Avowry is in liew of an Action and thereto privity is requisite for the same cause he cannot have an Action of Waste nor many other Actions there mentioned and the Authorities cited and so is Littleton himself expresly Litt. Sect. 580. Section 580. Where a man by grant to himself or by descent from his Ancestor hath a Rent-charge and might once lawfully distrain and Avow for such Rent if Arrear by due Attornment made to him or his Ancestor he may still do so whenever the Rent is behind unless by Law that power be some way lost 1. That power may be lost by extinguishment of the Rent by a perpetual union of the tenancy to the rent or rent to the tenancy or in other manner the Grantee having no Heir 2. It may be lost for a time by Suspension as by such union for a time and after restored again 3. It may be lost by a Grant of the Rent upon Condition 7 H. 6.3 Br. Extinguishment p. 17. and upon performance or breach of the Condition restored again but the power of distraining is not in this Case lost by any of these ways 4. It may be principally lost by a sufficient granting over and transferring the Rent to another which way comes nearest to the Case in question And therefore I shall agree the Case so much insisted on which is said to be agreed per Curiam Andrew Ognell's Case 4. Rep. f. 49. in Andrew Ognell's Case in the fourth Rep. That if a man be seized of a Rent-service or Rent-charge in Fee and grant it over by his Deed to another and his Heirs and the Tenant Attorn such Grantor is without remedy for the Rent arrear before his Grant for distrain he cannot and other remedy he hath not because all privity between him and the Tenant is destroyed by the Attornment to the Grantee and he hath no more right than any Stranger to come upon the Land after such transferring over of the Rent I shall likewise agree another Case That if such Grantee should regrant the same Rent back to the Grantor either in fee in tail or for life and the Tenant Attorn as he must to this regrant yet the first Grantor shall never be enabled to distrain for Arrears due to him before he granted over the Rent for now the privity between him and the Tenant begins but from the Attornment to the regrant the former being absolutely destroyed and the Tenant no more distrainable for the ancient Arrears than he was upon the creation of the Rent for Arrears incurred before till first attorn'd If the Case in question prove to be the same in effect with either of these Cases then the reason of Law for these Cases must sway and determine the Case in question And I conceive that there is no likeness or parity between the Case in question and either of those Cases either for the fact of the Cases or the reason of Law I shall therefore begin with comparing this Case with the first of those Cases 1. In the first of those Cases he that is seis'd of the Rent-charge doth intend to transferr his Estate in the Rent to the Grantee and it is accordingly actually transferr'd by the Tenants Attornment to the Grant 2. The Grantee by his Grant and Attornment to it becomes actually seis'd of the Rent and may enjoy the benefit of it by perception of the Rent 3. His Wife becomes dowable of it 4. It is subject to Statutes Recognizances and Debts enter'd into by the Grantee or due from him to the King 5. It is possible to descend to his Heir 6. It may be Arrear and he hath a possibility to distrain and avow for it 1. But in the Case in question the Conizors of the Fine did never intend to transfer their Estate in the Rent to the Conizee nor that any Attornment be made to him What a man intends to pass to another he intends to be without it himself at least for some time which is not in this Case 2. The Conizee never becomes actually seiz'd of the Rent and not only doth not but never can enjoy the perception of it for there is no moment of time wherein the Conizors themselves are not actually in seisin of it and consequently may distrain if it be in Arrear and the Conizee can never have actually seisin or possibility to have Attornment or distrain his seisin being but a meer fiction and an invented form of Conveyance only 3. The Conizee's Wife is never dowable of it 4. It is not subject to any Statutes Recognizances or Debts of the Conizee 5. It is never possible to descend to his Heir for it instantly vests in the Conizors 6. It can never be Arrear to the Conizee nor hath he ever a possibility to distrain for it To this purpose what is agreed in the Lord Cromwell's Case L. Cromwell's Case 2. Rep. f. 77. 2. Rep. is applicable Then it is to be consider'd what seisin Perkins had who was the Conizee of a Fine in that Case and he had but a Seisin for an instant and only to this purpose to make a Render for his Wife shall not be endowed nor the Land subject to his Statutes or Recognizances f. 77. Therefore that first Case cited out of the Report of Andrew Ognell's Case which I admit to be good Law hath no resemblance with the present Case in any circumstance or consequent but had the Fine been to a third persons use the consequents had been the same as in the Case cited out of Ognell's Case not as to the Conizee but as to that third person to whom the rent was intended To conclude then this first part 1. That whereof the Conizors were alwaies actually and separately seiz'd the same was never by them transferr'd to the seisin of another But of this Rent the Conizors were alwaies in actual seisin for there was no moment of time wherein they were not seis'd therefore this Rent was never transferr'd to the seisin of another nor could any other for any moment of time have a separated seisin thereof for what was mine at all times could be anothers at no time 2. It is an impossibility in Law that two men severally shall have several Rights and Fee-simples in possession in one and the same Land Dyer 28 H. 8. f. 12. a. p. 51. simul semel per Fitz-herbert in the Argument of Bokenhams Case and the same impossibility is so to have of a Rent Nor hath this relation to the learning of Instants in Digbie's Case Coke 1. Rep. and Fitz-williams in the sixth Report That an old Use may be revoked and a new rais'd in the same time and an old possession ended and a new begun this is usual in all transmutation of Estates and things also For in nature a new form introduc'd doth in the same moment destroy the old according to that Generatio unius est corruptio alterius but a separate possession can never be
the Grantee for life when his Estate was enlarg'd needing no new Attornment or privity he did not thereby lose the Rent-arrear If two Jointenants in Fee let the Land for life Litt. Sect. 574 reserving a Rent to them and their Heirs if one release to the other and his Heirs this Release is good and he to whom it was made shall have the Rent of Tenant for life only and a Writ of Waste without Attornment to such Release for the privity which once was between the Tenant for life and them in the Reversion So is it if one Jointenant confirms the Land to the other and his Heirs Litt. Sect. 523. The Law must necessarily be the same if a man seis'd of a Rent-service or Rent-charge in Fee grant it to two and their Heirs or to two and the Heirs of one of them and the Tenant attorn if after one Jointenant release to the other or he which hath the Inheritance to him which hath but an Estate for life and to his Heirs the person to whom such Release is made shall thereby have a Fee-simple whereas before he had but for life in the Rent and an Estate absolute which before was joynt without any new Attornment for the reason of the former Case because there was once a privity between the Tenant and them which was never destroyed So is it if there be Lessee for life the Remainder for life he Litt. Sect. 573 in the Reversion releaseth to him in the Remainder and to his Heirs all his right he in the Remainder hath thereby a Fee and shall have a Writ of Waste and likewise the Rent of Tenant for life if any were without any Attornment of the Tenant for life for the former privity between them Enlargement of Estate by descent If a man seiz'd of a Rent-charge in Fee grant it for life to A. and the Tenant attorns after the Grantor grants the Reversion of this Rent to the Father of A. and his Heirs to whom A. attorns as in this Case he may by Sir Edward Coke's Comment and after the Father dies Coke's Litt. Sect. 556. and this Reversion descends upon A. whereby he hath a Fee-simple in the Rent no new Attornment is requisite for this enlargement of Estate Diminishing of Estate A man seis'd of a Rent-charge in Fee grants this Rent for Seven years to commence from the time of his death the Remainder in Fee and the Tenant attorns in the life time of the Grantor 2. Rep. Sir Rowland Hayward's Case as he must by the Resolution in Sir Rowland Hayward's Case 2. Rep. here the Grantor hath diminish't his Estate in the Rent from a Fee-simple to an Estate for life yet it cannot be doubted but he may distrain for his Rent-arrear And so is the Law where a man seis'd in Fee of a Rent for good consideration Covenants to stand seiz'd for life with Remainder over Vpon these grounds upon Littleton If a man seis'd of a Rent-charge in Fee grant it over to a Feme sole for a term of years the Tenant attorns and she take Husband and during the term the Grantor confirm the Rent to the Husband and Wife for their lives or in Fee they become Jointenants for life or in Fee of this Rent and need no new Attornment This Case is proved by a Case in Littleton Sect. Hence it is manifest that where a man hath a Rent for which he may once lawfully distrain by Attornment of the Tenant which gives sufficient privity to avow such Grantee or Possessor of the Rent may enlarge or change his Estate in the Rent to a greater or lesser or different Estate and needs no new Attornment or privity therefore to distrain and avow for such Rent whenever Arrear unless he become dispossess'd of the Rent and the privity to distrain and avow thereby be destroyed by a Right gained by some other to have the Rent and a Right in the Tenant to pay it to some other 9 H. 6. f. 43. Br. Avoury p. 123. To this purpose there is a Case If a man be seis'd of Land in Jure uxoris in Fee and leaseth the Land for years reserving Rent his Wife dies without having had any Issue by him whereby he is no Tenant by the Curtesie but his Estate is determined yet he may avow for the Rent before the Heir hath made his actual Entry This Case is not adjudg'd but it is much the better Opinion of the Book Objections The Conizors are in possession since the Fine of another Estate Obj. 1 than they were before the Fine that is according to the uses of the Fine which they could not be without an Alienation of the Rent to the Conizee by the Fine to enable the raising of that new use out of the Estate transferr'd to the Conizee by the Fine That by such Alienation the former privity between the Conizors and the Tenant which they had as Parceners by Attornment to the first grant of the Rent was destroy'd and therefore they cannot now distrain but for Rent-arrear since the Fine by the possession given them by the Statute of 27 H. 8. to which no Attornment is necessary and not for any Arrears due before upon the old privity As specious as this Reason seems it may be answer'd Answ That the Conizors had alwaies an actual and separate seisin and possession of the Rent and were at no time without it therefore the Conizee could have no several and separate possession of it at any time for it is not possible that two severally can possess the same thing simul semel for the same thing can no more be in two separate possessions at the same time civilly then the same thing can be in two separate places at the same time naturally Is not the Reason then of equal force that the Conizors were at no time out of possession and seisin of this Rent and consequently never lost the power to distrain for it As to say the Conizee had sometime a separate possession of the Rent from the Conizors out of which the new uses were raised and therefore the privity to distrain for the old Arrears was for sometime destroy'd Besides if the old privity be destroy'd the greatest absurdity imaginable in Law follows That a man hath a right to a thing for which the Law gives him no remedy which is in truth as great an absurdity as to say the having of right in law and having no right are in effect the same When as on the other side the loss of the Arrears and the Conizors right to them is a Consequent deduc'd from the destruction of the old privity between the Conizors and the Tenant by an imaginary and not a real possession of the Rent by the Conizee Obj. 2 Ognell's Case 4. Rep. Nor will it serve to say as is insinuated in Ognell's Case that the Conizors have dispens'd with their own right in the Arrears and therefore such
than a local Subject ibid. 286 5. He must be otherwise a Subject than any Grant or Letters Patents can make him ibid. 6. The Natives of Jersey Garnsey Ireland and the English Plantations c. are not Aliens 268 in loco 278 279 7. Those which are born in the Kings Forreign Plantations are born his Natural Subjects and shall inherit in England 279 8. A Natural Subject is correlative to a Natural Prince and a man cannot have two natural Soveraigns no more than two Fathers or two Mothers 280 273 in loco 283 9. The several ways by which men born out of England may inherit in England 281 10. An Antenatus in Scotland shall not inherit without an Act of Parliament because he is an Alien 274 in loco 284 287 11. Who are the Antenati Postnati and the difference between them 273 in loco 283 12. An Act of Parliament in Ireland shall never Naturalize an Alien to England to make him inheritable there 274 in loco 284 13. No Tenure by Homage c. in any of the Kings Dominions acquired by Conquest or by Grant or Letters Patents can make a man inheritable in England 279 14. No Laws made in any Dominion acquired by Conquest or new Plantation by the Kings Governor or people there by virtue of the Kings Letters Patents can make an Alien inheritable in England 279 15. One Naturalized in Scotland since the Union cannot inherit in England 268 in loco 278 279 280 285 16. A man born a Subject to one that is King of another Country and who afterwards comes to be King of England is an Alien and shall not inherit in England ibid. 285 286 17. An act of Law making a man as if he had been born a Subject shall not work the same effect as his being born a Subject which is an effect of Law 280 18. An Alien hath issue a Son and afterwards is Denizen'd and he afterwards hath another Son here the youngest Son shall inherit 285 Allegiance 1. All Allegiance and Subjection are acts and obligations of Law the subjection begins with the birth of the Subject at which time the Kings protection of him likewise begins 279 Appendant 1. Whatsoever is appendant to the Land goes to the Occupier thereof naturally 190 2. An Advowson may be appendant to a Mannor 12 Apprentice 1. The Law permits not persons who have served Seven years to have a way of livelyhood to be hindred from the exercise of their Trades in any Town or part of the Kingdom 356 Arch-bishop See Ordinary Dispensation 1. The Arch-bishop may dispense for a Plurality 20 Assets 1. The manner of pleading Assets ultra 104 Assignee and Assignment 1. Offices or acts of personal Trust cannot be assigned for that Trust which any man may have is not personal 180 181 2. An Occupant becomes an Assignee in Law to the first Lessee 204 3. If a man Covenants against himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns yet if his Assigns do a tortious act it is no breach of the Covenant because he may have remedy by Action for the tort 118 to 128 Assise 1. An Assise will not lye for a Rent issuing out of Tythes barely 204 Attaint See Title Statutes 3 11. 1. An Attaint lies only in Civil not Criminal Causes 145 146 2. Jurors are not finable for a false Verdict an Attaint only lies against them 145 Attorney 1. An Attorney cannot bring Debt for Soliciting but Case only 99 2. The Defendant cannot wage his Law for Attorneys Fees ibid. Attornment 1. By the Common Law an Attornment was requisite to entitle the Lord the Reversioner the Grantee of a Remainder or of a Rent by Deed or Fine to distrain for Rent in arrear 39 2. By a Grant and Attornment the Grantee becomes actually seised of the Rent 40 3. Attornment and power to distrain follows the possession and not the use 43 4. An Attornment cannot be for a time 27 5. An Attornment of the Tenant doth not disclaim but affirm his possession For it is the act of the Tenant by reason of his being in possession 193 6. A mans Estate in a Rent-charge may be enlarged diminished or altered and no new attornment or privity requisite to such alteration 44 7. Attornment is requisite to the Grant of an Estate for life but to a Confirmation to enlarge an Estate it is not 44 45 46 8. A Rent-charge is granted to Commence Seven years after the death of the Grantor Remainder in Fee Attornment must be made in the life time of the Grantor 46 9. If a Fine is levied of the Reversion of Land or of a Rent to uses the Cestuy que use may distrain without Attornment 50 51 10. Where a Rent Reversion or Remainder is sold by Bargain and Sale the Bargainee may distrain without Attornment 51 11. Where a man is seised of a Rent-charge and grants it over to which the Tenant attorns and he afterwards retakes that Estate here must be a new Attornment for the former privity is wholly destroyed 44 12. Where an Attornment shall be good to a contingent use 52 Bargain and Sale See Intollment 1. WHere a Rent Reversion or Remainder is sold by Bargain and Sale the Bargainee may distrain for the Rent without Attornment 51 Baron and Feme 1. The man after the marriage hath the deduction of the woman ad Domum Thalamum and all the civil power over her and not she over him 306 2. The Interdicts of carnal knowledg in the Levitical Law were directed to the men not to the women who are interdicted but by a consequent for the woman being interdicted to the man the man must also be interdicted to the woman for a man cannot marry a woman and she not marry him 305 Bishop See Ordinary Archbishop 1. What Bishops were originally 22 2. A Parson is chosen Bishop his Benefices are all void and the King shall present 19 20 3. It is not at all inconsistent for a Bishop to be an Incumbent 22 4. A Bishop may be an Incumbent after Consecration 24 5. How many Benefices a Bishop may retain by a Dispensation 25 6. No Canon Ecclesiastical can be made and executed without the Kings Royal assent 329 7. Bishops in Wales were originally of the foundation of the Prince of Wales 411 Canons Ecclesiastical See Title Ecclesiastical Court 1. WHat Canons are good and binding and what not 327 328 Capias ad Satisfaciendum See Execution Certiorari 1. A Certior lies out of the Chancery to Ireland to certifie an Act of Parliament but it doth not lye to Scotland 287 2. A Certiorari doth not lye to Wales to certifie a Record to the Courts at Westminster to the intent that Execution may issue out here upon it 398 Certificate 1. There are many things whereof the Kings Courts sometimes ought to be certified which cannot be certified by Certiorari 288 Chancery 1. The Chancery may grant a Habeas Corpus and discharge a Prisoner thereupon as well
usually letten Lands which have been twice letten are within this proviso 33 2. Of Lands which have at any time before been usually letten that which was not in Lease at the time of the proviso nor twenty years before is out of the power 34 Possession 1. He that is out of possession if he brings his Action must make a good Title 8 2. Where one man would recover any thing from another it is not sufficient to destroy the Title of him in possession but you must prove your own to be better than his 58 60 3. When a man hath gotten the possession of Land that was void of a Proprietor the Law casts the Freehold upon him to make a sufficient Tenant to the Precipe 191 4. Prior possession is a good Title against him who hath no Title at all 299 5. A separate possession of one and the same Land can never be in two persons at one and the same time 42 47 6. By a Fine the Estate may be changed although the possession is not changed 42 43 7. The Conuzee of a Rent granted by Fine to Uses cannot have any actual Seisin nor be in possession since the 27 H. 8. 49 Quare Impedit 1. WHere in a Quare Impedit the Plaintiff and Defendant are both actors 6 7 8 58 2. The Plaintiff in his Count must alledge a presentation in himself or in those from whom he claims 7 8 17 57 3. So likewise must the Defendant because they are both Actors 7 8 57 60 4. The Plaintiff must recover by his own strength and not by the Defendants weakness 8 58 60 5. Where the King or a common person in a Quare Impedit sets forth a Title which is no more than a bare Suggestion he shall not then forsake his own and endeavour to destroy the Defendants Title 61 6. In all Quare Impedits the Defendants may traverse the presentation alledged by the Plaintiff if the matter of Fact will bear it 16 17 7. But the Defendant must not deny the presentation alledged where there was a presentation 17 8. Where the Presentation and not the Seisin in gross of the Advowson or Appendancy is traversable 10 11 12 13 9. When the Seisin in gross or appendancy is traversable 12 10. An Incumbent is elected Bishop and before Consecration he obtains a Dispensation in Commendam Retinere he is afterwards consecrated and dyes the Patron shall present and not the King 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 11. If a man who hath a Benefice with Cure accepts of another without Dispensation or Qualification the first Benefice is void and the Patron may present and his Clerk who is admitted instituted and inducted may bring his Action of Trespass or Ejectment 129 130 131 12. All Quare Impedits for disturbance to Churches within the Lordships Marchers of Wales shall be brought in England in the next adjoyning County 409 410 13. Judgment with a Cessat Executio upon the Bishops Disclaimer 6 14. Where the Parson Patron and Ordinary are sued in a Quare Impedit and the Ordinary disclaims and the Parson looseth by default the Plaintiff shall have Judgment to recover his presentation and a Writ to the Bishop to remove him with a Cessat Executio until the plea is determined between the Plaintiff and Patron ibid. Rebutter See Title Warranty 1. WWO may Rebut 384 2. The difference between a Rebutter and Voucher 385 386 387 3. Whether the Tenant in possession may Rebut without shewing how he came to the possession 385 4. Whether a Rebutter may be when the warranty is determined 387 5. How many several sorts of persons may Rebut and how those that come in ex institutione dispositione legis may Rebut 390 391 392 Recital 1. The Recital of one Lease in another is not a sufficient proof that there was such a Lease as is recited 74 75 Recognizance See Title Statutes 8. 1. The Chancery and all the Courts at Westminster had before the Statute of Acton Burnel and still have power to take Recognizances 102 2. So likewise may every Judge take a Recognizance in any part of England as well out of Term as in Term 103 3. Where a Recognizance taken before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas is in the nature of a Statute Staple 102 4. Execution upon such Recognizances are not as upon Statutes but by Elegit ibid. Record 1. How a Record is to be pleaded 92 Recovery and Common Recovery See Title Statutes 13. See Voucher Warranty 1. Where a Recovery against its nature shall be a Forfeiture because it is taken as a common Conveyance 51 2. A Rent may arise out of the Estate of Cestuy que use upon a Recovery which was to have risen out of the Estate of the Recoverer 51 Release 1. Joyntenants may release and confirm to each other 45 Remainder See Title Warranty 1. A Remainder must depend upon some particular Estate and be created at the same time with the particular Estate 269 2. A Remainder cannot depend upon an absolute Fee simple 269 367 3. If Land is devised to A. and his Heirs as long as B. hath Heirs of his body the Remainder over this is good in a Devise not as a Remainder but as an Executory Devise 270 4. A Remainder in Fee upon a Lease for years 46 5. The Statute de Donis restrains not the warranty of Tenant in Tayl from barring him in the Remainder in Tayl by his warranty descending upon him 367 377 Rent 1. By the Common Law there ought to be an Attornment to enable the Distrainor to make a good Avowry upon a Distress for Rent 39 2. Where a Rent is well vested and there is an Attornment when ever the Rent is arrear a Distress is lawful unless the power is lost ibid. 3. An Estate in a Rent-charge may be enlarged diminished or altered and no new Attornment or privity requisite 44 45 46 4. The power to distrain may be lost by a perpetual Union Suspension pro tempore Dying without Heir Granting of it upon Condition and by a granting over 39 5. The several things that a Rent is subject to 40 6. Rent is granted pur auter vie the Grantee dies the Rent is thereby determined 200 201 7. Where Rent is arrear and afterwards it is granted over in Fee and an Attornment thereupon here the Grantor hath lost his arrears and cannot afterwards distrain 40 8. A Rent may arise out of the Estate of Cestuy que use upon a Recovery 52 9. There can be no Occupancy of a Rent 200 Reversion See Title Warranty 1. By the grant of a Reversion Lands in possession will not pass but by the grant of Lands a Reversion will pass 83 2. If Tenant for life alien with warranty which descends upon the Reversioner such alienation with warranty is not restrained by the Statute de Donis 370 3. An alienation with warranty which shall hinder the Land from reverting to the Donor or his
