covenanted with Sir Edward Sackvil to levy a fine to him of that land before the fine acknowledged the eldest brother dyed and the question was whether the youngest shall be compelled to levy the fine and presidents were commanded to be searched concerning that matter Note that it was said that where a commission issued out of the Court of wards to 4 persons or to any 2 of them and one of them refuse to be a Commissioner and the other 3 sit as Commissioners and he who refused was sworn and examined by them as a witness and ruled that this is good for though he refused to be a Commissioner yet he is not excluded to be sworn as a witness In evidence to the Iury the case was that Tenant in taile bargained and sold his land to I. S. and his heires and I. S. sold to the heire of the Tenant in taile being of full age and Tenant in taile died and the heire in taile claimed to hold his estate and the doubt was whether he was remitted or no Hobert was of opinion that after the death of the Tenant in taile that the heire is remitted for if Tenant in taile bargain and sell his land the issue in taile may enter and where his entrie is lawful there if he happâ— the possession he shall be remitted Hutton and Warberton Iustices contrary For at the first by the bargain and sale the son had fee and then the estate of the son may not be changed by the death of the father he being of full age when he took this estate and this was in an Ejectione firme of land which concerns Sir Henry Compton and the Lord Morley and Mounteagle White against Williams VVHite brought an action of accompt against Williams as his Bayliff to his damages 100. l. the Defendant pleaded he never was his Bayliff and it was found against him and the Iudgement was given that he should render an accompt and at the day the Defendant made default Ideo consideratum est per Curiam quod Querens recuperet versus predict Defendent 42. l. 10. s. and upon that the Defendant brought a writ of error and assigned for error that the Court gave Iudgement of the value without inquiring of the value and it was holden by Gaudy and Fenner only present that the Iudgement ought to be given which the Plantiff had counted of Baron Altham contrarie for the Court may in discretion give a lesser summe Hill 43. Eliz. B. R. vide 14. E 3. Accompt 109. 20. E. 3. 17. Sir George Topping against King VVA st was assigned in the cutting of Elmes and other Trees to such a price and Iudgement was given for the Plantiff by nihil dicit and a writ of inquiry of dammages issued upon that and the Iury found to the dammages of 8. s. and upon this Davies the Kings Serjeant moved to have a new writ of inquiry and that the old writ shall not be returned for the dammages are too litle Winch said all is confessed by the nihil dicit Hobert The Iury here have found the value and presidents were commanded to be searched and Hobert said that if an information is for ingrossing of 1000 quarters of corn and Iudgement is given by nihil dicit and a writ of enquiry issues which findes him guilty of 100. yet this is good And not that at another day the case was moved again it was between Sir George Topping and King and it was said if a man recover in waste by nihil dicit and a writ of inquiry issues the Iury in this case may inquire of the dammages but not of the place wasted for this is confessed and so are the presidents according and Hobert said if the Defendant is bound by the nihil dicit as to the place wasted for what cause shall not he be bound as to the dammages and by all the Court if the jury finde dammages only to 8. s. the Plantiff shall not have Iudgement for it ought to be above 40. s. Hob. this is in the discretion of the Court in this case and it was also said in this case that upon the grant of all the trees and after the grantee cut them and new ones grow upon the slumps which in time will be trees that in this case the grantee shall have them also by Hobert Wetherly against Wells in an action for words VVEtherly against Wells in an action upon the case for these words thou hast stollen hay from Mr. Bells racks and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of Iudgement because he had not shewed what quantity was of that and perchance it may be of so little a value that it is not fellony and the rather because it is hay from the Racks but Hobert contrary that Iudgement shall be given against the Defendant for the Plantiff for it hath been adjudged lately in this Court that where a man was charged with petty Larceny to steal under the value of 12. d. that an action of the case will lie for the discredit is not in the value but the taking of that with a fellonious intent and yet it had been adjudged in this Court that where one said of another thou art a thief and hast stolen my trees that in this case an action will not lie but this is by reason of the subsequent words trees for it is said Arbor dum crescit lignum dum crescere nescit And Winch said that it had been adjudged actionable to say thou art a thief and hast stolen my corn and yet perchance not exceed 2. or 3. grains and Warberton said that it had been adjudged in the Kings Bench that where one said thou art a thief and stollest the corn out of my field that no action will lie The Earl of Northumberland and the Earl of Devon NOte that in the case of the Earle of Northumberland and the Earle of Devon execution issued out for dammages recovered against the Bayliff of the Earle of Northumberland by the name of I. S. of D. and there was I. S. the father and I. S. the son and the father being dead the son issued his writ of Idemptitate nominis and he prayed to have a supersedeas and Warberton demanded of Brownlow if he had any such president to award a supersedeas in such case who answered no and Warberton and Hutton being only present said that they will advise of that Sir George Sparke Prescription IN a Replevin for the taking of a horse in 5. acres of land in such a place and the Defendant avowed as Bayliff to Sir George Spark and shewed that Sir George Spark and all those whose estate he had in the land had used time beyond the memory of man to have herbage and pasturage in all the 5. acres when that was not sowen and upon this plea the Plantiff demurred Ashley argued for the Plantiff that the prescription is void and this is not
seisin of the homage and therefore perchance it will be hard to finde my antient president they adjourned and at another day Hutton and Winch being only present judgement was given for the avowant against Whitgift and Hutton said that he had spoke with the other Iustices and they agreed Vpon a motion made by Towse the case was this a man made a lease for one year and so from year to year during the Will of the lessor and lessee rendring rent and the lessee died and the rent was behinde and by Winch being only present if the rent is behinde in the time of the lessee and he dies an action of debt is maintainable against his Executor in the detinâ—t only and so I conceive if that was behinde after his death he may have an action in the debt and the detinet or in the detinet only to which Brownlow agreed Secondly Winch said that when a man made a lease for a year and so from year to year at the pleasure of the parties that this is a lease for 3. years and not for two Thirdly he doubted if the lessee hold over his term so that he is tenant at sufferance what remedy the lessor had for his rent Vpon the reading of a record the case was that a Scire facias issued against the land Tenant to have execution of a judgement given against Ferdinando Earl of Darby in the 15. Eliz. and the Defendant pleaded that a long time before the said Ferdinando any thing had in the land one Edward Earl of Darby was seised of the land and being so seised 3. Mar. infeoffed I. S. to the use of the Lord Strange and his wife in tail the remainder over to the said Ferdinando and made the said Ferdinando heire to the estate taâ—le and pretended that by this meanes the land should not be liable to this judgement because it was intailed to Ferdinando and of such estate he died seised the Plantiff traversed the feofment made by Edw. Earl of Darby and the jury found that the feofment was made by Edward Earl of Darby to the same persons as the Defendant had pleaded but this was to the use of the feoffor for life the remainder over to the Lord Strange and his wife the remainder as before and whether this shall be intended the same Feofment which the Defendant had pleaded was the question because the estate for life was omitted and upon the special verdict that was the question and Attoe said that if the jury had found this feofment made to other feoffees though the estate had agreed this should be found against the Defendant and Winch Iustice said that there was such estate found as had taken away the execution or extent and the estate for life is not material but it was adjourned till another day A man Covenanted to make such assurance as shall be devised by the counsel of the Plantiff so the same assurance be made within the county of Norff. or the Citty of Norwich and the Plantiff assigned the breach and shewed that in this case his Councel devised that a fine should be leavied of the same land which was not done and it was moved by Serjeant Attoe that in this case the breach was not well laid because he had not shewed where his councel devised that the fine should be leavied In the case of a prohibition in case of a libel in the Ecclesiastical Court for the tithes of Cattles the Plantiff alleadged that those Cattle of which Tithes were demanded are for his Dairy and for the plough and Winch being only present said that the parson shall not have Tithes of such Cattle but if he bred up Cattle to sell it is otherwise secondly the Plantiff in the prohibition alleadged that time beyond memory the parishoners had paid a half peny for the Tithe of a Calf and a penny for a Cow and that upon a day limitted they use to bring this to the Church and to pay this to the Vicar and now the Vicar had libelled in the spiritual Court against them to compel them to bring it home to his house and Winch said that this is no occasion of a prohibition for they agree in the modus but vary in the place of payment and this is not matter of substance and for that reason no prohibition will lie Vpon the reading of a record the case was that the father made a feofment to the use of himself for life the remainder to his son and his wife and to the heires of the body of the son and this was for a joynture for his wife and the father died and the son also died and whether this was a good joynture was the question for all this matter was pleaded in barre of dower brought by the wife and it was ruled to be no good joynture for the feme notwithstanding that the father died in the life of his son and Hutton said if a man made a feofment to the use of himself for life the remainder to his Executors for years the remainder to his wife for a joynture this will be no good joynture within the Statute of joyntures though the feme here had the immediate franktenement In an action of debt against an Administrator who pleads outlawry in the Testator and it was moved that this was no plea for he had taken the Administration upon him Winch a man who is outlawed may not make an executor for if he meet with his goods he shall answer for them to the King and for that reason it seems to be a good plea 3. H. 6. 32. and Brownlow chief Prothonotary said that he could shew a president 27. Eliz. where this is adjudged to be no plea and Iustice Winch said to him shew that president if any such be and upon Tuesday after he shewed that and then Winch agreed Auditor Curle for words AUditor Curle brought an action upon the case and in his declaration he set forth the Statute of 32. H. 8. for the erection of the Court of Wards and that the same Statute appointed the Auditor of the same Court and shewed that the Plantiff was an Auditor of the same Court and that the Defendant such a day and at such a place said of him you have taken money for ingrossing of feodaries innuendo accompts and tunc et ibidem you are a Cozner and live by Cozning and I will prove that to be Coznage and upon not guilty pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Finch Serjeant of the King that the Plantiff shall not have judgement upon this verdict for the first words are not actionable for the taking of money for the ingrossing of feodaries are insensible and then the inuendo will not help nor aid that also the words in the second place are not actionable because he had not said that he was a Cozning officer and so he had not expresly applied that to his office and
that all such recoveryes shall be void and shall be taken for fained recoveries and this may not be imagined a fained recovery where he in remainder in tail is vouched by him who is Tenant for life Jennings case Coo. 10. and such recovery as is there resolved is out of the Statute of the 14. Eliz. and is good by the Common Law and so in our case but admitting this to be within the Statute of the 11. of H. 7. yet the proviso of the same Statute had made that good for there is an express proviso that a recovery with the assent of the heir inheritable if this appear upon Record this shall not be within the Statute and in our case this is with the assent of the heir inheritable and also this appears to be of record and so the recovery is out of the danger of the Statute of the 11. H. 7. See Doctor and Student a book which was written but a litle time after the making of this Statute and Dyer 89. Vernons case and he said that the intent of the same Statute and of the proviso of the same Statute was to have issues and heirs and not termors who had only a future interest to falsifie recoveries and so he concluded that the recovery is out of the same Statute and that the proviso of the same Statute had made that good by the assent of the heir but admitting this should be against him that this recovery shall be within the Statute yet the lessee in our case shall not falsifie nor take advantage of the forfeiture by force of the same Statute but it hath been objected by Harvy that the wife in this case had only an estate for life or Tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct and he answered that the resolution in Beamounts case Coo. 119. is contrary for it is there expresly agreed that she was Tenant in tail after the fine leavied by the issue and so was it also resolved in Pophams case 9. Eliz. but there it was doubted whether she was Tenant in tail within the 32. H. 8. who might make a lease but all agreed that she was Tenant in tail who may suffer a recovery and binde the remainder and then when the feme suffers such a recovery as in our case that recovery shall take away a term for years which was made by the issue in tail Mich. 20. Jac. C. P. in the life of his mother notwithstanding she was a joynteress within the 11. H. 7. also he said that this lease for years being made by Henry Mark-Williams the son who was heir to the estate in tail and also to the reversion in fee being made by deed indented rendring rent this shall be a lease which issued out of the estate in fee simple and not out of the estate tail and this shall be out of the estate tail by estoppel being by deed indented for an estate shall not enure partly by way of interest and this lease to begin after the death of the feme he may not take advantage of the forfeiture for though the words of the Statute are that all such recoveries shall be void yet this shall not be void without entry and he who will have benefit by this ought to be mabled to enter presently so soon as the recovery is suffered for as there ought to be a person in esse who shall take benefit of the same Statute as appears by Coo. 3. Lincoln Colledge case so there ought to be a present estate in esse at the time of the recovery for the words of the Statute are to whom the interest shall appertain but in our case the interest doth not appertain to the lessee who had only a future term and therefore he shall not take the benefit by any forfeiture within the Statute of 11. H. 7. and the rather in our case because there is a rent reserved also all this matter is found by special verdict what estate the son haâ— when he made the lease by indenture Dyer 244. Coo. 155. and