the Defendant wage his Law the Oath of the Eleven which are Sworn de credulitate may be dispensed with by the Plaintiffs assent Vid. Mag. Charta c. 28. Note It was Adjudged in the King's Bench 19 Car. II. That if a Prisoner escape by the permission of the Sheriff yet he may be taken by the party at whose Suit he was condemned for it may be the Sheriff is Insufficient and it is no reason that his own Act should damnifie the Plaintiff Vide Hob. 202. Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 20 21 Car. II. In Banco Regis Barnes versus Bruddel ACtion for these Words alledged to be spoken of the Plaintiff viz. She was with Child by J. S. whereof she Miscarried and concludes That by reason thereof she was so brought into her Fathers displeasure that he turned her out of Doors and that she was brought within the Penalty of the Statute of 18 Eliz. And in Maintenance of this Action a Case was cited out of Roll's 1st Part 35. inter Meadows Boyneham an Action was brought for calling of one Whore Per quod consortium amisit Vicin ' suorum and held it would lye And in Anne Davie's Case 4 Co. 17. it is held That since the Statute of the 18 Eliz. cap. 3. to say One had a Bastard would bear an Action But notwithstanding the Opinion of the Court was That such an Action would not lye unless a special Damage had been alledged as to say She had lost her Marriage as in Anne Davies's Case and the Reason upon the Statute alledged in the Case was said by Twisden to be of my Lord Coke's putting in for Iustice Jones affirmed to him there was nothing said thereof in the Case Anonymus IF a Tradesman contract Debts and after gives over Trading he may be afterwards a Bankrupt within the Statute in respect of the Debts contracted before And so it was said to be Ruled in Sir Job Harvies Case Anonymus A Warren may pay Tythes by Custom So of Doves in a Dove-house or Fish in a River Note It was said by Twisden That if a Libel be in the Ecclesiastical Court for a thing whereof they have cognisance altho' the party intitles himself to it by Custom no Prohibition lies Anonymus A Prohibition was prayed for that they Cited him to answer Articles in the Ecclesiastical Court and did not deliver a Copy of the Articles and it was granted quousque they should deliver the Copy But the Prohibition which was taken out was absolute which the Court being informed of they did not think fit to grant a Consultation but to discharge that Prohibition by a Supersedeas Whereupon they proceeded and Excommunicated the party for default of Answering Who again moved the Court for a Prohibition and one was granted with a Mandamus in it to absolve him if it were for not Answering before they gave him a Copy of the Articles Bains Biggersdale ERror to Reverse a Judgment in an Action of Debt upon a Bond in Rippon Court because it was entred upon the Record Assid ' damna ultra misas custagia ad 10 l and doth not say Occasione detentionis debiti or Occasione praedicta and the Iudgment was Quod recuperet damna praedicta and doth not say Per Juratores assessa Yet notwithstanding the Judgment was affirmed Billingham Vavasor ERror to Reverse a Judgment in Debt in the Court of York Assigned First In the Variance between the Count and Plaint for the Plaint was Entred Ad hanc Curiam venit queritur de Placito deb ' super demand ' 14 l and the Count was for 12 l but it was Answered That the certainty of the Sum needed not to be expressed in the Plaint and so Surplusage But otherwise it is of a Variance between the Original and the Count for the Writ must comprehend the certainty of the Debt and 2 Cro. 311. was cited where Debt was brought in the Common Bench for 40 s and after the Return of the Pluries Capias the Entry was Quod Querens obtulit se in plito deb ' 40 l and assigned for Error and disallowed But to that it was said That that was but a Misprision in the Entry of a Continuance which had a former Record to warrant it And here tho' the certainty of the Sum need not to have been expressed Vid. 3 Cro. 619. yet when it is the Plaint must not vary from it Et adjornatur Bourne versus Mason al' IN an Assumpsit the Plaintiff declares That whereas one Parrie was indebted to the Plaintiff and Defendants in two several Sums of Mony and that a Stranger was indebted in another Sum to Parrie that there being a Communication between them the Defendants in Consideration that Parrie would permit them to sue in his Name the Stranger for the Sum due to him they promised they would pay the Sum which Parrie owed to the Plaintiff and alledged that Parrie permitted them to Sue and that they Recovered After Non assumpsit pleaded and a Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Judgment That the Plaintiff could not bring this Action for he was a Stranger to the Consideration But in maintenance thereof a Judgment was cited in 1658. between Sprat and Agar Vid. 3 Cro. 619. in the Kings-Bench where one promised to the Father in Consideration that he would give his Daughter in Marriage with his Son he would settle so much Land After the Marriage the Son brought the Action and it was Adjudged maintainable And another Case was cited of a Promise to a Physician That if he did such a Cure he would give such a Sum of Mony to himself and another to his Daughter and it was Resolved the Daughter might bring an Assumpsit Which Cases the Court Agreed For in the one Case the parties that brought the Assumpsit did the Meritorious act tho' the Promise was made to another and in the other Case the nearness of the relation gives the Daughter the benefit of the consideration performed by her Father but here the Plaintiff did nothing of trouble to himself or benefit to the Defendant but is a mere Stranger to the Consideration wherefore it was adjudged quod nihil capiat per billam Herbert versus Merit A Prohibition was prayed to the Ecclesiastical Court for that the Defendant Libelled against the Plaintiff there for calling of her Impudent Whore which was said to be only a word of Passion and the later Opinions have been that unless some Act of Fornication were expressed that Prohibitions should be granted But the Court denied it in this case it being an offence of a Spiritual Cognizance and Eaton and Ailoffes Case 1 Cro. 78. and Pewes Case 329 were cited The Sheriff may Sell Goods he takes in Execution by a Fieri facias at any Rates if the Defendant denies to pay the Money Nota No Action of Debt lies against the Sheriff when the Party escapes who is taken upon a
Defendant pleaded that the place Where was the Freehold of Sir Thomas Hooke and that by his Command he entred The Plaintiff traverseth That it was the Freehold of Sir T.H. And thereupon this Special Verdict was found That Nicholas Heale was seised in Fee and that 16 Dec. 1640. he made a Deed to Jane Heale Enrolled within six Months by which the said Nicholas did for and in Consideration of Natural Love augmentation of her Portion and preferment of her in Marriage and other good and valuable Considerations give grant bargain sell alien enfeoff and confirm unto the said Jane Heale and her Heirs Then they found there was a Covenant that the said Jane Heale should after due Execution c. quietly enjoy c. and also a special Clause of Warranty And that the Deed was Enrolled within six Months and that there was no other Consideration of making the Indenture than what was expressed And if it were sufficient to convey the Premisses to the said Jane they found for the Plaintiff if not for the Defendant And it was Argued by Winnington for the Plaintiff He agreed that it could not take the effect as a Bargain and Sale because no Money was paid but Argued that the Deed should enure as a Covenant to stand seized It is a Ground in the Law that the intention of the parties ought to guide the raising of Uses and the Construction how they shall enure Co. Lit. 49. Rolls 2d part 789. and to give the effect the words shall be disposed to other Construction than what otherwise they would import As if a man demises grants and to Farm-lets certain Lands in Consideration of Money and the Deed is Enrolled this is a good Bargain and Sale So if a man Covenants in Consideration of Money to stand seised to the use of his Son 8 Co. 93. Foxes Case 2 Rolls 789. it is said Nota per Cur ' if it appears that it was the Intent of him that made the Deed to pass the Estate according to Rules of Law it shall pass though there be not formal Words Again the Consideration expressed in this Deed is purely applicable to a Covenant to stand seised and a Deed shall enure upon the Consideration expressed rather than upon one that is implied As in Bedell's Case 7 Co. 40. If the Father in Consideration of 100 l paid Covenants to stand seised to the use of his Son and the Deed is not Enrolled nothing shall pass But where there are two Considerations expressed there the Vse may arise upon either As if the Father in Consideration of Blood and 100 l paid by the Son Covenants to stand seised c. and the Deed is not Enrolled yet the Vse shall arise as upon a Covenant to stand seised Pl. Com. 305. And so it was Adjudged between Watson and Dicks in the Common Pleas 1656. The Father by Deed in Consideration of Love and 100 l paid by the Son conveyed Land to him with a Letter of Attorney in the Deed to make Livery in that case the Son hath his election to take by the Enrolment or Livery which shall be first Executed 2 Rolls 787. pl. 25. But it hath been Objected here that there is a Clause of Warranty in the Deed which shews that the parties intended a Conveyance at the Common Law for if it enure by way of Covenant to stand seised the Warranty can have no effect but to Rebut Also there is a Covenant for quiet Enjoyment after Sealing and Delivery of the Deed and due Execution of the same which shews the parties had a prospect of Executing it by Livery c. To which he Answered That such remote Implications as those shall never make a Deed void against an express Consideration upon the which an Use may arise 'T is true if there had been a Letter of Attorney in the Deed it might have been void unless Livery had followed As if the Father by Deed grants Land to the Son and a Letter of Attorney in it to make Livery if none be made nothing passes Co. Lit. 49. a. The Authorities which have been cited on the other side are first Pitfields and Pierce's Case 2 Roll. 789. where the Father by Deed Poll in Consideration of Blood did give grant c. as in our Case to his Son Habend ' after his decease and a Proviso in it That the Son should pay a Rent during the Father's Life It was Adjudged That the Lands should not pass in that Case by way of Covenant to stand seised But in that Case the Conveyance was repugnant to the Rules of Law for that it was Habend ' the Land after the death of the Grantor and also repugnant in it self For notwithstanding that it reserves the Land to the Father during his Life yet it provides for a payment of Rent to him wherefore the Law would not help out a Deed so contradictory and repugnant by way of raising an Vse The other Case relied upon is between Foster and Foster Hill 13. of this King in this Court in Ejectment The Case was The Mother for divers good Considerations and 20 l paid did by a Deed which was Entituled Articles of Agreement demise grant bargain sell assign and set over to the Son and his Heirs for ever certain Lands the said Margery the Mother quietly enjoying the Premisses during her Life The Court Resolved that it should not amount to a Covenant to stand seised for they were but intended as Articles of Agreement and preparatory for a further Conveyance So the Case differs very much from ours as also that it reserves the Land to the Mother during her Life The Case also of Osborn and Bradshaw in 2 Cro. 127. hath been cited Where the Father in Consideration of Love which he hears to his Son and for Natural affection to him bargained and sold gave granted and confirmed Land to him and his Heirs the Deed was Enrolled It was held the Land should not pass unless Money had been paid or the Estate executed This Case cannot be urged as any great Authority for it appears that the Son was in possession Therefore the Court Adjudged that the Deed should be a Confirmation and it being clear that way they had not much occasion to insist upon or debate the other Point And he relied upon Debb and Peplewell's Case as an Authority in the Point 2 Rolls 78. 6. where there was a Clause of Warranty in the Deed and an Enrolment within six Months as in the Case at Bar But they Resolved there If a Letter of Attorney had been in the Deed it should not have been construed a Covenant to stand seised and therefore he prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff Finch Attorney General contra The Lands here cannot pass by Bargain and Sale there being no Money paid which I find is admitted by the other side neither shall it amount to a Covenant to stand seised There are Five things necessary to raise an Use by way of Covenant
should be informed what their course is and has been and therefore let us hear the Civilians as to this point Post The King and Marlow THe Defendant being a Printer was indicted for his second Offence for Printing of a Seditious Book contrary to the Act of 14 Car. 2. cap. 33. and being found Guilty at the Sessions of the Old Baily the Iudgment was given That he should be for ever disabled to exercise the Art or Mistery of Printing and pay 20 l Fine and to stand in the Pillory And a Writ of Error was brought and Errors were assigned in the Judgment as varying from the words of the Act. For First The Act is That he should be disabled to exercise the Art and Mistery of Printing or Founding of Letters And the Judgment is only to disable him from Printing Secondly The Act is That he shall receive such further punishment by Fine Imprisonment or other Corporal Punishment And the Judgment is both for a Fine and Corporal Punishment when it ought not to be for both Curia The first is as it should be for Printing and Founding of Letters are two distinct Trades and the words are to be taken respectively to such Trade as the Defendant is of Again 't is a Rule that a Man shall not Assign an Error in that which is for his advantage But the second was held an Error for that the Act did not intend a Fine and Corporal Punishment both and therefore the Judgment was reversed Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 29 Car. II. In Banco Regis Davis versus Price IN Error upon a Judgment in the Common Bench in an Action of Trover where Iudgment was given by default The Error was assigned in the Declaration which was de decem Juvencis Anglice Bullocks and Heifers and not said how many of one and of the other But it was answered that the Latin word being proper and of known signification the Anglice was void according to Osborns Case 10 Co. But the Court reversed the Judgment and cited the Case before in this Court Trover de viginti ovibus matricibus agnis And it was resolved to be naught for not ascertaining the number of each But Twisden said there was a Trover brought de Viginti averiis ivz. Bobus agnis c. and Viginti was applied to each Species and held well It was offered in this case to distinguish it from the case de Ovibus matricibus agnis that there the Latin was of two sorts Sed non allocatur for the words here being Equivocal it was all one Dutton versus Pool AN Assumpsit the Plaintiff declared That his Wives Father being seized of certain Lands now descended to the Defendant and about to cut a Thousand pounds worth of Timber off from the said Lands to raise a Portion for his said Daughter the Defendant promised to the Father in Consideration that he would forbear to fell the Timber that he would pay the said Daughter 1000 l After Verdict upon Non Assumpsit for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the Father ought to have brought this Action and not the Husband and Wife and there was a case shewn to be adjudged in the Common Bench Hillary 23 and 24 Car. 2. Rot. 1538. between Pine and Norris where the Son promised the Father that in Consideration that he would Surrender a Copyhold to him that he would pay a certain Sum to his Sister for which she brought the Action and then held that it would lie for none but the Father for where the Party to whom the Promise is to be performed is not concerned in the meritorious cause of it he cannot bring the Action But if a Promise were to a Man that if his Daughter should Marry his Son he would give her 1000 l there because the Daughter does the Act which is the Consideration she may bring the Action On the contrary the Case was cited 1 Rolls 32. Starkey and Miln where in Consideration of certain Goods sold the Promise was to pay part of the Money to another there that other might bring the Action And it differs from the case where Money is delivered to A. to pay over to B. B. may bring Debt Yelv. 24. If the Father had in the Case at Bar cut the Trees And the Son had said Let me have the Trees and I will pay the Daughter so much that had been the same with the Case before cited 1 Roll. and it doth not seem to differ as it is 1 Cro. 163. Rookwook Case where the Father being about to charge the Land with a Rent of 4 l per Annum to his Younger Sons the Eldest promised that if he would forbear to charge the Land he would pay the 4 l per Annum and the Sons upon this brought the Assumpsit and recovered Sed vide librum that Promise is said expresly to be made to the Sons who were present Vid. 1 Cro. 619.652 Levett and Haws Case where the Promise was made to a Man in Consideration that he had agreed that his Son should Mary his Daughter and to settle such a Joynture upon her that he would give the Son 200 l with her and for this the Father brought the Action and held well brought tho' the Court seemed to incline that the Son might also have brought it And the Court here inclined for the Plaintiffs Sed Adjornatur Post Saunders versus Williams IN an Action upon the Case the Plaintiff Declared that he was seised in Fee of one Acre and possessed for a certain number of years in another Acre and had a Common in Black-acre for Beasts levant and couchant thereupon and that the Defendant put his Beasts in the place and disturbed him The Defendant pleaded a Title of Common to himself also there Vpon which Issue was joyned and found for the Plaintiff and it was now moved in Arrest of Judgment that the Plaintiff had made no Title to the Common by Prescription or otherwise Sed non allocatur The Defendant being a Wrong-doer And the same Matter was Adjudged in the Court between St. John and Moody St. Mich. 27 Car. 2. quod vide ante and in the 2 Cro. 43.122 3 Cro. 500. Robinson versus Woolly THe Case was this Term Argued again And Holt Argued That the Induction tho' executed by the Archdeacon after the New Bishop was Consecrated was sufficient The Bishop is only to Admit and Institute and to send a Mandate to the Archdeacon to Induct who is to do it de communi Jure and therefore if the Bishop hath Admitted and Instituted and made a Mandate for Induction 't is a sufficient Excuse for him in a Quare impedit 11 H. 4. 9. for the Bishop is meerly a Spiritual Officer A Prebendary is to be Inducted by the Dean and Chapter Pl. Com. 529. But 't is Objected That the Archdeacon does not Induct ex Officio â—ut a Mandate from the Bishop is requisite scilicet First The