Arrears in strictness of Law when the Fine is levied are not due at all but remitted and so no absurdity to have no remedy for a thing not due 1. By this reason a Law should be equally good that provides no remedy for performance of Contracts as that which doth because all Contracts for performance of which the Law gives no remedy shall in Iudgment of Law be dispens'd with releas'd discharg'd 2. By this reason a Rent-seck before seisin had of it shall be no duty because the Law gives no Remedy before seisin And consequently such Rent or such Arrears as in the present Case being paid by the Tenant may be recover'd again as the proper mony of the Tenant deliver'd to the Grantee of the Rent without any consideration upon an indebitatus Assumpsit the Law creating a promise So might a Debt paid after six years elaps'd for which by the Statute of Limitations there was no remedy yet that doth not cease to be a Debt as if it had been released By like reason if a man hath by accident had his Bonds burn'd or destroy'd whereby he had no remedy to recover the Debt by Law it should cease to be a Debt at all 32 H. 8. c. 37. To this the words of the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 37. may be added which gives remedy for recovery of such Debts by Executors as were due to the Testators and for which there was no remedy before viz. That the Tenants did retain in their hands such Arrearages of Rents whereby the Executors could not therewith pay the Debts and perform the will of the Testator c. and surely no Arrearages could be of Rent if they were remitted in Law nor was it fit the Executors should pay the Debts or perform the Testators Will with that which was no part of the Testators Estate either in possession or as a credit If a common Recovery had been to uses of Lordships and Mannors before the Statute of 27. the Recoverors had no remedy to make the Tenants attorn for a quid Juris clamat would not lye upon a Recovery before the Statute of 7 H. 8. 7 H. 8. c. 4. c. 4. which did give remedy and which saith That such refusal of Attornment was to the great offence of their Conscience refusing and not only to the disinheritance of the Recoverors but often to the breaking of the last Wills of the Recoverees and also to the disinheritance of Husbands Wives and others to whose use the Recovery was had By which it is plain that duties for which there is no remedy often in Law are not therefore dispenced with and discharged by the party as is superficially said in Ognell's Case That the Conizee of a Rent granted by Fine to uses cannot have any actual seisin or be in possession of such Rent since the Statute of 27 H. 8. cap. 10. Before the Statute of 27 H. 8 If a Feoffment had been to uses and no Livery given or given by one Attorney when it ought to have been by two the uses in such Deed of Feoffment could never rise so if a Reversion had been granted to uses and no Attornment to the Grantee no use could rise because there was no sufficient Estate in possession And when the Statute of Vses came it could have no operation when the Estates in possession were not sufficient So if an Estate for life had been granted to the use of a man and his Heirs an Estate in Fee could not rise out of it by the Statute of 27 H. 8. c. 10. And if before the Statute a Reversion had been granted by Fine to Vses and no quid Juris clamat brought though the Land pass'd by the Fine yet the Tenant could not be distrain'd nor a Writ of Waste brought against him until he attorn'd and when the Statute came to transferr the use into the possession it could be but into such a possession as the Conizee had by the Fine without power to distrain or bring Waste for the words of the Statute are That the Estate Title Right and Possession that was in such person or persons that were or hereafter shall be seis'd of any Lands or Hereditaments to the use confidence or trust of any person or persons be from henceforth adjudged to be in him or them that have or hereafter shall have such use confidence or trust c. And therefore if before the Statute of 27. a Fine had been levied of a Rent-charge to uses as this Case is if before Attornment to or seisin had by the Conizee the Statute had come and brought the possession of the Rent to the use the Cestuy que use could have had the Rent but as a Rent-seck for which he could not distrain for want of Attornment nor have an Assise for want of seisin for the Conizee had no other possession of the Rent but after Attornment and seisin to or by Cestuy que use his possession perhaps became perfected But since the Statute if a Fine be levied of a Reversion of Lands to uses or of a Rent because the use and possession by the Statute come instantly together and the Conizee of the Fine hath no time possible to bring either a quid Juris clamat or a quem redditum reddit Sir Moyl Finch's Case Coke 6. f. 68. a for or to receive an Attornment to perfect his possession It was resolv'd in Sir Moyl Finch's Case that the Cestuy use should notwithstanding distrain and have the same advantage as if the Conizees possession had been perfected by Attornment and seisin The intent of the Statute of 27. which was to bring together the possession and the use when the use was to one or more persons and the possession in one or more other separate persons was soon after the Statute wholly declined upon what good construction or inference I know not For now the use by the name of trust which were one and the same before the Statute remains separately in some persons and the possession separately in others as it did before the Statute and are not brought together but by Decree in Chancery or the voluntary Conveyance of the possessor of the Land to Cestuy que trust So as now the principal use of the Statute of 27. especially upon Fines levied to uses is not to bring together a possession and use which at no time were separate the one from the other but to introduce a general form of Conveyance by which the Conizors of the Fine who are as Donors in the Case may execute their intents and purposes at pleasure either by transferring their Estates to Strangers by enlarging diminishing or altering them to and among themselves at their pleasure without observing that rigour and strictness of Law for the possession of the Conizee as was requisite before the Statute Which I have sufficiently evidenc'd by shewing that the Attornment of the Lessee to the Conizee or Reversioner or of the Tenant to him as
the Statute If the Father under Age should make such a Devise it were absolutely void for the same syllables shall never give the Custody of the Heir by the Father under Age which do not give it by the Father which is of Age. But in both Cases a Devise of the Custody is effectual and there is no reason that the Custody devis'd shall operate into a Lease when a Lease devis'd shall not operate into a Custody which it cannot do If a man devise the Custody of his Heir apparent to J. S. and mentions no time either during his Minority or for any other time this is a good devise of the Custody within the Act if the Heir be under Fourteen at the death of the Father because by the Devise the Modus habendi Custodiam is chang'd only as to the person and left the same it was as to the time But if above Fourteen at the Fathers death then the Devise of the Custody is meerly void for the incertainty For the Act did not intend every Heir should be in Custody until One and twenty Non ut tamdiu sed ne diutius therefore he shall be in this Custody but so long as the Father appoints and if he appoint no time there is no Custody If a man have power to make Leases for any term of years not exceeding One hundred and he demises Land but expresseth no time shall this therefore be a Lease for One hundred years There is no Reason it should be a Lease for the greatest term he could grant more than for the least term he could grant or indeed for any other term under One hundred Therefore it is void for incertainty and the Case is the same for the Custody For if the Father might intend as well any time under that no Reason will enforce that he only intended that And to say he intended the Custody for some time therefore since no other can be it must be for that will hold as well in the Lease and in all other Cases of incertainty If a man devises Ten pounds to his Servant but having many none shall have it for the incertainty It may be demanded If the Father appoint the Custody until the Age of One and twenty and the Guardian dye what shall become of this Custody It determines with the death of the Guardian and is a Condition in Law and the same as if a man grant to a man the Stewardship of his Mannor for Ten years or to be his Bailiff It is implyed by way of Condition if he live so long A Copyholder in Fee surrenders to the Lord Dyer 8 Eliz. f. 251. pl. 90. ad intentionem that the Lord should grant it back to him for term of life the Remainder to his Wife till his Son came to One and twenty Remainder to the Son in tayl Remainder to the Wife for life The Husband died The Lord at his Court granted the Land to the Wife till the Sons full age The Remainders ut supra The Wife marries and dies Intestate The Husband held in the Land The Wives Administrator and to whom the Lord had granted the Land during the Minority of the Son enters upon the Husband This Entry was adjudg'd unlawful because it was the Wives term but otherwise it had been if the Wife had been but a Guardian or next Friend of this Land The like Case is in Hobart Balder and Blackburn f. 285. 17 Jac. If it be insisted That this new Guardian hath the Custody not only of the Lands descended or left by the Father but of all Lands and Goods any way acquir'd or purchas'd by the Infant which the Guardian in Soccage had not That alters not the Case for if he were Guardian in Soccage without that particular power given by the Statute he is equally Guardian in Soccage with it and is no more than if the Statute had appointed Guardian in Soccage to have care of all the Estate of the Infant however he came by it Besides that proves directly that this new Guardian doth not derive his interest from the Father but from the Law for the Father could never give him power or interest of or in that which was never his The Court was divided viz. The Chief Justice and Justice Wylde for the Plaintiff Justice Tyrrell and Justice Archer for the Defendant Hill 19 20 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 506. Holden versus Smallbrooke IN Trover and Conversion and not Guilty pleaded Robinson the Iury gave a Special Verdict to this Effect That Doctor Mallory Prebendary of the Prebend of Wolvey founded in the Cathedral of Litchfield seis'd of the said Prebend and one Messuage one Barn and the Glebe appertaining thereto and of the Tithes of Wolvey in right of his Prebend 22 April 13 Car. 2. by Indenture demised to Giles Astly and his Assigns the said Prebend together with all Houses Barns Tenements Glebe Lands and Tithes thereto belonging for three Lives under the ancient Rent of Five pounds ten shillings Astly being one of the Lives died seis'd of the Premisses at whose death one Taverner was Tenant for one year not ended of the Demise of Astly of the Messuage Barn and Glebe Lands and in possession of them whereupon the Plaintiff entred into the Messuage and Glebe and was in the possession of the same and of the Tithes as Occupant And afterwards Frances Astly the Relict of the said Giles Astly enters upon the Messuage and claims the same as Occupant in haec verba Frances Astly Widow of Giles Astly enters upon the House and claims the same with the Glebe and Tithe as Occupant Taverner attorns to Frances Astly and afterwards grants and assigns all his Estate in the Premisses to the Plaintiff afterwards Conquest the Husband of Frances Astly took one Sheaf of Corn in the name of all the Tithes and afterwards demised the Tithes to the Defendant The Tithes are set forth and the Defendant took them whereupon the Plaintiff brought this Action Before I deliver my Opinion concerning the particular Questions before open'd arising upon this Record I shall say somewhat shortly of Natural Occupancy and Civil Occupancy First opening what I mean by those terms then briefly shewing their difference as far only as is material to the Questions now before me I call Natural Occupancy the possession either of such natural things as are immoveable fixt and permanent as Land a Pool River Sea for a Sea is capable of Occupancy and Dominion naturally as well as Land and hath naturally been in Occupancy as is demonstrated in Mr. Selden's Mare Clausum at large which lye unpossess'd and in which no other hath prior right Or of things natural and moveable either animate as a Horse a Cow a Sheep and the like without number or Inanimate as Gold precious Stones Grain Hony Fruit Flesh and the like numberless also wherein no man until the possession thereof by Occupancy had any other right than every man had which is
as much as to say wherein no man had right for that which is equally every mans right is no mans right Whence it follows for I shall not speak of the usage or extent of such a possession by natural Occupancy it being a subject too large and not necessary for my present purpose 1. That there can be no Occupancy natural of any thing wherein another than the Occupant hath right For by the definition made natural Occupancy is the first right 2. A Claim without actual possession cannot make a man a natural Occupant For 1. When a Claim is cannot be possibly known to all concern'd in the Occupancy of a natural thing and what cannot be known is as to all effect of right as if it had not been nor is there any Character of a natural Claim but the possession and use of the thing but civilly there may either by word or other sign agreed on 2. The end of a natural Right to any natural thing is the separate use of the thing to a part of Mankind which cannot be used by all Mankind but if Claim only would give a Right to the things of nature they might still remain as much without use after the Claim as before which agrees not with the end of Nature in giving a Right to natural things 3. If Claim could give a Natural Right one might claim all things in the Universe not already appropriated and might have done so in the beginning of time when nothing almost was appropriated 4. A natural Occupant hath no Estate of Fee Freehold or the like which are Estates formed and raised by municipal Laws but hath only a bare possession to keep or forsake 5. That Land possessed by a natural Occupant must be without any sort of Vassallage of Service Rent Condition or other Charge whatsoever for those servitudes upon the Land cannot be conceiv'd without a former right in him that laid them but natural Occupancy of things wherein none had any former right or having any have deserted it for naturally a man can have nothing against his own will 6. Two or more cannot at the same time have severally plenary possession that is Occupancy of the same thing therefore none can have right to that by reason of possession whereof another is already possess'd for then there would be two plenary Possessors severally of the same thing at the same time which is impossible And although every Nation hath by Consent and Agreement among the people of it its proper Laws to guide and determine mens Properties to all things capable of property and ownership yet the ancientest Nations of the World have no other right against each other to their own Countries and Territories than this original and natural occupancy and that Nation that will not admit a right by occupancy to another Nation in the Land so possess'd by it must at the same time confess they have no right to their own which they hold but in like manner They who would be further satisfied concerning this kind of occupancy may resort for exactness above other Books upon this Subject to Mr. Selden's Mare Clausum Seldeni Mare Clausum l. 1. Grotius de Jure Belli l. 1. c. 3 4. lib. 1. and to Hugo Grotius his first Book de Jure Belli Pacis c. 3. de acquisitione originaria rerum c. 4. de derelictione praesumpta eam secuta occupatione c. 1. By Civil Occupancy I mean such an occupancy either of things immoveable as Lands or of things moveable as is according to institution and the law of the place and particularly according to the Law of England as to the decision of the Question before us 2. By the Law of England there is no occupancy by any person of any thing which another hath a present right to possess wherein the Law of the Land agrees with that of natural occupancy Occupancy by the Law must be of things which have natural existence as of Land or of other natural things not of things which have their being and creation from Laws and Agreements of men for there is no direct and immediate occupancy of a Rent a Common an Advowson a Fair a Market a Remainder a Dignity and the like Cok. Litt. f. 41. b. Cr. 41 El. f. 721. Crauleys C. p. 50. no Occupancy of a Rent There can be no Occupant of any thing that lieth in grant and cannot pass without Deed because every Occupant must claim by a que estate and averr the life of Cestuy que vie And in this the Civil Occupancy with us of Land agrees with Natural Occupancy which must be of a thing that hath natural existence and not only legal But although the Occupancy be always of a natural thing yet the Occupant doth thereby by the Law enjoy several things many times that have their being by Law only as an Occupant of Land may thereby enjoy a Common Occupant of a House Estovers of the demesne Lands of a Mannor the Services and Advowsons appendant which are not themselves natural things but things created by Law nor are they immediately and by themselves capable of Occupancy but with reference to and as adjuncts of the Land and herein the civil Occupany differs from the natural And the reason is clear because the occupancy of the Land which ought not to lye void doth not sever or separate any thing from the Land which the Law hath joyned with it and if it doth not separate from it that which is joyn'd with it by Law though that be not capable of Occupancy in it self as an Advowson or Common it must follow that such things continue joyn'd or belonging to the Land as before notwithstanding the occupancy of the Land Cok. Litt. f. 41. b. In civil occupancy the Land in occupancy is charg'd with all the servitude impos'd by the first Lessor or by the Law As 1. to the payment of Rent 2. to be subject to waste 3. to forfeiture 4. to other Conditions wherein it differs from Land whereof a man is a natural occupant As to the civil occupancy of moveable things which are commonly termed personal things or goods there are few of those in our Law that have not a Proprietor and consequently no Occupant can be of them those which fall under occupancy of that kind are for the most part found in things ferae naturae whose acquisition is either per piscationem Bract. l. 2. c. 1. as in Fish or per aucupium as in Fowl or per venationem by hunting These do cedere occupanti communi Jure 1. Hence it follows by way of Inference and Corollary That there can be no primary and immediate Occupancy of a Tithe for it is not in its own nature capable of Occupancy more than a Rent or Common is and is in truth in its nature but a Rent it cannot pass by it self but by Deed and as other things which lye in grant A second thing that follows
no such Case in 38 E. 3. f. 26. but the Case intended is 38 E. 3. f. 21. and he quotes the folio truly in his Littleton But the Case is not That an Assignee may rebutt or have benefit of a warranty made to a man and his Heirs only but that a warranty being made to a man his Heirs and Assigns the Assignee of the Heir or the Assignee of the Assignee though neither be Assignee of the first Grantee of the warranty shall have like benefit of the warranty as if he were Assignee of the first Grantee which hath been often resolv'd in the old Books To the same purpose he cites a Case out of 7 E. 3. f. 34. 46 E. 3. f. 4. which doth but remember that of 7. as adjudg'd That the Assignee of Tenant in tayl might rebutt the Donor whence he infers as before that the Tenant in possession might rebutt without any right to the warranty But the Inference holds not from that Case The Case of 7 E. 3. was That Land was given in tayl and the Donor warranted the Land generally to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns the Donee made a Feoffment in Fee and died without Issue and the Donor impleading the Feoffee was rebutted because he had warranted the Land to the Donee his Heirs and Assigns and the Feoffee claimed as Assignee of the Donee and therefore rebutted not because he had a bare possession But this Judgment of 7 E. 3. Sir Edward Coke denies and perhaps justly to be Law now because the Estate tayl being determin'd to which the warranty was first annex'd the whole warranty determin'd with it But however the Case no way proves what it is alledg'd for in Lincoln Colledge Case That a man may rebutt without ever shewing the warranty extended to him for the Feoffee did in that Case shew it So in the Case 45 E. 3. f. 18. the Feme who rebutted shew'd she was Grantee of the warranty To this may be added That what is delivered as before in Lincoln Colledge Case is neither conducing to the Judgment given in that Case nor is it any Opinion of the Judges but is Sir Edward Coke's single Opinion emergently given as appears most clearly in the Case To conclude When the Feoffees were seis'd to the use of William Vescy for his life and after to the use of the Defendant his wife for her life and after to the use of the right Heirs of William Vescy And when by Operation of the Statute of 27 H. 8. the possession is brought to these uses the warranty made by William Vescy to the Feoffees and their Heirs is wholly destroy'd For if before the Statute the Feoffees had executed an Estate to William for life the Remainder to his wife for life the Remainder to his right Heirs The warranty had been extinguish'd by such Execution of Estate and releas'd in Law for it could be in none but in William and his Heirs who could not warrant to himself or themselves By Littleton Sect. 743. for his Heirs in such Case take not by Purchase but Limitation because the Freehold was in him with a Remainder over to his right Heirs and so hath as great an Estate in the Land as the Feoffees had and then the warranty is gone by Littleton Litt. Sect. 744. And now the Statute executes the possession in the same manner and the warranty is in none for the time present or future but extinct If the warranty had been to the Feoffees their Heirs and Assigns it might have been more colourably question'd Whether the mean Remainder were not an Assignee of the Feoffees and so to have benefit of the warranty but the warranty being to the Feoffees and their Heirs only no Estate remaining in them no Assignee can pretend to the warranty 2. William Vescy could by no possibility ever warrant this Estate to the Defendant during his life and where the warranty cannot possibly attach the Ancestor it shall never attach the Heir as by Littleton's Case If a man deviseth Lands in Fee to another with warranty for him and his Heirs his Heirs shall not be bound to the warranty because himself could never be And though in that Case the Estate to be warranted commenc'd after the death of the Warranter and here the Remainder to the wife is in being before his death yet the reason differs not for himself could no more warrant this by any possibility than that and his Heir might as equally warrant the Estate devis'd as this Next Justice Jones in Spirt and Bences Case cites a Case 7 Eliz. the same with this Resolution resolved in the Common Pleas That the mediate Remainder could not be warranted In this Case if the Feoffees before the Statute had either voluntarily or by coercion of the Chancery after the death of the first Cestuy que use for life executed the Estate of the mean Remainder such person in Remainder could have no benefit of the warranty being but an Assignee of the Feoffees because the warranty was only to them and their Heirs No more can the person in Remainder here whose Estate is executed by the Statute be warranted more than if such Estate had been executed by the Common Law There are another sort of persons who may rebutt and perhaps vouch who are neither Heirs nor formally Assignees to the Garrantee but have the Estate warranted dispositione instituto Legis which I conceive not to differ materially whether they have such Estate warranted by the Common Law or by Act of Parliament The first of this kind I shall name Ass p. 9. 35 is Tenant by the Courtesie who as was adjudg'd 35 Ass might rebutt the warranty made to his wives Ancestor yet was neither Heir nor formal Assignee to any to whom the warranty was granted nothing is said in the Book concerning his vouching but certainly the wives Heir may be receiv'd to defend his estate if impleaded by a stranger who may vouch according to the warranty or may rebutt as the Case of 45 E. 3. f. 18. is But this difference is observable also where such a Tenant rebutts it appears what claim he makes to the warranty and so the Inconveniences avoided which follow a Rebutter made upon no other reason than because he who rebutts is in possession of the Land warranted A second Tenant of this kind is the Lord of a Villain 22 Ass p. 37. and therefore the Case is 22 Ass That Tenant in Dower made a Lease for life to a Villain which in truth was a forfeiture for making a greater Estate of Freehold than she had power to make and bound her and her Heirs to warranty the Lord of the Villain entred upon the Land in her life time and before the warranty attach'd the Heir who had right to enter for the forfeiture the Mother died and the Heir entred upon the L. of the Villain who re-entred and the Heir brought an Assise The L. of the Villain
