that it shall be then holden as if no Adjournment had been the Essâ—ines had been the first day of Tres Trin. and the full Term had not been untill the fourth day which was the last day of the Term quod nota and so it was of the Adjournment which hapned first at Westminster and afterwards at Hertford from Michaelmas Term now last past Michaelmas Term 35 and 36 Eliz. Gravenor versus Brook and others 1. IN an Ejectione firmae by Edward Gravenor Plaintiff against Richard Brook and others Defendants the case appeared to be this Henry Hall was seised in his Demesne as of Fee according to the custom of the Mannor of A. in the County of D. of certain customary Tenements holden of the said Mannor called Fairchildes and Preachers c. In the third year of Henry the 8th before which time the customary Tenements of the said Mannor had alwaies been used to be granted by Copy of Court Roll of the said Mannor in Fee-simple or for life or years but never in Fee-tail but then the said Henry Hall surrendred his said Copy-hold Land to the use of Joane his eldest Daughter for her life the remainder to John Gravenor the eldest Son of the said Joane and to the Heirs of his body the Remainder to Henry Gravenor her other Son and the Heirs of his body the Remainder to the right Heirs of the said Henry Hall for ever wherupon in 3 H. 8. at the Court then there holden a grant was made by Copy of Court Roll accordingly and Seisin given to the said Joane by the Lord accordingly Henry Hall died having Issue the said Joane and one Elizabeth and at the Court holden within the said Mannor 4 H. 8. the death of the said Henry Hall was presented by the Homage and that the said Daughters were his Heirs and that the Surrender made as before was void because it was not used within the said Mannor to make Surrenders of Estates tails and therupon the said Homage made division of the said Land and limited Fairchilds for the purparty of the said Joane and Preachers for the purparty of the said Elizabeth and Seisin was granted to them accordingly Elizabeth died seised of her said part after which 33 H. 8. Margaret her Daughter was found Heir to her and admitted Tenant to this part after which Joane dyed seised of the said Tenements as the Law will And after the said Margaret takes to Husband one John Adye who with his said wife surrendred his said part to the use of the said John Adye and of his said wife and of their Heirs and afterwards the said Margaret died without Issue and the said John Adye held the part of his said wife and surrendred it to the use of the said Richard Brook and of one John North and their Heirs who were admitted accordingly after which the said John Gravenor died without Issue and now the said Henry Gravenor was sole Heirs to him and also to the said Henry Hall who had Issue Edward Gravenor and dyed the said Edward entred into the said Lands called Preachers and did let it to the Plaintiff upon whom the said Richard Brook and the other Defendants did re-re-enter and eject him And all this appeareth upon a speciall Verdict And by Clench and Gawdy an Estate tail cannot be of Copyhold Land unlesse it be in case where it hath been used for the Statute of Donis conditionalibus shall not enure to such customary Lands but to Lands which are at common Law and therfore an Estate tail cannot be of these customary Lands but in case where it hath been used time out of mind and they said that so it hath been lately taken in the Common Bench But they said that the first remainder limited to the said John Gravenor here upon the death of the said John was a good Fee-simple conditional which is well warrantes by the custom to demise in Fee for that which by custom may be demised of an Estate in Fee absolute may also be demised of a Fee-simple conditionall or upon any other limitation as if I. S. hath so long Issue of his body and the like but in such a case no Remainder can be limited over for one Fee cannot remain over upon another and therfore the Remainder to the said Henry was void But they said that for all the life of the said John Gravenor nothing was in the said Elizabeth which could descend from her to the said Margaret her Daughter or that might be surrendred by the said Margaret and her Husband and therfore the said Margaret dying without Issue in the life time of the said John Gravenor who had the Fee-simple conditionall nothing was done which might hinder the said Edward Son to the said Henry Gravenor of his Entry and therfore the said Plaintiff ought to have his Iudgment to recover for they took no regard to that which the Homage did 4th year of Hen. 8. But Fennor and Popham held that an Estate tail is wrought out of Copy-hold Land by the equity of the Statute of Donis conditionalibus for otherwise it cannot be that there can be any Estate tail of Copyhold Land for by usage it cannot be maintained because that no Estate tail was known in Law before this Statute but all were Fee-simple and after this Statute it cannot be by usage because this is within the time of limitation after which an usage cannot make a prescription as appeareth 22 23 Eliz. in Dyer And by 8 Eliz. a Custom cannot be made after Westm 2. And what Estates are of Copyhold land appeareth expresly by Littleton in his Chapter of Tenant by Copyhold c. And in Brook Title Tenant by Copyhold c. 15 H. 8. In both which it appeareth that a Plaint lyeth in Copyhold Land in the nature of a Formedon in the Descender at common Law and this could not be before the Statute of Donis conditionalibus for such Land because that before that Statute there was not any Formedon in the Descender at common Law and therfore the Statute helps them for their remedy for intailed Land which is customary by equity Add if the Action shall be given by equity for this Land why shall not the Statute by the same equity work to make an Estate intail also of this nature of the Land We see no reason to the contrary and if a man will well mark the words of the Statute of Westm 2. cap. 1. he shall well perceive that the Formedon in Descender was not before this Statute which wills that in a new case a new remedy may be given and therupon sets the form of a Formedon in Descender But as to the Formedon in the Reverter it is then said that it is used enough in Chancery and by Fitzherbert in his Natura brevium the Formedon in the Descender is founded upon this Statute and was not at Common Law before And the reason is because these Copyholds are now become by usage to be
resolved by all the Iustices as he said that it shall passe and he said that himself was of this opinion also And to say that by grant of Land at Common Law the use had been raised out of the possessions of the Land which the Grantor then had and by it passe to the Bargainee and that it shall not be raised and passed to another by grant of Land in consideration of marriage which is a more valuable consideration then money is absurd and against all reason And for the solemnity Vses in such cases in respect of marriage were the cause that they alwaies were left as they were at Common Law and not restrained as the case of bargain and sale is which by Common intendment may be made more easily and secretly then that which is done in consideration of marriage which is alwaies a thing publike and notorious but it is not reasonable that every slight or accidentall speech shall make an alteration of any Vse As if a man ask of any one what he will give or leave to any of his Sons or Daughters for their advancement in marriage or otherwise for their advancement this shall be but as a bare speech or communication which shall not alter or change any Vse But where there is upon the Speech a conclusion of a Marriage between the friends of the parties themselves and that in consideration therof they shall have such Lands and for such an Estate there the Vse shall be raised by it and shall passe accordingly to the parties according to the conclusion which Fennor granted But by Popham If it may be taken upon the words spoken that the purpose was to have the Estate passe by way of making of an Estate as by way of Feoffment c. then notwithstanding the consideration expressed the use shall not change nor no Estate by it but at will untill the Livery made therupon And therfore if a man make a Deed of Feoffment with expresse consideration of marriage although the Deed hath words in it of Dedi Concessi with a Letter of Attorney to make Livery therupon there untill Livery made nothing passe but at will because that by the Warrant of Attorney it appeareth the full intent of the parties was that it shall passe by way of Feoffment and not otherwise if it be of Land in possession And if it be of Land in Lease not untill Attornment of Tenants which was granted by all the Iustices But if a man in consideration of money makes a Deed of Gift Grant Bargain and Sale of his Lands to another and his Heirs by Deed indented with a Letter of Attorny to make Livery if Livery be therupon made before Inrolement there it hath been adjudged to passe by the Livery and not by the Inrolement But by Popham where Land is to passe in possession by Estate executed two things are requisite The one the grant of the said Land the other the Livery to be made therupon for by the bare Grant without Livery it doth not passe as by way of making of an Estate And this is the cause that such solemnity hath been used in Liveries to wit if it were of a Messuage to have the people out of it and then to give Seisin to the party by the Ring of the door of the House and of Land by a Turff and a Twig and the like which may be notorious Yet I agree it shall be a good Livery to say to the party Here is the Land enter into it and take it to you and your Heirs for ever or for life or in tail as the case is And albeit Livery by the View may be made in such manner yet by the sealing of the Deed of Grant upon the Land or by grant of it upon the Land without Livery nothing passe but at will But if therupon one party saith to the other after the Grant or upon it Here is the Land enter upon it and take it according to the Grant this is a good Livery But he ought to say this or somthing which amounts to so much or otherwise it shall not passe by the bare Grant of the Land although it be made upon the Land Clench said That when Thomas said to Eustace Stand forth here I do give to thee and thine Heirs these Lands this amounts to a Grant and a Livery also and by the words of the Reservation of the Estate to himself and his wife for their lives in this the Law shall make an use in the said Thomas and his wife for their lives so that by such means it shal enure as if he had reserved the use therof to him and his wife and so it shall enure to them as it may by the Law according to his intent without doing prejudice to the Estate passed to the said Eustace And afterwards Term Mich. 36 37 Eliz. the Case was again disputed amongst the Iustices and then Popham said That the Case of Baâ—gains and Sales of Lands in Cities as London c. as appeareth in Dyer 6. Eliz. are as they were at Common Law To which all the Iustices agreed and therfore shall passe by Bargain by parole without writing And by Bayntons Case in 6 7 Eliz. it is admitted of every side that an Vse was raised out of a Possession at Common Law by Bargain and Sale by parole and otherwise to what purpose was the Statute of Inrolements and by the same case it is also admitted now to passe by parole upon a full agreement by words in consideration of Marriage or the continuance of Name or Blood For it is agreed there that the consideration of nature is the most forceable consideration which can be and agreed also that a bare Covenant by writing without consideration will not change an Vse therfore the force therof is in the consideration of which the Law hath great respect And therfore the Son and Heir apparant ex assensu patris onely may at the door of the Church endow his wife of his Fathers Land which he hath in Fee and this is good by Littleton although the Son hath nothing in it wherby an Estate passe to the wife which is more then an Vse Nature is of so strong consideration in the Law And therupon after advice Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff the Roll of this appeareth in Banco Regis 1 Hill 35. Eliz. Rot. 355. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought and the Iudgment aforesaid reversed in the point of Iudgment in the Exchequer by the Statute of 27 Eliz. Kettle versus Mason and Esterby 6. IN a second deliverance between Joh. Kettle Plaintiff and George Mason Vide this case Coke lib. 1. 146 c. and Francis Esterby Avowants the case appeared to be this Thomas May was seised of the Mannor of Sawters and Hawlin in the County of Kent in his Demesne as of Fee and being so therof seised enfeoffed Thomas Scot and John Fremling and their Heirs
