods sufficient the Sheriff is not to meddle with the Lands and if there be not sufficient goods yet hee is not to meddle with the beasts of the plough If a man have an Authoritie and he doth lesse then his Authoritie all is void as here the Return of the Writ is part of his Authority As 12. Ass 24. If a man have a letter of Atturney to make Livery and Seisin to two and he makes it to one all is void and he is a disseisor to the Feoffor So 4. H. 7. If he have a letter of Atturney to make Livery of three Acres and he makes onely Livery of two Acres and not of the third Acre it is void for the whole Also the Elegit is Quod extendi facias liberari quousque the Debt be satisfied and therefore if the land be extended onely and there be no delivery made of the land ut tenementum suum liberum according to the Writ then there is no execution duly done And in the principall Case there was no delivery made of the land It was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 97 STRANSAM against COLBURN STransam brought a Writ of Error against Colburne upon a Judgment given in a Writ of Partitione facienda and divers Errors were assigned The first Error assigned was That the party doth not shew in his Writ nor in his Declaration upon what statute of Partition hee grounds his Action And there are two Statutes viz. the Statute of 31. H. 8. chap. 1. and the Statute of 32. H. 8. chap. 32. And yet hee groundeth his Action upon one of the Statutes As 3. H. 7. 5. Where the servants of the Bishop of Lincoln were indicted of Murder eo quod ipsi in Festo Sancti Petri 2. H. 7. felonicè apud D. murdraverunt c. and because there are two Feasts of Saint Peter viz. Cathedrae Ad vincula therefore the Indictment was not good 21. E. 3. One brought a Cessavit by severall Precipes viz. of one Acre in D. and of another in S. and of the third in Villa praedicta and because it was uncertain to which praedict shall be referred it was not good 5. H. 7. Br. Action upon the Statute 47. An Information was in the Exchequer for giving of Liveries and the partie did not declare upon what Statute of Liveries and Exception was taken to it and the Exception was not allowed because that the best shall be taken for the King but if it had been in the Case of a common person it had not been good So if a man bring an Action against another for entry into his Land against the forme of the Statute it is not good because hee doth not shew upon what Statute hee grounds his Action Whether 8. H. 6. which gives treble damages or 2. H. 2. which gives Imprisonment and single damages The second Error which was assigned by Weston was That the Declaration doth shew Quod tenet pro indiviso and doth not shew what estate they held pro indiviso And there is a Statute which gives Partition of an estate of an Inheritance viz. 31. H. 8. Cap. 1. And another which gives partition for years or for life and he doth not shew in which of the Statutes it is As if one claime by a Feoffment of Cestuy que use as 4. H. 7. is he ought to shew that the Cestuy que use was of full age at the time of the Feoffment c. for it is not a good Feoffment if he be not of full age So here he ought to shew that he is seized of such an estate of which by the Statute he may have a Writ of Partition For in many Cases there shall be Joynt-Tenants and yet the one shall not have a Writ of Partition against the other by any Statute As if a Statute Merchant be acknowledged to two and they sue for the execution upon it I conceive that the one shall not have partition against the other So if two Joynt-Tenants bee of a Seignorie and the Tenant dieth without heir so as the Lands escheat to them they are Joynt-Tenants and yet Partition doth not lye betwixt them by any Statute Therefore one may be seised pro indiviso and yet the same shall not entitle him to a Writ of Partition Shuttleworth contrary The Statute doth not give any forme of Writ but the Writ which was at the Common Law before And therefore it is not to be recited what kind of Writ he is to have As to the second point It is not necessary to shew the estate because it cannot be intended that he hath knowledge of the estate of the Defendant For if one plead Joynt-tenancy on the part of the Plaintiffe hee shall not shew of whose gift but if the Defendant or Tenant plead Joynt-tenancy of his part he ought to shew of whose gift and how 7. E. 6. Plo. Com. Partridges case In a Case upon the Statute of Maintenance The Plaintiffe may say That he accepted a Lease and shall not be forced to shew the beginning or the end of it or for what years it is In the Case of the Indictment before and the Case of severall Precipes of severall Acres in severall Towns that lyeth in the Plaintiffs Cognisance But here how can the Plaintiffe know the Defendants estate because he may change it as often as he pleaseth and therefore it is uncertain for if before he had a Fee hee might passe away the same unto another and take back an estate for years Also the Plaintiffe hath appeared and pleaded to the Declaration And therefore he shall not have a Writ of Error Gaudy Justice That is not so Shuttleworth True if there be matter of Error apparant Gaudy Justice Cannot you take notice of your own estate Cook The Declaration is not good therefore the Writ of Error is maintainable By the Common Law No partition lieth betwixt Tenants in common as these are And the Statute of 31. H. 8. gives Partition onely of an estate of Inheritance and prescribes also that the Writ shall be devised in the Chancery there he conceived the Ancient Writ is not to be used I grant for a generall rule That if a Statute in a new Case give an old Writ he shall not say Contra formam Statuti because it is not needfull to recite the Statute
or make mention of it And the Statute of 32. H. 8. Cap. 32. sayes That the Writ shall bee devised upon his or their Case or Cases If one bring a Writ upon the Statute of 31. H. 8. It is not necessary to shew of what estate he is seised but de haereditate generally But upon 32. H. 8. he ought to shew of what estate viz. for years or for life As it was in the Case where Sir Anthony Cook and Temple and Wood were parties which Case is in Bendloes Reports Mich. 7. 8. Eliz. which was a great Case twice stood upon and argued And the reason there is given That every Case is not within the Statute and if at the common Law and not within the Statute the Writ shall not be grounded upon the Statute For in the Case before they might have Partition at the common Law as one Co-parcener against the Alienee of the other Co-parcener may have Also he said That severall Judgements are to be given as the Case is upon the severall Statutes for the Judgement upon the first Statute of 31. H. 8. of Inheritances is Sit firma partitio in perpetuum but upon the Statute of 32. H. 8. it is not so for Judgment given upon that Statute shall not bind him in the Reversion for there is a Proviso in the Statute in the end of it That Partition made by force of that Statute shall not be prejudiciall or hurtfull to any persons other then such who be parties to the said Partition their Executors or Assignes But here it is observed That by intendment he cannot have knowledge of his estate Answ That is at his perill For if he cannot have knowledge of his estate there cannot be any Partition upon any of the Statutes If he will have benefit of the Statute he ought to shew that he is within the Statute and if he cannot shew it then it must remaine at the common Law But it hath been objected that we have confessed the Declaration to bee good because we have appeared and pleaded I answer That if the Declaration want substance it shall never bee made good by Plea or Confession But if it want circumstance that perhaps may bee made good by pleading or confession Tanfield contrary Two principall things are alleadged for Errour That the Declaration is uncertaine in the Estate and that it is uncertaine in the Statute I may know my own Estate but not the Estate of my Companion for it is uncertain and he may secretly change it when he pleaseth But then Cook said It must remaine as at the common Law Itane Then farewell Statute for it may easily be defrauded and no use of it for if I cannot know the Estate I cannot have an Action upon the Statute but our Case is better for our Case is that recusat facere partitionem contra formam Statuti in hoc casu provisam and that is according to the Statute for be the Estate an Estate of Inheritance Free-hold or Lease for Years we leave it indifferent to be referred to the consideration of the Law and according as our Case shall fall out Also it is but an Incertainty and you have pleaded to it and therefore it is no Error but I grant that if it were matter of substance that it were Error Yet Fitz. Nat. Br. 21. d. In a Writ of Entrie Sur disseisin if the Originall Writ want these words viz. Quam clamat esse jus haereditatem suam If the Tenant do admit of the Writ and plead to the Action and loseth he shall not assigne the same for Error because he hath admitted the Writ to be good by his Plea So in Detinue of Charters concerning Lands if the Plaintiffe in his Count or Declaration doth not declare the certainty of the Land c. if the Defendant doth admit of the Count or Declaration and plead the Declaration is made good As to the Judgement If the word Inperpetuum be in it either in the one Case or in the other it shall be construed to be but during the Estate In a Writ of Partition there are two Judgements the first That Fiet Partitio Secondly When the Partition is made and returned the Judgement is That stet firma stabilis Partitio Gawdy Justice The Writ is to be devised upon his or their Case or Cases therefore the Party ought to shew his Case in speciall and what Estate he hath And it is no answer that he cannot know the Estate of the Defendant for in a Precipe at the common Law he ought to take notice of the Estate of the Tenant or otherwise his Writ shall abate for the misprision of it for if he bring it against a Termor it is not good And if the Statute of 31. H. 8. had only been made and not the Statute of 32. H. 8. If he had brought a Writ of Partition upon the Statute he ought to have shewed that he had an Estate of Inheritance against whom he brought the Writ Suit Justice agreed with Tanfield in the whole Gawdy was strongly of the other side That he ought to shew within the purview of which Statute he was and if he will enable himself by Law to bring the Writ he must enable himselfe to be within the Law And he said That Temples Case was adjudged as it was accordingly vouched by Cook before Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 98 DENNIE and TURNER's Case AN Action was brought upon the Statute of 5. Eliz. for Perjury and the Plaintiffe did declare That where an Action of Debt was brought Hill ultimo praeterito 27. Elizabeth whereas in truth the Action in which he was perjured was Hill 28. Eliz. And so the recitall did misse the Record Bartlet argued upon the Case put in Leicester and Heydons Case in Plowdens Commentaries where time place and number ought to be observed otherwise all is void also he said That if the party should recover here upon a Perjury committed upon a Record of 27. Eliz. and should also recover in another Action upon the Statute of 5. Eliz. for a Perjury in an Action begun 28. Eliz. that he should be double charged Cook He cannot bee double charged for it is betwixt the same Parties and in the same Cause and only a Circumstance is mistaken Clench Justice It is needfull to shew in what Action the first Perjury was committed for if hee say in Trespasse whereas in truth it was in Debt all is naught Gaudy Justice If no Action be alledged he cannot sue upon the Statute of 5. Eliz. But the Case was upon a speciall Verdict and the Verdict did find that the Action was brought at another time then any of the Parties had alledged And that Variance was first found by Verdict and no mention made of it before and therefore Cook said it was void for he said That by the book of 22. Ass 17. The Jury cannot find any other thing then the Parties have alledged
licence be to A. and B. or C. some conceived that A. or B. might alien but not C. Et èâ—converso Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 105 IT was agreed by the whole Court That a Partition made by word betwixt Joyntenants is not good See Dyer 29. Pl. 134. and 350. Pl 20. doth agree and see there the reason of it Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 105 IT was holden by the whole Court That if the Father do devise Lands unto his Son and Heir apparant and to a stranger that it is a good Devise and that they are Joyntenants for the benefit of the Stranger Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 106 FULLER'S Case A. Promises unto the eldest son that if he will give his consent that his Father shall make an Assurance unto him of his Lands that he will give him ten pounds If he give his assent although no assurance be made yet he shall maintain an Action upon the promise But at another day Periam Justice said that in that case the son ought to promise to give his assent or otherwise A. had nothing if his son would not give his consent And so where each hath remedy against the other it is a good Consideration In Hillary Term after Fenner spake in arrest of Judgment upon the speciall Verdict That because that the Assumpsit is but of one part and the other is at liberty whether he will give his consent or not that therefore although that hee do consent that hee shall not recover the ten pounds Also he said That the promise was that if hee would give consent that his Father should make assurance to him and here the assurance is made to A. to the use of the Defendant and his Wife in taile so as it varies from the first Communication and also it is in tail Shuttleworth contrary in as much as he hath performed it by the giving of consent then when he hath performed It is not to the purpose that he was not tyed by a crosse Assumpsit to do it but if he had not given his consent he should have nothing At length Judgment was given for the Plaintiff And Periam Justice said in this Case That if a covenant be to make an Estate to A. and it is made to B. to the use of A. that he doubted whether that were good or not Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. Intratur Hill 28. Eliz. Rot. 1742. 107 WISEMAN and WALLINGER'S Case A Man seised of two Closes called Bl. Acre makes a Lease of them rendring Ten Shillings rent The Lessee grants all his Estate in one of them to A. and in the other to B. The Lessor doth devise all his Land called Bl. Acre in the tenure of A. and dieth The Devisee brings an Action of Debt for the whole Rent against the first Lessee And the Opinion of the whole Court was That the Action would not lie because they conceived That but the Reversion of one Close passed and also that the rent should not be apportioned in that Case because a terme is out of the Statute and a Rent reserved upon a Lease for years shall not be apportioned by the act of the Lessor as where he takes a Surrender of part of it But otherwise by Act in Law as where the Tenant maketh a Feoffment in Fee of part of the Land and the Lessor entreth And at another day Anderson Chief Justice said That if the Lessor of two Acres granteth the Reversion of one Acre that the whole Rent is extinct Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas 108 A Lease for years is made of Land by Deed rendring Rent the Lessee binds himselfe in a Bond of Ten Pound to perform all Covenants and Agreements contained in the Deed the Rent is behind and the Lessor brings an Action of Debt upon the Bond for not payment of the Rent the Obligor pleads performance of all Covenants and Agreements the Lessor saie That the Rent is behind it was holden That it is no Plea for the Obligor to say That the Rent was never demanded But in this Bar he ought to have pleaded That he had performed all Covenants and Agreements except the payment of the Rents And as to that That he was alwayes ready to have paid it if any had come to demand it but as the first Plea is it was held not to be good And as to the demand of the Rent the Court was of opinion That it was to be demanded for the payment of the Rent is contained in the word Agreements and not in the word Covenants and then if he be not to performe the Agreements in other manner then is contained in the Deed of that agreement the Law saith That there shall be a demand of the Rent But if the Lessee be particularly expressed by covenant to pay the Rent there he is bound to do it without any Demand Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 109 HOLLENSHEAD against KING THomas Hollenshead brought Debt against Ralph King upon a Recovery in a Scire fâ—cias in London upon a Recognizance taken in the Inner or Ouster Chamber of London and doth not shew That it is a Court of Record and that they have used to take Recognisances and Exception was taken unto the Declaration and a Demurrer upon it and divers Cases put That although that the Judgement be void that yet the Execution shall be awarded by Scire facias and the party shall not plead the same in a Writ of Error But Periam Justice took this difference Where Execution is sued upon such a Judgement and where Debt is brought upon it for in Debt it behoves the Party that he have a good Warrant and ground for his Action otherwise he shall not recover but upon a voidable Judgement he shall recover before it be reversed Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. Intratur Trinit 28. Eliz. Rot. 507. 110 COSTARD and WINGFIELD'S Case IN a Replevin the Defendant did avow for Damage Feasans by the commandment of his Master the Lord Cromwell The Plaintiffe by way of Replication did justifie the putting in of his Cattell into the Land in which c. by reason that the Towne of N. is an ancient Town and that there hath been a usage time out of mind That every Inhabitant of the same Towne had had common for all his cattel Levant and Couchant in the same Town and so justified the putting in of his cattell The Defendant said That the house in which the Plaintiffe did inhabite in the same Towne and by reason of Residency in which house he claimed common was a new house built within 30 years and within that time there had not been any house there and upon that Plea the Plaintiffe did demurr in Law Shuttleworth Serdeant for the Plaintiffe That he shall have common for cause of Resiance in that new house and the Resiancy is the cause and not the Land nor
taile and waives the Lands taken in Exchange and before any other entry the heir of B. enters upon the Land which was given in Exchange and the opinion of the whole Court was That it was no breach of the Condition because that was not the Land of the Devifor at the time of the devise therefore it was out of the Condition Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 116. PLYMPTON'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought by one Plympton and his wife Executors of one Dorrington upon a Bond with Condition to perform Covenants of an Indenture of Lease whereof one Covenant was That he should pay forty shillings yearly at the Feast of the Annunciation or within fourteen days after And the breach assigned was for not payment at such a Feast in such a year The Defendant said That hee paid it at the Feast upon which they were at issue And upon evidence given to the Jury it appeared That the same was not paid at the Feast but in eight dayes after it was paid And the opinion of the Court was That by his pleading that hee had paid it at such a day certain and tendring that for a speciall issue That hee had made the day part of the issue and then the Defendant ought to have proved the payment upon the very day But if the Defendant had pleaded That hee paid it within the fourteen dayes viz. the eighth day c. that had not made the day parcell of the issue but then hee might have given evidence that he paid it at another day within the fourteene dayes Then for the Defendant it was moved That the Plaintiffe had not well assigned the breach in saying that he had not paid it at the Feast without saying Nor within the fourteen dayes But the Court said That the Jury was sworn at the Barre and bid the Councell proceed and give in their evidence for the time to take exception was past Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 117. IT was the opinion of Anderson Chiefe Justice and so entred by the Court That if a Copie-holder doth surrender to him who hath a Lease for years of the Mannor to the use of the same Lessee That the Copie-hold estate is extinct For the estate in the Copie-hold is not of right but an estate at will although that custome and prescription had fortified it And Wray said That it had been resolved by good opinion That if a Copie-holder accept a Lease for years of the Mannor that the Copie-hold estate is extinct for ever Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 118. Anderson Chiefe Justice and Periam Justice being absent in a Commission upon the Queen of Scots Shuttleworth moved this case to the Court. If the Queen give Lands in taile to hold in Capite And afterwards granteth the Reversion how the Donee shall hold Windham Justice and Fenner Serjant The tenure in this case is not incident to the Reversion and the Donee shall hold of the Queen as in grosse and so two Tenures in Capite for one and the same Land And thereupon Windham Justice cited 30. H. 8. Dyer 45 46. That the Queen by no way can sever the tenure in chiefe from the Crown And therefore if the Queen do release to her Tenant in Capite to hold by a penny and not in Capite it is a void Release for the same is meerly incident to the Person and Crown of the Queen But Rodes Justice held the contrary viz. That the Tenure in Capite doth not remain But it was said by Windham That if the Queen had reserved a Rent upon the gift in tail the Grantee of the Reversion should have it Also he said That the Queen might have made the Tenure in such manner viz. to hold of the Mannor or of the Honor of D. Shuttleworth If Lands holden of the Mannor of D. come to the King may he give them to be holden of the Mannor of S that should be hard Windham I did not say That Lands holden of one Mannor may be given to be holden of another Mannor perhaps that may not bee but Lands which is parcell of any Mannor may be given Vt supra Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 119 SErjeant Fenner moved Case If Lands be given to the Husband and Wife and to the heirs of their two bodies and the Husband dieth leaving Issue by his Wife and the Wife makes a Lease of the lands according to the Statute of 32. H. 8. If the Lease be good by the Statute Windham and Rodes Justices conceived that it is a good Lease Fenner The Statute saith that such Lease shall be good against the Lessor and his Heirs and the Issue doth not claim as Heir to the Wife onely but it ought to be Heir to them both and he cited the case That the Statute of R. 3. makes Feoffments good against no heirs but those which claim onely as Heirs to the same Feoffors c. So here Rodes Justice There the word only is a word efficacy And Windham agreed cleerly That the Lease should binde the issue by the said Statute of 32. H. 8. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 120 WAlmesley Serjeant moved this Case If a man deviseth Lands in taile with divers Remainders over upon condition that if any of them alien or c. that then he who is next heir to him to whom the land ought to come after his decease if the said alienation had not been made might enter and enjoy the land as if he had been dead But Ady of the Temple said That the words of the Devise are viz. That if any of them alien or c. that then his estate to cease and hee in the next Remainder to enter and retain the land untill the aliener were dead Rodes Justice The Devise is good and an estate may cease in such manner so as it shall not be determined for ever but that his Heir after him shall have it And he put the case of Scholastica Plow Com. 408. where Weston fo 4. 14. was in some doubt that if the Tenant in talle had had Issue if the Issue should be excluded from the land or whether hee should have the land by the intent of the Devisor And therefore if it were necessary to shew that the Tenant in taile had not Tssue But Dyer said that the words of the Will were that such person and his Heirs who alien or c. should be excluded presently so as the estate by expresse words is to be determined for ever But it is otherwise in this Case Windham doubted of the Devise Fenner cited the Case 22. E. 3. 19. Where a Rent was granted and that it should ceâ—se during the Nonage of the Heir of the Grantee and it was good Windham When a thing is newly created he who creates it may limit it in such manner as he pleaseth Fenner 30. E. 3. 7. Det. 10. A Feoffment was made rendring Rent upon