the Kings license must be without any limitation to him that hath it to exercise his Trade as before it was prohibited otherwise it is no license 346 17. Where the King may dispense generally he is not bound to it but may limit his Dispensation 346 18. Where the King can dispense with particular persons he is not confined to number or place but may license as many and in such places as he thinks fit 347 19. A Corporation is capable of a Dispensation 347 348 20. A Dispensation to a person to keep an Office which person is not capable of such Office is void 355 21. Where a license Ex speciali gratia is good to dispense with a penal Law without a Non obstante 356 Distress 1. A privity is necessary by the common Law between the Distrainer and Distrained 39 2. Attornment and power to Distrain follows the possession and not the Use 43 3. Where a Rent is well vested and there is an Attornment when ever the Rent is arrear a Distress is lawful unless the power is lost 39 4. Where Rent is arrear and afterwards the Rent is granted over in Fee and an Attornment thereunto here the Grantor hath lost his arrears and cannot Distrain 40 5. If a Fine is levied of the Reversion of Land or of Rent to Uses the Cestuy que use may Distrain without attornment 50 51 Dominion 1. Dominions belonging to the Crown of England cannot be separated from it but by Act of Parliament made in England 300 2. What are Dominions belonging to the Realm of England though not in the Territorial Dominions of England ibid. 3. By what Title the Crown of England held Gascoign Guyen and Calais 401 Dower 1. The wife of a Conizee of a Fine shall not be thereof endowed because it is but a fictitious Seisin 41 2. The wife is dowable of a Rent in Fee 40 Droit d'Advowson 1. Where the Writ lies and for whom 11 16 2. In a Droit d'Advowson the King may alledge Seisin without alledging any time 56 Ecclesiastical Court See Archbishop Prohibition THe Secular Judges are most conuzant of Acts of Parliament 213 2. The Temporal Judges have conuzance of what marriages are within the Levitical Degrees and what not and what are incestuous 207 3. The Clergy of this Kingdom shall not enact or execute any Canon Constitution or Ordinance Provincial unless they have the Kings license 329 Elegit 1. It lies upon a Recognizance taken in any of the Courts at Westminster or before any Judge out of Term 102 Error See Presidents Iudgment 1. An erroneous Judgment is a good Judgment to all intents whatsoever until reversed 94 2. If an inferiour or superiour Court gives an erroneous Judgment it is reversible by Writ of Error 139 3. Where the matter concerns the Jurisdiction of the Court a Writ of Error lies no where but in Parliament 396 4. A Writ of Error lies to reverse a Judgment in any Dominion belonging to England 290 402 5. A Writ of Error lay to reverse a Judgment in Calais 402 6. It lies to reverse a Judgment in Ireland 290 291 298 402 Escheat 1. Where the Heir at Law dies without heir the Land escheats and the Lord's Title will precede any future Devise 270 Esplees 1. The profits of a Mine is no Esplees for the Land but only the Esplees for the Mine it self 255 2. So likewise for a Wood the profits of it is no Esplees but only for the Land only upon which the Wood grows ibid. Estates See Grant 1. The Law doth not in Conveyances of Estates admit Estates to pass by Implication as being a way of passing Estates not agreeable to the plainness required by Law in the transferring of Estates 261 262 c. 2. But in Devises they are admitted with due restrictions 261 262 263 c. 3. What Executory Devises and contingent Remainders are good and what not 272 273 4. When a new Estate is granted the privity to the old Estate is destroyed 43 5. The Estate may be changed and yet the possession not changed but remain as formerly 42 6. An Estate in a Rent-charge may may be enlarged diminished or altered and no new Attornment or privity requisite 44 45 46 7. The Seisin of the Conizee of a Fine is but a meer fiction and an invented form of Conveyance only 41 8. His wife shall not be endowed neither shall his heir inherit 41 Estoppel or Conclusion 1. A Demise by Indenture of a Term habendum from the expiration of another term therein recited when really there is no such term in esse is no Estoppel to the Lessor or Lessee but the Lessee may presently enter and the Lessor grant the Reversion 82 Evidence 1. No evidence can be given to a Jury of what is Law 143 2. A witness may be admitted to prove the Contents of a Deed or Will 77 3. The Jury may go upon evidence from their own personal knowledge 147 Execution See Elegit 1. Lands Persons or Goods ought not to be lyable to Judgments in other manner than they were at the time of the Judgment given which was where the Court had Jurisdiction which gave the Judgment 398 2. What Execution shall be sued out upon a Recognizance acknowledged in any of the Courts at Westminster or before a Judge 103 3. What Execution shall be sued out upon a Statute 102 4. Upon a Recovery in England an Execution doth not lye into Wales 397 398 5. Perhaps by special Writs to the chief Officer of the King Execution may be made of Judgments given at Westminster in any of his Dominions 420 Executor See Title Statute 10 20. 1. How they are to administer the Testators estate 96 2. An Executor may refuse but cannot assign over his Executorship 182 3. It is no Devastavit in an Executor to satisfie a Judgment obtained upon a simple Covenant before a debt due by Obligation 94 95 97 4. Where an Action of Debt upon Bond or Judgment is brought against him he may confess the Action if there be no fraud in the Case although he hath notice of a former Suit 95 100 5. The Executor may plead an erroneous Judgment in Barr 94 97 6. A Recognizance in Chancery must be paid before Debts upon simple Contracts and Debts by Bond 103 7. It is a Devastavit in an Executor to pay voluntarily a Debt by simple Contract before a Debt by Bond whereof he had notice and not otherwise 94 95 8. It is a Devastavit to satisfie a later Judgment if there are not Assets left to satisfie a former Judgment 95 9. An Action will not lye against Executors upon a Tally because it is no good Specialty 100 10. The pleading of Plene administravit praeter plene administravit ultra and in what Cases it may be pleaded and how 104 Exposition of Words Quam diu 32 Dum ibid. Dummodo ibid. Usually letten 33 34 At any time 34 Or more 35 More or less ibid. Gurges
Grantee of the Rent-charge is now dispenc'd with which was not before the Statute For if that were now requisite the Conizors could not only not distrain for the Rent due before the Fine but not for the Rent due since the Fine nor doth the Statute help the matter because the Cestuy que use is in possession of the Rent by the Statute and therefore needs no Attornment for that is true when the Conizee hath a perfect possession but without Attornment the Conizee had no perfect possession impowring him to distrain and therefore the Statute can bring no perfect possession to the uses to that end And so Sir Edward Coke agrees the Law Cok. Litt. f. 307. Sect. 55â— that since Littleton wrote If the Conizee of a Fine before Attornment by Deed indented and inroll'd bargains and sells a Seigniory to another the Bargainee shall not distrain because the Conizee that is the Bargainor could not for want of Attornment But on the other side a man perfectly seis'd of a Seigniory Rent Reversion or Remainder bargains and sells by Deed indented and inroll'd according to the Statute the Bargainee shall distrain without Attornment by vertue of the Statute And if a Fine be now levied to a man to the use of a third person the third person shall distrain without any Attornment made not only to himself by reason of the Statute but to the Conizee by the Resolution in Sir Moyle Finch his Case for otherwise the Fine were to little purpose Which Case though it make an Attornment not necessary where it is impossible to be had that the Conveyance might not be useless in effect and an intended right to be de novo introduc'd altogether hindred Shall it therefore destroy an old Attornment which cannot but be had and is still in being for no other use or end but to deprive the Conizors of a Rent and former Right justly due to introduce a general inconvenience upon all that have granted Leases for lives and are occasioned to settle their Estates And there is great difference between a Fine levied of a Reversion or of a Rent-charge to the use of a third person and to the use of the Conizors for a third person can never distrain unless either an Attornment were to the Conizee which is impossible because no possession continues in him so as to receive an Attornment or unless the construction of the Statute according to Sir Moyle Finch his Case to make the Conveyance of effect to Cestuy que use made the Attornment because it could not be had not necessary which is a great strain and violence upon the true reason of Law That a Conveyance which in reason could not be good without Attornment should be sufficient because it could not have an Attornment which was necessary to make it sufficient And this practice hath been frequent since the Statute of Uses Sir Will. Pelham's Case as in making a Recovery against his nature to be a forfeiture because taken as a Common Conveyance To make Vses declared by Indenture between the parties made a year after the Recovery to be the Vses of the Recovery Downan's Case 9. Rep. with such Limitations as are mentioned in Downan's Case the 9. Rep. L. Cromwell's Case 2. Rep. f. 72. b. To make a Rent arise out of the Estate of Cestuy que use upon a Recovery which was to arise out of the Estate of the Recoveror and his possession which is a principal point in Cromwell's Case and resolv'd because by the intention of the parties the Cestuy que use was to pay the Rent 14 Eliz. Harwell versus Lucas Moore 's Rep. f. 99. a. n. 243. Bracebridge's Case is eminent to this purpose Tho. Bracebridge seis'd of the Mannor of Kingbury in Com. Warwick made a Lease for One and twenty years of Birchin Close parcel del Mannor to Moore and another Lease of the same Close for Six and twenty years to commence at the end of the first Lease to one Curteis rendring Rent and after made a Feoffment of the Mannor and all other his Lands to the use of the Feoffees and their Heirs and Assigns upon Condition that if they paid not 10000 l. within fifteen daies to the said Tho. Bracebridge or his Assigns they should stand seiz'd to the use of Bracebridge and Joyce his Wife the Remainder to Thomas their second Son in tail with divers Remainders over The Remainder to the Right Heirs of Thomas the Father Livery was made of the Land in possession and not of Birchin Close and no Attornment the Feoffees paid not 10000 l. whereby Bracebridge the Father became seis'd and the first Tenant for years attorn'd to him Adjudg'd 1. That by Livery of the Mannor Birchin Close did not pass to the Feoffees without Attornment 2. That the Attornment of the first Lessee was sufficient Moore f. 99. n. 243. 3. Though the use limited to the Feoffees and their Heirs was determined before the Attornment yet the Attornment was good to the contingent use upon not paying the mony In the Resolution of this Case Wild Archer and Tyrrell Justices were for the Plaintiff and Vaughan Chief Justice for the Defendant Trin. 21. Car. II. C. B. Rot. 1714. The King Plaintiff in a Quare Impedit per Galfridum Palmer Atturnatum suum Generalem Robert Bishop of Worcester Thomas Jervis Esquire and John Hunckley Clerk Defendants THE King counts That Queen Elizabeth was seis'd of the Advowson of the Church of Norfield with the Chappel of Coston in gross in Fee in Jure Coronae and presented one James White her Clerk who was admitted instituted and inducted That from the said Queen the Advowson of the said Church with the said Chappel descended to King James and from him to King Charles the First and from him to his Majesty that now is who being seis'd thereof the said Church with the Chappel became void by the death of the said James White and therefore it belongs of right to him to present and the Defendants disturbe him to his damage of 200 l. which the said Attorney is ready to verifie for the King The Defendants plead severally and first the Bishop that he claims nothing in the said Church and the Advowson but as Ordinary The Defendant Jervis saith That long before the said Presentation suppos'd to be made by the late Queen one Richard Jervis Esquire was seis'd of the Mannor of Norfield with the Appurtenances in Com. praedicto to which the Advowson Ecclesiae praedictae tunc pertinuit adhuc pertinet in his Demesne as of Fee and so seis'd the said Church became void by the death of one Henry Squire then last Incumbent of the said Church and so continued for two years whereby the said late Queen praetextu lapsus temporis in default of the Patron Ordinary and Metropolitan Ecclesiae praedictae pro tempore existentis dictae nuper Reginae devolutae by her Prerogative afterward that is tertio die Decembris
f. 33. Letter H. if he cannot alledge a Presentation in himself or in his Ancestor or in another person through whom he claims the Advowson and that in his Count unless it be in a special Case Then puts that special Case As if a man at this day by the Kings Licence makes a Parochial Church or other Chantry which shall be presentable if he be disturbed to present to it he shall have a Quare Impedit without alledging any presentment in any person and shall Count upon the special Matter And the Law in this is the same in Case of the King with a Common Person by all the Books and Presidents in the Books of Entry To this add the Lord Hobarts Judgment which is alwaies accurate for the true reason of the Law Know that though it be true that a Presentation may make a Fee without more as a Presentation by Vsurpation doth that you never have a Declaration in a Quare Impedit L. Hobart Digby's Case f. 101. that the Plaintiff did present the last Incumbent without more but you declare that the Plaintiff was seis'd in Fee and presented or else lay the Fee-simple in some other and then bring down the Advowson to the Plaintiff either in Fee or some other estate The reason is That the Presentment alone is militant and indifferent and may be in such a Title as may prove that this new Avoidance is the Defendants and therefore you must lay the Case so as by the Title you make the Presentation past joyn'd to your Title shall prove that this Presentation is likewise yours as well as the last Whence it follows That to Count of an Estate and Seisin without a Presentation or of a Presentation without an Estate are equally vicious and naught be it in the Case of the King or of a Common Person and was never in Example or President 2. A second necessary Premise is this and is both natural and manifest When you will recover any thing from me it is not enough for you to destroy my Title but you must prove your own better than mine For it is not rational to conclude you have no right to this and therefore I have for without a better right melior est conditio possident is regularly Hobar 1. f. 162. Colt Glovers Case ad sinem paginae 3. Every Defendant may plead in a Quare Impedit the General Issue which is ne disturba pas because that Plea doth but defend the wrong wherewith he stands charg'd and leaves the Plaintiffs Title not only uncontroverted but in effect confess'd and the Plaintiff may upon that Plea presently pray a Writ to the Bishop or at his choice maintain the Disturbance for damages Hob. Digby versus Fitzherbert f. 103. 104. But if a man will leave the General Issue and controvert the Plaintiffs Title he must then enable himself by some Title of his own to do it but yet that is not the principal part of his Plea but a formal Inducement only And therefore there is no sense if you will quarrel my possession and I to avoid your Title effectually do induce that with a Title of my own that you shall fly upon my Title and forsake your own for you must recover by your own strength and not by my weakness The Lord Hobart goes further in giving the reason of this course of Pleading in Colt and Glovers Case in the place before cited of this form of pleading in Law there is one reason common to other Actions wherein Title is contain'd to the Land in question specially which is that the Tenant shall never be receiv'd to Counter-plead but he must make to himself by his Plea a Title to the Land and so avoid the Plaintiffs Title alledg'd by Traverse or confessing and avoiding But in the Quare Impedit there is a further reason of it for therein both Plaintiff and Defendant are Actors one against another and therefore the Defendant may have a Writ to the Bishop as well as the Plaintiff which he cannot have without a Title appearing to the Court And so are the Presidents Rastal L. Intratio f. 484. a.b. when a Quare Impedit is brought against the Patron for disturbance of his Clerk not being in possession The Case in brief and the Question upon it Vpon the Record as it hath been open'd and the pleading therein between the King and the Patron upon which all the Question ariseth first I shall not make the Question to be Whether there may be a Traverse taken upon a Traverse though that Question be in truth in the Case for that is a Question rather upon terms of Art than a Questio Forensis and rising upon the naked fact of a Case depending in Iudgment I shall therefore make the Question upon this Case such as nakedly it is without involving it in any difficulty of terms The King brings a Quare Impedit and declares That Queen Elizabeth was seis'd of the Advowson of the Church of Norfield in gross as of Fee and presented and derives the Advowson to himself and the Church became void by the death of the Queens Presentee and he is disturbed to present by the Defendant Jervis The Defendant saith That before the Queen presented R. Jervis his Ancestor was seis'd in Fee of the Mannor of Norfield to which the Advowson of this Church is appendant that it became void by the death of one Squire and continued so for two years and that the Queen then presented White her Clerk by lapse That the Mannor and Advowson descended from Richard to Thomas Jervis from Thomas to Sir Thomas Jervis who granted the next avoidance to one Phineas White who presented upon the death of James White one Timothy White who was instituted and inducted and then derives the Mannor and Advowson to himself and that the Church becoming void upon the death of the said Timothy he presented the other Defendant Hunckley and Traverseth the Queens Seisin of the Advowson in gross The Law in Case of a Common Person If a Common Person brings a Quare Impedit and counts his Title to present and that he is disturbed The Defendant to counter-plead the Plaintiffs Title makes as he must a Title to himself to present and confesses and avoids or Traverseth the Plaintiffs Title 1. The Plaintiff shall never desert his own Title and by falling upon and controverting the weakness only of the Defendants Title ever recover or obtain a Writ to the Bishop though the Defendants Title do not appear to the Court to be sufficient for the unanswerable Reasons given by the Lord Hobart in the first place 2. If you will recover any thing from another man it is not enough for you to destroy his Title but you must prove your own better than his 3. There is no sense if you will quarrel my Possession or Right and I to avoid your Title effectually either by Traversing it which is denying or confessing and avoiding
to that Issue but may take another This dis-affirms the former Case when the Information is by an Informer the King must maintain his Information Note the close of this Case Ut supra per Attornatum Regis alios legis peritos I shall give the Case here mentioned in this ut supra which will I think determine the Question and clearly establish the Law according to the Difference taken That Case is likewise in Br. and cited to be as in 34 H. 8. whereof there is no Year-book neither some four years before the last Case I mentioned It is thus Br. Prerogative p. 116. 34 H. 8. Nota by Whorhood Attornatum Regis alios When an Information is put into the Chequer upon a penal Statute and the Defendant makes a Barr and Traverseth that there the King cannot wave such Issue tender'd and Traverse the former matter of the Plea as he can upon Traverse of an Office and the like when the King is sole party and intitled by matter of Record for upon the Information there is no Office found before and also a Subject is party with the King for a moiety Quod nota bene Here it is most apparent That upon an Information when the King hath no Title by matter of Record as he hath upon Office found the King cannot waive the Issue tender'd upon the first Traverse though the Information be in his own name which disaffirms the second Case in that point And for the Supernumerary reason That the King is not the sole party in the Information it is but frivolous and without weight but the stress is where the King is sole party and intitled by matter of Record I shall add another Authority out of Stamford Praerogative If the King be once seis'd his Highness shall retain against all others who have not Title nothwithstanding it be found also that the King had no Title but that the other had possession before him 37 Ass pl. 11. as appeareth in 37. Ass p. 35. which is pl. 11. where it was found That neither the King nor the party had Title and yet adjudg'd that the King should retain for the Office that finds the King to have a Right or Title to enter Stamford Praerogative f. 62. b. makes ever the King a good Title though the Office be false c. and therefore no man shall Traverse the Office unless he make himself a Title and if he cannot prove his Title to be true although he be able to prove his Traverse to be true yet this Traverse will not serve him Stamford Prerogative f. 64. b. It is to be noted That the King hath a Prerogative which a Common Person hath not for his Highness may choose whether he will maintain the Office or Traverse the Title of the party and so take Traverse upon Traverse If the King take Issue upon a Traverse to an Office he cannot in another Term change his Issue by Traversing the Defendants Title for then he might do it infinitely But the King may take Issue and after Demurr 13 E. 4. expresly and several other Books 28 H. 6. f. 2. a. or first Demurr and after take Issue or he may vary his Declaration for in these Cases as to the Right all things remain and are as they were at first but this ought to be done in the same Term otherwise the King might change without limit and tye the Defendant to perpetual Attendance Judgment pro Defendente Hill 21 22. Car. II. C. B. Rot. 606. Thomas Rowe Plaintiff and Robert Huntington Defendant in a Plea of Trespass and Ejectment THE Plaintiff declares That Thomas Wise 1. April 21 Car. 2. at Hooknorton in the County of Oxford by his Indenture produc'd dated the said day and year demis'd to the said Thomas Rowe the Mannor of Hooknorton with the Appurtenances 4 Messuages 100 Acres of Land 50 Acres of Meadow 400 Acres of Pasture and 50 Acres of Wood with the Appurtenances in Hooknorton aforesaid As also the Rectory and Vicaridge of Hooknorton and the Tithes of Grain Hay and Wool renewing in Hooknorton aforesaid To have and to hold the Premisses from the Feast of the Annunciation of the Virgin then last past to the end and term of Seven years then next ensuing That by virtue thereof the said Thomas Rowe the Plaintiff into the said Mannor and Tenements enter'd and of the said Rectory Vicaridge and Tithes was possessed That the said Robert Huntington the Defendant the said First of April with Force and Arms into the said Mannor Rectory Vicaridge and Tithes entred and him Ejected against the Peace to his great damage and whereby he is endamaged 100 l. The Defendant Huntington pleads not Culpable And thereupon Issue is Ioyn'd The Jury give a Special Verdict That as to the Trespass and Ejectment in the said Mannor and Tenements and in the said Rectory Vicaridge and Tithes aforesaid excepting 200 Acres of Pasture parcel of the said Mannor of Hooknorton That the Defendant Huntington is not Culpable And as to the said 200 Acres they say that long before the said Trespass and Ejectment That is the 14th day of October 1. Mar. one Robert then Bishop of Oxford was seis'd in his Demesne as of Fee in Right of his Bishoprick of the said Mannor whereof the said 200 Acres are parcel and so seis'd the said 14th of October 1 Mariae at Hooknorton aforesaid by his Indenture of Demise seal'd with his Episcopal Seal Dated the said day and year and shew'd in Evidence to the Jury made between the said Bishop of the one part and John Croker of Hooknorton Esq of the other part for Considerations in the said Indenture of Demise mentioned had demis'd and to farm lett to the said Croker Among other things the said Mannor with the Appurtenances whereof the said 200 Acres are parcel To have and to hold to the said Croker and his Assigns from the end and expiration prioris Dimissionis in eadem Indentur Mentionat for and during the term of Ninety years then next following The tenor of which Indenture of Demise follows in haec verba This Indenture made the Fourteenth day of October 1 Mariae c. Between the said Bishop and the said John Croker c witnesseth That where the said Bishop by the name of the Reverend Father in God Robert King Abbot of Tame and Commendatory of the late Monastery of Oseney in the County of Oxford and the Covent of the same by their Deed Indented Dated 6. April 29 Hen. 8. with the Consent of their whole Chapter Have demis'd and to farm lett All that their Mansion or Farm of Hooknorton with the Appurtenances in the said County and all the Mansion and Farm Demesne Lands Meadows Leasowes and Pastures with all Commodities and Profits to the said Mannor belonging or appertaining and the customary works of all the Tenants not granted nor remitted before the Date of the Deed And the Parsonage of Hooknorton and
