Selected quad for the lemma: land_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
land_n	good_a	lord_n	manor_n	1,411	5	10.3370	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A36820	The Duke of Norfolk's case, or, The doctrine of perpetuities fully set forth and explain'd		1688 (1688)	Wing D2513; ESTC R17683	59,123	72

for I pretend not to be Infallible but that is a thing I cannot help Upon the whole matter I am under a Constraint and under an Obligation which I cannot resist A Man behaves himself very ill in such a place as this that he needs to make Apologies for what he does I will not do it I must Decree for the Plaintiff in this Case and my Decree is this That the Plaintiff shall enjoy this Barony for the residue of the Term of two hundred years the Defendant shall make him a Conveyance accordingly because he extinguished the Trust in the other and the Term contrary to both Law and Reason by the Merger and Surrender and common Recovery And that the Defendants do account with the Plaintiff for the profits of the premisses by them or any of them received since the Death of the said Duke Thomas and which they or any of them might have received without wilful default and that it be referred to Sir Lacon William Child Knight one of the Masters of this Court to take the said Accompt and to make unto the Defendants all just allowances and what the said Master shall certifie due the said Defendants are to pay unto the Plaintiffs according to the Masters Report herein to be made And that the Defendants shall forthwith deliver the possession of the Premisses to the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff shall hold and enjoy the said Barony of Greystock with the Lands and Tenements thereto belonging for the residue of the said Term of two hundred years against the Defendants and all claiming by from or under them And it is further Ordered and Decreed that the said Defendants do Seal and Execute such a Conveyance of the said Term to the Plaintiff as the Master shall approve of in Case the parties cannot agree the same but the Defendants are not to pay any Costs of the Suit. Die Veneris 19 Junii 1685. AFter hearing Council two several days upon the Petition and Appeal of Charles Howard Esq shewing that his Father intended a Provision for his younger Children by Deed made by advice of eminent Council and did settle the Barony of Greystocke and other Lands of the value of 500 l. per annum in Trustees in order thereunto and that after a long Suit in Chancery wherein the Petitioner was Plaintiff against his Grace the late Duke of Norfolk the Marquess of Dorchester Henry Lord Mowbray and Richard Marriott Esq Defendants the Cause coming to be heard before the Lord Chancellor Nottingham on the 17th of June in the Four and Thirtieth Year of His late Majesties Reign of Glorious Memory who after several Days hearing did declare his Opinion to be That the Petitioner had a good Title to the Barony of Greystocke and other the Lands in question and Decreed the Defendants to account to him for the Profits thereof by them received after the Death of Thomas late Duke of Norfolk which Decree was signed and enrolled and the Petitioner actually vested in the Possession of the said Mannors and Premisses and further sheweth That the Defendants the late Duke of Norfolk the Lord Mowbray now Duke of Norfolk and Richard Marriott exhibited a Bill of Review into the High Court of Chancery for reversing the said Decree to which the Petitioner put in a Plea and Demurer which being argued on the 15th of May in the Five and Thirtieth Year of the Reign of our late King Charles the Second before the Right Honourable the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England who after hearing Council on both sides over-ruled the said Plea and Demurrer and reverst the Decree aforesaid and ordered a Writ or Writs of Restitution to be directed to the Sheriffs of Cumberland and Westmerland to put the Plaintiffs in the Bill of Review in Possession which accordingly was done as in the Petition amongst other things is suggested and prayed a Reversal of the last Decree as also upon the Answer of the Right Noble Henry Duke of Norfolk Earl Marshal of England and Richard Marriot Esq put in thereunto And after due Consideration had of what was offered at the Bar by Council on either part thereupon IT is ordered and adjudged by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled That the said Decree made in the High Court of Chancery on the 15th of May in the Five and Thirtieth Year of the Reign of the late King Charles the Second of Glorious Memory in behalf of the late Duke of Norfolk and the now Duke of Norfolk and Richard Marriott Esq be and is hereby reversed and that the Decree made in the said Court of Chancery on the 17th of June in the Four and Thirtieth Year of His late Majesties Reign in behalf of Charles Howard Esq the now Petitioner Be and Is hereby affirmed JOHN BROWNE Cler. Parl. FINIS