here is not mis-joyned for if the Counties could joyne the issue were good but because that the Counties cannot joyne it cannot be well tried But the issue it selfe is well enough Windham and Rodes were of the same opinion that it was not helped by the Statute but Periam doubted it Anderson said That if an issue triable in one Countie be tried in another and judgement given upon it it is errour And afterwards Lutrich the Atturney said That it was awarded that they should re-plead Nota quia mirum for 1. The Statute of 32. H. 8. Cap. 30. speaks of mis-joyning of processe and mis-joyning of issues and admit that this case is not within any of those clauses each of them being considered by it selfe yet I conceive it is contained within the substance and effect of them being considered together Also I conceive That it is within the meaning of both Statutes viz. 32. H. 8. Cap. 30. and 18. Eliz. Cap. 14. for I conceive the meaning of both the Statutes was to oust delayes circuits of actions and molestations and that the partie might have his judgement notwithstanding any defect if it were so that notwithstanding that defect sufficient title and cause did appeare to the Court. And here the Plaintiffe hath sufficient cause to recover If any of the points of the issue be found for him For if it bee found that the matter and substance of the oath be found true which might be tried well enough by those in London the Plaintiffe hath cause to recover Wherefore I conceive that the verdict in London is good enough and effectuall And note That Rodes said that hee was of Councell in suh a case in the Kings Bench betwixt Nevell and Dent. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 128 IN an Action of Trespasse the Defendant pleaded that at another time before the Trespasse he did recover against the same Plaintiffe in an Ejectione firme and demanded judgement And the opinion of the whole Court was That it is a good plea primâ faciâ— and that the possession is bound by it for otherwise the recovery should be in vaine and uneffectuall And Anderson chiefe justice said That if two claime one and the same Land by severall Leases and the one recovereth in an Ejectione firme against the other that if afterwards the other bring an Ejectione firme of the same Land the first recovery shall be a barre against him Rodes said That hee can shew authority that a recovery in an Ad terminum quem praeteriit shall bind the possession Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 129 IN Trespasse the Defendant did justifie as Bailiffe unto another The Plaintiffe replied that he took his cattell of his own wrong without that that he was his Bailiffe Anderson chiefe Justice If one have cause to distreine my goods and a stranger of his own wrong without any warrant or authority given him by the other take my goods not as Bailiff or servant to the other And I bring an Action of trespasse against him can he excuse himself by saying that he did it as my Bailiffe or Servant Can he so father his mis-demeanours upon another He cannot for once he was a trespasser and his intent was manifest But if one distrein as Bailiffe although in truth he is not Bailiffe if after he in whose right he doth it doth assent to it he shall not be punished as a trespassour for that assent shall have relation unto the time of the distresse taken and so is the book of 7. H. 4. And all that was agreed by Periam Shuttleworth What if hee distraine generally not shewing his intent nor the cause wherefore he distrained c. ad hoc non fuit responsum Rodes came to Anderson and said unto him If I having cause to distrain come to the Land and distraine and another ask the cause why I do so if I assigne a cause not true or insufficient yet when an Action is brought against me I may avow or justifie and assigne any other cause Anderson That is another case but in the principall case clearly the taking is not good to which Rodes agreed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 130 HOODIE and WINSCOMB'S Case IN an Attaint brought by Hoodie against Winscombe c. One of the Grand Jury was challenged because he was a Captain and one of the Petie Jury was his Lieutenant And it was holden by the whole Court that that was no principall challenge Windham It hath been holden no principall challenge notwithstanding that one of the Jurours was Master of the Game and one of the Petit Jury was Keeper of his Park And in that case it was holden by all the Justices That if a man make a Lease rendring rent upon condition that if the rent be behind and no sufficient distresse upon the Land that then the Lessor may re-enter If the Rent be behind and there be a piece of lead or other thing hidden in the Land and no other thing there to be distrained the Lessor may re-enter for the distresse ought to be open and to be come by for if it should be otherwise said a sufficient distresse one might inclose money or other things within a wall and thereby the Lessor should be excluded of his re-entry Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 131 IN a Quare Impedit the Plaintiffe counted That the Defendant being Parson of the Church in question was presented to another Benefice and inducted 15 Aprilis and that the other Church became void c. The Defendant said That he was qualified at such a day which was after 15 Aprilis without that that he was inducted 15 Aprilis And the Court was of opinion Anderson being absent that it was no good Traverse for he ought to have said generally without that that he was inducted before the day in which he is alledged to be qualified As if one declare in Trespasse done 1 Aprilis and the Defendant plead a Release 1. Feb. he ought to traverse without that that the Trespasse was done before the Release by Periam Justice Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 132 HALES and HOME'S Case IN an Avowry for Damage feasance one pleaded a Lease made unto him by I. S. the other said that before the Lease â— S. did enfeoff him the other replied and maintained the said Lease absque hoc quod J. S. seiâ—itus feoffavit Gawdy The Traverse is not formall for the word seisitus is idle and ought to be left out for he cannot enfeoff if that he were not seised and it hath never been seen that the seisin in such Case hath been traversed but generally in Pleading the Traverse hath been absque hoc that Feoffavit without speaking of seisin which is superfluous And so was the opinion of the whole Court Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 133 THE Queen granted Lands unto the Earle of Leicester by her Letters Patents the Patentee made a Lease of
haeredes de corpore and we are not to devise a new form in such case but it is sufficient to shew the speciall matter to the Court. Also the words of the Writ are true for they are Heirs to Sir Roger Lewknor and the count is sufficient pursuant and agreeing to their Writ for they are Heirs although they are not speciall Heirs of the body and so the Court was of opinion that the Writ was good notwithstanding that Exception And Anderson and Periam Justices said That the case is not to be compared to the case in F. Nat. Br. 57. c. for there he cannot shew by whose Demise the Tenant holdeth if he doth not shew the speciall conveyance viz. that the land was given to the Husband and Wife and the Heirs of the body of the Wife Nor is it like unto the case of 26. H. â— 6. for the same cause for alwayes the demise of the Tenant ought to be especially shewed and certainly which it cannot be in these two cases but by the disclosing of the Title also to the Reversion Another Exception was taken because that the Writ doth suppose quod tenuerunt which as they conceived is to be meant that tenuerunt joyntly whereas in truth they were Tenants in common Walmesley contrary because there is not any other form of Writ for there is not any Writ which doth contain two Tenuerunts And the words of the Writ are true quod tenuerunt although tenuerunt in Common But although they were not true yet because there is no other form of Writ it is good enough As Littleton If a lease be made for half a year and the Lessee doth waste yet the Writ shall suppose quod tenet ad terminum annorum and the count shall be speciall 40. Ed. 3. 41. E. 3. 18. If the Lessee doth commit waste and granteth over his term the Writ shall be brought against the Grantor and shall suppose quod tenet and yet in truth he doth not hold the Land 44. Ed. 3. and Fitz. If one make divers leases of divers lands and the Lessee doth waste in them all the Lessor shall have one Writ of waste supposing quod tenet and the Writ shall not contain two Tenets And such was also the opinion of the Court The third Exception was because that the Writ was brought by the two coparceners and the Heir of the third coparcener without naming of the Tenant by the Courtesie And thereupon Snagg cited the Case of 4. Ed. 3. That where a Lease is made for life the Remainder for life and the tenant for life doth waste he in the Reversion cannot have an Action of waste during the life of him in the Remainder So in this case the Heir of the third coparcener cannot have waste because the mean estate for life is in the Tenant by the courtesie And to prove that the Tenant by the courtesie ought to joyn he cited 3. E. 3. which he had seen in the Book it self at large where the Reversion of a tenant in Dower was granted to the Husband and to the Heirs of the Husband and the tenant in Dower did waste and they did joyn in an Action of waste and not good And so is 17. E. 3. 37. F. N. B. 59. f. and 22. H. 6. 25. a. Walmesley contrary for here in our case there is nothing to be recovered by the tenant by the courtesie for he cannot recover damages because the disinheresin is not to him and the term is expired and therefore no place wasted is to be recovered and therefore it is not like unto the Books which have been cited for in all those the tenant was in possession and the place wasted was to be recovered which ought to go to both according to their estates in reversion But it is not so here for in as much as the term is expired the land is in the tenant by the courtesie and so he hath no cause to complain And such also was the opinion of the whole Court viz. that because the term was ended that the Writ was good notwithstanding the said Exception Then concerning the principall matter in Law which was Whether the Writ were well brought against the second Lessee or whether it ought to have been brought against the first Lessee It was argued by Shuttleworth that it ought to have been brought against the first Lessee for when he granted over his term excepting the trees the Exception was good Ergo c. For when the Land upon which the trees are growing is leased out to another the trees passe with the Lease as well as the Land and the property of them is in the Lessee during the term and therefore when he grants his term hee may well except the trees as well as the first Lessor might have done And that is proved by the Statute of Marlebridge Cap. 23. for before that Statute the Lessee was not punishable for cutting downe the trees and that Statute doth not alter the properties of the trees but onely that the Lessee shall render damages if he cut them down c. Also the words of the Writ of Wast proveth the same which are viz. in terris domibus c. sibi dimissis Also the Lessee might have cut them down for reparations c. and for fire-wood if there were not sufficient underwoods which he could not have done if the trees had been excepted And in 23. H 8. in Brooke It is holden that the excepting of the trees is the excepting of the Soile And so is 46. E. 3. 22. Where one made a Lease excepting the woods and afterwards the Lessee did cut them down and the Lessor brought an Action of Trespasse quare vi armis clausum fregit c. and it was good notwithstanding that Exception was taken to it And it is holden in 12. E. 4. 8. by Fairfax and Littieton That if the Lessee cut the trees that the Lessor cannot carry them away but he is put to his Action of Waste Fenner and Walmesley Serjeants contrary and they conceived that the Lessee hath but a speciall property in the trees viz. for fire-boot plough-boot house-boot c. And if he passe over the Lands unto another that he cannot reserve unto himselfe that speciall property in the trees no more then he who hath common appendant can grant the principall excepting and reserving the Common or grant the Land excepting the foldage The grand property of the trees doth remain in the Lessor and it is proved by 10. H. 7. 30. and 27. H. 8 13. c. If Tenant for life and he in the reversion joyne in a Lease and the Lessee doth wast they shall joyne in an Action of Wast and Tenant for life shall recover the Free-hold and the first Lessor the damages which proves that the property of the trees is in him As to that that he was dispunishable at the common law that was the folly of the Lessor and although it was so at the
common law yet it is otherwise at this day For when the Statute sayes That the Lessor shall recover damages for the Wast that proves sufficiently that the property of the trees is in him as the Statute of Merton Cap. 4. enacts That if the Lessor do approve part of the Wast leaving sufficient for the Commoners and they notwithstanding that bring an Assize they shall be barred in that Case and the Lord may have an Action of Trespass against them if they break the Hedges by force of that Statute as it hath been adjudged for the intent of the Statute was to settle the Inheritance of the Land approved without interruption of the Commoners And so in this case But Note that by the Statute of Marlebridge the Lessor shall recover damages for the houses c. which are wasted c. and yet a man cannot inferre thereupon that therefore the Lessee hath no Interest or property in them and such interest hath he in the trees notwithstanding the words of the Statute which is contrary to this meaning as it seems And therefore Quaere If there be any difference betwixt them and what shall be meant by this word Property But the damages are given by the Statute in respect of the property which the Lessor is to have in reversion after the Lease determined Anderson Chiefe Justice The Lessor hath no greater property in the trees then the Commoner hath in the soile Walmesley 2. H. 7. 14. and 10. H. 7. 2. The Lessor may give leave to the Lessee to cut the trees and the same shall be a good plea in an Action of Wast and the reason of both the books is because the property of them is in the Lessor and to this purpose the difference is taken in 2. H. 7. betwixt Gravell and trees 42. H. 3. If a Prior licence the Lessee to cut trees the same shall discharge him in Wast brought by the Successour But if the Lessee cutteth down the trees and then the Prior doth release unto him the same shall not barre the Successour and so is 21. H. 6. Also he cited Culpepers case 2 Eliz. and 44. E. 3. Statham and 40. Ass 22. to prove that the Lessor shall have the Wind-falls If a stranger cutteth down trees and the Lessee bringeth an Action of Trespasse he shall recover but according to his losse viz. for lopping and topping As to that which was said That if the Lessee cut down trees that the Lessor cannot take them away that is true for that there is a contract of the Law that if the Lessee doth cut them down that he shall have the trees and the Lessor shall have treble damages for them Also he said That the trees are no part of the thing demised but are as servants and shall be for reparations As if one hath a Piscarie in the land of another man the land adjoyning is as it were a servant viz. to drie the Nets So if one have conduit-pipes lying in the land of ather he may dig the land for to mend the pipes and yet he hath no Interest nor Free-hold To that which was said That by the excepting of the trees the land upon which they stood is excepted It is true as a servant to the trees for their nourishment but not otherwise for if the Lessor selleth the trees he afterwards shall not meddle with the land but it shall be wholly in the Lessee quia sublata causa tollitur effâ—ctus And if the Lessee tieth a horse upon the land where the trees stood the Lessor may distraine the same for his rent and avow as upon land within his distress and Fee and holden of him And he said that the lessor may grant the trees but so cannot the lessee and therefore he said That the property is in the lessor and not in the lessee Also if the lessor granteth them they passe without Atturnment But contrary if the lessor had but a Reversion in them Also if the lessor cutteth them down his Rent shall not be apportioned and therefore they are no part of the thing demised For 16. H. 7. and temps E. 1. Fitz. Waste in two or three places it is holden That if the Waste be done Sparsim in a Close or Grove the lessor shall recover the whole Then admit that the trees excepted are cut down sparsim if the Exception shall be good how shall the thing wasted be recovered and against whom quod nota Anderson Chief Justice did conceive that the Exception was void and that the Action was well brought and he said It was a Knavish and Foolish demise and if it should be good many mischiefs would follow which he would not remember Windham Justice was of the same opinion and he said The lessor might have excepted them and so take from the lessee his fire wood and Plough bote c. But the lessee could not grant his estate excepting the trees because he had but a speciall interest in them viz. for his fire-bote c. which shall go with the land Periam Justice agreed That as to such a speciall property none can have it but such a one who hath the land and therefore the exception of the Wood by the lessee was void But as to the other things perhaps if they were Apple trees or other Fruit-Trees the exception had been good Also although the trees are not let directly yet they are after a sort by a mean as annexed to the land and if the Action be brought against him who made the exception he cannot plead that they were let unto him and therefore he doubted of the exception Rodes Justice also said That he doubted of the Exception And he said That the Book of 44 E. 3. is That the lessee should have the Wind-falls and he did not much regard the Opinion of Statham But Anderson Chief Justice was of opinion that the lessor should have the Wind-falls Note the Case was not adjudged at this time Hill 29. Eliz. in the King's Bench 137 EXceptions were taken by Fuller to an Indictment upon the Statute of 1. Eliz. cap. 2. for the omitting of the Crossing of a Child in Baptising of him The Case was That a Minister out of his Cure at another Church viz. at Chelmesford in Essex did Baptize a Child without the Sign of the Crosse for which he was indicted The first Exception was That the Statute speaks of Ministers which do not use the administring of the Sacrament in such Cathedrall Churches or Parish Churches as he should use to administer the same that this was not the Parish Church in which he should use the same Suit Justice was of opinion That it was good notwithstanding that for otherwise the Statute might be greatly defrauded The words of the Statute are farther Or shall wilfully or obstinately standing in the same use any other Rule Ceremony Order Forme c. 2. He took another Exception upon those words For the omitting of the Crossing only is put and
Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 146 LONDON doth prescribe to have a Custom That after Verdict given in any of the Sheriffs Courts or such like Court there that the Maior may remove any such Suit before himself and as Chancellor secundùm bonam sanam conscientiam moderate it and it was moved whether it were a reasonable custom or not because that after tryal by ordinary course at Law he should thereby stay judgment Gaudy Justice It ought to be before judgment otherwise it cannot be for the Statute of 4. H. 4. is that judgment given in any Court shall not be reversed but by Error or Attaint Vide Rastal Tit. Judgment Mich. 28. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 2619. 147 GREENE and HARRIS Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict it was found that one John Brenne was seised of a Manor where there were Copyholders for life and by Indenture leased a copyhold called Harris Tenure parcel of the Land in question to Peter and John Blackborow for eight years to begin after the death of Brenne his Wife and by the same Indenture leased all the Manor to them as before The Copyholder did surrender and Brenne granted a copy to hold according to the custom of the Manor Brenne and his Wife died So as the lease of Blackborow was to begin Peter entred and granted all his Interest unto a stranger and died John entred into the whole as Survivor and made a lease thereof to the Plaintiff and the Copyholder entred and he brought the action Shuttleworth for the plaintiff The question is whether the plaintiff shall have Harris Tenure as in gross or as parcel of the Manor and he conceived that because it is named by it self that it shall pass as in gross for so their intent appeareth to be In 33. H. 8. Dyer 48. A Feoffment was made of a Manor to which a Villein was Regardant by these words viz. Dedi unam acram c. And further Dedi concessi Villanum meum and there it was holden that the Villein should pass as in gross and that they were several gifts although there was but one Deed. The same Law shall be of an Advowson appendant 14. and 15. El. Dyers Husband and Wife were joint-tenants in Fee of a Manor out of which the Queen had a Rent of twenty pound per annum and she by her Letters patents in Consideration of Money paid by the Husband did give grant release and remise unto the Husband and his heirs the said twenty pound Rent habendum percipiendum to him and his heirs The Husband did devise the Rent unto another and his heirs and dyed There it is debated whether the Wife should pay the Rent or not and it was holden that she should pay it for the deed having words of grant and release it shall be referred to the Election of the Husband and for his best avail how he will take it and there is no necessity that the Rent be extinguished in his possession for it is a maxime in Law that every grant shall be taken beneficially for the grantee so is it if it contain words of two intents he may take that which makes best for him 21. and 22. H. 6. A deed comprehending Dedi concessi was pleaded as a Feoffment In 5. E. 3. A Rent issuing out of Lands in Fee was granted to Tenant by the courtesie to have and to hold to him and his heirs It shall not be taken as extinct but the Rent shall go to his heires although he himself could not have it Then in our Case because it is more beneficial for the Termor he shall have it in gross And so he shall avoid the Estate of the Copyholder afterwards and here is an Election made by Peter so to have it by the grant of his Interest over Our Case is not like unto the Case of 48. E. 3. 14. Where a Cessavit was brought supposing that the House was holden of the Plaintiff by five Shillings and the Defendant pleaded that the Ancestor of the Plaintiff by his deed which he shewed forth gave the house to him and a shop which are holden by one intire service and demanded judgment c. And there it was holden that that deed did not prove but that the shop might be parcel of the house and not a shop in gross by it self And there Finchdon saith That if a man grant the Manor of F. to which an Advowson is appendant and the Advowson of the Church of F. so as it is named in gross yet it shall pass as appendant I yeild to that for there it is not more beneficial for him the one way or the other as it is in our Case It may be perhaps objected That the Plaintiff here shall not recover at all for the cause alleadged in Plo. Comm. 424. in Bracebridges Case because that the action is brought for a certain number of Acres as one hundred Acres and it is found that the Plaintiff hath right but to a moyty of them But it hath been ruled against that viz. that he shall recover Walmesley Sergeant contrary Notwithstanding that this Copy-hold be twice named yet it shall pass as parcel of the Manor and not as a thing in gross and there is but one Rent one Tenure and one reversion of both 45. E. 3. A Fine was levyed of a Manor unto which an Advowson was appendant wherein a third part was rendred back to one for life with divers Remainders over And so of the other two parts with the advowson of every third part as abovesaid and there it is debated who shall have the first avoidance And it is holden notwithstanding the Division as aforesaid and the naming of one before the other that they are all Tenants in common of it So as if they cannot agree to present that Lapse shall incurre to the Bishop and there no Prerogative is given to him who is first named nor any prejudice to the last named for being by one Deed it shall passe uno flatu 14. H. 8. 10. A Lease was made for a year Et sic de anno in annum c. And there it was debated whether it were a severall Lease for every year and it was ruled That an Action might be brought supposing that he held for one and twenty years if in truth by force of the same Demise the Lessee occupy the Land so long And if I by my Deed grant unto A. and B. the services of I. D. and by the same Deed the services of I. S. are also granted unto them they are Joyn-tenants of the Services or Seignories So if I lease a Manor reciting every parcell of the Land of the Manor for the whole consists in severall parcels In 33. H. 8. before remembred It is said That the Advowson shall be appendant if the whole Manor be granted c. But if it be admitted that there be severall Leases and that it passeth as a thing in grosse
yet in the interim during the life of Brenne and his wife it is one entire Manor For if Blackborow had levied a Fine thereof before entry his Interest in the Land had not passed And if a Fine be levied of the Manor and the Conusee render back part to one for life and another part to another for life the remainder of the whole to a third until the Two enter it is one entire Manor in the hands of the Conusee If I devise that my Executors shall sell such Lands which are parcell of a Manor and dye untill they sell it remains parcell of the Manor So if the heir selleth the Manor that Land shall passe for it is but executory and remains parcell untill it be executed Wherefore in the principall Case here the Copy-hold is good The reason of the Case 33. H. 8. Dyer 48. is because before the grant the advowson was not appendant to that acre onely but to the whole Manor and to that acre as parcell of it Also he said that the Copy-hold shall be good against the Lessee being granted before execution of his term when as the Manor was entire For he who hath a Manor but for one year may grant Copies and the grant shall be good to bind him in the Reversion And if one recovereth an acre parcell of a Manor before execution it is parcell of the Manor and by grant of the Manor shall passe Periam Justice But yet now being executed by the death of the Lessor and his wife it is no part of the Manor if they be severall Leases Walmesley But the Defendant is in by Custome by one who is Dominus pro tempore Anderson Chief Justice The Case of 48. E. 3. is like our Case And I conceive clearly here is no severance but if there had been any severance it had been otherwise but I doubt of the other point Periam Justice In 13. H. 4. the difference is taken betwixt a grant of a Manor una cum advocatione and a grant of a Manor et ulterius a grant of the Advowson In 14. Eliz. Dyer 311. in the Case of the Lord Cromwell and Andrews it is moved If a man bargain and sell give and grant a Manor and Advowson to one and afterwards levieth a Fine or inrolleth the Deed Dyer held that the Advowson shall passe by the Bargain and Sale as in gross before that the Deed be enrolled But I conceive that it cannot pass if the Deed be not enrolled and then it shall pass as appendant by reason of the intent of the parties and so in this Case And for the last matter I conceive very strongly that when the Lease which is executory takes effect that it shall avoid the Copy-hold for although at once viz. during the expectancy of the said Lease to begin at a day to come the Copy-hold be not extinct yet now he may say That all times as in respect to him the Copy-hold Custome was broken I hold That a Tenant in Dower shall not avoid a Copy-hold made during the Coverture and so it hath been adjudged in the Kings Bench. But I conceive there is a difference betwixt that Case and the Case in question for in that Case the title of the wife to have Dower is not consummate till the death of the Husband Anderson Chief Justice I can shew you an Authority That if I grant unto you such Land and the Manor of D. there the Land shall pass as parcell of the Manor Periam True there for it doth enforce the first grant But here the intent of the parties doth appear and the same is to be respected Anderson But their intent ought to be according to the Law as in 19. H. 8. it is holden it shall be in a Devise Anderson upon the Argument of this Case said That if a Warranty be to a whole Manor and also to an Advowson the party cannot have Two Warrantia Chartae Periam If he had further said in the Deed That his intent was that it should be severall the same had altered the Case Anderson No truely because his intent did not stand with the rule of Law As if a man devise that his Lands shall be sold and doth not say by whom it is void and yet the intent is expressed If the Lease had been by severall Deeds Periam said The Copy-hold had beene severed Windham denied that If both the Deeds bee delivered at one time It was adjourned Hill 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 148 AN Information was upon the Statute of 5. 6. E. 6. for buying of seed Corn having sufficient of his own and not bringing so much unto the Market of his own corn and a generall issue was found upon it And it was delivered for Law to the Jury by the Justices That a Contract in Market for corn not in the Market or which was not there that day is not within the Branch of the Statute But if corn or graine be in the Market although that the Contract be made in a house out of the Market and delivered to the Vendee out of the Market yet it is within the Statute And in the Argument of that Case Anderson said That the Market shall be said The place in the Town where it hath used to be kept and not every place of the Town And a Sale in Market overt in London ought to be in a Shop which is open to the street and not in Chambers or inward rooms otherwise the property is not altered And so it is of all Statutes in open Markets And the Recorder of London said That such was their Custome in London Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 149 It was holden by Anderson chiefe Justice That if one deviseth Lands to the heirs of I. S. and the Clerk writes it to I. S. and his heirs that the same may be holpen by averrment because the intent of the Devisor is written and more And it shall be naught for that which is against his intent and against his will and good for the residue But if a Devise be to I. S. and his heirs and it is written but to the heirs of I. S. there an averrment shall not make it good to I. S. because it is not in writing which the Statute requires anâ— so an averrment to take away surplusage is good but not to encrease that which is defective in the Will of the Testator Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 150 A Feoffment was made unto A. unto the use of him and his wife dis-punishable of Wast during their lives one died and the Survivor committed Wast It was the opinion of the whole Court that an Action of Wast would not lie by him in the Reversion for it is a Priviledge which is annexed to the Estate which shall continue as long as the Estate doth continue Mich. 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 151 A. grants annualem redditum out of Lands in which he hath nothing The opinion of
the Court was That it is a good grant of an Annuity by these words annualem redditum But whether the Husband shall have a Writ of Annuity after the death of the wife for an Annuity during the Coverture they were in some doubt because it is but a thing in Action as is an Obligation Otherwise were it of a Rent which she had for life Note in pleading for a Rent he shall plead That he was seised c. Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 152 WINKFEILD'S Case Winkfeild devised Land in Norfolk to one Winkfeild of London Goldsmith and to his heirs in Fee And afterwards he made a Deed of Feoffment thereof to divers persons unto the use of himselfe for life without impeachment of waste the Remainder unto the Devisee in fee. But before he sealed the Deed of Feoffment he asked one if it would be any prejudice to his Will who answered No. And the Devisor asked again if it would be any prejudice because he conceived that he should not live untill Livery was made And it was answered No. Then he said that he would seale it for his intent was that his Will should stand And afterwards Livery was executed upon part of the Land and the Devisor died Rodes and Periam Justices The Feoffment is no Countermand of the Will because it was to one person but perhaps it had been otherwise if it had been to the use of a stranger although it were not executed Anderson Chiefe Justice and others the Will is revoked in that part where the Livery is executed And he said It would have been a question if he had said nothing And all the Justices agreed That a man may revoke his Will in part and in other part not And he may revoke it by word and that a Will in writing may he revoked by word Periam said It is no revocation by the party himselfe but the Law doth revoke it to which Windham agreed But he said That if the party had said nothing when he sealed the Feoffment it had been a revocation of the party and not of the Law Periam If the Witnesses dye so as he cannot prove the words spoken at the sealing of the Feoffment the Feoffment will destroy the Will and so he spake to Anderson who did not deny it All this was delivered by the Justices upon an Evidence given to a Jury at the Barre Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 153 NOte That it was said by Anderson Chiefe Justice That if one intrude upon the possession of the King and another man entreth upon him that he shall not have an Action of Trespasse for he who is to have trespasse ought to have a possession and in this case he had not for that every Intruder shall answer the King for his time and therefore he shal not answer to the other party To which Walmesley and Fenner Serjeants agreed Periam doubted of it for he conceived That he had a possession against every stranger Snagg Serjeant conceived That he might maintain an Action of Trespasse but Windham and Rodes Justices were of opinion that he could not maintain Trespass Walmesley he cannot say in the Writ Quare clausam frâ—git c. Rodes vouched 19. E. 4. to maintain his opinion Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 154 NORRIS and SALISBURIE'S Case IN an Action of Debt upon a Bond the Case was this Norris was possessed of wools for which there was a contention betwixt the Defendant and one A. And Norris promised A. in consideration that the goods were his and also that he should serve processe upon Salisbury out of the Admiral Court that he would deliver the goods to A. And afterwards he delivered the goods to Salisbury the Defendant who gave him Bond with Condition to keep him harmlesse from all losses charges and hinderances concerning and touching the said wools Afterwards A. served processe upon him and he did not deliver to him the goods for which A. brought his Action upon the Case against Norris who pleaded That he made no such promise which was found against him And afterwards Norris brought an Action of Debt upon the Bond against Salisbury because he did not save him harmlesse in that Action upon the Case And the opinion of the whole Court was That the Action of Debt would not lie because that the Action upon the Case did not concern the wools directly for the Action is not brought but for breach of the promise And that is a thing of which the Defendant had not notice and it was a secret thing not concerning the wools but by circumstances and so out of the Condition Anderson Chiefe Justice said That if A. promise B. in Consideration that B. is owner of goods and hath them to deliver them to C. the same may be a good consideration yet he somewhat doubted of it But Walmesley did affirme it to be a good Consideration Mich. 29 Eliz in the Common Pleas. 155 IT was holden by the whole Court That in an Action of Trespasse It is a good plea in barre That the Plaintiffe was barred in an Assize brought by him against the Defendant and issue joyned upon the Title But otherwise if it were upon the generall issue viz. Nul tort nul disseisin For then it might be that the Plaintiffe was never ousted nor disseised and so no cause to recover In which case it was no reason to put him from his Writ of Right Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Intratur Mich. 27. Rot. 1627. 156 BRAGG'S Case A Woman having cause to be endowed of a Manor in which are Copy-holders doth demand her Dower by the name of certain Messuages certain Acres of land and certain Rents and not by the name of the third part of the Manor and she doth recover and keeps Courts and grants Copy-holds It was holden by the whole Court that in such Case that the Grants were void for she hath not a Manor because she hath made her demand as of a thing in grosse Otherwise if the demand had been of the third part of the Manor for then she had a Manor and might have kept Courts and granted Copies And the pleading in that Case was That she did recover the third part of the Manor per nomen of certain Messuages and Acres and Rents which was holden to be no recovery of the third part of the Manor Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 157 NOte it was holden for Law That the Justices may increase but not decrease damages because the party may have an Attaint and so is not without remedy But note contrary by Anderson and Periam Justices Hill 39. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 158 SErjeant Fenner moved this Case That the Lord of a Manor doth prescribe That if the Tenant do a Rescous or drive his Cattel off from the Land when the Lord comes to distrain that the Tenant shall be amerced by the Homage and that the Lord may distrain for the same Anderson
did admit a Copy-holder in Remainder for life That the same was a good admittance according to the Custome And that he was a sufficient Dominus pro tempore as to this purpose Although it was objected by Walmesley That the Gardian is but Servus and not Dominus But because it was agreed that he had a lawfull Interest the admittance was good and so it was adjudged 33. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 178 SHIPWITH and SHEFFIELD'S Case THe Custome of a Copy-hold Manor was That a feme Covert might give Lands to her Husband And if it were a good Custome or not was the Question Fleetwood The Custom is good and vouched 12. E 3. That in York there is such a custome That the Husband might give the Land of his own purchase to his wife during the Coverture and it is a good Custome That an Infant at the age of fifteen years may make a Feoffment 29. E. 3. and the same is good at the Common Law and yet the same all began by custome But the Court was of opinion That the Custome is unreasonable because it cannot have a lawfull Commencement And Anderson Chiefe Justice said That a Custome that an Infant at the age of seven years might make a Feoffment is no good custome because he is not of age of discretion And in this case at Barre It shall be intended that the wife being sub potestate viri did it by the Coherison of her Husband The same Law is of a Custome That the wife may lease to her Husband Fleetwood urged That the custome might be good because the wife was to be examined by the Steward of the Court as the manner is upon a Fine to be examined by a Judge To which the Court said nothing 31. Eliz. in the King's Bench 179 AN Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit was brought And the Plaintiff layed his Action That such a one did promise him in respect of his labour in another Realme c. to pay him his contentment And he said That Twenty five Pound is his contentment and that he had required the same of the Defendant Cook moved in arrest of Judgement it being found for the Plaintiffe upon Non Assumpsit pleaded that no place was alledged where the contentment was shewed And the opinion of the Court was against him for Gawdy and Wray were of opinion that he might shew his contentment in any Action and so it is where it is to have so much as he can prove he might prove it in the same Action Cook said That it had been moved in stay of Judgement in this Court upon an Assumpsit because the request was not certain And that case was agreed by the Justices because the request is parcell of the Assumpsit and the entire Assumpsit together in such case is the cause of the Action but in this case that he should content him is not the cause of the Assumpsit but only a circumstance of the matter and it was resembled to the Case of 39. H. 6. where a Writ of Annuity was brought for Arrerages against an Abbot pro consilio c. And the Plaintiffe declared that the Councel was ad proficuum Domus and was not alledged in certain and it was holden that the same was not materiall although it were uncertain because it was but an induction and necessary circumstance to the Action And so the Plaintiffe recovered and had Judgement Mich. 29 Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 180 THE Statute of 23. Eliz. cap. 25. is Quod non licuit alicui to engrosse Barley c. and in the Statute there is a Proviso That he may so do so as he convert it into Malt. The question was If in an Information upon that Statute That the Defendant had converted it to Malt he might plead the generall Issue Not guilty and give in Evidence the speciall matter or whether he ought to plead the speciall matter Clench Justice He may plead Not guilty c. for the Proviso is parcel and within the body of the Statute as 27. H. 8. 2. where upon an Information upon the Statute of Farmors it is holden by Fitzherbert That the Vicar may plead Non habuit seu tenuit ad firmam contra formam Statuti c. and yet the Statute in the premises of it restrains every Spirituall Person to take in Farme any Lands c. and afterwards by a Proviso gives him liberty to take Lands for the maintenance of his house c. As upon the Statute of R. 2. If he do plead That he did not enter contra formam Statuti he may give in Evidence that he entred by Title as that his father was seised and died and the same is not like unto the condition of a Bond for that is a severall thing But the Proviso and the Statute is but one Act. Mich. 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 181 NOte It was said by Master Kemp Secondary of the King's Bench That there is a Court within the Tower of London but he said That it was but a Court Baron and said That he can shew a Judgement That no Writ of Error lieth of a Judgement given there And it was a question Whether Process might be awarded to the Lieutenant of the Tower for Execution upon a Judgment given in the Kings Bench because the Defendant was removed and dwelt within the Liberty of the Tower And it was said It could not but the Writ ought to be awarded to the Sheriffs of London and if they returne the Liberties of the Tower then a Non omittas shall be awarded But some Counsellors said That although a Non omittas be awarded yet the Sheriffs durst not go unto the Liberties of the Tower to serve the Process 2 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 182 The Lady STOWELL'S Case IT was adjudged in this Case That the wife who is divorced causa adulterii shall have her Dower 3. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 183 WARNER'S Cafe LEssee for twenty years doth surrender rendring rent during the term It was adjudged a good rent for so many years as the term might have continued 3. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 184 WHITLOCK and HARTWELL'S Case TWO Joint-Tenants for life the one demised and granted the moyty unto his companion for certain years to begin after his death Adjudged void because it is but a possibility And so is it of a Covenant to stand seised to the use c. as it was adjudged in Barton and Harvey's Case 37. Eliz. 3. Jacobi In the Kings Bench. 185 PINDER'S Case A. devised lands in Fee to his son and many other lands in tail And afterwards he said I will that if my son die without issue within age that the lands in Fee shall go to such a one Item I will that the other lands in tail shall go to others and doth not say in the second Item if the son dieth without issue within age It was adjudged That the second Item should be without
