the which the Lord chief Baron Tanfield said insist not upon a labour of that kinde for it is plain enough because the Queen being partie there can be no Estoppel as to any part in that case also as to that part of his argument Mr. Walter agreed on the other side and also he said that if a grant of the Queeen were void at the Common Law for default of want of consideration this Statute aids not Walter for the Defendant and he divided the case into foure points the first whether the Tenant for life by the Kings guift by surrendring his letters Patents hath also surrendred his estate Secondly if the surrender in this case made be defective only for want of matter of circumstance as the inrolment c. whether such defects are saved by the Statute 43. Eliz. Thirdly whether in this case an actual surrender be the consideration meerly which moveth the Queen to grant or what shall be intended the consideration in this case Fourthly admitting that an actual surrender is the sole consideration in this case then whether a Patent shall be adjudg'd void for default of such consideration for a false consideration doth not avoid a Patent but a false surmise doth first when the Kings Tenant for life doth surrender or give up his Patent although without deed yet with such circumstances as the law requireth the surrender is good for although a surrender of letters Patents made by the Kings Tenant in tail will not make estate tail void or determine as it appears by the book case of 35. H. 8. title surrender and Cook 6. the Lord Chandos case yet the bare giving up of the letters Patents by a Tenant for life is a surrender of his estate so here in this case is some proportion between a Tenant for life of the Queen and a Tenant for life of a Common person to amount to a surrender and therefore it appeareth by 43. E. 3. that a Tenant for life may surrender without deed and without livery and from the land but a Tenant in tail may not do so also if a Common person hath a rent or other thing which cannot pass but by deed yet a surrender of such a rent shall be good by a bare deliverie up of the deed if he hath but an estate for life in the Rent and this also although it be but to the disseissor of the land out of which c. the same Law he took it of a particular Tenant for life of years also 32. H. 8. Brook Patents 97. it is made a doubt whether the estate tail of the Kings Donee be determined and gone by surrendring of the letters Patent and he referred that if thought worthy of a doubt whether it should be a good surrender of an estate tail they would hade held it clearly a surrender for an estate for life and it was admitted 3. Eli 2. Dyer fo 193. Mack-Williams case that if in the principal case if a Vacat or cancellation had been the surrender had been good actually without question and Sir Maurice Barkleys case cited on the other part proves the same also for there it is admitted that if the letters Patents had been given up there had been a perfect surrender And 40. H. 3. fol. 5. Belknap held that a surrender may be by word which is to be intended by giving up the Patent and that appears by Rolfs case in Dyer that a voluntary surrender needs no Conftat also where it hath been objected that the special verdict in this case hath not found in what Court the surrender was made he answered that the Law shall intend it to be made in the same Court from whence the letters Patents did issue for a surrender cannot be good being made in another Court and therefore it must needs be intended the same Court and he vouched 11. Ed. 3. fo 1. and 18. Eliz. Plinies Case and Covel and Cabels Case in Banco Regis 38. Eliz. wherein a special verdict it was holden that all things necessary for the perfecting of that the Iury hath found to be done must be necessarily intended concurrent Secondly the want of circumstances in a surrender are perfected and supplied by the Statute of 43. Eliz. for although matters of substance are not aided within this Statute yet matters of circumstances are aided And he said that all the defects in this Case are matters of circumstance and to prove that the defects in this Case are only in circumstance he said that there are three principal defects in conveyances which are meerly matters of circumstance and aided within this Statute the first is meerly want of form in a conveyance and that such a defect is aided he cited Hussies Case to be adjudged accordingly the second is where words are wanting in a conveyance and that such a conveyance is aided by this Statute he cited the opinion of Popham and Gawdy in 44. Eliz. in a cause depending in the Chancery the third matter of circumstance is where there is want of some matter concerning the executing of an estate and that such defect is only matter of circumstance and aided within this Statute he cited Morley and Whartons Case to be adjudged 7. Eliz. in the Common Pleas that the default of not inrolling is aided by this Statute and Mack-Williams and Kemps Case cited in Dyer before proves this to be but matter of circumstance and for that he thought the surrender in the principal Case wanting nothing but inrolment is aided by this Statute also in the argument of the second point he shews what defects in conveyances should be accompted matter of substance and so not aided by this Statute of 43. Eliz. and to this purpose he held that all disabilities of the person in a grant is matter of substance and so not aided within this Statute and he cited Twynes Case 32. Eliz. in the Exchequer to be accordingly Secondly he held that the nature of an assurance is not aided by this Statute and therefore if a man hath power to grant an estate by fine and he doth it by Deed this is not aided by the Statute for this is defective in matter of substance and he cited Wisemans Case and Sir Hugh Cholmleys Case in Cook l. 2. also he said if a man give land to the King and his heirs to have ten years after such grant this is not made good by the Statute Thirdly whereas it may be Collected that because it is found in the special verdict that an actual surrender was the cause which moved the Queen to grant or that it appears to be the cause he held that no consideration plainly appeareth but only by relation to a consideration before mentioned and he said that these words used by the Queen viz. modo habens et gaudens shew that the Queen took notice the state was still injoyed notwithstanding the delivery up of the letters Patents and therefore it cannot be intended by the verdict that the Queen intended
above mentioned of a lease for years and also it was there said that if Tenant for life be the remainder to the King for years the remainder to another in Fee and the Tenant for life makes a Feofment in Fee this drawes the Kings remainder out of him and so he held that here is no gift Secondly that here is no imployment and so the Feofment is made good Altham second Baron contra I will consider only two points First if it be a gift for years or for ever and I say that it is a gift for ever for here is no intent in the Donor to determine the superstitious use because he doth not limit any other use to which it should revert but only that the Priest should be maintained for ever and as that which hath been said that it was not imployed he answereth that out of the Book of 22. Assises 52. where 12. d. is reserved for three years and after 100. s. seisin of 12. d. is seisin of the 100. s. because it is issuing out of the freehold as the case is in Littleton in the Chapter of Atturnement Tenant for life the remainder in Fee the Lord shall not avow upon the remainder but shall have it by way of Escheat for all the estates together are holden of the Lord but if land be given to finde a Priest in D. and one is maintained in S. this is a mis-imployment but in our case I conceive that the Feoffees have power to dispose the land as to them seems best and therefore it is uncertain and then given to the King as it was in Dales case land was given to the intent that a Priest should be maintained as I. S. and I. D. thought fit so that he had not less then 8. marks yearly the King shall have all for the Feoffees may give all to the Priest if they please and in Turners case land was devised to a Priest and divers poor men all is given to the King by the superstitious imployment and as to the words if by the Law it may be they are idle for id possumus quod de Jure possumus and therefore 9. Ed. 6. an office was given to one if he were able to exercise it these words are idle for the Law saith that he shall not have it if he be not able to execute it 30. Ed. 3.8 a gift to two and to the longer liver of them that the Survivor shall have it are idle words 10. H. 7. a Condition that c. and here it the condition had been until an Act of Parliament prohibit it they are Idle words for if land be given to I. S. and his heirs upon condition that if he die without heirs c. this is a void condition and Repugnant to Law Lastly I hold the feofment good by way of Admittance and that the livery takes effect notwithstanding the Queens interest 4. H. 6.19 the Kings Tenant for life is disseised he shall have an Assise and yet there is no intrusion upon the King 17. H. 7.6 the Kings Lessee makes a feofment the King enters and so he held that the judgement should he given for the Defendant Snig Baron argued much to the same intent that Bromley had done and that the Schedule is so circumspect that nothing is given after the 99. years and that a spirit of Divination forwarned him of the alteration and he agreed the Feofment to be good with this difference where the King is in possession actually and where the Reversion is in the King and the book of 2 H. 4.9 that none shall enter upon the Kings Farmor is to be understood of the Kings under Tenants and not of his Lessees Tanfield chief Baron said that neither by the intent of the Statute nor of the parties the fee is given to the Queen but it is apparant that during the 99. years the parties intent is in suspence for fear of alteration and that they would see the difference of the times and leave the disposing thereof to his Feoffees and if they had sold the land and with the money maintained a Priest as many stocks of money have used to do without doubt it had been forfeited to the King and not the land and it would be in vain to speak of an Amortization if it be for a stipendary Priest only for this would not be necessary to have a foundation incorporated and to make an Amortization for such a Priest and therefore it seems to him that there is no determination of his will after the 99. years but that all is left to the determination and disposition of the feoffees who then should be and after the intent of the Statute which was penned by Hales Iustice of the Common Pleas. I observe four words given appointed limited and assigned and I do not conceive that our case is within the compass of any of them for as I said before it is in suspence until the end of 99. years and the parties who should have the interest are not known untill the time come nor the estate setled until that time but if it had been conveyed to superstitious uses after it had been given to the Queen notwithstanding the conveyance had not been sufficient if he who did convey had power in respect of the abilitie of his person and the estate in him and therefore Pasch 22. Eliz. the case was this Sir William Say before the Statute of 32. H. 8. of Wills was seised of lands in fee not devisable and before the said Statute he devised it to finde a Priest and notwithstanding that the devise was not good yet it was adjudged that the land was given to the Queen by 1. Ed. 6. but if it were a feme covert or an infant who are disabled in Law or a Tenant in tail who is disabled in respect of his estate there it had not been given to the Queeen but in all cases there ought to be an assignment or otherwise nothing is given and there is a difference where one grants land to the intent with the profits thereof to finde a Priest there all the land is given to the Queen and where he grants a rent for the maintenance of a Priest for there the King shall have but the Rent and he said that the Case cited 5. Ed. 6. Benlos is good Law and as to that which hath been said That because the power of the Feoffees is uncertain it should be given to the Queen true it is where the power is uncertain to bestow the profits but if their power be certain it is otherwise and as to the imployment there is none because there is no gift but the imployment of the particular estate is an imployment of the Remainder and a small thing will make an imployment James case was of the Greyhound in Fleetstreet which was given to finde a Priest and the White Horse for the maintenance of another and the Feoffees of the White-horse maintained the Priest of the
Earl of C. now dead and found that by fine and recovery he conveyed an estate in this land to the use of his brother that now is Earl of C. in tail the remainder over to c. and died having a daughter now Countess of Dorset who moved by Dodderidge the Kings Serjeant in the Court of wards that this office was insufficient for by the pretence of the said Countess the first estate given to the Cliffords by E. 2. was a general tail and then the fine levied and the recovery suffered by the last Earl her father is no Bar but that it may discend to this Countess as his heir in tail and therefore Serjeant Dodderidge said to the Lord Treasurer then present in Court that if this should be allowed that Iurors may finde generally a grant made and shew no quallitie of the conveyance nor any place or time but if this were a grant of reversion or of a possession he said that many men by such offices should have their lands given away whereunto they had no means for uncertainties to take a Traverse and as to insufficiency of this office he said that the insufficiency therein consisted first in matter Secondly in form for the insufficiency of the matter is two fold First because that the office findes only that King H. 6. by sufficient conveyance not limited any manner of conveyances nor any qualitie thereof which ought to be shewed and it is material because we may give a different answer thereunto for against letters Patents we may plead one thing and against an other conveyance we may plead another thing and so our answer differeth according to the qualitie of the conveyance Secondly it is insuffient in matter because it is found that H. 6. granted the possession and that he granted the reversion nec non manerium which is repugnant for if the King grant a reversion then no possession passeth and if he pass a possession then no reversion passeth and therefore it is repuguant to say that he granted Reversionem nec non manerium which implieth a possession also he said that his exceptions to the office as to the Mannor of it are two-fold First the office doth finde any time of the grant made by H. 6. and this is material for the grants upon Record take their force from the time of their date as appears by Ludfords Case in Plowdens Commentaries and he said that at this time the case is material to be exprest in respect that H. 6. was for part of his reign deposed and after restored and it might be in the time that he was deposed by Edward the fourth but unto that it was answered by the attorney of the wards that the office found that H. 6. granted c. that it was not in the time when he was deposed the second insufficiency in the Mannor is because it is not found at what place H. 6. made the said grant and that this is material to be found by office he vouched 36. H. 6.32 and he said that it is very requisite that in such offices all circumstances ought to be expressed in as ample certaintie as in a declaration so that the partie prejudiced by the office may know where to search for the conveyance but the Attorney general said that there needs no such express finding of all circumstances by a Iury as it ought to be in pleading for it shall be taken by intendment in divers cases but yet he said that it appears by 1. Eliz. Dyer 174. it is a good plea to say that A. granted a reversion c. to the King without shewing how much more in office which is the Act of the Iurors and therefore Serjeant Harris cited the Book of 14 15. H. 7.22 where an office found an estate tail without mention of the Donor and yet good and the Attorney general said also that it appears by the finding of the Iury in Fulwoods Case Cook lib. 4. that the Iury need not precisely to finde all circumstances for if there be convenient certaintie the residue shall be supplied by intendment as it is there said and the Attorney said that whereas it hath been objected that the issue is evil because it is found that H. 6. granted the reversion and also the Mannor and Castle aforesaid and doth not limit incertaintie that the King granted a reversion or that he granted a Mannor in possession to that he said that it is clear that the King may after recital of a particular estate grant the reversion nec non terras sive manerium and then be the land in lease or be the lease void in Law yet the land shall pass and this is his course alwayes in granting the Kings lands to others and therefore the Iury did well to finde the truth without determining what should pass for admit that there were no estate precedent in being yet by this finding it appears plainly that the Mannor and Castle should pass by the grant in the time of H. 6. to which the Lord Cook agreed for Law and so he said it was his use when he was Attorney general to which also the Lord Treasurer Flemming chief Justice and Tanfield chief Baron agreed and the Attorney general said that his use was if A. had a lease from the King of B. acre which by effluction is to determine in Anno. 1612. and the said A. doubting that this lease was not good in Law prayed to have a new lease that in this case he recited the first lease in the new letters Patents and thereby granted the land for twentie years from c. which shall be in Anno 1612. or from the sooner determination of the former lease and the Iudges allowed it to be good and Dodderidge Serjeant said that after the difference taken between the pleading and the finding of the Iury it seemed to him that there is a great difference between them but after the finding of the Iury upon an office as our case is and a pleading there is no difference for the office is a thing to which an answer may be made but a verdict given upon issue joyned between the parties hath no other proceeding but to judgement immediately and therefore such a verdict shall be divers times supplied by the construction of the Iudges but a verdict upon an office ought to be as certain as an indictment because the partie may Traverse and to prove that upon such uncertain offices there is no remedy by Traverse he vouched the case of 3. H. 4 5. upon an insufficient office after the outlawry of A. and no time is found of the outlawry and he observed out of the said book that the partie outed by the said insufficient office had no remedy by Traverse but was compelled to make a motion to the Court and after this case for difficultie was referred to the two chief Iustices and the chief Baron to consider upon who the said Term at Serjeants Inne appointed it to be