cannot tender an Oath to the party sued nisi in causis Matrimonialibus Testamentariis But the Court after hearing divers Arguments denied the Prohibition for they said It was no more than the Chancery did to make Defendants answer upon Oath in such like Cases Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 31 Car. II. In Banco Regis How versus Whitfield ante in ult ' Term. IN Repl the Plaintiff declares of the taking of his Cattle in a Close containing five Acres The Defendant avows and sets forth a Fine to the use of A. in Tail which discended to him Virtute cujus he was seised in Dominico ut de feodo talliato c. The Plaintiff Replies that the Fine was first to the use of J. S. for Life the Remainder to his Executors Administrators and Assigns for 80 years with Power to him and his Assigns to lett the five Acres in Possession or Reversion for 21 years determinable upon three Lives reserving the ancient Rent and that J. S. Devised this Term to J. N. and died his Executors assented and after it came to the Executors of J. N. who assigned it and that the Assignee made a Lease of the said five Acres inter alia reserving proinde the Rent of 6 s per annum and avers that the ancient Rent was 6 s per annum The Avowant Rejoyns setting forth his former Title And the Plaintiff Demurrs It was Objected First That the Plaintiff ought to have traversed the Seisin in Tail alledged by the Avowant seeing in his Replication he sets forth and intitles himself under an Estate inconsistent with it To this it was Answered and the Court agreed that there ought to be no Traverse for the Avowant doth not say it was his Freehold or that he was Seised in Tail but only under a Virtute cujus c. And the Plaintiff in his Replication sets forth a Title consistent with all that the Avowant alledges and so confesses and avoids and all depends upon the execution of the Power And for that Secondly It was Objected That he which made this Lease was not Assignee of J. S. for Executors were not within the Power and consequently not their Assignee This is a Power collateral to the Estate and shall not run with the Land for then Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupcy the Vendee of the Term by the Sheriff upon an Execution c. should execute this Power It is like Covenants annexed to Leases which the Assignee could not take advantage of till 32 H. 8. Again Here appears to be no good Reservation for the Lease is of the five Acres inter al' reserving proinde so that the Rent issues out of other Lands as well as the five Acres and therefore cannot be said to be the ancient Rent reserved upon that The Court were all of Opinion that the Assignee in this case might execute the Power and conceived that Assignees might include Assignees in Law Vid. Mo. 855. as well as Fact but however the Tenant for Life devising this Term the Devisee was an Assignee and the Power in the greatest strictness of acceptation was in him and consequently must go to his Executors and by the same Reason to their Assignee As to the Reserving the Rent proinde the Court said it might be intended that the inter al' might comprehend nothing but such things out of which a Rent could not be reserved and then the six Shillings was reserved only for the five Acres However the proinde might reasonably be referred only to the five Acres and not to the inter al and that a distinct Reservation of Six shillings might be for five Acres And so Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Ante. Steed versus Berrier ERror upon a Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect J.S. made his Will in Writing and devised Lands to his Son J.S. and his Heirs and in the same Will gave a Legacy of 100 l to his Grandson The Son died afterwards in his Life time after whose decease J. S. the Grandfather made a Codicil wherein he gave away part of the Lands devised as aforesaid to a Stranger and afterwards declared by Parol that his Intention was that his Grandson J. S. should have the Lands which his Son J. S. should have had The Question upon this Special Verdict was Whether this were sufficient to carry the Lands to the Grandson And Judgment was given in the Common Pleas by three Judges against one that it was Whereupon a Writ of Error was brought in this Court Finch Solicitor Argued that this Will was sufficient to carry it to the Grandson He agreed Brett and Ridgen's Case in Pl. Com. that a Devise to a man and his Heirs who dies in the Life of the Devisor a new Publication will not be enough to make the Heir take by the Will because named in the Will by way of Limitation of the Estate and not Designation of the Person that should take But in Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. 423. and in Mo. 2. where the Devise was to his Son Richard and the Heirs of his Body which Richard afterwards died in his Life time and then the Devisor said My Will is That the Sons of Richard my Son deceased shall have the Land devised to their Father as they should have had if their Father had lived and died after me There Popham and Fenner held that this new Publication would carry the Land to Richard's Son Gawdy and Clench contra But our Case is much stronger for there Heirs of the Body were used only for Limitation but in the Will here where the words are I Devise to my Son J. with this new Publication the Grandson J. may take because a Grandson is a Son and when a Will is new Published it is all one as if it were wrote at the time of such Publication Beckford and Parncot's Case in the 1 Cro. 493. Mo. 404. Devise of all his Lands and after the Will the Devisor purchaseth other Lands and then publishes it again it will carry the new purchased Lands Dyer 149. Trevanian's Case Cestuy que use before the 27th of H. 8. Devised the Lands a new Publication will pass the Lands executed in him by the Statute The Opinion of the Court inclined to Reverse the Judgment they held it to be the same with Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. that no Parol averment can carry Lands to one person when the words of the Will plainly intended them to another They agreed If a man having no Son but a Grandson deviseth his Lands to his Son the Grandson may take But here is an opposition contained in the new Publication viz. Those Lands which my Son J. should have had my meaning is my Grandson J. shall have And in the Will it self there is a Legacy devised to the Grandson by that Name so where they are so distinguished 't is impossible to take the Grandson to be
upon the Warranty as well as the other tho' the Declaration saith knowing them to be naught yet the knowledge need not to be proved in Evidence Debt upon a Bond and a mutuatus may be joyned in one Action yet there must be several Pleas for Nil debet which is proper to the one will not serve in the Action upon the Bond. Sed Adjornatur Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 34 35 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus A Quo Warranto was brought against divers persons of the City of Worcester why they claimed to be Aldermen c. of the said Corporation The Cause came to be tried at the Bar and a Challenge was made to the Jury in behalf of the Defendants for that the Jury men were not Freeholders The Court said that for Juries within Corporate Towns it hath hath been held that the Statutes that have been made requiring that Jurymen should have so much Freehold do not extend to such places for if so there might be a failer of Justice for want of such Jurymen so qualified but then to maintain the Challenge it was said by the Common Law Jurymen were to be Freeholders But the Court overruled the Challenge but at the importunity of the Counsel they allowed a Bill of Exceptions and so a Verdict passed against the Defendants and afterwards it was moved in Arrest of Judgment upon the Point But the Court would not admit the Matter to be Debated before them tho' divers Presidents of like nature were offered because they said they had declared their Opinions before and the Redress might be upon a Writ of Error Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 35 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus A Motion for a Prohibition to a Suit in the Ecclesiastical Court for a Churchwarden's Rate suggesting that they had pleaded That it was not made with the Consent of the Parishioners and that the Plea was refused The Court said That the Churchwardens if the Parish were Summoned and refused to meet or make a Rate might make one alone for the Repairs of the Church if needful because that if the Repairs were neglected the Churchwardens were to be Cited and not the Parishioners and a Day was given to shew Cause why there should not go to a Prohibition Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 35 Car. II. In Banco Regis Gamage's Case ERror out of the Court of the Grand Sessions where in an Ejectment the Case was upon Special Verdict upon the Will of one Gamage who devised his Lands in A. to his Wife for Life Item his Lands in B. to his Wife for Life and also his Lands which he purchased of C. to his Wife for Life and after the decease of his Wife he gave the said Lands to one of his Sons and his Heirs And the Question was Whether the Son should have all the Lands devised to the Wife or only those last mentioned And it was Adjudged in the Grand Sessions that all should pass And upon Error brought it was Argued that they were Devises to the Wife in distinct and separate Sentences and therefore his said Lands should be referred only to the last On the other side it was said that the word Said should not be referred to the last Antecedent but to all If a man conveys Land to A. for Life Remainder to B. in Tail Remainder to C. in forma praedict ' the Gift to C. is void 1 Inst 20. b. It is agreed if he said All the said Lands to his Son and his heirs it would have extended to the whole This is the same because Indefinitum equipollet universali Et Adjornatur Herring versus Brown IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the Case was Tenant for Life with several Remainders over with a Power of Revocation Levied a Fine and then by a Deed found to be Sealed ten Days after declared the Vses of the Fine which Deed had the Circumstances required by the Power The Question in the Case was Whether the Fine had extinguished the Power It was Argued that it had not because the Deed and Fine shall be but one Conveyance and the use of a Fine or Recovery may be declared by a subsequent Deed in the 9 Co. Downam's Case And a Case was Cited which was in this Court in my Lord Hale's time between Garrett and Wilson where Tenant for Life with Remainders over had a Power of Revocation and by a Deed under his Hand and Seal Covenanted to levy a Fine and declared it should be to certain Vses and afterwards the Fine was Levied accordingly This was held to be a good execution of the Power and limitation of the new Vses and the Deed and Fine taken as one On the other side it was Argued That the Deed was but an Evidence to what Vses the Fine was intended and the Power was absolutely revoked by the Fine Suppose he in Remainder had Entred for the Forfeiture before this Deed should the Defendant have defeated his Right Et Adjornatur Postea Hodson versus Cooke IN an Action upon the Case for commencing of an Action against him in an Inferiour Court where the Cause of Action did arise out of the Jurisdiction After a Verdict for the Plaintiff upon Not Guilty it was moved in Arrest of Judgment That it was not set forth that the Defendant did know that the Place where the Action arose was out of the Jurisdiction which it would be hard to put the Plaintiff to take notice of On the other side it was said that the party ought to have a Recompence for the Inconvenience he is put to by being put to Bail perhaps in a Case where Bail is not required above and such like Disadvantages which are not in a Suit brought here and the Plaintiff ought at his peril to take notice However to help by the Verdict And of that Opinion were Jeffreys Lord Chief Justice Holloway and Walcot but Withens contra The Court said that it could not be assigned for Error in Fact that the Cause arose out of the Jurisdiction because that is contrary to the Allegation of the Record neither is the Officer punishable that executes Process in such Action but an Action lies against the party And so it was said to be resolved in a Case between Cowper and Cowper Pasch 18 Car. 2. in Scac. when my Lord Chief Baron Hale sate there Anonymus AN Indictment of Perjury for Swearing before a Justice of the Peace that J. S. was present at a Conventicle or Meeting for Religious Worship c. It was moved to quash it because it did not appear to be a Conventicle viz. That there was above the number of Five and so the Justice of the Peace had no power to take an Oath concerning it and then it could be no Perjury To which the Lord Chief Justice said That Conventicles were unlawful by the Common Law and the Justices may punish Unlawful Assemblies And he seemed to be of Opinion that a man might be
George because being descended from an Alien the Law takes no notice of them as to this purpose otherwise 't is if the said Nicholas had been a Denizen born and Attainted because in such a case though he could not take himself by Discent he could obstruct the Discent to the younger Brother so the Land would Escheat Thirdly That the Case of George the Son naturalized and the Case of John his Son as in reterence to John the Earl and the Discent from him will be all one if George had survived him John the Earl might have inherited so will John his Son who jure Representationis is the same with his Father Et è Converso These things being unquestionably to be admitted before I come to the Argument of the Case I shall premise certain General Observations First Touching Discents Secondly Touching the Capacities of Incapacities of an Alien Thirdly Touching Naturalizations Touching Discents I shall consider First The Rule whereby they are to be Governed Secondly The various kinds of Discents or hereditary Successions Concerning the Rule of Discents we must not govern our selves therein by the General Notions of Law or Proximity of Nature but by the Principal Laws of the Country where the Question ariseth for the various Countries have variously disposed the manner of Discents even in the same Law or Degree of Proximity For Instance The Father is certainly as near of Kin to the Son as the Son is to the Father and is nearer in Proximity than a Brother and therefore shall be preferred as next of Kin in an Administration 3 Rep. Ratcliffs Case Yet touching the Succession of the Father to the purchase of his Son the Laws of several Countries variously provide First According to the Jews for want of Issue of the Son the Father succeeds excluding the Brother and that hath been the Vse and Construction of the Jewish Doctors upon Number 27. Selden de Successionibus Hebr. Cap. 12. But the Mother was wholly excluded Secondly According to the Greeks the Provision for the Succession of the Father is left doubtful Petit Leges 1 6. fol. 6. According to the Romans or Civil Law by the Construction of the Law of the Twelve Tables the Father succeeds in the purchase of the Son for want of Issue of the Son under the Title of Proximus Agnatus and accordingly was their Vsage tho' my Lord Coke supposed the contrary Co. Lit. 5. But to settle all the Institutes of Justinian Lib. 3. Tit. 3. in an Authentick Collection 8. Tit. de Haered ' ab intestato venientibus the Son dying without Issue his Brothers and Sisters Father and Mother do succeed him in a kind of Coparcenary as well to Lands as Goods According to the Customs of Normandy which in some things have a Cognition with the Laws of England the Son dying without Issue his Brothers are preferred before the Father but the Father is preferred before the Vncles Terrien lib. 6. c. 6. la Customier de Normandie cap. Descheants 5. According to the Laws of England the Son dying without Issue or Brother or Sister the Father cannot succeed but it descends to the Vncle. And it is a Maxim of the English Law An Inheritance cannot Lineally ascend Consequently the Question being in this Case touching a Discent of Lands in England it must be Ruled and Disputed according to the Grounds and Reasons of the Laws of England Secondly Touching the Second the Division of Discents are of two kinds First Lineal as from the Father or Grandfather to the Son or Grandson Secondly Collateral or Transversal as from Brother to Brother Vncle to Nephew or è converso And both these are again of two sorts First Immediate as in Lineals from Father to Son Secondly Mediate as in Lineals from Grandfather to Grandson the Father dying in the Life of the Grandfather when the Father is the medium differens of the Discent Thirdly In Collaterals from the Vncle to the Nephew or from the Nephew to the Vncle where the Father is likewise the medium differens And I call this a Mediate Discent tho' as to many purposes it be Immediate for the Father dying in the Life of the Grandfather the Son succeeds in point of Discent of the Laws immediately to the Grandfather and in a Writ of Entry shall be supposed in the Per to the Grandfather and not in the Per and Cui But I call it a Mediate Discent because the Father is the medium through or by whom the Son derives his Title to the Grandfather Therefore if any man thinks the term of Mediate Discent not properly used he may if he please use the words of Mediate or Immediate Ancestors Words are imposed to signifie Things and therefore the Terms being explained what I mean by them I shall retain the Terms of Mediate or Immediate Discents This distinction of Discents or Relations between Ancestor and Heir and Hereditary Succession will be of use throughout this whole Debate In Immediate Discents there can be no Impediment but what arises in the parties themselves For Instance The Father seised of Lands the Impediment that hinders the Discent must be either in the Father or the Son as if the Father or the Son be Attaint or an Alien In Immediate Discents a Disability of being an Alien or Attaint in him that I call a medius Ancestor will disable a person to take by Discent tho' he himself hath no such Disability For Instance In Lineal Discents If the Father be Attaint or an Alien and hath Issue a Denizen born and dies in the life of the Grandfather the Grandfather dies seised the Son shall not take but the Land shall Escheat In Collateral Discents A. and B. Brothers A. is an Alien or Attainted and hath Issue C. a Denizen born B. purchaseth Lands and dies without Issue C. shall not inherit for A. which was the Medius Ancestor or medium differens of this Discent was incapable Dyer 274. Gray's Case And this is apparent in this very Case for by this means Patrick tho' a Denizen and the Son of an Elder Brother is disabled to inherit the Earl A. and B. Brothers A. is an Alien or person Attainted and hath Issue C. and dies and C. purchaseth Lands and dies without Issue B. his Vncle shall not inherit for the Reason before-going for A. is a Medius which was disabled This is Courtney's Case And if in our Case Patrick the Son of Nicholas altho' a Denizen born had purchased Lands and died without Issue John his Vncle should not have Inherited him by reason of the Disability of Nicholas and yet Nicholas himself had he not been an Alien could not immediately have Inherited to his Son but yet he is a Block in the way to John See the Reason 17 E. 4. cap. 1. But this must be intended of such as are absolute Impediments as Attainder or Alien not Temporary suspensions As in the Lord Delaware's Case in 10 Co. But in any Discents the Impediment of