Bredons case in Treports case lessee for life and he in reversion by indenture let for years this is no estoppel and it shall be said to be the lease of one and the confirmation of the other and here the lease shall be said to issue out of the reversion in fee and not out of the estate tail and he vouched a case adjudged 10. Jac. when Flemming was chief Iustice of the Kings Bench between Errington and Errington and the case was that a man conveyed land to the use of himself and his wife in tail the remainder to his right heirs and had issue a son and a daughter and he died and the son let for years to begin after the death of his Mother and he died without issue and the daughter leavied a fine and the wife who was Tenant in tail died and the question was whether this lease for years issued out of the estate tail by way of estoppel for then the Conusee shall not avoid this but it was adjudged this lease was drawn out of the reversion in fee and the Conusee of the daughter shall avoid that which is all one with our case but admit that this lease is good by estoppel out of the estate taile yet he shall not take benefit of the forfeiture within 11. H. 7. and this differs from Sir George Browns case for there the Conuser entered by vertue of a remainder and not by the estate tail which passed to him by estoppel and upon that he concluded that if this is an estate meerly by estoppel he shall not have benefit by that Pope and Reynolds before NOw the case between Pope and Reynolds which see before was moved again by Ashley for the Plantiff in the prohibition and the case was that he was owner of a Park and the Park had been time beyond memory replenished with deer till the 10th of Eliz. at which time that was disparked and that the owners had used before the disparking to pay a Buck in Summer and a Doe in winter in full satisfaction of all Tithes due to the Vicar and the Parson had libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for Tithes in kinde and also traversed the prescription and it was found for the Plantiff in the prohibition and it had been moved in arrest of judgement that notwithstanding this prescription is found for the Plantiff yet he shall not have judgement for two causes First because gross Tithes belong to the Parson and not to the Vicar for the Vicaridge is derived out of the Parsonage to this he answered that for the most part every Vicaridge is derived out of the Parsonage but it is a meer non sequitur that this doth for the Vicarage and the Parsonage may have several patrons Fitzh 45. also a Vicarage may be time beyond memory as in our case 40. E. 3. 2. 7. and Fitz. juris utrum a Vicar may have a juris utrum and
recovery here the Term is saved and yet for the time the lessee was seised to his own use but because that the fine was Preparatory to inable him to suffer the recovery now in this case after the recovery suffered that will look back to the first agreement of the parties and so the Statute hath saved the Term and for that reason if the Statute do save a Term which is of small account much more a freehold and so he prayed judgement for the defendant see more after The case of Hilliard and of Sanders entred Mich. 20. Jac. Rot. 1791. HIlliard brought a replevin against Michael Sanders for the taking of Beasts in a place called Kingsbury and the Defendant avowed and shewed that Sir Ambrose Cave was seised in his demeasne as of fee of Kingsbury where the place in which c. is parcel and 14. Feb. 16. Eliz. granted a rent charge of 42. l. 8. s. 4. d. to one Thomas Bracebridg and to the heirs of Thomas upon Alice to be ingendred the remainder to the right heirs of Thomas and Thomas had issue John and Thomas died and then Iohn his son died having issue Anne the wife of the Avowant in whose right he avowed for the rent of half a year c. 21. l. 4. s. 2. d. due at W. in Bar of which avowrie the Plantiff pleaded that true it is that Sir Ambrose Cave was seised of the Mannor c. and he made the grant according and that Sir Ambrose Cave died seised and that the said Mannor descended to Mary his daughter as daughter and heir to him who was married to one Mr. Henry Knowles and shewed that he was seised and then shewed that the 12. Iac. it was agreed between the said Sir Thomas Bracebridg and Alice his wife Mich. 22. Jac. C. P. and the said Henry Knowles and mary his wife that for the extinguishment and final determination of the said rent that Thomas and Alice should levie a fine to Henry and Mary of the said lands and Tenements aforesaid by the name of the Maniior of Kingsbury 300. Acres of land and of divers other things but no mention was made of the rent and this fine was upon Conusance of right as that which they had c. and also they released all the right which they had in the land to Henry and to Mary and then shewed that after the death of Mary this land descended to two daughters one being now married to the Lord Willoughby the other to the Lord Paget under whom the Plantiff claimed to which the avowant said by protestation that there was no such agreement and for plea that the rent was not comprised and upon that it was demurred in Law and now Serjeant Attoe this Term argued for the Plantiff and the substance of his argument was in this manner Attoe said the case was Tenant in tail of a rent charge agreed with the Tenant of the land to extinguish that and that he would levie a fine of the land to the land Tenant which is upon Conusance of right and upon release which fine is levied accordingly whether this cuts off the tail of the rent and I hold that it will and I do not finde any opinion in all the Law against this but only the opinion of Thornton in Smith and in Stapletons case in Plowden which I do not esteem to be a binding authoritie and the case is Tenant in tail of a rent disseised the land Tenant and levied a fine with proclamation of the same fine to a stranger now said Thornton this shall not bar the issue in tail of the rent because the fine was only levied of the land and he cited this to prove another case which is Tenant in tail of land accepted a fine of a stranger as that which he had c. and he rendered to him a rent and he said that his issue may avoid that rent and this case I grant because the rent was not intailed but for the other case I openly denie that and there is much difference between those two cases for a fine levied of the land may include the rent as well as the land but it is impossible that a fine of rent should include the land and our case here is pleaded to be of the land and of the rent and a fine of the land may carry the rent inclusively because it is a fine of a thing intailed yea it is not a new thing that rent should be carried inclusively by way of extinguishment in the case of a feofment and then á fortiori in a fine which is a feofment upon Record and especially when it is levied on purpose to extinguish the rent and the Statute of fines is more strong for that is of any lands Tenements and hereditaments any wayes intailed to any person c. but this rent is an hereditament intailed to the person who levied the fine and this which is carried inclusively is within the Statute nay if a man had nothing in the land yet if it was intailed to him who levied the fine this shall bar the estate tail for ever as if Tenant in tail made a feofment to G. S. and after that he did levie a fine to a stranger of the same land that in this case the issue shall never avoid this and yet neither the Conusor nor the Conusee had any thing in the land and see for Archers case Cook 3. where the issue in tail levied a fine in the life of his ancestor and a good bar and yet there he had but a possibilitie and so was the case of Mark-williams Mich. 19. Jac. Rot. 763. C. B. where all the distinctions were made for Henry Mark-williams was heir apparant to his Mother who was Tenant in tail and he levied a fine in the life of his Mother and died without issue and then his Mother died and it was ruled that this did not bar the sister heirs because she may have that and never make mention of her brother but in our case if the rent had been granted in fee it had been no question but that a meer release will extinguish that and I think a fine with proclamation is as forcible to extinguish a rent which is intailed as a release is for a rent in fee another reason is this is a fine directly of the rent though this is by the name of land and also this is upon Conusance of right c. and also in that he released and remised to the Conusees all his right in the said land but a case out of Bendloes Reports may be objected Tenant in tail accepted a fine of the land and rendred that for life ruled the issue is not barred but first I do not allow this case to be good law but if it be good law the reason is because he accepted only a fine of the land and for that it only extends to that and not to the rent as if a man is seised
ought to maintain the award but to shew the breach for it shall be otherwise if it be found against him and then Hendon answered to the other exception that this is not for direct usury but is rather for the damage which he sustained by the forbearance of the money and yet if it were for interest it is good and then as to that which now had been agreed by my brother Bridgman that contracts and obligations for usury are good I say then by the same reason an award for that is good for whatsoever a man may contract for the same thing may be awarded if the contract will bear that and usury is not malum in se but only malum prohibitum and is good by our law and here in this case though the Arbitrator was deceived in the summe yet after the award made it is altogether certain and an implied recompence is sufficient in this case but the Court said that the casting up of the accompts did not make an award for it is not a good Calculation but the ending of the controversies that doth make the award but yet the opinion of the Court in this case was that the award was good for an Arbitrement shall not be taken absolutely upon the bare words and the Court did command the parties to come before them upon the morrow in the Treasury and as it seems this was for mediation to make an agreement for the opinion seemed to be for the Plantiff The case of Hilliard and Sanders argued by the Court. IUstice Harvey this Term did argue the case of Hilliard and Sanders which see before and after a brief recital of the case he said that his opinion was that the avowant shall not have return because that by the fine of the lands the rent is extract and I am induced to be of this opinion by two things the first is the agreement and tâ—e other is the favourable exposition of the Statute of fines to settle repose and quiet and I will first shew the efficacie of fines at the common law 21. Ed. 4. the Pryor of Binghams case it is laid for a ground and rule in law if a thing be contained in a fine either expresly or implicitly this is very good and so is 44. Ed. 3. 22. 37. H. 6. 5. for a fine is no more then an agreement and therefore it is called in latin Concordia and then see if by any words you may pass this rent by the fine and though the word rent is not there yet if it be so infolded in the lands that is good with that it is very good and for that 3. H. 7. 16. 17. 21. H. 7. proves that by a feofment of the land the rent doth pass and wherefore not by fine then and this shall be within the Statute of 4. H. 7. and 32. H. 8. and a case may be out of the Statute of 32. H. 8. and yet be within the Statute of the 4. H. 7. as the 2. Ed. 3. in Dyer though the feme after the death of the husband she may enter upon the discontinues of the husband yet if she do not within 5 years she shall be barred and now you see that the construction of these Statutes was alwayes to settle repose and quietness for if such a construction should be made according to the opinion of Chornton in Smith and Stapletons case then it will be mischievous and for his opinion it was only in the way of arguing and yet I conceive he had the good opinion of the Reporter and without all question it is a case of as hard a construction as that is of Archers case where the heir who nothing had in the land in the life of his father did levie a fine this is a bar for ever and the reason is because it is of a thing which is intailed and he cited a case in Bendloes Reports where a discontinuee was disseised by Tenant in tail who levied a fine and the discontinuee entred and then proclamations passed that in this case the issue was barred truly I do agree the case of 36. H. 8. that that a fine levied of land did not bar him who had title of Common or a way the reason is because there is no privitie but in our case there is a privitie and by Margaret Podgers case a Coppiholder is within this Statute and in our case the rent passeth especially in regard of the agreement as in the Lord Cromwels case and he cited a case primo Jacobi between Gage and Selby in an ejectione firme where Gage was Tenant in tail and he levied a fine to I. S. in fee and after he levied another fine to the use of himself for life the remainder over and his brother brought a writ of error to reverse the first fine and ruled that he may not for the second fine had barred him of any writ of error and so I conclude the fine had extinguished the rent The argument of Justice Hutton to the contrary HUtton contrary the fine had not barred the rent in which I will consider the nature of fines at the Common Law and they were of mightie and great esteem and force as appears by the great solemnitie which is used in them as is prescribed in the Statute of fines 18. Ed. 1. de modo Levandi fines and he agreed that such a fine by Tenant in fee simple will pass that inclusively for by the release of all his right in the land a Signiorie is gone I agree also that a fine is but an agreement but yet it must work according to the nature of the thing as upon a writ of Measne or of right of advowson a fine may be levied and yet it is not levied of the lands but of the advowson or Signiorie and so if the writ of covenant be one thing and the agreement of another thing then it is not good and first I will prove that at the Common law fines have been rejected when the writ of covenant did not contain the thing of which the fine is to be be levied and if at the Common law a fine was levied of rent there ought to be a writ of covenant of that 18. Ed. 2. fines 123. and there the rule is given that it is against reason to hold covenant of that which never was and the rent there never was before but ought to begin then and yet it is clear a man may create a rent by fine but he shall not have a writ of covenant of that when it was not in esse before and because the concord may not varie from that therefore it was not received 38. Ed. 3. 17. Knevet put the rule that a fine may not be of more then is in the writ of covenant and when a fine is properly levied of that it is by way of release Fitz. fine 100. and so I conceive here the rent doth not pass Secondly here no man may plead that any fine is levied of