man and his heirs such Seat and he and his heirs have used to repair the said Seat If another will libell against him in the Spirituall Court for the same Seat he shall have a Prohibition And he said That he had seen a Judgement in 6. E. 6. That if Executors lay a Grave Stone upon the Testator in the Church or set up his Coat-armour in the Church If the Parson or Vicar doth remove them or carry them away that they or the heir may have their Action upon the Case against the Parson or Vicar Note in the principall no Prohibition for the reasons before Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 287 The Archbishop of York Sedgwick's Case THe Archbishop of York and Doctor Ingram brought and exhibited a Bill in the Exchequer at York upon an Obligation of seven hundred pound and declared in their Bill in the nature of an Action of Debt brought at the common Law which matter being shewed unto the Court of Common Pleas by Sedgwick the Defendant there A Prohibition was awarded to the Archbishop and to the said Court at York And Cook chief Justice gave the reasons wherefore the Court granted the Prohibition 1. He said because the matter was meerly determinable at the common Law and therefore ought to be proceeded in according to the course of the common Law 2. Although the King hath granted to the Lord President and the Councel of York to hold pleas of all personall Actions yet he said they cannot alter the form of the proceedings For as 6. H. 7. 5. is The King by his Grant cannot make that inquirable in a Leet which was not inquirable there by the Law nor a Leet to be of other nature then it was at the common Law And in 11. H. 4. it is holden That the Pope nor any other person can change the common Law without a Parliament And Cook vouched a Record in 8. H. 4. That the King granted to both the Universities that they should hold plea of all Causes arising within the Universities according to the course of the Civil Law and all the Judges of England were then of opinion That that grant was not good because the King could not by his Grant alter the Law of the Land with which case agrees 37. H. 6. 26. 2. E. 4. 16. and 7. H. 7. But at this day by a speciall Act of Parliament made 13. Eliz. not printed The Universities have now power to proceed and judge according to the Civil Law 3. He said That the Oath of Judges is viz. You shall do and procure the profit of the King and his Crown in all things wherein you may reasonably effect and do the same And he said That upon every Judgement upon debt of forty pound the King was to have ten shillings paid to the Hamper and if the debt were more then more But he said by this manner of proceeding by English Bill the King should lose his Fine 4. He said That if it was against the Statute of Magna Charta viz. Nec super eum ibimus nec super eum mittemus nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrae And the Law of the Land is That matters of fact shall be tried by verdict of twelve men but by their proceedings by English Bill the partie should be examined upon his oath And it is a Rule in Law That Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere And also he said That upon their Judgement there no Writ of Error lyeth so as the Subject should by such means be deprived of his Birth-right 5. It was said by all the Justices with which the Justices of the King's Bench did agree That such proceedings were illegall And the Lord Chancellor of England would have cast such a Bill out of the Court of Chancery And they advised the Court of York so to do and a Prohibition was awarded accordingly Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 288 Doctor HUTCHINSON's Case DOctor Hutchinson libelled in the Spirituall Court against one of his Parishioners for Tithes The Defendant there shewed that the Doctor came to the Parsonage by Symony and Corruption And upon suggestion thereof made in the Common Pleas prayed a Prohibition Doctor Hutchinson alledged that he had his pardon and pleaded the same in the Spirituall Court And notwithstanding that the Court granted a Prohibition because the Pardon doth not make the Church to be plena but maketh the offence onely dispunishable But in such case If the King doth present his presentee shall have the Tithes Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 289 NOte by Cook Chief Justice that these words viz. Thou wouldest have taken my purse from me on the high way are not actionable But Thou hast taken my money and I will carry thee before a Justice lay felony to thy charge are actionable Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 290 HATCH and CAPEL's Case IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit brought against the Defendant The Plaintiffe declared How that one Hallingworth who was the Defendants Husband was indebted unto the Plaintiffe eight pound ten shillings for beer and that he died and that after his death the Plaintiff demanded the said mony of the Defendant his wife and she in consideration that he would serve her withbeer promised that she would pay unto the said Plaintiff eight pound ten shillings and for the rest of the beer at such a day certain And the Plaintiffe did averr That he did sell and deliver to her Beer and gave her day for the payment of the other money as also for the Beer delivered unto her and that at the day she did not pay the Money Cook and all the other Justices agreed That the Action would well lie and that it was a good Assumpsit and a good consideration for they said That the forbearance of the money is a good consideration of it selfe and they said That in every Assumpsit he who makes the promise ought to have benefit thereby and the other is to sustain some losse And judgement was given for the Plaintiff Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 291 NORTON and LYSTERS Case IN the Case of a Prohibition the Case was this Queen Elizabeth was seised of the Manor of Nammington which did extend into four Parishes viz. Stangrave and three other And the Plaintiff shewed That he was seised of three Closes in Stangrave and prescribed That the said Queen and all those whose Estate he hath in the said Closes had a Modus decimandi for the said three Closes and for all the Demeanes of the said Manor in Stangrave And whether the Venire facias should be de parochia de Stangrave or of the Manor was the question And it was resolved by the whole Court That the Visne should be of the Parish of Stangrave and not of the Manor And the Difference was taken when one claimes any thing which goes unto the whole Manor and when only to
Tenures of such men viz. A. B. C. 3. All his lands which he had by Purchase c. And the words All my Lands are to be intended all those my Lands which are within the restrictions And he said that the word Et being in the copulative was not material for all was but one sentence and it did not make several sentences and the word Et is but the conclusion of the sentence 3. They resolved That general words in a Grant may be overthrown by words restrictive as is 2 E. 4. and Plow Com. Hill Granges Case And therefore if a man giveth all his lands in D. which he hath by Discent from his Father if he have no lands by Discent from his Father nothing passeth 4. They agreed That a Restriction may be in a special Grant as in C. 4. par Ognels Case but they said that if the Restriction doth not concur and meet with the Grant that then the Restriction is void Note the principal Case was adjudged according to these Resolutions Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 293. COOPER and ANDREWS Case TO have a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court suggestion was made That the Lord De la Ware was seised of 140 Acres of lands in the County of Sussex which were parcel of a Park And a Modus Decimandi by Prescription was said to be That the Tenants of the said 140 Acres for the time being had used to pay for the tythes of the said 140 Acres two shillings in mony and a shoulder of every third Deer which was killed in the same Park in consideration of all tythes of the said Park And it was shewed how that the Lord De la Ware had enfeoffed one Cumber of the said 140 acres of land who bargained and sold the said 140 acres of land to the Plaintiffe who prayed the Prohibition The Defendant said that the said Park is disparked and that the same is now converted into arable lands and pasture-grounds and so demanded tythes in kind upon which the Plaintiffe in the Prohibition did demur Hutton Serjeant By the disparking of the Park the Prescription is not gone nor extinct because the Prescription is said to be to 140 acres of lands and not to the Park and although the shoulder of the Deer being but casual and at the pleasure of the party be gone yet the same shall not make void the Prescription 2. He said that the act of the party shall not destroy the Prescription and although it be not a Park now in form and reputation yet in Law the same still remains a Park And he compared the Case unto Lutterels Case C. 4. par 48. where a Prescription was to Fulling-Mils and afterwards the Mils were converted to Corn-Mils yet the Prescription remained 3. He said Admit it is not now a Park yet there is a possibility that it may be a Park again and that Deer may be killed there again For the Disparking in the principal Case is only alleadged to be that the Pale is thrown down which may be amended For although that all the Park-pale or parcel of it be cast down yet the same doth still remain in Law a Park and a Park is but a Liberty and the not using of a Liberty doth not determine it nor any Prescription which goes with it And if a man have Estovers in a Wood by Prescription if the Lord felleth down all the Wood yet the right of Estovers doth remain and the Owner shall have an Assise for the Estovers or an Action upon the Case Vid. C. 5. par 78. in Grayes Case the Case vouched by Popham Further he said That in the beginning a Modus Decimandi did commence by Temporal act and Spiritual and the mony is now the tythe for which the Parson may sue in the Spiritual Court And a Case Mich. 5. Jacobi was vouched where a Prescription to pay a Buck or a Doe in consideration of all Tythes was adjudged to be a good Prescription And the Case Mich. 6. Jacobi of Skipton-Park was remembred where the difference was taken when the Prescription runs to Land and when to a Park In the one case although the Park be disparked the Prescription doth remain in the other not And 6 E. 6. Dyer 71. was vouched That although the Park be disparked yet the Fee doth remain And so in the Case at Bar although the casual profit be gone yet the certain profit which is the two shillings doth remain Harris Serjeant contrary And he said that the Conveyance was executory and the Agreement executory and not like unto a Conveyance or Agreement executed And said that Tythes are due jure divino and that the party should not take advantage of his own wrong but that now the Parson should have the tythes in kind And upon the difference of Executory and Executed he vouched many Authorities viz. 16 Eliz. Dyer 335. Calthrops Case 15 E. 4. 3. 5 E. 4. 7. 32 E. 3. Anuitie 245. And in this case he said that the Parson hath no remedy for the shoulder of the Deer and therefore he prayed a Consultation Hobart Chief Justice said That the Pleading was too short and it was not sufficiently pleaded For it is not pleaded That the Park is so disparked that all the benefit thereof is lost But he agreed it That if a man doth pull down his Park-pale that the same is a disparking without any seisure of the Liberty into the Kings hands by a Quo Warranto But yet all the Court agreed That it doth yet remain a Park in habit And they were all also of opinion That the disparking the Park of the Deer was not any disparking of the Park as to take away the Prescription The Case was adjourned till another day Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 330. PIGGOT and PIGGOT's Case IN a Writ of Right the Donee in tail did joyn the Mise upon the meer Right and final Judgment was given against the Donee in which case the Gift in tail was given in Evidence Afterwards the Donee in tail brought a Formedon in the Discender and it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Writ would not lie For when final Judgment is given against the Donee in tail upon issue joyned upon the meer Right it is as strong against him as a Fine with Proclamations and the Court did agree That after a year and day where final Judgment is given the party is barred and also that such final Judgment should bar the Issue in tail Mich. 11 Iacobi in the Exchequer-Chamber 331 AN action upon the Case was brought for speaking these words Thou doest lead a life in manner of a Rogue I doubt not but to see thee hanged for striking Mr. Sydenhams man who was murdered And it was resolved by all the Justices in the Exchequer-Chamber That the words were not actionable At the same day in the same Court a Judgment was reversed in the Exchequer-Chamber because the words were not actionable The words
them and held that the Custom might be good Mich. 17 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 400. IN an Evidence in an Ejectione firme for Land in the Countie of Hartford the Case was this A man was married unto a woman and died The wife after 40 weeks and 10 days was delivered with child of a daughter and whether the said daughter should be heir to her Father or should be bastard was the Question and Sir William Padde Knight and Dr Montford Physitians were commanded by the Court to attend and to deliver their opinions in the Case who being upon their Oaths delivered their opinions That such a child might be a lawfull daughter and heir to her Father For as wellas an Antenatus might be heir viz. a child born at the end of 7 months so they said might a Postnatus viz. child born after the 40 weeks although that 40 weeks be the ordinary time And if it be objected that our Saviour Christ was born at 9 months and five days end who had the perfection of Nature To that it may be answered That that was miraeulum amplias And they held that by many Authorities and by their own Experiences a child might be Legitimate although it be born the last day of the 10â—h Month after the conception of it accounting the Months per Menses solares non Lunares Hill 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 401. WEBB and PATERNOSTERS Case A Man gave Licence unto another to set a Cock of Hay upon his Medow and to remove the same in reasonable time and afterwards he who gave the Licence made a Lease of the Medow to the Defendant who put his Cattel into the Medow which did eat the Hay And for that the Paintiffe brought his Action of Trespass And upon Demurrer joyned the Court was of opinion against the Plaintiffe For upon the whole matter it appeared That the said Hay had stood upon the said ground or Medow for 2 years which the Court held to be an unreasonable time Mich. 18 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 402. BROWN and PELL's Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict found the Case was this Browne had issue two Sons and devised his Lands to his youngest Son and his Heirs And if it shall happen his said youngest Son to die without issue living his eldest Son That then his eldest Son should have the Lands to him and his Heirs in as ample manner as the youngest Son had them The youngest Son suffered a Common Recovery and died without issue living the eldest Son The Question was whether the eldest Son or the Recoverer should have the â—ands Montague Haughton and Chamberlain Justices The same is a Fee-simple Conditional and no Estate Tail in the youngest Son Doddridge Justice contrarie Mich. 18. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 403. POLLYES Case IN an Action of Trespass It was agreed by the Court If 2 Tenants in Common be of Lands upon which Trees are growing and one of them felleth the Trees and layeth them upon his Freehold If the other entreth into the â—and and carrieth them away an Action of Trespasse Quaere clausum fregit lyeth against him because the taking away of the Trees by the first was not wrongfull but that which he might well do by Law And yet the other Tenant in Common might have seized them before they were carried off from the Land But if a man do wrongfully take my Goods as a Horse c. and putteth the same upon his Land I may enter into his Land and seize my Horse again But if he put the Goods into his House in such Case I cannot enter into his House and retake my Goods because every mans House is his Castle into which another man may not enter without special Liâ—ence Hill 19 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 404. THe Case was That two Tenants in Common of Lands made a Lease thereof for years rendring Rent and then one of them died And the Question was who should have the Rent And if the Executor of him who died and the other might joyn in an Action for the Rent And as this Case was The opinion of the whole Court was That the Executor and the other might joyn in one Action for the Rent or sever in Action at their pleasures But if the Lease had been made for life rendring Rent The Court was cleer of opinion that they ought to sever in Actions Trin. 20 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 405. A Man was bounden in a Bond by the name of Edmond and his true name was Edward And an Action of Debt was brought against the Executors of Edmond upon the said Bond who demanded Oyer of the Bond and then pleaded that it was not the Deed of their Testator and issue being thereupon joyned It was found by Inquest in London to be his Deed viz. the Deed of Edmond And it was moved in Arrest of Judgment Quod querens nihil caperet per Billam and so it was resolved and adjudged by the Court Doddridge only being absent And a Case was vouched by Henage Finch Recorder of London to prove this case That it was so adjudged in a Case of Writ of ErError brought in the Exchequer-Chamber in which Case the party himself upon such a Misnosmer and after a Verdict and Judgment given in the same Case did reverse the Judgment for this Error Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 406. VESEY's Case VVIlliam Vesey was indicted for erecting of a Dove-house And Serjeant Harvey moved That the Indictment was insufficient the words were That the Defendant erexit Columbare vi armis ad commune nocumentum c. and that he was not Dominus Manerii nes Rector Ecclesiae And the Indictment was quashed because it was not contained in the Indictment that there were Doves in the Dove-cote For the meer erecting of a Dove-cote if there be no Doves kept in it it is no Nusans as it was holden by the Justices Mich. 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 407 Sir WILLIAM BRONKER's Case SIR William Bronker brought an Action upon the Case for slanderous words And he shewed in his Declaration how that he was a Knight and one of the Gentlemen of His Majesties Privy-Chamber And that the Defendant spake of him these scandalous words viz. Sir William Bronker is a Cosening Knave and lives by Cosenage Which was found for the Plaintiffe In arrest of Judgment it was moved that the words were not actionable And so it was adjudged per Curiam Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 408. YATE and ALEXANDER's Case YAte brought an action upon the Case against Alexander Attorney of the Kings Bench and declared That the Plaintiffe in an action of Debt brought against Alexander the Defendant who was Executor to his Father had Judgment to recover against him as Executor and that he sued forth a Fieri facias to the Sheriffe to have Execution and that before the Sheriffe could come to levy the debt and serve the