argued where Walter of the inner Temple moved that the office was insufficient and he cited one Baylies case to be resolved here where an office found that A. died seised de quodam tenemento that office was not good because of the incertaintie for it may be a rent or a house but otherwise it would be if it were upon a special verdict after issue joyned as he said it was there agreed also he said that it was there agreed if an office findes that A. was seised of B. acre in see and died it is not good because it is not found that he died seised yet in pleading it is good because when the fee simple is shewed to be in a man it shall be intended to continue in him until the contrary appears also in Pasch 43. Eliz. Morton and Brigs Case an office found A. to be seised of certain lands in D. holden in capite c. it is not good without shewing the certaintie c. so if the office had found that he was seised of 100. acres in D. and that certain of them were holden c. this is not good without shewing which c. as it was there also agreed in 26. H. 8. the condition of an Obligation was that the Obligor should make a sufficient estate of B. acre in debt upon this obligation it is no good plea to say that he had made a sufficient conveyance c. without shewing in certain what it was Mich. 32. c 33. Eliz. between Ireland and Gold a man pleaded for title that A. was seised and by deed inrolled gave and granted such land c. this is no good pleading because no sufficient certainty therein also it is not good because there is no certain time shewed of the grant made and although that a grant by record is good as it is in 37. H. 6. yet in pleading he ought to shew the time of the making of it 20. H. 7. also it is specially required to have the time of the making of the grant to be found here because there were divers Acts of Resumption made to nullifie grants by H. 6. in some of the years of his raign and it may be that this grant was made within those times contained in the Acts of resumption and therefore c. Hutton Serjeant argued that the office finding quod concessit generally is good and sufficient without these words by sufficient conveyance and the Traverse may be generally non concessit modo et forma and by 40. Assise pla 24. it is sufficient to say that A. was seised in fee and committed a forfeiture 5. Ed. 4.10 accordingly also he said that it appears by 14. 15. H. 7. if an office findes that A. was seised in tail it is a good office but in pleading not good without shewing how also in Knights Case Cook lib. 5.56 it appears that an office is good enough to intitle the King if it have substance although the manner be not formal 3. H. 6. an office finding that A. died seised and findeth not of what estate and yet it is good to intitle the King Bacon Solicitor general contra and he said that they are in veigled by reason of this office for the partie grieved knoweth not where or how to Travers because it is not found by what conveyance H. 6. granted the reversion for if it be by letters Patents a man cannot plead to them nul tiel Record also a verdict upon an office is principally to inform the partie who may Traverse and not like a verdict upon issue joyned whereunto the partie hath no answer but is only to inform the Iudges who ought to Iudge Hobert Attorney generall contra yet he agreed that if a patent be pleaded a man cannot say against it nul tiel Record but he said that Lucies Case 14. H. 7. is a stronger case then ours where an office is holden good finding a man to be seised in tail and upon that book he relied much to prove the office to be good Bacon Solicitor said here is an incertaintie in the conveyance and also in the estate which is not in the 14th of H. 7. for there is an express finding of an estate and a dying seised thereof but here the finding is that he was seised prout lex postulat Harris Serjeant that the office is good and he vouched also Knights Case Cook lib. 5. vouched by Hutton and also the case of Alton-woods Cook lib. 1. that an office there was holden good although more uncertain then this office and here the office is only that H. 6. granted and shewed how and therefore c. Walter said that it appears by the argument of Keeble in the case 14. H. 7.26 where he argued that where the right of the estate is to be inquired there it ought to be certain in all circumstance but otherwise it is if the inquiry be only upon the possession for there if a sufficient possession be found it is good enough And Brian chief Iustice said the office was void in that case fo 27. and the Iudges in this case would be advised until the next Term and the next Term it was recited again by Nichols Serjeant for the Earl of Cumberland and by Bacon Solicitor for the the Countess of Dorset at which day the Iudges said that the question in the case is only this viz. if an office findes only that A. was seised of a particular estate and that the King granted the reversion c. without shewing how or other particular certainties and to that if such an office be good or not they said that it is not easie to determin for although it be good in the case of a common person yet it will be greatly mischievous to the King if by such offices his inheritance should be devested in respect no Traverse can be to such an office but yet they would not award the office to be void but advised the Attorney of the wards to grant a special premunire to the heir general who was the Countess of Dorset Salvo jure cujuslibet c. and so in an Action at the Common Law the Earl might trie his right and title and not upon the validitie of an office and so it was done The King against the Earl of Nottingham and others BEtween the King by English Bill and the Earl of Nottingham and others Defendants but concerned Sit Robert Dudley in interest and was as followeth viz. Sir Robert Dudley intending to travel beyond the Seas did by indenture inrolled the 10th of June for a valuable consideration expressed but none paid convey the Mannor of Killingworth amongst other lands to the Earl of Nottingham c. in see but the Barganees were not privy unto the Deed not till afterwards and in the Deed there was a proviso that upon the tender of an Angel of Gold all should be void and convenants on the part of the Barganees that they should make all such estates as
Common Law it is also to make an obligation in the name of another to be forfeitable although it was not at the Common Law so if we will have a confidence or a trust to be forfeited we ought to have a Statute made to this purpose and as to Pauncefoots case he said that the King had a title by the indictment of recusancy before the conveyance made by Pauncefoots but so it is not in our case whereby appeareth a plain difference betwixt the cases see the 14. H. 8. fo 8. the Attorney general to the contrary at another day and first he spake to the quality of the offence viz. the contempt and this offence as he said is aggravated by these circumstances First the command of the King himself came and not of any inferiour officer as Sheriff c. and it is immediately directed to the partie himself Secondly the command is that he shall return upon his faith and allegeance which is the strongest compulsion that can be used Thirdly the thing required by the King is the principal dutie of a subject viz. to be at the command of the King for service and not as the common summons in Law is to answer at the suit of I. S. and he said that this contempt is to be accompted in quality of a contempt from the very time when the privy Seal came to his hands for the words quod indilate c. and it hath been in all ages the course and use to punish contempts of this kinde by seising their lands and he vouched in proof thereof the presidents of John de Brittons case in 19. E. 2. and of Edward de woodstock in the time of E. 2. and the case in 2. Ma. Dyer fo 128. 2. Eliz. Dyer Barners case fo 176. and 23. Eliz Dyer 375. and Englefields case Cook lib. 7. moreover he argued in so much it is clear that the King shall seise his lands for this contempt it is to be considered what estate or interest the King shall gain by this seisure and as to that he thought that the King hath an estate at the least for the life of the effendor and that he conceived is proved by the presidents for these words are used in the seisure c. donec aliter duxerimus ordinandum c. and he said that this is proved by Englefields case and also by the way and manner of the seisure and disposing of the land for such contempt in 23. Eliz. Dyer 375. by the Statute of 13. and 14 Eliz made against fugitives also he used this reason to prove that the King had an estate for life viz. because the offender by this contempt had impliedly deserted his land and left it to the Kings dispose and then it is all one as if he granted the land to the King to hold and use as long as he pleaseth and such an express grant will create an estate for life in the King as is proved by 35. H. 6. where it is agreed that if I give land to A. as long as he will this is an estate for life and so here by this implied Art c. also as to that that may be pretended in this case that the King granted licence in this case to Sir Robert Dudley to travel for a time certain which time is not yet expired and therefore the contempt qualified or satisfied by reason of this licence to that he said that notwithstanding that was the case yet the contempt is all one as if he had no licence at all in regard it is countermanded by the privy Seal which injoyns him to return and to prove that this licence is alwayes countermandable by the King he said that besides the common usage and obedience of countermands of this kinde he said that it was to be proved by reason also and authority of our books for although here be a licence indeed yet there is great adversitie between a licence indeed which giveth interest and a licence indeed which giveth only an authoritie or dispensation as in our case for the one is not to be countermanded but the other is as appeareth by 5. H. 7. and 1. Ma. Dyer 92 and admit that after this licence and before the departure of Sir Robert Dudley the King had said unto him you shall not go this had been a good countermand as seemed to him and he vouched 9. E. 4.4 and 8. E. 4. if I licence A. to stay in my house for three dayes yet I may put him out in the mean time but otherwise it is if I licence A. to hold my land for 3. dayes because there an interest passeth and the reason wherefore this licence in our case is countermandable is because all licences of this kinde have tacite conditions annexed to them for no Act or licence wil. free a subject from his allegeance as appeareth by Doctor Stories case in the 13. Eliz. Dyer fo 300. and no man can put off or be dismissed of duties which belong to a subject no more then he can put off his subjection and this is the reason that an honor or dignitie intailed ought to be forfeited although it be intailed for the honor which is given by the King hath a tacit condition in Law annexed unto it and it ought not to continue in him who committeth Treason nor in his posteritie although that the partie had but an estate tail therein see Nevels case Cook lib. 7. and so had the King his licence which is but a dispensation for the time and countermandable by the King and he said that the Book in 2. Eliz. Dyer fo 176. makes it a doubt but he thought it clear for the reasons aforesaid and as to the material point viz. if this land shall be priviledged from seisure by reason of this bargain or not and he said that it shall not be priviledged for this conveyance which is revokable at the will of the Bargainor is meerly fraudulent against any interest of forfeiture for otherwise the Kings subjects are but as ferae naturae which when they are out of their pale the King had no means to reduce them within the Park again for in this case had no means directly to punish this offence upon the body of the offender but by the depriving him of the means of his maintenance and although there be no fraud here in the parties Bargainees yet the fraud in the Bargainor makes the conveyance void against the King for as it appeareth by our books the King cannot be an instrument of fraud although he may be party thereunto see 17. and 21. E. 3. so in the case of an infant cited before by Mountague all which and many others to this purpose of fraud are cited in Farmors case Cook lib. 3. fo 48. and whereas it was objected that here can be no fraud intended in the offender in regard he had a licence to travel and it cannot be intended that he presupposed any countermand of this licence and
and therefore he vouched a case between Scockwood and Sear where a man devised part of his land to his wife for life and another part of his land until Michaelmas next ensuing his death and further by the said will he devised to his younger son all his lands not devised to his wife and adjudged that by the said words the younger son shall have only that parcel which was devised to the wife for life and not that which was devised unto her till Michaelmas and yet by Popham it appeareth that his intent was otherwise viz. that all that should go to his younger son so there ought not to be a strained construction made against the heir and so in our case the words being that if he die without issue c. that then it shall go to his wife herein as much as he had issue at the time of his death it cannot be said that he died without issue but that he is dead without issue and this appeareth by the pleading in the Lord Bartleys case in Plowden and he vouched also a case in the Kings Bench 4. Jac. between Miller and Robinson where a man devised to Thomas his son and if he die without issue having no son there it was holden that if the devisee had issue a son yet if he had none at the time of his death the devisee in the remainder shall have it yet he was once a person having a son and so in our case there was a person who did not die without issue and he vouched also the case of Bold and Mollineux in 28. H. 8. Dyer fo 15.3 when a man deviseth to his wife for life paying a yearly rent to his sister and that if the rent be not paid that the sister may distrain it seems to me that this is a conditional estate in the wife notwithstanding the limitation of the distress and he vouched 18. Eliz. in Dyer 348. which as he said proved the case expresly for there in such a case it is adjudged that the devisee of the rent may after demand thereof distrain and yet the heir may enter for the not payment of the rent although it were never demanded so that the subsequent words of distraining do not qualifie the force of the condition although there be there an express condition and in our case but a condition implyed and he said that it seemed reasonable that such a construction for the distress and condition also shall stand as appeareth by divers cases that upon such words the Law will allow a double remedy and therefore he vouched Gravenors case in the Common Pleas Hill 36. Eliz. Rot. 1322. where a lease was made by Magdalen Colledge to husband and wife so that if the husband alien that the lease shall be void and provided that they do not make any under-tenants and to this purpose he vouched the case of the Earl of Pembrook cited in the Lord Cromwels case Cook lib. 2. where the words amounted to a covenant and a coudition and