if one be named in the venire facias Gregory is returned George there needs not amendment if it be in a Tales otherwise in a principal pannel 66 Action for words he is as arrant a Thief as any is in England the Plantiff needs not aver that there are Thieves in England for the difference is when the words relate to a particular place and when to an intire Realm and so when it is tied to one kinde of fellonie 70 89 Action upon the case where it lieth for a malitious prosecution at the Sessions 73 An action by the Obligee for the Obligor saying he had forged the bond but if he had said to another that he was a forger and had forged false writings no action lies 76 Action upon the case upon a contract in London to Table with the Plantiff at A. in N. and he then and there assumed to pay 4. s. by the week where the action must be brought 78 An action upon a promise against a Parson in consideration that the Plantiff would better his Tithes by Planting hops that he would allow him 40. s. an acre for his charge if that be a good consideration 80 Action upon the case where it lieth against an Attorney for convinous pleading 90 Action by an Attorney for saying he had forged writings and deserved to lose his ears lieth not 90 91 An action against a Sheriff whethâ—r it lies in the Countie where the return of the extent was made or where the land lies 100 Averment against the Sheriffs return where good and where not 100 Amendment where the venire facias habeas Corpus and the pannel agree but the Jury Rolâ— differs 101 Action of the case upon a promise 101 Action for saying the Plantiff stole a ring and had been hanged but for me lieth 102 Action upon a promise where the time and place of the request ought to be expressed 102 103 112 113 Aâ—bitrators amongst other things award interest mony whether good for all or part 114 120 Action by Serjeant Hitcham for saying I doubt not but to prove Sir Robert Hitcham hath spoken Treason 123 124 B A Bail where he is not liable to the judgement until default be in the principal or if the principal die 61 62 C A Commission to 4. or 2. of them and one refuseth the other sit the 4th may be a witness 45 Condition to save harmless he plead in the affirmative he must show how 9 A Coppiholder releaseth to his Companion it is good without admittance 3 A Coppiholder where he may inclose or dig for Marle and where not 8 A Covenant to injoy without the let of the Grantors c. or by their procurement 4 A Custome for a Coppiholder to cut trees at his pleasure is void 1 If Tenant in antient Demesne devise his lands the Devisee shall have fee 1 Covenant See fine Costs where they shall be given against an Administrator 11 A Condition to surrender coppihold he pleads he did it not good because he shewed not when the Court was holden 11 A Commission to seise for recusancie they seise an advowson the Kâ—ng grants to I. S. who presents and is disturbed by the Universitie of Oxford to whom the presentation belongs 11 12 13 Costs upon a Nonsuit at a nisi prius whether assessible by the Court or by the Judge of Assize 16 Common claimed to 600 acres and certain Messuages and lands and that he was disturbed by digging common Borrowes and doth not say he was seised at the timâ— much good matter 16 17 Custome of Merchants in Bills of Exchange varietie of good matter 24 Condition to free the nâ—xt avoidance from incumbrance the Grantors heir presents if that be a breach 25 Custome to have a widdowes estate and the husband is attainted if it holds 27 Condition that I. S. shall levie a fine to the Obligee who sued not a writ of Covenant the Plantiff replies that before c. I. S. had made a feofment of c. whether the Obligee must sue a writ of Covenant 29 30 A Condition contingent where extract by release 30 31 54 55 56 Covenant to make assurance by advice so that it be within Norfolk or Citie of N. a fine is advised not good because not shewed where it should be levied 32 33 Covenant not to alien an advowson without assent the Plantiff saith he had aliened c. good although he had not said by deed 34 Covenant where it raiseth a present use and where not 35 36 37 59 60 Custome touching Marchants and nationall lawes 52 Church shall be repaired by him who hath land there though he be no inhabitant but not lyable for the ornaments thereof 53 Coppiholder what act by him will make forfeiture 62 Covenant by a draper against his apprentice for defrauding him the Defendant pleads the Statute 5. Eliz. and that thereby there ought to be a certificate that his father had 40 s. per annum freehold which was not done here 63 64 If a Coppiholder sels his land to a Lessee of the Mannor it is good 67 Condition in a Will where nothing vesteth till it be performed 69 Costs not to be paid where the Plantiff mistakes his action 69 Covenant brought by an Executor the Defendant pleads giving of an horse in full satisfaction which the Testator accepted 76 A Court of equitie if it doth decree against a maxime in law as benefit of Survivorship a prohibition lieth 79 Covenant that he was seized of a good estate in fee and had good authoritie to sell and that no reversion was in the King c. 91 92 93 Condition where it shall be precedent and where subsequent 105 106 107 108 c. 115 116 c Costs not discharged although the offence be pardoned 125 Commendam See King D IN dept after imparlance alwayes ready is a good Plea 4 Distress gone as to the nomine Paenae if the rent be expired 7 A Declaration where it shall be mended in matter of substance 20 Damages where good in part especially after verdict 27 28 Debt against an Administrator who pleads outlawrie in the intestate no good Plea 33 58 A man soweth land and deviseth to I. S and dies before severance whether the devisee or Executor shall have the Corn 51 A Devise for years if an entrie by him must be pleaded 53 Declaration see new assignment Dower a Tenant pleads a fine levied by her husband and that the wife had not claimed within the Statute 4. H. 7. she replied she brought a writ which abated and this writ now brought was by Journeys accompts 66 Debt for rent must be brought by a privie in estate only where the land lies otherwise of a Privie in estate and contract 69 Debt upon a bond the Plantiff saith he had not paid the money and did not say nor any part thereof good for that must come of the other part to shew 72 Debt upon a bond to perform an award the Defendant
of Tithes and good because they are a spiritual bodie 65 In a Prohibition upon a suit for a Legacie the Executor shewed he had not assets to pay the debts and the spiritual Court would not allow that allegation yet no Prohibition 78 Prohibition to the Marches of wales because a Legatee sued there for 500. l. good before a decree but not after 78 Prohibition see Court of equitie c. 79 Prohibition to the Marches of Wales for requiring an accompt of an Administrator 103 Proces against two Obligors by several precipes and thereupon several Executions whether the writs are well awarded 112 A parco fracto where it lies against the Lord of the Soil and where not except the Cattle come out 80 81 Prohibition to the delegates a pardon not allowed of there 125 Q IN a Quare impedit adjudged that nothing ought to be questioned after induction the spiritual Court there 63 R TEnant in tail sells to I. S. in fee who sells to the heir of Tenant in tail being of full age the father dies if the son be demitted 5 A replevin c. the Defendant saith that all those c. had used to have pasturage in c. when it was not sowed the Prescription is good 7 In a return of Rescous there needeth no addition 10 Replevin for rent issuing out of six acres the avowant must prove that the grantor was seised of 6. acres or more 15 Replevin in the Plantiff claimeth propertie without that the propertie was in the Defendant the Traverse not good yet judgement for the Plantiff because after verdict 26 In Return of an extent by the Sheriff surplusage hurteth not 27 Replevin the Defendant avowed for homage and shewed not how it was due if good 31 Replication although evil where the Plantiff shall have judgement if the Defendants plea be vitious 37 A Riotous quarrel about an arrest between the Sheriffs Bailiffs and the Bailiffs of the Marches of Wales 72 Release an avowrie not good without pleading it by deed 72 A Rent-charge granted and a Covenant if it happen to be behinde then the land to be alwayes open to distress whether this be a distinct covenant or not 74 87 Replevin for rent the Defendants say that the land was parcel of a Chaunterie which came to the King by the Statute wherein the right of others was saved the Plantiff replies that the land is out of the fee of the Defendant no good plea but he might have Traversed the Tenure that at the making of the Statute the land was not holden of him 77 A Record amended where the bargain and sale and deed of uses were by the right name but the writ of entrie was of another name 99 100 Rent granted in fee by Tenant for life and him in remainder in tail levied a fine a good grant 102 Rent-charge whether it be extinct by a fine of the land to the Ter-tenant and a release unto him 109 110 111 121 122 S SCire facias the Defendant pleads a feofment the Plantiff traverses and the jury found a feofment to other uses whether this shall be intended the same feofment which was pleaded 32 Scire facias by an Executor upon a judgement for the Testator the Defendant cannot plead the Testators death between the verdict and judgement but he must bring a writ of error 48 Simonie a grant of a next avoidance for monie the Parson being readie to die is Simonie 63 A Sheriff by force of a Capias utlagatum to inquire what lands c. cannot put the partie out of possession 78 Statute-Merchant if good in regard no day of payment is limited largely and learnedly argued by the Court 82 83 c. Servant taken away See Trespas T TIthes See Prescription Trespass the Defendant saith that I. S. was seised in right of his wife and that she died seised and that he as heir c. the Plantiff replied that she died not seised he ought to have said that she died not sole seised 7 Trespass in Yorkshire Justification in Durham without that that guiltie in Yorkshire good because it is local 7 A Traverse to a presentation where good and where not 13 14 Tenure where it is Traversable and where the seisin 18 Tithes not due of Cattle for the diarie 33. Trespass for Beasts taken in London Justification upon a lease of land in Kent Replied that the Defendant sold them in London no good plea to bring the trial out of Kent 48 Trespass for taking ones servant lieth not upon a private retainer otherwise if it were at the Sessions 51 Tithe giuen by the Pope to the Vicar and the Copie of the Bull only was shewed in evidence not good 70 Tithes cannot be appurtenant to a Grange except the Grange be the Gleab 72 73 Traverse where good and where not 113 U VEnire facias omitting part of the venue if good 34 Variance between the writ and Declaration where good 35 A feofment to the use of A. for life and after to the use of his daughter till B. pay her 100. l. here the daughter hath no remedie for this 100. l. without a promise 71 A Ventre inspiciendo awarded and returned but the Court would not agree that she should be detained from her second husband but attended by divers women till her deliverie 71 Variance between the venire facias and the Sheriffs return no judgement in that case 73 W IN Waste judgement by nihil dicit and upon an inquirie the jury found 8. s. damages what judgement shall be given 5 Wager of Law upon a Bill of Exchange 24 Writs a difference wherein there is an error in the original and where in the judicial writ that is amendable 73 Waste although for a time it is punishable yet after the action may revive 79 86 Writ against husband and wife as an Inheritrix the husband dies if the writ abate 102 Errata PAge 1. line 2. 27. for do read Doa p. 2. l. 4. r. lieu p. 4. l. 2. 22. r. 300. pa. 8. l. 36. r. Hendon and so throughout p. 12. in the Title r. Duncombe against the Vniversitie of Oxford p. 12. l. 14. r. 38. H. 8. cap. 39. p. 14. in the Title r. Sir George Savile against Thornton p. 15. l. 21. r. communication p. 16. l. 12. r. 7. Jac. cap. 5. p. 17. l. 47. r. Maines and l. 17. r. sic and also p. 17. 18. in the Margent r. Trin. p. 21 l. 51. r. 39. Eliz. p. 23. l. 9. r. till p. 26 l. 28 for writ r. Action and for Action r. writ p. 27. l. 12. for he r. they p. 28. l. 34. r. may not p. 29. in the Margent r. Easter p. 29. l. 33. for S. r. N. p. 33. l. ultim r. Moore p. 36. l. 43. r. Titterels p. 45. l. 20. r. demandable p. 50. l. 35. r. Bar p. 51. l. 22. r. a penalty p. 53. l. 16. r. may not p. 54. l. 44. r. Estate p. 57. l. 19. r. in our case p. 58. l 50 r. 16. E. 4. p. 68. l. 5. r. estray p. 71. l. 26. r. 12. Note in p. 72. l. 7. Wolseys case ought to have been printed by it self p. 77. l. 4. r. avoided p. 88. l. 4. r. Finch p. 90. l. 15. r. continuance p. 100. l. 21. for preservation r. perswasion and l. 34. for entire r. entrie p. 109. in the Margent for Trin. r. Mich. p. 112. l. 25. r. thought p. 114. l. 18. for interested r. interest
simple shall alwayes be supposed to have continuance if the contrary is not shewed to that he answered that is not so for the book of the 7. H. 7. 8. if in barre of assise the Tenant said that I. S. was seised and gave this is not good because he had not shewed quod fit seisitus existens dedit c. which being in a plea in barre is more strong then in a declaration to prove that a fee shall not be intended to have continuance without an express allegation and so he concluded that the declaration is naught but by Hobert Winch and Hutton it is very good notwithstanding this objection and Winch cited the 13. Eliz. in Ejectione firme where the life of the person was not cleerly alleadged but the declaration only was that the lessor was and yet is seised which was a sufficient averment of the life of the person and so the declaration is good and another exception was taken to the declaration by Hitcham Serjeant because that the Plantiff had declared that the Defendant had made conney borroughs and with the aforesaid conneys had eat up the grass where he had not alleadged any storeing of the coney borroughs before with coneys and then it is impossible they should eat up the grass to the prejudice of the Plantiff but to this it was answered by Serjeant Attoe that though the declaration as to that is naught yet the diging of the coney borroughs is to his prejudice and sufficient to maintaine the action which the Court granted and as to the matter in law Attoe argued for the Plantiff and recited the case to be that E. 3. granted to the Deane and Chapter of Windsor that they shall have free warren in the lands which yet they had not purchased and of which they were not seised at the time whether this is a good grant and shall extend to take effect after the purchase see Buckleys case and be argued that it is not a good grant and he put a difference between a warren and other priviledges which are flowers of the Crown which may be granted infuturo but a warren never was a flower of the Crown and for that reason a grant de bonis et cattallis fellon et fugitivorum may be granted and yet not be in esse at the time of the grant for it is a flower of the Crown and it is said 44. E. 3. 12. that the King may not grant a warren in other mens lands but only in the land of the grantee and upon this he concluded that this grant shall not extend to land after purchased and the rather because it is in the nature of a licence which shall be taken strictly see 21. H. 7. 1. 6. And Hobert chief Iustice said that this word demeans is derived of the French words en son manies and though the Lord of the mannor had the waste in his hands yet he had not the common and as to the confirmation by Ed. 4. they all agreed that this will confirm nothing to him but what was granted by E. 3. himself and then as to the licence pleaded that is of no effect for first the licence is pleaded to be made to one Sir Cha. Haydon and the Defendant did claime under him and this licence was made by the father which will not binde the son who had the land to which the common is appendant after the death of his father for a common may not be extinguished without deed and Hobert and all the Court agreed that the licence of the father will not binde the son and by the Court if nothing is shewed to the contrary within a week judgement shall be given for the Plantiff Davies against Turner DAvies brought a replevin against Turner and he declared of the taking in a place called the Holmes and the Defendant made conusance as bayliff to Sir George Bing for that one Clap held certain land of him by 20. s. rent and suite of Court and for the rent he avowed and alleadged seisin by the hands of Clap the Plantiff said that Chap held 40. acres of land by 9. s. rent fealty and suite of Court absque hoc that he held modo et forma and upon this it was demurred and the single point was this in auowry the Tenant alleadged c. and the question is whether he ought to traverse the tenure or the seisin and it was argued by Henden Serjeant that he ought to traverse the seisin and that the traverse of the tenure is not good and besides here is double matter for the conclusion sounds in barre of the avowry and in abatement of the avowry see a good case 18. H. 6. 6. for the falsness of the quantity of the land and the falsness of the quantity of rent the on goes in barre the other in abatement of the avowry 47. E. 3. 79. 5. H. 6. 4. and affirmed for good law And as to the second point he held the seisin to be traversable and not the tenure and first he said there was a difference between pleading in barre of avowry and in the abatement of the avowry for in barre of the avowry there the seisin is is not traversable by Frowick 21. H. 7. 73. which opinion he held for good law for it is agreed in Bucknels case Co. 9. he may not say that he held of a stranger absque hoc that the avowant was seised but otherwise it is when that goes in abatement of the avowry Secondly he said that the seisin is the principal thing and the principal thing ought to be traversed for if a man had seisin of many services seisin shall never be ayded till the Stat. of magna charta see Bucknels case Cook 9. and here the seisin is the most meterial thing and the most proper see 37. H. 6. Bro. Avowry 76. ne tiendra is no plea for a stranger to the avowry but he ought to answer to the seisin Thirdly the cause for which the seisin is traversable see a notable case per Danby 7. E. 4. 29. for the beginning of the services may be time beyond memory c. and for that reason may not be tried see 20. E. 4. 17. 22. H. 6. 3. 26. H. 6. 25. by Newton he may traverse the tenure Attoe contrary 13. H. 7. 25. to this it was answered that the number Rolle may not be found 5. H. 7. 4. 13. H. 6. 21. 21. H. 7. 22. by Frowick and Kingsmil Harvey to the contrary the case was that the Defendant made conusance as Bayliff to Sir George Bing for this that Chap held a messuage c. by certain rent and by suite of Court and the other said that he held 40. acres by 9. s. and suite of Court absque hoc that he held the messuage and the land modo et forma and he argued that it was a good traverse of the tenure and not double which was granted by Hobert and by Winch being only present and Hobert said true