in Indentura praedict mentionat shall be as is contended an absolute and positive finding of a former Demise made to whose expiration the Indenture 1 Mariae referrs it must be either the demise 29 H. 8. or that of 1 E. 6. for no other are mentioned in the Indenture 1 Mar. and it can be but a finding of one of them for the words à fine prioris dimissionis in Indentur praedict mentionat cannot possibly extend to both Be it then understood the Demise 1 E. 6. for in that the Mannor is clearly named the Consequence must be That the Deed of 1 Mar. which is an intire lease as well of the Mannor as of the Vicaridge Parsonage and of other things under several Rents for Ninety years commencing as to the Mannor from the Expiration of the suppos'd Demise 1 E. 6. shall be a good lease for Ninety years thence forwards because that recited Demise is also suppos'd to be positively found by the Jury by those words of their Verdict But as to the Vicaridge Parsonage and other things and the Rents thereupon reserv'd which are demis'd by the Indenture of 1 Mar. for Ninety years to commence from the Expiration of the other recited Demise suppos'd in 29 H. 8. the lease of 1 Mar. must commence immediately from the Date because the Jury have not found that recited Demise positively but only as recited and therefore not found it to be a real Demise and consequently the lease of 1 Mariae as to those particulars referring the term to commence from the Expiration of a term granted 29 H. 8. not in esse because not found must begin from 1. Mar. which doubtless the Jury never intended But now for Authority I will resume the Case formerly cited of 3 E. 6. in the Lord Brook If A. makes a Lease to B. Habendum for Forty years from the expiration of a former Lease made of the Premises to J. N. and this be found occasionally by special Verdict as our Case is but the Jury in no other manner find any Lease to be made to J. N. then as mentioned in the Lease to B. By the Resolution of that Book the Lease to B for Forty years shall begin presently And who will say in this Case That because the Jury find a Lease made to B. for Forty years Habendum from the Expiration of a former Lease made to J. N. that therefore they find a Lease made formerly to J. N. when in truth J. N. had no such Lease for they only find what the Habendum in the Lease to B. is which makes a false mention of a former Lease to J. N. but had no Evidence to find a Lease which was not Exactly parallel to this is our present Case the Jury find the Bishop of Oxford by a Lease dated the Fourteenth of October 1 Mariae demised to Groker the Mannor of Hooknorton Habendum to him and his Assigns for Ninety years from the Expiration of a former Demise mentioned in the said Indenture of Lease 1 Mariae But do not affirm or find explicitly or implicitly any former demise made when they only find summarily the Habendum of the Lease 1 Mariae which mentions such a former Demise Cr. 10 Car. 1. f. 397. Another Case I shall make use of is the Case of Miller and Jones versus Manwaring in an Ejectment brought in Chester upon the Demise of Sir Randolph Crew The Jury in a Special Verdict found That John Earl of Oxford and Elizabeth his Wife were seis'd in Fee in Right of Elizabeth of the Mannor of Blacon whereof the Land in question was parcel and had Issue John the said John Earl of Oxford by Indenture dated the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. demis'd the Mannor to Anne Seaton for Four and Thirty years Elizabeth died 29 H. 8. And the said Earl of Oxford died March 31. H. 8. Afterwards John the Son then Earl of Oxford the Thirtieth of July 35 H. 8. by Indenture reciting the Demise to Anne Seaton to be dated the Tenth of February 28 H. 8. demis'd the said Mannor to Robert Rochester Habendum after the End Surrender or Forfeiture of the said Lease to Anne Seaton for Thirty years It was adjudged first in Chester and after upon Error brought in the Kings Bench It was resolv'd by all the Iudges who affirmed unanimously the first Iudgment That the Lease to Rochester began presently at the time of the Sealing for several Reasons 1. Which is directly to our purpose because there was no such Lease made to Anne Seaton having such beginning and ending as was recited in Rochester's lease 2. Because the lease made by John first Earl of Oxford was determined by his death Three years before Rochester's lease and consequently no lease in esse when the lease was made to Rochester which Reasons are in effect the same viz. That a lease made to commence from the end of any lease suppos'd to be in esse which indeed is not the lease shall commence presently From this Case these Conclusions are with clearness deducible 1. That if a lease be found specially by a Jury in which one or more other leases are recited the finding of such lease is not a finding of any the recited leases Therefore the finding of the lease made to Rochester was not a finding of the lease therein recited to be made to Anne Seaton in any respect 2. The second thing clearly deducible out of this Case is That although the Jury by their Special Verdict did find that John the Son Earl of Oxford did by his Indenture demise to Rochester for Thirty years the Mannor of Blacon Habendum from the End Surrender or Forfeiture of a former lease thereof made to Anne Seaton dated the Tenth of February 28 H. 8. yet this was not a finding of any such lease made to Anne Seaton but only a finding of the Habendum as it was in the lease made to Rochester which mentioned such a lease to be made to Anne Seaton So in our present Case the Jury finding that the Bishop of Oxford 1 Mariae did demise the Mannor of Hooknorton to John Croker Habendum for Ninety years from the Expiration of a former Demise mentioned in the Indenture of 1 Mar. is not a finding of any such former Demise to be made but a finding that in the Indenture 1 Mariae it is suggested there was such a former Demise and no more And if any man shall object That in Rochester's Case the Reason why no such lease is found to be made to Anne Seaton in 28 H. 8. to be because it is found that the lease made to Anne Seaton was in 27 H. 8. that is not to the purpose because the Jury might find and truly that a lease was made to her Dated the Tenth of February 27 H. 8. but that was no hindrance but that another lease was made to her in 28 H. 8. as is mentioned in Rochester's lease which had been a Surrender in Law
the Issue was not found Hill 10 Car. 1. B. R. Wilkinson and Meriams Case Rolls 700. 701. Tit. Tryal If a Jury find that J.S. was seis'd in Fee of Land and posses'd of certain Leases for years of other Land made his Will in writing and thereby devis'd his Leases to J.D. and after devis'd to his Executors the residue of his Estate Mortgages Goods c. his Debts being paid and funeral Expences discharg'd It being referred by the Jury to the Court Whether by this devise the Executor hath an Estate in Fee or not This is no perfect special Verdict because the Jury find not the Debts paid and the Funeral Expences discharg'd which is a Condition precedent to the Executors having an Estate in Fee and without finding which the Court cannot resolve the matter to them referr'd by the Jury Therefore a Venire facias de novo was awarded Judgment was given for the Defendant Trin. 22. Car. II. C. B. Rot. 461. Richard Edgcomb Knight of the Bath Executor of Pierce Edgcomb Esquire his Father is Plaintiff Rowland d ee Administrator of Charles Everard Esquire during the Minority of Charles Everard Son of the Intestate Defendant In an Action of the Case upon an Assumpsit THE Plaintiff declares That the Intestate the Thirteenth of July 1664. at London in the Parish of St. Mary Bow in the Ward of Cheap in consideration that the said Pierce Edgcomb would at his request lend him 500 l. promis'd the said Pierce to repay it within Seven daies after demand with Interest after the rate of 4 l. per Centum That thereupon the said Pierce Edgcomb after at the time and place aforesaid did lend the said Intestate 500 l. That the said Pierce the Testator afterwards the Fourteenth of July 17 Car. 2. at the place aforesaid required the Intestate to pay the said 500 l. with Interest after the rate aforesaid both which amounted to the Sum of 520 l. He lays further That the said Intestate was indebted to Pierce the Testator the Fourteenth day of July 1664. in the Sum of 500 l. for mony before that time to him lent by the said Pierce And in Consideration thereof the said Fourteenth of July 1664. in the said Parish and Ward promis'd to pay when requir'd But that neither the Intestate in his life time nor the Defendant to whom the Administration of his Goods were committed during the Minority of Charles Everard Son of the said Intestate at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid did pay the said Sums nor either of them amounting to 1020 l. to the said Pierce Edgcomb in his life time nor to the said Richard the Plaintiff after his death Though required by the Intestate afterwards in his life time that is upon the First of August 17 Car. 2. And the said Defendant after the death of the Intestate viz. the Tenth day of March 18 Car. 2. and often after at the said Parish and Ward by the Testator Pierce were requir'd And the said Defendant after the death of the Testator the First day of January 21 Car. 2. was required at the place aforesaid by the Plaintiff to pay the said mony which he did not and still refuses to his damage of 800 l. The Defendant pleads payment after the Plaintiffs Writ purchas'd of several great debts due by Bond and Bills obligatory from the Intestate to several persons at his death in number One and thirty That the Intestate the Two and twentieth of December 16 Car. 2. became bound in a Recognizance in the Chancery to Sir Harbottle Grimstone Baronet Master of the Rolls and to Sir Nathaniel Hobart one of the Masters of the Chancery in 2000 l. And that the said 2000 l. is still due and unpaid and the said Recognizance in its full force unsatisfied or discharg'd He pleads the City of London is an ancient City and that within it time out of mind hath been held a Court of Record of the Kings c. before the Mayor and Aldermen of the said City in Camera Guild-hall ejusdem Civitatis of all personal Actions arising and growing within the said City That the Intestate at the time of his death was indebted apud London praedict in the Parish and Ward praedict to one William Allington in 2670 l. 17 s. 7 d. And who after the purchase of the Plaintiffs Writ the Tenth of March the Eighteenth of the King came to the said Court before Sir Thomas Bludworth then Mayor and the Aldermen in the said Chamber according to the Custome of the said City held us'd and approv'd Et praedictus Willielmus Allington tunc ibidem in eadem Curia secundum consuetudinem praedictae Civitatis affirmabat contra praedictum Rolandum Dee ut Administratorem c. quandam Billam originalem de placito debiti super demand Mille sexcentarum septuaginta librarum decem septem solidorum septem denariorum legalis monetae c. And that it was so proceeded according to the Custome of the said City that the said William Allington had Judgment to recover against the Defendant the said Debt and 85 l. 16 s. for damages c. And that after the Defendant in full satisfaction of the said Judgment paid to the said William Allington the Sum of 2670 l. and 17 s. Then pleads about Four and twenty Recoveries and Judgments thereupon in the Kings Bench in Pleas of Debt without Specialties all satisfied but one of 7000 l. and more due to one Cornwallis Then pleads Plene administravit all the Goods of the Intestate at the time of his death to be administred and that he had not die Impetrationis brevis Originalis praedicti nec unquam postea aliqua bona seu cattalla predict Car. Everard tempore mortis suae in manibus suis administrand praeterquam bona cattalla ad valentiam separalium denariorum summarum per ipsum sic ut praefertur solutarum in exonerationem separalium Judiciorum scriptorum obligatori orum billarum obligatoriarum predict Ac praeter alia bona cattalla ad valentiam decem solidorum quae executioni Recognitionis praedict ac Judicii praedicti per praefatum Carolum Cornwallis versus ipsum ut praefertur recuperat onerabilia onerata existunt Et quod ipse Rolandus modo non habet aliqua bona seu cattalla quae fuerunt praedict Caroli tempore mortis suae administrand praeter praedicta bona catalla ad valentiam praedictorum decem solidorum quae executioni recognitionis praedict ac Judicii praedict per praefatum Carolum Cornwallis recuperat sic ut praefertur onerata onerabilia existunt Et hoc paratus est c. Et petit Judicium Then Averrs the debts so as aforesaid by him paid to be bonâ fide paid pro veris justis debitis owing and unpaid by the Intestate at the time of his death And that the several Iudgments aforesaid against him recover'd were for true and just debts of
it is said The Rent was granted out of the Twenty Acres being the Locus in quo by the Name of all the Grantors Lands and Hereditaments in King's Norton and that a per nomen in that Case is not good The Case of Grey and Chapman was urg'd 43 Eliz. Cro. f. 822. where by Indenture S. one Prudence Cousin let a House and Twenty Acres of Land by the Name of all her Tenements in S. But it was not alledg'd in what Vill the Acres were The Court was of Opinion in Arrest of Judgment that the naming of the Vill in the per nomen was not material Another Case to the same purpose was urg'd of Gay against Cay where a Grant in possession was pleaded 41 Eliz. Cro. f. 662. pl. 10. and not as in Reversion And upon view of the Record the Grantor had granted Tenementa praedicta per nomen of a Mesuage which A. P. held for life where the per nomen was adjudg'd not to make good the Grant The Court is of Opinion notwithstanding these Cases That in the present Case the per nomen is well enough because it is alledg'd the Grantor was seis'd of Two hundred Acres of Land in Kings Norton whereof the locus in quo being Twenty Acres is parcel By reason whereof the Rent being granted out of every parcel of the Two hundred Acres it is well enough to say it was granted out of the Twenty Acres per nomen of all his Lands in Kings Norton because the Twenty Acres are alledg'd to be parcel of all his Lands there being Two hundred Acres But in Chapman's Case It is not alledg'd that the Twenty Acres of Land demis'd were parcel of all the Tenements in S. per nomen of which the Twenty Acres were to pass As for the second Case of Gay it was not possible that Lands granted as in possession should pass per nomen of Land that was in Reversion The second Exception is Because the Clause of Entry and Distress in the Deed upon Oyer of it differs from the Clause of Entry and Distress alledg'd in the Conizance For in the Conizance it is said It should be lawful to Enter and Distrain if the rent were unpaid and behind after any of the Feasts whereon it was due that is at any Feast that should first happen after the death of Anne or Thomas Greaves for the Rent did not commence before But by the Deed If the Rent were behind at any the Feasts the Entry and Distress is made to be lawful for it during the joynt Lives of Anne and Thomas Greaves the Uncle and during their joynt lives it could not be behind for it commenc'd not till one of them were dead Scarplus Handkinson 37 El. Cro. f. 420. words repugnant and sensless to be rejected So as the sense must run That if the Rent were behind it should be lawful to distrain during the joint Lives of Anne and Thomas Greaves which was before it could be behind for it could not be behind till the death of one of them Therefore those words during their joynt natural lives being insensible ought to be rejected For words of known signification but so placed in the Context of a Deed that they make it repugnant and sensless are to be rejected equally with words of no known signification Judgment pro Defendent The Chief Justice delivered the Opinion of the Court. Trin. 16 Car. II. C. B. Rot. 2487. But Adjudg'd Mich. 20 Car. II. Bedell versus Constable BY the Act of 12 Car. 2. cap. 24. It is among other things Enacted That where any person hath or shall have any Child or Children under the Age of One and twenty years and not married at the time of his death It shall and may be lawful to and for the Father of such Child or Children whether born at the time of the decease of the Father or at that time in ventre sa mere or whether such Father be within the Age of One and twenty years or of full Age by his Deed executed in his life time or by his last Will and Testament in writing in the presence of two or more credible Witnesses to dispose of the custody and tuition of such Child or Children for and during such time as he or they shall respectively remain under the Age of One and twenty years or any lesser time to any person or persons in possession or remainder other than Popish Recusants And such disposition of the Custody of such Child or Children made since the Four and twentieth of February 1645. or hereafter to be made shall be good and effectual against all and every person or persons claiming the custody or tuition of such Child or Children as Guardian in Soccage or otherwise And such person or persons to whom the custody of such Child or Children hath been or shall be so disposed or devised as aforesaid shall and may maintain an Action of Ravishment of Ward or Trespass against any person or persons which shall wrongfully take away or detain such Child or Children for the Recovery of such Child or Children and shall and may recover Damages for the same in the said Action for the use and benefit of such Child or Children And such person or persons to whom the custody of such Child or Children hath been or shall be so disposed or devised shall and may take into his or their custody to the use of such Child or Children the profits of all Lands Tenements and Hereditaments of such Child or Children and also the custody tuition and management of the Goods Chattels and personal Estate of such Child or Children till their respective Age of One and twenty years or any lesser time according to such Disposition aforesaid and may bring such Action or Actions in relation thereto as by Law a Guardian in Common Soccage might do By the Will is devised in these words I do bequeath my son Thomas to my Brother Robert Towray of Rickhall to be his Tutor during his Minority Before this Act Tenant in Soccage of Age might have dispos'd his Land by Deed or last Will in trust for his Heir but not the Custody and Tuition of his Heir for the Law gave that to the next of Kinn to whom the Land could not descend But Tenant in Soccage under Age could not dispose the Custody of his Heir nor devise or demise his Land in trust for him in any manner Now by this Statute he may grant the Custody of his Heir but cannot devise or demise his Land in trust for him for any time directly for if he should the devise or demise were as before the Statute as I conceive which is most observable in this Case I say directly he cannot but by a mean and obliquely he may for nominating who shall have the Custody and for what time by a consequent the Land follows as an incident given by the Law to attend the custody not as an Interest devis'd or demis'd
by the party This difference is very material for if the Father could devise the Land in trust for him until his Son came to One and twenty as he can grant the Custody then as in other Cases of Leases for years the Land undoubtedly should go to the Executor or Administrator of him whom the Father named for the tuition and the trust should follow the Land as in other Cases where Lands are convey'd in trust But when he cannot ex directo devise the Land in trust then the Land follows the Custody and not the Custody the Land and the Land must go as the Custody can go and not the Custody as the Land can go Coke Litt. f. 49. a. 1 H. 7. 28. 8 H. 7. 4. As where a House or Land belongs to an Office or a Chamber to a Corody the Office or Corody being granted by Deed the House and Land follows as incident or belonging without Livery because the Office is the principal and the Land but pertaining to it A second Consideration is That by this Act no new custody is instituted but the office of Guardian as to the duty and power of the place is left the same as the Law before had prescrib'd and setled of Guardian in Soccage But the modus habendi of that office is alter'd by this Act in two Circumstances The first 1. It may be held for a longer time viz. to the Age of the Heir of One and twenty where before it was but to Fourteen 2. It may be by other persons held for before it was the next of Kindred not inheritable could have it now who the Father names shall have it So it is as if an Office grantable for life only before should be made grantable for years by Parliament or grantable before to any person should be made grantable but to some kind of persons only The Office as to the Duty of it and its essence is the same it was But the Modus habendi alter'd If therefore this new Guardian is the same in Office and Interest with the former Guardian in Soccage and varies from it only in the Modus habendi then the Ward hath the same legal Remedy against this Guardian as was against the old But if this be a new Office of Guardianship differing in its nature from the other the Heir hath no remedy against him at all in Law For though this new Guardian be enabled to have such Actions as the old might have yet this Act enables not the Heir to have like Actions or any other against him as he might against the Guardian in Soccage The Intent of this Statute is to priviledge the Father against common right to appoint the Guardian of his Heir and the time of his Wardship under One and twenty But leaves the Heirs of all other Ancestors Wards in Soccage as before Therefore I hold 1. That such a Special Guardian cannot transferr the Custody of the Ward by Deed or will to any other 2. That he hath no different Interest from a Guardian in Soccage but for the time of the Wardship 1. When an Act of Parliament alteâ—s the Common Law the meaning shall not be strained beyond the words except in Cases of publick Vtility when the end of the Act appears to be larger than the enacting words But by the words the Father only can appoint the Guardian therefore the Guardian so appointed cannot appoint another Guardian 2. The Mother hath the same concern for her Heir as the Father hath But she cannot by the Act name a Guardian therefore much less can the Guardian named by the Father 3. The Father cannot by the Act give the custody to a Papist but if it may be transferr'd over by him whom the Father names or by Act in Law go to his Executor or Administrator it may come to a Papist against the meaning of the Act. 4. Offices or Acts of personal Trust cannot be assign'd for the Trust is not personal which any man may have Dyer 2 3 Eliz. f. 189. b. 5. At the Common Law none could have the Custody and Marriage of a mans Son and Heir apparent from the Father yet the Father could not grant or sell the Custody and Marriage of his Heir apparent though the marriage was to his own benefit as was resolved by the greater number of the Iudges in the Lord Bray's Case who by Indenture had sold for Eight hundred pounds the Custody and Marriage of his Son and Heir apparent in the time of Henry the Eighth to the Lord Audley Chancellor of England Lord Cromwell Lord Privy Seal Sir William Paulett Treasurer of the Houshold The Marquis of Winchester Lord Treasurer Dyer supra f. 190. b. pl. 19. The Reason given is That the Father hath no Interest to be granted or sold to a Stranger in his eldest Son but it is inseparably annex'd to the person of the Father Two Judges differ'd because an Action of Trespass would lye for taking away a mans Heir apparent and marrying him whence they conclude he might be granted as a Chattel 11 H. 4. f. 23. a. Fitz. N. Br. Tresp f. 90. b. Lett. G. f. 89. Lett. O. But an Action of Trespass will lye for taking away ones Servant For taking away a Monk where he was cloyster'd in Castigationem Pro Uxore abducta cum bonis Viri yet none of these are assignable West 1. c. 48. By the Statute of Westminster the First If the Guardian in Chivalry made a Feoffment of the Wards Lands in his Custody during his Minority the Heir might forthwith have a Writ of Novel Disseisin against the Guardian and Tenant and the Land recover'd should be deliver'd to the next of kinn to the Heir to be kept and accompted for to him at his full Age. This was neither Guardian in Soccage nor Chivalry Coke 2. Inst f. 260. b. By 4 5 P.M. c. 8. No woman child under 16. can be taken against his will whom the Father hath made Guardian by Deed or Will yet this is no Lease of the Custody till 16. nor is it assignable Ratcliffs C. 3. Rep. Shoplands C. 3 Jac. Cr. f. 99. but a special Guardian appointed by the Statute and such a Guardian could not assign over nor should it go to his Executors by the Express Book This Case likewise and common Experience proves That Guardian in Soccage cannot assign nor shall the Custody go to his Executors though some ancient Books make some doubt therein For expresly by the Statute of 52 H. 3. the next of kin is to answer and be accomptable to the Heir in Soccage as this special Guardian is here by Westminster the First These several sorts of Guardians trusted for the Heir could neither assign their Custody nor did it go to their Executors because the Trust was personal and they had no Interest for themselves The Trust is as personal in this new Guardian nor hath he any Interest in it for himself and