if this word paying should not be construed to be a condition then it were altogether void and idle and such a construction ought not to be made in a will and he conceived that this rent ought to be paid by the wife without any demand upon the pain of the condition and therefore he vouched 22. H. 6. fo 57.14 E. 4 21. E. 4. by Hussey and 18. Eliz. Dyer 348. vouched before and so it was resolved as he said in the Court of Wards in Somings case where a man made a devise paying a rent to a stranger this ought to be paid without demand and he said that the Common case is proved when a feofment is made upon condition that the feoffee shall do an act to a stranger this ought to be done in convenient time without request by the stranger and so here it seemeth although a demand ought to be made by the sister yet the wife ought to give notice to the sister of the Legacy so that she may make a demand and therefore he vouched Warder and Downings case where a man devised that his eldest son upon entry should pay to the younger son such a summe of money here the eldes brother ought to give notice at what time he will enter to the intent that the younger brother may be provided to make a demand Edwards of the Inner Temple contrary First it seemeth that by this limitation the wife ought to retain the land until the issue of the devisor should have come to the age of 18. years for this a time certain and as it is construed upon such words in Borastons case Cook lib. 3. that the Executors there have an interest certain so it should be construed here to refer to a certainty which is until the time by computation that the issue should have attained to 18. years and the rather in this case in respect the devisor had otherwise disposed of the land until the son should have accomplished the said age Secondly it seemeth that the wife hath an estate for life not conditional in so much as the words are not joyned in the case the 18. Eliz. Dyer hath been vouched but that was upon an express condition but here it is by implication and then the clause of distress taketh away the force of the implication which otherwise might be thereupon inferred and therefore in 5. Eliz. Dyer it appeareth that the word Proviso annexed to other words makes it no condition in judgement of Law and so in 14. Eliz. Dyer 311. and he vouched also 18. Eliz. Dyer Greens case that if a man deviseth lands to his friends paying to his wife with a clause of distress this is no condition as it is adjudged Thirdly it seemeth that this summe to be paid to the sister is a rent and therefore ought to be demanded or otherwise in judgement of Law the condition shall not be broken and the 21. E. 4. the case of an obligation to perform covenants c. and a case between Wentworth and Wentworth 37. Eliz. that a demand ought to be made for a rent which is granted in liew of Dower for the wife brought a writ of Dower for the land of her husband the Tenant pleaded that she accepted a rent out of the land in liew of her Dower and the wife replied that the said rent was granted upon condition that if it were not paid at certain dayes that it should be void and that she should have Dower of the land and she said that the rent was not paid at the dayes c. but shewed not in her pleading any demand to be made and therefore it was holden evil pleading for such a rent ought to be demanded or otherwise the condition is not broken and so here Nota that this case was appointed to be argued again but after as I heard the Barons amongst themselves resolved to give judgement for the Defendant upon one point only which was that the estate
therefore he had done well to shew the special matter as he had done and not to confess it as it is in the in formation nor to traverse the said demise because it is matter in Law 5. H. 7. and Vernons case Cook lib. 4. he needs not traverse absque hoc that the lease was made for and in satisfaction of Dower and to shew the special matter viz. that it was a conditional lease and so leave it to the Iudges for the matter in Law if it be a joynture or not also it seemeth to me that it is sufficient for the Bar to say that the Commission was not returned by Hammond and Porter for that is a Traverse to the information and it cannot be intended to be returned by any other of the Commissioners in regard that those two only did execute it for the taking of the acknowledgement as the information mentions but he said nothing in this case if this Commission may be returned by those Commissioners who took not the acknowledgement also by him and Snig Bromley absent sigillo suo ratificat is good enough without saying sigillo suo sigillat contrary to Baron Altham also the Defendants have shewed the time in their Bar when the first lease was intolled so that it is certain but it seems to me that admit the matter in Law was for the King yet upon this information we cannot give judgement for him for the information is for the mean profits incurred before the inrolment and this is clear that the King cannot have them without doubt admit that the Bishop had been living yet the inrolment cannot relate as to the mean profits although it should be admitted to be good to make the lease good at the time of the inrolment and so upon all the matter he agreed that judgement ought to be given against the King and so it was Tanfield chief Baron said that if a man take a lease of my land from the King by Patent rendring rent this is not an Indenture to compel him to pay the rent for the King had nothing to grant whereupon a rent might be reserved to him Altham Baron said that the King shall have the rent here as by estoppel between common persons but it was adjourned It was said by Tanfield chief Baron that a Collector of a fifteenth may levie all the Tax within one Township upon the goods of one inhabitant only if he will and that inhabitant shall have aid of the Court to make each other inhabitant to be contributory which was granted by the Court Bromley being absent Tanfield chief Baron said that if a man had judgement against A. upon an Obligation who dieth and another Obligee of the said A. assignes his Obligation to the King the Executors of A. satisfie the said judgement it is good against the King in respect the debt now due to the King was not upon Record before the death of the Testator which was granted by the Court. Levison against Kirk THis Term the case between Levison and Kirk which was opened the last Term was adjudged and the case was that Levison brought an Action upon the case in the office of Pleas against Kirk and declared that whereas the Plantiff was a Merchant and 13. Martii 40. Eliz. intended to go beyond the Seas to M. to Merchandise and the same day and year at D. he acquainted the Defendant with his determination and then in the same place appointed and trusted the Defendant being his servant to receive for him all such Merchandise and goods which should be sent over or carried or conveyed by the Plantiff in the same voyage and to pay for the custome of them and to dispose of them and convert them for the profit and commoditie of the said Plantiff and thereupon conveyed divers goods to the Defendant and that the same day and year the Plantiff took shipping and sailed to M. and that within five dayes following 20. pieces of Velvet were brought into the Port of S. consigned by the Plantiff to the Defendant in the absence of the Plantiff and that the Defendant on purpose to deceive the Queen of her custome and to make the Plantiff to allow custome unto him did take of the said goods so consigned and land them on the land at S. aforesaid the custome not paid whereby the Plantiff lost his goods as forfeited for default of payment of custome to the damage of c. and upon not guiltie pleaded a venire facias was awarded to the the Sheriff that he should cause to come 12. from the Venue of D. and those c. viz. from the place where the trust was reposed and from the place where the trust was broken and thereupon the Defendant was found guiltie and damages 50. l. and in Pasch Chibborn Serjeant moved in arrest of judgement that the Action did not lie for every fault against the servant although it be such a misfeazance for which the Plantiff receives prejudice and therefore if you will have an Action in this case you ought to shew a special trust reposed and a breach of that trust by the servent or otherwise an Action upon the case lieth not and that is not observed here for although that you shew that the Defendant being your servant was appointed and trusted for the goods to be consigned in the said voyage yet you did not shew that these goods were not consigned in the said voyage neither do you shew that he was such a servant generally used to be imployed in trading for your goods neither do you shew that you have allowed or delivered moneys to him to make him able to pay the custome and to say that by the sale of the goods themselves he may pay it himself and you appointed him to dispose them at his pleasure yet hereby you do not inable him thereunto for he ought to pay the custome before he sell them and them peradventure he had not money to discharge the custome wherefore there is no cause of your Action as this Declaration is and therefore he prayed that judgement may be stayed George Crook prayed that judgement may be given for although it bâ— not expresly shewed that the Plantiff continued beyond the Seas in the said voyage at the time of the coming of the goods to the said Port yet the intendment ought to be so of necessitie in regard it is shewed that within five dayes after his departure and in his absence these goods were consigned c. and his return cannot be intended in so smal a time and he vouched 21. E. 4. fo 13. also it is not material in the case to shew that the Master hath left where withal to pay the custome for here the Action is brought in respect of deceipt and fraud in the Defendant and this is inferred divers wayes the first that the Defendant ought to receive my goods Secondly that he should pay the custome Thirdly that he should dispose of them at his pleasure for
the book upon which I do principally relie is a point resolved in the principal case of Altonwood Cook lib. 1. fo 45. or 43. where the King recites that he had made a lease to A. and B. and that whereas they had surrendred the Patent of the said lease he in consideration of the said surrender makes a new lease to A. and B. here although that in fact the demise supposed in the recital to be made to A. and B. was void and so the King was deceived in the matter of recital yet in respect that he made the surrender of the Patent to be the sole consideration of his grant the falsitie of his recital is not material for the Iudges ought to take it to be a Motive to the King in his Grant which he did not express to be a Motive especially if he express another Motive and so in our case also it should be greatly mischievous to Hitchmore if this falsitie of the recital should prejudice him for by intendment it is not in his power to inform the King of this lease which was made by Burwel to Wilkinson because he is a stranger unto it and also the lease is not upon Record and therefore Hitchmore is not bound to take notice of it see temps H. 8. Brook Action upon the case c. and also the lease here made by Burwel to Wilkinson is to have continuance but for 8. years after the time of the commencement of the new lease made to Hitchmore and so the King then shall have it liable to his rent newly reserved and so in these circumstances our case differs in matter of prejudice from Barwicks case Cook lib. 5. for there the Kings Lessee made divers under Lessees for all his Term and after he himself by fraud accepted a new lease of all rendring rent which new lease was in consideration expresly of a surrender of the first demise and of all the estate c. and this lease was there void and so the diversitie appears also in 18. Eliz. Dyer 352. where the deceipt to the Queen was in point of express consideration and yet the Lord Dyer said that in that case the grant was not void and then much more in our case but admitting that the lease should not be good notwithstanding this false recital yet it hath been objected that the consideration is not performed according to the Kings intention for the words of the lease are know yee now aswel for a fine of 30 l. as for that that Hitchmore had assumed to repair the Mills at his costs and charges c. and that here the said Hitchmore had not assumed by Record so that the King may have any remedy against him for his not repairing and that the contract is no assurance it seems to me that the words for that that he assumed and the express Covenant was sufficient to satisfie the intent of the Consideration for the words are the words of the King and of the Patentee also in judgement of Law and therefore Pasch 7. Iac the Lord Evers and Stricklands case was adjudged the Lord Evers had made a lease by Patent in which these words were contained viz. and the aforesaid Lessee shall repair the aforesaid Tenement and that after the reversion was granted to the Lord Evers and it was adjudged that the Lord Evers should have a Covenant against the Lessee and this was in the Kings Bench Pasch 7. Iac. and so here for that he had assumed upon himself it is an accord sufficient to testifie his promise whereupon the King may have remedy to compel a reparation to be made and although that the words are not personally spoken by the Lessee yet he shall be bound to perform them as it is in 38. E. 3. fo 8. if one takes benefit by a lease which he never sealed unto yet he shall be bound to a nomine penae therein contained and besides here is an express Covenant and therefore c. Thirdly it hath been objected that the estate is conditional by these words he hath assumed to repaire which condition is not performed and so the lease made to Hitchmore void and 38. H. 6.34 and 35. hath been vouched in proofe which book I do agree for there the King had no other remedy to have his intent performed and also the words there are ad intentionem doth not make the estate conditional and he vouched Brook condition 96. and 43. E. 3.34 and Perkins 144. that if the Queen give land and that the Donee should not Amortize that makes not the estate conditional for the Amortizing and so if a man make a feofment to A. that he should pay 10. l. and that R. may enter for non-payment yet this maketh not a Condition the reason is because the first words leaves it to the libertie of the feoffee and the words after shall not be construed to make it conditional but I agreed the case put in Sir Thomas Wrothes case in Plowden Pro eo quod relaxabit that this makes a condition if it be not performed because it is of a thing futurely to be done or Executory and the King had no other remedy also in our case the circumstances manifest that the Kings intent was not to make a conditional estate upon this lease for he accepted an express Covenant for the requiring and he vouched the Lord Cromwels case in Cook lib. 2. fo 72. and he said that if here the lease had been made to Hitchmore in respect he had agreed to increase his rent and further had a clause of distress for the rent it shall not be intended that the King in such case purposed to make the lease conditional if the increase be not paid because he had provided himselfe a distress wherein although that the King had no more remedy then by the Law he should have had without these words yet the words manifest his intent to have no other remedy but the distresse see 7. E. 6. fo 79. and 3. E. 6. Dyer Non licebit alienare makes no condition in the case of the King without the words subpaena foris facturae and he vouched 4. Ma. Dyer 138. the Countesse of Surreyes case and also 18. Eliz. Dyer 348. which as he said was one Greens case where it was adjudged that if the King provide himself of another remedy the words by reason of any implications shall never be construed to be conditionall and so was the opinion of Manwood and Harper in Wellock and Hamonds case cited in Barrastons case Cook lib. 3. and 31 E. 1. Voucher 141. A man made a Feoffement with warranty against all people rendring rent and further willed that if the Feoffee could not enjoy the land that he should pay no rent here the words subsequent take away the force of a recovery in value which the warranty otherwise would have given and so here the King had appointed the remedy which he intended to have and therefore it shall not