within the Statute and â—hirdly he had not shewed what time he was received that so it might appeare that he was an apprentice but for half a year and such a retainer is not within the Statute fourthly the conclusion of the information is contrary to the form of the Statute yet this doth not aide the imperfection of the information for such information only extends to matter of circumstance and not to matter of substance Finch Serjeant contrary that the retainer of an apprentice who departs out of the service of his Mr. without a testimonial is within the Statute of the 5th of Eliz. for the same branch is general there being no person who departs c. and an apprentice is a person which departs secondly the clause of the Statute is be it enacted that none of the forementioned retained persons c. and an apprentice is a person which is in a special manner named before Mich. 19. Jac. and therefore he is within the express words of the same branch Thirdly the form of the testimonial proves that for it is I. W. servant to such c. and an apprentice is such a servant Hobert chief Iustice said that it was never the intent of the Statute to make an infant who is an apprentice to be within the danger of the same Statute for an infant at the age of 14. years may be bound to be an apprentice and the punishment which is given by the same Statute is that such person shall be whipt as a Rogue which plainly proves the Statute intends only those who are of full age and if other construction shall be made perchance that the sonne of a gentleman may be punished as a Rogue by such departure and he held that if an apprentice depart with his Mrs. goods delivered to him that in this case he is not within the Statute of the 21. H 8. as another servant is and Serjeant Finch said that there is an express exception and if that had not been that an apprentice had been within the danger of the law but Hobert said that he doubted much whether an apprentice had been within that Statute though the Proviso had not been made but this proves that the makers of the Statute thought this to be a hard matter to make an infant who is apprentice to be within the danger of the same law and for that reason the proviso of the Statute was made Winch said to which Hutton agreed that when the Defendant had pleaded nihil debet and this was found for the Plantâ—ff yet he may move in arrest of judgement if the matter be not within the Statute adjurned In a replevin the Defendant said that he hâ—d property in the beasts absque hoc that the property was to the Plantiff and so prayed judgement of the writ and it was found for the Plantiff and now Harvey Serjeant moved in arrest of judgment for in no book is found such a traverse as this that the Plantiff had not property but only that the property was to the Defendant and secondly the conclusion of the plea is not good for he ought to conclude to the writ and not to the action Hobert 6. H. 7. is that an action of detinue affirmes the property at the time of the action but a repleviant the time of the taking and two men may have such property in the same thing that every of them may have a replevin and Hutton said that when the Defendant in the replevin claimed property he ought to conclude to the action and Hendon Serjeant being only at the barre and not of councell in the case said that the book of entries is that he shall traverse the property of the Plantiff as in the principal case Hutton Iustice said that this was never seen by him but they all agreed that this being after verdict judgement shall be given for the Plantiff Trehern against Claybrook Ent. Tr. 18. Jac. Rot. 650. TRehern against Claybrook in a debt upon a lease for yeares the jury gave a special verdict to this effect that Iohn Trehern Grandfather of the Plantiff was seised of land in fee and let this for forty yeers rendring rent for which the action is brought and that he devised the reversion to the Plantiff in catle the remainder to Leonard Trehern in taile with divers remainders over and with provises in the same will that for the raising of a stock for the Plantiff and for him in remainder his will was that one Griffith and Anne his wife being daughter of the devisor should have the profits and rent of the said land to their own use until the time that the Plantiff and the said Leonard Trehern accomplish the age of 21. years provided alwayes and upon this condition that the said Griffith and his wife within 3 moneths of his decease enter into bond to the overseers of his will in such a summe and in such a penalty as shall be thought fit by the said overseers and this bond to be made by their advice and if the said Griffith and Anne his wife do refuse to be bound as is aforesaid then the overseers shall have the rents and the profits c. and the jury found over that he made two executors and 3. who were overseers and that the 3. October 16. Iac. died and that within 3. weeks after the death of the devisor the executor read the will to the overseers but they found that the overseers did not remember that and if upon all the matter Griffith and Anne his wife had not performed the condition was the question and that if not the reversion was in the Plantiff And the point in law upon the verdict was whether Griffith and Anne his wife ought of their perils to tender the bond within 3. moneths or whether the overseers ought to make the first act and to tender the bond and the penalty for them to seal and Towse Serjeant argued that Anne and Griffith her husband ought to tender the bond at their peril for he said that the condition did precede the estate and therefore if they will have the benefit of the devise then he ought to tender the obligation and vouched Corbets case and 18. Eliz. the devise of land upon condition to pay money he ought to pay that at his perill Attoe Serjeant contrary and yet he agreed that if the condition was to precede the estate then the law was as Towse had said but here he said the estate precedes the condition for all the profits are devised to Griffith and to Anne his wife during the minority of the Plantiff by which it is apparent the estate is presently in the devisees and by consequence the estate precedes the condition and then the sole doubt will be whether Griffith and Anne his wife ought to procure the overseers to make the obligation and to limit the condition or whether the overseers ought to make this first they being the parties instrusted by the Will
doth not lye for for it is not averred that there was any fellony committed also Iustice Hutton held that in this case the declaration is not good because it is not expresly alleadged with an eo quod that the Plantiff stole the Vetches but only an indictment preferred containing such a matter and Iustice Winch said that the framing of an indictment in a Court of record is not any cause of an action for it is a proceeding in an ordinary Course of justice and for that reason ought not to be punished by an action upon the case for that will deterre and scare men from the just prosecutions in the ordinary way of justice Hobert chief Iustice was of a contrary opinion and yet he said that it is true that the ordinary Course of justice ought not by any means to be hopped or hindred and as that may not be obstructed so neither may the good name of a man in any thing which concerns his life be taken away and impeached without good cause for Courts of justice were not erected to be stages to take away the good name or fame of any man and therefore by the common law if two do maliciously conspire to judict a man without cause though the indictment it self be good and legally drawn yet a writ of conspiracy lies against those which caused this indictment to be preferred and it is as great a slander to preferre a Bill of indictment to the grand jury and to give this in evidence to them as it is to declare that in an ale house and as to the declaration he held that to be good without any averment of an indictment indeed and the indictment in writing and the preferring that to the grand jury containes the scandal and I am of opinion that an action upon the case lyes well see more after Easter 20. Jac. C. P. Hill against Waldron Easter 20. Jac. C. P. HIll against Waldron in an action of debt upon an obligation the condition was that I. S. shall levy a fine to the obligee before such a day of such land the Defendant pleaded that the obligee had not sued forth any writ of covenant the replication was that before the obligation made I. S. had made of feofment in fee of the same land to I. S. and that the feoffee continued in possession at the time of the making of the obligation and upon this the Defendant demurred and in this case two points were moved first when I am obliged that I. S. who is a stranger shall levy a fine to the obligee whether in this case the obligee is bound to sue a writ of covenant and it was argued by Serjeant Harvy that not yet he agreed that if the condition was that the obligor shall levy a fine to the obligee in this case the obligee ought to do the first act viz. to sue a writ of covenant as Palmers case Cooke 5. but otherwise when the fine is levied by a third person for there the obligor had took all upon him 4. H. 7. 15. E. 4. if I am bound to marry the daughter of I. S. and she will not marry me yet I have forfited my obligation and so here he ought to leavy a fine at his perill and at his own costs or at the costs of the obligor But admitting that the obligee ought to sue a writ of covenant because it appears by the replication that before the obligation made I. S. had made a feofment over and that the feoffee did continue possession at the time when the fine was to be leavied and therefore the obligee needs not to sue forth any writ of covenant because he who is to leavy the fine had disabled himself to perform that and he urged Sir Anthony Maines case where Cooke 5. the party needs not to tender a Surrender because that he who had the reversion had granted that over before the Surrender was to be made Serjeant Hendon to the contrary for he argued that the obligation is not forfeit except the obligee sue a writ of covenant and there is no difference between this case and when the obligor himself was to leavy a fine for the obligor had not undertaken for the whole fine but only that I. S. shall acknowledge a fine and if the obligor shall be compelled at his perill to sue a writ of covenant then you will construe the condition to extend to an unlawfull act for it shall be maintenance in him to sue forth a writ of covenant he vouched a case P. 4 Iac. Rot. 1548. Burnell against Bowle the condition of the obligation was that I. S. shall acknowledge a judgement in this Court to I. D. and in debt upon this obligation the Defendant pleaded that the Plantiff had not sued forth any orginall writ and it was holden a good plea and for the second point he held that the obligee ought to sue this writ of Covenant though that I. S. had dismissed himself of the land for the words are general that I. S. shall leavy a fine and this he ought to do though no estate pass by the fine for a fine upon release shall be a good performance of the Condition but otherwise if it had been to make a feofment in fee for a man cannot make a feofment except he be seised of the land at the time as 31. E. 3. debt 164. a man was obliged to present the obligee to such a Church and the obligee took a wife by which he had disabled himself to be a person yet the obligor ought to present him for otherwise he shall forfeit his obligation and so in this case Hobert and Hutton as to the first point held the barre to be good and that the obligee ought to sue forth the writ of Covenant for Hobert said he ought to do that for it is no reason to compel the obligor who is a stranger to the estate which passeth by the fine to sue a writ of Covenant and for that reason if I am bound to compel you to come upon such land to take a feofment I am not bound that the other make a livery of seisin but if the case was that I was obliged to you that I. S. shall leavy a fine to I. N. in such case the fine ought to be leavied at my peril though that I. N. will not sue a writ of Covenant Hutton according but Winch doubted of the case and as to the second point Hutton and Hobert agreed that the obligee as this case is needs not to sue a writ of Covenant because that I. S. had made a feofment of the land before and so had disabled himself at the time of the obligation for now it is impossible to leavy a good fine for if he should enter into the land and put out the feoffee this were not good within the condition and Hutton said it ought to be agreed that if I. S. had made a feofment after the time of the making