out of the former Premisses is That the Freehold qua Freehold is not the thing whereof there is an Occupancy for the Freehold is not a natural thing but hath its essence by the positive Municipal Law of the Kingdome it cannot abstract from the Land in this matter of Occupancy he either entred into or possessed The Freehold is an immediate consequent of the possession for when a man hath gotten the possession of Land that was void of a Proprietor or other thing capable of Occupancy the Law forthwith doth cast the Freehold upon the Possessor to make a sufficient Tenant to the Precipe Therefore As to the first Question Whether Holden the Plaintiffs Entry Quest 1 upon the Lessee Taverner's possession into the House Glebe and Barn the First of March 1666. and openly saying I enter and take possession of this House Glebe and Barn and the Ground thereto belonging and the Tithes of Woolney in my own Name and Right as Occupant upon a Lease made to Giles Astly and his Assigns for three Lives by Dr. Mallory Prebend of Woolney did make him Occupant of the House Land and Tithe or either of them the Lessee Taverner not having made any Claim as Occupant to any of them I hold clearly this Entry and Claim did not make Holden Occupant of the House Land or Tithe or of any of them To every Occupant of Land or other thing capable of Occupancy two things are requisite 1. Possession of the Land which was void and without Owner 2. The having of the Freehold to avoid an obeyance which is had as well where the possession is not void as where it is The first that is the possession is acquired by the party and his Act but the Freehold is acquir'd by the Act of Law which casts it upon the possession assoon as there is a Possessor or where it finds a Possessor when the Freehold is in none 1. This Claim and Entry was in Order to gain the first possession of the Land which was void but that was impossible to be had for the Lessee Taverner had the possession before he held it then therefore the Claim was to no end 2. Secondly A man cannot be an Occupant but of a void Possession or of a Possession which himself hath but here was no void Possession when Holden enter'd and claimed as Occupant for the Lessee was in lawful possession of the House and Barn and Land at the time of the entry and claim 3. Thirdly If this Entry and Claim should make Holden a legal Occupant which cannot be without gaining the possession then there would be two plenary legal possessors of the same thing at the same time Holden by his Entry and Claim and Taverner the Lessee by virtue of his lease but that is impossible there should be two plenary possessors of the same thing at the same time Therefore Holden can be no Occupant by such Entry and Claim Skelton Hay 17 Jac. Cr. 554. b. 4. This very Case in every point hath been resolv'd in the Case of Skelton and Hay 17 Jac. where upon an Ejectment brought a Special Verdict found That the Bishop of Worcester made a lease to Sir William Whorehood of certain land for his own and the lives of two of his Sons Sir William did let the land to John Mallett at will rendring Rent and dyed Mallett continued the possession not claiming as Occupant one of Sir William's Sons entred as Occupant and made a lease to the Plaintiff in the Action It was adjudg'd that Mallett the Defendant being in possession the Law cast the Freehold upon him without Claim and had he disclaim'd to hold as Occupant Chamberlayn Ewes C. Rolls 2. part f. 151. Lett. E. keeping the possession he must have been the Occupant for where one entred to the use of another he that entred was adjudg'd the Occupant Which Case proves one may be an Occupant against and besides his own intention and therefore a Claim to denote his intention 5. To be an Occupant is not necessary and Tenant for years as well as at will is Occupant by that Case Besides claiming to be Occupant is to claim to be in possession or to claim the Freehold or both but the Law binds not a man to claim that which he hath already and therefore he that hath possession and doth occupy the land is not to claim possession or to be Occupant of it no more is he to claim a Freehold which he already hath for the Law hath cast it where it finds the possession so having both possession and Freehold the Law binds him not to claim what he hath 6. Claim is never to make a Right which a man hath not but to preserve that which he hath from being lost As Claim to avoid a Descent whereby a man had lost his right to enter so a man makes no Claim to be remitted when by act of law he is in his Remitter As to the second Question Whether Frances Astly the Relict Quest 2 of Giles entring the Five and twentieth of March 1667. upon the Lessee Taverner's possession and claiming the House Glebe and Tithe as Occupant and the Lessee Taverner attorning to her makes her an Occupant of the House Land or Tithe The Question hath nothing in it differing from the former but only the Attornment and it is clear the Attornment of Taverner the Lessee doth not disclaim his possession but affirms it for Attornment is the Act of a Tenant by reason of his being in possession Besides admitting the Tenant a perfect Occupant he might continuing so attorn to whom he pleased as well as Astly might have done in his life time yet still continue the Estate that was in him It follows then that Taverner was the undoubted Occupant after Astly's death of the House Land and Barn but whether he had the Tithe of Woolney by such his Occupancy whereof Astly died seis'd is the difficult Question Another Question will arise when Taverner the Lessee who had by lease the House Barn and Land and so found and was Occupant certainly of those when afterwards Taverner the Lessee 12 June 1667 concessit assignavit totum statum suum de in praemissis to Holden the Plaintiff and gave him Livery and Seifin thereupon what shall be understood to pass by the word praemissis if only what was leas'd and his Estate therein as Occupant and likewise the Tithe if the Tithe accrued to him by reason of being Occupant of the land For if he were Occupant of the Tithe by Act in Law by being Occupant of the land it follows not that if he past all his Estate to Holden in the House and Land and gave him Livery that therefore he past his Estate in the Tithe nor is such passing found to be by Deed. To clear the way then towards resolving the principal Question 1. At the time of Giles Astly's death the Tithes and the House and Lands were sever'd in
Interest for the Lessee Taverner had a Lease of the House Glebe and Barn and the Tithe continued in Astly 2. This severance was equally the same as if the Tithe had been demis'd to Taverner and the House and Land had remained still in Astly's possession 3. Though the Freehold of both remained still in Astly at his death notwithstanding the divided Interest in the Land and Tithe yet the Freehold being a thing quatenus Freehold not capable in it self of Occupancy nor no natural but a legal thing which the Law casts upon him that is Occupant that will not concern the Questions either who was Occupant or of what he was Occupant Cok. Litt. f. 41. b. 4. I take it for clear That a naked Tithe granted by it self pur auter vie and the Grantee dying without assignment living Cestuy que vie is not capable of Occupancy more than a Rent a Common in gross and Advowson in gross a Fair or the like are it being a thing lying in Grant equally as those others do Coke's Littleton There can be no Occupant of any thing which lyeth in Grant and cannot pass without Deed. I cited the place at full before with other Authorities against Occupancy of a Rent 5. If a man dye seis'd of Land which he holds pur auter vie and also dies seis'd of Rent held pur auter vie or of an Advowson or Common in gross held by distinct Grants pur auter vie and the same Cestuy que vie or the several Cestuy vies for that will not differ the Case living Though the Grantee died seis'd of a Freehold in these several things I conceive that he which enters into the Land first after his death will be Occupant of the Land which was capable of Occupancy but neither of the Tithe Advowson nor Common which are not capable of Occupancy and have no more coherence with dependence upon nor relation to the Land than if they had been granted pur auter vie to another who had happen'd to dye in like manner as the Grantee of the Land did And that which hath intricated men in this matter hath been a Conception taken up as if the Occupant had for his object in being Occupant the Freehold which the Tenant died seis'd of which is a mistake for the subject and object of the Occupant are only such things which are capable of Occupancy not things which are not and not the Freehold at all into which he neither doth nor can enter but the Law casts it immediately upon him that hath made himself Occupant of the Land or other real thing whereof he is Occupant that there may be a Tenant to the Precipe But as was well observed by my Brother Wilmott No Precipe lies for setting out Tithe at Common Law and I doubt not by the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 7. though Sir Edward Coke in his Litt. f. 159. a. seems to be of opinion Coke Litt. 159. a. that a man may at his Election have remedy for witholding Tithe after that Statute by Action or in the Ecclesiastical Court by that Statute doubtless he hath for the title of Tithe as for title of Land or for the taking of them away but not perhaps for not setting them out 6. When a Severance therefore is once made of the Land and Tithe it is as much severance of them though the Tithe remain in Astly's possession as if he had leas'd the Land to Taverner and the Tithe to another if then Taverner becoming Occupant of the Land should have had nothing in the Tithe leas'd to another as the Land was to him no more shall he have the Tithe remaining in Astly himself at his death Still we must remember the ground insisted on That no Occupancy begins with the Freehold but begins by possessing the Land or other real thing which was void and ownerless and that by Act of Law the Freehold is cast upon the Possessor either entring where the possession was void or being in possession when Tenant pur auter vie died either as Lessee for years or at will to Tenant pur auter vie for the Law equally casts the Freehold upon him as was resolved in Chamberleyne and Eures Case reported by Serjeant Rolls and others Second Part. f. 151. Letter E. and in Castle and Dods Case 5 Jac. Cr. f. 200. Therefore after such Severance made by the Tenant pur auter vie the Land and Tithe are as distinct and sunder'd from each other as if Tenant pur auter vie had held them by distinct Grants or leas'd them to distinct persons In the next place I shall agree That the Occupant of a House shall have the Estovers or way pertaining to such House the Occupant of the Demesne of a Mannor or of other Land shall have the Advowson appendant or Villain regardant to the Mannor or Common belonging to the Land and the Services of the Mannor not sever'd from the Demesne before the occupancy For a Possessor of a House Land Demesne of a Mannor as Occupant doth not by such his possession sever any thing belonging to the Land House or Demesne more than the Possessor by any other title than occupancy doth and if they be not sever'd it follows they must remain as before to the Possessor of that to which they pertain So if a Mannor being an intire thing consisting of Demesnes and Services which are parts constituent of the Mannor the possessing and occupancy of the Demesns which is one part can make no severance of the Services from the intire and therefore the Occupant hath all And these things though primarily there can be no occupancy of them being things that lye in Grant and pass not without Deed yet when they are adjuncts or pertaining to Land they do pass by Livery only without Deed. Coke Litt. f. 121. 8. Sect. 183. Whatsoever passeth by Livery of Seisin either in Deed or in Law may pass without Deed and not only the Rent and Services parcel of the Mannor shall with the Demesns as the more principal and worthy pass by Livery without Deed but all things regardant appendant or appurtenant to the Mannor as Incidents or Adjuncts to the same shall together with the Mannor pass without Deed without saying cum pertinentiis And if they pass by Livery which must be of the Land they must likewise pass by any lawful Entry made into the Land and such the Entry of the Occupant is But as by occupancy of the demesn Lands of a Mannor the Services are not sever'd so if they be sever'd at the time when the occupancy happens that shall never of it self unite them again Now in the Case before us The Tithe is neither appendant or appurtenant or any sort of Adjunct to the Glebe or House nor are they to the Tithe nor will a lease and livery of the Glebe simply with the appurtenances pass the Tithe at all nor a Grant of the Tithe pass the Glebe nor are either
confessed that the Land was a Common and that he had approv'd the places in question leaving sufficient Pasture for the Tenants if then the Tenant had demurr'd upon his Plea of Sola separalis pastura the right of approving had properly come in question A man hath no right to any thing for which the Law gives no remedy This must be a Common or Nothing 1. If disseis'd the Assise is Quare disseisivit eum de Communia pasturae suae If surcharg'd an Admensuratio pasturae is Quare Superoneravit Communiam pasturam suam 22 Ass p. 48. Cok. Litt. 4. b. Trespass lies not for a Common but doth for Sola separalis pastura granted to one or more jointly But not here where all cannot joyn in Action and several Actions would cause several Fines to the King for the same offence which the Law permits not He cannot avow but for Damage done to his Common not for his Sola separalis pastura 2. No Common or Pasture can be claimed by Custome within the Mannor that may not be prescribed for out of the Mannor for what one might grant another might Foyston Cratchrod's Case 4. Rep. f. 31. But no Prescription can be for Sola separalis pastura out of the Mannor to such Common Therefore they shall not claim it by Custome in the Mannor For Copy-holders must prescribe out of the Mannor that the Lord for himself and his Tenants at will hath always had Common in such a place which Prescription gives the Lord what this Custome would take from him 3. No man enjoys a Real profit convey'd from the Lord which he cannot re-transfer again to the Lords benefit but a Commoner of such a Common cannot Release Surrender Extinguish or otherwise Convey this Common to the Lords benefit Smith Gatewoods Case 3 Jac. Cr. f. 152 6. Rep. f. 59. 15 E. 2. Title Prescript pl. 51. Which is the reason in Gatewood's Case That Inhabitants not corporate cannot prescribe in a Common none of them can extinguish or release that Common he claims A man prescribed in the sole Pasture after carrying of the Hay to a certain time of the year So tempore E. 1. a Prescription for all the Pasture and the Owner of the Soyl could only plough Fitz. pl. 55. super sow and carry his Corn but not depasture the Grass at all But no Case where different persons had by different Title as here in the same ground Solam separalem pasturam Nor no Case where Sola separalis pastura is granted to a man and his Heirs which seems the same as granting omne proficuum terrae For where it is alledged there may be Mines Woods and the like notwithstanding the Grant of Solam separalem pasturam these are casual and not constant profits they may be or not be at all When a man brings an Action as an Entry sur Disseisin or the like where he must alledge Esplees the profit of a Mine will not serve but for the Mine it self which may be a divided Inheritance from the Soyl. So may Woodland be a divided Inheritance from the Soyl and the profit or cutting of that is not Esplees of the Land generally but of the Woodland but the profits of all and every part are the Esplees of the Land and proves seisin of the whole Land which are in the form of pleading the Corn Grass and Hay which are profits pour moy pour tout and where Sola separalis pastura is granted generally away Seisin cannot be alledg'd in taking any of these It is agreed generally for Law Cok. Litt. f. 122. a. That a Prescription to have Solam separalem Communiam incertain Land doth not exclude the Owner of the Soyl to have Pasture or Estovers But by that Book a man may prescribe to have Solam vesturam terrae from a certain day to a certain day in the year and so to have Solam pasturam terrae And so are the Books of 15 E. 2. pl. 51. and of E. 1. pl. 55. in Fitz-herbert Title Prescription but they go no further nor determine what Estate he hath who claims Solam separalem pasturam to him and his Heirs excluding the Lord wholly from any Pasture Hay or Corn. In granting or prescribing to have Solam separalem Communiam why the Lord is not excluded is not clear by that Book or any other For There are two notions or senses of the word Communia the one as it signifies that Interest in the Common which one Commoner hath against another not to have the Common surcharg'd And is that Interest Fitz. Na. Br. de Admensuratione pasturae f. 125. a. to which the Writ De Admensuratione pasturae relates which only lies for Commoner against Commoner and not for a Commoner against the Lord or for the Lord against a Commoner as is clear by Fitz-herbert And in this sense there may be Sola separalis Communia for only one may have right of Common and no more either by Grant or Prescription So in this sense one part of the Tenants of a Mannor may have the sole right of Commoning in a certain place excluding the other part of the Tenants Foyston's C. 4. Rep. and may claim there Solam separalem Communiam à caeteris Tenentibus Manerii The other notion of Communia is when one or more hath right to Pasture with the Owner of the Soyl and in this sense it is impossible for a man to have solam separalem Communiam for one cannot have that alone which is to be had with another nor do that alone which is to be done with another So as a man may have Solam separalem Communiam in that sense that none is to be a Commoner but himself but not in that sense that none else should depasture the Land but he for Communia cannot signifie an absolute several As 't is a Contradiction that a Common which is to more than one can be a several and belong but to one So it is an equal Contradiction That what in its nature is to be the right of one only can be Common and the right of more than one Others cannot have what is only to be had by me more than I can have only what is to be had by others with me Therefore Sola separalis Pastura may be enjoyed by one or by many jointly and by way of Survivor but not by many by different Titles as belonging to several Free-holds for Sola separalis pastura can be but Soli separatim Na. Br. f. 231. a. l. c. 8 E. 4. f. 17. Br. grants pl. 95. If the King had a Corody from an Abby of two or three loaves of Bread per diem and of so many measures of Drink this might be granted to two or three several persons But if he had a Corody of one Meal a day or Sustentationem unius Valecti per diem this
the words of a Will are of ambiguous and doubtful construction they shall not be interpreted to the disinheriting of the right Heir as is already shew'd This being clear That there is no devise by this Will of the Land by implication in any kind to the Son and Daughters it follows that Katherine the surviving Daughter of the Testator and Lessor of the Plaintiff had no Title to enter and make the Lease to the Plaintiff Gardner and then as to the Case in question before us which is only Whether the Defendants be culpable of Ejecting the Plaintiff It will not be material whether The devise to the Nephew William Rose be void or not and if not void how and when he shall take by the devise which may come in question perhaps hereafter But to that point ex abundante and to make the Will not ineffectual in that point of the devise to the Nephew if no Estate for lives or other Estate be created by this Will by Implication to the Son and Daughters it follows That the Nephew can take nothing by way of Remainder for the Remainder must depend upon some particular Estate and be created the same time with the particular Estate Cok. Litt. f. 49. a. The Remainder is the residue of an Estate in Land depending upon a particular Estate and created together with the same and the Will creating no particular Estate the consequent must be That the Land was left to descend in Fee-simple to the heir at law without creating either particular Estate or Remainder upon it Sir Edward Coke hath a Case Cok. Litt. f. 18. a. but quotes no Authority for it If Land be given to H. and his heirs as long as B. hath heirs of his body the Remainder over in Fee the Remainder is void being a Remainder after a Fee-simple though that Fee-simple determines when no heirs are left of the body of B. whether that case be law or not I shall not now discuss in regard that when such a base Fee determines for want of Issue of the body of B. the Land returns to the Grantor and his heirs as a kind of Reversion and if there can be a Reversion of such Estate I know not why a Remainder may not be granted of it but for the former reason this can be no Remainder because no particular Estate is upon which it depends and if the Lord Coke's Case be law it is the stronger Cok. Litt. f. 18. a. Sect. 11. that no Remainder is in this Case But without question a Remainder cannot depend upon an absolute Fee-simple by necessary reason For when all a man hath of Estate or any thing else is given or gone away nothing remains but an absolute Fee-simple being given or gone out of a man that being all no other or further Estate can remain to be given or dispos'd and therefore no Remainder can be of a pure Fee-simple To this purpose is the Case of Hearne and Allen in this Court 2 Car. 1. Cr. f. 57. Richard Keen seis'd of a Messuage and Lands in Cheping-Norton having Issue Thomas his Son and Anne a Daughter by the same Venter devis'd his Land to Thomas his Son and his heirs for ever and for want of heirs of Thomas to Anne and her heirs and died It became a Question Whether Thomas had an Estate in Fee or in Tayl by this Will for he could not dye without heir if his Sister outlived him who was to take according to the intent of the Devisor Two Judges held it and with reason to be an Estate tayl in Thomas and the Remainder to the Daughter who might be his heir shew'd That the Devise to him and his heirs could be intended only to be to him and the heirs of his body But three other Judges held it to be a devise in Fee but all agreed if the Remainder had been to a Stranger it had been void for then Thomas which is only to my purpose had had an absolute Estate in Fee after which there could be no Remainder which is undoubted law The Case out of Coke's Littleton and this Case are the same to this purpose That a Remainder cannot depend upon a Fee-simple yet in another respect they much differ For in this last Case after an Estate in Fee devis'd to Thomas and if he died without heir the Remainder to a Stranger or Sister of the half blood not only the Remainder was void as a Remainder but no future devise could have been made of the land by the Devisor for if Thomas died without heir the land escheated and the Lords Title would precede any future devise But in that Case of Sir Edward Coke which he puts by way of Grant if it be put by way of devise That if land be devised to H. and his heirs as long as B. hath heirs of his body the Remainder over such later devise will be good though not as a Remainder yet as an Executory devise because somewhat remain'd to be devis'd when the Estate in Fee determin'd upon B. his having no Issue of his Body And as an Executory Devise and not as a Remainder I conceive the Nephew shall well take in the present Case And the intention of the Testator by his Will will run as if he had said I leave my Land to descend to my Son and his Heirs according to the Common Law until he and both my Daughters shall happen to dye without Issue And then I devise my Land to my Nephew William Rose and his Heirs Or as if he had said my Son shall have all my Land To have and to hold to him and his Heirs in Fee-simple as long as any Heirs of the bodies of A.B. and c. shall be living and for want of such Heirs I devise my Land to my Nephew William Rose and his Heirs The Nephew shall take as by a future and Executory Devise And there is no difference whether such devise be limited upon the contingent of three Strangers dying without Heirs of their bodies or upon the contingent of three of the Devisors own Children dying without Heirs of their Bodies for if a future devise may be upon any contingent after a Fee-simple it may as well be upon any other contingent if it appear by the Will the Testator intended his Son and Heir should have his Land in Fee-simple This way of Executory devise after a Fee-simple of any nature was in former Ages unknown as appears by a Case in the Lord Dyer 29 H. 8. f. 33. concerning a Devise to the Prior of St. Bartholomew in West-Smithfield by the clear Opinion of Baldwin and Fitz herbert the greatest Lawyers of the Age. But now nothing more ordinary The Cases are for the most part remembred in Pell and Browns Case that is Dyer f. 124. Ed. Clatch his Case f. 330. b. 354. Wellock Hamonds Case cited in Borastons Case 3. Rep. Fulmerston Stewards Case c. I shall instance two Cases