inherit If the Father a Natural Subject hath Issue a Son an Alien who is Naturalized the Father dies the Son shall inherit Co. Lit. 129. Touching the retrospect of a Naturalization and whether the Son being an Alien Naturalized after the death of the Father shall direct the Discent to the youngest depends upon the words of the Naturalization which being by Act of Parliament may by a strange retrospect direct it But as the Naturalization in the Case in question is Penned it would not do it the Naturalization hath only respect to what shall be hereafter The Clause of taking by Discent after the Commencement of the Session of Parliament is sufficient to check that Retrospect And this brings me to the Consideration of the Naturalization in the Case in question and the Effect thereof which I shall not Argue as a Point because I take the Point of the Case to be single But I shall deliver my Opinion of it by way of Conveyance to the Case Read the Naturalization First In this Naturalization I shall set down what Effect it hath And Secondly What Effect it hath not First What Effect it hath It doth doubtless remove that Inability and Incapacity that is in John the Earl and George in respect of themselves being Aliens and so put them in the Condition as if they had been Born in England But if there be a Consequential Impediment or Incapacity derived upon them by Robert their Fathers being an Alien which might hinder their Successions one to another which at the present I suppose or admit I say if there be any such Consequential Impediment this I take is not removed by this Naturalization My Reasons are briefly these First Because this Act of Naturalization hath a proper Subject upon which it may work and with which it is satisfied viz. the Personal defects of the Parties Naturalized because this Defect arising from the Incapacity of the Father is not in any measure taken notice of by the Act nor so much as mentioned that the Father was an Alien By the whole scope of the Act and every Clause of it and those Relative Terms As if Born in England is only to supply the Personal defect of the Parties Naturalized arising from their Birth out of England and therefore shall never be carried to a Collateral purpose Touching the Objection Tho' this Remedy will not Cure a Disease of another nature as Illegitimation Half-Blood c. yet it Cures all the defects of Foreign Births whether in the Parties themselves or resulting from the Ancestors And the Act might have been so Penned as it might have done it but it is not The Plaister is applied only to defects in the arising from their own Birth not defects arising from the Father or that Consequential disability arising thereby Second Objection But we find in Curteen's Case Placita Coronae 241. that where the Father was Attainted the Restitution in Blood granted by the Act to the Son cures that disability that results from the Fathers Attainder and this not only to the Son but also to the Collateral Heirs of the Father And I have before observed the Corruption of the Blood by Attainder is only of the Blood of the Father for the Son's Blood was not at all Corrupted By this Act of Restitution 1. Notice is taken of the Father's Attainder 2. It doth Intentionally provide against it and it was the only business of that Act to remove it 3. Had it not removed that Corruption of Blood it had been useless for there had been nothing else for it to provide against and so the Restitution had been idle had it not had that Effect But in our Case the Naturalization as it takes no notice of the defect in the Father nor provides against it so it hath another business to satisfie it doth remedy the Foreign Birth of the Son And let us examine the several Clauses in this Act of Naturalization we shall find the whole scope of it was no other than to put them in the same and no better Condition than as if they were Born in England This is the Governing Clause both in the first and last Sentence and hath an influence upon all the Clauses that intervene It hath been endeavoured to break the Context and to make the Clause As if Born in England to be cumulative and superabundant But this were by a Nicety to alter the scope and intent of the Act. If it were omitted yet the first Clause making him but a Natural Born Subject to all intents and purposes surely makes him no more and meddles not with the disability of his Father or the Consequence thereof There hath been some stress laid upon the Clause which enables him to make his resort and Pedigree to Ancestors Lineal or Collateral as if that should Entitle George at least to some more advantage by Naturalization than if he had been Born here But to this I say First That is a General Clause and cannot make a Legal Ancestor Secondly Vpon the same Reason it may make John or George inheritable to Patrick and not adjudge the disability of Nicholas his Father which no man pretends It makes him as much inheritable to Ancestors Lineal as well as Collateral and yet it makes no Ancestors Lineal The Words are General and create no new Ancestor that the Law doth not enable It is true that in the Argument of Godfrey and Dixon's Case especially Mountague laid some stress upon these Ancillary Clauses but the rest rather rested upon the very Matter that the party Naturalized was become thereby a Natural born Subject And thus I have done with the Naturalization which doth not Cure any disability of Transmission Hereditary between the Brothers resulting from the disability of the Father if any such be But it doth cure the Personal disability in John and George and makes them to all intents as Natural Subjects as if they had been born in England So that now the Case made is no more than this An Alien hath Issue two Sons born in England and one purchaseth Lands and dies without Issue whether the other shall inherit For as I have before observed the Case of John the Son of George is all one with the Case of George himself whom he represents as to the Point of the Discent from John the Earl Before I come to the Argument of the Question the Verdict had need be delivered from a Question which possibly would make an end of the Dispute It hath been said that if the Wife of Robert were an English Woman there would be no question but the Land might discend between the Brothers John and George tho' Robert the Father were an Alien and that it shall be so intended because nothing appears to the contrary To this I say It is true that if the Mother were an English Woman the Discent from John to George his Son would be unquestionable For notwithstanding the Incapacity of Robert the Father by being an
Alien they might inherit their Mother and consequently they might inherit one the other It hath been endeavoured to be Answered that it is not possible the Mother could be an English Woman because the Sons are found to be Aliens But that will not be so altho' an English Man marry an Alien beyond the Seas and having there Issue the Issue will be Denizens as hath been often Resolved Yet it is without question that if an English Woman go beyond the Seas and marry an Alien and have Issue born beyond the Seas the Issue are Aliens for the Wife was sub potestate viri and yet the Issue born in England should inherit tho' the Husband be an Alien But the true Answer is That in this Case Robert the Husband being an Alien born out of the Allegiance of the Crown of England and marrying and having all his Issues born there She shall not be presumed an English Woman but shall be presumed a Native in Scotland where her Husband lived and had Issue unless the contrary had been expresly found Now touching the Point in question it is true that Sir Edw. Coke in his Littl. fo 8. is of another Opinion He says That if an Alien have two Sons born in England and one dye without Issue the other shall not inherit him But I take the Law to be the contrary First I will shew what Reasons do not move me Secondly What Reasons do convince and satisfie me It doth not move me thus to conclude because there is no defectus Parriae or Nationis or Ligeantiae of either of the Brothers for tho' there be no personal defect in either of the Extreams yet it may be possible that a consequential Impediment arising from another Ancestor may hinder the Discent and this is apparent in the Case in question for Patrick the Son of Nicholas the Elder Brother of John the Earl hath no Defectus Ligeantiae for he was naturalized yet the Land shall not Discend from John the Earl to Patrick by reason of the defect of Nicholas his Father neither doth it move me that George or John his Son do not claim the Land from Robert the Father but from John the Earl for if the Grandfather be seized the Father is an Alien The Son of Denizen born the Father dies in the Life of the Grandfather the Son shall not inherit by reason of the defect of the Father tho' he claim nothing from him but from the Grandfather But the Reasons that satisfie me are these three in order as they are propounded My first Reason is because the Discent from a Brother to a Brother tho' it be a Collateral Discent yet it is an Immediate Discent and consequently upon what hath been premised at first unless we can find a disability or impediment in them no impediment in another Ancestor will hinder the Discent between them Now to prove this Discent immediate I shall use these three ensuing Instances or Evidences First In point of Pleading one Brother shall derive himself as Heir to another without mentioning another Ancestor this hath been at large insisted on by others and therefore I shall pass it over Secondly According to the computation of Degrees according to the Laws of England Brother and Brother make one Degree and the Brother is distant from his Brother and Sister in the first degree of Consanguinity According to the Civil Law the Brother is in the second Degre from the Brother for they make one Degree from the Brother to the Father and from the Father a second Degree to the other Brother but yet they say in Collaterals Nullus est proximior Fratre ideoque in Collateralibus nullus est primus Gradus sed secundus Gradus obtinet vocem primi Inst lib. 3. Tit. B. de Gradibus Consaguinitatis According to the Cannon Law Frater Frater Soror Soror sunt in primo Gradu Decret ' gratian Laus 35. quest 5. ad sedem and therefore their Laws prohibiting Marriage in the fourth Degree take Brother and Sister to be the first Degree of the fourth The Laws of England in computation of the Degrees of Consanguinity agree with the Common Law and reckon the Brother and Brother to be the first Degree and this is apparent by Littl ' sect 20. and the Objection of Lord Coke thereupon and the Book of 31 E. 3. Hollands Case cited by Littleton And with this likewise agrees the Laws and Custome of Normandy which tho' in some things they differ from the Law of England as is before observed yet in this particular and divers other touching Discents they agree with it Vid. Glov Com. super Customeir de Normandy in Cap. de Escheat Et doir un ' Scavoir que tonque le Custome de paijs de Normandy pur compter les Degrees en Line Collateral solonque les Cannoists deux freres ont le primier Degree eont que en Degree My third Evidence that the Discent between Brothers is immediate this viz. the Discent between Brothers differs from all others Collateral Discents whatsoever for in other Discents Collateral the half Blood doth inherit but in a Discent between Brothers the half Blood doth impede the Discent which argues that the Discent is immediate The Vncle of the part of the Father hath no more of the Blood of the Mother than the Brother of the Second Venter The Brother by the second Venter hath the immediate Blood of the Father which the Vncle viz the Fathers Brother hath not but only as they meet in the Grandfather The Brother of the half Blood is nearer of Blood than the Vncle and therefore shall be preferred in the Administration And so it hath been resolved in 5 E. 6. in Browns Case and tho' the Book of 5 E. 6. B. Administration 47. mistakes the Law in preferring the Brother of the half Blood before the Mother yet it had been right in the case of a Competition between him and the Vncle. And yet the Vncle is preferred in the Discent before the Brother of the half Blood and the reason is because that is a mediate Discent mediante Patre but the Discent to the Brother must be immediate if at all and therefore the half Blood impedes it Again it is apparent that if in the Line between Brother and Brother the Law took notice of the Father as the Medium thereof the Brother by the second Venter should rather succeed the other Brother because he is Heir to his Father therefore in a Discent between Brothers the Law respects only the mediate relation of the Brothers as Brothers and not in respect of their Father tho' it is true the Bosom or Foundation of their Consanguinity is in the Father and Mother My second principal Reason is to prove that the disability of the Father doth not at all hinder the Discent between the Brothers immediate is this If the Father in case of a Discent between Brothers were such an Ancestor as the Law
looks upon as the Medium that derives the one Discent from the other then the Attainder of the Father would hinder the Discent between the Brothers But the Attainder of the Father doth not hinder the Discent between the Brothers Therefore the Father is not such a Medium or Nexus as is look'd upon by Law as the means deriving such Discent between the two Brothers Both the former Propositions and indeed the Illustration and Enforcement of the whole reason will be evidenced by the comparison of three Cases the two former of the Cases evincing the truth of the first Proposition and the later proving the second Proposition The First is Gravers's Case 10 Eliz. Dyer 274. The younger Brother hath Issue and is attaint of Treason and dies the elder Brother having a Title to a Petition of Right dies without Issue without a Restitution the other Brothers Son hath lost that Title for though that Title were in an Ancestor that was not attainted yet his Father that is the Medium whereby he must convey that Title was Attainted and so the Discent is obstructed On the other side the Case of Courtney in Cro. Car. 241. Henry Courtney had Issue Edward and is attaint of Treason and dies Edward purchaseth Lands and dies without Issue the Sisters and Sisters Children of Henry are disabled to inherit Edward yet neither Edward nor his Aunts were attainted nor their Blood corrupted as is before manifested but only Henry tho' the Land could not discend immediately from Edward yet because he who nevertheless was the Medium whereby the Aunts must derive their Pedigree and Consanguinity to Edward was attainted the Discent was obstructed till a restitution in Blood But suppose that the Grandfather of Edward was attainted and not Henry this could not have hindred the Discent from Edward to his Aunts because the Attainder had been paramount that Consanguinity which was between Henry and his Sisters as Brothers and Sisters and that is proved by the third Case In 40 41 Eliz. in the Exchequer Hobbies Case William Hobby had Issue Philip and Mary and is attainted of Treason and dies Philip purchaseth Lands and dies without Issue Ruled that notwithstanding the Attainder Mary shall inherit because the Discent between Philip and Mary was immediate and the Law regards not the disability of the Father and in that Case all the Reasons that have been objected against the Discent in the Case at Bar were objected If it be objected that in that Case the Mother was not attainted which might preserve the Legal Blood between Philip and Mary I Answer That that would not serve admitting the disability of the Parents were not at all considerable for if it disable the Blood of the Father which is derived to the Son it would infallibly destroy the Discent to Mary the Sister for she could not inherit her Brother in the capacity of Heir to the part of the Mother if by the Attainder she had been disabled to take as Heir by the Fathers Blood 49 E. 3. 12. If the Heir on the part of the Father be attainted the Land shall escheat and shall never discend to the Heir of the Mother because notwithstanding the Attainder the Law looks upon it as in esse but otherwise it is in case of an Alien as hath been before shewn for if the Son purchase Land and have no Kindred on the part of his Father but an Alien it shall discend to the Heir of the part of the Mother And altho' the Blood both of the Father and the Mother were in Mary yet if she were disabled in the Blood of her Father by his Attainder she could never intitle her self by the Blood of her Mother I have done with this Reason there remain two Principal Objections to be answered Object 1. The Father in the Case at Bar is the Fountain from whence the Blood of John and George is derived and their Consanguinity ariseth not from one to another but from their Father which is the common vinculum to them both and therefore this disability in the Parents destroys the Civil Relation of Hereditary Blood between the two Brothers I Answer First The very same Objection might be and indeed was made in Hobbies Case but prevailed not Secondly But further no man will say but that the Blood of the Father and Mother are necessary to derive Consanguinity in the Son for the Blood of the Father without the Mother is impossible to be derived to the Children and yet no man will deny that if the one or the other were Denizen born their Children should inherit one the other Thirdly But the truth is the Father and the Mother are the Blood Natural to both the Sons but it is the Law into which by their Birth or Naturalization they are translated that is the Fountain of the Civil or Hereditary Blood the Parents are the common Vinculum the Fonntain of their Blood that aliquod tertium in quo conveniunt in regno naturali but it is the Law of the Land into which by their birth or naturalization they are transplanted the Commune Vinculum that aliquod tertium in quo conveniunt in Regno Civili Object 2. But all their blood that they have is derived from their Parents and they can take no other blood but what they have from them and if that blood which the Parents transmit be stained and void of Hereditary Quality no hereditary blood can intervene between them I Answer It is true that their natural blood is derived from their Parents and as it is that that makes them Brothers Sons so it is that that makes them their blood but yet the civil qualification of their blood which makes them inheritable one to the other is from another Fountain viz. the Law of the Land and this Law finding them Legitimate untrinque conjunctos sanguine parentali naturali and so natural Brothers and finding them transplanted into the civil rights of this Kingdom by their birth here or Naturalization which is all one doth superinduce and close the natural Consanguinity with a civil hereditary Quality whereby they may inherit one the other For Instance A. Grandfather and B. his Wife both Aliens have Issue C. a Son born here who hath Issue D. a Son also born here No body can deny that C. hath all his natural blood from A. and B. and no where else nor is that blood that he hath so from them an inheritable blood yet is it unquestionable that D. shall inherit C. and D. hath no natural blood but what he hath from C. nor C. no natural blood but what he hath from A. and B. But true it is the Law doth superinduce that civil hereditary Quality upon the blood of C. by his birth in England tho' as he took it from his Father and Mother it was void of that Quality the Law of Nature made him indeed Son but it was the Law of England that gave him a capacity to be an
Heir in England or to have one My third and last Reason is indeed more general tho' not so conclusive as the two former were upon the particular Reason of the Case tho' not altogether to be neglected viz. The Law of England which is the only ground and must be the only measure of the incapacity of an Alien and of those consequential results that arise from it hath been always very gentle in the construction of the disability and rather contracting than extending it so severely For Instance The Statute de natis ultra Mare 25 E. 3. declares that the Issue born beyond Sea of an English Man upon an English Woman shall be a Denizen yet the construction hath been tho' an English Merchant marries a Foreigner and hath Issue by her beyond the Sea that Issue is a natural born Subject In 16 Cro. Car. in the Dutchy Bacons Case per omnes Justic ' Angl ' And accordingly it hath been more than once Resolved in my Remembrance Pround's Case of Rent The Case of the Postnati commonly called Calvin's Case the Report is grounded upon this gentle Interpretation of the Law tho' there were very witty Reasons urged to the contrary and surely if ever there were reason for a gentle Construction even in the Case in question it concerns us to be guided by such an Interpretation since the Vnion of the two Kingdoms by which many perthance very Considerable and Noble Families of a Scottish Extract may be concerned in the consequence of this Question both in England and Ireland that enjoy their Inheritances in peace I spare to mention particulars So far therefore as the parallel Cases of Attainder warrant this extent of this Ability I shall not dispute but further than that I dare not extend Now as touching the Authorities that favour my Opinion I shall not mention them because they have been fully Repeated and the later Authorities in this very Case are not in my Iudgment to be neglected Touching the Case of Godfrey and Dixon it is true it doth differ from the Case in question and in that the Father was made a Denizen and then had Issue a younger Son who inherited the elder Son an Alien born but Naturalized after the death of his Father yet there is to be observed in that Case either the Naturalization of the elder Son relates to his Birth or relates only to the Time of his Naturalization whether it did relate or not depends upon the words of the Act of Naturalization which I have not seen If it did relate the Cause in effect will be no more but an Alien hath Issue a Natural born Son for so he is as I have Argued by his Naturalization and then is made a Denizen and hath Issue and dies the elder Son purchaseth Lands and dies without Issue the younger Son shall inherit the elder should not have inherited his Father by reason of the Incapacity of the Father But it doth not relate further than the Time of his Naturalization which was after the time of the Death of his Father and consequently he could not divest the Heirship of his younger Brother yet if he purchaseth and dies without Issue his younger Brother shall inherit him tho' there was never Inheritable Blood between the elder Son and his Father so much as in fiction or relation Vpon the whole Case I conclude First That there be two Brochers Natural born in England the Sons of an Alien the one shall inherit the other Secondly That the Naturalization puts them in the same Condition as if born here tho' it does not more Thirdly That John the Son of George stands in the same Condition of inheriting his Vncle the Earl as George should have done had he survived the Earl Fourthly But if the Disability of Robert the Father had disabled the Brothers to have inherited one the other the Naturalization of the Earl or George had not removed that Disability Fifthly But no such Disability of the Father doth disable the Brother George to inherit the Earl it neither doth Consequentially disable John the Son of George to inherit the Earl Consequently as to the Point referred to our Iudgment John the Son of George is Inheritable to the Land of John his Vncle. The End of the First Volume A TABLE OF THE Principal Points Argued and Resolved in the First PART OF THESE REPORTS A. Abatement See Pleadings IN the Ecclesiastical Court a Suit does not abate by the Death of either Party Pag. 134 A Baronet is Sued by the Addition of Knight and Baronet the Action shall abate 154 In all Actions where one Plaintiff of several Dyes the Writ shall abate save in an Action brought by an Executor 235 Acceptance Where Acceptance of Rent from the Assignee shall discharge the Lessee 99 Action See Bail Whether an Action of Debt qui tam upon the Stat. 5 El. c. 4. lies in B. R. 8 Action brought de uxore abducta and concludes contra forman Statuti where there is no Statute in the case yet good 104 Action for a Nusance in stopping of the Lights of his House p. 139 237 248 Action upon the Stat. 13 Car. 2. by one Bookseller against another for Printing his Coppy p. 253 Where the Matter consists of two parts in several Counties the Plaintiff may bring his Action in which he pleases p. 344 Where several Causes may be joyned in one Action and where not 365 366 Action upon the Case See Jurisdiction Way In the Nature of Conspiracy a-against three for Arresting without Cause and only one found Guilty 12 Such an Action lies against one p. 19 Lies for a Justice of Peace against one who Indicts him for Matters in the Execution of his Office p. 23 25 For taking his Wife from him brought against the Womans Father p. 37 Lies not against a Justice of Peace for causing one to be Indicted who was after accquitted 47 Where it lies for Suing one in the Ecclesiastical Court and where not 86 For erecting a Market 7 miles off 98 Upon the Custom of Merchants for a Bill of Exchange accepted 152 For not Grinding at his Mill 167 Where it lies against a Master of a Ship for Goods lost out of the same 138 190 191 Against the Mayor of L. for not Granting a Poll upon a doubtful Election 206 For not repairing a Fence 264 Against a Taylor for Spoiling his Coat in making 268 For Riding over the Plaintiff with an unruly Horse 295 Where Action lies for Defaming the Wife whereby the Husband loses his Customers 348 Action upon the Case For Slander You are a Forger of Bonds a Publisher of Forgery and Sue upon forged Bonds These last Words not Actionable 3 She was with Child by J. S. whereof she miscarried 4 Thou hast received stoln Goods and knew they were stolen J. S. Stole them and thou wert Partner with her 18 Of a Midwife She is an Ignorant Woman and of small Practice and very unfortunate in her Way there