the Kingdom and ought to take place in this Court as well as any other Court. So I take it then that the Trust of a Term is as much a Chattel and under the consideration of this Court as the Term it self and therefore I cannot see why the Trust of a Term upon a voluntary Settlement should be carried further in a Court of Equity than the Devise of a Term in the Courts of Common Law. It is true where there is a long Term in being upon Mortgage and as a security which is determined it is of great conveniency that it should be kept on foot to protect the Inheritance and so it will lie still to wait upon the Inheritance and thereupon in many Descents it will go from Heir to Heir and that upon a particular consideration to attend and protect the Inheritance But for a meer Chattel to go from Heir to Heir is not the same case nor do I see any reason why this Court should carry such a Chattel any further than Devises of terms are carried at Common Law. Now let us see and a little consider what those Rules are and how they are appliable to this Case In both cases a Term may be limited for life to one with Remainders over though in the bare consideration of Law an Estate for life is a greater Estate than a Term for years but in case of an Estate-tail there can be no such thing therefore in Burgesses Case the Trust of a term is limited to A. for life the Remainder to his Wife for life the Remainder to the first second and other Sons successively and the Issue of their bodies and for default of such Issue to the Daughters of A. and their Issue the Remainder to the right Heirs of A. A. had no Son at that time living nor after but the Remainder over was to the Daughter of A. in being It was strongly urged that the Daughter should have the Trust vested in her and that the Trust for the Daughter should close with the Estate for life till A. should have a Son. But because there was a Limitation to the first Son of A. and the Issue of his body and the Remainder of the Daughter was but to take place after that Son died without Issue and so the others though it was not to a Son then in being But his Estate was in contingencies which did never happen yet the Court did not allow of any such thing as any Remainder that the Daughter should have but made a Decree for the execution of the Devisee so that it is clear there can be no direct Remainder of the Trust of a term upon an Estate-tail The Question then is whether there can be any contigent Remainder for this for this Case depends upon that consideration i. e. it is limited upon a Contingency if such a thing should happen in the life of a man and so it is a springing Trust and good that way My Lord I take it in this case where there can be no direct Remainder there can be no contingent Remainder though it happen never so soon Therefore if a Term be limited to one and his Heirs of his body and he die without Issue of his body within two years the Remainder over there can be no such Remainder limited at all and therefore no contingent Remainder for this Remainder is limited at the end of an Intail and that is so remote a consideration that as the Law will not suffer a direct Remainder upon it so upon a Contingency neither Now in this Case there is onely this difference if the Estate-tail in this Term had been limited to my Lord Maltravers as 't is here to Henry Howard and the Heirs of his body and if he die without Issue in the life of Henry c. then the Remainder over then it had been clear the Contingency had been limited upon the expiring of the Intail and though it be said that it expires within the compass of the life of a man yet that helps not in this Case at all as I conceive for I will put a case upon a Fee-simple upon Pell and Brown's Case A man limits an Estate in Fee-simple to a man and his Heirs and if he die without Heirs during the life of J. S. then to J. D. this is void and the Lord shall have it by Escheat and that though it be brought within the compass of the life of a man shall never be a good Limitation And if that Case of Pell and Brown had been that a man devised Land to a man and his Heirs whereby it would appear that it was intended the Devisee should have had a Fee-simple with a Remainder over upon a Contingency I take it this could not be good by way of executory Devise because a mans dying without Heirs which to lose his Fee-simple he must do comes not under the intention of the Law as of a Contingency An Estate for life in the judgment of the Law is of longer duration than a Term for years and the Rule in Child and Baily's Case is firm that the expiring of the Limitation of a Term in Tail within the life of a man will not make good a Limitation of the Remainder over which I hold to be a good Rule and the reason of it I conceive will reach to this Case For what is the difference here is a Contingency indeed but it is to have an Estate-tail expire within one Life which I take to be the same case Suppose the Term had been limited to Henry and the Heirs Males of his body so long as Thomas shall have Heirs Male of his body that would sure have cut off the Remainder and what is the difference For it doth depend upon Thomas dying without Issue whereby the Earldom should descend then when it is limited to Henry and the Heirs Males of his body And if Thomas die without Issue in the life of Henry then over this can no more abridge it than if he had said if Henry die without Issue during the life of another man. So that I think the whole Term is swallowed in the Estate-tail upon this consideration and there can be no Remainder of it no executory Devise nor any springing Trust to Charles upon this Contingency and my Lord upon that reason I think this Settlement fails and is disappointed as to the younger Brothers If it had been limited to Henry for Life onely and no further then let the Contingency have been what it would that were to happen in his life if complicated with several ascendents yet it should be good in Remainder because the Law doth allow a Remainder directly upon an Estate for Life and so it would also in Contingency if that were to happen during the continuance of the particular Estate But I take this to be a step further than any of our Resolutions in Law have gone yet and therefore I cannot see reason to extend the Exposition any further but