will speak to such things which in my opinion will not avoid the Patent First it seems that this want of not assuring doth not vitiate the Patent for the word Assumpsit supposeth matter of Fact executed and whether it be true or false it cannot be now examined no more then in the Cases put 21. Ed. 4. and 26 H. 8. In consideration of service done although there was no service done yet that shall not avoid the Patent Sir Hugh Cholmlies case Cook lib. 2. Recitall of a matter in Pais and not of Record which is not materiall nor valuable doth not vitiate the Patent 37. H. 6.27 The King in his Privie Seale suggests a matter in Fact this doth not destroy the Patent also although that the consideration is aswell for that he assumed to repair as c. and it is found that he hath not repaired yet this fault shall not avoid the Patent for as it seems here it is not in nature of a conditionall estate or Grant as if it had been in consideration he shall repaire for as the words are here placed it is intended that the Queen will relie upon the Assumpsit and not upon the condition and grant and it seems that the Patent is void only upon the misrecitall and the false suggestion which is the first Point for it appears by the misrecitall that the Queen was deceived in a thing materiall and valuable and therefore the Patent void and yet I agree that every false ricitall or suggestion doth not avoid a Patent as in 9. Ed. 4. Baggots Ass 29. Ed. 3.7 if the King recite in his Patent that he had made a precedent Grant upon a Petition yet this falsity doth not avoid the Patent and in 27. Ed. 4. although that this falsity be in point of consideration yet if it be not for matter of profit and valuable to the King it doth not avoid the Patent but if it appear that the Kings intention was grounded upon a matter of value and substance and that he was therein deceived the Patent is for that cause void as in 9. H. 6. fo 2.8 H. 7. fo 3.21 Ed. 4.9 H. 7. fo 2. and 11. H. 4. fo 1. and this is all one as if it should appear in the Recitall or consideration that the Kings intention was grounded upon a matter of value and the King therein deceived therefore in Altonwoods case Cooke lib. 1. If the King recite that A. is indebted unto him as Executor of B and he release to him all demands generally yet nothing shall be released but that which he owed as Executor and so if the King recite that whereas an Advowson is holden of I. S. and he gives Licence to appropriate if the Advowson be holden of the King this is void 19. E. 3. Fitzh Grants 58. It seems cleerly that if it appear by the Patent expresly that the intent of the King was deceived and abused the Patent shall be void although it be not in matter of recitall or in matter of consideration neither as in 9. Ed. 4. fo 6. and 8. by Neale 21. Ass pla 15.40 Ass pla 36. The King gives Licence to his Tenant to aften in Fee and afterwards it appears that this Tenant was but Tenant in Lail and so in the case of the Market or Fair of Torrington cited in Altonwoods case and in our Case the Queen is deceived and misinformed in two Circumstances materiall and of value First for that she conceived that a greater quantity of the thing demised to Potter is surrendred then in truth there was and therein she is deceived for part of the thing is not come to her hands by the surrender Secondly the Queens intent was to make an intire Lease of all in possession and this cannot be for part of the thing it enures but as a Lease in reversion or future interest and therefore void as it is in Altonwoods case Cook Lib. 1. and the Queen hath a double prejudice hereby First because she cannot distrain for her rent reserved in that part which is not surrendred Secondly she cannot enter therein for the condition broken wherefore c. Tanfield accordingly that judgement should be given for the Plaintiff The Patent recites That all the Term-which Potter had surrendred c. where in truth it was not so and therefore it is cleere that the Queen is deceived therein and the Grant void for it was the very inducement which procured the new Patent and this recital is grounded upon the words of the deed of surrender so yâ— the surren is grounded upon the information of Hitchmore contained the surrender And if in that Clause Hitchmore had been well advised the Lease to him ought to have been A. having of the Mills in possession and A. having the Messuage and Garden after the Term which Wilkinson had should be expired and the reservation of the Rent ought to have been expressed accordingly for as it is shuffled together the condition cannot avoid the surrender nor the rent cannot issue out thereof Therefore it was adjudged in 9. Eliz. in the Common-Bench in the Bishop of Salisburies case B. seised of two Acres one whereof was in Lease to A. for years B. makes a Lease of both to a Stranger to have yâ— one in possession the other in reversion rendring 20. s. rent entirely now this rent shall issue out of that in possession during the Term in A. and after it shall issue out of the whole as one intire rent and so it is in our Case for default of severall reservations for this is one intâ—erent and then the Queen cannot distrain upon all the Land as she intended so in our Case wherefore I adjudge the Patent void not upon the point of recitall that is not for the not recitall of a Subjects Lease viz. the Lease of one Wilkinson but it is for the cause of misinforming the Queen in the matter of value and by consequence as hath been said Nemo tenetur informare qui nescit sed quisquis scire quod informat And where Snig hath said that this Patent is made Ex certa scientià mero motu And for this it cannot be intended that the Queen was gull'd upon the information of the party I say that there are not any words in the Grant to prove that it was Ex mero mortu c. And for that it seems Snig had no true Copy of the Case yet if these words were in the Patent it is not void for a triviall and petry mistaking yet in matter substantiall it will not help it as if the King be misinformed of his estate in such a thing to be granted or of estates which are in Lease for these are matertall things 21. Ed. 4. by Huffey and Briant if the King recite that whereas I have given my Land of 100. l. value to him or whereas I have given to him the Mannor of D. and he grants to me the Mannor of S. if this recitall be
of 99. years is agreed to be given Secondly if there be such an imployment of this land as the Statute requireth admitting the lease was not given Thirdly if the livery upon the Queens Lessee for years be good and I hold that the Fee is not given to the Queen Secondly the land is not imployed c. admitting that it was given Thirdly that the Feofment here is not good and as to the case at Bar the Feoffees may enter I doubt not of that because there is not any thing found but that it was imployed to the uses intended for 99. years Secondly if it were not imployed according to the condition after 1. Ed. 6. yet they cannot enter for themselves were parties to the Art which did prohibit it as 34. H. 8. Dyer 52. the Queen gives licence that Belmelt shall be transported notwithstanding any Statute made or to be made if after it be prohibited the licence is determined because the Patentee himself was a partie to such Statutes Secondly it is said in Addams and Lamberts case that a superstitious devise or other estate upon condition is within the Statute because the Patentee was partie thereunto Thirdly it is said in the said case that a superstitious devise or other estate upon condition is within the Statute because it is penal and compulsorie for the maintenance of a thing prohibited by the Law and also there it is said that there is a proviso towards the end of that Act that it shall not be Lawful by reason of any remainder or condition for any man to claim any lands c. for the not doing or finding of any such Priest as to the other point which was moved at Bar I hold that the use doth not arise upon the words subsequent and if they do not re-enter that then the land shall go to the use of the four Feoffees to the intent aforesaid is not a mis-ordering nor an imployment Secondly these words to the intent do not raise any use but only a confidence and trust reposed in the Feoffees Doctor and Student 94. for the first point therefore he held that there is no superstitious gift of the Fee-simple and if there were it is not imployed c. and therefore it is not given by the Statute of 1. Ed. 6. to the Queen and touching that we are to consider the Statute Indenture and the Schedule and there is not a word that after 99. years the land shall finde a Priest but the money and the land is not given but the money as in the Dean of Pauls case 22. Eliz. Dyer 368. if land be given to finde a Priest with part of the profits thereof those profits are only given to the King by this Statute and not the land but that belongs to the Dean and Chapter also the Schedule is if then it may be lawful and therefore if it were not then lawful the money is not given and it is like to the case where I make a lease for 21. years if I do allow of it before Michaelmas and before Michaelmas do not allow of it this is a void lease and so if I give land to the use of Westminster School if the Dean will enter into a Recognizance c. and if he will not enter into a Recognizance it is no gift like to the case 15 H. 7. a grant of Annuitie if such a thing be done c. secondly as to the imployment the lease is only found to be imployed and the imployment of the lease is no imployment of the Fee which was not given until the Term was expired and if the gift be not superstitious the imployment ought not to be superstitious and yet as it is said in Adams case there ought to be an imployment to intitle the Queen as the case there is if one gives the Mannor of D. and S. to superstitious uses the Queen shall have the lands out of the hands of the Feoffee and if land be given to finde a Priest in the Church of D. for 20 years and after to finde one in S. for 21. years and before the expiration of the first Term the Statute is made it seems the Queen shall have only the first Term because there is no imployment of the second Term within the Statute 5. Ed. 4.20.15 Ed. 3. Execu 63. I agree those cases for land or rent issue from a seisin 30. Ed. 3.12 in a quare impedit 5. Ed. 6. Benlowes a devise to 8. to the uses and intent that the Feoffees with the profits shall finde a Priest whilst the Law of this Realm will suffer it and if the Law will not suffer it then to the use of three of the poorest of the Parishes adjoyning by all the Iudges this is not within the Statute and as to the last point it seems that the Feofment is good and the interest of the Queen is no impediment which if it be not then there is no question as Dyer 20. Eliz. 363. Tenant in tail makes a feofment the servants of the Lessee for years being upon the land and livery is made and after the Lessee for years agrees saving his Term this is a discontinuance 14. Ed. 4.2 3. and 4. Ph. et M. Dyer 139. possession shall not be gained from the Queen but by matter of Record 4. Assises 5.21 Assises 2.8 H. 4.16.1 H. 7. no livery upon the Kings possession it may be devised by the heir or conveyed by bargain and sale or by fine from him and the Kings estate in reversion doth not priviledge the estate in possession as it is 23. Ed. 3.7 a disseisor conveys land to the Queen who grants for life and the disseisee shall have a writ of entrie against the Queens Lessee for life by the opinion of Thorp Cook lib. 4.55 a disseisor makes a lease for life the remainder to the King a recovery of the land against Tenant for life will defeat the Kings remainder 7. Rich. 2. aide of the King 61. Tenant in tail grants the land to the King with warranty and the King makes a lease for life if the issue recover in a Formedon the Kings estate is defeated and I was of Councel in the Court of wards in a case which was Pasch 43. Eliz. betwixt Chackston and Starkey for the Wardship of the heir of Clifford and it was this the Ward at full age tendred his livery and had six moneths to sue it and within the six moneths made a Feofment and after died before livery sued in this case the livery and seisin was void and it is all one as if no tender had been made for the Queens possession was priviledged the second point was that one being in Ward to the King had a reversion in Fee expectant upon an estate for life and before livery sued made a Feofment in Fee this makes a discontinuance of the reversion notwithstanding the Kings interest which he had in reversion for the Wardship which case is like to the case
this be confessed that the King there should take nothing without inrolment yet this is not like to our case for here this is but to merge a particular estate which differs much from the case of conveying of an inheritance also this is confessed if there had been a Memorandum made in the Margent then the surrender had been good and the want thereof is the laches of the Clark and then if it should not be a surrender before the Memorandum made the Clark should make the surrender and not the partie and as to the Book of 37. H. 6. it is not answered for to say that the King hath no right to the thing granted before inrolment but that he hath the propertie that cannot be and to that which hath been objected that there doth not appear any intention of the surrender because that although the Patents are surrendred the estate remained the Book of 32. E. 3. Monstrance of faith 178. proveth nothing for there it is said that a man may plead that a Dean and Chapter did not lease modo et forma without shewing any Deed for there this pleading is not to devest any thing out of c. and also it appears in the principal case that his intent was to surrender for the Iury do finde that the Letters Patents were restored by the command of the Lord Seymor to be cancelled and to that which hath been objected if the second Patent should be good that the Queen might lose her Rent or condition because the first lease hath his continuance to that I give answer that the first lease hath not his continuance and therefore no loss can grow to the Queen and to that which hath been objected that the Queen is deceived it appears by these words modo habens c. restituit c. that the intention of the Queen was that the Lord Seymor had surrendred his estate before and that he now had nothing because that the word modo being joyned with the word reddidit signifieth the time past but as to that it seems to me that although modo poetica licentia in the strict construction of Grammer may signifie the time past yet the signification thereof shall not be so taken in the letters Patents for there it shall be taken in common construction and not to the deceipt of the King and therefore in the Dean and Chapter of Bristols case 7. E. 6. Dyer the words are nuper in Tenura I. S. et modo in Tenura A. B. there nuper is taken for the time past but modo for the present time and in 11. H. 7. Rogerum Townesend modo militem is to be intended that he is now Knight and not that he was a Knight in time past and not now also it is so to be observed here that these words habens et gaudens are annexed to this word modo both which are in the present time and restituit comes afterwards and so modo is not annexed to restituit but unto habens et gaudens also although the word shall be referred unto restituit yet all may well stand together for restituit may be referred unto the time present as siquae fuerint in 35. H. 6.11 and to that which hath been objected that until the Queen agrees unto the surrender the estate is not in the Queen he thought that where Tenant for life surrenders before agreement he in the reversion is Tenant to the Praecipe although he shall not maintain a Trespass before entrie for by 21. H. 7.12 it appeareth that an estate for life may be determined aswel by word as by surrender so in 9. H. 7. where the Tenant dies without heir the freehold is immediately in the Lord but yet he shall not have an action of Trespas before entrie now as to the first point he conceived it to be an actual surrender although there be no Vacat made nor any Memorandum and to examine it he did relate what Acts might make a surrender and to that purpose he said that words being used which do prove an assent of the Tenant that he in reversion shall have an estate that shall be a surrender without express words of a surrender for a man may surrender by these words Remisit or resignavit for the words are not material if so there be substance as in 40. E. 3. placito 14. and 40. Assises pl. 16. if a lessee for life saith to his lessor that you shall enter and I will that you shall have this land this is a good surrender So in 28. H. 8. Dyer 33. if a Termor agree that he in the reversion shall make a feofment that is a surrender so in 8. Eliz. Dyer 251 252. lessee for life is content that he in the reversion shall have the land and his interest that is a surrender but in that case it appeared that a rent was reserved and an agreement that the lessee should have it againe if he survived the lessor and therefore appearing plainly that it was not intended to pass by way of surrender it was at the last adjudged no surrender so in 14. H. 8. the Grantee of a Rent did surrender the Deed and that held to be a good surrender of the Rent it is daubted in 2. Eliz. Dyer in Sir Maurice Barkleys case 156. if the surrender of the Patent of an Office unto a master of the Chancerie out of the Court be good without beliverie of the Patent to be cancelled but that Book proveth nothing but that a delivery of a Patent to be cancelled shall be a good surrender though the Patent be not cancelled in facto it hath been objected that it matters not what commandment the Lord Seymor did give nor in what Court the Patents were given up nor before whom but to that he said in asmuch as it is found that the Patents were given up by the commandment of the Loâ—d Seymor to be cancelled that being it was by his command it was his own surrender also it appears that the letters Patents were under the great Seal of England which alwayes issueth out of the Chancery and therefore it cannot be cancelled in any other Court and it shall be intended that they were given up to be cancelled there also this word restituit signifieth to restore and a man cannot restore any thing but where he had it and he had it out of the Chancery and therefore it shall not be otherwise intended but to be there restored so in Baggots Assise 9. E. 4.7 it is pleaded Quod restituit litteras Patentes Cancellandas and sheweth not to whom nor where and it was held to be very good but it is there pleaded Quod sursum reddidit Patentes Domini Regis and shewed in special to whom they were surrendred because it may be to any that hath power at the time of the surrender but a man cannot restore unto any but such a one who granted unto him and therefore needs not shew unto whom he did restore