his Bill to have the Land Conveyed according to the Agreement above But for the Defendants it was much insisted upon that this being to settle the Lands in case Thomas should dye without Issue it should not be regarded in this Court for the Execution of a Trust of a Remainder or Reversion in Fee upon an Estate Tail shall not be compelled because it is subject to be destroyed by the Tenant in Tail as here Thomas might have done in case he had made a Settlement according to the import of that Writing who therefore could not have been compelled himself to have executed this Agreement But the Lord Chancellor Fynch Decreed the Land for the Plaintiff because it was proved that the Marriage with the Plaintiffs Wife was in expectation of the performance of this Agreement and he was obliged to have left the Land to the Plaintiff if he had had no Issue Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria Collet versus Collet WIlliam Fox having three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha the two latter being Married and the first a Widow by his Will devised in these Words Viz. I give unto Martha my Daughter the Sum of 400 l to be paid unto her by my Executors within one year next after my decease But I will and my desire is that Cornelius Collet the Husband of Martha upon the payment of the said 400 l shall give such Security as my Executors shall approve of that the said 400 l shall be laid out within 18 Months next after my decease and purchase an Estate of that value to be setled and assured upon her the said Martha and the Heirs of her Body lawfully begotten And in the Close of his Will were these words following Viz. I Will That after my Debts which I shall owe at the time of my Decease and my Funeral Expences and the Probat of this my Will be discharged then I do give all the rest of my Personal Estate Unbequeathed to purchase an Estate near of as good value as the same Personal Estate shall amount unto within one year next after my my decease Which said Estate so to be purchased I Will shall be setled and assured unto and upon my said three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha and the Heirs of their respective Bodies lawfully begotten for ever or otherwise my said Daughter Mary and the Husbands of my said two other Daughters Elizabeth and Martha shall for such Moneys as they shall receive of my said Executors for the Overplus of my Personal Estate enter into one or more Bonds in the double Sum of Money as each part shall amount unto the same being to be divided into three parts unto my said Executors within 18 Months next after my decease to settle and assure such part or Sum of Money as each of them shall receive and have by this my Will for the Overplus of my Personal Estate unto and upon the Child and Children of my said Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha part and part alike Martha the Wife of Cornelius Collet died within six Months after the Testator leaving Issue only a Daughter who died within four Months after the Mother the other two Sisters surviving Cornelius Collet took out Letters of Administration both to Martha his Wife and likewise to his Daughter the Four hundred Pounds and likewise the Overplus of the Personal Estate being unpaid or disposed of Cornelius Collet preferred his Bill against the Executors and the surviving Sisters and thereby demanded the 400 l and likewise a third part of the Overplus which amounted unto 700 l And the Cause came to be heard before the Lord Chancellor upon Bill and Answer who Decreed the 400 l to the Plaintiff but as to the Surplus of the Estate the Bill was dismissed altho ' it was much insisted upon for the Plaintiff that he might have given Bond to secure the Surplus for his Child and so from the Child it would have come to him as Administrator But seeing that no Interest could vest in the Child till the Election were determined it not being material as to this Point whether the Executors or the Husband aâ— the Election the Father could not claim it as Administrator to the Child And then if the Money had been laid out in Land and the Settlement according to the direction of the Will the Husband would have had no benefit for there would have been a Ioynt Estate for Life in the Daughters with several Inheritances and no severance of the Ioynture by the Marriage and having Issue Co. Inst and so no Tenant by the Courtesie Therefore as to the Surplusage the Bill was Decreed to be dismissed Note As to the 400 l the Order of my Lord Chancellor was That Interest should be paid for it from the time of bringing the Bill Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria West versus The Lord Delaware WEST Heir apparent of the Lord Delaware Exhibited his Bill against the said Lord setting forth That upon a Marriage agreed to be had between him and the Daughter of one Mr. Huddleston with whom he was to have 10000 l Portion The Lord his Father Articled to settle Lands of such yearly value for the Wives Ioynture for their maintenance and the Heirs of their Bodies c. That the Wife being now dead and without Issue and no Settlement made the Bill prayed an Execution of the Articles and a discovery of what Incumbrances there were upon the Lands to be setled To this the Lord Delaware Answered That he never intended to settle Lands but for the Wives Ioynture only and that the Plaintiff her Husband was not named in the Articles and so was Advised He need make no Settlement and upon that Reason the Plaintiff could not require him to discover Incumbrances An Exception being taken to the Answer for that it did not discover any thing touching Incumbrances it was Argued before my Lord and for the Defendant it was alledged That by the Course of the Court the time of the Discovery should be when the other Point was determined for if that be for the Defendant then no Discovery can be required but if otherwise that then the Defendant shall be put to answer Interrogatories as is usual in Cases of like nature And it cannot be Objected That the Estate may be charged with Incumbrances since the Bill because they will be of no avail On the other side it was said That this would create great delay for upon the discovery of Incumbrances other parties must be made to the Bill and therefore this Case differed from the Case of Account which concerns the Defendant himself only but the Question now is only for the making proper Parties The Court Ordered That a further Answer should be made Nota If a man deviseth that such a Sum of Money shall be paid out of the Profits of his Lands and the Profits will not amount to the Sum in such case the Land
that time this made an Estate Tail But if it had béen and after their decease to their Children then the Children should take by Purchase tho' born after 'T is true that case is variously reported in the Books but I adhere to my Lord Coke presuming that being brought before all the Judges in the Argument of VVilds Case it was a true Report As for the second Point 't is plain that the power is extinguished for by the Recovery the Estate for Life to which it was annexed in privity is gone and forfeited so that 't is not necessary to dispute the third Point whether well executed or no But upon the whole I agree with my Brother Rainsford that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgment Hale I differ from my two Brothers and tho' I was of their Opinion at the finding of the Special Verdict yet upon very great Consideration of the Case I am of Opinion for the Defendant I shall proceed in a different method from my Brothers and begin with that Point which they made last and I agree with them admitting that Bernard had but an Estate for Life that the power was destroyed also here the Recovery does not only bar the Estate but all powers annexed to it for the recompence in value is of such strong Consideration that it serves as well for Rents Possibilities c. going out of and depending upon the Land as for the Land it self So Fines and Feoffments do ransack the whole Estate and pass or extinguish c. all Rights Conditions Powers c. belonging to the Land as well as the Land it self Secondly I agree with my Brother Rainsford that if Bernard had but an Estate for Life by the Devise the power was not well executed Where Tenant for Life has a power to make Leases 't is not always necessary to recite his power when he makes a Lease but if he makes a Lease which will not have an effectual continuance if it be directed out of his interest there it shall be as made by virtue of his power and so it was resolved in one Roger's Case in which I was Counsel Again Tho' it be here by Covenant to stand seized an improper way to execute his power yet it might be construed an Execution of it Mich. 51. In this Court Stapleton's Case where a Devise was to A. for Life Remainder to B. for Life Remainder to C. in Fee with power to B. to make his Wife a Joynture B. covenanted to stand seized for the Joynture of his Wife reciting his power tho' this could not make a legal Joynture yet it was resolved to enure by virtue of his power quando non valet quod ago ut ago valeat quantum valere potest But in this Case Bernard has got a new Fee which tho' it be defeasible by him in Remainder yet the Covenant to stand seized shall enure thereupon and the use shall arise out of the Fee Thirdly I was at the first opening of the Case of Opinion that Bernard had but an Estate for Life but upon deep Examination of the Will and of the Authority and Considerations of the Consequences of the Case I hold it to be an Estate Tail And first to ease that Point of all difficulties if cannot be denied but a Devise to a Man and the Heirs of his Body by a second Wife makes an Estate Tail executed tho' the Devisee had a Wife at the time As the Case often cited Land given to a Married Man and a Married Woman and the Heirs of their Bodies We are here in case of the Creation of an estate-Estate-Tail where intention has some influence voluntas Donatoris c. and may help words which are not exactly according to legal form 39 Ass 20. Land given to a Man and his Wife haeredi de corpore uni haeredi tantum this judged an Entail Again we are in case of an Estate Tail to be created by a Will and the intention of the Testator is the Law to expound the Testament therefore a Devise to a Man and his Heirs Males or a Devise to a Man and if he dies without Issue c. are always construed to make an Entail It must be admitted that if the Devise were to B. and the Issue of his Body having no Issue at that time it would be an Estate Tail for the Law will carry over the word Issue not only to his immediate Issue but to all that shall descend from him I agree it would be otherwise if there were Issue at the time Tayler and Sayer 41 Eliz. rot 541. a Devise to his Wife for Life 1 Cro. 742. Remainder to his Issue having two Children it was held the Remainder was void being to the Issue in the singular number for incertainy which should take But that was a little too rank for Issue is nomen collectivum Again I agree if a Devise be made to a man and after his death to his Issue or Children having Issue at that time they take by way of Remainder And that was the only Point adjudged in Wild's Case and there also against the Opinion of Popham and Gawdy This way being made I come to the Case it self and shall briefly give my Reasons why I hold Bernard has an Estate Tail First Because the word Issue is nomen collectivum and takes in the whole Generation ex vi termini and so the Case is stronger than if it were Children And where 't is said to the Issue that he shall have of the Body of the second Wife that is all that shall come of the second Wife For so 't is understood in common Parlance Secondly In all Acts of Parliament Exitus is as comprehensive as Heirs of the Body In Westm 2. de donis Issue is made a term of equivalence to Heirs of the Body for where it speaks of the Alienation of the Donee 't is said quo minus ad exitum discenderet So in 34 H. 8. of Entails setled by the Crown 'T is true in Conveyances c. the wisdom of the Law has appropriated the word Heirs as a Term of Art In Clerke's Case A Lease was made to commence after the death of his Son without Issue the Son had a Son and died and then that Son died without Issue It was Resolved both in the Kings Bench and the Exchequer that the Lease should commence for Issue being nomen collectivum whenever the Issue of the Son failed the term of Commencement did happen But now to see the difference Tyler's Case Mich. 34 Eliz. B.R. He had Issue A. B. C. and D. and Devised to his Wife for Life and after her death to B. his Son in Tail and if he dies without Issue then to his Children A. had Issue a Son and died and B. died without Issue Resolved that the Son of A. should not take as one of the Children of the Testator Which Case I cite to shew the odds between the word Issue and the
word Children My second Reason is from the manner of the Limitation which is to his Issue and of his Body lawfully begotten upon the second Wife Phrases agreeable to an Estate Tail and the meaning of a Testator is to be spelled out by little Hints It is admitted in Wild's Case in the 6 Co. 17. that if the Devise had been to the Children of their Bodies it would have been an Entail Thirdly It appears by the Devise that the Testator knew there could be no Children at that time and shall not be supposed to intend a contingent Remainder Fourthly It appears that the Testator did not intend to prefer the Children of the first Wife of Bernard but did the Children of the second and therefore cannot be thought to mean that John the younger Brother of Bernard should take before failure of the Issue which Bernard should have by his second Wife And to this purpose is Spalding's Case 3 Cro. 185. A Devise to his eldest Son and the Heirs of his Body after the death of his Wife and if he died living the Wife then to his Son N. And devised other Lands to another Son and the Heirs of his Body and if he died without Issue then to remain c. The first Son died living the Wife It was strongly urged that his Estate should cease for being said If he died living the Wife this was a Corrective of what went before But 't was Ruled by all the Court that it was an absolute Estate Tail in the first Son as if the words had been If he died without Issue living the Wife for he could not be thought to intend to prefer a younger Son before the Issue of his eldest Fifthly The words are further and for want of such Issue then to John which words in a Will do often make an Estate Tail by Implication As 4 Jac. Robinson's Case A Devise to A. for Life and if he died without Issue then to remain A. took an Entail So Burley's Case 43 Eliz. A Devise to A. for Life Remainder to the next Heir Male and for default of such Heir Male then to remain Adjudged an Estate Tail 'T is true Dyer 171. is where Lands were Devised to a man and the Heirs Males of his Body and if he died without Issue c. these last words did not make a Tail General to the Devisee For an Implication of an Estate of Inheritance shall never ride over an express limitation of an Inheritance before being 't is said here for want of such Issue the Land should remain 't is plainly meant that it should not before the Issue failed and then the Issue must have it so long for none else can and so 't is an Estate Tail I come now to Authorities 6 Eliz. Anderson num 86. Moor pl. 397. A Devise to his Son for Life and after his decease to the Men Children of his Body said to be an Estate Tail and so cited by Coke in that Book and so contrary to his Report of it in Wild's Case Bendloes num 124. But that Case is not so strong as this for Children is not so operative a word as Issue Rolls 839. A Devise to his eldest Son for Life non aliter for so were the words tho' not printed in the Book and after his decease to the Sons of his Body it was but an Estate for Life by reason of the words Non aliter Hill 13 Car. 2. Rot. 121. Wedgward's Case A Devise to his Son Thomas for Life and after his decease if he died without Issue living at his death then to the Daughter c. it was held to be an Estate for Life But were it an Estate Tail or no it was not necessary to be Resolved the Case depending upon the destruction or continuance of a Contingent Remainder which would have been gone had the Devise made an Estate Tail again there being an express Devise for Life they would not raise a larger Estate by Implication Again Wild's Case where Lands were Devised to A. for Life Remainder to B. and the Heirs of his Body Remainder to Wild and his Wife and after their decease to their Children And the Court of Kings-Bench were at first divided Indeed it was afterwards adjudged an Estate for Life to Wild and his Wife First Because having limited a Remainder in Tail to B. by express and the usual words if he had meant the same Estate in the second Remainder 't is like he would have used the same words Secondly It was not after their decease to the Children of their Bodies for then there would be an Eye of an Estate Tail Thirdly The main Reason was because there were Children at the time of the Devise and that was the only Reason the Resolution went upon in the Exchequer Chamber And tho' it be said in the latter end of the Case That if there were no Children at that time every Child born after might take by Remainder 't is not said positively that they should take And it seems to be in opposition to their taking presently but however that be it comes not to this Case For tho' the word Children may be made nomen collectivum the word Issue is nomen collectivum of it self Hill 42. and 43 Eliz. Bifield's Case A Devise to A. and if he dies not having a Son then to remain to the Heirs of the Testator Son was there taken to be used as nomen collectivum and held an Entail I come now to answer Objections First 'T is objected that in this Case the Limitation is expresly for Life and in that respect stronger than Wild's Case And this is the great difficulty But I Answer That tho' these words do weigh the Intention that way yet they are ballanced by an apparent Intention that weighs as much on the other side which is That as long as Bernard should have Children that the Land should never go over to John for there was as much reason to provide for the Issue of the Issue as the first Issue Again A Tenant in Tail has to many purposes but an Estate for Life Again 'T is possible that he did intend him but an Estate for Life and 't is by consequence and operation of Law only that it becomes an Estate Tail 1651. Hansy and Lowther The Case was A Copyholder surrendred to the use of his Will and Devised to his first Son for Life and after his decease to the Heir Male of his Body c. This was Ruled to be an Estate Tail and this differs from Archer's Case in the 1st of Co. for that the Devise there was for Life and after to the Heir Male and the Heirs of the Body of that Heir Male There the words of Limitation being grafted upon the word Heir it shews that the word Heir was used as Designatio personae and not for Limitation of the Estate So is the Case of Clerk and Day 1 Cro. 313. Another Objection was That there being a Power appointed