said Queen her Heirs and Successors for ever which Deed was acknowledged the 25th day of March 32 Eliz. and enrolled in the Chancery the 12th day of May in thâ— same year And there was a Proviso in the same Deed that if the said Robert Bret shall pay to the Queen at the receipt of the Exchequer 5 s. of lawfull money that then the said Gift Grant Bargain and Sale shall be void and that from thence-forward it shall be lawfull for the said Robert Bret and his Heirs to re-enter into the said Tenements and in the mean time between the Inrolement of this Deed And the said 14th day of Octob. to wit the 15th day of September 32 Eliz. the said Arthur upon the said Tenements in North-petherton entred and claimed the Reversion therof in the right of the said Elianor his wife by reason of the death of the said Christian And that afterwards to wit the 30th day of February 33 Eliz. the said Robert Bret to redeem the said Tenements out of the Queen paid the said 5 s. at the receipt of the Exchequer which payment is there recorded and enrolled accordingly after which in September 34 Eliz. the said Arthur and Elianor sued out a speciall Livery of the said Elianor out of the hands of the Queen of all the Lands seised into the hands of the Queen by reason of the Nonage of the said John Mallet And afterwards in the same meneth of September 34 Eliz. the said Arthur and Elianor sued out another speciall Livery as Heir to the said Christian of all the Lands which were in the Queens hands by the death of the said Christian And it was further found that the said John Clark and Elianor Middleton died after the 5 s. paid as before and that the said Robert Bret entred the 8th day of October 34 Eliz. and then made the Lease to the Plaintiff upon which the Defendant by commandment of the said Arthur and with him entred upon the Plaintiff and the generall question was Whether the entry of the Defendant were lawfull But no ouster of the Plaintiff was found And by Clench and Fennor a Fee-simple passe at Common Law by a Fine levied by him in Reversion or Remainder in Tail because a Fine is said to be a Feoffment of Record and by their entry and Feoffment a Fee-simple passe in such a case at Common Law But by Popham and Gaudy a Fee-simple doth not passe nor nothing but that which Tenant in Tail may lawfully grant over which is for his life in which he said that Littleton was plain in all cases of Grant although it be by Fine and a Fee-simple does not passe at Common Law but where the Fee may be drawn out of him who had the Reversion or Remainder in Fee therupon if such a Reversion or Remainder had been in a stranger which had not been in this case if the Reversion or Remainder had been in a stranger and therfore a Discontinuance cannot be of an Intail where the Reversion or Remainder is in the King But by them all however it was at Common Law it is cleer upon the Statute of Fines that a Fee-simple determinable passe by such a Fine as soon as the Fine is levied because every Fine by presumption of Law shall be taken to be such wherupon proclamation is made untill the contrary therof appeareth to the Court. And this is the reason why a Quid juris clamat is at this day maintained upon such a Fine which was not at Common Law before this Statute or otherwise it will never lye And so it was holden lately in the Common Bench in the case of Iustice Wimondham and yet we may see that the Quid juris clamat ought to be brought before that the Fine be engrossed wherby it is manifest that now a Fee-simple shall passe by the Fine levied for the possibility of the Proclamations to wit that the Proclamations shall not be made and to this Fee-simple the Proclamations shall enure to make a bar to the Estate-tail But such a Fine by Popham and Gawdy was not any wrong to him who had the Reversion or Remainder in Fee being levied by him who had a mean Reversion or Remainder in Tail depending upon an Estate for life or in Tail precedent And it is cleer that the Proclamations do not make the Estate but enure to the Estate made by the Fine for if an Estate be granted in Reversion for life or in Tail by Fine with Proclamations by such a Tenant in Tail in Reversion or Remainder the Proclamations work to this Estate and no further for alwaies the Estate passe by the Fine and the Proclamations make the Bar according to the Estate which passe by the Fine before But by Clench Gawdy and Fennor the Fee-simple which was in the Queen after the Fine levied as before was divested by means of this claim made upon the possession of the Queen lo that the Proclamations following are of no force to hurt the Estate tail for they said in divers cases a possession may be invested out of the Queen without Office Petition or Monstrans de droit as the case is where a man devise that his Land shall be sold and in the mean time before the sale the possession of the Land cometh to the Queen and afterwards the Land is sold according to the Will the Vendee enter there the Land passe from the Queen therby and is divested and so in many other cases And in all cases where the Queens Estate is determined the Subject may enter into the Land without Office or Ouster le main c. And they said if it had been in the possession of a common person that by such a claim the force of the Fine had been defeated and this appeareth by the case between Smith and Stapleton in the Commentaries where it is holden that where a Fine is levied with Proclamations by Tenant in Tail of an Advowson Rent or Tithes by claim made by the Issue in Tail before the Proclamations are passed where the Tenant in Tail is dead the same is defeated and that the Proclamations passing afterwards shall not be of force to bar the Intail And they said that the conveyance therof to the Queen after the Fine levied doth not make it to be in worse case And admit it will not serve against the Queen yet the claim will serve against Bret when he had entred by the performance of the Condition And Clench and Gawdy said that Bret shall not take advantage of this covenous Deed made by himself of very purpose to bar the party who had right and to put him without remedy no more then where the Disseisor enfeoff his Father who dies seised he shall not take advantage of this descent or if he who hath cause of Action to recover Lands by Covin causeth another to enter into the Lands to the intent to recover against him and does it accordingly for the Covin the Recovery shall
to attend and be assistant to the Iustices Sheriffs or other Ministers of the King in the doing of it 3. AT the same time it was also resolved by them all except Walmsley Fennor and Owen in the Case of one Richard Bradshaw and Robert Burton who with others lately by word entred themselves into an agreement one with another to rise and put themselves into Armes and so to go from one Gentlemans house to another and so from house to house to pull down Inclosures generally that this so appearing by their own confession or by two Witnesses according to the Statute is high Treason by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 1. The words of which Statute are That if any intend to levy War against the Queen and this maliciously advisedly and expresly declare or utter by any words or sayings that this shall be high Treason For all agreed that Rebellion of Subjects against the Queen hath Rebellion of Subjects high Treason been alwaies high Treason at the Common Law for the Statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 1. is that levying of War within the Realm against the King is Treason and Rebellion is all the War which a Subject can make against the King But Walmsley and the others with him said that the Statute of 1 Mar cap. 12. 10. That if any to the number of twelve or more assemble themselves to the intent to pull down Inclosures Pales and the like with force and continuing together after proclamation according to the Statute to go away by the space of an hour or do any of the Offences mentioned in the Statute that this is Felony So that if these Actions had been Treason at the Common Law it had been to no purpose to have made it Felony And it seemed to them that the resistance ought to be with force to the Queen before that such Acts shall be said Treason But all the other Iustices agreed and so it was put in ure lately in the case of the Prentices of London that if any assemble themselves with force to alter the Laws or to set a price upon Victualls or to lay violent hands upon the Magistrate as upon the Major of London and the like and with force attempt to put it in action that this is Rebellion and Treason at Common Law and yet this Statute of 1 Mariae makes it in such a case but Felony And they put a diversity between the cases of pulling down Inclosures Pales c. comprised in the Statute of 1 Mar. for those are to be understood where diverse to the number of twelve or more pretending any or all of them to be injured in particular as by reason of their common or other Interest in the Land inclosed and the like and assembling to pull it down forcibly and not to the cases where they have a generall dislike to all manner of Inclosures and therfore the assembling in a forcible manner and with Armes to pull them down where they have any Interest wherby they were in any particular to be annoyed or grieved is not Treason but the case here tending to a generality makes the act if it had been executed to be high Treason by the câ—uâ—se of the Common Law And therfore the intention appearing as the case is here it is Treason by the Stâ—tute of 13. aforesaid Periam in some manner doubted of the principall case but to intend to rise with force to alter the Laws to set price upon any Victuals or to use force against a Magistrate for executing his Office of Iustice and the like he said that they were cleerly Treason by the Statute of 13. aforesaid if it may appear by expresse words or otherwise as the said Statute mentions for all these tend against the Queen her Crown and Dignity and therfore shall be as against the Queen her self And if it had been put in practice it had been Treason at the Common Law Here ends the LORD POPHAM'S REPORTS An addition of certain Select CASES in the time of KING JAMES and KING CHARLES Trin. 15. Jac. In the Kings Bench entred Hill Jac. Rot. 194. Brooks Case IN an Ejectione firmae brough by one Brook against Brook the Case was thus Iohn Wright a Copyholder in Fee 10 Eliz. surrendred his Land into the hands of the Lord by the hands of Tenants according to the Custom c. without saying to whose use the Surrender should be And at the next Court the said Iohn Wright was admitted Habendum to him and his Wife in Tail the remainder to the right Heirs of Iohn Wright and the Wife of Iohn Wright now Defendant was seised from the time of Where upon surrender of Copyhold land no use is limited to whole use iâ— shall be the admittance untill this day And it was objected by the Counsell of the Plaintiff that the surrender was void because no use was limitted and therfore by constitution of Law ought to be to the use of the Surrender as if a Feoffment be made and no Use limited it shall be to the Use of the Feoffor or as it is in Sir Edward Cleers Case Coke lib. 6. 18. If a Feoffment be made by one to the use of his last Will he hath the use in the mean time 2. That the admittance was not available to passe an Estate to the Wife for she was not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and the Office of an Habendum is to limit the Estate and not the person and therfore it is said in Throgmorten and Tracies Case in Plowd com That if one be named to take an Estate in the Habendum where he was not named at all in the Premisses this is not good But it was resolved by the whole Court for the first point that the subsequent Act shâ—ll explain the Surrender for Quando abest Provisio partis adest provisio legis And when the Copyholder accepts a new admittance the Law intends that the Surrender generally made was to such an Vse as is specified in the admittance and the Lord is only as an Instrument to convey the Estate and as it were put in trust to make such an admittance â—s he who surrenders would hâ—ve him to make And Crook Iustice said Fides adhibita fidem obligat For the second point it was also agreed by the Court that the Wife shall take by this admittance albeit she were not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and they agreed that in Feoffments and Grants the party that is not named in the Premisses shall not take by the Habendum and therfore Throgmorton and Tracies Case as to this point is good Law But this case of a Copyhold is like to the case of a Will or to the case of Frank-marriage in which it is sufficient to passe an Estate albeit the party be only named in the Habendum and if it should be otherwise the Estates of many Copyholders would be subverted And so they resolved that Iudg-should be
Issue a Son which selleth this Remainder and afterwards I. S. dyed this Son being his Heir notwithstanding his Sale he shall have this Remainder not his Grantee because it was not in him at the time of his Grant but by a matter which cometh Ex post facto to wit the death of his Father and afterwards Iudgment was given in the first case that the Grantee shal have the term granted to him by the Husband and that the Wife shall not have the term during this Leese Hunt Versus Gateler Mich. 34. and 35 Eliz. in Commun Banco IN a Replevin between Hunt Plaintiff and Gateler Avowant in the Common Pleas which was adjorned for difficulty into the Exchequer Chamber the Case was thus Tenant in tail Remainder in Fee he in Remainder in Vide this case Cook lib. 1. 61. by the name of Capeâ—s case Fee grants a Rent-charge in Fee out of the same Land to begin after the Estate tail determined Tenant in Tail suffer a common Recovery with a Voucher over to the use of the sayd Hunt in Fee and dyed without Issue inheritable to the intail and whether Hunt shall now hold the Land charged with the Rent was the question and after that it had long depended and was many times argued in the Common Pleas and Exchequer Chamber at Hertford Term it was at last resolved by all the Iustices and Barons unanimously that the sayd Rent charge wss gone by the Recovery although the Estate tail was expired because that he which is in is in under this Intail And therefore Popham sayd suppose thâ—t the Tenant in tail himself before the Recovery had granted a Rent charge out of the same Land or had made a Lease for yeers or had acknowledged a Statute all those had been good and to be executed against him which cometh in under the Recovery notwithstanding that the Estate tayl had been determined for want of an heir inheritable to the intail for he which recovereth cannot lay that he against whom he recovered had but an Estate in tail and if his Lease remain yet good as all agreed it did how can the Lease a Rent granted by him in the Remainder be good also for the one and the other cannot stand together and therefore all the Leases Charges or Statutes acknowledged or made by him in the Remainder are gon and avoided by the Recovery had against Tenant in tail To which opinion all the other agreed and Popham sayd further That he in the Remainder upon an Estate tail cannot by any means plead to defend his Remainder unless the Tenant will as by vouching of him and therefore shall be bound by the Act of Tenant in Tail where the Estate it self is bound as here it is by the Voucher and then they which come in by him in the Remainder by way of Lease Charge or Statute which are not so much favoured in Law as Tenant in tail himself be in better condition then he in the Remainder himself is for he in the Remainder upon an Estate tail cannot put more into the Mouth of the Lessee or Grantee to defend their Estates then he himself could have to defend his Remainder and this is the reason that such a Termer or Grantee shall never falsifie the Recovery had against Tenant in tail as the Grantee or Termer shall do which cometh in under Tenant in tail against whom the Recovery was had for there as the Tenant in tail may plead to defend his Possession and Estate so may his Termer or Grantee of a Rentcharge do for by the Demise or Grant made the Tenant in tail hath put all the Pleas into their mouthes for their Interests which he himself had to defend his Right and Possession which they may plead for the time to defend their Possessions and Rights as well as the Tenant in tail himself may do and this is the reason that such may falsifie Recoveries against their Lessors or Grantors if they be not had upon the meer right Paramount which he that cometh in by such a Remainder as before cannot do for such a one in Remainder cannot be received to defend his Right but his mouth is meerly foreclosed to do it and by the same reason are all those which come in by such men foreclosed to defend their Interests or Estates and upon this Audgement was given in the same Tearm in the common Pleas. Gibbons versus Maltyard and Martin IN an Ejectione firmae brought in the Kings Bench by John Gibbons Vide this case in Cook lib. 8. 