The first is Haynsworths and Prettyes Case Where a man seis'd of Land in Soccage having Issue two Sons and a Daughter devis'd to his youngest Son and Daughter Twenty pounds apiece to be paid by his eldest Son and devis'd his Lands to his eldest Son and his Heirs upon Condition if he paid not those Legacies that his Land should be to his second Son and Daughter and their Heirs The eldest Son fail'd of payment After Argument upon a Special Verdict It was resolv'd by the Court clearly That the second Son and Daughter should have the Land 1. For that the devise to his Son and his Heir in Fee Hill 41. El. Cr. 833. a. being no other then what the Law gave him was void 2. That it was a future devise to the second Son and Daughter upon the contingent of the eldest Sons default of payment 3. That it was no more in effect than if he had devis'd That if his eldest Son did not pay all Legacies that his land should be to the Legatories and there was no doubt in that Case but the land in default of payment should vest in them Which Case in the reason of law differs not from the present Case where the land is devis'd by devise future and executory to the Nephew upon a contingent to happen by the Testators Son and Daughters having no issue 18 Jac. Pell Browns C. Cro. f. 590. The second Case is that of Pell and Brown the Father being seis'd of certain land having Issue William his eldest Son Thomas and Richard Brown devis'd the land to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and if Thomas died without Issue living William then William should have the lands to him his Heirs and Assigns 1. This was adjudg'd an Estate in Fee-simple in Thomas 2. That William by way of Executory devise had an Estate in Fee-simple in possibility if Thomas died without Issue before him And it being once clear That the Estate of Thomas was a Fee-simple determinable upon a contingent and not an Estate tayl and so in the present case it being clear'd that George the Testators Son had the land descended to him in Fee from the Testator and took no Estate tayl expresly or by implication from the Will it will not be material whether the Contingent which shall determine that Fee-simple proceeds from the person which hath such determinable Fee or from another or partly from him and partly from another as in Haynsworth's Case the Son determined his Fee-simple by not paying the Legacies in Pell and Brown's Case Thomas his Fee-simple determined by his dying without Issue living William the Fee-simple vested in George the Son by descent determines when he and his two Sisters dye without Issue and upon such determination in every of these Cases the future and executory devise must take effect But the great Objection is That if this should be an executory devise to the Nephew upon the contingent of George the Son and both his Sisters dying without Issue It will be dangerous to introduce a new way of perpetuity for if a man have several Children and shall permit his Estate to descend or by his Will devise it to his Heir so as he may therein have an unquestionable Fee-simple which is the same with permitting it to descend he may then devise it futurely when all his Children shall dye without Issue of their bodies to J. S. and his Heirs as long as A. B. and C. strangers shall have any Heirs of their bodies living and then to a third person by like future devise For if he should devise it futurely to J. S. and his Heirs as long as J. S. had any Heirs of his body it were a clear Estate tayl in J. S. upon which no future devise could be but it would be a Remainder to be docked This Objection was in some measure made by Doderidge in Pell and Browns Case and the Iudges said there was no danger Vid. Stiles Rep. Gay Gaps Case 258 275. because the Estate in Fee of Thomas did not determine by his dying without Heir of his body generally but by dying without Issue living William for if the land had been given to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and if he died without Heirs of his body then to William and his Heirs Thomas his Estate had been judg'd an Estate tayl with the Remainder to William and not a Fee upon which no future or executory devise can be So was it adjudg'd in Foy and Hinds Case 22 Jac. Cr. f. 695. 6. and anciently 37 Ass p. 18. 5. H. 5. f. 6. and to be within the reason of Mildmay and Corbets Case of Perpetuities But in Pell and Browns Case the Iudges said it was more dangerous to destroy future devises than to admit of such Perpetuities as could follow from them any way by determinable Fee-simples which is true for a Fee simple determinable upon a contingent is a Fee-simple to all intents but not so durable as absolute Fee-simples And all Fee-simples are unequally durable for one will escheat sooner than another by the failer of Heirs An Estate of Fee-simple will determine in a Bastard with his life if he want Issue An Estate to a man and his Heirs as long as John Stiles hath any Heir which is no absolute Fee-simple is doubtless as durable as the Estate in Fee which John Stiles hath to him and his Heirs which is an absolute Fee-simple Nor do I know any Law simply against a Perpetuity but against Intails of Perpetuity for every Fee-simple is a perpetuity but in the accident of Alienation and Alienation is an incident to a Fee-simple determinable upon a contingent as to any more absolute or more perdurable Fee-simple The Chief Justice Justice Archer and Justice Wylde for the Defendant Justice Tyrrell for the Plaintiff Judgment for the Defendant Hill 21 22 Car. II. C. B. Craw versus Ramsey Philip Craw is Plaintiff and John Ramsey Defendant In an Action of Trespass and Ejectment THE Plaintiff declares That Lionel Tolmach Baronet and Humphrey Weld Esquire January the Twentieth the Sixteenth of the King demis'd to the Plaintiff the Mannor of Kingston with the appurtenances in the County of Surrey one Messuage two Barns one Dove-house two Gardens eighty Acres of Land and ten Acres of Meadow with the appurtenances in Kingston aforesaid and other places and also the Rectory of Kingston aforesaid To have and to hold to the said Philip and his Assignes from the Feast of the Nativity last past for five years next ensuing By virtue whereof he entred into the Premisses and was possessed until the Defendant the said Twentieth of January in the Sixteenth year of the King entred upon him and Ejected him with force to his Damage of Forty pounds To this the Defendant pleads he is not Culpable Vpon a Special Verdict it appear'd That Robert Ramsey Alien Antenatus had Issue 1. Robert 2. Nicholas 3. John 4. George Antenatos
eas in omnibus sequantur In cujus c. T. R. apud Wadestocks ix die Septembris Out of the Close Rolls of King Henry the Third his Time Clause 1 H. 3. dorso 14. The Kings thanks to G. de Mariscis Justice of Ireland The King signifies that himself and other his Lieges of Ireland should enjoy the Liberties which he had granted to his Lieges of England and that he will grant and confirm the same to them Clause 3. H. 3. m. 8. part 2. The King writes singly to Nicholas Son of Leonard Steward of Meth and to Nicholas de Verdenz and to Walter Purcell Steward of Lagenia and to Thomas the son of Adam and to the King of Connage and to Richard de Burgh and to J. Saint John Treasurer and to the other Barons of the Exchequer of Dublin That they be intendant and answerable to H. Lord Arch-bishop of Dublin as to the Lord the King's Keeper and Bailiff of the Kingdome of Ireland as the King had writ concerning the same matter to G. de Mariscis Justice of Ireland Clause 5. H. 3. m. 14. The King writes to his Justice of Ireland That whereas there is but a single Justice itinerant in Ireland which is said to be dissonant from the more approved custome in England for Reasons there specified two more Justices should be associated to him the one a Knight the other a Clerk and to make their Circuits together according to the Custome of the Kingdom of England Witness c. The Close Roll. 5 H. 3. m. 6. Dorso The King makes a Recital That though he had covenanted with Geoffrey de Mariscis That all Fines and other Profits of Ireland should be paid unto the Treasure and to other Bailiffs of the Kings Exchequer of Dublin yet he receiv'd all in his own Chamber and therefore is removed by the King from his Office Whereupon the King by advise of his Council of England establisheth that H. Arch-bishop of Ireland be Keeper of that Land till further order And writes to Thomas the son of Anthony to be answerable and intendant to him After the same manner it is written to sundry Irish Kings and Nobles there specially nominated Clause 7. H. 3. m. 9. The King writes to the Arch-bishop of Dublin his Justice of Ireland to reverse a Judgment there given in a Case concerning Lands in Dalkera between Geoffrey de Mariscis and Eve his wife Plaintiffs and Reignald Talbott Tenant By the Record of the same Plea returned into England the Judgment is reversed upon these two Errors The first because upon Reignald's shewing the Charter of King John the King's Father concerning the same Land in regard thereof desiring peace it was denyed him The second Because the Seisin was adjudged to the said Geoffrey and Eve because Reynald calling us to warranty had us not to warranty at the day set him by the Court which was a thing impossible for either Geoffrey or the Court themselves to do our Court not being above us to summon us or compel us against our will Therefore the King writes to the Justice of Ireland to re-seise Reynald because he was disseised by Erroneous Judgment Clause 28. H. 3. m. 7. The King writes to M. Donenald King of Tirchonill to aid him against the King of Scots Witness c. The like Letters to other Kings and Nobles of Ireland Clause 40. E. 3. m. 12. Dorso The King takes notice of an illegal proceeding to Judgment in Ireland Ordered to send the Record and Process into England It was objected by one of my Brothers That Ireland received not the Laws of England by Act of Parliament of England but at the Common Law by King John's Charter If his meaning be that the Fact was so I agree it but if he mean they could not receive them by Act of Parliament of England as my Brother Maynard did conjecturally inferr for his purpose then I deny my Brothers Assertion for doubtless they might have received them by Act of Parliament And I must clear my Brother Maynard from any mention of an Union as was discoursed of England and Ireland Nor was it at all to his purpose If any Union other than that of a Provincial Government under England had been Ireland had made no Laws more than Wales but England had made them for Ireland as it doth for Wales As for the Judgment Obj. One of my Brothers made a Question Whether George Ramsey the younger Brother inheriting John Earl of Holdernes before the naturalization of Nicholas Whether Nicholas as elder Brother being naturalized should have it from him Doubtless he should if his Naturalizing were good He saith the Plaintiff cannot have Iudgment because a third person by this Verdict hath the Title Answ If a Title appear for the King the Court ex Officio ought to give Iudgment for him though no party But if a man have a prior Possession and another enters upon him without Title I conceive the priority of Possession is a good Title against such an Entry equally when a Title appears for a third that is no party as if no Title appear'd for a third But who is this third party For any thing appears in the Verdict George Ramsey died before the Earl 2. It appears not that his Son John or the Defendant his Grand-child were born within the Kings Liegeance Patient appears to be born at Kingston and so the Daughters of Robert by the Verdict The Acts of Ireland except all Land whereof Office was found before the Act to entitle the King but that is in Ireland for the Act extends not to England If Nicholas have Title it is by the Law of England as a consequent of Naturalization So it may be for the Act of 7 Jac. cap. 2. he that is Naturalized in England since the Act must receive the Sacrament but if no Alien by consequent then he must no more receive the Sacrament than a Postnatus of Scotland Obj. Ireland is a distinct Kingdom from England and therefore cannot make any Law Obligative to England Answ That is no adequate Reason for by that Reason England being a distinct Kingdom should make no Law to bind Ireland which is not so England can naturalize if it please nominally a person in Ireland and not in England But he recover'd by saying That Ireland was subordinate to England and therefore could not make a Law Obligatory to England True for every Law is coactive and it is a contradiction that the Inferior which is civilly the lesser power should compel the Superior which is greater power Secondly He said England and Ireland were two distinct Kingdoms and no otherwise united than because they had one Soveraign Had this been said of Scotland and England it had been right for they are both absolute Kingdoms and each of them Sui Juris But Ireland far otherwise For it is a Dominion belonging to the Crown of England and follows that it cannot be separate from it but by
the first Cestuy que use nor his Heir the last Cestuy que use in the Case could nor can have any benefit of this warranty because William the first Cestuy que use nor his Heir could not nor can warrant to himself but as to William and his Heirs the warranty is clearly extinct The Argument And as to the first Question I conceive the Law to be that the warranty of William the Tenant in tayl descending upon Elizabeth and Sarah the Demandants his Heirs at Law is no barr in the Formedon in Reverter brought by them as Heirs to William their Grandfather the Donor though it be a Collateral warranty I know it is the perswasion of many professing the Law That by the Statute of Westminster the second De donis conditionalibus the Lineal warranty of Tenant in tayl shall be no barr in a Formedon in the Descender but that the Collateral warranty of Tenant in tayl is at large as at the Common Law unrestrain'd by that Statute Sir Edward Coke in his Comment upon Section 712. Sect. 712. of Littleton A lineal warranty doth not bind the right of an Estate tayl for that it is restrain'd by the Statute de donis Conditionalibus And immediately follows A lineal warranty and assets is a barr of the right in tayl and is not restrain'd But the reason why the warranty of Tenant in tayl with Assets binds the right of the Estate tayl is in no respect from the Statute de donis but is by the Equity of the Statute of Glocester by which the warranty of Tenant by the Courtesie barrs not the Heir for the Lands of his Mother if the Father leave not Assets to descend in recompence And therefore it was conceived after the Statute de donis was made That if Tenant in tayl left Assets to descend in Fee-simple his warranty should bind the right of the Issue in tayl by the equity of that preceding Statute of Glocester Whereas if the Statute of Glocester had not been the Lineal warranty of Tenant in tayl had no more bound the right of the Estate tayl by the Statute de donis with Assets descending than it doth without Assets For the better clearing therefore of the Law in the Case in question I shall preparatorily assert some few things and clear what I so assert without which the truth of the Conclusion I hold will not appear so naked to the Hearers as it should Ass 1. The first is That at the Common Law the distinction of a lineal and collateral warranty was useless and unknown For though what we now call a Collateral and a lineal warranty might be in speculation and notionable at the Common Law as at this day a Male warranty or a Female warranty may be yet as to any effect in Law there was no difference between a Lineal warranty and a Collateral but the warranty of the Ancestor descending upon the Heir be it the one or the other did equally bind And this as it is evident in it self so is it by Littleton whose words are Litt. Sect. 697. Before the Statute of Glocester all warranties which descended to them who are Heirs to those who made the warranties were barrs to the same Heirs to demand any Lands or Tenements against the warranties except the warranties which commence by disseisin Therefore if a Question had been at the Common Law only Whether in some particular Case the Ancestors warranty had bound the Heir It had been a sensless Answer to say it did or did not because the warranty was Lineal or Collateral for those warranties were not defined at the Common Law nor of use to be defined But the proper Answer had been That the warranty did bind the Heir because it commenc'd not by disseisin for every warranty of the Ancestor but such descending upon the Heir did bind him So if after the Statute of Glocester Tenant by the Courtesie had aliened with warranty had it been demanded if the Heir were barr'd by that warranty it had been an absurd Answer That he was not because it was a Collateral warranty of his Father without Assets For all Collateral warranties of the Father were not restrained but his warranty in that Case which could be no other than Collateral was restrained by the Statute Therefore The adequate Answer had been That the Fathers warranty bound not in that Case without Assets because the Statute of Glocester had so restrained it My second Assertion is Ass 2. That the Statute de Donis restrains not the warranty of Tenant in tayl from barring him in the Remainder in tayl by his warranty descending upon him 1. For that the mischief complained of and remedied by the Statute is That in omnibus praedictis casibus therein recited post prolem suscitatam habuerunt illi quibus Tenementum sic conditionaliter datum fuit hucusque potestatem alienandi Tenementum sic datum exhaeredandi exitum eorum contra voluntatem Donatoris But the warranty of the Donee in tayl descending upon him in the Remainder who regularly claims by purchase from the Donor and not by descent from the Donee in tayl could be no disinheriting of the Issue of the Donee claiming by descent from him against which disinheriting only the Statute provides which is evident by the Writ of Formedon in the Descender framed by the Statute in behalf of such Issue of the Donee whom the Statute intends 2. The Statute did not provide against Inconveniences or Mischiefs which were not at the time of making the Statute but against those which were But at the making of it there could be no Remainder in tayl because all Estates which are Estates tayl since the Statute were Fee-simples Conditional before the Statute upon which a Remainder could not be limited So is Sir Edward Coke in his Comment upon the Statute de Donis The Formedon in Reverter did lye at Common Law Cok. part 2. f. 336. but not a Formedon in Remainder upon an Estate tayl because it was a Fee-simple Conditional whereupon no Remainder could be limited at Common Law but after the Statute it may be limited upon an Estate tayl in respect of the Division of the Estates 3. The Statute formed a Writ of Formedon in the Descender for the new Estate tayl created by the Statute and mentions a Formedon in the Reverter as already known in the Chancery for the Donor for whom the Statute likewise intended to provide but formed or mentioned none for the Remainder in tayl And the Cases are common in Littleton Litt. Sect. 716 718 719. and in many other Books that the warranty of Donee in tayl is Collateral to him in the Remainder in tayl and binds as at the Common Law But thence to conclude That therefore the warranty of the Donee in tayl shall barr the Donor of his Reversion because it is a Collateral warranty also is a gross Non sequitur for the Donees warranty doth not therefore barr
the Remainder because it is a Collateral warranty but because the Statute de Donis doth not restrain his warranty from barring him in the Remainder as hath been clear'd but leaves it as at Common Law but it doth restrain his warranty from barring him in the Reversion as shall appear There is one Case in Littleton remarkable for many Reasons where the warranty of Tenant in tayl is lineal and not collateral to the person in Remainder and therefore binds not if the Case be Law as may be justly doubted as Littleton is commonly understood Litt. Sect. 719. Land is given to a man and the heirs males of his body the Remainder to the heirs females of his body and the Donee in tayl makes a Feoffment in Fee with warranty and hath Issue a Son and a Daughter and dieth this warranty is but a lineal warranty to the Son to demand by a Writ of Formedon in the Descender and also it is but lineal to the Daughter to demand the same Land by a Writ of Formedon in the Remainder unless the Brother dieth without Issue male because she claimeth as Heir female of the body of her Father engendred But if her Brother release to the Discontinuee with warranty and after dye without Issue this is a collateral warranty to the daughter because she cannot conveigh the right which she hath to the Remainder by any means of descent by her brother 1. Here the warranty of the Father Donee in tayl is but lineal to the Daughter in Remainder in tayl But she claims saith the Book her Remainder as heir female of the body of the Donee in tayl which differs the Case from other persons in Remainder of an Estate tayl But of this more hereafter 2. And by the way in this Case Sir Edward Coke though he hath commented upon it hath committed an over-sight of some moment by using a Copy that wanted a critical emendation For where it is said That the warranty of the Father is but lineal to the Daughter to demand the Land by a Formedon in the Remainder unless the Brother dye without Issue-male because she claims as Heir female of the body of her Father By which reading and context the sense must be That if the Son dye without Issue male of his body then the warranty of the Father is not lineal to the Daughter cujus contrarium est verum for she can claim her Remainder as heir female of the body of her Father and thereby make the Fathers warranty lineal to her but only because her Brother died without Issue male That which deceived Sir Edward Coke to admit this Case as he hath printed it was a deprav'd French Copy thus Si non frere devyast sans Issue male which truly read should be Si son frere devyast and the Translation should be Not unless the Brother dye without Issue male but If her Brother dye without Issue male Another reason is that his French Copy was deprav'd Because the French of it is Si non frere devyast sans Issue male which is no Language for that rendred in English is Vnless Brother dye For it cannot be rendred as he hath done it unless the Brother dye without the French had been Si non le frere devyast and not Si non frere devyast Sir Edward Coke's first Edition of his Littleton and all the following Editions are alike false in this Section I have an Edition of Littleton in 1604. so deprav'd which was long before Sir Edward Coke publisht his but I have a right Edition in 1581. which it seems Sir Edward Coke saw not where the Reading is right Si son frere devyast sans Issue male Therefore you may mend all your Littletons if you please and in perusing the Case you will find the grossness of the false Copies more clearly than you can by this my Discourse of it And after all I much doubt whether this Case as Littleton is commonly understood that is That this lineal warranty doth not bind the Daughter without Assets descending be Law my Reason is for that no Issue in tayl is defended from the warranty of the Donee or Tenant in tayl but such as are inheritable to the Estates intended within that Statute and no Estates are so intended but such as had been Fee-simples Conditional at the Common Law And no Estate in Remainder of an Estate tayl that is of a Fee Conditional could be at Common Law All Issues in tayl within that Statute are to claim by the Writ there purposely formed for them which is a Formedon in the Descender not in Remainder 3. A third thing to be cleared is That the Statute de Donis did not intend to preserve the Estate tayl for the Issue or the Reversion for the Donor absolutely against all warranties that might barr them but only against the Alienation with or without warranty of the Donee and Tenant in tayl only for if it had intended otherwise it had restrain'd all Collateral warranties of any other Ancestor from binding the Issue in tayl which it neither did nor intended though well it might such warranters having no title 4. The Statute de Donis did not intend to restrain the Alienation of any Estates but Estates of Inheritance upon Condition expressed or implyed such as were Fee-simples Conditional at Common Law And therefore if Tenant for life aliened with warranty which descended upon the Reversioner such Alienation or Warranty were not restrained by this Statute but left at Common Law 1. Because the Estate aliened was not of Inheritance upon Condition within that Statute 2. He in the Reversion had his remedy by entring for the forfeiture upon the Alienation if he pleas'd which the Donors of Fee-simples Conditional could not do These things cleared I think it will be most manifest by the Statute de Donis and all ancient Authority That the warranty of Tenant in tayl though it be a Collateral warranty will not barr the Donor or his Heir of the Reversion After the Inconvenience before recited That the Donees disinherited their Issue against the form of the Gift then follows Et praeterea cum deficienti exitu de hujusmodi Feoffatis Tenementum sic datum ad donatorem vel ad ejus haeredes reverti debuit per formam in Charta de dono hujusmodi expressam licet exitus si quis fuerit obiisset per factum tamen Feoffamentum eorum quibus Tenementum sic datum fuit sub conditione exclusi fuerunt hucúsque de Reversione eorundem Tenementorum quod manifeste fuit contra formam doni Hitherto the Inconveniences and Mischiefs which followed the Issue of the Donees and to the Donor when they fail'd by the Donees power of Alienation are only recited in the Statute without a word of restraint or remedy The follows the remedy and restraint in these words only and no other Propter quod Dominus Rex perpendens quod necessarium utile est in praedictis casibus which