c. be indicted for not repairing of a Way within their Precinct they cannot plead Not guilty and give in Evidence that another by Prescription or Tenure ought to repair it for they are chargeable de communi Jure and if they would discharge themselves by laying it elsewhere it must be pleaded Error ERror to Reverse a Judgment in Debt upon a Bond given in Norwich Court where by the Custom the plea of the Defendant was quod non dedicit factum sed petit quod inquiratur de debito First It was moved to be Error for that the Venire was XII Men c. in figures Sed non allocatur for being in these letters XII and not in the figures 12. it was well enough Secondly It was ad triandum exi tum whereas there was no Issue joyned wherefore it ought to have been ad inquirend ' de debito c. Sed non allocatur for the Presidents are as the Case is here Thirdly The Condition of the Bond was to pay at Alborough and that ought to have been shewn to be within the Jurisdiction of the Court Sed non allocatur for the Plea here is not payment secund ' formam Conditionis but the Jury is to inquire by the custom of all manner of payments and discharges Fourthly In the Record it was continued over to several Courts and in the Court where the Judgment is given 't is said in Curia praedicta and so incertain which but notwithstanding these matters the Iudgment was affirmed Anonymus THe Case upon Evidence at a Tryal in Ejectment was this a Dean and Chapter having a right to certain Land but being out of Possession Sealed a Lease with a Letter of Attorney to deliver it upon the Land which was done accordingly and held to be a good Lease for tho' the putting the Seal of a Corporation aggregate to a Deed carries with it a delivery yet the Letter of Attorney to deliver it upon the Land shall suspend the operation of it while then Tenant for Life being in Debt to defraud his Creditors commits a Forfeiture to the end that he in Reversion may enter who is made privy to the contrivance The Opinion of Hale was that the Creditors should avoid this as well as any fraudulent Conveyance Anonymus IN an Ejectment upon a Tryal at Bar for Lands in antient Demesne there was shewn a Recovery in the Court of antient Demesne to cut off an Entail which had been suffered a long time since and the Possession had gone accordingly But there was now objected against it First That no sufficient Evidence of it appeared because the Recovery it self nor a Copy of it was shewn for in truth it was lost But the Court did admit other proof of it to be sufficient and said if a Record be lost it may be proved to a Jury by Testimony as the Decree in H. 8. time for Tythe in London is lost yet it hath been often allowed that there was one Secondly It appeared that a part of the Land was leased for Life and the Recovery with a single Voucher was suffered by him in Reversion and so no Tenant to the Praecipe for those Lands But in regard the Possession had followed it for so long time the Court said they would presume a Surrender as in an Appropriation of great Antiquity there has been presumed a Licence tho' none appeared Thirdly It was objected That the Tenant in Tail which suffered the Recovery having first accepted of a Fine sur Conusans de droit come ceo his Estate Tail was changed for he was estopped during his Life to say that he had any other Estate than Fee then he being made Tenant to the Praecipe the Recovery was not of the Estate Tail and so should not bind But the Court held clearly that the acceptance of this Fine made no alteration of his Estate If Tenant for Life accepts such a Fine 't is a Forfeiture because he admits the Reversion to be in a Stranger but it does not change his Estate so where two Joynt-tenants in Fee accept a Fine which is to the Heirs of one of them yet they continue Joynt-tenants in Fee as they were before Fourthly The Writ of Right Close did express the Land to lie in such a Mannor and a Praecipe that demands Land ought to mention the Vill in which they lie for a Praecipe of Land in Parochia or in Manerio is not good But this exception was disallowed by the Court for Hale said the Writ of Right Close is directed Ballivis Manerij c. quod plenum rectum teneant of the Land within the Precinct of the Mannor and it is not to be resembled to another Praecipe But if a Praecipe be faulty in that Point unless exception be taken to it in Abatement it cannot be assigned for Error but if it were Erroneous the Recovery would bind until reversed Note After Judgment quod computet tho' it be not the final Judgment yet no motion is to be admitted in Arrest of Judgment and after such Judgment a Scire facias lies against the Executor of the Defendant Note In an Action of Debt against the Lessee he may plead nil debet and give the expulsion in Evidence Anonymus IN an Assumpsit the consideration appeared to be that the Defendant promised to pay a Sum of Money which he owed this is no good consideration tho' after a Verdict unless it appeared that the Debt was become remediless by the Statute of Limitations but payment of a Debt without Suit is a good consideration Anonymus A Justice of the Peace brought an Action of Slander for that the Defendant said He was not worth a Groat and that he was gone to the Dogs and upon motion in Arrest of Judgment notwithstanding that it was urged to maintain it that the Statute of H. 6. requires that a Justice of Peace should have 40 l a year And therefore in regard an Estate was necessary to his Office that the Action would lie yet the Judgment was stayed for such words will not bear an Action unless the person of whom they are spoken lives by buying and selling Anonymus IT was returned upon Elegit that the Sheriff had delivered medietatem Terrar ' Tenementorum in extent and after the Filing and Entry of it upon the Record the Plaintiff moved to quash it because it was insufficient for the Sheriff ought upon such Execution to deliver the Possession by Metes and Bounds Wild held that it being entred upon the Record there was no avoiding of it but by Writ of Error But Hale held that in regard it appeared by the Record to be void it might be quashed as if upon an Ejectment to recover Possession upon such a return it appears upon the Evidence that there was more than the half the Land delivered this shall be avoided So if a Fieri facias be not warranted by the Judgment upon which it is awarded tho' the Sheriff shall be
Ejectment the Case upon a Special Verdict was to this effect Sir John Danvers being seized of the Lands c. in Tail with the Fee expectant Anno 1646 and in 1647 levied a Fine to the same uses as he was before seized save that a power was reserved to make Leases for any number of years and without reserving any Rent Sir John Danvers did after become Guilty of Treason in Murdring of King Charles the first in 1648 and died in 1655. In 13 Car. 2. cap. 15. the Statute commonly called the Statute of Pains and Penalties Enacts That sundry of the Offenders in that execrable Treason of which Sir J. D. was one should amongst other Penalties there inflicted forfeit all their Lands Tenements and Hereditaments Leases for years Chattels real and interest of what nature or quality soever See the Act of 14 of this King The Lands were by Patent granted to the Duke of York who let them to the Defendant And John Danvers Heir of Sir John Danvers entred and made the Lease to the Plaintiff It had been several times argued at the Bar and this Term Iudgment was given by the Court for the Defendant And Rainsford Chief Justice delivered the Opinion of the Court and the Reasons for himself Twisden Wild and Jones as followeth The question being Whether an Estate Tail were forfeited by the words of the Act of 13 Car. 2. It was observed that all Estates were Fee simple at the Common Law and forfeitable W. the 2. de donis was the first Statute that protected Estates Tail from Alienations and from all Forfeitures of all kinds and so continued until the 12 E. 4. Taltarums Case from which time common Recoveries have been held not to be restrained by the Statute de donis and by the way it must be considered that Perpetuities were never favoured Then came the Statute of 4. H. 7. of Fines which with the explanation of the 32 H. 8. have been always resolved to bar the Issues in Tail so as to Alienations Estates Tail were set free but were not forfeitable no not for Treason until the 26 H. 8. by which they became subjected to Forfeitures in case of Treason and so by 5 E. 6. But 't is true these Statutes extend only to Attainders and 33 H. 8. Vests the Lands c. in the Kings possession without Office Thus having considered the History and Progress of Estates Tail the reasons why such an Estate should be construed to be forfeited upon this Act of 13 Car. 2. are these First The Crime mentioned is of the same nature and with the same aggravations as in 12 Car. 2. by which the Offenders are attainted of Treason c. for they are called Perpetrators of that execrable Treason with many Expressions to the like effect which was looked upon as an offence of that hainous nature that the same Parliament Enacted An Anniversary Humiliation throughout the whole Kingdom to be perpetually observed upon the account of it as if not only they that acted it but the whole Kingdom and their Posterity like to another Original sin were involved in the Guilt of it Nati natorum qui nascuntur ab illis And therefore the Punishment shall not be mitigated in any other manner than is expresly provided by that Act. Secondly It is proved by the generally and comprehensions of the words which are made use of viz. Possessions Rights Hereditaments of what nature soever Interests which does as well signifie the Estate in the ting as that wherein the Estate is which can have no effect if not extended to Estates Tail We must observe also that at the making of this Act entailed Lands were not protected from Forfeitures and tho' 26 H. 8. extends only to Cases where the Offender is attainted yet 't is of good direction to the Judges in Cases of like nature and 't is plain that by this Act of 13 Car. 2. the Offenders were looked upon in pari gradu with these attainted for when the Proviso comes to save the Estates of Strangers c. in trust for whom the Offenders were seized It is said notwithstanding any of the Convictions or Attainders aforesaid Thirdly It is to be observed that the Act takes notice that divers of the Offenders included in this Act were dead now in regard most Lands are known to be entailed if the Act had not intended such Estates to be forfeited it would signifie nothing indeed if the Offenders had been alive it might have been somewhat satisfied with the Forfeiture during their Lives But as the case was it should be of no effect at all after making a great noise of Forfeitures and Confiscations the Act would have been but a Gun charged only with Powder or as in the Fable Parturiunt Montes c. Fourthly It is manifest that the Parliament did not intend that the Children or Heirs of the Persons within the Penalties of the Act should have any benefit of their Estates for in the saving which is made for Purchasers upon valuable Considerations the Wives Children and Heirs of the Offenders are excepted then surely if they would bar them of the benefit of their Purchases à fortiori from inheriting to an Estate Tail especially of a voluntary Entail that seems to be made with a prospect of this Treason which was perpetrated a year after and such an Entail as scarce the like was ever seen before that a power should be reserved to make Leases for any number of years and without Reservation of any Rent By which it is manifest that Sir John Danvers that committed the Treason was fully Master of the Estate Again all Conveyances are avoided by the Act unless such as were upon valuable Consideration which this Fine was not The great case which has been insisted upon by way of objection is Trudgeons Case Co. Litt. 130. Estates Tail were not forfeited upon the Statute of Praemunire but during the Offenders Life For answer to that it must be observed that that Forfeiture is upon the Statute of 16 R. 2. at which times Estates Tail were under thè protection of the Statute de donis but since that time the Judges have not been so strict in expounding Statutes concerning Estates Tail as appears by Adams and Lamberts Case 4 Co. That an Estate Tail given for a superstitious use was within the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 4. where the words are generally and not so large as in our case nor so much to demonstrate the intent as is in our Act to extend to Estates Tail wherefore Iudgment was given for the Defendant Note They that argued for the Defendant endeavoured to maintain that if it should be admitted that Entails were not forfeited by the Act yet the Estate of Sir John Danvers in those Lands would be forfeited in regard he levied a Fine in 1647 and the Act of 13 Car. 2. extends to all Lands c. whereof the Persons therein mentioned were seized c. since 1646 and he being
makes a Lease for the Life of the Lessee not warranted by the Statute and dies leaving B. in Remainder his Heir B. let ts for 99 years to commence after the death of the Tenant for Life reserving Rent and then the Tenant for Life surrenders to B. upon Condition and dies B. suffers a Recovery with single Voucher and dies the Lessee for years enters the Heir of B. distrains for the Rent and the Lessee brings a Replevin and upon an Avowry and Pleadings thereupon this Case was disclosed to the Court of Common Bench and Judgment given there for the Avowant and Error thereupon brought in this Court For the Plaintiff in the Error it was Argued That the Lease being derived out of a Reversion in Fee which was Created in A. upon the Discontinuance for Life and the New Fee vanishing by the Surrender of the Tenant for Life for it was urged he was in his Remitter altho' the taking of the Surrender was his own Act that the Lease for years by consequence was become void Again It was Objected against the Common Recovery that the Tenant in Tail and a Stranger which had nothing in the Estate were made Tenants to the Praecipe and therefore no good Recovery Again In case B. were not remitted after acceptance of the Surrender then he was Seised by force of the Tail and so no good Recovery being with single Voucher On the other side it was Argued to be no Remitter because the acceptance of the Surrender was his own Act and the Entry was taken away But admitting it were a Remitter because by the Surrender the Estate for Life which was the Discontinuance was gone and it was no more than a Discontinuance for Life For if Tenant in Tail letts for Life and after grants the Reversion in Fee if the Lessee for Life dies after the Death of the Tenant in Tail so that the Estate was not executed in the Grantee during the Life of the Tenant in Tail the Heir shall immediately Enter upon the Grantee of the Reversion Co. Litt. It seems also to be stronger against the Remitter in this case because 't is not Absolute but only Conditional However the Lease may be good by Estoppel for it appears to have been by Indenture and if the Lessor cannot avoid the Lease the Lessee shall without question be subject to the Rent But it was Objected against the Estoppel that here an Interest passes and the Lease was good for a time As if the Lessee for Ten years makes a Lease for Twenty years and afterwards purchaseth the Reversion it shall bind him for no more than Ten. To which Pemberton Chief Justice said The difference is where the party that makes the Estate has a legal Estate and where a Defeasible Estate only for in the latter a Lease may work by Estoppel tho' an Interest passed so long as the Estate out of which the Lease was derived remained undefeated As to the Recovery it was held clearly good altho' a Stranger that had nothing in the Land was made Tenant to the Praecipe with the Tenant in Tail for the Recompence in Value shall go to him that lost the Estate and being a Common Assurance 't is to be favourably Expounded Et Adjornatur Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 33 34 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IN Error upon a Judgment in Ejectione Firmae in the Common Pleas where the Case was That the Bishop of London was seized injure Episcopatus of a Mannor of which the Lands in question were held and time out of mind were demised and demisable by Copy of Court Roll for Life in Possession and Reversion and J.S. being Copyholder for Life in Reversion after an Estate for Life in Ann Pitt and J.N. being seized of the Mannor by Disseisin J.S. at a Court holden for the Mannor in the name of J. N. surrendred into the Hands of the said J.N. the Disseisor Lord to the used of the said Lord. Afterwards the Bishop of London entred and avoided the Disseisin Ann Pitt died and an Ejectment was brought by J. S. And it was adjudged in the Common Bench that he had a good Title and now upon a Writ of Error in this Court the Matter in Law was insisted upon by Pollexfen for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That this Surrender to the Disseisor Lord to the Lords own use was good for all the Books agree a Copyholder may Surrender to a Disseisor of the Mannor to the use of a Stranger and why not to the Lords own use As if Lessee for years be ousted and he in Reversion disseised and the Lessee Releases to the Disseisor this extinguishes his Term. Here is a compleat Disseisin of the Mannor by Attornment of the Freeholders without which the Services cannot be gained and the Copyholders comeing to the Disseisors Court and by making Surrenders c. owning him for their Lords tantamounts Serjeant Maynard contra And he insisted that this Surrender was not good for the Disseisor had no Estate in this Land capable of a Surrender for the Copyholder for Life continuing in Possession and never having been ousted there could be no Disssesin of that And he endeavoured to distinguish it from a Surrender to a Disseisor Lord to the use of another for in such Surrenders the Lord is only an Instrument and does but as it were assent and until admittance the Estate is in the Surrenderer And he resembled it to the Attornment of a Tenant when è converso a Seigniory is granted and he put Cases upon Surrenders of Leases that they must be to one that hath the immediate Reversion as an under Lessee for part of the Term cannot Surrender to the first Lessor and he cited a Case of Lessee for years Remainder for Life Remainder in Fee to a Stranger he that had the Fee enfeoffed the Tenant for years by Deed and made Livery and the Conveyance held void for it could not work by Livery to the Tenant for years who was in Possession before and a Surrender it could not be because of the intermediate Estate for Life and it could not work as a Grant for want of Attornment He said it had been commonly received that a Common Recovery cannot be suffered where the Tail is expectant upon an Estate for Life not made Tenant to the Praecipe which he said was true in a Writ of Entry in the Post which are commonly used And the true reason is because such Writ supposes a Disseisin which cannot be when there is a Tenant for Life in Possession But as he said a Common Recovery in such case in a Writ of Right would be good Pemberton Chief Justice said his reason of Desseisin would overthrow Surrenders to the use of a Stranger for if the Possession of the Copyholder would preserve it from a Disseisin then was it pro tempore lopped off or severed from the Mannor and then no Surrender could be at all Et Adjornatur Berry