130 Thetford Scholies case Plaintiff upon a Demise made by Edward Peacock the Son of Lands in Croxton in the County of Norfolk against Thomas Maltyard and John Martin upon a speciall verdict the case appeared to be thus to wit that Sir Richard Fulmerston Knight was seised of the sayd Lands amongst others holden in soccage in his Demesne as of Fee and being so seised by his last Will in Writing made 9 Eliz. Ordained that a Devise shall be made by his Executors that a Preacher shall be found for ever to preach the Word of God in the Church of Saint Maries in Thetford four times in the year and to have for his Labour ten shillings for every Sermon And further he devised to his Executors and their heirs certaine Lands and Tenements in Thetford aforesaid to this intent and upon this condition that they or the Survivor of them within seven years after his decease should procure of the Queens Highness to erect a free Grammar School in Thetford for ever to be had and kept in a house by them to be erected upon part of the sayd Land that they shal assure three of the said ienements for the house and Chamber of the Schoolmaster and Vsher and their Successors for ever and for the other tonement that they shall make an assurance of it for the Habitation of font poor people two men and two women for ever And for the better maintenance of the sayd Preacher Schoolmaster Vsher and Poore people he devised amongst others his sayd tenements in Croxton to his Executors for ten years for the performance of his Will and after this he devised them to Sir Edward Cleer and Frances his Wife the Daughter and Heir of the sayd Sir Richard and to the Heirs of the sayd Sir Edward upon Condition that if the sayd Sir Edward his Heires or Assignes before the end of the sayd ten years shall assure Lands or Tenements in possession to the value of five and thirty pounds a year to the sayd Executors or the Survivor of them their Heirs and Assignes or to such persons their heirs or Successors as his sayd Executors or the Survivor of them shall name or assigne for and towards the maintenance of the sayd Preacher Schoolmaster and Vsher in the sayd School house c. and for the releif of the sayd poor people in the one of the sayd houses according to the Ordinance as he
35 E. Rot. 258. And Popham said further in this case that to erect an Hospitall by the name of an Hospitall in the County of S. or in the Bishopprick of B. and the like is not good because he is bound to a place too large and incertain But a Colledge erected in Accademia Cantabrig or Oxon. is good and sâ—me are so founded because it tends but to a particular place as a City Town c. King versus Bery and Palmer 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by William King against John Bery and William Palmer Defendants for two Messuages and certain Lands in Halstead in the County of Leicester upon a Demise alledged to be made by Dorothy Pool and Robert Smith the case upon a speciall Verdict was this The said Dorothy was Tenant for life of the said Tenants the Remainder over to the said Robert Smith and his Heirs and they being so seised made the Lease in the Declaration upon which the Action was brought And per curiam the Lease found by the Verdict doth not warrant the Lease alledged in the Declaration for although they joyned in the Demise yet during the life of the said Dorothy it is her Demise and not the Demise of the said Robert Smith but as his confirmation for that time for he hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land during the life of the said Dorothy but after the death of the said Dorothy then it shall be said to be the Domise of the said Robert Smith and not before because untill this time Smith hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land And in a more strong case If Tenant for life and he in the Reversion in Fee make a Gift in tail for the life of Tenant for life it shall be said to be his Gift but after his death it shall be said the Gift of him in the Reversion and if the Estate tail had expired during the life of the said Tenant for life he shall have the Land again in his former Estate and there shal be no forfeiture in the case because he in the Reversion of the immediate Estate of Inheritance had joyned in it and therfore hath dispensed with that which otherwise had been a meer forfeiture of the Estate for life wherby it was awarded by the Court that the Plaintif take nothing by his Bill in 33 34 Eliz. Rot. And the Judgment is entred Hill 34. Eliz. Ret. 72. 3. In this Term I hapned to see a Case agreed by the Iustices in 3. 4. Eliz. which was this If a man make a Lease of two Barns rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry if the Tenant be at one of the Barns to pay the Rent and the Lessor at the other to demand the Rent and none be there to pay it that yet the Lessor cannot enter for the Condition broken because there was no default in the Tenant he being at one for it was not possible for him to be at both places together And upon this Case now remembred to the Iustices Popham Walmesley and Fennor said That perhaps also the Tenant had not money sufficient to have been ready to have paid it at either of the said places but it is sufficient for him to have and provide one Rent which cannot be at two places together And by the Case reported here also If Lands and Woods are demised together the Rent ought to be demanded at the Land and not the Woood because the Land is the more worthy thing and also more open then the Wood And therfore by the three Iustices aforesaid Rent ought not to be demanded in any private place of a Close as amongst Bushes in a Pit or the like nor in the open and most usuall passage therof as at a Stile Gate and the like 4. Vpon a Prohibition sued out of the Kings Bench the Case appeared to be this The late Lord Rich Father to the now Lord Rich devised to his Daughter for her advancement in marriage 1500. upon condition that she marry with the consent of certain friends and deviseth further that if his Goods and Chattels are not sufficient to pay his Debts and Legacies that then there shall be 200 l. a year of his Lands sold to supply it and dies making the now Lord Rich his Executor his Goods and Chattels not being sufficient to pay the Debts of the Testator as was averred the said Daughter married with a Husband against the will of those who were put in trust to give their assents and the Husband and the Wife sued in the Spirituall Court for the Legacy And it was surmised that they would not allow the proofs of the said now Lord Rich exhihited to prove the payment of the Debts of his Testator and further that they would charge him for the sale of the Land upon which matter the Prohibition was granted to the Delegates before whom the matter depended and now consultation was prayed in the case Vpon which it was affirmed by a Doctor of the Civill Law that they will allow the proofs for the payment of the Debts according to our Law and that the Legacy shall not be paid untill the Debs are satisfied But he said that by the Law if the Executor do not exhibit his Inventory but neglect it for a year or more that then if any omission or default be in the true value of the Inventory exhibited that then such on Executor for this default shall pay all the Legacies of his Testator of what value soever they are not respecting the Debts or the value of the Goods or Chattels how small soever the omission or default be in the Inventory And so he said was the case of the now Sir Richard S. who did not bring in the Inventory for four years after the death of the Testator and that in the Inventory exhibited the values of every thing were found to be too small and therfore to be charged by their Law albeit he hath not Goods and Chattels sufficient of the Testators To which it was answered that this was quite without reason for by such means every Subject of the Realm may be utterly defeated if he take upon him the charge of an Executorship And if this shall be admitted no man will take upon him the Execution of the Will of any and by such a means none will have their Wills performed which shall be too inconvenient And they said further that in as much as Debts are to be proved by the Common Law of the Realm those of the Ecclesiasticall Courts ought to admit in the proof therof such proofs as our Law allows and not according to the precisenesse of their Law And although by their Law such a Condition as before being annexed to a Legacy is void because that marriage oughr to be free without Coercion yet where we are to judge upon the point as we are here if the Execution happen to be charged because of the sale of Land and for
thing that is uncertain certain but shall serve as a Predict yet the words import that he had a Master and that his Master had a Cook to which all the Court agreed and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And another Action was brought for these words Scil. Thou hast sacrificed Thou hast sacrificed thy child to the Devill thy Child to the Devill and adjudged that the words were actionable Mich. 15. Iac. In the Kings Bench. Lee versus Brown IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Lee against Brown the Case was this Whether copyhold Lands may be intailed Tenant in Tail of Copyhâ—ld Land surrendred the same into the hands of the Lord to the use of I. S. wherupon two points did arise 1. Whether Copyhold Land be within the Statute of Donis conditionalibus so that iâ— may be intailed 2. Whether the Intail may be cuâ— off by the surrender Doderidge Iustice said as to the first point that it hath been a great doubt whether it may be intailed but the common and better opinion was that by the same Statute co-operating with the custom it may be intailed and with this agrees Heydons case in my Lord Cokes 3. Report and so was the opinion An Intail of copyhold lâ—nd nâ—t to be cut off by â—urrender unlesse by speciall custom of the Court. And for the second point their opinion also was that it could not be cut off by surrender unlesse it were by speciall custom and they directed the Iury accordingly And it was said to maintain this custom it ought to be shewn that a Formedon had been brought upon such a Surrender and Iudgment given that it doth not lye yet it was agreed that it was a strong proof of the custom that they to whose use such Surrenders had been made had enjoyed the Land against the Issues in Tail And it was said by the Counsell of the Defendant that there was a Verdict for them before in the same case which they could prove by witnesses but the Court would not allow such a proof because it was matter of Record which ought to be shewn forth In the same Term in the Common Pleas. May versus Kett. AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz. Thou hast Words Thou hast stoln my Corn out of my Earn stoln my Corn out of my Barn And it was moved in Arrest of Iuâ—gment because he had not said how much he had stoln and perhaps it was of small value and yet it was adjudged that the Action would lye for it is at least petit Larceny But if he had said that he had stoln his Corn generally it had not been actionable for it might have been growing and then it had been but a Trespasse The same Term in the Star Chamber Riman versus Bickley and others IOhn Riman exhibited a Bill in the Star Chamber against Thomas Bickley and Anne his Wife Dr. Thorn Mr Goulding and others Defendants the said Anne was first married to Devenish Riman the Plaintiffs Son and between them were many â—ars and disâ—greemâ—nts and the said Devenish was much given to drinking and other Vices and divers times did beat and abuse his Wife and was also jealous of the saiâ— Thomas Bickley and his Wife being at a certain time at Supper with Dr. Thorn Goulding and others spake such words as these having communication thâ—t her Husband did beat and abuse her to wit That she heard that his Father had that quality and being once whipt for it was the better ever after and that if she thought it would do her Husband any goâ—d she would willingly bestow 40 s. on some body to give him a whipping wherupon Gâ—ulding said that he would give him a Medâ—cine for his Mâ—lâ—dy and within two daies after he came in the night in womâ—ns apparrell with a Weapon under his Cloak and with a Rod and wenâ— into the House and Chamber of the said Devenish and would have whipped him and in striving together there was some hurt done on either side but Gâ—ulding not being able to effect his purpose fled and this was conceived to be by the procurement of Anne his wife And not long after Devenish fell sick and sent to his said wife for certain necessaries which she would not send him and presently after Devenish died and she refused to come to his buriall And although it were much disliked that Devenish should abuse his Wife in such uncivill manner as to strike and beat her and as Coke late chief Iustice said it is not lawfull by the Act Military for one man to strike another in the presence of Ladies yet it was resolved by the whole Court that it was a great misde meanor in the Wife and uncivill and undutifull carriage in her to do so to her Husband as they use to do to Children or fools to wit to give them the Whip and so to disgrace and take away the good name of her Husband which viz. A mans good name and his Childrens are the two things which make a man live to Posterity as was said by Sir Francis Bacon Lord keeper and the Court fiâ—ed the Wife 500 l. and it was said that Thomaâ— Bickley her noâ— Husband well deserved to pay this Fine because he was too familiar with her in the time of his Predecessor and as the Bishop of London said Devenish Rimon lay upon her hands and Thomas Bickley upon â—eâ— heart And to aggravate this matter a Letter was shown whiâ—h Devenish Rimon wrote to his Wife in which he called her Whoor and told her somwhat roundly of her faults and she wrote back to him in the Margeâ—t that he lyed and wished him to get a better Scribe for his next Lâ—â—ter for he was a Fool that wrote that wherin she called him Fool by craft And Goldings offence was accâ—vnted the greater because he was a Minister so that he was fined 500 l. also And Coke said that the course of this Court was that if any were fined who is not able to pay it Respondeat superior he that is the principall and chief agent therin must answer it for otherwise poor men might be made Instruments of great mischief who are not able to answer and the greater Offenders shall escape which the Lord Keeper confirmed And as to Doctor Thorn he was acquitted by all And the Bishop of London said that they had thought to have troad upon a Thorn and they gat a Thorn in their foot And by Coke if Devenish Rimon had died upon it it had been capitall in the Wife who procured it for it was an unlawfull Act. The same Term in the Kings Bench. Wescot versus Cotton THe case was this An Infant Executor upon an Action brought against Where an Infant Executor may declare by Attorney but not defend by Attorney but by Guardian him appeared by Attorney where he ought to appear by Guardian and it was resolved by the Court that this was Error for this