been breach'd is no Judicial Opinion nor more than a gratis dictum But an Opinion though Erroneous concluding to the Iudgment is a Judicial Opinion because delivered under the Sanction of the Judges Oath upon deliberation which assures it is or was when delivered the Opinion of the Deliverer Yet if a Court give Judgment judicially another Court is not bound to give like Judgment unless it think that Judgment first given was according to Law For any Court may err else Errors in Judgment would not be admitted nor a Reversal of them Therefore if a Judge conceives a Judgment given in another Court to be erroneous he being sworn to judge according to Law that is in his own conscience ought not to give the like Judgment for that were to wrong every man having a like cause because another was wrong'd before much less to follow extra-judicial Opinions unless he believes those Opinions are right The other Case is in Coke 5 Car. Salvin versus Clerk in Ejectment upon a special Verdict Alexander Sidenham Tenant in tayl to him and the Heirs males of his body the Reversion to John his eldest Brother made a Lease for three Lives warranted by the Statute of 32 H. 8. c. 28. with warranty And after 16 Eliz. levies a Fine with warranty and proclamations to Taylor and dies without Issue male leaving Issue Elizabeth his Daughter Mother to the Plaintiffs Lessor In 18 Eliz. the Lease for Lives expir'd In 30 Eliz. John the elder Brother died without Issue the said Elizabeth being his Neece and Heir The Defendant entred claiming by a Lease from Taylor and Points entred upon him as Heir to Elizabeth A question was mov'd upon a suppos'd Case and not in fact within the Case Whether if the Fine had not been with proclamation as it was and no Non-claim had been in the Case as there was this warranty should make a discontinuance in Fee and barr Elizabeth it not descending upon John after Alexanders death but upon Elizabeth who is now also John's Heir or determined by Alexander's death The Judges were of opinion as the Reporter saith That the warranty did barr Elizabeth and consequently her Heir because the Reversion was discontinued by the Estate for Lives and a new Fee thereby gain'd and the Reversion displac'd thereby and the warranty was annex'd to that new Fee But this Case is all false and mis-reported 1. For that it saith the Lease for Lives was a discontinuance of the Reversion thereby a new Fee gain'd to Tenant in tayl which he passed away by the Fine with warranty which could not be for in the Case it appears the Lease was warranted by the Stat. of 32 H. 8 and then it could make no discontinuance nor no new Fee of a Reversion could be gain'd 40 Eliz. Keen Copes C. 602. pl. 13. and then no Estate to which the warranty was annex'd and so was it resolv'd 40 El. Keen Copes Case 2. That Opinion was extra-judicial it being concerning a point not in the Case but suppos'd 3. That Case was resolv'd upon the point of Non-claim and not upon this of the warranty which was not a point in the Case 4. Some of the Judges therefore spoke not to that point as appears in the Case As to the second Question Admitting the warranty of Tenant in tayl doth bind the Donor and his Heirs yet in regard the Defendant Tenant in possession cannot derive the warranty to her self from the Feoffees as Assignee or otherwise Whether she may rebutt the Demandants or not by her possession only is the question and I conceive she may not as this Case is I shall begin with those Authorities that make and are most press'd against me which is the Authority of Sir Edward Coke in Lincoln Colledge Case in the third Report and from thence brought over to his Littleton f. 385. a. His words in Lincoln Colledge Case f. 63. a. are He which hath the possession of the Land shall rebutt the Demandant himself without shewing how he came to the possession of it for it sufficeth him to defend his possession and barr the Demandant and the Demandant cannot recover the Land against his own warranty And there he cites several Cases as making good this his Assertion In the same place he saith it is adjudg'd 38 E. 3. f. 26. That an Assignee shall rebutt by force of a warranty made to one and his Heirs only This Doctrine is transferred to his Littleton in these words If the warranty be made to a man and his heirs without this word Assignes yet the Assignee or any Tenant of the Land may rebutt And albeit no man shall vouch or have a Warrantia Chartae either as party Heir or Assignee but in privity of Estate yet any one that is in of another Estate be it by disseisin abatement intrusion usurpation or otherwise shall rebutt by force of the warranty as a thing annex'd to the Land which sometimes was doubted in our Books when as in the Cases aforesaid he that rebutteth claimeth under and not above the warranty I shall clearly agree no man shall vouch or have a warrantia Chartae who is not in in privity of Estate that is who hath not the same Estate as well as the same Land to which the warranty was annexed And the reason is evident because the Tenant must recover if the Land be not defended to him by the warranter such Estate as was first warranted and no other unless a Fee be granted with warranty only for the life of the Grantee or Grantor in which Case the Grantee upon voucher recovers a Fee though the warranty were but for life I shall likewise agree the Law to be as Sir Edward Coke saith in both places if his meaning be that the Tenant in possession when he is impleaded may rebutt the Demandant without shewing how he came to the possession which he then hath when impleaded be it by dissism abatement intrusion or any other tortious way And for the reason given in Lincoln Colledge Case That it sufficeth that the Tenant defend his possession But if his meaning be that the Tenant in possession need not shew that the warranty ever extended to him or that he hath any right to it then I must deny his Doctrine in Lincoln Colledge Case or in Littleton which is but the former there repeated to be Law For as it is not reasonable a man should recover that Land which he hath once warranted to me from me what title soever I have in it at the time when he impleads me So on the other side it is against reason I should warrant Land to one who never had any right in my warranty And the same reason is if a man will be warranted by Rebutter he should make it appear how the warranty extends to him as if he will be warranted by Voucher for the difference is no other than that in the case of Voucher a stranger impleads him in
case of Rebutter the Warranter himself impleads him and in a Voucher he must make his title appear to be warranted Ergo in a Rebutter But he needs not have like Estate in the Land upon a Rebutter as upon Voucher which is for the reason given of recovering in value And the only reason why the person who is to warrant impleading the Tenant of the Land shall not recover but be rebutted by the warranty is because if he should recover the Land the Tenant who is intitled to the warranty must recover in value from him again and therefore to avoid Circuit of Action he shall not recover but be rebutted and barr'd as is most reasonable I shall therefore first make it appear by all ancient Authorities That the Tenant in possession shall not rebutt the Demandant by the warranty without he first make it appear that the warranty did extend to him as Heir or Assignee To prove this are full in the point Hill 8 E. 3. f. 10. tit garranty pl. 48. New Edit f. 283. b. num 28 The Book of 8 E. 3. f. 10. of the Old Edition Hillary Term tit Garranty pl. 48. where upon a great Debate it was rul'd That the Tenant must shew how he was entitled to the warranty and how it extended to him and accordingly did so before his Plea was admitted by way of Rebutter 10. E. 3. f. 42. b. New Edit f. 391. b. num 42 Another Book full in the point is 10 E. 3. f. 42. b. of the Old Edition where in like manner the Tenant was forc'd to shew how the warranty extended to him upon Debate and it is remarkable in that Case That his shewing the Deed of warranty to him whose Assignee he was and the Deed of Assignment to himself was not enough but he was compell'd to plead orally as the manner then was That William who had the warranty assign'd to him by his Deed there shew'd forth and the reason given that the Deed of Assignment could not speak and make his Plea and was but Evidence of the truth of his Plea But in that very Case when it was replyed That he was not Tenant by the Assignment of William but by disseisin of the Plaintiff it was not permitted without traversing the Assignment of William For if he were once intitled to the warranty what Estate soever he had when impleaded he might rebutt though he could not vouch Which Case proves fully both my Positions That a man cannot rebutt without shewing how the warranty extends to him 2. That so doing he may whatever Seisin he hath at that time be it by Disseisin or Abatement c. or otherwise 22 Ass pl. 88. A third Case is when the Tenant being impleaded pleaded the warranty of the Demandants Father to one A. and bound him and his Heirs to warrant to A. his Heirs and Assigns and that he was Assignee of A. and demanded Judgment In that Case because he did not plead that he was Assignee of A. by Deed the Plea was disallow'd which since hath been thought not necessary but à fortiori if he had pleaded no Assignment at all from A. by Deed or without Deed to intitle him to the warranty his Plea had been necessarily disallowed My next Assertion is That the Tenant in possession setting forth how the warranty extends to him needs not set forth by what Estate or Title he is in possession To this I shall cite three Books full in the point 6 E. 3. f. 7. old Edit new Edit 6 E. 3. f. 187 Num. 16. 10 F. 3. f. 42. cited before old Book 45 E. 3. But in all these Cases it is to be noted That the Tenant rebutting though he was in possession of another Estate than that to which the warranty was annex'd yet constantly shew'd how the warranty was deriv'd to him which Sir Edward Coke observ'd not either in Lincoln Colledge Case or his Littleton but cites in Lincoln Colledge Case the Case of 45 E. 3. 45 E. 3. f. 18. and some others I shall mention after to shew a man may rebutt being in of another Estate than that which was warranted which is true but not without intitling himself to the warranty That the Law of rebutting stands upon the difference I have taken besides the Authorities urg'd will be evident for these Reasons As a warranty may be created so may it be determin'd or extinguish'd various ways 1. It may be releas'd as Littleton himself is Sect. 748. 2. It may be defeasanc'd as Sir Edward Coke upon that Sect. 748. 3. It may be lost by Attainder Sect. 745. 4. It may be extinguish'd by Re-feoffment of the warranter or his Heirs by the Garrantee or his Heir In all these Cases if the warranty be destroy'd it cannot be rebutted for there cannot be an accident to a thing which is not and rebutting is an accident incident to a warranty And therefore if the warranty have no being there can be no rebutter Why then admit A. warrants Land to B. and his Assigns during the life of B. after B. releases this warranty to A. and then Assigns to C. C. is impleaded by A. and pleads generally that A. warranted to B. for his life and that B. is still living if C. could rebutt A. by this manner of pleading without shewing when B. assigned to him so to derive the benefit of the warranty to himself A. could never have benefit of the Release of the warranty because it could not appear whether the warranty were releas'd before or after the assignment if before then the warranty is gone and cannot be rebutted but if after it may So if A. binds him and his Heirs to warrant to B. his Heirs and Assigns B. dyes his Heir releases the warranty and dies and then the Heir of the Heir assigns The Tenant is impleaded by A. If he may rebutt by his bare possession without shewing how the warranty extended to him A. can have no benefit of his Release before any assignment was made for the Demandant cannot be suppos'd to know the time of the assignment and consequently cannot know how to plead the Release until the time of the assignment appear which is most consonant in reason with the Authorities before urg'd Another reason is That constantly in elder times when the Tenant pleaded a warranty to rebutt he concluded his Plea that if he were impleaded by a stranger the Demandant was to warrant him which could not be without shewing how the warranty extended to him for he was not to warrant him if impleaded by a stranger because he had possession of the Land only Sir Edward Coke in Lincoln Colledge Case cites the Book of 38 E. 3. f. 26. as adjudg'd to prove that the bare possession of the Land is sufficient for the Tenant to rebutt for that the Assignee may rebutt a warranty made only to a man and his Heirs If that were so it were to his purpose but there is
pleaded the warranty and that the Heir if a stranger had impleaded him was bound to warrant the Estate and therefore demanded Judgment if the Heir himself should implead him 1. It is there agreed if the warranty had attach'd the Heir before the Lords entry the Heir had been bound but quaere 2. By that Book it seems the Lord impleaded by a Stranger might have vouch'd the Heir if the warranty had attach'd him before the Lords entry But in this Case it appears the Lord was no formal Assignee of the Villains for this warranty must be as to an Assignee for the Estate warranted was but for life and the Lords Estate was only by order of the Law A third Case of this nature is Where the Ancestor granted Lands to a Bastard with warranty but how far the warranty extended as to the Heirs or Heirs and Assigns of the Bastard appears not in the Case the Bastard died without Issue and consequently without Heir the L. by Escheat entred upon whom the Heir entred the warranty of his Ancestor having not attach'd him before the Bastards death for it seems this was in a Case where the Heir might have entred in his Ancestors life time so avoided his warranty as in the former case of the L. of a Villain by the Book the warranty having not attach'd him during the Bastards life the Lord by Escheat could have no benefit of it but if it had attach'd him he might ut videtur In this Case if the warranty were to the Bastard and his Heirs only it determined he dying without Issue and then there could be no Rebutter or Voucher by the Lord by Escheat if the warranty had attach'd the Heir but if it were to him his Heirs and Assigns then the Lord whose title is by the Act and Disposition of the Law and not as Assignee in the per had notwithstanding the benefit of this warranty quod nota These Cases are mentioned in Lincoln Colledge Case and in Spirt and Bences Case in Cr. 1. and in both places admitted for Law Nor seems this very unreasonable That the warranty being an incident to the Estate warranted should accompany it where the Law dispos'd the Estate and Land warranted to all intents 2. In many Cases the Law disposing the Estate if the warranty attended it not the disposition made by the Law were in vain for without the warranty the Estate may be necessarily avoided Such persons who come to the Estate dispositione Legis are not properly in in the post but they modally have the Estate by consent both of the Warranter and Garrantee because they have it by the Act of Law Statute or Common to whose dispose every man is as much consenting and more solemnly than he is to his own private Deed. And after this way if the two last Cases be Law the Cestuy que use having his Estate by operation and appointment of the Statute of Uses of 27 H. 8. may have the benefit of the warranty attending the Estate though he be no formal Assignee or Heir to the Feoffees to use Many other Estates are of this kind as Tenant in Dower if endowed of all the Land warranted An Occupant Tenants by the Statute of 6 R. 2. c. 6. where the Feme consents to the Ravisher Tenant by 4 5 P. M. because the ward consented to her taking away without the Guardians consent Lands warranted which after become forfeited to the King or other Lords c. Quaere in the Cases of 22 Ass p. 37. 29 Ass p. 34. Whether notwithstanding the warranty had descended upon the Heir while the Lands were in the possession of the Villain in the first Case and of the Bastard in the second Case before any entry made by either Lord the Lands could have rebutted or vouched by reason of those warranties being in truth strangers to the warranty and not able to derive it to themselves any way But if after the warranty descended upon the Villain or Bastard the Villain or Bastard had been impleaded by the Heir and had pleaded the warranty against the Heir and had Judgment thereupon by way of Rebutter then the Lords might have pleaded this Judgment as conclusive and making the Villains Title or Bastard good against the Heir and the Heir should never have recover'd against the Lords And this seems the meaning of the Book 22 Ass p. 37. if well consider'd Though in Spirt and Bences Case no such difference is observ'd Caetera desiderantur The Court was in this Case divided viz. The Chief Justice and Justice Archer for the Demandant and Justice Wylde and Justice Atkins for the Tenant CONCERNING PROCESS Out of the COURTS at WESTMINSTER INTO WALES Of late times and how anciently Memorandum These Notes following were all wrote with the proper hand of the Chief Justice Sir John Vaughan and intended to be methodised by him in order to be delivered in Court A Man taken upon a Latitat in England 10 Jac. Bolstrode part 2. f. 54 55. Hall and Rotherams Case puts in two Welch men for his Bayl Judgment passing against him it was a Question Whether after a Capias ad Satisfaciendum issued against the Principal who was not to be found Process might issue into Wales which must be by Scire Facias first against the Bayl whereupon Mann the Secondary of the Kings Bench informed the Court that it had been so done in like Cases many times But the Court was likewise informed that Brownloe Chief Pronotary of the Common Pleas affirmed they did not then use to send such Process into Wales but only Process of Outlawry But Mann affirming that their Course was otherwise in the Kings Bench the Court awarded Process into Wales against the Bayl and said If the parties were grieved they might bring their Writ of Error 1. This Award of the Kings Bench hath no other Foundation to justifie it than Mann 's the Secondaries Information That the like had been often done which was his own doing possibly and never fell under the Consideration of the Court. 2. The Court weighed it no more than to say The parties grieved might have a Writ of Error which by the way must be into the Parliament for it concerned the Jurisdiction of the Court which the Act of 27 Eliz. for Errors in the Exchequer Chamber excepts and upon that ground any injustice might be done because the party wronged may have a Writ of Error 3. Brownloe the Chief Pronotary of the Common Pleas and a most knowing man affirm'd no such Process issued thence into Wales and but only Process of Outlawry So as this awarding of Process into Wales upon the usage of that Court affirmed by Mann is counter'd by the contrary usage of the Common Pleas affirmed by Brownloe Therefore that Book and Authority is of no moment to justifie the issuing of a Scire facias into Wales 11 Jac. Bolstrode part 2. f. 156 157. Bedo v. Piper The next Case
Ne Exeat Regnum de Leproso amovendo de Apostata Capiendo ad quod damnum and Writs to call persons thence as hath been done before they had Burgesses to the Parliament of England And Writs of Error into all Dominions belonging to England lye upon the ultimate Iudgments there given into the Kings Courts of England to reverse Judgments or affirm which is the only Writ which concerns Right and Property between the Subjects that lies The Reasons are First for that without such Writ the Law appointed or permitted to such inferiour Dominion might be insensibly changed within it self without the assent of the Dominion Superiour Secondly Judgments might be then given to the disadvantage or lessening of the Superiority which cannot be reasonable or to make the Superiority to be only of the King not of the Crown of England as King James once would have it in the Case of Ireland ex relatione J. Selden mihi whom King James consulted in this Question The practice hath always been accordingly as is familiarly known by reversal or affirmance of Judgments given in the Kings Bench in Ireland in the Kings Bench here which is enough alone to prove the Law to be so to other subordinate Dominions 21 H. 7. f. 3. And it is as clear That Writs of Error did lye in the Kings Bench to reverse Judgments in Calais and the reason is alike per Curiam for which were divers Presidents This being the state of Wales when it first became an Accession to the Dominion of England under E. 1. and when it was far from the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Justice in England as before it was added to the Dominion of the Crown of England And as other Dominions added to it were 7 H. 4. f. 14. it was questioned only Whether a Protection quia moratur in obsequio nostro in Wallia were good because saith the Book it is within the Realm of England it may be as in the Case of Bastardy the Husband being infra quatuor maria which doubtless was the Isle of Brittain so the Primacy of Bishops in Scotland and Wales was that of England Qu. about this but that gives no Jurisdiction to the Courts There were two ways by which alteration might be wrought The first by Act of Parliament in England making Laws to change either the Laws or Jurisdictions of Wales or both The second by Alterations made in the Laws formerly by him established by E. 1. himself and perhaps by his Successors Kings of England without Parliament by a Clause contained in the Close of that Statute or Ordinance called Statutum Walliae in these words Et ideo vobis Mandamus quod premissa de caetero in omnibus observetis ita tantum quod quotiescunque quandocunque ubicunque nobis placuerit possimus predicta Statuta eorum partes singulas declarare interpretari addere sive diminuere pro nostrae libito voluntatis prout securitati nostrae terrae nostrae predictae viderimus expediri This seems to extend but to the person of E. 1. and not to his Successors and however no such change was made by Him or his Successors But the first remarkable Alteration made seems to have been by Act of Parliament and probably in the time of E. 1. who reigned long after the Statute of Wales but the Act it self is no where extant that I could learn But great Evidence that such there was which in some measure gave a Jurisdiction to the Kings Courts of England in Wales not generally but over the Lordships Marchers there This appears clearly by a Case Fitz. Ass 18 E. 2. pl. 382. not much noted nor cited by any that I know to this purpose being out of the printed Year-Books but printed by Fitz-herbert out of the Reports he had of E. 2. as he had of E. 1. and H. 3. all which we want wholly though some Copies are extant of E. 2. which Case is the only light that I know to clear the Question in hand An Assise of Novel Disseisin was brought against C. de libero tenemento in Gowre and the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Glocester and the Plaint was made of two Commots which is mis-printed Commons and comprehends all govers-Gouers-land now part of the County of Glamorgan by 27 H. 8. but was not so then the Assise past against the Tenant before the Iustice assigned to take Assises in the Marches of Wales The Tenant brought his Writ of Error and Assignes for Error 1. That the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Glocester and the Land put in view was in Wales 2 That the Land was out of the Power and Bayliwick of the Sheriff of Glocester 3 That the Assise ought to be taken in the County where the Land lies and that Goures-land was in no County 4 That the Writ was de libero tenemento in villa sive Hamletto de Gouerse and Gouer was no Village or Hamlet but an entire Country consisting of two Commots To these Errors assigned Scroope then Chief Justice made Answer 1. That Gower is a great Barony in the Marches of Wales and That every Barony of the Marches hath a Chancellor and its own Writs whereby one Tenant wronged by another may be righted But when the Lord is outed of his intire Barony he can have no remedy by his own Writ for he is outed of all his Jurisdiction And it is repugnant to demand Iustice of him whose Iurisdiction is questioned that is to give it ut mihi videtur That therefore it was ordained by Parliament when the Baron or Marcher is outed of his Barony in the Marches of Wales he ought to go to the King for Remedy and have a Writ in the Kings Chancery directed to the Sheriff of the next English County and the Sheriff of Glocester served the Writ as being the next English Sheriff This being the most material the other Errors were also answered and the Judgment was affirmed From this Case we may learn and from no other as I believe at least with so much clearness That the Summons of Inhabitants in Wales and the tryal of an Issue there arising should be by the Sheriff of and in the next adjoyning English County was first ordained by Parliament though the Act be not extant now nor is it conceived how it should be otherwise it being an empty Opinion that it was by the Common Law as is touched in several Books who knew the practice but were strangers to the reasons of it For if the Law had been that an Issue arising out of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of England should be tryed in that County of England next to the place where the Issue did arise not only any Issue arising in any the Dominions of England out of the Realm might be tryed in England by that rule but any Issue arising in any Forreign parts as France Holland Scotland or elsewhere that were not of the Dominions of England might pari