of the obligation and so had disabled himself afterwards and the obligor is bound that a fine shall be leavied this is to be understood of a good and a lawfull fine and not a fine in name only and he put the case that I let for years and after Covenant to make a feofment to I. S. this lease for years is a breach of the Condition though at the time of the Covenant made the lease for years was made Iustice Winch thought the contrary for this disability is by the act of a stranger and for that the obligor may not take any certain notice of that and therefore if I am obliged to you that I. S. shall enfeoffe you of his Mannor and at the time I. S. had made a feoffement of two or three acres of the same Mannor yet if he enfeoffe you of that which he was seised at the time of the obligation this is a good performance of the Condition though that 2. or 3. acres were disjoyned from that before and so in this case the obligor being a stranger to the estate of I. S. if I. S. make such an estate as he had at the time of the obligation made this is sufficient upon which he concluded that the Plantiff shall not have judgement but afterward judgement was commanded to be entered for the Plantiff according to the opinion of Hobert and Hutton Hoels case HOels case upon a special verdict was to this effect a man was seised of 2. acres of land in fee and had 2. sones and he devised both the acres to his wife for life the remainder of one acre to his eldest son in fee the remainder of the other acre to his youngest son in fee upon this condition in manner and form following if either of my sonnes die before my depts and legacies are paid or before either of my sonnes enter into their part that then the longest liver shall have both parts to him and to his heires in fee and the devisor died and Hoel the Plantiff being the eldest sonne in the life of his mother released all his interest and his demand in this to his younger brother and the doubt was whether this condition was gone by this release and Attoe argued that it was gone for Littleton saith that every land may be charged one way or other see Anne Mayowes case Release Coo. 1. Albaines case power of revocation released see more of this afterwards Trin. 20. Jac. C. P. Whitgift aganist Sir Francis Barrington IN Replevin the Defendant avowed as Baliff to Sir Francis Barrington and that Whitgift the Plantiff held certaine land of Sir Francis Barrington by escuage et quendam reditum and that the said Sir Francis was seised by the hands of Whitgift his very Tenant and for homage he avowed and upon this the Plaintiff demurred first because he had avowed for homage and had not shewed how nor in what manner the homage is due whether in respect that the tenancy come to him by discent or by purchase and for that this general allegation is naught for by Hendon Serjeant all the presidents in such avowryes made mention of the title to the homage as 4. E. 4. in avowry for homage the tenure is shewed and a discent alleadged or a purchase of the land and in no book or in any president that he ever yet saw did he see such a general allegation in avowry for homage but he agreeth the book of the 44. E. 3. 42. if the avowry is upon tenant by the curtesie this general allegation is good but otherwise of a tenant in fee simple and for that he alledged the second E. 3. avowry in a replevin the Bishop avowed for homage due by the Plantiff and exception was taken because it was not shewed in whose time the death of the ancestor was whether in his own time or the time of his predecessor and ruled to be evill for his avowry being his title he ought to shew that in certaine and so in our case Hobert this case doth not prove our case for in our case prima facie it is certain to all intents and purposes and I cannot see how an avowry may be better made and Finch at the barre vouched a president in the book of entries title horse de son fee secondly where such a avowry as in our case is made and then Hendon moved that the avowrie is not good for he had shewed the tenure by homage and by escuage and rent de quo quidem redditu he was seised c. and this is also repugnant for when he said that he was seised of the rent by the hands of the Plaintiff this is a seisin of the homage as Bevils case is and then by his own shewing because the seisin of the rent is a seisin of the homage he shall not have the homage of the Plantiff Thirdly admitting this point against him and that the seisin of the rent is not seisin of the homage yet the pleading is not good for when he expresly alleadged seisin of the rent in this manner de quo quidem redditu he was seised this excluded the seisin of any other services but only of the rent which is expresly alleadged and therefore in our case he ought to have alleadged generally de quibus serviciis he was seised and to leave this to the construction of the Law and he vouched 13. H. 7. 31. Serjeant Harvy to the same intent for though perchance no good reason may be given wherefore the pleading shall be such and that the seisin of the homage ought to be expressed yet because all the presidents are so the course of pleading shall not be altered and all the presidents shew a seisin of the homage see the book of entries 597. and 598. Serjeant â—owse to the contrary the book of the 19. E. 2. Recovery 224. is that the alleadging of the seisin or escuage as in our case of tent is a sufficient avowry for homage and 29. H. 3. such an allegation of the seisin of rent was made in avowry for fealty and good Hutton if the book of the 19. E. 12. be as Towse had alleadged it is all one with our case Hobert seems the avoury is good notwithstanding this last exception for perchance he was not actually seised of the homage by the hands of the Tenant himself and then by his own shewing his avowry shall abate and he demanded of Brownlow if there were any such president of an avowry who answered no. Hobert if the continual pleading be as my brother Harvy had alleadged we will not alter the course of pleading but in my opinion in reason none may plead in better manner or form and Hutton being only present agreed and then Hobert commanded the presidents to be searched concerning that matter and Finch at the barre being of Councel with the avowant said that till the resolution in Bevils case it was a great question whether the seisin of the rent was the
son and his wife and upon a demurrer the question was whether this Covenant did raise a present use to the Son and to his wife or whether this only rests in Covenant and Harris Serjeant argued that no present use will arise by this Covenant for first all other Covenants in the indenture are in the future for the words are that the lands shall remain and come c. and therefore till the death of the Covenantor the fee simple is in him and no use will arise for it shall be in the election of the Covenantor what estate he will make to his Son for he himself shall interpret his intent and the difference in our books is when the words are in the present tense and when in the future and for this he cited 22. H. 7. by Iustice Rede if a man Covenant that land shall discend remain or revert he said this did not give any present interest because the wors are in the future and it is in the election of the Covenantor how and in what manner the land shall pass and there he put the case that if I give my horse or my Cow to I. S. there the Donee had election to take at his pleasure the one or the other because the words are in the present tense but if the words are that I will give a horse or a Cow there the Donor had election which he shall have because the words are in the future the Lord Borroughs Covenanted 34. H. 8. Dyer 55. with another in frank marriage with his son that immediately after his death his son shall enjoy the use of his land of inheritance according to the course as then they stood and the question was whether the see simple was presently out of the Covenantor and the opinion was that it was not because it was but a Covenant and did not change the fee simple and so is Dyer 96. Sir Thomas Seymor promised and Covenanted by indenture in consideration that the Covenantee had granted land to him that he would leavy a fine to Wimbish and Pennoy of other lands which fine should be to Sir Thomas Seymor for life the remainder to the Covenantee in taile and no fine was levied and the question was whether any use was raised by this Covenant to the Covenantee and the opinion of the book is that not because it is in the future and he cited the 20. H. 7. 10. the Duke of Buckingham in consideration that the Lord Henry his brother was to marry the Lady Wiltshire he Covenanted with Bray and with others that the Mannors of D. and of S. shall be to the Lady and to her heirs of her body begotten by the said Lord and after the Duke granted to the Lord Henry and his wife for their lives and it was argued whether this second grant is good or no for if it is then the first Covenant will not work to raise an use to the feme and the book left that as a quere and if it be then he argued that in the principal case no present use is raised but that this rests meerly in Covenant and so he prayed judgement for the Plantiff Serjeant Hendon to the contrary for he thought this will raise a present use and that this was the intent of the parties that this should raise a present use for the intent was to advance them first during their lives with the rent and after the death of the Covenantor and his wife with the land it self and therefore of necessity this will raise a present use for a bare action of Covenant may not be any advancement at all and the rather here because they who take benefit of this are strangers to the Covenant and not Preston himself for as it appears by 3. H. 7. a stranger shall not take benefit by a Covenant and therefore he said the intentions of the parties was to raise an use for otherwise there shall be no advancement at all And further the words in the indenture are Covenant and grant and if no use is raised then this word grant is idle and every word shall be so expounded that they may take effect and the word Covenant is insufficient of it self to pass an estate in land or to have any estate in signification other then to a meer Covenant and to be obligatory as is put Co. 2. Cromwels case Tirrels case there vouched a lease for years provided and it is Covenanâ—ed and agreed there the Covenant is a condition and also a Covenant and 8. Ass 1. 12. it is agreed that if I Covenant that an other shall have my land for 7. years this a good lease of the land it self and it was adjudged here Tr. 2. Jac. Rot. 1696. accordingly and in our case this word Covenant and grant is also sufficient to raise an use and to give an interest in the land it self and yet he agreed that if there was an other act to be made by the Covenantor or the Covenantee that then no use will arise but it shall rest only in Covenant Dyer 162. there are Covenants between the Lady Vere and Sir Anthony Wingfield her son that the said Lady would convey to her son by a recovery and that after 6. moneths the said Sir Anthony shall make an estate to his Mother for life and there it is doubted whether the use is changed within the 6. moneths and it was holden that it was not Mich. 20. Jac. C.P. for then it is impossible that the Covenants should be performed and in that case it is in the power of the Covenantor to make an act that the Covenants shall not be performed and therefore Covenants will not raise an use but in our case no act of the Covenantor may hinder that this use shall arise and therefore good and for that the difference is Dyer 296. which is entered 11. Eliz. the Roll of which I have seen the father upon the marriage of his son promised to the friends of his wife that after his death his son shall have his land to him and his heirs and the book is ruled that this did not change the use and the reason was this Covenant was by words and not in writing but it was not doubted if this Covenant had been by writing but that the Covenant will raise an use which is all one with our case and so was Callard and Callards case 37. Eliz. stand forth Eustace reserving to my wife and my self I give to thee and thy heires and there it was doubted whether any use will arise to the son and ruled that not because this was by words only but it was also agreed that if these words had been by writing they had been sufficient to raise an use to the son and he cited Dyer 232. before the Statute of the 27. H. 8. A Covenanted and agreed with B. that upon the marriage of his son with the daughter of the other that he would retain his land for life and that
the very Common Law see Ouleys case 19. Eliz. in Dyer but Hutton doubted whether this bond is void by the Common Law because the Statute of the 23. H. 6. inflicts so great specialty upon the Sheriffs for extortion and after judgement was Commanded to be entred for the Defendant in the action if no other matter be shewed to the contrary before such a day In trespas quare vi et armis one such being his servant cepit et adduxit at D. in Essex the Defendant pleaded that he was a vagrant in the same Countie and he not having notice that he was servant to another he retained him and it was moved by Finch if I retain the servant of another man in the same Countie where I and his Mr. inhabit this is not justifiable though in veritie I had not notice of that and this according to the express book of the 19. Ed. 3. 47. Hobert the book may not be law for it is a hard matter to make me take notice of every servant which is retained in the same Countie and yet perchance if this retainer be upon the Statute of labourers at the Sessions this is notorious and I ought to take notice of that at my peril but it is otherwise of a private retainer for though it is within the same Countie yet being a private matter in fact the Law will not compel me to take notice of that at my peril otherwise if this be matter of record 2. H. 4. 64. and Hobert and Winch seemed to agree and then Finch moved that the Plantiff had charged the Defendant with his servant by cepit et adduxit and the Defendant excused himself and never traversed cepit et adduxit see 11. H. 4. Hutton and Hobert the receiving and the entertaining of a servant may not be said to be vi et armis Mr. Spencers case HArvy Serjeant came to the barre and demanded this question of the Court in the behalf of Mr. Spencer a man was seised of land in fee and sowed the land and devised that to I. S. and before severance he died and whether the devisee shall have the Corn or the executor of the devisor was the question and by Hobert Winch and Hutton the devisee shall have that and not the executor of the devisor and Harris said 18. Elizabeth Allens case that it was adjudged that where a man devised land which was sowed for life the remainder in fee and the devisor died and the devisee for life also died before the severance and it was adjudged that the executor of the Tenant for life shall not have that but he in remainder and Winch Iustice said that it had been adjudged that if a man devise land and after sowe that and after he dies that in this case the devisee shall have the Corn and not the executor of the devisor nota bene Dodderidge against Anthony Entred Mich. 19. Jac. Rot. 1791. ENt. Mich. 19. Jac. Rot. 1791. Peter Dodderidge brought an action of accompt against one Anthony and he declared that he deâ—ivered to the Defendant so many pieces of cloath called Bridge-water red to be sold at Bilbo in Spain and the Defendant said that he sold the same cloath at Bilbo in Spain for 40. l. 18. s. English to be paid in May next insuing the sale which was in November before and over he alledged the Custome of Merchants to be that if any Merchant had goods in the same Kingdome to be sold to another Merchant and he sell the goods to be paid at a day to come and this is done before a publick Notary and thereby a Bill signed and acknowledged to him in his name who sold the goods and that if the Merchant who so sold the goods delivered the Merchant who was owner of the goods this Bill so taken in his name this shall be a discharge to him of the goods and he averred that he sold them to a Spanish Merchant and that he took a Bill accordingly and at London offered that Bill to the Plantiff who refused that and upon this plea the Plantiff demurred Attoe argued that the plea is not good because he had not alledged that the partie who takes such a Bill may plead that and the Custome is also alledged with an if if the party sell and if he take the Bill and not with positive averment that he may so sell and may so take the Bill which being delivered to the owner of the goods shall be a discharge to the factor who sold the goods and here this custome is not good by the Common Law for if I deliver goods to another to sell and he sell them to be paid the money at a day to come this is not good for he ought by his sale to make a compleat contract and if I sell my horse for 10. l. I may retain the horse till the money is paid for till then the contract is not compleat and so in this case and here the Plantiff shall have an action of accompt upon this delivery and if he sell them otherwise or do not sell them for ready money he had gone beyond his Commission and this Custome is unreasonable that the Bill shall be taken in his name who sold the goods but perchance if the custome had been alleadged to take the Bill in the name of the owner of the goods this had been good but in our case the owner of the goods may not sue nor have any remedy for his goods except the factor will go into Spain and sue the said Bill and it is unreasonable to leave this to the pleasure of my factor whether I shall have any remedy for my goods sold and it is very unreasonable that I shall be paid with a Bill which may not be sued and here the Plantiff is a stranger to the Custome of Spain and shall not be bound by that Serjeant Harris to the contrary the Custome which is alledged is good among Merchants though it is not good according to our Common Law and so if two Merchants trade joyntly and one of them dies before severance of the goods yet his executor shall have his part and not the Survivor and so by the law of Merchants a man cannot wage his law in debt upon a simple contract by which it is apparant that the laws of Merchants differ from our laws and indeed the laws of Merchants are National laws and that this is the Custome in Spain is confessed by the demurrer and then we may not examine that by the reason of our laws and the laws of Merchants ought to be favoured for trading sake which is the life of every Kingdome and by the law of Merchants a Bill without seal is good and yet by our law it is but an escrowl and so I pray judgement for the Defendant Hobert chief Iustice when the Merchant had delivered goods to the factor to sell he had made the factor negotiator gestorum and for that