it is not known whether he be guilty or not and in Cuddingtons Case it was a general Pardon and that was the cause that the Action did lie for that it is not known whether he committed the Felony or not But they conceived that if it had been a particular Pardon that then in that case the Action would not have been maintainable For the procuring of a special Pardon doth presuppose and it is a strong presumption that the party is guilty of the offence Note it did not appear in the Case of Fines the principal Case whether the Pardon by which Dr. Spicer was pardoned were a general Pardon or whether it were a particular and special Pardon Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 415. DAVER's Case IN Davers Case who was arraigned for the death of William Dutton Ley Chief Justice delivered it for Law That if two men voluntarily fight together and the one killeth the other if it be upon a sudden quarrel that the same is but Man-slaughter And if two men fight together and the one flieth as far as he can and he which flieth killeth him who doth pursue him the same is Se defendendo Also if one man assaulteth another upon the High-way and he who is assaulted killeth the other he shall forfeit neither life nor lands nor goods if he that killed the other fled so far as he could Quod nota Pasch 21 Jacobi â—n the Court of Wards 416. Sir EDWARD COKE's Case THis Case being of great consequence and concernment The Master of the Court of Wards was assisted by four of the Judges in the hearing and debating of it and after many Arguments at the Barr the said four Judges argued the same in Court viz. Dodderidge one of the Justices of the Kings Bench Tanfield Lord chief Baron of the Exchequer Hobart Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and Ley Lord Chief Justice of his Majesties Court of Kings Bench The Case in effect was this Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents did grant to Sir Christopher Hatton the Office of Remembrancer and Collector of the first Fruits for his life Habendum to him after the death or surrender of one Godfrey who held the said Office then in possession Sir Christopher Hatton being thus estated in the said Office in Reversion and being seised in Fee-simple of diverse Mannors Lands and Tenements did Covenant to stand seised of his said lands c. unto the use of himself for life and afterwards to the use of J. Hatton his son in tail and so to his other sons intail with the Remainder to the right heirs of J. Hatton in Fee with Proviso of Revocation at his pleasure during his life Godfrey the Officer in possession died and Sir Christopher Hatton became Officer and was possessed of the Office and afterwards he became indebted to the Queen by reason of his said Office And the Question in this great Case was Whether the Mannors and Lands which were so conveyed and setled by Sir Christopher Hatton might be extended for the said Debt due to the Queen by reason of the Proviso and Revocation in the said Conveyance of Assurance of the said Mannors and Lands the debt due to the Queen was assign'd over and the Lands extended and the Extent came to Sir Edward Coke and the heir of John Hatton sued in the Court of Wards to make void the Extent And it was agreed by the said four Justices and so it was afterwards decreed by Cranfield Master of the Court of Wards and the whole Court That the said Mannors and Lands were liable to the said Extent And Dodderidge Justice who argued first said that the Kings Majestie had sundry prerogatives for the Recovery of Debts and other Duties owing unto him First he had this prerogative ab origine legis That he might have the Lands the Goods and the Body of the Person his Debtor in Execution for his Debt But at the Common Law a common person a common person could not have taken the body of his debtor in execution for his debt but the same priviledg was given unto him by the Statute of 25. E. 3. cap. 17. At the Common Law he said that a common person Debtee might have had a Levari facias for the Recovery of his Debt by which Writ the Sheriffe was commanded Quod de terris Catallis ipsius the Debtor c. Levari faciat c. but in such Case the Debtee did not meddle with the Land but the Sheriffe did collect the Debt and pay the same over to the Debtor But by the Statute of West 2. cap 20. The Debtee might have an Elegit and so have the moyetie of the Lands of his Debtor in Execution for his Debt as it appeareth in C. 3. part 12. in Sir William Harberts Case Secondly He said That the King had another prerogative and that was to have his Debt paid before the Debt of any Subject as it appeareth 41. E. 3. Execution 38. and Pasc 3. Elizabeth Dyer 197. in the Lord Dacres and Lassels Case and in M. 3. E. 6. Dyer 67 Stringfellows Case For there the Sheriffe was amerced because the King ought to have his Debt first paid and ought to be preferred before a Subject vid. 328 Dyer There the words of the Writ of Priviledg shew that the King is to be preferred before other Creditors By the Statute of 33. H. 8. cap. 39. The Execution of the Subject shall be first served if his Judgment be before any Processe be awarded for the Kings debt In the Statute of 25. E. 3. Cap. 19. I find that by the Common Law the King might grant a Protection to his Debtor that no other might sue him before that the King was satisfied his debt See the Writ of Protection Register â— 81. B. the words of which are Et quia nolumus solutionem debitorum nostrorum caeteris omnibus prout ratione Perogativae nostrae totis temporibus retroactis usitatae c. But that grew such a Grievance to the Subject that the Statute of 25. E. 3. Cap. 19. was made And now by that Statute a common person may lawfully sue to Judgment but he cannot proceed to Execution and so the Kings Prerogative is saved unless the Plaintiffe who sueth will give security to pay first the Kings Debt For otherwise if the Paty doth take forth Execution upon his Judgment and doth levy the money the same money may be seized upon to satisfie the Kings Debt as appeareth in 45. E. 3. title Decies tantum 13. The third Prerogative which the King hath is That the King shall have the Debt of the Debtor to the Kings Debtor paid unto him v. 21 H. 7. 12. The Abbot of Ramseys Case The Prior of Ramsey was indebted to the King and another Prior was indebted to the Prior of Ramsey and then it was pleaded in Barr that he had paid the same Debt to the King and the Plea holden for a good Plea
Cestuy que use when he entreth and maketh a Lease he hath no reversion nor shall punish waste And as it is in the Creation so is it in the Continuance 4 H. 7. 18. If Cestuy que use for life or in tail maketh a Lease for life it is warranted during his own life by the Statute of 1 R. 3. but if Tenant for life at the Common Law maketh a Feoffment or a lease for life there the first Lessor ought to avoid this forfeiture by entrie and it is not void by the death of the second Lessor viz. the Tenant for life 27 H. 8. 23. A Feme Covers is Cestuy que use the husband maketh a Feoffment and dieth the Feoffment is void by his death Br. Feoffments to Uses 48. If Cestuy que use for life levieth a fine it is no forfeiture but good by the Statute of 1 R. 3. during his own life And if in such case Proclamations pass there needeth no claim nor entrie within five years but the Law is contrarie of Tenant for life by the Common Law for if Tenant for life at the Common Law levieth a fine it is a forfeiture Dyer 57. Cestuy que use for life or in tail maketh a Lease for life the Lease is determined by the death of Cestuy que use and the Lessee is become Tenant at sufferance but a Lease for life by Tenant for life at the Common Law is not determined by the death of Lessee for life who was Lessor and his Tenant is tenant for life and not at sufferance as in the Case before and the first Lessor ought to avoid it by entrie Br. Feoffments to Uses 48. A Recovery by Cestuy que use in tail or in fee is ended by his death By these Cases appears a main difference betwixt the validitie of a Feoffment by Cestuy que use and the Feoffment at the Common Law The Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses doth not execute Uses which are in abeyance C. 1. part Chudleigh's Case 9 H. 6. by the Common Law the Devise to an Enfant in ventre samier is good but by the Statutes of 32 and 34 H. 8. of Wills such a Devise is not good for the Statute Law doth not provide for the putting of lands in abeyance By the Statute of 1 R. 3. All Feoffments and Releases c. shall be good and effectual to those to whom they are made to their uses And this Feoffment in our Case was not made to a man in Nubibus Cestuy que use by this Statute of 1 R. 3. makes a lease for years the remainder over to the right heirs of I. S. the remainder is not good for the Statute doth not put it in abeyance for the remainder ought to be limited to one in esse 21 H. 8. cap. 4. giveth power to Executors to sell that Executor who proveth the Will shall sell and when he selleth if he have any right to the land the right of the said Executor is not gone by that Statute So if Commissioners upon the Statute of Bankrupts sell the Lands of the Bankrupt and one of the Commissioners hath right to the land so sold his right is not extinct And so in this Case the Statute limits what shall pass Upon the Statute of â—3 Eliz. cap. 4. which makes the lands of Receivers liable for their debts if the King selleth the right of the Accomptant passeth but not the Kings right 17 E. 3. 60. An Abbot having occasion to go beyond the Seas made another Abbot his Procurator to present to such Benefices which became void in his absence That Abbot presents in the name of him who made him Procurator to one of his own Advowsons the right of his own Advowson doth not pass but yet it is an usurpation of the Abbot which went beyond sea to that Church What is the nature of this right All rights are not giâ—en away by Feoffments at the Common Law Lit. 672. Land is given unto husband and wife in tail the husband maketh a Feoffment and takes back an Estate to him and his wife both of them are remitted Which Case proveth that the husband hath left in himself a right notwithstanding the Feoffment 41 E. 3. 17. 41 Ass 1. John at Lee's Case So at the Common Law a Feoffment doth not give away all the right This right doth stick so fast in the issue as the Statute of West 2. cap. 1. can back it unto him 2 E. 3. 23. 22 E. 3. 18. At the Common Law if Tenant in tail had offered to levie a fine the Judges ought not to receive it but ought to have refused it if it had appeared unto them that the Conusor was Tenant in tail the same was before the Statute of 4 H. 7. which gave power to Tenant in tail to levie a fine for the Statute of West 2. Cap. 1. saies Quod finis sit nullus 2. E. 2. age 77. 2 E. 3. 33. 3 E. 3. 1. 24 E 3. 25. If Donee in tail levieâ—h a Fine yet there is no remedie against his Tenant for he shall not be compelled to attorn for that the right is in the Donor â— E. 2. Avowry 181. 48 E. 3. 8. Avowry was made upon the Donee in tail notwithstanding that he made a Feoffment and Avowry is in the realtie and right 4 E. 3. 4. 4 H. 6. 28. 10 H. 7. 14. In a Replevin ancient Demesne is a good plea because the Avowry is in the realtie The Donor shall know for homage upon the Donee after that the Donee hath made a Feoffment 7 E. 4. 28. the Donee shall do homage And Litt. 90. saith That none shall do homage but such as is seised in his own right or in the right of another 2 E. 2. Avowry 85. 7 E 54. 28. 15 E. 4. 15 Gard. 116. the issue shall be in Ward notwithstanding a Feoffment by Tenant in tail Com. 561. Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment yet the right of the tail doth remain in the Tenant in tail 21 H. 7. 40. Tenant in tail of a Rent grants the same in Fee if an Ancestor collateral releaseth with Warranty the same bindeth the Tenant in tail There is a common Rule That a Warranty doth not bind when a man hath not a right The Cases cited in C. 1. part Albonies Case where Feoffments give Rights I agree Barton and Ewers Case A man made a Feoffment of Land of which he had cause to have a Writ of Error he gave away his Writ of Error by the Feoffment I agree all those Cases for that is in Cases of Feoffments at the Common Law but in our Case the Feoffment is by the Statute of 1 R. 3. In our Case there is Jus habendi possedendi recuperandi It is like unto a plant in Winter which seemeth to be dead yet there is in it anima vegitativa which in due time brings forth fruit So the right in our Case is not given away nor is it in abeyance
but in Francis Bigot which may be regained in due time Dyer 340. there was Scintilla juris as here in our Case 19 H. 8. 7. Where Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and the Feoffee levieth a fine and five years pass there it is said that the Issue in tail shall have five years after the death of Tenant in tail who made the Feoffment and the reason is because he is the first to whom the right doth discend This Case was objected against me yet I answer that Tenant in tail in that Case hath right but he cannot claim it by reason of his own Feoffment he cannot say he hath right but another may say he hath right In our Case Francis Bigot cannot say he hath a Right in him but another may say he hath a Right It is like where Tenant in Fee taketh a Lease for years by Deed Indented of his own Lands He during the years cannot say that he hath Fee yet all other may say that he hath the Fee C. 4. part 127. The King shall avoid the Feoffment for the benefit of a Lunatique which Feoffment the Lunatique had made and shall not the King avoid a Feoffment which a Lunatique hath made for his own benefit viz for the benefit of the King himself I conceive that he shall Secondly Admit the right be in the person viz. in Francis Bigot yet they object that it is a right of Action and so not forfeited If this right be in the person at the time of the Attainder it shall be forfeited if it be not in his person but in Nubibus yet it shall be forfeited Tenant in tail makes a Feoffment unto the use of himself and his wife in tail if the old right of entail rest or not in his person it is forfeited to the King 34 Eliz. this very Point was then adjudged Where Tenant in tail before the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses made a Feoffment unto the use of himself and his wife in tail It was resolved upon mature deliberation by all the Judges of England that the old Estate tail was in such case forfeited for Treason Set this Judgment aside yet it rests upon the Statute of 26 H. 8. A general Act for forfeiture for Treason and the particular Act of 31 H. 8. which was made for the particular Attaindor of Francis Bigot I will argue argue only upon the Statute 26 H. 8. which hath three clauses First to take away Sanctuary Secondly to provide that no Treason be committed and the Offender punished The third which clause I am to deal with which giveth the forfeiture of Lands of Inheritance c These three clauses do depend upon the Preamble It was high time to make this Statute For when H. 8. excluded the Pope he was to stand upon his guard And that year of 26 H. 8. there were five several Insurrections against the King therefore it was great wisdom to bridle such persons King Ed. 6. and Queen Mary repealed divers Statutes for Treason and Felony yet left this Statute of 26 H. 8. to stand in force Anno 5 E. 6. cap. 5. this Statute of 26 H. 8. somewhat too strict was in part repealed viz. That the Church lands should not be forfeited for the Treason of the Parson This third branch doth insist upon a Purview aâ—d a Saving and both agree with the Preamble The Purview is ample Every Offender and Offenders of any manner of High Treason shall forfeit and lose c. I observe these two words in the Statute shall Forfeit those things which are forfeitable and Lose those things which are not forfeitable But it shall be lost that the heir of the Offender shall not find it shall Forfeit and lâ—se to the King his heirs and successors for ever so it is a perpetual forfeiture shall forfeit all his Lands which includes Use Estate and Right by any right title or means So you have Estate Right Title and Use Here Francis Bigot shal forfeit the Castle and Mannor of Mulgrave unto the King his heirs and Successors and he must forfeit the Land Right Title and Use otherwise it cannot be to the King for ever and what is saved to strangers all shall be saved and what will you not save to the Offender and his heirs all his Lands Right c. as was saved to strangers It was objected that it was not an Act of Assurance but an Act of Forfeiture which is not so strong as an Act of Assurance I do not doubt of the difference but how much will that difference make to this Case doth the Statute goe by way of Escheat it doth not but in case of Petty Treason Land shall Escheat but when the Statute of 25 E. 3. speaketh of High Treason the words of the said Statute are Shall forfeit the Escheat to the King But is the Right devided from the King Truely no the word Forfeit take it in nomine or in natura is as strong a word as any word of Assurance Alienare in the Statute of West 2. cap. 1. Non habeant illi potestatem alienandi so non habent illi potestatem forisfaciendi is in the nature of a Gift Com. 260. Forfeiture is a gift in Law Et fortior est dispositio legis quam hominis and so as strong as any assurance of the partie If a Statute give the Land to the King then there needeth not any Office 27 H. 8. Br. Office Com. 486. The Right vests before Office It was objected that the statute of 26 H 8. doth not extend to a right of Action but to a right of Entrie The purpose of this Act of 26 H. 8. is not to attaint any particular person as the Statute of 31 H. 8. was made for the particular Attaindor of Francis Bigot 5 E. 4. 7. Cestuy que use at the Common Law did not forfeit for Felony or Treason but by this Act of 26. H. 8. Cestuy que use shall forfeit both Use and Lands out of the hands of the Feoffees 4 E. 3. 47. 4 Ass 4. The husband seised in the right of his wife at the Common Law for Treason shall not forfeit but the profits of the lands of his wife during his life and not the Freehold it self but by this Act of 26 H. 8. the Freehold it self is forfeited 18 Eliz. in the Common Pleas Wyats Case C. 10. Lib. Entries 300. And if the Statute of 26 H. 8. had had no saving all had been forfeited from the wife 7 H. 4. 32. there it is no forfeiture yet by this Statute it is a forfeiture A right of Action shall not Escheat 44 E 3. 44 Entre Cong 38 C. 3 part the Marquess of Winchesters Case and Bowtiâ—s Case and C 7. part Inglefieldâ—s Case A right of Action per se shall not be forfeited by the Rules of the Common Law nor by any Statute can a right of Action be transferred to another but by the Common Law a right of Action may
the Kings Bench by the opinion of the whole Court the Judgment was reversed Trin. 21 Jacobi Intratur Hill 20 Jac. Rot. 137. in the Kings Bench. 444. KITE and SMITH's Case ONe Recovered by Erronious Judgment and the Defendant did promise unto the Plaintiffe That if he would forbear to take forth Execution that at such a day certain he would pay him the debt and damages And Action upon the Case was brought upon that Promise And now it was moved by the Defendants Councel That there was not any Consideration upon which the Promise could be made because the Judgment was an Erronious Judgment It was adjourned But I conceive that because it doth not appear to the Court but that the Judgment is a good Judgment that it is a good Consideration Otherwise if the Judgment had been reversed by a Writ of Error before the Action upon the Case brought upon the Promise for there it doth appear judicially to the Court that the Judgment was Erronious Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 445. TOTNAM and HOPKIN's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought upon an Assumpsit And the Plaintiff did declare That in Consideration of c. the Defendant 1 Martii did promise to pay and deliver to the Plaintiffe 20 Quarters of Barley the next Seed-time Upon Non Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiffe It was moved for the Defendant That the Plaintiffe ought to have shewed in his Declaration when the Seed-time was which he hath not done But it was answered That he needeth not so to do because he brings his Action half a year after the Promise for not payment of the same at Seed-time which was betwixt the Promise and the Assumpsit Dodderidge Justice If I promise to pay you so much Corn at Harvest next If it appeareth that the Harvest is ended before the Action brought it is good without shewing the time of the Harvest for it is apparent to the Court that the Harvest is past And here the Action being brought at Michaelmas it sufficiently appears that the Harvest is past And Judgment was given for the â—laintiffe Trin. 21 Iacobi Iatratur Hill 1â— Iacobi Rot. 652. inter Hard Foy in the Kings Bench. 446. KELLAWAY's Case IN an Ejectione Firme brought for the Mannor of Lillington upon a Lease made by Kellaway to Fey It was found by a special Verdict That M. Kellaway seised of the Mannor of Lillington in Fee holden in Soccage did devise the same by his Will in writing in these words viz. For the good will I bear unto the name of the Kellawayes I give all my Lands to John Kellaway in tail the Remainder to my right Heirs so long as they keep the true intent and meaning of this my Will To have to the said John Kellaway and the heirs of his body untill John Kellaway or any of his issues go about to alter and change the intent and meaning of this my Will Then and in such case it shall be lawfull to and for H. Kellaway to enter and have the Land in tail with the like limitation And so the Lands was put in Remainder to five several persons the Remainder to the right heirs of the Devisor M. Kellaway dyed without issue John Kellaway is heir and entred and demised the same to R. K. for 500 years and afterwards granted all his estate to Hard. Afterwards John Kellaway did agree by Deed indented with W. K. to levy a Fine of the Reversion to W. and his heirs H. Kellaway entred according to the words of the Proviso in the Will and made the Lease to Foy who brought an Ejectione Firme against Hard. And whether H. Kellaway might lawfully enter or no was the Question It was objected That in the Case there is not any Forfeiture because the Fine was without proclamations and so it was a Discontinuance only The first Question is If the Remainder doth continue The second is If it be a Perpetuity or a Limitation John Kellaway is Tenant in tail by Devise untill such time as John Kellaway or any of his issues agree or go about to alter or change the estate tail mentioned in the Will with Proviso to make Leases for 21 years 3 lives or to make Jointures Then his Will is That it shall be lawfull for H. K. to enter and to have the Land with the same limitations If it be a Perpetuity then it is for the Plaintiffe but if it be but a Limitation then it is for the Defendant The Fine was levied without proclamations and H. K. entreth for the Forfeiture Damport It is no Perpetuity but a Limitation which is not restrained by the Law as Perpetuities are Untill such time as c. shall discontinue c. The Jury find an Agreement by Indenture The act which is alleadged to be the breach is Conclusivit agreavit not to levy a Fine with proclamations but to levy a Fine without proclamations which is but a Discontinuance Yelverton If the Fine had been with proclamations then without doubt he in the Remainder during the life of him who levied it had been barred The Devise was To have to them and to the heirs of their bodies so long as they and every of their issues do observe perform fulfill and keep the true meaning of this my Will touching the entailed Lands in form following and no otherwise And therfore I M. Kellaway do devise unto John Kellaway the issue of his body the Remainder c. â—o have to the said John Kellaway and the issue of his body untill he or any of his issue shall go about to conclude do or make any act or acts to alien discontinue or change the true meaning of this my Will That then my Will is and I do give and bequeath to H K in tail And that it shall be lawfull for him the said H. K. or his issue to enter immediately upon such assent conclusion or going about to conclude c. And that H. K. and his issue shall leave it untill he or any of them go about c. C. 9 part Sundayes Case 128. where it was resolved That no Condition or Limitation be it by act executed or by limitation of an Use or by a Devise can bar Tenant in tail to alien by a common Recovery v. C. 3. part acc The Case was not resolved but it was adjourned to another day to be argued and then the Court to deliver their opinions in it Trin. 21. Intratur Trin. 20 Jacobi Rot. 811. in the Kings Bench. 447. KNIGHT's Case IN this Case George Crook said That Land could not belong to Land yet in a Will such Land which had been enjoyed with other might pass by the words cum pertinaciis As where A. hath two houses adjoyning viz. the Swan and the Red-Lyon and A. hath the Swan in his own possession and occupieth a Parlour or Hall which belongs in truth to the Red-Lyon with the Swan-house and then leaseth the Red-lyon