the letters Patents is not material for he said it seemed to him that in rei veritate the particular estate cannot be sufficiently surrendred by this bare giving up of the letters Patents by the Tenant for life as it appears by Walshes Case cited in Altonwoods Case Cook lib. 1. and therefore he insisted not upon that Secondly he argued that a recital in the Kings Patents of a thing material if it be false and come by information of the partie is all one as a false Consideration and not otherwise and he said that it appears by Brook tit Patents pla 100. that all Considerations valuable although they are false do not avoid a Patent as where the King grants lands prodecem libris sibi solutis although that in facto this is false yet the grant is good also it appears by 26. H. 8. and Sir Thomas Wrothes Case and by 21. E. 4 fol. 48. that a consideration executed avoideth not a grant although it be false but he said that it appears by the Case of 18. Eliz. Dyer 352. that if the King make a lease in Consideration of a surrender of a precedent lease which in truth was void by some that the King may avoid the lease but others contrary because it was not done upon the suggestion of the partie but for a consideration executed and the surrender of the estate precedent was the material cause and consideration of the grant and he said that although in this Case there be not a good surrender of the letters Patents yet the Consideration being only the surrendring of the estate that is not material for as it is said in Altonwoods Case Cook lib. 1. if the King in Consideration only of the surrender of precedent Patents makes a grant in this Case there needs no averment of an estate for the surrender is not material of the letters Patents Also it appears Cholmleys Case Cook lib. 2. that if the King recite an estate to be made with Condition although that at the same time of the recital this is not Conditional yet if once this were Conditional the King is not deceived although the condition be now released and he cited also the Lord Chandos Case Cook lib. 6. where it appears that if the King recite a thing untruly which cometh not of the information of the partie this shall not hurt the Grant except it be part of the consideration and he said that Harris and Wings Case differs from this Case for there the King had a Tenant who held a Tenement by the yearly rent of six pounds and another Tenement of him by the yearly rent of nineteen pounds and he made a new lease of both those to the said Tenant without any recital of the former leases reserving but Nineteen pounds for both and there it was adjudged that the second lease was not good but he said that the reason of that judgement was not because the antient lease was not recited but by reason that a loss in the rent came to the King and so by intendment he was deceived and this was also upon the matter the reason of the resolution of Barwicks Case and also in Mack-Williams Case for there was not a surrender of the estate as the King intended which ought to be but in our Case the estate is well surrendred clearly and he thought that these words modo habens may well stand with the Kings intent aswel to a surrender in Law as to an actual surrender The Attorney generall to the contrary First for the recital that the information of the partie was that the King should have an actual surrender and so was the Kings intent collected upon the information of the partie Secondly that here is not any actual surrender Thirdly that by consequence it followeth that the Queen is deceived Fourthly here is no surrender in Law in this Case Fifthly although here were a surrender in Law yet that is not sufficient to make the grant good to the first point be said that alwayes a familiar construction ought to be made of the Kings grants and therefore if the King grant all his portion of Tithes in D. this doth not pass his Parsonage in D. although he had no other Tithes there so if the King grant all his Titheable lands within the Mannor of B. although the lands of Coppiholders are parcel of the demeasnes of the Mannor of B. yet these lands in such Case do not pass Cook lib. 1. Bozuns Case and Cook lib. 1. Altonwoods Case fo 46. aâ—so it appears by the pleading in Plowden in Wrothesleys case and in Adams case and also in Fulmerstons case that although the antient particular estate be gone in Law by the acceptance of a new estate yet it ought not to be pleaded as a surrender and therefore it shall not be construed that the King intended such a surrender which pleaders in their pleading do not accompt a surrender also he said that in regard that the Queen saith quam quidem sursum redditionem acceptamus it seems by that that she did not intend a surrender in Law and therefore accepted nothing but gave an estate c. and must be meant such a surrender to which she is partie by her acceptance also where the words are modo habens et gaudens and therefore it is inferred that the Queen intended an estate containing in the Patentee this is true for although that the Queen intended an actual surrender precedent to be made by the Patentee yet his estate continues against the Queen untill an acceptance of a surrender by her although also this may be called a surrender like unto a surrender of a benefice untill an acceptance by the ordinary also although it was found that the Queen made a new lease or letters Patents of the said Land to the said Lord Seymor yet it appears not that the new letters Patents were accepted by the Lord Seymor until a moneth after the making of them when he made a lease to Johnson and until that time without question there was no surrender either in fact or in Law and where it hath been objected that these words modo habens implie only the present time he said that the word modo will alwayes signifie such a time as the Verb with which it is joyned will signifie and therefore Cicero saith modo hoc malum in hanc Rempublicam invasit also the words Jam et nunc are of such signification as this word modo is and these words are alwayes governed by the Verb as Jam venit c. so in the Bible the story of Naaman and Gehesey Jam modo venerunt duo behold two young men are come to me c. and as to the second point it is clear that here is not any actual surrender for the King cannot take by an actual surrender without matter of Record And therefore it was holden in the Lord Stanleys Case that the King took nothing although his officers by his command did
demurrer joyned George Crook for the King conceived that the lease made in the 26. Eliz. is good first he said that although the Queen cannot take an inheritance of freehold without matter of Record yet she may take Chattels upon a surmise made that they were granted unto her and therefore he vouched 21. H. 7. fo 19 that an Obligation may be granted to the King without inrolment of the grant and 40. Assise pl. 35. Brook tit suggestion pl. 5. it appears that the King shall have a Chattel by a demise by parol upon a suggestion made thereof in the Exchequer without a Record and in the 15. H. 7. fo 15. the Kings Baylie who is not of Record may be compelled to accompt upon a suggestion made Brooks suggestion pla 31. and in the 37. H. 6. fo 7. 18. if the King gives goods with his hands this is good although no record be made thereof because it is but a Chattel and by the same reason he inferred that he may also accept of Chattel without a Record but admitting that he cannot take without a Record it seemeth that here is a thing well enough Recorded to intitle the King after the return made by the Commissioners for the Commissioners are officers of Record to this purpose and they endorse the prayer of the partie to have it Recorded and this being after the return is a sufficient Record to intitle the King and he vouched the 2. H. 7. fo 10. where the servant of Iustice Catesby after the death of the Iudge made a return and this was good and the 8. H. 4. a Record certified by a Iudge after he was displaced and 43. Assises if a Coroner makes his Rols and dies before he certifie them they may be certified after his death and so here this acknowledgement and prayer being certified may at any time after be inrolled and although it seemeth by the Book in the 19. Eliz. Dyer fo 355. that a grant being made to the King and acknowledged before one of the Masters of the Chancery and inrolled in the time of another King maketh not the Grant good yet he said that it was adjudged for another grant made to the King by the Duke of Somerset and acknowledged before one of the Masters of Chancery and inrolled in the time of another King was good enough to perfect the grant and this was by a grant made by the Duke of Bozoms Inne in London and he said that it is not reasonable that the Law should adjudge otherwise for it may be that the Clark will not inroll it untill such a time viz. a moneth within which time the King may die should it now be reasonable that it should not be inrolled at all he said it was unreasonable and he said that it appeareth by the 37. H. 6. fo 10. that a deed delivered at the Kings Coffers is good enough to avoid his lease made in the 44. Eliz. for although that it be true that a grant of a reversion shall never operate to the destruction of a right of a third person yet it seemeth that an Act commenced may be confirmed well enough to the destruction of a mean interposed Act and it seemeth that the inrolment here is but a confirmation of a precedent lease and not a relation to make a thing which was not before and therefore to examine what thing an inrolment is and it seemed to him that it is no matter of Record as it appears 24. E. 3. and 29. H. 8. fo 15. and therefore it appears by Wymacks Case Cook L. 5. that a deed inrolled ought to be pleaded hic in Curia Prolat which proveth that the deed and not the inrolment thereof is the thing which passeth the estate and therefore he vouched the case in the 6. E. 6. Brook title faits if one joynt Tenant sells all his land in D. and after his companion dieth and then the deed is inrolled yet a moitie only shall pass and 41. Eliz. Cook Perimans Case lib. 5. if a man make a feofment of lands and inroll the Deed within the Mannor as by the custome it ought to be yet the inrolment shall pass nothing and therefore it is there said the inrolment may be good enough after the death of the parties so by the same reason aforesaid it is put in the same Case of Perimon and also in Butlers and Bakers Case Cook lib. 3. that if a man deliver a writing as an escrow to be his Deed upon certain conditions performed and after the Obligor and the Obligee die and then the Conditions are performed the Deed is good for there was traditio inchoata in the life of the parties and this being after consummated takes his effect by force of the first delivery and acknowledgement and therefore also he said that it was lately adjudged that if two men are mentioned to be bound by one Obligation and the one seals at one day and the other at another day this is as good as if it had been at one day and therefore he said that there is no doubt but if a lease be made to the King by a Bishop and after another lease is made also of the same land or if the Bishop die yet if after the first lease be inrolled this is good and therefore also he cited a case to be adjudged in Banco Regis 41. Eliz. between Collins and Harding that if a man be seised of freehold and Coppihold land and makes a lease of both for years with licence rendring rent and after he grants the reversion of the freehold and makes a surrender of the Coppihold to the use of the same person and an attornment is had for the freehold and the presentment of the surrender for the Coppihold is not made untill a year after yet he in reversion shall have an action of debt for all the rent for the presentment of the surrender is but a perfection of the surrender before made also he cited the case as I observed him to this effect in the 9th of Eliz. in the Abbot of Colchesters Case where he said that the Abbot of Colchester committed treason and after made a lease for years and then he surrendred to the King all his lands and after an office found the treason and it was holden the lease is good against the King who took by the surrender and not by the treason committed before but as Walter said the case was adjudged that the King should avoid the lease for now he is in by the treason paramount the surrender Phillips against Evans IN an Ejectione firmae brought up three acres in the forrest of Kevington in the Countie c. the Defendant pleaded not guiltie and the Venire facias was awarded de vicineto of the forrest and the Defendant moved in arrest of judgement because the Venire facias de vicineto of the forrest was not good for as Stephens for the Defendant said that a forrest and the name thereof is but
because nothing vested in the Queen nothing can vest in the King as successor for a thing cannot be vested in one as heir or successor which was never vested in the Ancestor and he vouched Bullocks case in 10. Eliz. Dyer 21. Ed. 4. of election also it cannot vest in the King Primarily because he was never partie to the Iudenture of lease and he cited a case to be adjudged accordingly betwixt Founds and 29. Eliz. 11. H. 7. that he who is not partie to the Indenture shall not be primarily bound nor shall primarily take by the same Indenture and it is inconvenient that this should be a good inrolment and where it was said of the other part that a bargain and sale is good enough although it be not inrolled in the life of the parties so that it be inrolled within 6. moneths to that he well agreed for by the bargain and sale an use passeth at the Common Law without help of the Statute and this without inrolment and the Statute of inrolments restraineth it not but that it may pass well enough at this day and so the Statute perfects it so that it be within 6. moneths indifferently and therefore it is good notwithstanding the death of the parties and he concluded with the Book of the 19. Eliz. Dyer fol. and wheras it was said to be resolved contrary in an authoritie not printed he said that he believed the printed Book and vouched also the case cited before in Butlers and Bakers Case Cook lib. 3. to the third point it seemed to him that although the inrolment be good yet that should not avoid the estate by relation for a relation is not good to avoid mean conveyances without an antient right as if the Kings Villein purchase lands the King now hath right and therefore an office found after shall relate to avoid all mean conveyances and he said that relations are not so certain wherefore a man may make a ground for every case hath his particular reason and therefore to some purposes an attornament ought to relate but to other purposes it ought not to relate and therefore an attornament cannot relate to intitle a grantee to rents due between the grant and the attornament and so in this case if the inrolment had been in the life of the Bishop and of the Queen yet it could not have given to her the mean profits between the grant and the inrolment and he vouched a case in Butlers and Bakers case and the 11. H. 7. that a relation shall never be prejudicial to a stranger for his estate lawfully executed and therefore if a feofment be made to a husband and wife and to a third person and after the husband and wife are divorced for a precontract yet they shall take but a Moitie as if they were married also it is a rule that an estate vested cannnot be made Tortious by relation see Butlers and Bakers Case and he vouched a case to be adjudged betwixt Wind gate and Hall in the Kings Bench Mich. 31. 