shall take effect by Livery where by Jurolist 49 Grants of the King  Where voyd 61 H HEire Where he shall be charged where not 152 153 I JMparlance  Not before a Declaration is entred 150 Imprisonment  Where justifiable 13 Indictments 107 134 210 taken before Coroners Where quashed 202 Upon the Statute of 8. H. 9. of forcible entry of copy-hold Lands 205 Inn-keepers 128 179 may detain a Horse untill he be satisfied for his meat 127 Inquisition  by the Coroner in case of death must bee Super visum corporis per sacramentum proborem legatum hominum where not hood 210 Indiciments  for stopping a Church-way where good 206 For being a Night-walker where good 208 If good in one part shall not be quashed  Joyâ—ture  where it may be waived 88 Joynt-tâ—nants â—6 Justâ—fication 13. 161 Justices of Peace of Gaol delivery and Nisiprius and their power 17 Judgmâ—nts 211. 212 by Nihil dicit 153 Where a Judgment reversed without Errour brought where noâ— 181 Entred in the Book as a Memorandum stayed by a subsequent order of Court 181 L. Lâ—ases 99. 106. 57 Void by Acceptance 9 Where in Reversion good 9 By Tenants for life or years to begin after his death 96 By a Copyholder upon a License 105 Where determined without entry 27. 53. 64. Lessce for life without impeachment â—f Wast may make a Lease excepting the Trees 193 What interest he hath in them ib. Leeâ— 141 Libels  Where a privaâ—e Letter is punishable aâ— a Libell 139 Legacies not payable but upon demand 104 Livery of Seâ—sin 103 Where words spâ—ken upon the 〈◊〉 do amount to a Livery 47 49 Liâ—â—se  〈◊〉 couâ—termandable 151 〈◊〉 a Copâ—holder to make Leaâ—es 150 〈◊〉  〈…〉 by Bargain and Sale by word 48 Lunatick  The Action must be brought in his name 141 M. MAgis dignum continet in se minus 35 Mayhem 115 Market Overt  Where the Sale shall be good where not 48 In a Scriviners Shop of Plate void 84 What kind of Sale alters the property 84 Monstrans of Deeds 113 Melius Inquirendum  Where it shall issue where not and what to be found upon it 54 55 Misnosme 151 In Grains 57 Of a Corporation 58 N. NOtice 37. 151. Of a condition of payment where to be given 12 Taken strongly against the Party 12 Of one Sheriff to another Sheriff of the persons in Execution 85. 86 Where requisite 136. 164 Nusance 166 Errecting a Dove-coat by a Freeholder no Nusance 141 O. OBligation 165. discharged by the act of God 98 not to be avoided by the act of the Obligor himself 40 To the use of a Feme Covert shall go to her Administrator not to the Husband 106 One forfeited revived and good 16 Office and Officers  Where an Office is void Ipso facto 28 Forfeited and by what act 117 Of his own wrong 149 Office Trove 25 26 Where Lands shall be in the King without Office 19 Relates 20 helps the King to the meane profits 30 Countervailes an Entry And where no entry is requisite in case of a common person There needs no Office found for the King 53 Where an Estate shall be devested out of the King without Office 63 Where not 64. without Returne or Monstrans de droit 64 Oyer  Where of a condition where not 202 P. PAtents 16 Where the Patentee shall take advantage of a condition to avoid a Lease 27 Void for the generality in the Grant 61 Void notwithstanding the words Ex certa sciaentia 61 Perjury where not punishable 144 Pleadings 28. 42. 101. 109. 152. 150. 160. 163. 206. Void because double Plea 113. 114 Nul tiel in rerum natura no Plea in appeal of Mayhem 115 Perpetuities 97. not tollerable 80 Plenarty by Induction of a Lay-man 37. Binds not the King 133 Proviso How to be construed 27 For a Limitation 53. 117. 118 119 Where repugnant and void 87 Possessio fratris 35 Principall Accessare 107 Prisoners Must be delivered over at the Gaol 85. 86 Presentation 132 Proofs What Proofs are to be allowed in the Ecclesiasticall Court 59 Priviledges  Grant by the Pope not allowable 157 Prescription 169 For Common for Vicinage good 101 Difference betwixt it and Custome and how to be taxed 201 â—roperty 38 What kind of Sale alters the property 84 â—rohibition 59. 126. 159. 197 For a Seat in the Church 140 Severall Prohibitions in one Cause 156 Prerogative 26 Q. QViâ— juris clamat 63 〈◊〉 warrantâ— 150. 180 Quare Impedit by an Executor for a disturbance in vite Testator 189. 190 191 R. RAvishment of Ward by an Executor 190. 191 Recovery 6. 5 Releaâ—es 28. 132 Exâ—cuted where avoided by Proviso 16 Of all demands will dischaâ—ge a rest in â—uturo 136 Relation 12 Of a Baâ—l 132 Of Entry of Judgement 132 Return of the Sheriff of a Capias upon a day not Dies faci good 205 Request 160. 211. 212 Upon payment upon a Contract is not necessary 211. 212 Remainder 97 in Fee not good upon a Lease for years 4. 82 Must take effect when the particular Estate determines for life wiâ—hout impeachment of Wast whether he may cut Trees duâ—ing the life of Tenant for life 196. 74 Rents  Rent and Pension all one in a Demand in a â—ecovery 23 Where the Executor shall have the rent upon a Lease of the Wâ—ves land 145 Restitution  Of an Alderman to his place 134 Of one put out of his Office 176 Reservatâ—on 145 195. how construed 17 Revivor 167 S. SAvingâ— in an Act of Paâ—liament how construed 17 Scire 〈◊〉  Lâ—es â—â—t against the Bail till a Capiaâ— be awarded of the Principall 186 Seals 161 Scandalum Magnatum 66 Sheriffs Oâ—e Sheriff must deliver over the Prisoners to the other by Indeâ—ture 85. 86 Surplusage  shall not abate a Writ 24 Surrender 9. 31. 84. 110. 125 129 Of the Husband of the land of the Wife no discontinuance 38 39 Of an Infant Copyholder void 39 Of an Alderman of his place 134 Of Tenant for life in remainder good without Deed 137 138 T. TAles  where awarded of Aliens 36 Tender  where not good to avoid a condition 20 Title  where must be made 1 2 Trusts not abridged 8 Their difference from Uses 77 Traverse 1. 101. 103. not necessary where there are two Affirmatives but where they do not agree 67 Traverse upon a Traverse 101 Circumstances not traversable 161 Treason 122 Triall  Of the same person upon another Indictment after Attainder upon a former Indictment 107 Transporting Corn 149 Trespasse 161 Where Vi armis e contr 192 Tithes 140 Where discharged by Prescription or Priviledge 156 De animalibus inutilibus animalibus utrilibus and the difference 197 Of Sheep and their pasturing wool c. 157 V. VErdict 19 void 202 Found for thâ— Deâ—endants because no 〈…〉 â—â—tred for one of them 145 Volenti non fit injuria 9 Use and Uses  What a Use is 71 How to be construed 3 Not to be abridged 8 Void upâ—n a tender 18 Raised by word upon a good consideration where good where not 47 49 Raiâ—ed upon Contracts 48 Considerations to raise Uses 48 49 A bare Covenant writing without consideration will not raise an Use 50 What persons cannot stand seised to Uses 72 Uses contingent not executed by the Statute of 27. H. 8. 72 Uâ—es contingent destroyed by a Feoffment 72 Uses grounded upon fraud 77 Use cannot râ—â—e out of a Uâ—e 81 Uses in contingency barred by a Release of the Feoffees 83 Use upon a Bargain and Sale for years passeth without inrolement of the Deed 38 Use amerced upon a Fine upon render without a Deed 105 W. WAger of Law 127 Words  Where the King shall have a third part of the Land of the Ward and of other land setled upon a marriage 54 Wast 24. 25 47 Damages in Wast 24 Warrants  When a Warrant is returned upon Record in case of the King it is as strong as an Office found 20. 28 29 Warranty  doth bind an Infant if his Entry is not lawfull 71 cannot enlarge an Estate 138 Wills 152 Words which make a condition in Wills 8 Writ  of enquiry of damages 24 Where not abated 24 Originall shall be taken as they are written 101 FINIS
Harrison Erringtons case 202p Hebborns case 206p I JEne and Chesters case 151p Jenningâ— Maystâ—â—â— case 102b Jorden Ayliffs case 168b Jenkin and Vivians case 201p K. Kettle and Masons Case 50p King and Berys Case 57p Kellies Case 104p Kirton and Hoxtons case 115p The King and Brigs case 150p Kebles case 18â—b Knights case 187b King Merricks case 2o L Lee and Browns case 128p Lewes and Jeofferies case 153p Lemasons and Dicksons case 189p Laurking and Wylds case 126p Leechford and Saunders case 194b Liverel and Rivets case 206b Lathams case 210b M MIchels case 8b Morgans case 52p Morgan and Tadcastles case 55p Montague and Jeofferies case 108p Mounson and Wests case 110p May and Kets case 129p Middletons case 131p May and Samuels case 134p Mingies case 135p Sir Arthur Mannarings case 145p Morley and Sir Richard Molineuxs case 1â—5p Millen and Fandries case 161p March and Fandries case 161p March and Newmans case 163p Mayor of Maidstons case 180p Mills and Parsons case 199b O OAks and the Lord Sturtonrs case 65b Overton and Sydalls case 120p Old and Estgreens case 160b Owen Wards case 187b P PIgots case 94p Porramor and Veralds case 101p Pollard and Lutterells case 108p Sir John Pools case 128p Powels case 139p Pack and Metholds case 160p Probe and Maynes case 192b Petit and Robinsons case 203p Ployden and Symes case 205p R ROper and Ropers case 106b Robinson Walkers case 127p Rawlinson and Greens case 127p Rones case 133p Richardson and Cabells case 142p Sir George Reynalds case 165p Ryman and Bickleys case 129p Reynor and Hallets case 187p Rochester and Rickhouse case 203p Rosse and Harvies case 206b Risley and Hains case 209p S STocks case 37p Smiths case 53p Southwell and Wards case 91p Sawyer and Hardies case 99p Stainings case 102p Scot and Mainys case 109p Strowd and Wyllis case 114p Southern and Howes case 143p Silvesters case 148p Stone and Withipoles case 152p Sary and Pigots case 166p Sharp and Rasts case 181p Snaggs case 187b Sherry and Richardsons case 15p Smithers case 169b Scheverel Dales case 193p Sanders Meritors case 200p Staple Kings case 206b Savile Wortleys case 207p Sparman Sherwoods case 222p T THompson Traffords case 8p Taunton Raries case 106p Tailours case 133p Thurman Coopers case 188p Talbot and Sir Walters Lacens case 146p Turner and Dennis case 169 V VAughans case 134p W WOod and Downings case 10p Webly and Skinners case 85p Wood and Matthews case 102p Westcot and Cottons case 130p Wrenhams case 135p Wootton and Byes case 136p Wards case 144p Webb and Paternosters case 151p Westermans case 151p Wales case 160p Welden and Bâ—sies case  Wicks case 186b Williams and Vaughans case 186b Willers case 197b Whelhorseys case 208p Woodroof and Vaughans case 210q CASES Reported by S R. JOHN POPHAM Knight Lord chief Justice of ENGLAND In the time of Queen ELIZABETH and written with his own hand in French and now faithfully done into English to which are added some remarkable CASES Reported by other Learned and Judicious Pens since his death Fenner versus Fisher Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz. Reginae in the Kings Bench IN Trespasse brought by Iustice Fenner against Andrew Fisher for a Trespasse done in the Parsonage house of Cravfords in the County of Kent 30. Maij 34. of the Queen the Defendant pleaded that one 〈…〉 was seised of the same Messuage in his Demesne as of see and being so seised the 〈…〉 day of in the same year did demise it to the Defendant for two years from such a Feast then last past by virtue of which he entred and was possessed untill the Plaintiff claiming by colour of a Deed made of the sayd Wrighâ— where nothing passed by the Deed upon which the Defendant entred c. The Plaintiff replies by protestation that the sayd Wrighâ— was not seised as the Defendant hath alledged And for Plea saith that the sayd Wright did not let it to the Defendant as the Defendant hath alledged upon which being at Issue and found for the Plaintif Ackinson moved that Iudgment ought not to be given for the plaintiff because that he hath not made any Title by his Replication for by 9 E. 4. 49. In Trespasse the Defendant pleads in Bar and gives colour to the Plaintiff it is taken for a Rule that the Plaintiff ought to make Title Cook answered that he needs not to make Title in this case but that it sufficeth to traverse the Bar without making a Title and sayd that in 22 E. 4. Fitzh Trespass It is adjudged that in Trespasse the Plaintiff may traverse the Bar without making Title in his Replication and here in as much as it is acknowledged by the Defendant that Wright did demise it to the Plaintiff and that this is a Lease ta will at the least not defeated by his own shewing but by the Lease made to Defendant this being traversed and found against the Defendant The Plaintiff by the acknowledgment of the Defendant himself hath a good Title against him to enter into the Land and by it the Defendant by his Re-entry is become Trespassâ—â— to the Plaintiff and he sayd that in 2 E. 4. fol. In Trespasse where the Defendant pleads that he let the Land to the Plaintiff for another mans life and that he for whose life it was was dead upon which he entred and it is adjudged that it sufficeth for the Plaintiff to maintain that Cestuy vie was yet living without making any other Title And yet these reasons Cleoch and Gawdy held the Replication good to which Popham sayd that we as Iustices ought not to adjudge for the Plaintif where a good formall bar is pleaded as here it is But wherby the Record it self which is before us we cannot see that the Plaintiff hath good cause of Action And therefore I agree that in Trespasse in some cases the Plaintiff may traverse the Bar or part of it without making any other Title then that which is acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the Bar but this alwaies ought to be where a Title is acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the Bar and by another means destroy by the same Bar for there it sufficeth the Plaintiff to traverse that part of the Bar which goeth to the destruction of the Title of the Plaintiff comprised in the Bar without making any other Title but if hee will traverse any other part of the Bar he cannot do it without making an especiall Title to himself in his Replication where by the Bar the first possession appeareth to be in the Defendant because that although the Traverse there be found for the Plaintiff yet notwithstanding by the Record in such a Case the first Possessions will yet appear to be in the Defendant which sufficeth to maintain his Regresse upon the Plaintiff and therefore the Court hath no matter before them in such a Case to adjudge for the Plaintiff unlesse in cases