that then his two sons shall pay them and if it happen that either of them die before his debts and legacies paid or before either of them do enter into his part that thou the other shall have all the land in fee and after the devisor died and in the life of the mother the eldest son released to the youngest all his right title Claim and demand to the land which was devised to him by his father and after the wife died and two points came in question in this case First whether this limitation is good Secondly whether the release is good and it was argued by Richardson Serjeant that this limitation of the Statute by way of devisee is good and he vouched Dyer 330. Clarks case and 4. Eliz. Goldley and Buckleys case a man devised to his son and his heirs provided that if his personal estate did not suffice to pay his debts and legacies that then his lands shall be to another and he vouched Brown and Pells case which was adjudged in Banco Regis the case was that a man had two sons William the eldest and Thomas the youngest and he devised his lands to Thomas his son and his heirs provided that if Thomas died without issue living that then William shall have the land and it was resolved that this was good to William by way of executory devise and in that case doubt was moved whether if Thomas suffer a recovery whether this shall take away the estate of William and it was holden by all the Court except Doderidg that it shall not but all agreed that this devise upon the future contingency is good and so he concluded that if the youngest son die in the life of the Mother and before the legacies are paid the land shall remain to the Plantiff according to the intent of the devisor but the other doubt is when the Plantiff did release all his right and claim to the other whether this release will extinguish this future possibility and he held that it will not and he said that he had seen the case of Lampet Coo. 10. and there the release of a possibility is penned as in our case and if any word discharge this possibility it is this word right but if the resolution of that book had not been against him he would have argued that this right was not sufficient to extinguish this future possibility but that there ought to be a more apt and proper word but he said he would not argue against books but he said that which he would insist upon was the distinguishing of possibilities for there are two manner of possibilities the one is Common and ordinary the other is more remote and forreigne And first there is a possibility which is Common and necessary and this depends upon an ordinary casualty as a lease for life the remainder to the right heirs of I. S. for it is apparant that the right heirs of I. S. may take by this and such a possibility may be released and a possibility which is remote and forreigne is as if a lease be made for life the remainder to another during the life of the lessee for life or a lease for life the remainder to the Corporation of B. those remainders are void but yet by possibility they may be good for in the first case the Tenant for life may enter into religion and in the latter case the King may make Corporations and yet because such possibilities are not usual the remainders are void see Coo. 2. Chamleys case where such a remote possibility may not be released if a man give land to one which is married and to another woman which is married and to the heirs of their two bodies ingendred this is a good estate tail for there is a common possibility that they may intermarry but if the gift be to a man and to two women who are married and to the heirs of their bodies ingendred they shall not have an estate tail executed for it is a remote and forreigne possibility and an imbrodery of estates which the law will not allow nor respect see the Rector of Chedingtons case that such a possibility as in our case may not be released for first here the mother ought to be dead before the Plantiff shall have land Secondly legacies ought to be paid Thirdly Thomas ought to be dead and till all these possibilities hap the Plantiff shall have nothing in the land and for that it is a remote possibility which is not gone by the release for as it is said when a possibility shall be gone by a release there ought to be a good foundation upon which the release may operate secondly the possibility which is released ought to be necessary and Common but in our case it is not necessary that the son shall enjoy it in the life of his mother and also the mother may in a short time pay the legacies and then neither of the sons shall have the land by which circumstances it is apparant that this is not a Common or an ordinary possibility but is a remote and forraigne expectancy which shall not be gone by this release and this differs from Lampets case for there was a possibility of a Chattel which as it may easily be created so it may easily be destroyed but in our case it is a franktenement which as that requires a greater ceremony in the creation and for that it will require a greater matter to destroy and to extinguish that and it is said in Woods case cited in Shelleys case Coo. 1. that if a man covenant with A. that if I. S. infeoffed him of the Mannor of D. that then he will stand seised to the use of him and his heirs of the Mannor of B. and the Covenantee died and the said I. S. infeoffed the Covenantor in such case the heir shall be inward and yet it is only a possibility which descends which possibility of an use may not be discharged or released and yet in that case there was a possibility which is more Common and ordinary then in our case for there was a possibility that I. S. should make the feofment and so say a good foundation upon which the release may operate and he put the case that I. shall let for so many years as I. S. shall name if I. S. name it is good and yet he held if I. S. release before the nomination that this release is meerly void because he had only a possibility and as to Digs case Coo. 1. there a power of Revocation may be released and good reason for the Covenantor who released had the bird in his own hand and for that it was no remote possibility but there it is said that if the power be limited to an estranger there the stranger may not release and he also agreed Albanies case for there the power to release was upon the death of a man only but in our case it is upon death and other
covenantor shall have an estate for life and so the law makes in that case fractions of estates as the case of the Lord Seymor Dyer 96. seems to accord with this and besides those two books he said he could not finde any book which will warrant that and for that reason he held those two books to be no law for if I Covenant that my son shall have my land after my death this will not raise an estate to me by implication for life and an estate to my son and so by such means to change my estate in fee for an estate for life without more words for the word covenant in his proper and native signification is only obligatorie and yet it had been alwayes conceived sufficient to raise an use to him who is not partie to that as if I covenant with a stranger that I will stand seised of my land to the use of my son this will raise an use to my son and yet neither my son nor the covenantee may have an action of covenant but an use will very well arise to my son as if a man bargain and sell his land in consideration of 100. l. paid by I. S. though in this case the consideration ariseth from a stronger yet that will pass the use to the bargainee and in case of covenant it is not this word covenant only which creats the use but it is rather the agreement of the parties which is testified by the covenant for if sufficient agreement appears there will not need this word covenant as if I will agree and declare to stand seised to the use of my son by which it appears that the word covenant is onely declarative of the intentions of the parties and then in the principal case the covenant is not that the son shall have the land but that the land shall come remain and be to him and those words are incertain as 21. H. 7. redert come or discent and for that reason it is all one with the law of the same case and then void to raise any use for the incertainly and then when Andrew Buckley covenants that his son shall have his lands and no words to inforce his intention and for that reason the intention shall be lyable to an action of covenant and not to change his estate which he had in fee for an estate for life by this covenant but if he had expresly covenanted that in consideration of marriage of his son that he would hold his land for life and after this should be to his son this will change the estate which was in fee for an estate for life but in our case the covenant being general and left to the indifferent construction of the law the word covenant shall be taken in his proper and native signification and this is obligatorie and so he concluded that this covenant being at the first to grant a rent and was executory and the last part of that is executory for assurance and the limitation of the estate to the son being intangled between these two Covenants this shall be of the same nature and by consequence the covenant is obligatorie only and will raise no use to the son and so he concluded that judgement shall be given for the Plantiff and it was commanded to be entered accordingly Sparrow against Sowgate IN debt by Sparrow against Sowgate who declared that the Defendant became Bail for one Richard Sowgate in Banco Regis against whom the Plantiff had brought a Bill of debt of 77. l. and now the Defendant bound himself in a Recognizance of 77. l. upon which the action is now brought that in case judgement should be given against the said Richard Sowgate that he shall satisfie the said judgement or render his bodie to prison for in this case no part was impossible for after the judgement the principal may render himself in B. R. to the Marshal for the redemption of his suretie and that is the Common course there as he said but he agreed the case to be otherwise if a scire facias issue out of the Kings Bench against the Bail for there the death of the principal is a good plea for a scire facias doth not lie there till default is assigned in the principal in his not comming upon the capias ad satisfaciendum which may not be when he is dead Note that but yet before any capias it is clear he may have an action of debt Sir Robert Hitcham Serjeant of the King to the contrary and he alledged this to be the constant course in the Kings Bench that the Bail is never chargable till there is default assigned in the principal upon the recorn of the Capias ad satisfaciendum which may not be here for the principal is dead and he agreed the case of the other side that when a man is to do two things though the one is become impossible yet he ought to perform the other but when it is in the election of one to make either the one or the other then it is otherwise see Dyer 262. and so he concluded for the Defendant Hobert chief Iustice said that it is inconvenient that the Plantiff shall be forced to sue his Capias ad satisfaciendum against the partie before he have execution against the Bail for perchance he will sue a fieri facias or an elegit against him and that the Corps of the partie will not satisfie him and Browlow Prothonotary said that it had been adjudged in this Court that such plea is not good Winch the course of the Kings Bench is that default shall be assigned upon the retorn of the principal before the Bail shall be charged and though the Plantiff refuse to take his bodie after he had made his election to take his fieri facias or elegit he shall never more resort to the Bail which was granted by Hobert and Hutton as to that last point and it was holden by all the Court that if the principal render his bodie though the Plantiff refuse to take that yet that is a discharge of the Bail and also it was agreed by Hutton Hobert and by Winch that if the course of the Kings Bench be such that the Bail shall not be forfeit till there is a default assigned in the principal the same course also shall be followed here and per Curiam if the course of the Kings Bench be such that such Capias is necessary to be awarded that then a convenient time shall be allowed for the principal to render his bodie gratis and if the principal do die before such time the Bail is discharged but it was said by Winch if he die before convenient time and the Capias is awarded that such death shall not discharge the Bail note that Iones Iustice said that he thought in this case that it is necessary that the principal render himself gratis for when he is let to Bail the law supposeth him to be alwayes in custodie
Harvey and Blacklock in this Court where the Defendant pleaded such plea in all points as here as to the Fettering for the Defendant fettered the horse of the Plantiff because he was so fierce and so wild to one of his own horses and so continued till he delivered him to the Plantiff and because the horse died within the year the Plantiff brought his action and upon this plea pleaded by the Defendant it was demurred in law and judgement was given for him for Cook who was then chief Iustice said that a horse may be of 40. or 100. l. price and it shall be intollerable to allow such Nusance and secondly he had not made proclamation and so trespass lies against and so in our case Harris Serjeant to the contrary for when the Lord of a Mannor takes an estate he had some kinde of property before the year is expired and for that reason he may detain the estray against the owner till amends is made to him 44. E. 3. 14. 29. E. 3. 6. by Knevet 20. H. 7. by Vavasor and Frewick and if he had property against the owner himself he may use that with moderation to make some benefit of that especially in case of necessity as 22. Assise 5. 6. a man may justifie the beating another if he be in a rage and 6. E. 4. 