32. Eliz. that if a Statute be acknowledged to a Common person and another Statute to the King by the same Conusor and after the Statute acknowledged to the common person is extended and the Conusee in possession and also the King sues execution of his Statute he shall not avoid the estate lawfully executed in the first Conusee as it was there holden but the Barons said una voce that if such a case should come in question before them they would hold the contrary for the King and for the fourth point viz. if the confirmation were good being made before inrolment of the lease and so upon the matter before any lease in being to which the Counsel of the one part nor of the other were provided to speak Walter said that the confirmation was not good for Littleton saith that a thing or estate which is not in being cannot be confirmed and Tanfield chief Baron said and others also that this was the principal point of the case and the great doubt is of the other part viz. that this is not good and therefore advised them to argue it at another day and Walter said that the confirmation is not good in regard it is not of record nor inrolled and he vouched the 26. of E. 3. fo 20. that the King cannot take notice of any thing without record the next Term upon the first Tuesday it was appointed to be argued again and Doddridge the Kings Serjeant observed foure points First if any inrolment be necessary in the case Secondly admitting that the inrolment be requisite if here be a good inrolment being made after the Kings death Thirdly if the confirmation of the Dean and Chapter be of necessitie to be inrolled Fourthly admit that the confirmation need not to be inrolled and that the lease ought to be inrolled then if this confirmation be good because it was before the inrolment of the lease as to the first he conceived that aswel a Chattel real as a thing personal may vest in the King without Record for it should be inconvenient that Chattels should be inrolled First for the infinitness Secondly for the small value of them in the judgement of Law and he vouched 40. Assises pla 35. of a Legacy devised to the King and 37. H. 6. fo 10. if a Chattel be given to the King there needeth no record and the 28. E. 3. fo 23. the King brings a quare impedit upon a grant of the next presentation without record and yet it was good 21. H. 7. fo 19. an obligation may be granted to the King without record 35. H. 8. Brook prerogative and 33. H. 6. the Baily shall have aid of the King and he vouched also 2. E. 6. Brook prerogative and 35. H. 6. fo 3. Fitz. villinage and Brook prerogative and the 21. H. 7. fo 8. if a man possest of a Term be outlawed this Term is in the King by outlawry without Record to the second point he thought that the inrolment was good after the Queens death for the inrolment ought to relate as it appears by 1. H. 7. fo 28. and this relation disaffirmeth the mean estate and gives also the mean profits and as to the point of relation he vouched Nichols Case Plowden where the entrie of the heir once lawful was made unlawful by relation and he vouched also 14. H. 8. fo 18. in the end of Wheelers Case and by the 4. H. 7. fo 10. a man seised of land is attainted of Treason the King grants this land to A. the person attainted commits a Trespass and is restored by Parliament the Patentee shall never have an action of Trespass because this restitution takes away the cause of action and to prove that the inrolment may be well enough after the Queens death he said that the said case put to be resolved in the 19th of Eliz. Dyer fo 355. concerning the Duke of Somerset was after adjudged contrary to
come ceo only of foure Bullaries if this fine and the use of the estate passed thereby shall be directed by the covenant it was the question and it was moved for a doubt what Bullarie that shall be intended whereof the fine is not levied by reason of the incertaintie quaere and it was adjourned Nota that an estreate of divers fines imposed upon several indictments at the Quarter Sessions for several Riots was sent into this Court and the estreat here being mentioned not for what offences the fines were imposed and the records of the indictments were in the Crown office by a Certiorari and the chief Baron Tanfield said that the estreat was insufficient and we ought not to send out Proces upon them because they do not mention the quality of the offence for which the fines were imposed and therefore it may be discharged by Plea yet if the estreat be not warranted by the indictment so that the indictment is discharged for insufficiency in the Kings Bench the Record thereof may be certified into the Chancery and by mittimus transferred hither and we may discharge the estreat and Altham Baron agreed that the partie grieved by such fine upon an insufficient indictment may plead all this matter and spare to remove the Record and if the Kings Attorney will confess the plea to be true it is as good as if the Record had been removed which was not denied An Amercement for a by Law IT was moved for the King upon a lease holden for him that I.S. was amerced 10. l. because he received a poor man to be his Tenant who was chargable to the parish contrary to a pain made by the Township and thereupon Proces issued out of this Court and the Baily distrained and I. S. brought Trespas and it was said by the Barons and ordered that if I. S. will bring an action for the distraining for this amercement be it lawfully imposed or not yet I. S. shall be restrained to sue in any other Court but in this and here he shall sue in the office of Pleas if he will for the Bailiff levied it as an officer of this Court and for the matter Snig said that if I. S. received a poor man into his house against a by Law made in the Township there is good cause of amercement but by Tanfield it is nothing to us that they have a custome to make by-Lawes herein against a by Law made by us also a leet of it self hath no authority to make by Lawes or such an order but by custome it is good Snig and Altham Barons it is good policy to make an order with a pain in a Leet that no person shall receive any such Tenant as shall be chargable to the parish but clearly the Steward cannot amerce one for such a cause without an order with a pain made before Sir John Littletons case SIr Iohn Littletons case was that all the lands of a Monastery were granted unto one Dudley reserving 28. l. rent yearly for a Tenth of all the laid land according to the Statute and after Dudley granted the greater part of this land to Littleton and that he had used upon the agreement made between Dudley and him to pay 20. l. yearly for the Tenth of his part and Dudley had used to pay 8. l. yearly for that which he retained and after Dudley was attainted whereupon his part of the said land came to the King and now the Auditor would impose the charge for all the Tenth upon Littleton but by the Court although the Tenth was Originally chargable and leviable upon all and every part of the land yet it being apparant to them that part thereof came to the Kings hands it was ordered that the land of Sir Iohn Littleton should be discharged before the Auditor prorata and so it was and Littleton to pay only 20. l. yearly Sweet and Beal NOta that in Michaelmas Term 6. Iac. upon a special verdict this case was depending in the Exchequer viz. Anthony Brown devised a term to his wife until the issue of the body of the Devisor accomplish the age of 18. years bringing up the said child Provided that if the devisor die without issue that then the land shall go to the said wife for term of her life paying to the sister of the Devisor 6. l. 13. s. 4. d. yearly which he willed to be paid at two feasts half yearly and that if it be arrear then it shall be lawful for the sister to distrain and to detain the distress until it be paid and the Iury found that the devisor had issue at the time of his death but that the said issue died before he accomplished the age of 18. years and they found also that the rent of 6. l. 13. s. 4. d. payable to the sister was not paid at one day in which it was payable and that no demand was made for it and that Moil Beal who was the right heir entred for the condition broken and made a lease to the Plantiff who being outed by the wife brought an Ejectione firme and Chibborn of Lincolns Inne argued that the entrie of the heir is lawful first he said when he devised to his wife until his heir come to the age of 18. years bringing up the said heir if in this case the heir die within the said age the state of the wife is determined by reason that the education was the cause the land should continue to the wife and the cause being determined by the death of the heir before the said age therefore the estate is also determined and upon that he bouched a case in Mich. 3. Iac. one Collins devised that one Carpenter should have the over-sight and managing of his land until his son should attain the age of 5. years and the son died before he attained the said age and it was agreed admitting that Carpenter had by that devise an interest that it is now determined by the death of the heir to the second matter viz. when it is limited that if the devisor die without issue that then the wife shall have it by that it seems to me that the wife shall not have an estate for life by these words as our case for at the time of the death of the devisor he had issue so that it cannot be said that he died without issue although now we may say that he is dead without issue but in regard that the words of the will are not performed according to the proper intendment of them the Iudges ought not to make another construction then according to the litteral sence the litteral construction being properly the words to bear such a meaning and this as he said may be proved by Wildes case in Cook lib. 6. but more strong is our case because in a case which carrieth the land from the heir there ought to be a strong and strickt and not a favourable construction made to the prejudice of the heir
Slade and Morleys case a case was put which proves it to be according Snig Baron agreed that Iudgement ought to be given for the Plantiff and by Tanfield if I take your goods and detain them until I have caused you to pay me 10. l. a general Action of Trespass lieth and not an Action upon the case and it is cited 7. H. 4. or 7. E. 4. to be accordingly but yet he agreed that judgement should be entred and so it was appointed to be done but then Chibborn for the Defendant said that here is a mistrial for if this trust be not material because it is not effectually shewed in the Declaration as you have argued then the Venue shall come only from the parish where the Wares were laid upon the land and not from the parish also where the appointment or trust was made by the Plantiff and therefore the trial also being from both parishes is a mistrial and the Court agreed that this is a mistrial upon that reason for now the appointment or Trust is but an inducement and therefore needs not to be shewed within what parish it was made and therefore a new Venire facias was granted and upon that a new trial and damages more then before and judgement was given accordingly Arden against Darcie NOta a good case of Attornament which was decreed in the time of Baron Manwood betwixt Arden and Darcie and it was this one Arden was seised in fee of divers lands in the County of c. and made a lease for years and after made a feofment with words of Grant of those lands to A. and B. to the use of the feoffor and his wife for their lives the remainder to Arden his son in tail and after the feoffor said to the Lessee that he had conveyed his land which the Lessee held in lease to the uses aforesaid and the Lessee said I like it well and after he paid his rent to the feoffor generally and it was decreed in the Exchequer Chamber that this is no Attornament because the Attornament ought to be to the feoffees and it appeareth not that the Lessee had notice of the names of the feoffees and therefore it cannot be said to amount to an Attornament but notwithstanding that Decree Arden the same to whom the remainder was limited had his Action depending in the Kings Bench to trie the point again as he said to me also this Term a point concerning the said Decree was in question upon another Bill exhibited in the Exchequer Chamber by Sir Edward Darcie against Arden and the case was as followeth Sir Edward Darcie exhibited his Bill here in the nature of a scire facias against Arden to shew cause wherefore the said Edward Darcie should not have execution of a Decree made in the time of Baron Manwood and the Defendant shewed that Darcie in his first suit supposed by his Bill that he had a grant of the land then and now in question from Queen Elizabeth rendring rent as it appears by the letters Patents and in facto there was no rent reserved upon the Patent and that the Defendant gave answer to the said Bill and admitted the Iurisdiction of the Court and after a Decree was made against the Defendant and the Defendant now having shewed this special matter demurred upon this Bill in respect that by his pretence the Court had not jurisdiction to hold plea in the first suit and here it was shewed that the first decree was made upon a matter in Law not properly examinable by English Bill and that in facto the Law was therein mistaken and therefore the Defendant prayed that the decree may be re-examined Tanfield chief Baron it is usual in the office of Pleas that if an action be brought as a debtor of our Lord the King this is good although that de facto no suggestion be made thereof if it be not shewed on the other side and therefore a writ of Error for this falsity shall not cause the judgement to be reversed as it was resolved in a case in which I was of Councel and so here as it seemeth Altham Baron here we are in equity wherein we are not tied to so strickt a course as if it were in the office of pleas Brock of the Inner Temple for the Defendant in a Court of equity it is in the discretion of the Court to deny Execution of a decree if good cause be shewed and in 18. E. 4. fo 1. judgement was given against a married wife by the name of a feme sole and reversed although she did not shew in the first suit that she was married and in 8. E. 4. judgement was given in the Kings Bench in a suit and by writ of error was reversed although the Defendant had admitted the Iurisdiction of the Court and the chief Baron and all the Court inclined that Arden may exhibit a Bill to reverse this Decree made against him and may shew what point in Law the Iudges mistook in the Decree or otherwise we should not do as Law and Iustice requireth for it is not expedient to be examined by way of Bar to this Bill in the nature of a scire facias and after Arden according to the Decree of the Court and their direction did exhibit his Bill in the nature of a writ of error Comprising how the first decree was erroneously made and prayed that the said decree might be reversed and in his Bill he shewed the point in Law which was decreed and that upon divers long conveyances appears to be thus and so it was agreed by Councel on both parties that Arden the father was seised of the Mannor of Cudworth in the County of c. and was also seised of the Mannor of Parkhal in the same County and of Blackclose c. which was parcel of the Mannor of Cudworth but lying neer unto Parkhal and alwayes used and occupied with it and reputed parcel thereof but in truth it was parcel of Cudworth and that Arden the father made a Conveyance of the Mannor of Parkhal and of all the lands thereunto belonging and reputed as parcel thereof or occupied with it as part or parcel thereof and of all other his lands in England except the Mannor of Cudworth to the use of Arden his son that now is Plantiffe here and if Blackclose will pass to the son by this conveyance or if by intendment it shall be excepted by the exception made it was the question here and was decreed in the time of Baron Manwood that it is excepted by the exception but all the Barons now thought it to be a strong case that Blackclose is not excepted by the exception of the Mannor of Cudworth and so the first decree was upon a mistake out of the Law and Tanfield chief Baron said that the point is no other but that I infeoffe you of Blackacre parcel of the Mannor of D. exceyt my Mannor of D. this doth not except the King