because the Intent of the parties appears that it should be so There 's no great difference between the Construction of a Deed of Uses and a Will 13 H. 7. The Wife takes an Estate for Life by Implication where the Land is devised to the eldest Son after her decease Manning and Andrew's Case in 1 Leon. 259. The Reason of these Cases is the fulfilling of the Intention of the Parties and here this Limitation cannot be made good by way of a Future Use nor by any other way but only by creating of an Estate for Life in Michael the Father by Implication and this is according to the nature of a Covenant to stand seiz'd For the Use is not to pass out of the Covenantor till the proper time for the subsequent Estate to commence As to my Lord Paget's Case 't was his Intention to have the Use during his Life And my Lord Coke was certainly very well satisfied with the Resolution in Fenwick and Mitford's Case when he wrote his Institutes for he Argued before to the contrary as appears by the Report of that Case in Moor. Rainsford Justice to the same Intent If no Use rises immediately to Ralph yet if a Use rises by the Deed so that he has the Land any way be it by discent from his Father 't is within the Conclusion of the Verdict By the scope of the Conveyance it appears that it was intended that Robert should never have his Land till Twelve hundred Pound was paid for the provision of younger Children so that if Robert should have it it would be against the Intention of Michael There are two Reasons and Grounds in Law by which we may make this Deed agree with the Intention of the Parties First Because it is in the Case of an Estate Tail ubi voluntas donatoris observari debet Secondly It is in a Conveyance setled by way of Use and in Cases of Uses the Intention of the parties ought to be pursued And this is in Case of a Use that rises by Covenant to stand seiz'd which makes the Case the stronger And I conceive this is not a void Limitation but such an one as gives an Estate to Ralph In speaking to which I shall observe what my Lord Coke in the 1 Inst 23. says viz. That so much of the Use as the Owner of the Land does not dispose of remains in him c. and so in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. 30. And this is the Reason of Bingham's Case 1 Co. 91. Now here when Michael Covenanted to stand seiz'd to the Vse of his Heirs Male on the Body of his second Wife begotten I conceive he shall retain the Land as parcel of his ancient Vse during his Life for non est Haeres viventis according to Archer's Case 1 Co. And that Michael shall retain an Estate for Life is prov'd by my Lord Paget's Case 1 Co. 154. Dyer 310. N. 79. 1 Co. Chudleigh's Case 129. 2 Rolls 788. 21 H. 7. 18. From my Lord Paget's Case upon which I shall rely and the other Cases it appears that were there 's a Limitation to one after the death of another the Covenantor shall retain the Land during the Life of the other and here in our Case this Estate not taking effect till after the Death of Michael he shall retain the Estate and shall be Tenant for Life of the old Vse Now the Question is Whether Ralph shall take by Discent or Purchase And I conceive this Estate for Life with the Remainder in Tail makes but one Estate Tail in Michael and that he becomes Tenant in Tail and so Ralph shall take as Heir in Tail I shall not trouble my self whether Ralph may take here as a Purchaser because in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. it is Resolved that he cannot take as Heir Male of the Body by Purchase because all the words are not verified in him for he is not Heir I shall rely upon the First Point That here is an Estate Tail executed in Michael For when an Estate for Life is in the Auncestor by way of Retainer and an Estate is afterwards limited to his Heirs this is within the Rule put in Shelley's Case in 1 Co. where the Auncestor takes an Estate of Freehold and by the same Conveyance an Estate is limited to his Heirs Mediately or Immediately they are Words of Limitation and not of Purchase because the Heir is part of his Father Our Case is stronger that Fenwick and Mitfords Case It s true the same Reason for that Case is not given by Anderson and More which is given by my Lord Coke More 437. There the Reason is because the Limitation to the right Heirs is merely void here Michael hath an Estate in Tail of the ancient Use therefore 't is not necessary for the Law to create an Estate for Life Obj. That this cannot be an Estate Tail executed in Michael because the Estate for Life is not by the same Limitation but by Construction of Law But my Lord Coke says in Fenwick and Mitfords Case 1 Inst 22. b. that there is no difference where the Estate is created by Law and where by the Deed. 1 Anderson 259. and the Law retaining an Estate in Michael for Life our Case is the same as if the Estate had been limited to him with the Remainder to his Heirs Male begotten on his second Wife which would be an Estate Tail executed in Michael and would have discended to Ralph Twisden Justice for the Plaintiff I hold there 's no Use raised to Ralph by this Deed. We are here in the construction of a Deed and not of a Will It may be an Estate should be raised in such a case by a Will altho' my Lord Hobart is of a contrary Opinion I agree the Case of Hodgkinson and Wood Cro. Car. 23. but it cannot be argued from thence that it shall be so in a Deed for a Devise is not to take effect till after the Death of the Devisor and then 't is apparent that he is Heir Male of his Body It hath been agreed that Heirs Male of the Body are words of purchase It is plain that Ralph cannot take as Special Heir unless by Purchase and that he cannot do because he who shall take by virtue of such a Limitation ought to be Heir as well as Issue Male and Ralph here cannot take by vertue of the Statute de Donis Conditionalibis because none can take as Special Heir but where his Ancestor took before and therefore this Limitation is utterly void To make this Limitation good divers ways have been urged First That this Deed has an operation by way of returning of the Use and it has been compared to my Lord Pagets Case which differs from it here cannot be any part of the old Use in Michael for if he hath an Estate for Life it ought to be a new Use It cannot be a returning Use for the Limitation to the Heirs Male of the Body
Estate Tail in Michael First Because in this Case the Use returns by operation of Law and executes an Estate in Michael for Life which being conjoined to the Estate limited to the Heirs Male of his Body makes an Estate Tail This Estate for Life rising by operation of Law is as strong as if it had been limitted to him for his Life and after his decease to the Heirs Male of his Body Secondly Because that a Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body is in Construction of Law a Limitation to himself and the Heirs Male of his Body There is a great difference when he who has the Use limits it to A. for Life the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of B. here no Estate can rise to B. because nothing moved from him but where he who has the Estate limits it to the Heirs Male of his own Body ut res valeat he shall have it for his Life Thirdly It is plainly according to the intent of the Parties the intent perfectly appears that the Issue by the second Wife should take and that Robert the eldest Son should not take till so much Money be paid therefore if we can by any means serve the intent of the parties we ought to do it as good Expositors For as my Lord Hobart says Judges in Construction of Deeds do no harm if they are astuti in serving the intent of the Parties without violating any Law Obj. Here the Use being never out of Michael he hath the ancient Use which is the Fee simple and consequently being the ancient Use and this being a new Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body the ancient use and the new one cannot be piec'd to make an Estate Tail executed in Michael but it shall be a Contingent Use if any which ought to rise to the Heir Male of his Body and so remains the ancient Fee simple And it hath been compared to these Cases If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J.S. or of his Son after his Marriage or after the Death of J. D. these are Contingent Limitations and there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor to serve the future Uses Resp 'T is true if a Man Covenants to stand seized to such Uses as that he leaves a discendible Estate in himself As if a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of his Son from and after his Marriage this is purely a Contingent Use because t is possible the Marriage may never take effect and nothing is fetch'd out of the Covenantor so if he Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J. S. after 40 years there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor and therefore those Cases are not to be resembled to our Case where the Estate of Michael cannot continue longer than his Life And this without any wrong done to any Rule of Law may be turned to a Use for Life and therefore such construction shall be Object 2. Here is an Estate to rise by way of Use by a Deed and not by a Will which shall not be by Implication by a Deed. Resp It s a certain truth But we are not here upon raising an Estate by Implication but qualifying an Estate that is now in the Father which by this new Deed is to be qualified to be an Estate for Life to preserve the Estate Tail so that the Cases of Implication are not to the purpose Object 3. In this Case Michael shall be in of his ancient Estate in Fee simple which is in him and not of a new Estate created by Implication of Law and it hath been compared to the Devise of Land to a Mans Heir he shall not be in by the Devise but of his ancient Estate that would have descended to him Resp True But in this Case a Man may qualifie his Estate as in Gilpins Case Cro. Ca. 161. Devise to his Heir upon Condition that he shall pay his Debts in a year the Heir is a Purchasor so here is a qualification to turn the Estate of Michael into an Estate for Life ut res valeat Object 4. Michael had not an Intention to have an Estate for Life for in the Limitation of the other Lands he has limited them expressly to himself for Life and if he had intended to have had an Estate for Life in the Lands in question he would also have so expressed it Resp The intention will not controul the operation of Law his main intent was to settle the Lands upon his younger Children this the Law serves but not his secondary intentions If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of himself for Life without impeachment of Wast and afterwards to the Use of the Heirs Male of his Body the Law supervenes his intention and makes him to be Tenant in Tail And in our Case there was a necessity to limit the other Lands to himself for Life because there was another Estate to intervene the Estate for Life and the Estate Tail The Reason given by my Lord Coke in Fenwick and Mitfords Case is plain enough and it appears that he was of that Opinion afterwards by the Report of Pannel and Lanes Case 13 Jac. in Rolls Rep. 1 part 238. The Case upon which I shall rely which has not been answered is my Lord Pagets Case adjudged by all the Judges of England Tho. Lord Paget Covenants in consideration of the discharge of his Funerals Payment of his Debts and Legacies out of the profits of his Land and for the advancement of his Son Brother and others of his Blood that he and his Heirs would stand seized of divers Mannors to the Use of T.F. one of the Covenantees for the Life of my Lord Paget and after his Death to the Use of C. Paget for the term of 24 years and then to the Use of W. Paget his Son in Tail with Remainders in over and afterwards the Lord Paget was aâ—â—â—nted of Treason And it was adjudged that the Lord Paget himself had an Estate for his Life for the Remainder being limited after his Death the Estate cannot pass out of him during his Life and there in Case of a Covenant to stand seized he himself hath an Estate for Life And this is not because the Estate returns as my Brother Twisden has said but because the Estate was never out of him and cannot return either from the Heir or the Covenantee otherwise where should it be during the Life of the Lord Paget who was attainted the Book is that it was never out of him but was turn'd into an Estate for Life So that now it is all one as if he had Covenanted to stand seized to the Use of his eldest Son after his Death And the question is What Estate he has during his Life It is adjudged that he has an Estate for Life for if there had been a Contingent Fee simple in the Lord Paget his Heir could never have had an Amoveas manus
for if a Man Covenants to stand seized to a Contingent Use and afterwards is attainted of Treason before the Contingency happen the Contingency shall never rise for the King has the Estate discharged and the Use is to rise out of the Estate of the Covenantor so is Moor Sir Tho Palmers Case 815 In Moors Rep. of my Lord Pagets Case 194. It s said that W. Paget had an Amoveas manus for the Estate of the Queen leased by the Death of my Lord Paget In Sir Francis Englefeilds Case Popham 18. n. 7. It s resolved that no Use rises because t is that it shall Discend Remain or Come which is uncertain but if he had Covenanted that after his Death he and his Heirs would have stood seized to the Use of John an Use would have resulted to Sir Francis Second Point I conceive if it be impossible for Ralph to take by Discent this would be a Contingent Use in him by Purchase The great Objection against this is that the Limitation is to an Heir and an Heir which ought to take by Purchase ought not to be only Heir of the Body c. but Heir general Of this I am not well satisfied I conceive the Remainder being limited to the Heirs of the Body of Jane begotten by Michael such a Limitation will make a special Heir to serve the turn and t is not to be resembled to Shelley's Case My Reasons are First Because at the Common Law before the Statute de Donis notice was taken that this was a special Heir and therefore 't is no wrong done to make him here a qualified Heir In the Statute de Donis 't is said When Lands are given to Man and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten Secondly Vpon the special penning of the Deed it is apparent that Michael took notice that he had an Heir at Common Law therefore it can't be intended that he meant here such an Heir that should be Heir general to him this would be Contradictio in Adjecto Litt. Sect. 352. puts this Case If a Feoffment be made upon Condition that the Feoffee shall give the Land to the Feoffor and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten In this Case if the Husband dye living his Wife before the Estate Tail is granted to them the Feoffee ought to make the Estate as near the Condition and as near the intent of the Condition as may be viz. To let the Land to the Wife for her Life without impeachment of Wast the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of the Husband on her begotten If the Husband and Wife dye before the Gift made then the Feoffee ought to make it to the Issue and to the Heirs of the Body of his Father and Mother begotten Suppose that this had been to a second Wife and there had been Issue by a former the Book of 12 H. 4. 3. says that there it shall be in another manner but Litt. says it shall be as near vid. Litt. Sect. 22. Morevils Case Fitzh Tail 23. 2 Ed. 3. 1. 4. Ed. 3. 50. by all these Cases it appears that no regard is had whether the Son be Heir of the Husband if he be Heir of their two Bodies Therefore it seems that by this Limitation Ralph shall take by way of Contingent Remainder For Heirs of the Body of the second Wife is a good name of Purchase I have not read any Case against this Hill 16. or 26 Eliz. there was this Case A Man taking notice in his Will that his Brother who was dead had a Son and that he himself had three Daughters who were his right and immediate Heirs he gave them 2000 l and gave his Land to the Son of his Brother by the name of his Heir Male. Provided If his Daughters troubled his Heir then the Devise of the 2000 l to them should be void And it was resolved that the Devisor taking notice that others were his Heirs the Limitation to his Brothers Son by the name of Heir Male was a good name of Purchase and this agrees with Cownden and Clarks Case in Hob. Wild Justice said he was of the same Opinion with Hale in this last Point And Iudgment was given for the Defendant Three Learned ARGUMENTS One in the Court of Kings-Bench BY Sir FRANCIS NORTH Attorny General And Two in the Court of Exchequer BY Sir MATTHEW HALE Chief Baron there The Argument of Sir Francis North. In Banco Regis Potter and Sir Henry North. IN a Replevin for taking of an Horse in a certain place called the Fenn at Milden-Hall in the County of Suffolk the Defendant makes Cognizance as Bayliff to Sir Henry North and saith That the place Where c. containeth Ten thousand Acres of Pasture in Milden-Hall whereof a certain place called Delfe is parcel and that it is Sir Henry North's Freehold and the Horse was Damage feasant there c. The Plaintiff Replies Confessing the Soyl to be the Freehold of Sir Henry Norths but says That time whereof c. the place Where hath been parcel of the Fenn and parcel of the Mannor of Milden-Hall of which Sir Henry North is seised in Fee and that the Plaintiff was at the time c. seised of an Ancient Messuage one of the Freeholds holden of the Mannor by Rents and Services and parcel of the said Mannor and that Time out of Mind there were divers ancient Freehold Messuages holden of the said Mannor by Rents and Services and divers Copyhold Messuages parcel of the said Mannor by Custom of the said Mannor demised and demisable by Copy of Court Rolls of the said Mannor And the several Tenants of the said Freehold Tenements being seised in their Demesn as of Fee and they whose Estate they have in the same Time out of mind have had together with the Customary Tenants of the said Customary Tenements the sole and several Feeding of 100 Acres of Pasture for all Beasts except Hogs Sheep and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Freeholds every year at all times of the year as to their several Freeholds belonging And that within the said Mannor there is and Temps d'ont c. hath been such a Custom that the several Tenants of the Customary Messuages together with the Freeholders aforesaid have used and accustomed to have the sole and several Feeding of the said 100 Acres of Pasture for all their Beasts except Sheep Hogs and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Copy-holds every year at all times in the year tanquam ad seperal ' Tenementa customar ' spectant ' pertinent ' and the Plaintiff being seised put in his Horse c. and so Iustifies Vpon this the Defendant demurs generally This Prescription is naught in substance and Judgment ought to be given for the Defendant upon these Four Exceptions First That several Freeholders cannot joyn or be joyned in a Prescription to claim an entire Interest in another mans Soyl as