ratione be tryed in the County next adjoyning whereof there is no Vestigium for the one or the other nor sorts it any way with the rule of the Law 2. This Ordinance of Parliament extended not to all Wales but only to the Lordships Marchers there nor any way comprehended the ancient Shires of Wales or Body of the Principality to which the Ordinance of the Statute of Rutland only extended For Lordships Marchers were out of the Shires as appears by Statute 27 H. 8. 3. It appears by the Case that Gower was not within any County at that time Another Case to the same purpose is in Fitz herbert Fitz. Jurisdiction 13 E. 3. pl. 23. Title Jurisdiction and not in any other Reports 13 E. 3. in a Writ of Cosenage the Demand was of Castle of K. and Commot of J. the Defendant pleaded the Castle and Commot were in Wales where the King 's Writ runs not and it was said that the word was not intelligible in the Courts of England and Judgment was prayed if the Court would take Conizance To give the Court Jurisdiction it was urged pressingly 1. That they had given the Court Jurisdiction by alledging the Court knew not what was meant by Commot which the Court was to determine whether it did or not Therefore Jurisdiction was admitted therein 2. Parning pressed they had demanded the view which gave the Court Jurisdiction 3. For that the Original was directed to the Sheriff of Hereford who by his Retorn had testified the Summons and the Tenant had appeared and so affirmed the Summons 4. For that the view was had Notwithstanding all which to give the Court Jurisdiction it was said to Parning He must say more before the Court would have Jurisdiction Which evidently proves that the Court had no Jurisdiction generally of Land in Wales as I observed from the former Case And no act of the party gives Jurisdiction to the Court by elapsing his time to plead to the Jurisdiction if it appear by the Record the Court hath no Jurisdiction as in this Case it did Then Woodstock said Though the Castle and Commot were in Wales the Court ought not to be outed of Jurisdiction for by Commot a great Signiory was demanded consisting of Lands Rents and Services and that the Castle and Commot were held in Capite of the King as of his Crown and said those so held were to be impleaded here and not elsewhere 7 H. 6. f. 36. b. so is 7 H. 6. f. 36. b. And said the King by his Charter had granted the Castle and Commot to the Tenant in tayl and thereupon pray'd aid of the King and it was granted hereupon But before this was shew'd and that it was a great Signiory and held of the King in Capite by which it was no part of the Principality nor held under it the Court would own no Jurisdiction but when that appeared the Case was the same with the former in 18 E. 2. and the Defendant had no remedy but in the Kings Courts This Case was cited by Sir Edward Coke in the Case before cited 11 Jacobi concerning the Sheriff of Radnor but the difference not observ'd of its being a Lordship in Wales held immediately of the King in Capite nor that the Court owned no Jurisdictions generally concerning Lands in Wales by the Summons and view of the next adjoyning Sheriff William de Cosington and Elizabeth his Wife brought a Writ of Dower of the third part of the Land in Gower against the Earl of Warwick as Tenant and the Writ was Quod reddat ei rationabilem dotem de libero tenemento quod fuit Jo. Moubray quondam viri sui in terra de Gowre in Wallia It appears not in the Case to what Sheriff the Writ was directed though this Case be in the Book at large but it appears that those of the Chancery and the Judges of the Kings Bench had been consulted with concerning the Writ in bringing it for Dower in terra de Gower in Wallia therefore it must issue from the High Court of Chancery and must be directed consequently to the Sheriff of Glocester as the Assise was in 18 E. 2. Br. abridging this Case saith The Action was against the Earl of Warwick as being Lord of the intire Signiory of Gower and then he was to be impleaded by Writ out of the Chancery here equally and upon the same reason for a third part of the Signiory as for the whole according to the Case of 18 E. 2. first cited for the Lord could no more make a Precipe to summon himself to his own Minister or to make Execution against himself for a third part of the Royalty than for the whole And therefore the Ordinance of Parliament then mentioned equally extended to this Case as to that of 18 E. 2. This is not strange that Acts of Parliament are lost sometimes Note the Act of 3 E. 1. by which old Customes were granted not extant but clear proofs of it remain These three last Cases therefore wherein the Tenants were impleaded in the Courts here for Land in Wales and Summons and Execution made by the Sheriff of the next adjoyning County are well warranted by an Act of Parliament not extant being for either the Lordships Marchers themselves or some part of them and against the Lord himself as that Case of 18 E. 2. expresly resolves All these were real Actions The first an Assise of Novel Disseisin the second a Writ of Cosenage the third a Writ of Dower The like Case is cited 19 H. 6. 19 H. 6. f. 12. A. That when the Mannor of Abergavenny was demanded the Writ was directed to the Sheriff of Hereford as Newton urged for this was a Lordship Marcher and held of the King in Capite as appears by Moore 's Reports in Cornwals Case in that the Barony of Abergavenny was held by the Lord Hastings of the King in Capite to defend it at his charge ad utilitatem Domini Regis Exactly agreeing with this Doctrine is the Book of 21 H. 7. f. 33. b. if a Signiory in Wales be to be tryed 21 H. 7. f. 33. B. it shall be tryed here by the Course of the Common Law but if Lands be held of a Signiory in Wales it shall be tryed within the Mannor and not elsewhere As for that expression by the Course of the Common Law 19 H. 6. f. 12. A. it is also in the Book 19 H. 6. that Deeds and all other things alledged in Wales shall be tryed in the adjoyning Countries at the Common Law otherwise there would be a failer of Right And of this opinion seemed most of the Iustices arguendo obiter the Case before them not concerning Wales but the County Palatine of Lancaster Of Churches in Wales a Quare Impedit shall be brought in England yet the Land and other things in Wales 30 H. 6. f. 6. B. shall be determined before the Stewards of
recovered in Damages 101 Debt 1. Debts by simple contracts were the first Debts that ever were and are more noble than Actions on the Case upon which only damages are recoverable 101 2. Actions in the debet detinet are actions of property which is not in an action on the Case ibid. 3. Actions upon Bond or Deed made in Wales Ireland Normandy c. where to be tryed 413 4. Wheresoever the Debt grew due yet the Debtor is indebted to the Creditor in any place where he is as long as the Debt is unsatisfied 92 5. It lies not for a Solicitor for his soliciting Fees but for an Attorney it well lies and there shall be no ley Gager in it 99 Declaration See Pleading 1. The Plaintiff must recover by his own strength and not by the Defendants weakness 8 58 60 2. When the Plaintiff makes it appear to the Court that the Defendants Title is not good yet if the Plaintiff do not make out a good Title for himself he shall never have Judgment 60 3. The form of a Declaration in London according to their custome 93 4. The King may vary his Declaration but it must be done the first Term 65 5. In a Quare Impedit the Plaintiff must in his Declaration alledge a presentation in himself or those from whom he claims 7 57 Demand See Request 1. A Demand of Rent is not requisite upon a Limitation because Non-payment avoids it 32 2. But where there is a condition there must be a demand before entry ibid. 3. Where there are several Rents the demands must be several 72 4. If more Rent is demanded than is payable the demand is void ibid. Devastavit See Executors  Devise Devisor Devisee 1. The Law doth not in Conveyances of Estates admit Estates to pass by Implication regularly but in Devises they are allowed with due restrictions 261 262 c. 2. If an Estate given by Implication in a Will be to the disinheriting of the Heir at Law it is not good if such Implication be only constructive and possible but not a necessary Implication 262 263 267 268 3. The necessary Implication is that the Devisee must have the thing Devised or none else can have it 262 263 4. A. deviseth his Goods to his wife and after her decease his Son and Heir shall have the House where they are this is a good Devise of the House to the wife by Implication because the Heir at Law is excluded by it and then no person can claim it but the wife by Implication of the Devise 263 264. 5. A. having issue Thomas and Mary devises to Thomas and his Heirs for ever and for want of Heirs of Thomas to Mary and her Heirs This is an Estate tayl in Thomas 269 270 6. My will is if it happen my Son George Mary and Katherine my Daughters to dye without issue of their bodies lawfully begotten then all the Freehold Lands I am now seized of shall remain and be to my Nephew A. B. The construction and meaning of these words quid operatur by them 260 261 262 263 264 c. 7. If Land is devised to H. and his heirs as long as B. hath heirs of his body the remainder over such latter Devise will be good not as a Remainder but as an Executory Devise 270 8. My son shall have my Land to him and his heirs so long as any heirs of the body of A. shall be living and for want of such heirs I devise it to B. here B. shall take by future and Executory Devise 270 9. A Devise to the son and heir in Fee being no other than what the Law gave him is void 271 10. A Devise that if the son and heir pay not all the Legacies then the Land shall go to the Legatories upon default of payment this shall vest in the Legatories by Executory Devise 271 11. A. had issue W. T. and R. and devises to T. and his heirs for ever and if T. died without issue living W. that then R. should have the Land this is a good Fee in T. and R had a good Estate in possibility by Executory Devise upon the dying of T. without issue 272 12. An Executory Devise cannot be upon an Estate tayl 273 13. I bequeath my son Thomas to my Brother R to be his Tutor during his minority here the Land follows the custody and the Trust is not assignable over to any person 178 179 c. 14. A Devise of the Land during the minority of the Son and for his maintenance and education until he come of age is no devising of the Guardianship 184 Discent 1. Children inherit their Ancestors Estates without limit in the right ascending Line and are not inherited by them 244 2. In the collateral Lines of Uncle and Nephew the Uncle as well inherits the Nephew as the Nephew the Uncle 244 3. In the case of Aliens nothing interrupts the common course of Discents but Defectus Nationis 268 Disclaimer 1. In a Quare Impedit upon the Bishops Disclaimer there is a Judgment with a Cessat Executio quousque c. Dismes See Tythes  Disseisor 1. A Disseisor Tenant in possession may Rebut the Demandant without shewing how he came to the possession which he then hath but he must shew how the warranty extended to him 385 386 Dispensation See Title Statutes 14. 1. The Pope could formerly and the Arch-bishop now can dispense for a plurality 20 23 2. How many Benefices a Bishop may retain by Dispensation 25 3. A Dispensation for years and good 24 4. A Dispensation after the Consecration of a Bishop comes too late to prevent the Voidance 20 5. If a man hath a Benefice with cure and accepts another without a Dispensation or Qualification the first becomes void and the Patron may present 131 132 6. No Dispensation can be had for marrying within the Levitical Degrees 214 216 239 7. A Dispensation obtained doth jus dare and makes the thing prohibited lawful to be done by him who hath it 333 336 8. Freedom from punishment is a consequent of a Dispensation but not its effect 333 9. What penal Laws the King may dispense with and what not 334 335 336 c. 10. Where the Suit is only the Kings for the breach of a penal Law and which is not to the damage of a third person the King may dispense 334 336 339 340 11. Where the Offence wrongs none but the King he may dispense with it 344 12. Where the Suit is the Kings only for the benefit of a third person there he cannot dispense 334 336 339 340 13. Offences not to be dispensed with 342 14. A Dispensation to make lawful the taking from a man any thing which he may lawfully defend from being taken or lawfully punish it if it is taken must be void 341 15. Dispensations void against Acts of Parliament for maintaining Native Artificers 344 16. Where the exercise of a Trade is generally prohibited
Heirs is expresly forbidden by the Statute de Donis 374 Right See Title Action 1. Where there can be presumed to be no remedy there is no right 38 Seisin 1. THe profits of all and every part of the Land are the Esplees of the Land and prove the Seisin of the whole Land 255 2. In an Entry sur Disseisin or other Action where Esplees are to be alledged the profits of a Mine will not serve 254 Spoliation 1. The Writ of Spoliation lyes for one Incumbent against the other where the Patrons right comes in question 24 Statute See Recognizance 1. A Recognizance taken before the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in the nature of a Statute Staple 102 Statutes in general 1. Where an Act of Parliament is dubious long usage is a just medium to expound it by and the meaning of things spoken and written must be as hath been constantly received by common acceptation 169 2. But where usage is against the obvious meaning of an Act by the vulgar and common acceptation of words then it is rather an oppression then exposition of the Act 170 3. When an Act of Parliament alters the Common Law the meaning shall not be strained beyond the words except in cases of publick utility when the end of the Act appears to be larger than the words themselves 179 4. Secular Judges are most conizant in Acts of Parliament 213 5. When the words of a Statute extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening but doth to those which often happen it is good reason not to strain the words further than they will reach by saying it is casus omissus and that the Law intended quae frequentius accidunt 373 6. But where the words of a Law do extend to an inconvenience seldom happening there it shall extend to it as well as if it happens more frequently 373 7. An Act of Parliament which generally prohibits a thing upon a penalty which is popular or only given to the King may be inconvenient to diverse particular persons in respect of person place time c. For this cause the Law hath given power to the King to dispense with particular persons 347 8. Whatsoever is declared by an Act of Parliament to be against Law we must admit it so for by a Law viz. by Act of Parliament it is so declared 327 9. Where the Kings Grant is void in its creation a saving of that Grant in an Act of Parliament shall not aid it 332 10. How an Act of Parliament may be proved there hath been such an Act where the Roll is lost 162 163 404 405 407 11. An Act of Parliament in Ireland cannot effect a thing which could not be done without an Act of Parliament in England 289 12. Distinct Kingdoms cannot be united but by mutual Acts of Parliament 300 13. A repealed Act of Parliament is of no more effect than if it had never been made 325 Statutes 1. Merton cap. 4. The Statute of Merton which gave the owner of the Soyl power to approve Common did not consider whether the Lord was equally bound to pasture with his Tenants or not but it considered that the Lord should approve his own Ground so as the Commoners had sufficient 256 257 2. The inconveniences before the making of the Statute and the several remedies that were provided by it 257 1. Westm 1. 3 E. 1. The Antiquae Custumae upon Woolls Woolfells and Leather were granted to E. 1. by Parliament and therefore they are not by the Common Law 162 163 1. Westm 1. cap. 38. Attaints in Pleas real were granted by this Statute 146 1. Westm 2. cap. 24. The Quare Ejecit infra terminum is given by this Statute for the recovery of the Term against the Feoffee for an Ejectment lay not against him he coming to the Land by Feoffment 127 Statute of Glocester 1. Restrained warranties from binding as at Common Law 366 377 2. Before this Statute all Warranties which descended to the Heirs of the Warrantors were barrs to them except they were Warranties which commenced by Disseisin 366 3. The reason why the warranty of Tenant in Tayl with assets binds the right of the Estate Tayl is in no respect from the Statute de Donis but by the equity of the Statute of Glocester by which the Warranty of the Tenant per Curtesie barrs not the Heir for his Mothers Land if his Father leaves not assets to descend 365 4. If this Statute had not been made the lineal Warranty of Tenant in Tayl had no more bound the right of the Estate Tayl by the Statute de Donis with assets descending than it doth without assets ibid. Westm 2. De Donis 1. All Issues in Tayl within this Statute are to claim by the Writ purposely formed there for them which is a Formedon in the Descender 369 2. it intended not to restrain the alienation of any Estates but such as were Fee-simples at the Common Law 370 3. This Statute intended not to preserve the Estate for the Issue or the Reversion for the Donor absolutely against all Warranties but against the alienation with or without Warranty of the Donee and Tenant in Tayl only 369 4. Therefore if Tenant for life alien with Warranty which descended upon the Reversioner that was not restrained by the Statute but left at the Common Law 370 5. By this Statute the Warranty of Tenant in Tayl will not barr the Donor or his Heir of the Reversion ibid. 6. The Donee in Tayl is hereby expresly restrained from all power of alienation whereby the Lands entayled may not revert to the Donor for want of issue in Tayl 371 7. See a further Exposition upon this Statute from fol. 371 to 393 1. Wales Statute de Rutland 12 E. 1. after the Conquest of it by Edward the First was annext to England Jure proprietatis and received Laws from England as Ireland did Vide postea 9 17 18. and had a Chancery of their own and was not bound by the Law of England until 27 H. 8. 300 301 399 400 2. Although Wales became of the Dominion of England from that time yet the Courts of England had nothing to do with the Administration of Justice there in other manner than now they have with the Barbadoes Jersey c. all which are of the Dominions of England and may be bound by Laws made respectively for them by an English Parliament 400 See for a further Exposition 401 402 c. Acton Burnell 13 E. 1. 1. Recognizances for Debt were taken before this Statute by the Chancellor two Chief Justices and Justices Itinerants neither are they hindred by this Statute from taking them as they did before 102 28 E. 3. c. 2. concerning Wales 1. Tryals and Writs in England for Lands in Wales were only for Lordships Marchers and not for Lands within the Principality of Wales Vide ante 7. pòstea 17 18. for the Lordships and Marchers were of the Dominion of England and held of
presentation makes no Usurpation when the Kings Presentation gains a Title by Usurpation 14 2. If a man in time of Vacancy present his Clerk who is admitted instituted and inducted he gains a good Title to present by Usurpation when the Church becomes next void 10 11 12 15 57 Wager of Law 1. A Man can never wage his Law for a Demand which is uncertain because he cannot swear he paid that which consisted of Damages only 101 2. Debt lies against an Executor for Attorneys Fees because there the Testator could not wage his Law 99 Wales See Title Statute 7 9 15. 1. Wales after the Conquest of it by Edward the First was annexed to England Jure Proprietatis 300 2. It received Laws from England as Ireland did and differs nothing from it but only in Irelands having a Parliament 300 301 3. Wales before the Conquest of it by England was governed by its own Laws 399 4. When Wales came to be of the Dominion of the Crown of England and what Laws they were then obliged to 399 400 402 415 5. Process in Wales differs from Process in England 400 412 6. That the Summons of Inhabitants in Wales and the Tryal of an Issue arising there should be by the Sheriff of the next adjoyning County was first ordained by Parliament and not at the Common Law 404 408 412 7. This Ordinance extended not to all Wales but only to the Lordships Marchers there neither did it extend to the Body of the Principal ty of Wales to which the Statute of Rutland only extended 405 408 411 412 8. Where the Land is part of the Principality of Wales it was subject to the Laws of Wales but when it is held of the King then there was no remedy but in the Kings Courts 405 406 408 9. If a Signiory in Wales was to be tryed it should be tryed by the Common Law but if Lands were held of the Signiory it should be tryed within the Mannor 407 10. All Quare Impedits for disturbance to Churches in Wales within the Lordships Marchers only were tryable in England and not in Wales 409 410 11. The Bishops of Wales were originally of the Foundation of the Prince of Wales 411 12. By the 26 H. 8. Power is given to Indict Outlaw and Proceed against Traytors and Felons c. within the Lordships Marchers of Wales and to be indicted in the adjoyning County but not against Offenders within the Principality 413 13. What alterations have since been made by the 27 H. 8. and 1 E. 6. cap. 10. 414 415 416 c. 14. The uniting and incorporating of Wales to England doth not thereby make the Laws used in England extend to Wales without more express words 415 15. Since the Act of 27 Hen. 8. the Courts at Westminster have less Jurisdiction in Wales than they had for as they before had Jurisdiction in all the Lordships Marchers they now have only in these four Counties therein particularly mentioned but none over the rest 417 16. No Fieri Facias Capias ad satisfaciendum or other Judicial Process did run into Wales but only an Outlawry and an Extent had gone 397 412 414 17. A Judgment given in Wales shall not be executed in England 398 18. The Lordships Marchers did lye betwixt the Shires of England and the Shires of Wales 415 19. To what Counties and Places the Lordships Marchers in Wales are now annext by the 27 H. 8. 415 Warrantia Chartae 1. No man shall have a Warrantia Chartae who is not privy to the Estate that is who hath not the same Estate as well as the Land to which the warranty was annexed 384 Warranty See Title Statutes 5 6. 1. Dedi Concessi is a warranty in Law 126 2. Where there is a warranty in Law and an express warranty it is at the election of the party to take advantage of either 126 127 3. At the Common Law the distinction of a lineal and collateral warranty was useless and unknown and as to any effect of Law there was no difference between a lineal and collateral warranty but the warranty of the Ancestor descending upon the Heir be it the one or the other did equally bind 366 4. The warranty of Tenant Tayl descending upon the Donor or his Heirs is no barr in a Formedon in Reverter brought by them although it be a collateral warranty 364 365 368 5. The warranty of Tenant by the Courtesie barrs not the Heir if the Father leave not Assets to descend in Recompence 365 6. The lineal warranty of Tenant in Tayl shall not bind the right of the Estate Tayl by the Statute de Donis neither with or without Assets descending 365 366 7. The Statute de Donis restrains not the warranty of Tenant in Tayl from barring him in the Remainder in Tayl by his warranty descending upon him 367 As to him in Remainder in Tayl the warranty of the Donee is collateral and binds as at the Common Law 367 377 379 381 8. No Issue in Tayl is defended from the warranty of the Donee or Tenant in Tayl but such as are inheritable to the Estates intended within that Statute and no Estates are so intended but such only as had been Fee-simples conditional 369 9. The Statute de Donis preserves the Estate Tayl for the Issue or the Reversion for the Donor against the alienations of the Donee or Tenant in Tayl with or without warranty but not absolutely against all warranties that might barr them for it hath not restrained the collateral warranty of any other Ancestor 369 370 377 379 381 10. An alienation with warranty which shall hinder the Land from reverting to the Donor or his Heirs is expresly forbidden by the Statute de Donis 374 11. No mans warranty doth bind directly à priori because it is lineal or collateral for no Statute restrains any warranty under those terms from binding nor no Law institutes any warranty in those terms but those are restraints by consequent only from the restraints of warranties made by Statute 375 12 The Statute de Donis makes no difference between a Donor stranger and a Donor privy in blood to the Donee but the warranties are the same in both Cases 378 13. The Tenant in possession may Rebutt the Demandant without shewing how he came to the possession which he then hath when impleaded be it by disseisin or any other tortious way but he must shew how the warranty extended to him 385 386 14. If a man will be warranted by a Rebutter he must make it appear how the warranty extends to him but he need not have the like estate in the Land upon a Rebutter as upon a Voucher 385 15. The Tenant in possession shall not rebut the Demandant by the warranty without he first make it appear that the warranty did extend to him as Heir or Assignee 385 386 387 388 16. Where a man is once entituled to the warranty whatsoever Estate he had when