where the Plaintiff shews a speciall Title under the Possession of the Defendant As for example In trespasse for breaking of his Close the Defendant pleads that J. G. was seised of it in his Demesne as of fee and enfeoffed J. K. by virtue of which he was seised accordingly and so being seised enfeoffed the Defendant of it by which he was seised untill the Plaintiff claiming by calour of a Deed of Feoffment made by the sayd J. G. long before that he enfeoffed J. K. where nothing passed by the sayd Feoffment entred upon which the Defendant did re-enter here the Plaintiff may well traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made by the sayd J. G. to the sayd I. K. without making Title because that this Feoffment only destroies the Estate at will made by the sayd I. G. to the Plaintiff which being destroyed he cannot enter upon the Defendant albeit the Defendant cometh to the Land by Disseisin and not by the Feoffment of the sayd I. K. for the first Possession of the Defendant is a good Title in Trespasse against the Plaintiff if he cannot shew or maintain a Title Paramounâ— But the Feoffment of the sayd I. G. being traversed and found for him he hath by the acknowledgment of the Defendant himself a good Title against him by reason of the first Estate at will acknowledged by the Defendant to be to the Plaintiff and now not defeated But in the same case he cannot traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made to the sayd I. K. to the Defendant without an especiall Title made to himself for albeit that I. K. did not enfeoff the Defendant but that the Defendant disseised him or that he cometh to the Land by another means yet he hath a good Title against the Plaintiff by his first Possession not destroyed by any Title Paramount by any matter which appeareth by the Record upon which the Court is to adjudge and with this accord the opinion of 31 4. 1. That the materiall matter of the Bar ought alwaies to be traversed or other wise that which upon the pleading is become to be materiall and that which the Plaintiff traversed here to wit the Lease made by Wright to the Defendant is the materiall point of the Bar which destroyeth the Title Paramount acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the colour given in the Bar which is good without another Title made So note well the diversity where in pleading in Trespasse the first Possession is acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar and where it appeareth by the pleading to be in the Defendant and where and by what matter the first Possession acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar is avoided by the same Bar And upon this Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff as appeareth in 34. and 35. Eliz. Rol. Earl of Bedford versus Eliz. Anne Russell Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz. 2. IN tho Court of Wards the Case was thus between the now Earl of Bedford In the Court of Wards and Elizabeth and Anne the Daughters and Heirs of John late Lord Russell which was put ten times to all the Iustices to be resolved Francis late Earl of Bedford was seised of the Mannor of Baruake Chaldon c. in Commitatu Dorset in his Demesne as of see and so seised the fourth year of Queen Eliz. of it enfeoffed the Lord S. John of Bletsoe and others in see to the use of himself for forty years from the date of the sayd Deed and after to the use of the sayd John then his second Son and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue then to the use of the right Heirs of the sayd Earl the Feoffor for ever Afterwards Edward Lord Russell Son and Heir apparant to the sayd Earl dyed without Issue and after the sayd John Lord Russell dyed without Issue Male having Issue the sayd two Daughters afterwards to wit 27 Eliz. the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford by Indenture made between him and the Earl of Cumberland and others in consideration of the advancement of the Heirs Males of the body of the sayd Earl which by course of descent should or might succeed the sayd Earl in the name and dignity of the Earldome of Bedford and for the better establishment of his Lordships Mannors and Hereditaments in the name and blood of the sayd Earl covenanted and grantes with the sayd Covenantees that he and his Heirs hereafter shall stand seised of the sayd Mannors amongst others to the use of himself for life without impeachment of Waste and after his decease to the use of Francis the Lord Russell and the Heirs Males of his body for default of such Issue to the use of Sir William Russell Knight his youngest Son and the Heirs Males of his body with diverse Remainders over after which the sayd Francis Lord Russell tyed having Issue Edward the now Earl of Bedford and after this the sayd Francâ—s late Earl of Bedford dyed also and after the Daughters of the sayd John Lord Russell or the now Earl of Bedford shall have these Mannors of Barunke c. was the question and upon this it was argued by Cook Sollinton and others for the Daughters that an use at Common-law was but a confidence put in some to the benefit and behoof of others and that Conscience was to give remedy but for those for whose availe the confidence was and that was in this Case for the sayd Daughters which were the right Heirs to the sayd Francis late Earl of Bedford upon the first conveyance made 41 Eliz. for the confidence that he put in the Feoffees as to the profits that he himself was to have was but for the forty years and how can any other say that he shall have any other Estate when he himself saith that he will have it but for forty years and therefore in this case his right Heir shall take as a Purchasor by the intent of the Feoffor which hath power to make a disposition of the use at his pleasure and his pleasure as appeareth was to have it so and it is not as if the use had been limitted to be to himself for life with such a Remainder over in which Case the use of the Fee by the operation of Law ought to execuse in himself for the Free-hold which was in him before As where Land is given to one for life the Remainder to his right Heirs he hath a Fee-simple executed but here he shall have but an Estate for forty years precedent and that the Fee-simple cannot be executed by such a limitation made to the right Heirs but in case of an Estate for years only precedent such a limitation to his right Heirs afterwards is not good but in case of an use it is otherwise for it may remain to be executed to be an use in Esse where the right Heir shall be and therefore not to be resembled to an Estate made in Possession And an Vse is alwaies to be
himself in the sayd Will had declared or otherwise as by his Executors or the Survivor of them shall be prescribed And if the sayd Sir Edward and his Heirs shall make default in the assurance of the sayd Land by him to be assured as aforesayd then hee will that immediatly upon such default his Estate and the Estate of the sayd Frances shall cease in the sayd Lands in Croxton c. and then he devise the same Lands to his Executors and their Heirs for ever to the use of them and their heirs upon trust and confidence that they or the Survivor of them and their Heirs shall assure the same or otherwise yearly dispose the profits of them in finding the sayd Preacher and other charitable works as aforesayd and made Edward Peacock Father to the Lessor whose Heir the Lessor is and others his Executors and dyed 9. of the Queen after whose Death all the Executors refuse to be Executors The seven years passe without the establishing of the School and other things according to the Will for the first part of it whereby the Land in Thetford was forfeited to the heir for the Condition broken and within the ten years Sir Edward Cleer made a Feoffment of Land to the value of 35. l. a year to the surviving Executor for the use of the School but with acondition contrary to the Will and no Livery waâ— made upon the sayd Feoffment but it was inrolled of Record in the Chancery whereby the sayd Sir Edward had broken the Condition annexed to his Estate and also during all this time neither the Executors nor their Heirs had done any thing in finding the Preacher or the other works of charity with the profits of the sayd Lands in Croxton or in assuring of it according to the Will and yet the sayd Edward Peacock the Son in September 32. Eliz. being Heir to the surviving Executor entred into the Land in Croxton and demised it to the Plaintiff for seven years upon which the Defendant as Servant and by the commandement of Sir Edward Cleer and of Edmund the Son and Heir of the sayd Frances who was then dead entred upon which entry and Efectment the Action was brought and it was mooved by Godfrey and others that the entry of the Defendants was lawfull first in the right of the sayd Sir Edward because that his Estate by the Statute of 23. H. 8. cap. was without condition or determined because that by this Statute all the uses limited in such a manner are made void because they are in the nature of a Mortmain as may appear by a Proviso at the end of the same Statute for a certain person of Norwich who had Devised Lands for the case of the poor Inhabitants of the same Citty in Taxes and Tallages and for cleansing of streets there and for discharge of toll and Custome within the City all which were good uses and not tending to Superstition and yet if it had not been for the Proviso they had been gon by the body of the Statute And the Statute ordained also that every penalty and thing which shall be devised to defraud this Statute shall be void and if this do not help them yet the Entry made in the right of the sayd Heir of Sir Richard Fulmerston is good for the estates of the sayd Executors are also bound as with a tacite condition that these things shall be performed which are not done and therefore the entry in right of the heir is lawfull for the words Ad propositum ea intentione and the like in a Will are good Conditions which Gaudey agreed vouched the case 28. Sess Pl. but it was after often argument agreed by all the Court that the first exception was to no purpose for they conceived that this Statute was to be taken to extend only to the uses which tend to Superstition as might be collected as well by the words of it in the very body of the Act at the beginning as by the time in which it was made for at this time they began to have respect to the ruine of the authority of the Pope and to the dissolution of the Abbies Chantries and the like And by Popham the Proviso was put in the Statute but for satisfaction of the Burgesses of the same City at this time and not for any necessity as oftentimes it happens And for the other point he sayd that it appeareth fully by the Will that it was not the intent of the sayd Sir Richard to have the Land in Croxton bound with any condition in the possession of his Executors or with any other matter which determine their Estate for the Words that they shall have it upon trust and confidence exclude all constraint which is in every condition and the Will is that they shall have it to the use of themselves and their Heirs for ever which câ—nnot be if it shall be abridged by any Limitation or Determination And he sayd that the Lord Anderson demanded of him a Case which was adiudged in the Common Pleas 29. Eliz. Rot. 639. which was thus One Michel made a Lease for years rendring Rent and for default of payment a re-entry with Covenants on the part of the Lessee to repair the Messuages c. and the term continuing the sayd Michel by his Will in Writing devised the same Land to the sayd Lessee for more years then hee had to come in it rendring yearly the like Rent and under the same Covenants which he now holds it and dyed and afterwards the first term expired the Lessee does not repaire the Houses and the question was whether by this he hath forfeited his term and adjudged that as to this it was not any condition and a Covenant it could not be for a Covenant ought alwaies to come on the part of the Lessee himself which cannot be this case for he doth not speak any thing in the Will to bind him but they are all the words of the Devisor himself which comprised in a Will and it never was his intent to have it to be a condition and therefore void as to the Lessee to bind him either by way of Covenant or Condition so here c. And for the sayd Feoffment enrolled without Livery it was agreed by all that it was not of any force to make the Land to passe to the Executors but the enrolment conclude him to say not his Deed And also that the Executors refuse to be Executors this shall not hinder them to take by Devise as to the Inheritance whereupon it was adjudged that the Plaintiff shall recover as appears Thomson Versus Trafford Hillary Term 35 of Queen Eâ—izabeth IN an Ejectione firmae between John Thomson Plaintiff and Thomaâ— Trafford Defendant the case was thus The President and Schollers of Magdelen Colledge in Oxford 20 Decemb. 8. Eliz Did let a Messuage uâ— the Burrough of Southwark to which no Land appertained to William Staâ—dish for twenty years from the Feast of