Process which I have and if you will give me my Bond I will give you 3. l. and discharge you of the said Amercement to which Oglander agreed and delivered the Bond accordingly and all this Oglander disclosed by Affidavit and further said that Sir Daniel Norton had taken his goods for the said Amercement again this not being discharged in the Office and it was said by the Court that this was a good levy of the said Amercement by Chamberlaine in the Law and therefore Sir Daniel Norton ought to be charged for it to the King as a thing levied by him and Oglander shall be discharged of any another levying and therefore c. Sawier against East SAwier against East in an Ejectione firmae for certain Mills in East Smithfield called Crush Mills a speciall Verdict was found that Queen Eliz. was seised of them in right of her Crown and the 28. of her Raign leased them to Potter for 40. years who in the 30. Eliz. dyed and Mary his Executrix entred and took to Husband one Burrell which Burrell 33. Eliz. demised parcell to Wilkinson for 20. years and dyed Mary took Hitchmore to Husband who in 44. Eliz. 2. May surrendred to the Queen and after the 2. of June 44. Eliz. the Queen reciting the first Demise made to Potter the interest of which is now come to Hitchmore and that he had surrendred to us demised the premisses to Hitchmore as well in consideration of xxx l. paid as for that that the said Hitchmore did assume upon himself to repair the said Mills at his own cost being greatly in decay and to leave them so repaired and the Iury also found that in the same Patent there was a Covenant that Hitchmore should repaire them c. for the doing thereof he had given some assurance and that the Mills were not repaired and that the Lease made to Wilkinson is now in Esse being for 20. years and that the King that now is had granted the said Mills to the Lesse of Sawier c. Walter for the Plaintif First it seemeth that this false recitall in the lease made to Hitchmore makes the lease void and the point is that the King by recitall in this Lease intends that all the interest of the former lease was surrendred whereas Wilkinson was possessed of part thereof and so it is in deceit of the Queen in matter of Profit and therefore makes the new Lease void and to prove that a false recitall in the Patent may avoid it he vouched 37. H. 6. fo 23.3 H. 7. fo 6. and 11. H. 4. fo in all which cases it is said that if the King make a Grant upon a suggestion made to him which is false this will avoid the Patent but if a true suggestion be made to the King and he himsel thereupon makes a collection or surmise this doth not avoid the Patent as the Lord Chandos case Cook L. 6. and by 21. E. 4. fo 48. By Hussey but there if the surmise of the party be false in any thing this avoids the Patent and therefore Hussey there saith that if the King recite that whereas the Mannor of D. is escheated to him and he grants it to A. where in truth it was parcell of his Autient Inheritance this doth avoid the Patent but there by him if the King recite that whereas his servant is decrepit he of his meere motion grants the Mannor of D. to him this falcity doth not avoid the Patent because the consideration is of his meere motion and by intendment the recitall is not the information of the party and then in our case the lease is not ex gratia c. and the recitall is the recitall of the party for it is of an Act done viz. of a surrender supposed to be made by the party and that upon the matter is resolved to be a cause to avoid the Patent as it is in the Lord Chandos case and so also holden by Hussey in 21. E. 4. fo 48. and 9. of E. 4. in Baggots Assises if the surmise of the party be false and valuable to the King then the falcity there avoids the patent but if it be not of a thing valuable or beneficiall to the King the falsity doth not avoid the Patent 29. E. 3. Grants 58. if the King recites that whereas the Advowson of D. is holden of A. and he licenceth A. to appropriate if in facto it be holden of the King himself the licence is not good because the King is deceived in matter of profit and so 12. Eliz. Dyer 292. and 25. E. 3. there cited where the King presents and before admision he repeals and then recites that whereas his Presentee is Canonice institutus c. and confirms it here although that the Bishop after this repeale had instituted the party yet it appears that the recitall which is void makes also the confirmation void 8. H. 7. fo 3.9 H. 6. fo 28. and 21. E. 4 if the King recite that whereas the Mannor of D. came unto him by the Attainder of A. be grants to B. and in truth this did not come by the Attainder of A. but is an inheritance of the Crown this avoids the Grant and 21. E. 4. fo 28. by Bryan if the King recite that he is indebted to A. in 20. l. and grants to him the Mannor of D. if he be not indebted to him the Grant is void and so it appears by Sir Hugh Cholmleyes case Cook lib. 2. fo 54. that if the Queen recite a thing the falsitie whereof doth prejudice her in matter of profit now the misrecitall avoids the Patent as there it was admitted that if the Queen recite that whereas A. is seised of an Acre in taile upon a condition c. and she grants the reversion to B. here if the state of A. were without a condition the grant of the reversion is void for this false recitall and according he vouched Alton Woods case Cook L. 1. and in our case it is prejudiciall to the Queen that all the interest in the former lease is not surrendred but a part thereof is in Wilkinson for the Queen intended that all this Land now leased should be immediately lyable to her rent newly reserved where in deed it cannot be so here untill the antient lease be determined whereby c. this recitall is tacitely intended part of the consideration For the second Point it seemeth that here is a falcity in the consideration expressed for the Queen leased to Hitchmore as well for 30 l. as for that that he assumed to build and sustaine so that the assumpsit to build and sustain is part of the consideration and therein the Queen is deceived and to prove that the word pro is as good as if it had been in consideration he vouched 43. Eliz. Luttrels case that the word pro implyes a consideration and here the finding of the Iury is that no other security or assurance was given to the
Heir except that judgement be given against the Ancestor and for that see 40. E. 3. Executors 74. and 41. Ass pl. 15. and 15. Eliz Dyer 322. And also if a Recusant had been convicted upon the Sat. of 23. Eliz. and dyed before judgement cleerely this forfeiture shall never be charged upon the Heir for the words are that a Recusant shall forfeit 20. l. a moneth and if he doe not pay it then appoints the recovery by Bill Plaint or Information and this ought to be alwaies in the life of the party then the Stat. of 28. Eliz. maketh not a new debt or Forfeiture but gives a penalty for the non-payment of that which was a debt within 23. Eliz. and that the intent of the Stat. of 28. Eli. was but such this is proved by the Title of the Act. viz. for the more speedy and due execution c. 2. It is proved by the first words of the Act for the avoiding of all delaies c. so that it appears that this Act is but as a penalty meerly Also he said that this Stat. of 28. Eliz. dispenceth with the conviction as to the penalty but doth not take away the Conviction also he said that conviction without Iudgement maketh not a Debt Also he who is convicted by proclamation and dieth is discharged Also he said that our Case hath been compared to a Debt upon an Obligation but this is not like for the Stat. stands not indefinite but hath reference to 23. for otherwise a Recusant may be doubly charged that is upon both the Statutes for there is no means to recover the Debt but by this Statute of 23. Eliz. See Sir Edward Walgraves case Dyer 231. Wentworth and others against Stanley WEntworth and his Wife and Rich and his Wife brought an Ejectione firmae against Stanley and shewed in their Declaration how one Edward Stanley was seised in Fee and infeoffed the Earl of Darby others to the use of himself for life the remainder to the use of the Plantiffs wife for 100. years and died and the Plantiffs entred and the Defendant ejected them c. and this Feofment was made in 40. Eliz. the Defendant saith that long before one Richard Stanley was sesed in Fee and gave it to the said Edward Stanley in tail and that he so seised made a Feefment to the uses as is alledged and died and the Plantiffs entred and the Defendant as issue of the Feoffor re-entred and so by his pretence his is remitted whereupon it was demurred and upon the opening this case the Barons were clear of opinion that the issue in tail is remitted and came paramount the lease and so the lease for years is gone also by the chief Baron and Baron Snig there needs no Traverse to be alledged by the Plantiffe because it was but of a fee gained in an instant by the feofment of a Tenant in tail and a fee-simple gained in an instant needeth not to be Traversed 5. H. 7. and 2. E. 4. wherefore the Court said that judgement ought to be given against the Plantiffs but yet at the desire of the some the Court gave day to the Councel on both parts to argue the case at which day came Heneag Finch for the Plantiffs and he argued to the matter in Law and therein he said that by the feofment of Tenant in tail the use to himself for life the remainder to his daughters for years without limiting the residue of the use that in this case the residue of the use shall be in the feoffes and not in the feoffor for by him there is a difference between a feofment by him who had a fee with limitation of an use as above and a feofment made by him who derives an estate out of a fee for when Tenant for life or Tenant in tail makes a feofment and limits an use for part of the estate as above there the residue of the issue shall be to the feoffee and he vouched Castle and Dods case adjudged in the Common Pleas 8. Iac. that if Tenant for life grant over his estate without limiting of an use it shall be to the use of the grantee more strong here in a tortious act as our case is but if Tenant in tail will levy a fine with limitation of uses as above there the residue of the use shall be to the use of the Conusor Secondly admit that the residue of the use in this case shall he to the feoffor yet he shall not be remitted to the use as it seemeth the words of the Statute of 27. H. 8. are that cestuy que use shall have like estate in the land as he had in the use and therefore it is clear that the first taker of the use shall not be remitted as it is resolved in Amy Townsends case in Plowden and although the words of the Statute mention not heirs or issues yet by the intent of the Statute they are in equal degree but the Books which are against this opinion are two viz. 33. H. 8. Dyer fo 51. but there it is not expresly said that the issue is remitted but 34. H. 8 Br. remitter 49. is expresly against me but the same year in Dyer fo 54. it is there made a quere and in Bevils case it is only said that the first taker of the use cannot be remitted but of my opinion was Baldwin and Shelley in 28. H. 8. Dyer 23 24. and in Sanages case and 29. H. 8. it is resolved that if a man hath land by Act of Parliament there shall be no remitter and so here wherefore c. and he said if Tenant in tail be the remainder in fee and Tenant in tail makes a feofment to the use of himself in tail the remainder to him in remainder in fee in this case he in the remainder in fee shall not be remitted for then the first taker should be remitted to the pleading it seemeth that the bar is not good and first the general demurrer here doth not confess the matter of fact no more then in Gawins case in 29. H. 8. fo 40. by Brown a demurrer upon account in an appeal is no confession of the fact and in 44. Eliz. in Crisp and Byrons case accordingly see Sir Henry Browns case before a good case to this purpose then as to the Bar it seems it is not sufficient for want of a Traverse of a seisin in fee alledged in the feoffor who was Edward Stanley for it is a rule that two affirmatives cannot be allowed in a Declaration and the Bar without Traverse of that which is mentioned in the Declaration is not good except there be cause of some impossibilitie or inconvenience but yet this is to be understood where the affirmatives are express and not by implication as in Moiles case if the Defendant in his Bar confess a fee determinable he needs not Traverse the fee alledged by the Plantiffe but in our case here is an allegation made by the
Recusant may be seised after his death Thirdly if they shall be charged by the Statute of 1. Iac. as to the first it seems they are not wherein I shall endeavour to prove three things First that such land was not liable to debt by the Common Law Secondly that they are not liable to debts by the general words of the Statute Law Thirdly that they are not liable to debt by any word within the Statute of primo Iac. as to the first he observed that here is no fraud put in the case but that these lands and leases were never in the Recusant so that before that they were conveyed to the Defendants they were not liable to this debt and I alwayes observed that which the common law calleth fraud ought to be of such nature as shall be tortious and prejudicial to a third person and put him in a worse estate and condition then he was before and then he who is so prejudiced in some cases should avoid such conveyances by the common Law 22. Assises 72.43 Ed. 3.2 and 32. the Defendant in debt after judgement aliens his goods and he himself takes the profits yet the Plantiffe shall have them in execution so that if a man binde himself and his heirs in an Obligation and dies and assets descend to his heir who by Covin aliens those assets yet he shall be charged in debt for in these cases the Plantiffe had a lawful debt and such lands and goods before the alienation were liable and that former interest was intended to be defeated by those alienations and therefore they are void but of the other side where no former interest of the partie is wronged there no fraudulent conveyance was void at the Common Law and therefore if Tenant in Knights service had made a fraudulent Feofment to defraud the Lord of his wardship this was not aided by the Common Law until the Statute of Marlebridge for the title of the Lord was not prejudiced or wronged by this Feofment because it was subsequent to the Feofment also after the said Statute the Lord was without remedy for his release for it is agreed in 17. Ed. 3. fo 54. and 31. Ed. 3. Collation 29. and therefore at the Common Law if cestuy que use had bound himself and his heirs in an Obligation and died if the use descended to his heir none will say this use was assets to the heir and so was Rigler and Hunters case 25. Eliz. as to the second point it seems that the general words of a Statute shall be expounded according to the rule and reason of the Common Law and by the Common Law such confidence is not extendible therefore c. Westmin 2. cap. 18. which gives the elegit hath these words medietatem terrae and within those words an use was never extendible by that Statute 30. Ed. 3. because it was not an estate in him and so if a man be indebted for Merchandise or money borrowed and makes a gift of his lands and Chattels to defraud Creditors and takes the profits himself and flieth to the Sanctuary at Westminster or Saint Martins and there abideth by conclusion to avoid the payment of his debts it is thereby enacted that Proclamation shall be made at the Gate of the Sanctuary where such person resideth by the Sheriffe and if such person doth not thereupon appear in person or by Atturney judgement shall be given against him 2 Rich. 2. Stat. 2. cap. 3. 1. Rich. 3. cap. 1. and execution awarded aswel of those lands and goods given by fraud as of any other out of the same Franchise these words are more particular then the Statute of Westminster the second and yet it was doubted if it did extend to executions for debt as it appears by 7. H. 7. and 11. H. 7.27 and therefore in 19. H. 7. cap. 15. an Act of Parliament was made that execution for debts Recognizances and Statutes should be sued of lands in use As to the third it seems that that Statute doth not make lands in use liable to debts the words of the Statute are that the King shall seise two parts of the lands Tenements and Hereditaments leases of Farms of such offendors so that they are as general as the words of the Statute of Westminster 2. cap. 18. and here those lands and leases were not the Recusants for he had but a confidence in them the first clause of the Statute doth not extend thereunto for two causes First in regard that it never was in the Recusant and this clause extends only to such conveyances which are made by any man which hath not repaired or shall not repair to some Church for the disjunctive words do not extend throughout that branch but to the last part thereof viz. that which cometh after the word and for otherwise this would extend to conveyances made at any time without limitation which should be against the meaning of the Act. Secondly this Branch provides what shall be done concerning the King touching the levying and paying of such summes of money as any person by the Lawes of the Realm ought to pay of else to forfeit c. and by the Statutes before made nothing was forfeited but for such time as is mentioned in the Indictment which in our case is but 6. moneths but out of this branch a strong argument may be made in respect that the Statute avoids all conveyances made by Recusants in trust by express words but saith nothing to conveyances made by others to the use of Recusants and therefore this Statute doth not extend unto it if Tenant by Knights service infeoffs his heir within age and dies the Lord may enter upon the heir without suing an action but if a Feofmenche made to a stranger there he cannot enter but ought to bring his Action according to the provision of that Statute because it may be to the use of the Feoffee but no such provision is made for the heir the Statute of 3. Jac. cap. 4. provides by express words that the King shall seise two parts of all the lands Tenements and Hereditaments Leases and Faims that at the time of such seisure shall be or afterwards shall come to any of the hands of the said offendors or any other to their use or in trust for him or her or at his or her dispose or disposition or whereby wherewith or in consideration whereof such offendors or their families or any of them shall or may be relieved maintained or kept c. the different penning of these Statutes proves the diversitie of the meaning thereof this Statute is a new Law which gives to the King this penalty which he had not before and in new manner for it appoints that the partie shall be convicted by Proclamation and that being so convicted he shall alwayes pay the said penaltie until his submission without any other conviction 3. Jac. cap. 4. and also limits a manner how this new penaltie shall be levied viz.