much for every Pound breach is a good Prescription to bind the Tenants but naught as to Strangers because as to the Tenants it might have a good beginning by way of Reservation but as to a Stranger it could have no Lawful beginning by way of Grant or Reservation or any way that can be imagined Now if we examine the Prescription in the Case in Question by these Rules we shall find First That the Thing prescribed for does not agree in the nature and quality nor is applicable to the Thing to which it is annexed The Thing prescribed for is an entire determinate Interest and the Thing to which it is annexed is several Estates that have no relation one to another the Usage of one can have no relation to the Usage of another I would put this Case In an Action of Trespass the Defendant Iustifies for Estovers certain or Pasture certain in this Mannor and that he is seised of a Messuage c. in Fee and that J. S. is seised of another Messuage c. in Fee and that he and J. S. and all they whose Estates they have in the said two Messuages have had ten Load of Wood c. or Feeding for 500 Beasts Or if two Lords of several Mannors in Fee joyn in prescribing for a certain Rent under Favour it were absurd and never was known or allowed for the Things to which c. being several the Usage of necessity must be several and the Prescriptions also must be several As for Example For one of them to prescribe for a Moiety c. The Reason why a man cannot prescribe to have Estovers of Wood to Land is because there can be no Usage to annex it for it cannot be used with it and in all Cases Prescription follows the nature of the Usage and therefore in the Case at Bar the Usage being several and the Estates several the Prescription ought to be several also It is impossible to raise such an Interest by a Grant at this day for if such a Grant were now made either the Grantees would be Joyntenants of this Interest and then there would be a Survivorship or else they would be Tenants in Common of it and their several Interests might be annexed to their several Estates by Purparties or Apportionment And so it would be in the nature of several Grants and there must be to several Prescriptions several Men that have had Land time out of mind yet cannot joyn in making Title but must make it severally As for Example If there be Three one of them must say That his Father was seised of a Third part that discended to him and so make a Title against a Stranger tho' there be a joynt Possession And if he be to make a Title against his Companions he may say That he and all those whose Estates they have in the other Two parts they cannot say That their three Fathers were seised of the Lands and shew the several Discents nor That they Two and all whose Estates they have in Two parts in Three to be divided have held in Common For the Title of the one concerns not the other they are upon Lines and Discents and Prescription is making of a Title as was said before and the Law is as strict in it or rather more strict than in making of a Title to Land Therefore several Men that have several Estates and no Relation one to another cannot joyn in making a Prescription for the Prescription of one does not concern the other Rastal's Entries 622. d. en Trespass c. Two Commoners to avoid prolixity and repetition do as near as they can joyn in a Prescription but being considered it is a several Prescription as much as if they had Iustified severally My Lord Coke's Rule on Littleton 197. a. That Tenants in Common may joyn in an Assize for an entire thing as an Hawk or an Horse for the necessity of the case It may be objected that there is the same necessity here I Answer That tho' in that case they joyn in the Demand and the Action yet they must make their Titles severally as they are they must Sue as they may Recover which cannot be half an Hawk or half an Horse but when they come to make their Titles in Pleading they must set them forth distinct there the possession is joynt and cannot be severed but in our case the possessions are several and one hath nothing to do with the other and the thing claimed is in its nature severable either by Moieties Purparties or Apportionment It may be Objected against my Rule That a Prescription must be as a Grant may at this day be made that 11 H. 7. 13 14. a man may prescribe against a great many as Tenants or a Commonalty without naming a party certain and such a Prescription cannot spring out of one Grant no more than this For if a great many may joyn in one Grant yet it is so many several Grants as to their several Interests and so it may be said there ought to be so many several Prescriptions I Answer The Rules are not alike For if 100 Men being a Generality as all the Tenants of the Mannor of Dale make the same king of Grant to J.S. or there be the same kind of Reservation and the thing claimed be annexable to the Estate of J. S. these all unite in the Grantee and his Estate and the Estate continues entire Time knits and unites it and an entire Prescription will serve being it will serve the Case But when a Grant is made from one to many that have several Estates their Estates are carried and discended several ways and Time and Usage makes them distinct and several and cannot be served by the same Prescription But the Prescription at Bar is worse upon my Second Reason for Prescription and Custom are of contrary Natures and incompatible and cannot give being to the same thing Prescription is a Title presuming a Grant to the Freeholders and a Lawful beginning The Copyholders claim by Custom because they are but Tenants at Will and not capable of a Grant their this must be raised from the Lord by parcels ' which being an Entire thing it cannot be For which soever should be raised first the rest must be left in the Lord who cannot have a Right of sole Pasturage in his own Soyl distinct from the Soyl. It may be Objected here That Custom and Prescription are not of such contrary Natures as I make them for in Day and Savage's Case in Hob. 85. the Pleadings were as a Custom of the City and the Court Adjudged it to be a Prescription which shews that Custom and Prescription differ not so much in the nature of the Thing as in the manner of the Pleading For Answer I need but observe the Nature of that Case The Officers of the City of London Iustified for a Duty of Wharfage claimed by the City The Plaintiff sets forth in his Replication That within
the Sheriffs Farm but he made Bayliffs of his own there and they were within the Survey of the Court of Augmentations so I say it refers only to those Hundreds which made a part of the Sheriffs Farm 2. None of these Statutes extend to prohibit a Grant of an Hundred in Fee I apprehend my Lord meant a Regrant of an Hundred which before those Statutes had been granted out in a Fee for 2 E. 3. c. 12. rejoyns and prohibits the Grant of those Hundreds only which were set to Farm by the King for term of Life or otherwise The very words of the Statute 14. E. 3. c. 9. make provision for the Hundredors in Fee 't is said that they which have Bayliwicks or Hundreds c. shall answer for their Bayliffs Fitzh Petition 1. there is a complaint of one who is turned out of an Hundred he had in Fee because of the Statute called there the New Statute And perhaps these Hundreds were seised upon the like pretence and that was the matter of the Presentment mentioned in the Grant of E. 3. or rather Regrant 3. Neither this Statute nor the Decree or Report of the Case in this Court does extend to this Case for they are not to be understood of nor extended to a Case wherein Retorna Brevium is granted were not Retorna Brevium added 't is true the Grant of the Bayliwick might be void where an Hundred is granted at this day the Grant is good but by Virtue of this Statute the Sheriff may put in and use his Bayliffs there the collection of the Profits c. the Grantee shall have but the execution of Writs is in subserviency to the Sheriff still I speak where no Retorna Brevium is granted this Bayliff shall not be a Bayliff to the Sheriff in spight of his Teeth and this was the very Case of Fortescue he had a Grant of the Three Hundreds of Newport We find the Farm of these Hundreds formerly here in the Exchequer the Firma Ballivatus in Chiltern c. the Farm of the three Hundreds of Newport was 5 l then in 13 E. 3. 7 l then in 23 E. 3. 9 l then in R. 2. 10 l c. these were the ancient Farms Queen Elizabeth grants a Lease of these three Hundreds to Fortescue for three lives at a certain Farm but does not grant him Retorna Brevium This grant indeed was adjudged void viz. as to the excluding of the Sheriff observe what my Lord Coke saith in the Case by the Statute c. saith he Hundreds are rejoyned as to the Balywick of the same to the Counties and all grants made of the Balywicks of Hundreds since that Statute are void and the making of the Bayliffs thereof belong to the Sheriff for the better execution of Iustice and of his Office and so it was resolved c. the Grant at this day is good as to what belongs to the Lord of an Hundred but not as to the execution of Process which belongs to the Sheriff so that I say 1. Consider the Grantee as an Officer for the collection of the Profits c. and so it is a good Grant 2. Consider him as an Officer for the Kings Process and so 't is void because the Sheriff ought not to have a Bayliff put upon him and the Grantee shall not be the Sheriffs Bailiff whether the Sheriff will or no. But 3. I say if the Grant be with Retorna Brevium then it is a good Grant as to the Bayliwick and all for in that Case the Sheriff is at no inconvenience for the Grantee shall do all and shall be liaable to all the Escapes and all things done or suffered by him My Lord Coke was very wary in what he said about this matter for he knew and the truth is if this Statute should make the Grants of Hundreds void it would call in question most of the Hundreds in England and particularly would shake his own Grants of Hundreds which he passed when Attorney General and some of which his Posterity enjoy at this day 8 H. 7. fol. 1 2 3 4 5. and 13 H. 7. fol. 19 20. Pl. 2. is a great Case concerning an Hundred granted by Ed. 4. and afterwards by R. 3. wherein there are many Questions much argued whereof the chief is whether a Leet may be granted and pass as part and parcel of a Hundred and 't is adjudged that it may but it is the Opinion of all on all sides that the Grant of an Hundred is good and so much is implied and concluded in the Iudgment Coke upon Amerediths Case 9. Co. 29 30. there Iudgment is given that the Grant of the Hundred is good I know that in 11 H. 4. by Special Act of Parliament vid. 1 H. 4. c. 11. the Sheriffs had an allowance made to them for several Hundreds which had been parcel of their Farms and were granted away which could not have been if this Statute had made the Grants void I think there ought to be Judgment for the Plaintiff Nevertheless I am glad with all my heart that we are delivered of this Case for truly if I could have found any Thing to satisfie my Iudgment I would have given Iudgment another way both for the General Concern and for the sake of the County of Gloucester which I know will suffer much by this thing One short Act of Parliament of three Lines viz. That all Process should go with a non omittas propter aliquam libertatem saving still the Liberty of a Mans House which indeed the Law in all such Cases saves now would avoid a great delay of Justice many Suits and Vexations grievous Wrongs and oppressions and would do more good to the Kingdom than all the Liberties of Retorna Brevium have been worth these 100 years for as they are used now they are nothing but a foundation of Brocage and Mischief they are a Feather in his Cap that has them but they are a Thorn in the Foot of every one that has to do with them For first the Party must go to the Undersheriff and there he is handled then through another Purgatory to the Bayliff of the Liberty and there he is handled and then to the Underbayliff and there he is handled and then to the Sheriff again I confess I drew a short Act once and I wish some good man would now promote it It is adjourned into the Exchequer Chamber THE CASE OF COLLINGWOOD and PACE IN THE Exchequer Chamber The Lord Chief Baron HALE's Argument IN the Argument of this Case I shall suppose as clear and unquestionable these three things viz. First That Patrick the Son and William the Grandson of Nicholas the elder Brother are not inheritable to John the Earl because though they are both Denizens born yet Nicholas their Father thorough whom they must convey their Pedigree was an Alien Secondly That as Patrick and William cannot inherit so neither can they obstruct the Discent to John the Son of
that he should suffer a Recovery his Term is not drowned 195 Tenant for Life with power to make a Jointure suffers a Recovery the Power is extinguished 226 227 Good tho' a Stranger that hath nothing in the Land be made Tenant to the Praecipe for a Recovery being a Common Assurance is to be favourably expounded 358 Whether a Recovery can be suffered where the Tail is expectant upon an Estate for Life the Tenant for Life not being made Tenant to the Praecipe 360 Release See Obligation Of all Demands its effect 314 Remainder Contingent Remainder by what Act destroyed 188 306 334 345 No Cross Remanders upon Construction in a Deed tho' sometimes in a Will 224 Rent Difference between a Rent and a Sum in Gross 99 Lease by Tenant in Fee and Rent reserved to the Lessor Executors Administrators and Assigns the words Executors and Administrators void 162 A Rent may be reserved by Contract without Deed 242 Where Rent shall be suspended and where apportioned by the Lessors Entry 276 277 Reputation Lands repurted parcel of a Mannor shall pass in a Recovery under the Word Appurtenances 52 Retorn Sheriff amerced for retorning Non est inventus on the Writ brought against his Bayliff 12 24 Sheriff retorns that Goods came to the Executors hands elongavit vendidit disposuit ad proprium usum suum convertit this tantamounts to quod devastavit 20 221 Sheriff retorns upon a Fi. fa. that he had taken Goods and that they were rescued from him not good 21 Action against Sheriff for a false Retorn of Cepi Corpus 85 Revocation What shall be a good Revocation upon a Power reserved 278 infra S. Scandal See Action upon the Case for Slander Scandalum Magnatum I do not know but my Lord of P. sent G. to take my Purse Action lies 59 Difference between an Action on the Statute of Scandalum Magnatum and a Common Action of Slander the Words in one Case shall be taken in mitiori sensu and in the other in the worst sense against the Speaker that the Honour of Great Persons may be preserved 60 Sewers Commissioners of Sewers and their Proceedings subject to the Jurisdiction of the King's Bench notwithstanding the Clause in Statute 13 Eliz. cap. 9. 67 Sheriff Sheriff may bring Trover for Goods taken in Execution and after taken away by the Defendant in the first Action 52 Soldiers Every Officer and Soldier as liable to be arrested as a Tradesman or any other person whatsoever 251 A Captain and Serjeant committed to Newgate for a great Misdemeaner in rescuing a Soldier ibid. Statutes When a Statute makes an Offence the King may punish it by Indictment but an Information will not lie when a Statute doth barely prohibit a thing 63 31 Ed. 1. Statute of Winton in an Action upon this Statute what taking shall be sufficient to discharge the Hundred 118 235 4 Ed. 3. cap. 7. Action lies for Executors upon this Statute for cutting and carrying way Corn 187. This Statute hath been always expounded largely ibid. 3 H. 7. cap. 2. A Wife forcibly married contrary to this Statute shall be admitted to give Evidence against her Husband 244 5 Eliz. cap. 4. For using a Trade not being Apprentice thereto 8 51 142 326 346 364. This Statute in relation to Apprentices expounded 174 31 Eliz. cap. 7. Of Cottages no Offence against this Statute to erect a Cottage if no body inhabits therein 107 43 Eliz. cap. 2. Poor By this Statute that enables Justices of Peace to tax a Neighbouring Parish the Justices may tax any of the Inhabitants and not the whole Parish 350 21 Jac. cap. 26. Of Felony to Personate 301 12 Car. 2. Of Ministers A good Act being made by King Lords and Commons and any defects in the Circumstances of calling them together ought not to be pried into 15 This Act extends only to Benefices with Cure ibid. 14 Car. 2. cap. 10. 16 Car. 2. cap. 3. Harth-mony Smiths Forges shall pay 191 192. So empty Houses 312 14 Car. 2. cap. 33. Of Printing Seditious Books 316. 16 Car. 2. cap. 7. Of Gaming Articles for above 100 l at a Horse Race within this Statute 253 254 17 Car. 2 cap. 2. Of Non Con-Ministers explained 328 29 Car. 2. Of Frauds and Perjuries No Promise made before the 24th of June within this Act 330. What Contracts within ths Act 361 31 Car. 2. Habeas Corpus Prayer must be made by Council wiihin the first Week after the beginning of the Term 346 T. Tail THO' a Term in gross cannot be entail'd yet where man hath a Term in point of Interest and at the same time the Trust of the Inheritance here he may entail the Trust of the Term to wait upon the Inheritance 194 What Words create an Estate Tail and what in Remainder contingent or vested 215 230 231 Estates Tail how forfeitable for Treason 299 infra A Devise to a Man and the Heirs Males of his Body with a proviso if he attempts to alien the Estate to cease the Condition void 321 322 A Limitation in Tail how it operates 378 Tender Tender and refusal is as much as payment 167 Tender where not good 252 261 Teste Where the Teste of a Writ before it was taken out is notwithstanding good 362 Tythes May be paid of a Warren by Custom 5. So of Doves and Fish ibid. Whether an Executor may bring Debt upon the Statute 2 E. 6. for Tythes due to the Testator 30 31 Where and what Modus shall bar the Recovery of Tythes in specie 32 A Prescription cannot be suggested time out of mind to pay a Modus for Tythe Hops since they were not known in England till Queen Elizabeth's time 61 Tythes of VVood tho' not Fewel payable unless exprest to be burnt in a House for the maintenance of Husbandry 75 Treason In Coyning and Clipping the Judgment 254 For raising a Rebellion in Carolina 349 Trespass See Pleading Quare Clausum fregit and threw down his Fences what Plea in Justification good 221 Continuando in Trespass where good and where not 363 Trust See Tayl. A Use in former time the same with what a Trust is now 130 Where a Trust for Life Remainder over with Power of Revocation is forfeitable and where not 128 infra Whether a Trustee is compellable to produce Writings or the Key of the Box wherein they are against the Interest of the Party for whom he is Trustee 197 Tryal See Venue What shall be Cause for new Tryal what not 30 Justices of Assize may try Informations tho' commenced before the Justices of a former Assizes 85 181 V. Venue WHere a Deed is forged at S. and given in Evidence at D. from whence the Venue ought to come in an Information thereupon 17 A Breach of Covenant assigned in Barwick the Venue shall arise from the next place in Northumberland 58 Judgment by Nihil dicit reverst after a Writ of Enquiry executed because no
tit ' Act ' Case 120. So 9 H. 6. 60. Action against an Escheator who had taken an Office whereby the Party was found to hold of J.S. and he retorned one whereby he was said to hold the Moiety in Capite Where an Officer does any thing against the Duty of his Place and Office and a Damage thereby accrues to the Party an Action lies 'T is positively affirmed here he had the greater Number Archer of the same Opinion This is a wilful dental of the duty of the Defendants Place and for the particular Damage an Action lies 'T was said there might be many Competitors and all might bring Actions No for 't is averred that the Plaintiff had the greatest Number An Action lies against an Arch-Deacon for not inducting F. N. B. 94. So if a Sheriff will not execute a Writ of Seisin an Action lies against him An Action lies against an Ordinary for admitting a wrong Patrons Clerk against a Verdict in a jure patronatus Hob. 318. I agree to the Case put at the Bar that upon a Writ de Coronatore eligendo if the Sheriff will not retorn him Coroner who was chosen by the major part an Action upon the Case lies tho' I know no Authority for it in point Vid. 6 E. 4. 9. b. Pl. 21. A man that has a Title to an Office before he has possession shall have an Action upon the Case after an Assize 21 E. 4. 23. is as memorable a Case for the purpose as any I know there Fairfax gives good advice to Pleaders to mind Actions upon the Case and then he said the use of the Subpoena would not be so frequent Hob. 205. Action for suing double Execution I think Actions upon the Case should be according to Justice Fairfax's his advice favoured in Courts of Justice Tyrrell Perhaps there never was such an Action which is an Argument against it Litt. 107. but I think it lies Action lies not against a Lord for not admitting a Copy-holder nor against Feoffees in trust for refusing to make a Feofment or a Tenant for refusing to Attorn or against a Foeffor for refusing to make Livery according to the Charter but it lies against an Officer or against a Clerk for refusing to enroll This Action is for Damages for being prevented of having the Office and not for the Office it self The Cases of the Copy-holders c. are not to be compared to this for there are proper Remedies for them as Subpoena's and other Writs at the Common Law but here is none De cetero non recedunt Partes a Curia nostra sine Remedio ne Curia deficeret in Justitia exhibenda says the Statute And my Lord Coke says 't is a Maxim in Law that no Action lies for the Ward against the Lord which disparages him but the next of Kin may enter Co. Lit. 107. An Action lies as much for injurious preventing him of having the Office as for hindring in of him the executing of it after that he is in For Actions of the Case are not of any certain Form but vary according to the Circumstances It was objected That every Action upon the Case supposes dammens injuriam now here was no Election 't is impossible to know whether he should be an Officer Answ The Custom is alledged positive that he which hath the greater Number is elected ipso facto again qui destruit medium destruit finem 't is as bad as if he had turned him out of his Office It may be tried whether he were duly elected and 't is in effect tried here there cannot be multiplicity of Actions brought by this this Mayor will make himself sole Iudge and Arbiter and dispose of Elections which should be Popular and as my Brother hath said an Action of the Case lies for a possibility of Damage Vaughan Chief Justice contra That wherein I am satisfied is that no Damage appears suppose none had been elected he should not have an Action more than any person in the Town If a Mayor will not elect a Burgess or a Sheriff a Knight no Action lies because there is no Election If an Officer will not elect at all 't is against his Duty and so 't is if he do it unduly but he is punishable in a publick way by Information or it may be by Indictment If 20 had stood must each have recovered the value of the Place Object But there is an Averment that he was chosen by the greater Number Answ That can't be put in Issue or known or tried suppose the Election were by Ballots c. should he have an Action for not opening the Box. In the Case of the Coroner there is apparent Damage and 't is against the Statute and in the Case of Induction there is a certain loss I take it that 't is not Actionable to call a man Bastard while his Father is alive the Books are cross in it nay if Land had Discended I doubt it without a Special Damage no more than to say one had no Title to his Land The Case of the Market is close but there the Person damnified is certain and the thing leads to deprive him of the benefit of the Kings Grant But my Brothers have given the Rule take Iudgment King of Grayes Inn versus Sir Edward Lake ACtion for that whereas he was bred up to the Law and practised it and had many Persons of Honour and others his Clients and thereby got Money and maintained his Family c. The Defendant falso malitiose wrote a Letter to Ann Countess of Lincoln who was the Plaintiffs Client containing that the Plaintiff would give vexatious and ill Councel and stir up a Suit and that he would milk her Purse and fill his own large Pockets c. per quod he lost the said Countess and other Clients Vpon not Guilty pleaded and a Verdict for the Plaintiff It being moved in Arrest of Iudgment Wyld Archer and Tyrrell held that the Action lay 't is a Scandalous Letter concerning his Profession and here is a Special Damage He does give bad Counsel spoken of a Lawyer judged Actionable so Dunce stirring up Suits is taken in malam partem Vaughan Chief Justice I must submit to the Rule given but am of another Opinion In ancient Books we do not read of an Action for Words unless the Slander concerned Life 'T was held not actionable to call Villain unless 't were added he was lain in wait to be seised the growth of these Actions will spoil all communications a man shall not say such an Inn or such Wine is not good Their progress extends to all Professions to say a man was not a good Surveyor has been held actionable The words spoken here have no more relation to the Plaintiffs Profession than to say of a Lawyer he hath a Red Nose or but a little Head to say one had the use of a Womans Body is a slander it being an ideom of speech for lying with