there which to their Office of Sheriff appertaineth or any waies to intermeddle with it except only for the Sheriff of the County of Glocester to hold their County-Courts as is aforesaid And that the Major Aldermen of the said Town for the time being their Successors having power and authority to enquire here determine all things which Iustices of P. or Iustices assigned to hear determine Trespasses and Misdemeanors within the County of Glocest before this time have made or exercised And that the Iustices of Peace of him his Heirs or Successors within the said County of Glocester should not intermeddle with the things or causes which belong to the Iustices of Peace within the said Town c. And upon this Charter divers things were moved by Sir William Periam Knight now chief Baron of the Exchequer before his going into the Circuit 1. Whether by the saving of the Charter they have sufficient power reserved to them to fit within the Town being now exempted from the said Town of Glocester to enquire there of the Felonies done in the said County of Glocester And so for the Assises and Nisi prius taken there of things made in the County of Glocester Then if the the Sheriffs may execute their Warrants made there at the time of the Assises or Goal-delivery notwithstanding the exemption given to them by the Patent And it was agreed by all the Justices that the saving in the Patent is sufficient for the Iustices of Assise and Goal-delivery to sit there for the things which happen within the County of Glocester for as the King may by his Letters Patents make a County and exempt this from any other County so may he in the making of it save and except to him and his Successors such part of the Iurisdiction or priviledge which the other County from which it is exempted had in it before As in divers places of the Realm the Goal of a Town which is a County of it self or which is a place priviledged from the County is the Goal of the County and the place where the Assises or Goal-delivery is holden is within the County of the Town and yet serve also for the County at large as in the Sessions Hall at Newgate which serves as well for the County of Middlesex as for London and yet it stands in London but by usage it hath alwaies been so and nothing can be well prescribed unto by usage which cannot have a lawfull beginning by Award or Grant and this by the division of London from Middlesex at the beginning might be so And so the Goal of Bury c. And although that the words are saving to him and his Heirs yet by the word Heirs it shall be taken for a perpetual saving which shall go to his Successors which is the Queen and the rather because it is a saving for Iustice to be done to the Subjects which shall be taken as largely as it can be And albeit the expresse saving for the Sheriff is but for to hold his turn yet in as much as the authority of the Iustices of Assise and Goal-delivery in holding their Sessions as before was accustomed is saved it is Included in it that all which appertain to the execution of this Service is also saved or otherwise the saving shall be to little purpose And therfore that the Sheriff or other Minister made by the authority of these Courts is well made there and warranted by the Charter And wee ought the rather to make such exposition of the Charter because it hath been alwaies after the Charter so put in execution by all the Iustices of Assise But it seems that by this Commision for the County a thing which happens in the Town cannot be determined albeit it be Felony commited in the Hall during the Sessions but by a Commission for the Towne it may 7. SIr Francis Englefield Knight being seised in his Demesne as of Fee of Vide this case reported in Coke lib. 7. 12 13. the Mannor of Englefield in the County of Berks and of divers other Lands in the first year of Queen Eliz. departed out of the Realm by licence of the Queen for a time and remained out of the Realm in the parts beyond the Seas above the time of his licence wherby the Queen by her Warrant under her privy Seal required him to return upon which he was warned but did not come wherupon the Queen seised his Land for his contempt After vvhich the Statute of Fugatives was made 13. year of the Queen upon which by Commissions found upon this Statute all his Lands were newly seised and afterwards 17 Eliz. by Indenture made between him and Francis Englefield his Nephew and sealed by the said Sir Francis at Rome the said Sir Francis covenanted with his said Nephew upon consideration of advancement of his Nephew and other good considerations to raise an use that he and his Heirs and all others seised of the said Mannor c. shall hereafter stand seised of them to the use of himself for term of his life without impeachment of Wast and afterwards to the use of his Nephew and of the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue to the use of the right Heirs and Assigns of the said Francis the Nephew for ever with a Proviso that if the said Sir Francis shall have any Issue Male of his body that then all the said Vses and Limitations shall be void and with a Proviso further that if the said Sir Francis by himself or any other shall at any time during his life deliver or tender to his said Nephew a King of Gold to the intent to make the said Vses and Limitations void that then the said Vses and Limitations shall be void and that therafter the said Mannors c. shall be as before Afterwards the said Francis was attainted of Treason supposed to be committed by him 18 Eliz. A Le umures in partibus transmarinis le attainder fuit primerment utlagary apres per act de Par. 28 Eliz. by which the forfeiture of the Condition was given to the Queen and at the same Parliament it was also enacted that all and every person or persons which had or claimed to have any Estate of Inheritance Lease or Rent then not entred of Record or certified into the Court of Exchequer of in to or out of any Mannors Lands c. by or under any Grant Assurance or Conveyance whatsoever had or made at any time after the beginning of the Raign of her Majesty by any persons attainted of any Treasons mentioned in the said Act after the 8. day of February 18 Eliz. within two years next ensuing the last day of the Session of the said Parliament shall openly shew in the said Court of Exchequer or cause to be openly shewn there the same his or their Grant Conveyance or Assusance and there in the Term time in open Court the same shall offer
to the use of Dennis May his Son and Heir apparant and his Heirs upon condition that the said Dennis and his Heirs should pay to one Petronell Martin for his life an annuall Rent of 10 l. which the said Thomas had before granted to the said Petronell to begin upon the death of the said Thomas And upon condition also that the said Thomas upon the payment of 10 s. by him to the said Feoffees or any of them c. might re-enter After which the said Thomas May and Dennis by their Deed dated 30. May 19 Eliz. granted a Rent-charge out of the said Mannor of 20 l. a year to one Anne May for her life after which the said Thomas May paid the said 10 s. to the said Feoffees in performance of the Condition aforesaid and therupon re-entred into the Land and enfeoffed a stranger And whether by this the Rent were defeated was the question And it was mooved by Coke Attorney-generall that it was not but that in respect that he joyned in the part it shall enure against the said Thomas by way of confirmation which shall bind him as well against this matter of Condition as it shall do against any Right which the said Thomas otherwise had And therfoâ—e by Littleton If a Disseisor make a Lease for years or grant a Rent-charge and the Disseisor confirm them and afterwards re-enters albeit Lit. there makes a Quaere of it yet Cook said That the Disseisor should not avoid the Charge or Lease which was granted by the whole Court And by him the opinion is in P. 11. H. 7. 21. If Tenant in Tail makes a Feoffment to his own use upon Condition and afterwards is bound in a Statute upon which Execution is sued and afterwards he re-enter for the Condition broken he shall not avoid the Execution no more the Rent here Fennor agreed with Cook and said further That in as much as every one who hath Title and Interest have joyned in the Grant it remains perpetually good And therfore if a Parson at Common Law had granted a Rent-charge out of his Rectory being confirmed by the Patron and Ordinary it shall be good in perpetuity and yet the Parson alone could not have charged it and the Patron and Ordinary have no Interest to charge it but in as much as all who have to intermeddle therin are parties to it or have given their assent to it it sufficeth Gawdy was of the same opinion and said That there is no Land but by some means or other it might be charged and therfore if Tenant for life grant a Rent-charge in Fee and he in the Reversion confirm the Grant per Littleton the Grant is good in property so here To which Clench also assented but Popham said That by the entry for the Condition the Charge is defeated And therfore we are to consider upon the ground of Littleton in his Chapter of Confirmation to what effect a Confirmation shall enure and this is to bind the right of him who makes the Confirmation but not to alter the nature of the Estate of him to whom the Confirmation is made And therfore in the case of a grant of a Rent-charge by the Disseisor which is confirmed by the Demisee the reason why the Confirmation shall make this good is because that as the Disseisee hath right to defeat the right and the Estate of the Disseisor by his Regresse in the same manner hath he right therby to avoid a Charge or a Lease granted by the Disseisor which Right for the time may be bound by his confirmation But when a man hath an Estate upon condition although the Feoffor or his Heirs confirm this Estate yet by this the Estate is not altered as to the Condition but it alwaies remaineth and therfore Nihil operatur by such a confirmation to prejudice the Condition And so there is a great diversity when hewho confirmeth hath right to the Land and where but a Condition in the Land And by him if a Feoffee upon condition make a Feoffment over or a Lease for life or years every one of these have their Estates subject to the Condition and therfore by a Confirmation made to them none can be excluded from the Condition And the same reason is in case of a Rent granted by a Feoffor upon Condition it is also subject to the Condition and therfore not excluded from it by the Confirmation as it shall be in case of a Right And to prove this diversity suppose there be Grand-father Father and Son the Father disseise the Grand-father and makes a Feoffment upon Condition and dies after which the Grand-father dies now the Son confirms the Estate of the Feoffee by this he hath excluded himself from the Right which descended to him by his Grand-father but not to the Condition which descended to him from his Father And of this opinion were Anderson and other Iustices at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet for the principall Case upon the Case moved there by Popham this Term And as the case is it would have made a good question upon the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances if the Avowry had been made as by the grant of Thomas May in as much as the Estate made to the use of Dennis was defeasable at the pleasure of the said Thomas in as much as it was made by the Tenant of the Land as well as by him who made the Conveyance which is to be judged fraudulent upon the Statute But this as the pleading was cannot come in question in this case And afterwards by the opinion of other three Iudges Iudgment was given that the Grant should bind the said Thomas May and his Feoffees after him notwithstanding his regresse made by the Condition in as much as the Grant of the said Thomas shall enure to the Grantee by way of confirmation And by Gawdy If a Feoffee upon Condition make a Feoffment over and the first Feoffor confirm the Estate of the last Feoffee he shall hold the Land discharged of the Condition because his Feoffment was made absolutely without any Condition expressed in his Feoffment But Popham denied this as it appeareth by Littleton Tit. Descents because he hath his Estate subject to the same Condition and in the same manner as his Feoffor hath it into whomsoever hands it hapneth to come and therfore the Confirmation shall not discharge the Condition but is only to bind the right of him who made it in the possession of him to whom it is made but not upon Condition Morgans Case 7. RObert Morgan Esquire being seised in his Demesne as of Fee of certain Lands called Wanster Tenements in Socage having Issue John his eldest Son Christopher his second Son and William his youngest Son by his last Will in writing demised to the said Christopher and William thus viz. Ioyntly and severally for their lives so that neither of them stall alienate the Lands and if they do that they shall remain to his Heirs Robert the Father
dies and afterwards John his Son and Heir dies without Issue the reversion by this descends to the said Christopher who dies leaving Issue And upon this Case made in the Court of Wards the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson agreed first That upon the devise and death of the Father the said Christopher and William were Joynt-tenants of the Land and not Tenants in Common notwithstanding the word severally because it is coupled with the said word joyntly But yet they agreed also that by the descent from John to Christopher the Fee-simple was executed in the said Christopher for the Moyety in the same Mannor as if he had purchased the Reversion of the whole or of this Moyety and that it is not like to the Case where Land is given and to the Heirs of one of them in which case for the benefit of the Survivorship it is not executed to divide the Ioynture because the Estates are made at one and the same time together and therfore not like to the case where the Inheritance cometh to the particular Estate by severall and divided means And a Decree was made accordingly Trin. 36. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 1. IT was agreed by all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchequer upon an Assembly made at Serjeants-Inn after search made for the ancient Presidents and upon good deliberation taken If a man have two houses and inhabit somtimes in one and somtimes in the other if that House in which he doth not then inhabity be broken in the night to the intent to steal the Goods then being in his house that this is Burglary although no person bee then in the House and that now by the new Statute made such an Offender shall not have his Clergy for before the Statutes were made which take away Clergy in case of Burglary where any person was put in fear no mention was made in the Inditements of Burglary that any person was in the House But it was generall that the house of such a one Noctanter fregit and such Goods then there Felonice cepit And the breaking of a Church in the night to steal the Goods there is Burglary although no person be in it because this is the place to keep the Goods of the Parish And in the same manner the house of every one is the proper place to preserve his Goods although no person be there And that the Law was alwaies so it is to be collected by the course of the Statutes therof made for first the Statute of 23 H. 8. doth not take Clergy from any in case of Burglary unlesse some of the same Family be in the house and put in fear And in 5 Eliz. 6. The Offendor shall be ousted of his Clergy if any of the Family be in the house be they sleeping or waking And these Statutes were the cause that it was used of late time to put in the Inditements of Burglary that some person of the Family was then in the house to put them from their Clergy But this doth not prove that it shall not be Burglary but where some person was in the house and by 18 Eliz. Clergy is taken away in all cases of Burglary generally without making mention of any person to be there which enforce the resolution aforesaid and according to it they all agreed hereafter to put it in Execution Finch versus Riseley 2. IN this Term the case betweeen Finch and Riseley was in question before all the Iustices and Barons for this assembled at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where after Arguments heard by the Councell of the parties upon this point only If the Queen make a Lease for years rendring Rent with a Proviso that the Rent be not paid at the day limited that the Lease shall cease without making mention that it was to be paid at the receit whether the Lease shall cease upon the default of payment before Office found therof And by Periam and some of the Iustices the Lease stall not cease untill an Office be found of the default because it is a matter in Fait which determines it to wit the not-payment And by Gawdy it shall be taken as if it had been for the not-payment that the Proviso had been that the Lease shall be forfeited In which case it is not detennined untill Re-entry made for the forfeiture which in the Queens case ought alwaies to be by Office which countervails the re-entry of a common person As where the Queen makes a Lease rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry albeit the Rent be not paid yet untill Office found therof the Rent continues Popham Anderson and the greater part of the Iustices and Barons resolved that it was cleer in this case that Ipso facto upon the default of payment the Lease was determined according to the very purport of the contract beyond which it cannot have any beeing and therfore there needs no Office in the case But where it is that it shall be forfeited or that he shall re-enter there untill advantage taken of the forfeiture in the one case or untill re-entry made in the other case the Term alwaies continues by the contract And where in the case of a common person there is need of a re-entry to undo the Estate there in the case of the King there needs an Office to determine the Estate for an Office in the Kings case countervails an entry for the King in person cannot make the entry And upon this resolution of the greater part of the Iustices in Mich. Term 31 32 Eliz. the same case was in question in the Office of Pleas in the Exchequer between the said Moil Finch Plaintiff and Thomas Throgmorton and others Defendants and there adjudged by Manwood late chief Baron and all the other Barons unanimously after long argument at the Bar and Bench that the Lease was void upon default of payment of the Rent according to the Proviso of the Lease and this immediatly without Office for the reasens before remembred upon which Iudgment was given a Writ of Error was brought before the Lord Keeper of the great Seal and the Lord Treasurer of England where it long depended and after many arguments the Iudgment given in the Exchequer by the advice of Popham and Anderson was affirmed and that upon this reason for the Proviso shall be taken to be a limitation to determine the Estate and not a Condition to undo the Estate which cannot be defeated in case of a Condition but by entry in case of a common person and but by Office which countervails an entry in the case of the Queen And this Iudgment was so affirmed in Mich. Term 36 37 Eliz. Smiths Case 3 IT was found by Diem clausit extremum after the death of Richard Smith that in consideration of a marriage to be had between Margaret Smith and William Littleton a younger Son to Sir John Littleton Knight and of 1300. marks paid by the said Sir John to the said
be avoided and in the same manner here But Popham took a diversity where the Possession or the Estate of the Queen is determined and where not for where the Estate is determined there the Subject may enter into the Land without Office or ouster le main But where the Possession continues there the party shall not come to it unlesse by petition Monstrans de droit officio or the like and therfore hee said that if the Queen had an Estate pur auter vie or depending upon any other Limitation if it be determined according to the Limitation the party who hath interest may enter so in the case of the Devise put before And if a Lease be made for life the Remainder in Tail the Reversion in Fee and he in the Remainder in Tail levy a Fine Sur conusance de droit come ceo que il ad de son done to a stranger with proclamations according to the Statute and afterwards the stranger convey the Remainder to the Queen her Heirs and Successors and after the Tenant for life dies and after he in the Remainder in tail dies without Issue now may he in the Remainder in Fee enter because the Estate of the Queen is determined But here the Queen hath a Fee-simple in her self but determinable upon the Estate-tail which yet remaineth which Fee-simple in Reversion cannot be divested out of the possession of the Queen but by matter of Record of so high nature as it is in her to wit by Petition Monstrans de droit or the like As if a Reversson or Remainder be alienated in Mortmain the claim of the Lord sufficeth therâ— to vest the Reversion in the Lord for the Alienation but if the Reversion or Remainder of which such a claim was made be conveyed to the King his remedy is now by Office Monstrans de droit or Petition for claim will not now serve him for this shall be to divest the possession out of the Queen which by such means cannot be done no more then where a Reversion or Remainder is granted to the Queen upon Condition but he ought to have an Office to find the performance of it if it be to be performed by matter in pais and without Monstrans de droit or otherwise it shall not be divested out of the Queens possession yet in the case of a common person a claim will divest it out of them but not so of the Queen And these cases Gawdy agreed but he conceived that in the case in question the claim made determines the Estate of the Queen which is made by means of the Fine upon the Statute And Popham denied the case put in 7 H. 6. to be Law as it is put upon the opinion of Strange there for it is cleer that the claim there does not divest any possession which was in the King by means of the Wardship and if this be not therby defeated the claim does not help the Disseisee against the Descent and this appeareth fully by Littleton who saith so of a Claime which avoids a Descent to wit that it ought to be such upon which the Disseisee may upon every such Claim made have an Action of Trespasse or Assise against the Dissessor or him who is in possession if he continue his possession after such Claim made which cannot be in this case where the possession is in the King which cannot be defeated by such a Claim And in the Lord Dyer where the Feoffee or Mortgagee of Lands holden of the Queen in Capite by Knights Service died before the day of Redemption his Heir being within age wherby upon Office found the Queen had the Wardship of the body and land of the Heir after which the Mortgagee at the day of redemption made payment and of this also an Office was found yet he could not enter either before or after Office but upon Monstrans de droit therupon he had his Ouster le main And the reason why a Claim shall serve in this case between common persons is because that by such Claim the thing it self is devested out of him who had it before and therby actually vested in him who made the claim As where a Villain purchase a Reversion by the Claim of the Lord the Reversion is actually in him as it is of a Possession by Entry But where he is put to his Claim to devest any thing out of a common person he is put to his Suit to devest it out of the Queen Aad to say that Bret should not take advantage of this Conveyance made to make it good by the Fine I think the Law to be clear otherwise as to this point for the Statute of Fines was made tor the security of Purchasors and Possessors of Land and therfore taken more strongly against them who pretend Right or Title and for the greatest advantage that may be for the Possessors of Lands and therfore the Possessor by what ever means he can may make his Fine to be forceable And therfore the Fine upon this Statute differeth much from a Fine at Common Law for where at Common Law an Infent being a Disseisor was disseised by one who levies a Fine and the year and the day passe without claim of the first Disseisee now was the first Disseisee barred yet if afterwards the Infant who was not bound by the Fine enter the first Disseisee may enter upon him because that by this entry the Fine at Common Law was utterly defeated But now by the Statute such a Fine being levied with Proclamations the first Disseisee not pursuing according to the Statute is barred for ever And although the Infant enter at full age and undoes the Fine as to himself yet this Fine remains alwaies to bar the first Disseissee and makes that the Infant hath now Right against all the world and so now takes advantage therof And this is the intent of the Statute for the repose of Controversies and Suits and the quiet of the people And if I procure a Fine to be levied on purpose to bar another of his Action which he may have against me for the Land yet I shall take advantage of this Fine and the other shall have no advantage against me because of this Covin for if this should be admitted it will countervail the benefit which is intended to be by means of the Statute of Fines And if a Disseisor enfeoffee another upon Condition to the intent that a Fine with Proclamations shall be levied to the Feoffee to bar the Disseisee and after the Disseisee is barred the Disseisor enter for the Condition he shall yet take advantage of the Fine against the Disseisee And Popham put a case which was in this Court 23 Eliz. upon a speciall Verdict which was between Okes Plaintiff upon the Demise of John late Lord Sturton of Cottington which was this The Lord Sturton was Tenant for life of certain Lands in Lighe in the County of Somerset the remainder in Tail
the Causa Matrimonii prolocuti which as they pretend ought to prove that there was a trust at Common Law And the other the Statute of Marlbridge that the Lord in case of Wards against Feoffments made by Collusion which Feoffments they alledge prove that a trust then was To which it was said that the gift made by a woman to another to the intent that he shal marry her hath in it a Condition more properly implied to wit that if he doe not marry her that she shall have her land back againe for which the Common Law gives her remedy by the Action aforesaid for if it had been but a trust no remedy had been by the Common Law And for the Statute of Marlbridge the contrary therunto is manifestly proved for the Statute speaks but of Feoffments made to Heirs apparants or upon Condition or to the intent to enffeoff the Heir at his full age or the like in which cases the use alwayes goes with the Possessions and is not to the Feffor And the Statute of 4. H. 7. was made in vaine which gives the Wardship of Cestuy que use where no Will is declared which had not been needfull if Feoffments within the Statute of Marlbridge had been said to have been to Uses And without doubt if those who made the Statute of Marlbridge had then had knowledge of these Feoffments to Uses which were so mischievous and more then the other Feoffments by Collusion they then would have provided remedy for these cases of Uses Also the Statute de Religiosis ordains that Nec arte nec ingenio Lands shal not be conveyed in Mortmain and therby it was conceived that a full provision had been made against these Mortmains and yet in 15 Rich. 2. Provision was made against Uses conveyed in Mortmain to Religious or other Corporations of which they took the Profits And without doubt those who were so precise in the making of the Statute of Religiosis against Mortmains would also have made provision for the uses if they had then been known But to cleer this point without all controversie the Statute it self of uses 27 H. 8. makes it plain which saith expresly that by the Common Law of the Realm Lands or Tenements ought not to passe from one to another without solemn Livery matter of Record or writing and that these Feoffments to uses were Errors used and accustomed within the Realm to the Subversion of the ancient Laws therfore it stands not with the ancient Common Law of the Realm as all the Parliment took it which is more to be regarded then any Book vouched But see how and when they began and crept in at Common Law and it shall be easily perceived as it hath been well said by some of those who argued to this point at the beginning that they began by two means to wit by fraud and by fear And he said that the first Book which he had seen in all the Books of the Law which tend to an use is the case of 8. Assise which makes mention that the Counsee of a Fine entred into the Land in the right of another which is to be taken to anothers use And in the Quadragessimâ—s of Edw. 3. mention is made of the Feoffees of the Lord Burglash who sued to the King by petition and by the Statute of 50 Ed. 3. cap. 6. mention is made that divers gave their Lands to their Friends to have the profits and afterwards fled to priviledged places and lived there to the hinderance of their Creditors And therfore it was provided that in such a case execution shall be made as if no such assurance had been made And by 2 Rich. 2. these are called Feoffments to uses and made by craft to deceive Creditors and there is the first mention which is made in any Statute of the word Use So fraud hath been alwaies the chief foundation of these Vses yet in time they began to have some credit in the Law And this was when men saw that the Court of Conscience gave remedy in these cases against such who had not the conscience themselves to perform the trust put in them and to take away the danger which hapned to an infinite number of good Subjects upon the Garboyls which hapned between the time of E. 3. and that of King H. 7. caused that in effect all the Possessions of the Realm were put in Feoffments to uses And the first case in the Law which speaks of this word Use which he ever saw was as he said in 5 H. 4. And in the like case by Gascoign 7 H. 4. no remedy is given by the Law for Cestay que use and afterwards it crept into the Law as appeareth yet as an Error of long time used And if before the Statute of 27 H 8. a Lease had been made for life the remainder in Fee to the use of B. for life the remainder to the use of the first Son of the said B. and so further as here If the Tenant for life had made a Feoffment in Fee to a stranger and had not given the stranger notice of the Use and all this were without consideration and afterwards he in the Remainder in Fee to the Use had released all his Right to the said stranger every one of them had been hereby without remedy for their Uses Were the Son of B. born before or after this wrong done So if it were at Common Law before this Statute as hath been weâ—l said and the Law being so before this Statute then he said it was to be seen what was to be done in the case after the Statute which will stand altogether upon this what will become of these contingent Vses to the Sons not born at the time of the said Feoffment made by Sir John Saintleger and his Co-feoffees by this Statute of 27 H. 8. and it seems to him cleerly that no possession is executed to any contingent use by this Statute untill it comes in being and that as the case is here and in some other speciall cases it shall never be executed And one cause why such a contingent Vse shall not be executed is because it doth not stand with the letter of the Law but rather is against the letter Another cause is because it is utterly against the intent of the Law to execute it as the case is here It doth not stand with the Letter of the Statute for this is Where any person or persons stand seised to the use of any other person or persons c. And it is cleer that none can stand seised to the use of him who is not neither can he who is not in rerum natura have any use therfore the case here doth not stand with the letter of the Statute to be now executed And further the words following are that in every such case every person who hath such an Use in Fee-simples Fee-tail for life for years c. or otherwise in Remainder or