8. one may justifie the felling of a tree in the ground of another in case of necessity and here is no other way to restrain this Savage Colt and so the justification is good but in this case it was resolved by Hobert Winch and Hutton Iones being in the Chancery First when a beast comes within the Mannor of another Lord this is a trespas but after the seisure for an estray it is a possession of the estray in the Lord and the beginning of property as Hutton used the term so that he may have an action of trespass against any stranger which takes that out of his possession and if he estray into the land of another he may him retake Secondly it was resolved that if the Lord make not proclamation in convenient time that this possession became tortious for the law necessarily imposeth it upon the Lord of the Mannor that he make Proclamation because that otherwise the owner may not come to the knowledge of him Thirdly that the estray within the year is as a pledge in the Custody of the law till amends be made to the Lord and for that reason the Lord may not work him no more then he can work a distress Fourthly it was resolved that if the estray goe into the Mannor of another Lord and the last Lord claims that as an estray the first Lord had lost that but not before claim Fifthly Hutton and Winch agree that he might Fetter the Colt being so fierce and wild for he is answerable for the trespas and wrong which he makes in the land of his neighbours and also to the owner if he lose him and therefore it is unreasonable that he may not keep him safe for his indempnity and that is not like to the case 27. Assise which was urged of the other side also they said fettering is the usual way in the Country to restrain wild horses and therefore if it be in an ordinary manner as he Fetters his own there is not any remedy against the Defendant Hobert chief Iustice was against that last point for the Lord may not hold him in arcta custodia as a prisoner because he had rather the keeping of an estray the the property and for that if the estray go into the land of another Lord the first may not take him again if the other claims him as an estray for the possession was rather in regard of his Mannor then in regard of himself and therefore he shall not answer for the wrong which he doth in the lands of others for the possession is in regard of his Mannor and his Fettering is an abuse and he may not neither use nor abuse an estray and he said over that the Defendant had not well pleaded for another reason because he had not shewed that he proclaimed him in the next market Town within convenient time which convenient time ought to be adjudged by the Court and he said the Lord may not keep him else where within the year then within the Mannor Winch Iustice said the Defendant ought to proclaim an estray ut supra if the year be past for by that he gains an absolute propertie but here where no property is devested he needs not to proclaim him within the year and Hobert commanded this case to be moved again see the last case but one in the book Ruled that after imparlance in debt upon an obligation the Defendant shall be admitted to plead alwayes ready though the 13. Eliz. in Dyer was urged to the contrary Hill 21. Jac. C. P. Hillary Term in 21 year Iac. C. P. Trehern against Claybrook TRehern brought an action of debt against Claybrook upon a lease for years and upon nihil debet pleaded and a special verdict the case was to this effect the Grandfather of the Plantiff was seised of lands in Southwark and he made a lease for years of that to the Defendant at London rendring 45. l. rent and after he devised the reversion to the Plantiff in fee and in his will he set forth that his intent was that his Executors shall have the reversion during the Term upon condition that they enter into bond to pay 34. l. per annum at 4. usual Feasts during the Term and he further devised that this bond shall be made by the advise of his overseers and he limitted all this to be done within 6. moneths after his decease and if his Executors refuse his will was that his overseers shall take the profits upon the same condition and appointed that both obligations be made to the Plantiff and the devisor died and the Executors within 3. moneths shewed the will to the overseers but no obligation was offered to be made within the 6. moneths and the Plantiff required the Executors to enter into the obligation and to pay the rent which was not done and he claimed the reversion and brought his action afterwards in London where the lease was made and not in Southwark where the land did lie and this case was twice argued by Councel at the barre and now it was argued by the 3. Iustices Hobert being absent And Iones Iustice moved a point which was not moved at the barre viz. that the Plantiff is devisee of the reversion and so is privie in estate only and for that reason the action ought to be brought in Southwark where the land lies and not in London where the contract was made but the lessor himself had liberty to bring the action where he pleased in regard of the privitie of estate and contract and so was it adjudged in the Kings Bench between Glover and Humble and here though this be
he was seised in fee and that he had power to alien that and this was to encourage the Purchasers and for the form he needs not aver that this was in the hands of Anne Parker for he had confessed that in the bar that he came lawfully to that and besides the Covenant is broken though he never was seised and so I conceive that the Plantiff shall have judgement Winch to the same intent it is true if it had been all but one Covenant then if it had been no question this had not been broken but I think they are several Covenants like to the case of Sir Robert Napper lately adjudged also the first two Covenants are in the affirmative and the other in the Negative and for that they ought to be answered with several pleas and these kinde of assurances are the Common assurances and therefore they ought to be interpreted favourably for the Purchasers and Iohn was not deceived in these Covenants for they brought down upon the deed an estate in fee and it is also agreed if the word Covenant and grant had been divers times added to the several clauses then they had been several Covenants and now it is all one word and made those to be several Covenants and words of relation never will controul that which is certainly put down before and so he concluded in this case the Plantiff shall have judgement to recover Hobert chief Iustice to the contrary every deed ought to be construed according to the intention of the parties and the intents ought to be adjudged of the several parts of the deed as a general issue out of the evidence and intent ought to be picked out of every part and not out of one Word only and here Peter joyned with his father to strengthen the assurance and Iohn had not only his own estate but the estate of Proud and it is plain he never meant to intangle himself with other Conveyances then those which he and Proud had made and I hold this to be no independent Covenant and it is all bound with one clause S. for any Act or Acts made by them c. and it is confessed if these words had been placed in the forefront that then they should relate to all and it is as clear as if they were and the first reson is that the intent appears only to undertake for himself because he should but have part of the land and for that he was to warrant his evidence and to that end he was to deliver to him his title at large in the said indenture and here he had made the Plantiff privie to every several conveyance of that to inform the Purchaser of it and will you also intangle him with a covenant you might have taken notice of his title and it appears to be the very intents of the parties that you should take notice of the title and inform your selves concerning the same Secondly this is a sentence which may be taken both wayes and I say it is agreed that if it had begun with these words notwithstanding any Act or Acts c. that then it shall be all construed by this and I never saw any difference I grant they are several Covenants in point of fact but not in point of obligation for there are not several words of binding nay I say if he had released this last he had released all but it hath been said that one is in the negative and the other is in the affirmative but I do not value that and it hath been said that this is the Common assurance of the Realm and if other construction shall be made then no man shall be sure of his own we had given him leave to say that no reversion nor remainder is in the King by any Act by him made and the King may not have any reversion and he seised in fee also this clause standing indifferent whether this shall be referred to all or not and then the question is how the Court will adjudge of that for my part I take it that this may stand with the intent of all the parties of the deed but take that as you take it that this destroyes all for if he is absolutely seised in fee what matter is where the reversion is and yet if the reversion was in the Crown and not by his Act you confess that may not charge him which is expresly against the first Covenant if this be distinct by it self but take that indifferently and all the parties will stand together Nappers case hath no affinity with this for questionless there were several Covenants for in that indenture it did not appear what estate Sir Thomas Eearsfield had and for that reason nothing might be collected out of that but he had a present estate but in our case all is contained in the bodie of the indenture and Nokes case is a strong case and stronger then the case at the bar is for thereupon construction of all the parties of the deeds the special warrantie controuls the general warranty and the reason is no man will take an express special warranty when the intent is that he shall have a general warranty there was a case lately ajudged between the Earl of Clanrickard and his wife against the Countess of Leicester where the Lady pleaded that she was Tenant in Dower where in veritie she had the revesion in fee expectant upon a Term for life and they conveyed all the estate the Lady had in Dower and then they covenanted that they would convey all their estate to the Lord of Leicester and his heirs during the life of his wife and then Covenanted that they would convey all their estate to the Earl of Leicester and his heirs for ever in the aforesaid land and it was resolved that though such Covenant will raise an use to the partie who ought to have that and so the reversion will pass if there had been no more words now it was but during the life of the Lady for that third part for the Covenant was but to strengthen an estate and not to convey it and so he concluded that the Plantiff should be hard and after it was said by the Court that this case was not of weight to be brought into the Exchequer Chamber and therefore the Court advised that the parties would agree quere for the residue in the Exchequer Chamber concerning that Entred Hill 18. Jac the case of Comendams Richard Woodley against the Bishop of Exeter and Mannering RIchard Woodley brought a quare Impedit against the Bishop of Exeter and Mannering who was Parson of the said Church and he declared that Arthur Basset was seised of an acre of land to which the said Advowson was appendant in his demeasne as of fee and that he the 13. Octobris 13. Eliz. granted the next advowson to one William Manwood who was then incumbent in the said Church who by his will 20. November made one Harcourt his executor
and died by whose death the Church became void the which was the first and the next avoydance after the grant and Harcourt presented Cardon and that the said Arthur Basset so being seised in fee 18. Octobris 17. Eliz. by his will in writing devised to Iohn Basset his son the first and next avoydance of the Church aforesaid which first and next avoydance hapned after the death of the said Arthur Basset and that the said Iohn Basset was possessed of the said next avoydance and the said Chardon being incumbent 29. of September 37. Eliz. he was elected Bishop of Down in Ireland and he being so Elect the Queen by her letters 37. of her Raign considering the smalness of the said Bishoprick that it was not able to maintain him in his episcopal dignitie ex gratia sua speciali concessit Lycensavit et potestatem dedit to the said Chardon Bishop elect that he with the said Bishoprick the rectory of Tedbome in comendum ad huc recepire et fructus de c. in usus suos convertere disponere et applicare valeat et possit habendum that in Comendam for 6. years and within the 6. years he was consecrated and after the Term of the 6. years the Church became void per legis Anglie and that the Queen by her prerogative presented one Bee who was admitted instituted and inducted and the Plantiff conveyed from Iohn Basset his title by his grant of the next avoydance and shewed that the said Church became void by the death of Gee and that the vacation by the death of Gee is the next avoydance after the death of Arthur Basset by reason whereof the Plantiff presented and was disturbed and upon his decla ration Edwards the patron demurred and the Bishop claimed nothing but as ordinary and Manering pleaded and confessed the seisin of Arthur Basset and the grant to Manwood and the presentation by Harcourt of Chardon and the devise to Iohn Basset but he shewed that after the death of Arthur Basset the Acre to which the advowson is appendant descended to Thomas Basset as c. and he being so seised the Church became void by the death of Chardon who had the next avoydance after the death of Arthur Basset and that this remained void by 2. years after his death by which the Queen presented by Lapse the said Gee who was admitted c. and Thomas Basset conveyed that to Edwards and that became void by the death of Gee and that he presented the said Mannering c. absque hoc quod praedicta vacatio Ecclesiae praedictae post Mortem de Gee was the first and next avoydance after the death of Arthur Basset as the Plantiff had alleadged and upon this bar the Plantiff demurred and it was argued by the Councel of both sides on several dayes and in Michaelmas Term ensuing it was argued by the Court but because that Harvey was newly made Iustice he did not argue the case but Iustice Hutton began The argument of Justice Hutton ANd Iustice Hutton after a recital of the case said that his opinion was that the Plantiff should be barred and in the first place it is to be considered whether the King had any title at all to present by the Creation of Chardon to be Bishop Secondly admit that he had title whether he had dispensed with that and by his dispensation he had satisfied his prerogative Thirdly admit that the King had title and that this was not satisfied with the Commendam whether the grantee had lost his turn and as to the first point it ought to be agreed that when a parson is made a Bishop that he is discharged of the Church by the Common Law and so is the 45. Edw. 3. 5. and Dyer 159. petit Broo. 116. and this is an avoydance by Cession and for any thing that I see in our books the King had not any title to present except that he himself was patâ—on but because that did not happen fully in question here I will not deliver any opinion but I will say what our antient books do lay 41. Edw. 35. adjudged that the King shall not present to a prebendary where the prebend was made Bishop and the tithe which the King had to present was by reason that the temporalities of the Bishoprick of which he was prebend was in his hands and see the 7. H. 4. 25. a good case 11. H. 4. 37. Dyer 228. and for Brooks presentation 61. that is but the report of the Chancellor who had that in presentation but our Common Law doth not warrant any such thing and then for the second point whether the King had dispenced with his prerogative and in the first place we are to know that these Commendams were at the first but to see the cure served and by the opinion of Pollard the ordinary is to see the cure served though that be charged with such rents that none would have it and for that Commendams were at the first good but now if the King had title then that began per the consecration otherwise he shall never have it and so is 41. Edw. 3. 5. if consecration doth not give that he shall never have it and hereby his grant to hold that in Commendam he had dispenced with this prerogative and if this had been granted to him for his life none will deny but that he had dispenced with his prerogative and shall never take advantage of that again afterwards and no more in this case for he is incumbent to all intents and purposes for Fitz N B. 36. he may have a Spoliation and yet in this case he is parson and Bishop and now that the King may dispence with that it is not to be doubted and I will compare that with the like cases A. 6. Eliz. Dyer 252. where the King granted the Custody of the land and heir of his Tenant if he died his heir being within age and this grant was to Cantrel and it was agreed to be good and Wardship is as Royal an antient perrogative as any appertains to the Crown and 3. H. 6. title grant 61. the King may grant the temporalities of the Bishoprick before it is void which in my opinion is Cosen German to our case out of which book I conclude the King may dispence and by the dispensation he is full parson and this is for his life for the King may not make him incumbent except it be for life like to the case of Dyer fo 52. where the patron and the ordinary made a confirmation of a lease for part of the time which was made by the parson and agreed that this shall stretch to the whole time and no better case may be put then the case of Packhurst in Dyer 22. 8. where Packhurst was incumbent of the Church of Cleave and was made Bishop of Norwich but before he was created Bishop he had a dispensation from the Arch-Bishop to retain that in Commendam for 3.