false the Patent is void although it hath these words Ex certa scientia et mero motu and so is 18. Eliz. Dyer 352. where the Patent was ex certa scientia et mero motu c. but there Dyer held that this falsitie in the matter of Recital did avoid the Patent notwithstanding the words ex mero motu c. but he held it otherwise if it were in a consideration which is faise for at that time the point of falsitie in matter of consideration for 100 l. to be paid although it be much contraverted in our Books and it seems in what place soever of the patent it appears that the King is mis-informed deceived in any matter material or concerning his own estate in the thing to be granted that that will dictate the Patent and therefore 17. Eliz. the Queen seised of the Mannor of D. grants all her purpartie of the Mannor of D. if in this case a Common person had granted by such words the Mannor had passed but in the Queens case it will be a void grant because a thing which she intended to pass cannot pass in such plight as she conceived it viz. as a purpartie and 36. Eliz. the Queen granted all her portion of Tithes c. although she had a Parsonage there yet it doth not pâ—â—s for this manner of Appellation implies that the Queen was mis-informed and not well instructed of the thing to be granted and therefore void see Cook lib. 4. in Bozuns case Ex certa scientia et mero motu c. doth not help it also if the King recite that whereas he had such land by the attainder of I. S. where in truth he had it not by his attainder now although that he grants this land Ex certa scientia et mero motu yet this will not pass but if the King be not deceived in the point of intitling himself but in the deducing of his title that will not prejudice the Patent as if the King recite that whereas I. S. had land by descent from his father and he grants it to the King and the King doth re-grant the same to I. S. this grant is good notwithstanding that I. S. had it not by descent from his father see the Lord Lovels case in Plowden that if the King be deceived only in the point of mis-conveyance the Law will not avoid the Patent as if be grant to one and his heirs born at D. the last words are void and the grant is good Pasch 42. Eliz. it was agreed that if the King be Tenant for life or years and makes a lease for one and twenty years this lease is void to all intents against the King because it appears not in the grant what estate the King had and by that lease the King conceived that he had power by his estate to make an absolute lease whereas legally his lease ought to determine by his death so by implication it is manifest that the King was not well instructed of his estate 39. Eliz. the Queen leased for twenty one years to begin whensoever the land should fall in possession by the expiration of any former lease then in being if in that case there were no precedent lease then in being this lease will be void for these words implie that the Queen conceived her former lease to be in being and so impliedly she is deceived in her intent in like manner in the principal case the Queen was deceived in her intention for the recital is that all the estate which Potter had is come to the Queen by surrender and in truth all the estate is not come unto her in respect of a mean estate to Wilkinson c. as to the second point it seems the consideration being that he did assume to new build implies asmuch as if he had said he faithfully promised and then it is all one as if it had been for that that he shall build for it is a consideration executory and is of value and then the not performance thereof vitiates the Patent and the estate was as if it had been by a limitation to cease and these words that he did assume upon himself cannot be construed to any other intent but unto an executory consideration because the King hath no remedy by way of Action for the breach of this promise and it cannot be conceived that the Covenant is satisfied in giving securitie for it is observable that the Covenant is but the ordinary Covenant viz. to repair and keep repaired and so a Trivial reparation will satisfie that but it appears that the Queens intent was not to make the lease for such a petty consideration because the Lessee had undertaken at his own charges to new build the Mills but the express Covenant doth not binde him to the new building of them and in 6. Eliz. the like lease was made of the Mannor of Lidlescourt to Customer Smith and the lease was for that that he assumed that he at his costs would c. and he avoided his lease upon a former lease made to A. of the premises and in truth the lease formerly made to A. was meerly void upon the making of this lease though perad venture the condition may be good and the consideration performed but the Queen was not well instructed of her title also in this case the lease to Hitchmore is not determined by a condition as it hath been objected but it ceaseth and is determined by a limitation and this may well enough revest in the Queen without entrie or office because it was but a Term and such words purporting an executory consideration in the Queens case implies as much as if in case of a Common person it had been said expresly to cease upon an act not performed for in the Kings case the Law speaketh and if so then the lease for years is void and the Patentee may enter without office and all considerations executory in leases made by the King amount to a conditional limitation and then he who will have benefit by such a lease ought to aver the performance of the consideration as if a man declare upon a lease made unto him c. if I. S. should so long live he ought to aver his life in the Declaration because it determines by limitation at his death but otherwise it is upon a condition if a Parson make a lease for years the Lessee must aver the life of the Parson because by his death the lease ends by a limitation implied but otherwise it should if it were upon condition for the performance of that needs not be averred but that ought to be shewed on the other part and so it seemeth that as wel for the point of falsitie in the recital as also in the not performing of the consideration that the lease is void and the Plantiffe should have judgement which was entred accordingly Snig Baron was of opmion against all the other Barons and he held that
the said resolution and he said that the case concerning parcel of the land contained in S. the Deed come in question in Parliament in the 43. Eliz. and it was then commanded that the Deed should be inrolled and also he compared it to a case put in Shelleys Case that the heir shall have land as by discent from his father although that the conveyance be not inrolled in the life of the father also he said that the Queen dieth not as to her body politick to the third point he said that the confirmation need not to be inrolled for it passeth nothing and is but a bare assent and therefore differeth from the case of Patron and Ordinary and of a disseissee for the disseisee hath right to grant end the Patron and Ordinary have interest in R. but Bishops are seised in their own right and therefore their lease wants the approbation only of the Dean and Chapter and he vouched Cook lib. 3. the Dean and Chapter of Norwiches Case and the writ of Sine Assensu Capituli in the Register proveth it for the tit confirmation pl. 30. observes and Littleton in the end of his chap. of discontinuance saith that a parson may charge the Gleab by the assent of the Patron and Ordinary and the opinion of Brook in the case of the 33. of H. 8. tit confirmation pl. 30. agreeth to this opinion and so are some opinions in the 7. H 4. fo 15. 16. and he said that this point was adjudged accordingly in the first of Ma. but he had not the record thereof and therefore he would not insist upon it and he vouched 1. and 2. of Ma. Dyer fo 106. and Cook lib 6. fo 15. Hodges Case that the acceptance of the Patron is good enough to make a confirmation to the fourth point he said that the confirmation was good notwithstanding it be before the inrolment of the lease for the lease shall stay his operation until all the Ceremonies be used for the perfection of the estate and he vouched Littleton fo 122. and 6. E. 6. Dyer fo 69. where a parson made a lease to commence after his death the Patron and Ordinary in the life of the parson confirmed it and this is good and he vouched also Anne Maiowes Case Cook lib. 1. where the father confirmed the sons grant when he had but a possibilitie and yet good and he vouched Dyer 2. 3. Eliz. fo 194. where a grant was incertain and the inception was before the confirmation after makes it good and therefore he said if disseissor and disseissee bargain land although it be but a confirmation of the disseisee which may be well enough without inrolment of the Deed by a bare delivery yet this shall hinder the operation until the inrolment of the Deed which should pass the estate from the disseisor and by Cook lib. 5. Fitz. Case it appeareth that one part of the assurance shall stay his operation until another part hath his perfection and therefore he concluded that here the confirmation in judgement of Law should stay his operation until the lease be inrolled which passed the estate see the argument of Serjeant Nichols to the contrary and also the argument of Thomas Crew in Easter Term and Trin. 7. Jac. Pasch 7. Jac. in the Exchequer Catesbies Case Pasch 7. Jac. in the Exchequer TAnfield chief Baron said that in the year 31. Eliz it was adjudged in Goar and Peers Case if Tenant for life infeoffe A. and his heirs to the use of the feoffee and his heirs during the life of the feoffor that this is a forfeiture because these words during the life of the feoffor shall be but to the use limited and he put the case which Serjeant Nichols put at the Bar of the Lady Catesby which was that a man suffered a recovery to the use of William Catesby and Anne his wife and of the longer liver of them and of the Executors of William for forty years if one Elizabeth Catesby should so long live William Catesby dies and the reversion came to the King by forfeiture and he pretended that Elizabeth Catesby being dead the estate is also determined in regard that these words if Elizabeth shall so long live refer to all the estate but Curia avisari vult It was said by the chief Baron that if a man plead a deed in writing and the other partie do not pray Oyer the same Term he shall not have Oyer in another Term in the Common Pleas but in the Kings Bench Oyer shall be granted in another Term. It was found by office that Elizabeth Bowes was convicted of Recusancy in 35. Eliz. and that a lease for years was made unto her in the year 36. Eliz. in trust and that she had conveyed this lease over according to the trust and a question was demanded if the King shall have this term or not for her Recusancy and it seemed that he shall because she is not capable nor lyable of any trust and therefore the conveyance made by the Recusant was as if it had been without any compulsion by reason of the trust If a Coppiholder of the Kings Mannor pretendeth prescription for a Modus decimandi against the Parson the right of Tithes shall be tried in the Exchequer and a prohibition was granted to the Ecclesiastical Court in this Case Owen Ratliff was lessee for years of the King rendring rent and he assigned his Term to Sir Thomas Chichley in trust for payment of the debts of the said Owen Ratliff and after the Debts were paid Chichley resigned it but in the interim between the assignment and the resignment divers rents incurred to the King and the Barons agreed that these arretages in Law may be levied upon the land of Chichley notwithstanding the trust but because the Court was informed that the Executors of Ratliff had assets and continued farmer of the farm at that time they compelled him to pay it and being present in Court they imprisoned him untill payment made and allowed him his remedy by English Bill against Chichley and that by the agreement Chichley was to have paid the rents to the King The Earl of Cumberlands Case IT was found by diem clausit extremum after the death of G. Eearl of Cumberland that King E. 2. gave to the Lord Clifford inter alia the Mannor of Skipton in Craven to him and to the heirs of his body and found further the discent in a direct line until the time of H. 6. and that the first Donee and all others to whom it descended were seised prout lex postulat without determining any estate in certain in the Donee and they found that H. 6. by sufficient conveyance concessit Revertionem nec non manerium de Skipton in Craven to Thomas Lord Clifford to whom the estate given by E. 2. was descended and his heirs by force whereof the said Thomas was seised prout lex postulat and found the discent to the