her But Object All these words together to make a Slander Answ No man can assign me such a ratiocination a male divisis ad bene conjuncta I never heard it but in my Lord Straffords Case viz. that many Trespasses should make a Treason 'T is said he stirred up a Vexatious Action so does a Counsell when he Advises an Unsuccessful Action for the party is amerced pro falso clamore He will milk your Purse taken enunciatively signifies no more than Milking a Bull the Phrase is not come to an Idiom So of Filling his Pockets these Words might have been spoken of the Law and indeed they are spoken of the Thing not the Man or his Practice Dunce Corrupt c. concern the Profession but these words are applicable to any If he had said he were not a Good Fidler would that be Actionable Termino Paschae Anno 28 Car. II. In Communi Banco Hockett Uxor versus Stegold Ux ' TRespass for Assault Battery and Wounding of the Baron and Feme Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Verdict was as to the Wife Guilty and quoad residuum Not guilty It was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the Baron and Feme could not joyn in an Action of Trespass for Beating them both 2 Cro. 355 655. 2. That there is nothing found as to the Beating of the Husband and so an imperfect Verdict for the Quoad residuum shall extend only to the other Trespasses done to the Wife Yelv. 106. Vid. Lib. which goes to both Points But the Whole Court were of Opinion that the Verdict had Cured this Mistake in the Action 9 Ed. 4. 51. 6 Acc ' Vid. Styles 349. Termino Paschae Anno 29 Car. II. In Communi Banco Herbert Perrot's Case HE having married a Wife that had an Inheritance of a considerable Value prevails upon her while she was but of the Age of 20 years to levy a Fine upon which the Use was declared to him and her and the Heirs of their two Bodies This was taken in the Country upon a Dedimus potestatem by Sir Herbert Perrot his Father and Mother After which the Wife died without Issue but had Issue at the time of the Fine It was moved in Court that this Fine might be set aside and a Fine imposed upon the Commissioners for the undue Practice and taking of a Fine of one under Age. But all the Judges agreed they could not meddle with the Fine but if the Wife had been alive and still under Age they might bring her in by Habeas Corpus and inspect her and set aside the Fine upon a Motion for perhaps the Husband would not suffer the bringing or proceeding in a Writ of Error And Justice Atkyns said These Abuses which are so frequent in taking Fines were occasioned by the Alteration of the Common Law made by the Statute of Carlisle 15 Ed. 2. that Fines which before were always to be done in Court may now be taken by Dedimus But the Common Law â—alls much short of the Order the Statute prescribes which requires that two Judges of the Court or one at the least should taking with him an Abbot Prior or Knight of good Fame take such Fines whereas 't is now the Common Practice to name Attorneys and Inconsiderable persons The Court were of Opinion That if a Commissioner to take a Fine do execute it corruptly he may be Fined by the Court for in relation to the Fine which is the proper Business of this Court he is subject to the Censures of it as Attorneys c. But they held that they had no power to Fine the Parties for a Misdemeanour in them North Chief Justice and Wyndham would have Fined Sir Herbert Perrot for taking a Fine of one under Age But Atkyns and Scroggs dissented because it did not appear that Sir Herbert Perrot did know she was under Age and it could not be discerned by the View she being Twenty Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 29 30 Car. II. In Communi Banco Sir John Otwaie's Case IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect It was found that there was a Parish of Ribton and Vill of Ribton but not Coextensive with the Parish J.S. had Land in Tail in the Parish and out of the Vill and bargained and sold by Indenture with a Covenant to levy a Fine and suffer a Recovery to the Vses of the Deed of the said Land in the Parish of Ribton and the Fine and Recovery were only of Lands in Ribton and whether this would serve for the said Land in the Parish of Ribton was the Question Serjeant Maynard Argued that it would not and said that the Division by Parishes is wholly Ecclesiastical the Limits of which are equal to the Cure of the Parson But that of Towns and Vills is Civil and hath the same Limits with the Power of the Constable and Tythingman Where a Place is named in a Record of the Law and no more said 't is always intended a Vill tho' when a Vill and Parish are both mentioned and of the same Name they are intended Coextensive The later Authorities have admitted Fines to be levied of Land in a place known 1 Cro. 2 Ro. 20. But in a Recovery the Town must be mentioned But 't is Objected That here the Intention appears by the Deed that these Lands should pass But he Answered That cannot carry the Words further than they are contained in the Record Again it is Objected That the Deed Fine and Recovery do all make but one Assurance True but each hath its several effect the Deed serves to declare the Uses but it cannot make the Record larger than it is in the Subject Matter of it If a Formedon had been brought and the Fine and Recovery pleaded in Bar had it not been a good Reply to have said Nient comprise c. In 2 Cro. 120. Storke and Fox the Case was Walton and Street were two Vills in the Parish of Street and a Fine was of Lands in Street and Resolved that no Lands but in the Vill of Street tho' in the Parish did pass And so is Mo. 910. in case of a Grant 2 Ro. 54. If this were permitted it would introduce much Mischief for men would not know what passed by searching the Record but this should be known only by a Pocket Deed and so they in Reversion a Lord of Ancient Demesne c. would not know when to make their Claim and should be barred by reason of a Private Deed when the Record of the Fine or Recovery did not import that they were concerned Fines are to end Controversies and therefore must be certain and in that respect sometimes receive a stricter Construction than Grants A Fine of a Tenement is not good but ought to be reversed but a Grant of a Tenement will bind On the other side it was Argued that since Common Recoveries have been so much in practice and become the Common Assurances of mens Estates
Tenant in Tail and levying of a Fine there is an Instantaneous Fee in him out of which the new Estate Tail is supposed to be created and that cannot hold bring derived out of a Fee subject to the Forfeiture by Relation but this Point was not touched by the Judges for that they were fully agreed upon the other Point Beasly's Case HE was taken in Execution taken a Recognizance of Bail and he made it appear to the Court that he never acknowledged the Recognizance but was personated by another and thereupon it was moved that the Bail might be vacated and he discharged as was done in Cottons Case 2 Cro. 256. But the Court said since 21 Jac. cap. 26. by which this Offence is made Felony without Clergy it is not convenient to vacate it until the Offender is convicted and so it was done 22 Car. 2. in Spicers Case Wherefore it was ordered that Beasly should bring the Money into Court an be let at large to prosecute the Offender Twisden said it must be tried in Middlesex tho' the Bayl was taken at a Judges Chamber in London because filed here and the Entry is venit coram Domingo Rege c. So it differs from a Recognizance acknowledged before my Lord Hobart upon 23 H. 8. at his Chamber and Recorded in Middlesex there Scire facias may be either in London or Middlesex Hob. rep If a false Bayl be acknowledged it is not Felony unless it be Filed and so held in Timberly's Case The King versus Humphrey's al. AN Indictment upon the Statute of Maintenance and one only found Guilty and it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that seeing but one was found Guilty it did not maintain the Indictment 2 Rolls 81. several were indicted for using of a Trade and said uterque eor ' usus fuit and held not good Sed non allocatur for that in that case in Rolls the using of the Trade by one cannot be an using by the other But this is an Offence that two may joyn in or it may be several as in a Trespass But then it was alledged that the Maintenance was in quodam placito in Cur ' coram Domino Rege pendent ' and not said where the Kings Bench Sate and this was held fatal Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 28 29 Car. II. In Banco Regis Jay's Case A Mandamus to restore to his place of a Common Council Man in the Corporation of Eye in Suffolk The Return was that he was amoved for speaking of approbious words of one of the Aldermen viz. That he was a Knave and deserved to be posted for a Knave all over England And it was moved that the Return was insufficient for words are not good cause to remove a Man from his place in the Corporation To which it was said that this not a difranchising of him but only removing him from the Common Council as a person not fit to sit there To which Twisden said that his place there could no more be forfeited than his Freedom for he was chosen thereunto by the Custom of the place And Magna Charta is that a Man shall not be disseised de liberis consuetudinibus But he held that words might be a cause to turn out a Freeman as if they were that the Mayor or the like did burn the Charters of the Town or other words that related to the Duty of his place But in the Case at Bar the words do not appear to have any reference to the Corporation wherefore it was ordered that he should be restored The Court said that my Lord Hale held That Returns of this nature should be sworn tho' of late days it has not been used and that it was so done in Medlecot's Case in Cro. Abram versus Cunningham UPon a Special Verdict the Case appeared to be to this effect A. possessed of a Term makes B. Executor who makes three Executors and dies two of them dies and the Will of B. the Executor not being discovered Administration is granted cum Testamento annexo to D. who grants over the Term. The surviving Execcutor never intermeddles but so soon as he had Notice of the Will Refused before the Ordinary and the Point was Whether the grant of the Term in the mean time was good Saunders to maintain it Argued That to the making of an Executor besides the Will there was requisite that the Executor should assent and if the Executor refuses 't is as much as if there never had been any There is no Book which proves the Acts of an Administrator void where there is a Will and the Executor renounces Greysbrook and Foxe's Case in Plowden's Com. is that after Administration granted the Executor proved the Will And so in 7 E. 4. 14. in Dormer and Clerke's Case it was held that where there was an Executor who after refused and Administration committed the Administrator should have all the Rent belonging to the Term in Reversion which accrued after the death of the Testator If an Executor be a Debtor and refuses the Administrator may Sue him Which was denied by Twisden because a Personal Action once suspended is ever so Dyer 372. If one makes an Executor who dies and never proves the Will Administration shall be granted as upon a dying Intestate suppose an Executor de son tort had Judgment against him Shall not there be Execution upon a Term as Assets in his hands Twisden It hath been Doubted whether there could be an Executor de son tort of a Term or whether he were not a Disseisor And by the same Reason it may be granted in the present Case for at least the Administrator here is an Executor de son tort before the Refusal Levins contra Anciently Bona Intestati capi solebant in manus Regis as appears in Hensloe's Case in the 9 Co. And since the Power of the Ordinary hath been introduced it was only to grant Administration upon a dying Intestate 4 H. 7. Pl. 10. If the Ordinary cites the Executor to prove the Will and he Renounces 't is said he may grant Administration which implies that it cannot be before So 21 H. 8. cap. 5. is to grant Administration c. upon a dying Intestate or refusal of the Executor the Interest of the Executor commences before the Probat In 36 H. 6. 8. an Executor commanded one to take the Goods and after the Executor refused before the Ordinary who committed Administration and the Administrator Sued the person that took the Goods who Iustified by the Executor's Command and it was held good And a Relation shall never make an Act good which was void for defect of Power And the Court seemed strongly of that Opinion But Serjeant Pemberton desiring to Argue it the Court permitted him to speak to it the next Term. Et sic Adjornatur And afterwards it was Argued again and Judgment was given for the Defendant per totam Curiam Dunwell versus Bullocke IN an Action of
of Jane the second Wife is void and it cannot be returning where the Use is not setled in any Person I agree my Lord Pagets Case because there the Estate was vested in William Paget and the other Use returned by operation of Law and the Estate setled could not be divested but here the Limitation to the Heirs Males being void the ancient Use remained yet in Michael for nothing was out of him he having limited a thing which cannot be And as to a returning Use tho' all be done in an instant yet there is a priority of time in the Eye of the Law for it ought to vest first in him in Remainder and then Return but here nothing vests in the Remainder Secondly It hath béen urged That it shall be made good by Implication of Law and so shall amount to a Covenant to stand seized to the Used of the Covenantor for Life c. and the rather as it has béen said by Wild because Uses are guided by Equity But I answer we are here in case of a Deed where an Estate shall not be raised by Implication as it shall by a Will Cro. Car. Seagood ad Hone 366. A Deed differs greatly from a Will for if a Man Surrenders Copyhold Land to two equally to be divided they are Joynt-tenants but such a Devise would have made them Tenants in Common Admit in some Case an Estate shall be raised by Implication in a Deed yet it shall not be so here for it would be to the disinheriting the Heir As to the case of 13 H. 7. I agree that a Devise to the Eldest Son after the Death of the Wife gives an Estate for Life to the Wife but otherwise it would be upon such a Devise to the Younger Son for there the Eldest Son and not the Wife should have the Estate in the mean time Cro. Jac. Horton and Horton 57. We are not herein Favorabili materiâ and therefore no construction shall be made which does not appear by the words It hath béen strongly urged that this being by way of Use which is a matter of Equity shall be favoured Admit it yet it shall be guided by the Common Law for aequitas sequitur legem There never shall be a Settlement by way of Use to make one capable who is not capable by the Common Law I do not see any difference between a Feoffment to Uses and a Covenant to stand seized for if a Feoffment be made to the use of one for Life the Use shall return which is not disposed of as well as upon a Covenant to stand seized Thirdly It has been urged if these severally cannot support this Limitation yet the intention operating with the Deed will both together make an Estate for Life in Michael But I do not see his intent here to have it for Life the intention even in a Will which is much stronger ought to be collected out of the words of the Will. Cro. Car. Spirt and Bence 368. agreed by the whole Court that words in a Will ought to have an apparent intent to disinherit an Heir and here there is not any apparent intent but rather to the contrary for of some Lands Michael Covenants to stand seised to the Use of himself for Life Remainder c. but of the Lands in question he makes a difference in the Limitation And the words of the Deed are to be considered He Covenants to stand seized to the Uses mentioned declared and limited in the Deed and if Michael shall have an Estate for Life he must have it by operation of Law There was a like case between Flavil and Ventroise in the Common Pleas in which the Court was divided but the same Point came afterwards in question in the Case of Mr. Tape of Norfolk and it was adjudged to be the ancient Use And no Case can be shewn that the Law will create an Estate in the Covenantor where the Use is not vested in any Person but the ancient Use remains in him As to the Cases cited on the other side I have answered my Lord Pagets's Case already And as to my Lord Cokes Case 1 Inst 22. b. I agree the Use returns and the Son is in by discent and so it was adjudged in Fenwick and Mitfords Case there cited But the Paraphrase he makes there I do not understand It is said there when the Limitation is made to his right Heirs and right Heirs he cannot have during his Life the Law doth create an Use in him during his Life Wherefore is this said to make the Heir in by discent No doubt without this he is in by discent and so was the Iudgment in that Case for what Reason then should there be an Estate for Life raised by the Law to be merg'd by the Fee as soon as raised And there 't is said Till the future use come in Esse I do not conceive then where it is so long as the Father lives and what he means by the Future Use I do not know for it always was in Esse and never was out of the Feoffor and this was so adjudg'd in that Case of Fenwick and Mitford and not the construction of my Lord Coke And t is strange that no other Reports should mention his construction Hale Chief Justice for the Defendant If Ralph takes either by Discent from Michael or by Purchase the one way or the other answers the Verdict and the Issue is for the Defendant I shall divide the Case into two Points 1. If he takes by Discent 2. Admitting he does not If he may take by Purchase as this Case is I shall Premise two or three things First It has been agreed if an Estate for Life be raised to Michael the Remainder being to his Heirs Male of the Body of Jane his second Wife the Estate Tail is executed in him be the Estate for Life raised by Implication or express Limitation Secondly It is plain quacunque via It be rais'd that the Estate was long'd in Michael till Ralph the Son be in a capacity to take it either by Discent or Purchase for be it part of the ancient Use or a new Use it ought to be in Michael during his Life for there is nothing to bring it out of him Thirdly In all Cases touching Uses there is a great difference between a Feoffment to Uses a Covenant to stand seized and a conveyance at the Common Law If a Man by Feoffment to uses conveys Land to the use of J.S. for Life he may remit the Use to himself and the Heirs Male of his Body by the same Deed and so alter that wich was before a Fee simple and turn it into another Estate but if A. gives Land to B. for Life Remainder to A. and the Heirs Male of his Body because a Man cannot give to himself the Remainder is void for a Man cannot convey to himself by a Conveyance at the Common Law These things being premised I conceive here is an