years notwithstanding his advancement and he resigned during the 3. years and issue there taken upon the resignation and this case proves all the partes of our case first that the King may dispence and that by his dispensation he is compleat person to resign and if he do resigne during the years the King shall not have the prerogative to present again for that was satisfied with the dispensation and also when the King came to his prerogative by subjects means he ought to take that as it falls for otherwise he loses that quite vide Bastervils case Coo. 7. and another reason is if it be not satisfied then the King shall have another which is mischievous and this being a new case such president is not to have more favour then the necessitie of the Law will require and so my opinion is that it is all one as if it had for life and there is a good case 9. Ed. 3. 20. where the King had 2. presentments vide the case but it was upon another reason but the case of 21. H. 7. 8. Frowike where the grantee of the next avoydance had judgement to recover and the incumbent resigned so that it is the second presentment yet the Plantiff shall have the effect of his judgement and he had a writ to the Bishop quere the application for I did not well heare that but in our case if the prerogative of the King was not satisfied yet it ought to appear that when he presented Gee he had no title but that was an usurpation and if the King was not satisfied then the Plantiff shall not have judgement for then Gee was an usurper and upon that declaration the Plantiff shall be barred but now for the last point admit that the King was satisfied of his prerogative by his presentation of Gee whether the Plantiff had lost his course I think he had in the first place the words of the devise are the first the next avoydance which shall hap after the death of Athur Basset now it hath been objected that the King had the first by his prerogative and therefore he shall have the second I think in this case Brook presentation 52. is a strong case where a presentation was granted to one and after to another when the first is void and ruled that the second grantee shall not have the second and so Dyer 35. it ought to be taken according to the words for otherwise he shall not have any for modus et Conventio uniunt Legem and the case of quare Impedit 152. proves something to this purpose for a man had 4. advowsons and granted the next which should hap of them to I. S. and he died and the heir assigned the wife for her Dower one Mannor to which the advowson was appendant which first became void and ruled that the Grantee shall not have that against the feme and then it was moved by Thorpe that he shall have the second but Shard said certainly never which proves that if the turn of the Grantee was taken from him by the indowment of the feme he had lost that for ever the like case is the 15. H. 7. 7. 14. H. 7. 22. moved by Mordant that the Grantee of the third shall have the fourth when the wife is indowed of the third which case is brought to prove a case which without question is not law and that is that the King being Gardian of the Grantee of the next avoydance and he grant that in this case the heir shall have that at his full age which without question is now law for by the same reason his course may be the 20. but there are two rules from this which seem to cross this opinion one rule is that the words of the grantor shall be taken most strong against himself and the other that the Grantor shall not be received to avoid his own grant as it is said in Davenports case Coo. 8. but yet these rules are to be intended where the words are compleat for as the case is the 13. Ed. 3. Grant 65. that where the husband and his wife are joynt Tenants for life and he in reversion grant the lands only which the husband held in this case nothing passeth for the reversion was expectant upon a lease which the husband and wife held nay I will cite one case where a man by his own Act shall avoid his own grant in a quare Impedit Elmes against Taylor where a man was seised of the Mannor to which the advowson was appendant and he granted the third next avoydance and after against his own grant he usurped and it was adjudged that by this usurpation he had gained the advowson to be appendant to his Mannor again and that the Grantee had lost his course and so the case in Dyer 283. where the Church was void and the patron granted the next avoidance tunc vacant to another and this pro hac unica vice tantum and there resolved that the grant was not good and that it should not extend to another and so in our case it shall not extend to a second another reason is if the King had a prerogative he is bound and every derivative estate under him for he shall not be in better case then the grantee for he was bound by the law of the land and for that it is equitie and it is Iustice that the estate of the grantee should be bound and so in this case like to the case in Plowden 207. and Dyer 231. where by Act of Parliament the possessions of an Abbot were bound now if afterwards the Abbot made a lease for years or granted the next avoydance and then after they came to the King he shall avoid the grant for the interest of the Grantor was bound by Act of Parliament and see the case of the universitie of Oxford Coo. 10. where a man before he was a recusant convict he granted the next avoydance and after he became a recusant convict and then the Church became void now the grantee shall not present for his interest was bound by Act of Parliament and so he must take it and here it behoves him to take that as it is bound with the prerogative of the King and so upon all the matter he hath lost his title and he concluded that the Plantiff shall be barred The argument of Justice Winch. WInch Iustice of the same opinion but because his argument was much to the purpose of that with Hutton and the Lord Hobert therefore I will not Report that verbatim and Winch said I will speak to the last point which was moved by my brother Hutton and I hold that where he had the first granted to him now he shall have none at all for it is punctually expressed that he shall have the first and that shall not extend to the next which may be granted but I grant if two coparceners had an advowson and the eldest presented and
years then this is void by resignation and so is the case of Packhurst that when he resignes during the years of the Commendam the Patron shall have that and not the King and so also my opinion is clear that if he had died within the 6. years limitted by the Commendam that the King shall not have that for then it is void by death and not by the assumption of the Bishoprick which book proves directly that a Commendam may be aswel for years as for life but yet I do not hold that upon those temporary Commendams if the Bishop continued Parson during the years and made no Act to impeach that then is a void cause S. the assumption of the Bishoprick and then when that is determined the supension is determined and it is void by the original cause S. by the assumption of the Bishoprick and this Commendam doth not turn the second or first Patron to any prejudice for the incumbent is still in by the presentation of the Patron and the determination of the Commendam is not any cause of the avoidance of the benefice but this is quasi non causa which is causa stolida as the Logicians do term it but in this case the assumption is the cause of the Cession and it is like to the case of 25. Ed. 3. 47. where the King brought a quare Impedit against the Arch-Bishop of York for a Prebendary vide the case and ruled in that case that the confirmation of the King had not taken away his title to present and the reason was because the confirmation had not filled the Church but continued that full which was full before and here this temporarie Commendam may not restrain the King to present afterwards for this is not a presentation and therefore may not take away the title of the King and here the Plantiff hath not well expressed it for he hath not shewed in this Court that the presentation of the King was lawful neither that Chardon held that by vertue of the Commendam for all the 6. years but only that the Church became void by the Laws of England and that is not sufficient and then if all before were for the Plantiff yet the question is whether he hath lost his turn and I think that he hath omnis argumentatio est à notoribus and the first is better known then the second and the second may not be the first and there when the devise gave him the first it is idle to say that he shall have the second for that departs from the meaning of the words and in every grant the law implies quantum in se est and no man may say that the devisor did intend to warrant that from antient Titles and so the Lord Hobert concluded his argument and said his opinion was that the Plantiff shall be barred and judgement was commanded to be entred accordingly Mich. 22. Jac. C.P. Michaelmas Term in the two and twentieth year of King James in the Common Pleas. DAvenport moved for the amendment of a Record where a recovery was suffered of lands in Sutton in the Countie of York and the indenture of bargain and sale was by the right name and the indenture of uses by the right name but the writ of entrie was of the Mannor of Sulton and upon the examination of the parties to be recovery that the recovery was to no other uses then is expressed and mentioned in the said indenture this was to be amended Sheis against Sir Francis Glover SHeis brought an action upon the case against Sir Francis Glover and shewed for the ground of his action that where one Harcourt was bound to the Plantiff in a Recognizance c. upon which the Plantiff took forth an elegit and the Defendant being the Sheriff of the Countie took an inquisition upon that upon which it was extended but he refused to deliver this to the Plantiff but yet he returned that he had delivered that and upon that he brought his Action and upon not guiltie pleaded it was found for the Plantiff and now it was moved in arrest of judgement by Serjeant Hendon and the reason he shewed was because he laid his action in an improper Countie for though the return was in Middlesex where the Action was brought yet because the land lies in Oxfordshire where the seisin ought to be delivered the place is Local and for that the Action ought to be brought there and now Serjeant Breamston argued that the Action was well brought in Middlesex for this being but a personal thing he may bring that in either of the Counties as 14. Ed. 4. 13. Ed. 4. 19. expresly in the point and to the second objection that had been made that an Averment may not be against the return of the Sheriff to that Breamston answered that in an other Action an Averment may be against the return of the Sheriff though not in the same Action as 5. Ed. 4. but it was agreed to have a new trial by the preservation of the Iustices for otherwise it seemed the opinion of the Court was that the Plantiff shall have judgement upon the reasons urged by Serjeant Breamston Mary Baker against Robert Baker an Infant in Dower MAry Baker brought a writ of Dower against Robert Baker an Infant who did appear by his Gardian and he pleaded that his father who was husband of the demandant was seised of a Messuage and of land in Socage and devised that to the demandant for her joynture in full satisfaction of all Dower and he shewed that after the death of his father the demandant did enter into the said Messuage and land and was seised of that by vertue of the devise and to that the demandant did replie by protestation that he did not devise and for plea confessed the seisin of the husband and her own entrie but she further shewed that the Infant who was then Tenant was but of the age of 14. years and that she entred as Gardian in Socage to the Infant and disagreed to accept of that by vertue of the devise and traversed the entire and the agreement and it was said by the Court that his bar is good though it had been more pregnant to have alledged that she entred virtute legationis praedictae and so was seised and after it was said that the Replication was very good without the traverse for this was not expresly set down but that was but meerly the consequence of the plea which in veritie was not traversable Hickman against Sir William Fish HIckman had judgement for 600. l. and 10. l. damages against Sir William Fish and he acknowledged satisfaction for 410. l. of the said debt and damages and after there was an agreement between them that if Sir William did not pay the residue by such a day that then it should be lawful for Hickman to take out execution against the said Fish without suing of any scire facias though it was after
the parties hinders the operation of the law and that law will not provide for him that provides not for himself and the Lady her self was partie to the limiting of the uses and she covenanted that she will be seised by vertue of the fine and under the condition in the indenture and so it is a plain Surrender of her former estate and so I pray judgement for the Plantiff The argument of Serjeant Hendon to the contrary HEndon contrary there are 3. points First whether this be a precedent or a subsequent condition and I conceive it is subsequent and here the indentures being but to declare the uses of the fine and not to create any use ergo it shall be guided by the intents of the parties appearing in them and so is the Earl of Rutlands case Cook 5. and Dyer 357. and Shelleys case and the meaning of the parties was not to raise any use to Robert but only a possibilitie to reduce that by the performance of the condition and first it is here said that the Conusee shall be seised to the uses hereafter expressed and under the conditions and then the use ought to preceed the condition for no man may stand seised under the condition except the condition is subsequent to the use to arise Secondly when is the use to arise to Robert surely when he payes 10. s. and then in the mean time the use is to the Lady and her heirs for tunc had here relation to when as it is said in Boles case Cook 3. and in Grants case cited in Loves case Cook 10. and 17. Ed. 3. 1. all which cases prove that tâ—en had relation to when and before this when he had nothing and this doth appear to be the agreement of the parties and now for the words themselves I take it that they make a subsequent condition and so it is here limited in intention and for that in matter also and it is said in Colthirsts case in Plowden that if the estate doth first pass reducible upon condition then it is subsequent and here it is limited to the Conusee and his heirs if the Conusor do not pay but here it hath been said is inversio verborum and the consequent is placed before the Antecedent and this hath been proved by Logick I never knew cases in law to be expounded by Logical and Grammatical learning but by the intentions of the parties and here I conceive that the estate is vâ—sted in the Conusee by the fine and so the condition is subsequent but admit it is Executory and I say concerning that there are these differences that if the state of the thing granted is executory and that the condition of the thing granted is Executory and the condition is to remain with the estate so long as the estate doth remain the condition is precedent 28. E. 3. 2 4. 3. 1. H. 6. 32. but if the condition be but one time to be executed and that not contained with the estate then it is subsequent 10. Eliz. Dyer Calthorps case but here our estate is executed for it is expresly limited to the Lady Cesar and her heirs which takes away all implied uses so that no implied use shall result in the mean time and so 75. Assises land given to a man and to his heirs if he have heirs of his body now this if is subsequent and so I conceive that it is not a condition simply but a conditional limitation for it appears by Mr. Littleton because it is no otherwise expressed and another reason is because the condition is annexed to the future time ergo that is subsequent and yet I grant there is a difference betwixt such an estate conditional annexed to an interest and where it is is annexed to an authoritie it may be precedent but for an interest it is subsequent as is the case of Bracton lib. 2. fo 3. and now for the second point whether the heir may and ought to perform that and I do conceive that he is and it is not annexed to the person because it is real and doth arise with the land Secondly yet the law doth expect who ought to have performed that but it is the performance it self which the law doth respect 4. E. 3. 2. such condition real which doth arise with the land and in such a case no notice is in that case requisite and the last point is whether the estate for life is gone and I hold that it is saved by the common law of England for the fine only is as the grant of the reversion by the explanation of the indenture and then there is no surrender in the case but when the condition is performed the estate for life doth remain and so was it resolved in Mr. Mansors case and yet I agree that a litle matter will make a surrender and Mr. Ruds case where lessee for years of an advowson was presented by the Patron that was a surrender but the Statute of the 27th of H. the Eighth at the end saved that though it is to her own use for the words of the saving are to every person and their heirs which hereafter shall be seised to any use all such former rights c. possession c. as they might have had to their own use in any lands whereof they be seised to any other use whatsoever and so upon the whole matter I do conceive that judgement ought to be given for the Defendant The residue of the case of Gibson and Ferrers NOw the case of Gibson and Ferrers which see before was argued again by Serjeant Bridgman and he said as before the award is not good for the interest and yet he now agreed that covenants bonds and contracts for usury are good in law but yet it may not be awarded 17. Ed. 4. 5. if a man do submit to Arbitrators they may not award that he and his wife shall levie a fine but if the partie himself do promise that this is good and shall binde the wife to perform that and besides he said that here is an award made only of one side and nothing is allowed to Ferrers and so not good 9. Ed. 4. 29. 29. H. 6. 22. and I pray that the Plantiff may be barred Hendon to the contrary and he argued if an award be good in any part though it be not in that which is assigned for breach yet it is good upon such plea of nullum fecerit arbitrium and the other shews an award and assignes the breach in this case the breach is not traversable for it is of the form and not of the substance of the action but to that the Court did presently answer that the cause of the action is the breach of the award and this he ought to make apparent to the Court for otherwise he shall not have any action and though the breach is not traversable yet it is of the substance of the action for upon such plea pleaded he not only