make a mingling of their Offices Vi. 13 E. 4 10 E. 3. By Hill and Herle For Trials out of the Chancery the Chancery and Kings Bench are but as one Court and if the Record come not in duely as it should the Court was never well seised of the Record Ley Chief Justice The coming of the Writ to the hands of one or two of the Commissioners shall not stay the Commission but the receipt of the one of them is the receit of them all having notice of it and the others may joyn with him to whom the Commission is delivered So it is in all cases every one of the Commissioners are interessed therein upon notice and not he only to whom the Commission is delivered If one Justice of peace taketh a Recognizance and dieth before it be certified the Certiorari shall be directed to the other Justice to certifie it if it come to his hands and he may retorn the Recognizance and it shall not be directed to the Executors of the Iustice who have not the Recognizance for the Certiorari is but the hand for the Court to receive it for otherwise the King might lose the benefit of the Recognizance And in our Case the Sheriff by a special Commission hath Authority to take the Recognizance and to retorn it upon Record One may do part of the Office as to make and take the Recognizance and the other may retorn it but one cannot execute a thing in part and another in another part the taking of the Recognizance by the two Justices doth exclude the Sheriff from medling with the taking or making of it but it doth not hinder him but that he may retorn it well enough and the Writ or Commission is general Vicecomiti which may extend as well to the new Sheriff as to the old Sheriff The Case was adjourned for by two Iudges the Supplicavit and Recognizance were not well retorned by the new Sheriff but Ley Chief Justice was against them Quaere Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 452. RANDAL and HARVEY's Case THe Case was Harvey in consideration that Brown might go at large who was arrested at the suit of Randal gave his word that Brown should pay the money at such a day certain and for non-payment of the money Randal brought his Action against Harvey and being at issue upon the promise it was found for the Plaintiff Yelverton moved in arrest of Iudgment that the arrest of Brown was not warrantable by Law and that being the consideration the Promise was void and he said A man cannot make another his Attorney to arrest another man without Deed neither can the Sheriff give Warrant to his Baylie to arrest another without a Deed sealed And in the principal case Randal gave one a VVarrant to T. being an Attorney to demand receive and recover money from Brown but it did not appear by the Declaration that the VVarrant was by Deed in writing George Crook said that it was no Exception For be the Arrest lawfull or unlawfull yet he said the consideration was good Randal gave to his Attornie Authority to receive demand and recover thereby he gave him Authority to arrest Brown because the arrest is incident to the Recoverie 2 R. 2. Grants One grants to another all the Fish in his Pond he may fish with Nets For when he giveth the principal the incidents do follow VVhen Brown had yieldded himself to be lawfully arrested and then Harvey in consideration that Brown might go at liberty made the promise the same was good The Declaration was That Randal gave Authority to T. being an Attorney to receive deliver and recover the Debt by force of which Letter of Attorney T. did arrest Brown and so in the Declaration it is shewed that the Warrant was a Letter of Attorney Yelverton 34 H. 6. In Debt upon a Recoverie in the 5 Ports If a man will declare and set forth a thing in particular if he faileth in any thing it overthroweth his Action But if a man alledge generally a Recoverie in the 5 Ports then the same is good enough I agree the Case of 9 E. 4. Where a man gives leave to another to lay Pipes of Lead through his Lands that he may dig the ground to lay them there because it is incident to it And I agree the Case of 2 R. 2. for there the one thing cannot be done without the other viz. the Fish cannot be taken without Nets but in this Case the partie might have come by his money by Outlawrie and so there needed no arresting of the partie Ley Chief Justice If he had declared debito modo arrestatus it had been generally good and it must be intended that the Arrest was by vertue of a Letter of Attorney For he alledges that he gave him Authority to recover and then he shall have and use the means to recover as to arrest the partie or to outlaw him Haughton Justice Things incident and accessary may be comprehended in the principal as to dig for to mend the Pipe 9 E. 4. Because he grants him leave to lay them in the ground and so he may dig and justifie the same for the amending of the pipes If A. Licence B. to hunt in his Park and to kill a Deer yet B. cannot carry away the Deer for that is not incident to the thing granted In this case the Declaration is not good for he ought to set forth that the VVarrant was by Deed in writing and yet one may plead a Judgment generally quod debito modo he recovered and the same is good but here in this case he ought to set forth and shew the VVarrant and Authority by which he was arrested but not so in the case of pleading of a Judgment because there it doth refer to matter of Record Dodderidge Justice The promise was to free him from the arrest and if the arrest was unlawfull then there was no consideration and so by consequent the promise was void It ought to be shewed that Brown was lawfully arrest and if the arrest had been only matter of inducement and no cause of the Action then it had been sufficient to have said debito modo arrestatus but in this case the arrest it self is material and the Plaintiff hath shewed that the arrest was per debitum legis Cursum by vertue of a VVarrant of Attorney and it doth not appear but that it was a Letter of Attorney to deliver Seisin and so because the Plaintiff hath not shewed the arrest to be lawfull there was no good consideration whereupon to ground the promise and so no cause of Action Yelverton took another Exception viz. That the Plaintiff doth not shew that the arrest was per breve Regis or how it was Chamberlain Justice If the partie had brought an Action of false Imprisonment this Plea had not been good and in this case there appeareth to be no good consideration for it doth not appear that it was a
lawfull arrest for no time is shewed nor no place nor how it was done Ley The Jury have found it to be debito modo and in this case the arrest is not in question by matter of Plea but by Declaration and the finding of the Jury hath made the same to be good Dodderidge Justice If A. be indebted to B. B may have either an Action upon the Case or an Action of Debt for the money but in an Action of Debt unless it be in London by the Custome Concessit solvere is no good Plea But in an Action upon the Case the Plaintiff may declare That whereas A. was indebted to him in a certain sum of money that Concessit solvere and there he needeth not to shew how he became indebted unto him as he ought to do in an Action of Debt Chamberlain Justice If a man be arrested upon a void arrest and another in consideration of setting him at liberty doth promise to pay the Debt there it is a thing Collateral and an Action will lie But if the arrest cometh in question then in that Case the Action will not lie but he may avoid it by special pleading for the arrest being unlawfull there is no consideration whereupon to ground the promise Yelverton If the Plaintiff had said in the Declaration That in consideration that he would forbear his Debt that he would pay c. there for not payment the Action would have been maintainable but in this case the consideration is the setting him at Liberty and so it is Collateral At another day Ley Chief Justice If I arrest a man generally and the party promise for the discharge of the arrest to give 20l. it is no good consideration if I do not shew that he had cause to arrest him For if the arrest be upon an ill ground the consideration is not good Haughton Justice To make it a lawfull arrest the partie ought to shew the Process the Letter of Attorney and the proceedings and an agreement afterwards made will not make the arrest good Legitimo debito modo arrestatus is too general for he ought to shew how he became indebted to him For if I be bounden to make unto I. S. a lawfull assurance or conveyance of such Lands it is too general for me to say that I have made him a lawfull assurance but I ought to shew what manner of assurance it is that the Court may judge whether it be a lawfull and good assurance or not In Mich. Term followinging 21 Jacobi It was adjudged That Judgment should be arrested Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. Intratur Mich. 19. Rot. 5â— 453 SEIGNIOR and WOLMER's Case IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit the Declaration was general that the Defendant Assumpsit to the Plaintiff and the Jury found that the promise was made to I. N. who Seignior the Plaintif sent and appointed ad componendum agreandum the Debt of Wolmer the Defendant It was argued That the promise made to the Servant was a promise to the Master Vi. â— E. 4. Where the sale of the Servant is the sale of the Master 8 H. 5. in trespas The Defendant said that the Prior of c. was seised c. and that such a one his Steward made a Demise unto him there it was ruled that he ought to have pleaded that the Prior did demise V. 27 H. 8. Jorden and Tatams Case which is express in the point Jorden brought an Action upon the Case against Tatam and declared that he did assume to him as the words of the book are The Evidence was That Tatam came in the absence of Jorden the husband and assumed to the wife of Jorden and our Case is a stronger Case then that for there the husband gave no authority to the wife to take such Assumpsit but in our Case he did authorize I. N. and it was adjudged that the agreement of the husband afterwards made the Assumpsit to be good to the husband But in our Case I. N. had authority to take the Assumpsit viz. Seignior sent I. N. ad componendum agreandum the Debt and Wolmer assumed to pay the money c. and I. N gave notice thereof to Seignior and he agreed unto Dodderidge Justice An Assumpsit to the Servant for the Master is good to the Master and an Assumpsit by the appointment of the Master of the Servant shall bind the Master and is his Assumpsit 27 Ass If my Baily of my Mannor buy cattel to stock my grounds I shall be chargeable in an Action of Debt and if my Baily sell corn or cattel I shall have an Action of Debt for the money For whatsoever comes within the compass of the servants service I shall be chargeable with and likewise shall have advantage of the same If a Servant selleth a horse with Warranty it is the sale and contract of the Master but it is the Warranty of the Servant unless the Master giveth him authority to warrant it for a Warranty is void which is not made and annexed to the contract but there it is the Warranty of the Servant and the Contract of the Master But if the Master do agree unto it after it shall be said that he did agree to it ab initio As where a Servant doth a disseisin to the use of his Master the Master not knowing of it and then the Servant makes a Lease for years and then the Master agrees the Master shall not avoid the Lease for years for now he is in by reason of his agreement ab initio When the Servant promiseth for the Master that the Master shall forbear to sue c. and shall by such a day deliver to the Defendant the Obligation c. and the Defendant promiseth to pay the money at such a day and the Master having notice thereof agreeth to it it is now the promise of the Master ab initio for it is included in his authority that he should agree compound c. and he hath power to make a promise Judgment in the principal Case was given for the Plaintiff Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. Intratur Pasch 18. Rot. 139. 454. GLEEDE and WALLIS Case A Writ of Error was brought to Reverse a Judgment given in the Court of Northampton in an Action upon the Case upon a Promise The Error which was assigned was because that it appeareth that the Action was brought before the Plaintiff had made request The Case was a Contract was made betwixt Gleede and Wallis and Wallis was to pay to Gleede 10l when Gleede should require him Gleede brought an Action in the said Court 1 Martii 16 Jacobi and the Request is laid to be 7 Martii 16 Jacobi following Where a Contract is made and no time is expressed for payment of the money If the partie bring his Action before he make his request he shall not have damages but if he maketh an actual request and the Defendant doth not
by vertue of the Act of 31 H. 8. A Feoffment in Fee is made unto the use of A. in Tail he hath the Use by the Statute of West â— cap. 1. Now when the Statute of 27 H. 8. cap. 10. came he hath the possession by force of that Act viz. of 27 H. 8. and not by force of the Statute of West 2. If the King be not in by the Statute of 3 H. 8. then he shall not have every of the Priviledges which the Act of 31 H. 8. giveth C. 2. part The Bishop of Canterburies Case The Colledg of Maidstone was Religious but not Ecclesiastical and it was adjudged that the Purchasors of the Lands of the said Colledg were not discharged from the payment of Tythes because the Colledg was not Ecclesiastical but Religious only and Religious and not Ecclesiastical came not to the King by the Statute of 31 H. 8. 18 Jacobi in the Common Pleas Wrights Case The Priory of Hatfield being of small value viz. not having Lands of the value of 200l per annum was dissolved by the Statute of 27 H. 8. and the Lands were not Tythe-free in the hands of the Purchasors because the Priory came not to the King by the Statute of 31 H. 8. and yet they were Tythe-free in the hands of the Prior himself The second point upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. The words are That the King shall have all Rights Interests and Priviledg as it was in the hands of the Abbots Priors c. It is objected To be free from payment of Tythes is a Priviledg I answer That neither Right Interest nor Priviledg do free him from the payment of Tythes First there is no discharge of Tythes by the word Interest in the Statute for that is plain Then the question is if the word Priveledg will discharge the Lands from the payment of Tythes and if that word would have sufficed to have discharged the Tythe what need was there of the special Clause to discharge Tythes The Statute of 27 H. 8. dissolves Chaunteries and there it is said That the King shall have and enjoy c. and there also all Priviledges are given then the Statute of 1 E. 6. came and gave all Chauntries to the King and there the word Priviledg was not in the Act yet by those words the Lands were not discharged from the payment of Tythes The Statute of 31 H. 8. is Conditions and Rights of Entrie yet there was another Act made to give Conditions to the King But admit that the King himself be discharged yet his Patentees are not discharged The Priviledg was personal and personal Priviledges are not transferrable 35 H. 6. 56. A Statute dissolveâ— the Templers and gives the Lands to the Hospitalers to hold by the same service as the Templers did which was Frankalmoign yet the Grantee held by Fealty for that Frankalmoign is a personal priviledg and cannot be transferred by general words The King it's true shall have the priviledg for he is a priviledged person for of his goods he shall not pay Tythes if he do not grant them over and the Grants prove That unless he had granted them he should have paid no Tythes The Statute of 31 H. 8. sayes All Conditions which the Abbots c. have yet untill the Statute of 32 H 8. no Purchasor could take advantage of a Condition Hill 44. Eliz. in the Common Pleas Rot. 1994. Spurlings Case The Purchasors of Lands of the Hospital of St Johns of Jerusalem were not priviledged from the payment of Tythes Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas Vrry and Bowyers Case In a Prohibition it was holden by Cook and Nichols That the Purchasor of St Johns of Jerusalem should pay Tythes but Winch and Warburton cont 18 Jacobi in the Common Pleas All the Judges but Warburton held that the Purchasor should pay Tythes 10 Eliz. Dyer There it doth not appear whether they were of the Order of Templers or Cistertians The third point in this Case The Defendant doth make no title to the Discharge for he hath not averred that the Priory were Ecclesiastical persons If a man plead that A. is professed the Court cannot take notice of it that he is a dead person in Law But if he saith that he was of such an Order he ought to set forth of what Rule the Order is Secondly The manner of their discharge was when they did Till and sow their Lands propriis sumptibus manibus If they grub up Roots and make the Lands fit for Tillage but if their Tenants sow the Lands they shall pay Tythes for they had the priviledg in respect they should not be idle unless all these do concur they shall pay Tythes viz. plough sow reap and carrie the Corn. These Priviledges are to be taken stritly because they are to defeat the Church of her endowment and therefore in this Case the Defendant doth not well entitle himself to the Discharge unless he do shew that he did occupie the Land for one whole year before and that he did plow sow and â—eap the corn But he ought for to have shewed that such time he plâ—â—ed the Land such a time he sowed it and such a time he reaped the 〈◊〉 Otherwise the Court will intend that another man did plow and sow the land and that he only reaped it For if Lessee of the Hospital doth plow the Land and sow it and afterwards doth surrender to the Prior of the Hospital who reaps the same he shall pay Tythe of the same for the Priviledge was granted unto them who were Labourers And the Defendant perhaps might have the Lands to halfs that is to say to have half the Corn growing upon the Lands The pleading is not good When you plead two Bars each Bar must stand of it self and the surplusage of the one Bar shall not help the defect of the other Bar. The word Priviledge in the Act of 32 H. 8. doth not extend to Tythes If it doth yet the Purchasor shall not have the Priviledge Dodderidge Justice The Statute of 32 H. 8. was made because that those of S. Johns of Jerusalem said that they could not surrender their Hospital because they had a Supreme Head over them viz. their great Master the Pope Crawley Serjeant argued for Weston the Defendant The pleading was over-ruled to be good the last day the Case was argued We have well entitled our selves to the Discharge For we have pleaded that we had the occupation of the Lands for one whole year and that Weston the Defendant plowed sowed and reaped the Corn upon the lands at his own costs and charges And the Plaintiff hath not shewed that any other plowed sowed or reaped the same Our title is by prescription which is confessed This Society was erected in the time of King Henry the 1. and it continued untill 32 H. 8. 44 Eliz. in Spurlings case there were two reasons of the Judgment 1. There the Statute of 31 H. 8.
39 H. 6. 9. is ruled in the point there the Attachment is in his own hands there the other pleaded there was no debt It is there ruled that the debt is not traversable for if there be no debt then he shall have restitution in London upon the pledges It was objected That he is to swear his debt to be a true debt I answer It ought to be so intended and then if he lay a Custom to swear the Debt and we say we have sworn our Debt then we have pursued the Custom 3. It was objected that it is not shewed where the goods were whether within the jurisdiction of the City 4 E. 4. 36. there the place came not in question But in our Case we lay That the Custom is that the goods must be in London Old Entries 155 156. there it is not alleadged that the goods were within the City of London at the time of the Attachment If a Precept be awarded to the Officer who retorns that he hath not any thing within the City and upon the allegation of the Plaintiff that such a one hath goods of the Defendant in his hands was the Objection I answer If we have not proceeded well yet the Process is well enough for here is a Judgment against him in London then so long as the Judgment is in force against him he cannot have the goods 21 E. 4 23. b. It is a Rule That a stranger unto a plaint shall not be received to alleadge discontinuance in the process So the Sheriff shall not excuse himself upon an Escape that there was Error in the Judgment nor a privy shall not take advantage of it Ognels Case Trim. 31 Eliz. there lies no process of Capias by the Law upon a Recognisance but Extent or Levari facias Yet there a Capias was awarded and if the party taken escape the Sheriff shall not take advantage of the Erronious process So I desire Judgment for the Defendant And he took an Exception to the Declaration In Detinue if the Declaration be general it is good sc Licet sepius requisitu c. But here he shews that he delivered the Cloak to be redelivered upon Request and he doth not shew any particular Request but sayes generally Licet sepius requisitus Ward There is a difference betwixt Detinue and Action upon the Case For in an Action upon the Case he ought to shew a particular Request 26 H. 6. If I bail goods to redeliver upon request yet I may seise them without request Dodderidge Justice The reseisure of the goods is a Request in Law a Request with a witness a Request with effect and untill Request he hath just cause to keep them Jones Justice In Debt and Detinue the very bringing of the Action and demand of the Writ is a demand and request And if he appear at the first Summons then he excuses himself otherwise he shall be subject to damages but the Request ought not to be so precisely alleadged But if a collateral thing be to be done upon Request there to say sepius requisitus is not sufficient So if I sell a horse for 10â— to be paid upon Request there the Request must be precisely laid for it is parcel of the Contract And in Action upon the Case and upon Debt you must lay a Request Dodderidge Justice The Request is no part of the Debt for the Debt is presently due but if I make the Request to be part of the Contract there it is otherwise As if I deliver goods to redeliver to me there needeth no precise Request but if it be to redeliver upon Request there the Request ought to be alleadged for there the Request is part of the Contract The Case was adjourned till the next Term. Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 484. MOLE and CARTER'S Case IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit it was moved in arrest of Judgment That the Plaintiff declares that he was possessed of certain Goods viz. such c. at London And that in consideration of two shillings That the Defendant at London did promise to carrie the said Goods aboard such a Ship if the Plaintiff would deliver the Goods to him And he shewed that he did deliver the Goods to him and that he had not carried them aboard He shewed that he was possessed of the Goods but did not shew when or where he delivered the said Goods to the Defendant but said only deliberavit c. And then the Law saith that they were not delivered Jones Justice The same is but matter of Inducement to the promise and ought not to be shewed so precisely Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 485. FRYER and DEW'S Case DEW being sued prayed his Priviledg because he is a Commoner in Exeter Colledg in Oxford and brought Letters under the Seal of the Chancellor of Oxford certifying their Priviledg and he certifies that Dew is a Commoner as appeareth by the Certificate of Doctor Prideaux Rector of the said Colledg Whereas he ought to certifie that he is a Commoner upon his own knowledg and not upon the Certificate of another But afterwards Certificate was made of his own knowledg and then it was allowed as good The Declaration came in Hill 2 Caroli The Certificate bore date in the Vacation and he prayed his Priviledg this Easter Term. After Imparlance he comes too late to pray his Priviledg The Certificate is not that at the time of the Action brought he was a Commoner in Exeter Colledg but that now he is a Commoner And the Certificate bears date after the Action brought He ought to have said that at the time of the Action brought and now he is a Commoner in Exeter Colledg The Priviledg was allowed per Curiam Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 486. TANFIELD and HIRON'S Case THe Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Case against the Defendant for delivering of a scandalous Writing to the Prince and in his Declaration he set forth what place he held in the Commonwealth and that the Defendant seeking to extenuate and draw the love and favour of the King Prince and Subjects from him did complain that the Plaintiff did much oppress the Inhabitants of Michel Tue in the County of Oxford and that he did cause Meerstones to be digged up which might be a cause of great contention amongst the Inhabitants of Tue. The Plaintiffe denyed the oppression alledged against him and the Defendant did justifie and said that I. S. being seised of the Mannor of Tue did demise certain Lands parcel thereof unto I. F. for eighty years who made a Lease of the same at Will and afterwards I. S. did Enfeoff Tanfield the Plaintiff of the said Mannor to whom the Tenants did attorn Tenants And the Defendant shewed That time out of mind the Inhabitants of the Town of Tue had Common in the Waste of the said Mannor and that a great part of the said Mannor was inclosed and the Meerstones removed
for the Judgment was not given upon the verdict Pasch 25 H. 8. Rot. 25. Plot and his wife against Treventry in a Writ of Error after the Record removed Diminution of the Original was alledged and there it was pretended that the Judgment was given upon another Original and one of the Originals was before and the other after the Judgment and there the Judgment was reversed because it cannot appear to the contrary but that the Judgment was given upon the later Original Trin. 18 Jacobi Rot. 1613. Bowen and Jones's Case In an Action upon the Case brought upon Assumpsit Error assigned was because that no place was limited where the payment should be made The Original was That the promise was in consideration that the Plaintiff did lend to the Defendant so much he at London did promise to pay the same to him again There were two Originals which bore date the same day Judgment was in that Case for the Plaintiff And the Defendant brought a Writ of Error and alledged Diminution of the Original then the other Original was certified The Defendant in the Writ of Error said That the Original upon which the Recoverie was grounded was an Original which had a place certain The Judges did affirm the same to be the true Original which did maintain the Judgment and agree with the proceedings otherwise great mischief would â—ollow George Crook contrarie and recited the Case viz. Hayns brought a Writ of Error against Crouch and the Writ of Error is to reverse a Record upon a Judgment which was given in the Common Pleas The Original which is certified bears date Trin. 18 Jacobi and the Ejectione firme is brought Trin. 18 Jacobi for an Ejectment which is made in September following and now upon this Errour assigned the partie had a Certiorari to remove the Record upon which you alledge Diminution For you say That the Originall upon which the Judgment was given bore date in September 18. Jacobi which was after the Ejectment The bodie of the Record is Trin. 18. Contrary to this Record you say that there was an Originall Mich. 18 Jacobi and so that is contrary to the Record Error 2. upon the Record The Originall is not part of the Record but you ought to assigne Errour in that which is alledged in Diminution 6 H. 7. 4 Fitz. 21 a. To alledge any thing against a Record is void The Ejectment was after the Originall which warrants the Record and it was after the Action brought They alledge that the Originall was not truely certified and that then after an Imparlance an Originall Writ is made to Warrant the Action Jones and Bowâ—ns Case before cited There a vitious Originall was certified and then upon the Complaint of the Defendant the true Originall was certified both were retornable at the same day And in the Case before cited of Plott and Treventris The Originall which was first certified did not bear date according to the Record which was certified But in our Case the last Originall doth not agree with the Record but the first But in the Case of Plott the Judgement was reversed for another Error The Diminution when it stands with the Record shall be allowed but when it differs from the Record then it shall not be allowed The Ejectment was layed after the first Originall purchased which agrees with the Record and after the Action brought Quod nota It was adjuorned till another Terme viz. Mich. 21. Jacobi Trin. 21. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 489. SOMMERS Case THe Case was between Sommers and Mary his Wife Plaintiffs who Traversed an Office found after the death of one Roberts The parties were at Issue upon one point in the Traverse and it was found against the King Henden Serjeant moved The Office finds That Roberts dyed seised of two Acres in Soccage and four foot of Lands holden in Capite which was alledged Roberts had by Encroachment Sommers and his Wife pleaded That Roberts in his life time did enfeoffe them of one of the Acres Absque hoc that that Acre did discend And for the other Acre they pleaded and entitled themselves by the Will of Roberts Absque hoc that Roberts was seised thereof That I take to be an insufficient Traverse First it is found by the Office That Roberts dyed seised and that the same discended to four Daughters and One of the Daughters is the Wife of Sommers And hee and his Wife traverse the Office and confesse that the Ancestor died seised Absque hoc that the same discended The Traverse is repugnant in it self for if he did Devise it then untill Entry by the Devisee it doth discend but if they had pleaded the Devise only and Entry by force thereof it might have been a good Traverse The Office findes that it did discend to four Daughters and the Wife of Sommers is one of the four Daughters and he and his Wife Traverse the discent and that is not good for one cannot Traverse that which makes a Title to himself 37 Ass 1. The Rule there put is That a Man cannot Traverse the Office by which he is intitled but in point of Tenure he may Traverse it wherewith agrees Stamford Prerogat 61. 62. 42 Ass 23. One came and Traversed an Office and thereby it appeared that Two there had occasion to Traverse it and it was holden that they all ought to joyne in the Traverse Finch Recorder of London contr ' The Office found generally That Roberts had four Daughters and had two Acres and four Foot of Lands and that the same discended to four Daughters Sommers and his Wife Traverse the Office and plead That as to one Acre Roberts made a Feoffment thereof unto them Absque hoc that he died seised thereof 2. That Roberts devised the other Acre to them Absque hoc that the same did discend 5 Eliz. Dyer 221 Bishops Case There it is resolved That a Devise doth prevent a Remitter and then by consequent it shall prevent a Discent 49 E. 3 16. There a Devise did prevent an Escheat to the King As to the four Foot gained by Encroachment which is holden of the King in Capite They traverse Absque hoc that Roberts was seised thereof I agree that where their Title is joynt there all must Traverse but in our Case we Traverse for our selves and deny any thing to be due to the three other Sisters The four Foot of Waste was part of the Mannor of Bayhall and the Venire facias was out of that Mannor and the Towns where the other lands lay 9 E. 4. A. disseises B. of a Mannor and A. severs the Demeasnes from the Services Now B. shall demand the Mannor as in Truth it now is Henden contr ' It is no part of the Mannor of Bayhall for it is encroached out of it therefore the Venire facias ought not to be of the Mannor of Bayhall The Jury finde that he had encroached four Foot Ex vasto Manerii c.
Dodderige Justice the encroachment doth not make it to be no parcell of the Mannor Ley chief Justice it is not layed to be a Disseisin but an Encroachment and therefore it is not so strong as a Disseisin with a Discent but in Right it belongs to the Mannor Tenant in Tail makes a Feoffment to the use of himself and deviseth the Lands to A. the Devise doth prevent the Remitter Haughton Justice the Discent is Traversed The Father dieth seised and hath issue two Sons and that the Lands discended to him the other may say That the Land is borough English and that the Lands discend unto him Absque hoc that they discended to the Eldest Dodderidge Justice Regularly you shall not Traverse the Discent but by the dying seised but in this Case it ought to be of necessity sc â— in case of a Devise the Traverse must be of the Discent for here they cannot traverse the dying seised for if they traverse the dying seised then they overthrow their own Title sc the Devise but here in Case of a Will the partie shall traverse the Discent for he cannot say that it is true that the Lands did discend and that he Devised it c. The heir cannot traverse that which entitles him by Discent but here his Title is by the Devise and not as heir Finch Recorder the Devise is not of the four Foot for if we confess the dying seised of the four Foot which was holden in Capite then we should overthrow our own Devise The Office finds that he died seised of the whole and therefore of the four foot He being never seised we traverse the dying seised thereof and we deny that he ever had it so the Traverse is good without making of us any Title unto it for we desire not to have it Dodderidge Justice If a man deviseth to his heir it is a void Devise for the discent shall be preferred But if one hath Issue four daughters and he deviseth to one of them it is good for the whole Land so devised to her and no part of the Land so devised shall discend to the other the Lands being holden in Socage Ley Chief Justice and the whole Court did agree That they might deny and traverse the four Foot if the Ancestor had no Title unto it and Judgment was given accordingly against the King quod nota Trin. 21 Jac. in the Kings Bench. 490. PAYNE and COLLEDGES Case AN Agreement was made between Payne and Colledg That if Payne being Chirurgion did Cure Colledg of a great Disease viz. A Noli me tangere That then he should have 10l and that if he did not cure him That then for his pains and endeavours Colledg would give him 5l In an Action upon the Case brought by Payne he doth not shew in his Declaration in what place he used his endeavour and Industry And there is a difference where the Plaintiff is to do any thing of Skill and Industry for there he may do the same at several times and in several places and so this Case differs from the Cases in our books 15 H. 6. Accord 1. is expresly in the point There the Defendant pleaded an Accord That if the Defendant by his Industry c. And exception was taken because that he did not shew a place 3 E. 4. 1. Debt brought by a Servant and declares that he was reteined by the predecessor of the Defendant c. and that he had performed his Service c. It was moved in Arrest of Judgment and Exception taken as in our Case because he did not shew where he did the Service for that is issuable and Denly there said That he need not shew the place because he might do it in several places Bridgeman Serjeant contrarie If the issue had been upon a Collateral matter it had been good enough but here the issue is taken upon an endeavour and you ought to alleadg a place for the tryal of it Dodderidge Justice The Jury was from the place where the Agreement was made the verdict will not make good the Declaration although the Jury have found the whole matter of fact for it doth not appear to us That that was the Jury which could try his endeavour The Case of 3 E. 4. of the Servant was to serve him seaven years and there he need not shew any place where he did his Service but only that he obeyed his Master in his Service for the seaven years If the Plaintiff in this Case had shewed but any one place of doing his endeavour in it had been sufficient but here he sheweth no place at all And therefore Judgment was given That Querens nihil Capiat per Billam Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 491. The Lord ZOUCH and MOORES Case IN an Action of Trespass for cutting down of Trees in Odiham Park in Hampshire It was found by special Verdict That King Henry the eighth was seised of the Mannor and Park of Odiham And by his Letters Patents 33 of his Reign did grant unto Genny the Office of Stewardship of the said Mannor and the Office of Parkership of the said Park with reasonable Herbage and by the same Letters Patents did grant unto him the Mannor of Odiham cum pertinaciis and 100. Loads of Wood excepting the Park the Deer and the Wood for fifty years if he should so long live Then they found That after that Genny did surrender and restore the Letters Patents in the Chancery to be cancelled and that in truth they were cancelled and that the said Surrender was made to the intent to make a new Lease thereof unto Pawlet and that this Lease of 33 H. 8. being surrendred That King Henry the 8. Anno 36. of his Reign reciting the Letters Patents made to Genny to be dated anno 32 H. 8. whereas in truth they were dated 33 H. 8. and that they were surrendred and that the intent of the Surrender was to make a new Lease to Pawlet Did grant the same to Pawlet as before they were granted to Genny excepting as before They further found That King Philip and Queen Mary 5 6 of their Reigns being seised of the said Mannor and Park in jnro Coronae reciting that Henry the 8. anno 36 of his Reign had granted unto Paulet as before omitting the Proviso which was for 50 years if he should so long live and the Exceptions before And reciting that those Letters-Patents were surrendred ea intentione to make a new Lease in forma sequente They in consideration of good service and 200l paid did grant the Office as before and by those Letters-Patents did grant Herbage generally whereas the first Patent was reasonable Herbage And by these Letters-Patents did grant to him the Mannor cum pertinaciis except the grand trees and woods in the Park and Felons goods which were granted by the first Letters Patents for 50 years And here was a Rent reserved and a Proviso that for doing of Waste that the
certain Farme Lands called Estons and that a Fine was levied of Lands in Eslington Eston and Chilford whereas Eston lay in another Parish appell D. Calthrope argued That the Land in Eston did passe by the Fine although the Parish was not named for that the Writ of Covenant is a personall Action and will lie of Lands in a Hamlet or lieu conus 8. E. 4 6. Vide 4. E. 3. 15. 17. Ass 30. 18. E. 3. 36. 47. E. 3. 6. 19. E. 3. Brev. 767. 2. He said That it was good for that the Plea went only to the Writ in abatement but when a Concord is upon it which admits it good it shall not be avoided afterwards 3. He said That a Fine being a common assurance and made by assent of the parties will passe the Lands well enough 7 E. 4. 25. 38. E. 3. 19. And he vouched Pasch 17. Jacobi in the Kings Bench Rot. 140. Monk and Butlers Case Where it was adjudged that a Fine being but an arbitrary assurance would passe Lands in a Lieu conus and so he said it would do in a common recovery And Richardson said That if a Scire facias be brought to execute such a recovery Nul tiel ville ou Hamlet is no plea and the Fine or recovery stands good Vide 44. E. 3. 21. 21 E. 3. 14 Stone And the opinion of the Court was That the Lands did well passe by the Fine Mich. 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench 509 CAWDRY aud TETLEY's Case CAwdry being a Doctor of Physick the Defendant Praemissorum non ignorans to discredit the plaintiff with his Patients as appeared by the Evidence spake these words to the plaintiffe viz. Thou art a drunken Fool and an Asse Thou wert never a Scholer nor ever able to speak like a Scholer The opinions of Jones and Crook Justices were that the words were actionable because they did discredit him in his Profession and hee hath particular losse when by reason of those words others do not come to him And Palmers Case was vouched Where one said of a Lawyer Thou hast no more Law then a Jackanapes that an Action did lie for the words Contrary if he had said No more Wit And William Waldrons Case was also vouched where one said I am a true Subject thy Master is none that the words were actionable Mich. 4. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 510 The King and BAXTER SIMMON's Case THE Case was this Tenant in tail the Remainder in taile the Remainder in Fee to Tenant in tail in possession Tenant in tail in Remainder by Deed enrolled reciting that he had an estate tail in Remainder Granted his Remainder and all his estate and right unto the King and his Heirs Proviso that if he pay ten shillings at the Receipt of the Exchequer that then the Grant shall be void Tenant in tail in possession suffers a common Recovery and afterwards deviseth the Lands to I. S. and dieth without Issue 18. Jacobi Afterwards 21. Jac. he in the Remainder in tail dieth without issue but no seisure is made nor Offence found that the lands were in the Kings hands Noy who argued for the King The first Point is When Tenant in taile recites his estate and grants all his estate and right to the King and his Heirs what estate the King hath And if by the death of Tenant in tail without issue the estate of the King be so absolutly determined that the Kings possession needs not to be removed by Amoveas manum And he argued That when the Lands are once in the King that they cannot be out of him again but by matter of Record 8. E. 3. 12. Com. 558. And a bare entry upon the King doth not put the King out of possession of that which was once in him And so was it adjudged 34. Eliz. in the Lord Paget's Case as Walter chief Baron said And Noy took this difference 8. H. 5. Traverse 47. and 8. E. 2. Traverse 48. If a particular estate doth determine before that the King seise there the King cannot afterwards seise the Lands But if the King hath once the Lands in his hands or possession there they cannot be devested out of him but by matter of Record So F. Nat. Br. 254. If a man be seised of Lands in the right of his Wife and be outlawed for Felonie for which the Lands come into the Kings hands and afterwards hee who is outlawed dieth there a Writ of Diem clausit extremum shall issue forth which proveth That by the death of the Husband the Lands are not immediately out of the King and setled in the Wife againe 22. E. 4. Fitz. Petition 9. Tenant in taile is attainted of Treason and the Lands seised into the Kings hands and afterwards Tenant in taile dieth without Issue he in the Remainder is put to his Petition which proveth that the Lands are not presently after the death of Tenant in taile without issue out of the King But he agreed the Cases If Tenant in taile acknowledgeth a Statute or granteth a Rent charge and dieth that the Rent is gone and determined by his death as it is agreed in 14. Assisarum The second point argued by Noy was That although that there was not any seizure or Offence found which entituled the King Yet the Deed enrolled in the Chancery which is returned in this Court did make sufficient title for the King as 8. E. 3. p. 3. is The Judges of Courts ought to Judge upon the Records of the same Courts In 8. H. 7. 11. a Bayliff shewed That a Lease was made to T. his Master for life the Remainder to the King in Fee and prayed in Ayd of the King And the Plaintiff in Chancery prayed a Procedendo And it was ruled That a Procedendo should not be granted without examination of the Kings title Thirdly he said That in this case he who will have the Lands out of the possession of the King ought to shew forth his title and in the principall case it doth not appear that the Defendant had any title Vide 10. H. 7. 13. Athowe Serjeant argued for the Defendant he said That in this case the King had an estate but for the life of Tenant in tail And therefore he said That If Tenant in tail grant totum statum suum that an estate but for his own life passeth as Litt. is 145. and 13. H. 7. 10. acc So If Tenant for life the remainder in taile bee and he in the Remainder releaseth to Tenant for life in possession nothing passeth but for the life of Tenant in tail 19. H. 6. 60. If Tenant in tail be attainted of Treason or Felonie and Offence is found and the King seiseth the lands he hath an estate but for the life of Tenant in tail And he cited 35. Eliz. C. 2 part 52. Blithmans case Where Tenant in tail Covenanted to stand seized to the use of himself for his own life and after his death to the use
of his eldest son in tail and afterwards he married a wife and died that the wife should not be endowed for when he had limited the use to himself for his life he could not limit arâ— Remainder over And Edwards Case adjudged in the Court of Wards which was That there was Tenant for life the Remainder in tail he in the Remainder granted his Remainder to I. S. and his heirs and afterwards Tenant for life dyed and then the grantee dyed his heirs within age it was adjudged that the heir of the garntee should not be in ward because the Tenant in tail could not by his Grant grant a greater estate then for his own life But he said That in the principall Case it appeareth That the Tenant in tail in Remainder hath particularly recited his estate And where it appeareth in the Conveyance it self that he hath but an estate in tail a greater estate shall not passe As if Tenant for life granteth a Rent to one and his heirs the same at the first sight seems to be a good Rent in Fee but when it appeareth in the Conveyance that the grantor was but Tenant for life there upon the Construction of the Deed it self it cannot be intended that he granted a Fee but that an estate for life passed only in the Rent Secondly he argued That although the estate in tail in the principall case was an abeyance Yet a Common Recovery would barr such estate tail in abeyance And therewith agreeth C. 2. part Sr Hugh Cholmleys Case 3. He said That the estate was out of the King and vested in the party without any Offence found as 49. E. 3. Isabell Goodcheaps case A man devised houses in London holden of the King in tail and if the Donee dyed without Issue that the Lands should be sold by his Executors The devisee died without Issue The bargain and sale of the Lands by the Executor doth divert the estate out of the King without Petition or Monstrans de Droit So If there be Tenant in tail the Remainder in tail and Tenant in tail â—n Remainder levieth a fine of his Remainder to the King and afterwards dyeth without Issue the Kings estate is determined and there needs no Petition or Monstrans de Droit 4. He said That in the principall case nothing was in the King because it doth not appeare that there was any seisure or Offence found to entitle the King And the Tenant in tail in the Remainder died in the life of King James and then if the Kings estate were then determined as before by the death of the Tenant in taile the King which now is never had any title And hee said that he needed not to shew a greater title then he had And hee took a difference when Tenant in taile doth onely defend or make defence and when he makes title to Lands in the one Case he ought for to shew That the Tenant in taile died without issue and in the other Case not And therefore in the principall case he demanded Judgment for the Defendant The Case was adjourned to another day Mich. 4. Caroli in the Star-Chamber 511 TAILOR and TOWLIN's Case A Bill was preferred against the Defendant for a Conspiracy to Indict the plaintiff of a Rape And the Plaintiff aleadged in his Bill That an Indictment was preferred by the Defendant against the Plaintiff before the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius in the County of Suffolk And did not lay it in his Bill that the Indictment was preferred before the Justices of Oyer and Terminer and Gaole delivery and the same was holden by the Court to be a good Exception to the Bill for that the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius have not power to take Indictments But afterwards upon veiw of the Bill because the Conspiracy was the principall thing tryable and examinable in this Court and that was well layd in the Bill the Bill was retayned and the Court proceded to Sentence And in this Case Richardson Justice said That in Conspiracy the matter must bee layed to be falsè et malitiosè and if it be layed for a Rape It must be layd that there was recens persecutio of it otherwise it will argue a Consent And therefore because the Defendant did not preferre an Indictment of Rape in convenient time after the Rape supposed to be done but concealed the same for half a years time and then would have preferred a Bill of Indictment against the plaintiff for the same Rape he held that the Indictment was false and malitious And Hyde Chief Justice said That upon probable proof a man might accuse another before any Justice of Peace of an Offence and although his accusation be false yet the Accuser shall not be punished for it But where the Accusation is malitious and false it is otherwise and for such Accusation he shall be punished in this Court Trinit 8. Caroli in the King Bench. 513 JONES and BALLARD's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz These Jones are proper Witnesses they will sweare any thing They care not what they say They have already forsworn themselves in the Chancery and the Lord keeper Committed them for it Jermyn took Exceptions because it was not said to be in the Court of Chancery nor that it was in any Deposition there taken upon Oath But it was adjudged per Curiam That the Action would lie and Jones Justice said that the Addition in the Chauncery was as much as if he had said he was perjured there And Hâ—msies case was vouâ—hed by him Where one said of a Witness presently after a Tryall at the Guild Hall in London You have now forsworn your self That it was adjudged that the words were actionable Trinit 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 513. SYMME's and SMITH's Case A Woman being entituled to copyhold Lands of the Manor of D did covenant upon reasonable request to be made unto her to surrender the Copy-hold Land according to the Custome of the Manor And it was found That the Custome of the Manor is That a surrender may be made either in person or by Letter of Atturney and that the plaintiff did request the woman to make the surrender by a Letter of Atturney which shee refused to do And whether shee ought to surrender presently or might first advise with her Councell was the Question It was argued for the plaintiff that shee ought to do it presently And Munser's Case C. 2. part and 16. Eliz. Dyer 337. Sir Anthonie Cooks Case were vouched that she was to do it at her perill And the Election in this Case was given to the Covenantee and hee might require it to be done either in Court in person or by Letter of Atturney And C. 2. part Sir Rowland Heywards Case and C. 5. part Hallings Case was vouched to that purpose Rolls contrary for the Defendant And he said That the woman was to have convenient time to do it and
171 365 368 369 forfeiture 269 142 365 felling trees 173 174 trespasse brought 174 Corporation 347 dissolved the donor shall have his land again 211 sues 393 Costs 329 345 220 Covenant 38 assignee 162 Executors ibid. 11 12 48 69 70 to build a mill c. there 271 273 175 99 120 333 335 217 to surrender 445 performed 95 The Indenture is void in part 213 Covenant 87 121 cause of things must appear in the Court 401 Countermand 133 County where actions shall be brought 335 of trials 429 Courts-Baron 68 69 Leet 71 Tower Court 145 of Requests 208 216 243 244 Kings Bench and Chancery 357 Acts done in spiritual Courts 33 163 164 181 215 Curia claudenda 127 Custom 5 49 234 140 143 235 267 261 135 of descents 166 127 That the wife may devise to the husband 14 Particular Customes 163 D Day in Court 68 Day materiall to be set down 433 434 Damages recowping in them 53 135 362 jonyt severed 57 assessed 98 343 344 not assessed writ of enquiry 207 not recoverable in account 57 treble 245 to be severed 210 Damage feasan 124 185 Date of a Patent 416 Declaration 251 86 186 in an action upon 1 2. P. M. of distresses 11 upon an Assumpsit 32 Custome 252 particularly 358 insufficient 76 106 343 370 mistakes 345 287 119 160 125 Deed things passe by one deed 129 by deed 354 128 Debt 253 91 336 372 217 210 who liable 294 The Kings debt 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 Default 280 Defamation 440 Delivery of deeds 130 of money to anothers use 210 Demand 23 39 67 96 154 337 where to be 331 by writ 74 335 310 the word 398 Demurrer 10 Denizen made 417 Departure 255 122 Depositions 193 Deprivation 259 163 Detaining 8 Detinue 370 Declaration in it 403 Devastation by Executors 30 Devastavit 285 Devise 7 14 15 16 26 40 46 208 266 280 95 99 130 131 299 319 146 351 352 363 to a Colledge c. 394 prevents a remitter c. 411 to a mans heir 412 to one daughter heir of land held by Knights service c. 17 to sell 78 to the Son and heir 94 Dilapidation 259 Diminution 267 alledged 407 Disability the plaintiff cause of it 75 76 Discharge 11 105 ought to shew what 61 Discent 3â—5 312 365 Disclam 25 Discontinuance one issue only found 5 370 within a year 219 Discontinuance by tenant in taile 317 Disseisin 522 of a particular estate 139 Acts of disseisor disseisor sues c. 388 Distresse justified 109 110 187 190 driven out of the Countrey 11 sufficient upon the Land 67 110 Divorce 19 145 Dove-coat a Writ of Right lies of it 259 erected 284 Dower 21 135 145 A Lease is for years 266 Forfeitable by the Husband 323 Averment of seisin of the husband for damage 212 E Ejectione firmae 6 15 18 53 71 72 33â— extra tenet unnecessary 60. lyes 157 Plea 149 Election 258 159 127 140 446 To sue 196 determined ibid. Elegit 257 82 84 Ely jurisdiction there 380 381 Emblements 159 Enclosure in Forrests 167 168 169 170 171 Entry into one house 72 To defeat an estate 9 To fortifie it 25 for forfeiture 175 No trespasse 283 Error 26 258 248 73 80 84 87 372 373 lyes not 261 247. brought 376 377 378 379 439. directed 44. things uncertaine 408. severall 440 Escape 22 27 262 280 125 126 372 403 Fresh suite 177 433 Escheat 78 For Miscreancy 34 Right of action 322 Essoine 235 236 Estates 19 42 51 52 272 A Lease for time 102 103 determined 9 the lesse drowned 52 voidable 9 Estoppel 257 48 147 321 177 384 385 Estranger to a plaint erroneous c. 403 Estovers custome pleaded 235. see 238 97 173 Estrepment 112 164 Estrey 150 151 Eviction 258 Evidence maintaines not the issue 235 see 326 Execution 26 257 258 80 82 83 84 290 295 147 125 126 181 371 372 373 217 Assignment after judgement 161 Taking 372. severall 208 Executors 21 192 See Right Of his own wrong 104 Reteines 217 Order in payment 298 Pleads fully administred 178 Exception in a grant 116 117 118 Time past to take it 100 One releases 431 Exâ—hange 99 100 Exigent 83 217 Excommunication 191. unjust 406 Exposition 16 17 18 36 37 67 71 236 246 198 of Lawes 39 of Statutes 309. and Patents 425 Extent 82 289 311 Extinguishment 24 11 101 314 128 137 211 Lands given by Statute to the King Annuity not extinguished 170 F Falsâ—fying a Recâ—very 271 Falsely imprisoned 124 Fee executed â—â—2 one cannot depend of another â—â—7 Fee-simple 155 Felony not before attainder 267 Cause of arrest for it 406 Feoffments 318 319 320 Fieri facias 276 147 83 Fine for vert c. 277. What Courts may fine c. 381 Fine levied by tenor of it 246 Parish not named 440 Record of it 103 129 307 148 351 179 First fruits 393 Forceable entry 45 Forfeiture of Lessor 105 141. Of a Right 321 See Treason Forgery 62 63 175 Form commanded by Statute must be observed 334 188 189 Formedon 239 302 163 Forrests chases c. 169 Frankalmoigne 396 Franchises 17 262 Usurped 91 Frankmarriage 18 19 20 Franktenement rule of it 9 In an upper chamber 44 Forfeiture 6 318 In case of Treason 34 307 308 310 315 316 Fraudulent conveyances and acts 6 7 285 161 191 192 G. GArdian in soccage 316 Gardens 6 Gavel-kind Plea 55 Grants Words apt 7 Of a common person 8 18 24 25 236 237 270 273 Restriction rule 237 To dig in his waste 18 Generall words 183 One thing passes with another 352 Things passe in grosse 127. By one Deed 129. Of the King 8 35 Where a mistake shall not abridge the fulnesse of words precedent 36 Favoured 37 38 262 136 425. See 414 415 416 417 421 422 423 425 Of a possibility 316 H. HAbeas corpus directed 44. See 198 199 Habendum 51 269 272 Habendum successive 220 Holidayes 218 Heire-speciall 3. Force of the word ib. 4 275 102 312 Homage 320 Husband and Wife acts of both or either 2 5 14 15 312 141 180 Wifes lease good 327 Gives land to her husband 143 Execution of the Wives Lease 26 See Reservation Husband may forfeit the Wives Copy-hold 345 May correct his Wife 215 I. IDeot 302 Jeofailes 56 57 194 Imbracery 240 Imprisonment 158 344 199. See Fine Improvement of common 97 Incidents 359 Ingrossers of corn 144 Innkeepers 345 346 Incroachment 24 411 Inquisitions 294 299 Indictment 45 46 65 67 272 84 157 400 346 For erecting a Cottage 383 For omitting the Crosse in Baptisme 119 Joynt 349 Contra pacem when 59 Infant 60 104 In his mothers belly 319 364 365 366. May grant c. 14 Brings Error to reverse a Fine 20 May release 30 31 Acknowledges a Statute c. 149 Appears c. 382 Promises to pay for his meat c. 219. Sues his Guardian discharges 214 Information 91 131 158
could be if it were not of Land holden in Socage and therefore that tenure is implyed Contrary When a man is to plead a Devise but where the Verdict doth not strongly imply a thing it shall not be good as in Scolasticas Case Plo. Com. 411. Exception was taken that the Jury did not find That the Devisor had not any Heir Male alive praeter the said John and Francis for if he had the wife of the Plaintiffe had no cause of Action And it was there holden by Harper That it was not a good Verdict for the incertainty so in our Case Cook contrary 1. The Grant is not good and the Rectory is no part of it nor can they passe by the word Portion 1. By the Etimology of the word for Portion is a thing in grosse by it selfe and cannot passe by that thing which is intended Nomen Collectivum as a Rectory is So of a Manor if a man grant totam illam portionem Manerii hee being seised of a Manor nothing passeth for portio is no more then partio as the Latinists say and then if a man grant all that part of his Manor or part of his Tithes in D. and he be seised of the whole Manor of D. or of the Rectory of D. nothing passeth Also the words after expound the Queens mind for the words precedent are coupled with a Cum after scil Cum omnibus aliis c. So as the first part shews the grant of Tithes and the later part shews what Tithes viz. those which were in the Occupation of John Corbet so as but part is granted and in the Kings Grant a part shall not be taken for the whole and so in no case if not by the Figure Synecdoche which cannot be in cases of Grants at the common Law Also the words are totam illam portionem c. and not totam meam portionem c. and the word illa or that ought to have a word What which is a word shewing in whose possession the portion was Also the Kings Letters Patents ought for the most part be taken according to the meaning of the King for the case was in the Exchequer That where the King granted all his Tenements in D. that nothing passed by that Grant but the Houses Otherwise it is in the case of a common person So 22. Ass where the King grants goods of Felons quorumcunque damnatorum it shall not extend to Treason nor to murder of the Kings Messenger So 8. H. 4. 2. If the Grant be of all the goods of those who pro aliqua transgressione sive delicto c. forisfacere deberent it shall not extend to those who are felo de se Also the Non obstante doth not help the matter For I take this difference When nothing passeth by the words precedent Ex vi termini there nothing is helped by the Non obstante But if any thing passe by the precedent words Ex vi termini there a Non obstante may make the thing good which otherwise should be void As if the King grant to J. S. the Manor of D. Non obstante that he is seised for the term of life thereof it is a void Grant But if the Grant were of the Manor of D. notwithstanding that I. S. hath it for life here the Non obstante makes the Grant good which otherwise should be the ignorance of the King to make a Grant of that of which he is excluded by the Non obstante because thereby he takes knowledg of the particular estate and so he is not deceived As to the matter moved against the Verdict I conceive that it makes against the other side for it was on his part to prove the Occupation and if there be no Occupation at the time of the Lease the Grant is void and he was to prove it being in the affirmative And then in re dubia majus inficiatio quà m affirmatio intelligenda and a May be may be intended in every case And if such construction should be in speciall Verdicts I dare affirm that by such May bees all speciall Verdicts shall be quashed But the Law is to give a favourable construction of them according to the meaning of the Jurours Snagg contrary and by him these words cum omnibus aliis c. are void in the Kings case and vouched the case of 29. E. 3. 9. before vouched Where the King had granted to the Earl of Salisbury the custody of the Lands of the Prior of Mountague being seised into the Kings hands as a Prior Alien and afterwards the Earl died his Heir within age whereby the said Lands and others and Advowsons came to the Kings hand by reason of minority and afterwards the King granted to the Son all the Lands and Advowsons which were Patris sui ac omnes terras ac omnes advocationes of the said Prior which the King had before given to the father of the said son And it was there holden That although that the Advowsons passed not to the Father yet by that grant they did passe and that these woads which he granted to his father were meerly void Clâ—nche Justice Nothing passeth by this word Portion for it is a thing in gross and a thing in gross cannot contain another thing and a word which signifies a thing in grosse cannot passe another thing As if a man grant all his Services in D. it is to be intended Services in grosse and if he have not any Services but those which are parcell of a Manor nothing shall passe by those words But I conceive That those Tithes which are parcell of the Rectory shall passe by these words Cum aliis c. For although that the words are in the tenure of John Corbet yet if they were not in his tenure the Non obstante will help it for it is Non obstante any misnaming of the Tenants or of the quantity or quality of the Tithes so as these words imply as much as if the Grant had been in the tenure of John Corbet or of any other in L. or elsewhere Gaudy Justice If the words Totam illam portionem were left out of the Book the other words Cum omnibus aliis shall passe nothing and those words Totam illam portionem are as nothing to passe a thing not in grosse and by consequence nothing shall passe by the other words And afterwards Judgement was given That nothing passed by the Letters Patents Hill 28 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 43. CROPP's Case CRopp made a Lease for years reserving rent at Mich. upon Condition That if the rent be behind at Mich. and a Month after that he might enter The Lessee after Mich. and before the Month ended sent his servant to the house of Cropp to pay the money to Cropp the servant coming to Cropps house found him not for he was not at the House the Servant delivered the Rent to one Margery Briggs who was his Daughter in Law to deliver the