time to come and therfore by this exposition much more to the disinherison of the Heir then it was before the making of this Statute And which is more mischievous if a Feme putein happen to be in such a house who happen to have Children in Adultery these Bastards shall have the Land against the will of the Father to the utter disinherison of the true Heirs and against the intent of him who made the limitation by which we may see the just Judgment of of God upon these who attempt by humane pollicy to circumvent the divine providence of God for the time to come and of this also I have seen an example And now to the mischief that men do not know against whom to bring their Actions to sue for their Rights and it is cleer that now by such an exposition they shall be now in much worse condition then they were before for before the Action was given against him who received the Profits which is now gone by this Statute in the cases of Free-hold and therfore if the other exposition shall hold place it is cleer that untill the Statute of 13 Eliz. men might have been by means of this Statute put out of all remedy to recover their rights by any manner of Action as some put it in practice as to make Feoffments to the use of the Feoffor and his Heirs untill any intend to bring an Action against him for this Land and then over to others upon the like limâ—tation with a Proviso to make it void at his pleasure and the like and what mischief shall then be for the time upon such an exposition such that Justice therby cannot be done to the Subject and what an absurdity shall it be to say that such an Exposition can stand with the intent of the Makers of the Law And to that which hath been argued on the other side and first to that which was said by Walmsley That the Right Estate and Possession is wholly out of the Feoffee and vested to the Vses which have their beeing by the Statute and that upon the Contingents hapning their Estates uncouple and give place to the contingent Vse then executed and that the execution therof shall be by a Possession dâ—awn to it out of the Possession which was before executed by the Statute in another I say that this Statute can by no means have such an exposition for this is as much as to say that an Vse may arise upon an Vse contrary to what is adjudged 36 H. 8. That a Bargain and Sale by a Deed indented and enrolled cannot be at this day of Land to one to the Vse of another And if a man enfeoff another to the use of I. S. and his Heirs and if I. N. pay such a summ that then the said I. S. and his Heirs shall be seised of the same Land to the use of the said I. N. and the Heirs of his body I. â— paies the money yet the Vse doth not rise out of the Possession of the said I. S. But if it had been that upon the payment the first Feoffee and his Heirs shall stand seised to the use of the said I. N. and the Heirs of his body it shall be otherwise therfore somthing remains to the first Feoffee in the Judgment of the Law And I remember that when I was a Counsellor at Law in the time of the Lord Dyer where a Feoffment was made to the Vse of one for life with Remainders over with restraint to alien and with power given to Tenant for life to make Leases for one and twenty years or three lives it was much doubted whether this power so limited to him without words in the Assurance that the Feoffee and his Heirs shall stand seised to these Vses shall be good to make such Leases or not And therfore suppose that a man bargains and sells Land to one for his life by Deed indented and inrolled and make therin a Proviso that the Tenant for life may make such Leases this is to no purpose as to power to make a Lease but the strongest case which he put was that of 30 H. 8. which I agreed to be Law as it is there put whether it were before or after the Statute of 27 H 8. for it is not there put that the Feoffment was made upon any consideration to the stranger in which case although he had no notice of the first Covenant yet in such a case he shall take the Possession subject to the Vse to which it was bound by the present Covenant But if you consider the case well you shall see that it was a case before the Statute for it followeth presently in the same case that it is there said that it is not like the case where the Feoffees in Vse fell the Land to one who hath no notice of the first Vse wherby it appeareth that it was a case before the Statute for otherwise there had been no cause to have spoken then of the Feoffees to an Vse and by the same it appeareth if the Covenantor had bargained and sold the Land to another the same Vse had never risen upon the Covenant and therfore it is cleer against the Law that the Possession shall be bound wâ—th such an Vse in whosoevers hand it comes And to that which Peâ—â—am said in the case of these Contingent Vses they shall now by the Statute be in the same degree as if Land it self had been so conveyed and that now the Land shall be in Contingency in stead of the Vse and that by such manner it shall be executed and that by such means all is utterly out of the Feoffees because the Statute was made to determine all â—â—â—ter of trust to be hereafter reposed in any Feoffee this is well spoken but not well proved for as I have said before it is an exposition quite contrary to the letter and intention of the Law And I agree as hath been said if there be none to take the Use at the time that it falleth to be in possession according to the limitation that he shall never take it afterwards no more of an Use upon the Statute then of â—n Use at Common Law As if an Use be limitted for life the remainder to the right Heirs of I. S. if the Estate for life be determined in the life of I S. the remainder shall never vest afterwards in the right Heirs of I. S. no more then if an Estate had been so made But this makes for me to wit that the Estate upon the Uses executed by the Statute shall be of the same condition as Estates in possession were at Common Law and that they being executed ought also to be such of which the Common Law makes allowance And by way of argument I agree for the time that it is as hath been said by them who maintain that an Use may be in suspence as to that which is an Use in its proper nature for it is
the said Goodale that this Warrant was made to him After which it was agreed between the said Sir Ioh Packington Drew Woodale that the said Tho. Drew shall have but 32 l. of the said 100. marks wherupon the said Sir Iohn Packington within a year after the death of the said Ralph Woodliff paid to the said Drew Woodliff the 100. marks and presently the said Drew delivered to the said Sir John all the 100. marks but 32 l. And the Verdict stands upon this point whether the 100. marks were well paid or not And by Popham and Gawdy this was meerly a fraud which shall never prejudice a third person for if it be agreed between the Disseisee and I. S. that a stranger shall disseise the Tenant of the Land and enfeoff the said I. S. to the intent that the Disseisee shall recover against him this Recovery shall bind the said I. S. but not him who was disseised and yet he who recovered had a good Title and paramount the other but he shall not come to that to which he had good cause of Action and Title by fraudulent means to the prejudice of a third person not party to this fraud And it was said further that to pay money and take it away again presently before that it is pursed up by re-delivery is not properly a payment but rather a colour of payment And by Fennor and Popham the force of a Deed of Feoffment once effectuall cannot become void or of no effect nor the Livery therupon by such manner of words And it is not like a Bargain of Goods or an Obligation or a Lease for years which by such words may be dissolved and made to be of no force or effect because that as by the sealing a bare Contract it may be made perfect and effectuall without other circumstances so may it be defeated by such bare means without other circumstance But so it is not in case of an Inheritance or Free-hold which cannot be effectual by the bare delivery of a Deed unlesse that Livery be made therupon And all agreed that as this case is notwithstanding the Feoffment made over by the Father the money might have been paid to the Heir to perform the Condition if they had been duly paid and without Covin and that the words had been apt to have defeated the Estate But by Popham and Clench If a Feoffment be made to one upon condition In which case a Condition shall be performed to an Assignee and not to the Heir of payment of money to the Feoffee his Heirs or Assignes and the Feoffee makes a Feoffment over and dies the money ought to be paid to the Feoffee who is the Assignee and not to the Heir for there Heir is not named but in respect of the Inheritance which might be in him but here he is named as a meer stranger to it Bartons Case 3. IN a Writ of Error sued in the Kings Bench by Randall Barton upon a Fine levied at Lancaster 7 Eliz. of Land in Smithall and else where in the County of Lancaster by Robert Barton Esquire to Leven and Browndo where this Writ was brought by the said Randall as Heir in tail to the said Robert to wit Son of Ralph Brother of the said Robert The Defendant plead a Recovery in Bar therof had after the Fine in which the said Robert was vouched who vouched over the common Vouchee And by all the Court this common Recovery with such double Voucher which is the common assurance of Lands is a Bar by reason of the Voucher to every manner of right which the Vouchee or his Heir by means of him is to have to this land which is paramount the Recovery And so it is of every manner of way wherby they are otherwise to come to the Land before the Recovery And if the recovery be erroneous it remains a good Bar untill it be avoided by error But if the Recovery be void or the Voucher not warranted to be pursuing the appearance of the Tenant but precedent to it as was pretended and so no Tenant to warrant the Voucher when the Voucher was made the Recovery shall be no bar in such a case and the case here was informed to be this for the Writ of Entry bears date 1. Mart. 7 Eliz. returnable Die Lunae in 4. septimana quadragessimae propter futur and the Voucher was made in 4. septimana quadragessimae 7 Eliz. the said first day of March being the first week of this Lent 7 Eliz. And upon this it was inferred that the Tenant was not to appear untill Munday in the fourth week of Lent 8 Eliz. which is a long time after that the Voucher appeared and vouched over But by the whole Court the Original Writ shall be taken as it is written to be returnable on Munday in the fourth week of the same Lent 7 Eliz for it shall be taken as it is written shortly most beneficially that it can be to make the Recovery good And if it had been written Proxâ—me it should refer to the week before and so good And if the word Futur had been written at large Futura it also shall refer to Septimana and therfore being written briefly it shall refer as it may best do to make the Recovery good But if it had been in Quarta septimana proximae quadragessimae at large then the word Proxime shall refer to Quadragessimae because of the case But if it had been Proxima it shall refer to Septimana because also of the case But here as the case is it shall be a good reference to make the words Tunc proxima futur to shew what fourth week of Lent to wit that next ensuing the first day of March. As if a man be bound by Obligation bearing date the first day of March to pay the 10. day of March then next ensuing this shall be taken the 10. day of this March because this is next ensuing the first day Paramor versus Verrald 4. IN Trespasse of Assault and false Imprisonment by Robert Paramor against John Verrold and others supposed to be done at such a Parish and Ward in London the 20. day of May 35 Eliz The Defendants justifie by reason of an Erecution upon a Recovery in the Court of Sandwich within the Cinque-Ports Debt and traverse Absque hoc in that they were guilty in London c. The Plaintiff reply and maintain the Assault and Imprisonment as it is said and traverses Absque hoc quod habetur aliquod tale Recordum loqueâ—ae prout the Defendants have alledged Et hoc paratus est verificare per Recordum illud and upon this the Defendants demurred in Iudgment And per Curiam the Defendants plea Prima fâ—cie was good because it was a speciall manner of Iustification which cannot be pleaded and alledged to be in any other place then where it was done in the same manner as if they had justified by force of a Capias directed to the
Sheriff of another County then where the occasion brought or by Warrant of a Iustice of Peace of another County for matter of the Peace and the like which are not like to the case of Partridge who was beâ—ten in the County of Glocester by Sir Henry Pole for which he brought his Action in London And Sir Hen. Pole would have justified by Assault of the Plaintiff in the County of Glocester with a trâ—verse that he was not guilty in London But it was then ruled in this Court that he could not do it to oust the Plaintiff to sue in London but in such a case he might have alledged that the Assault was done in London because it was also a thing transitory of which they shall take notice there and so help himself if the matter had been true But in the case at the Bar if the speciall matter alledged in the forraign County be false as here the Plaintiff may maintain his Action and traverse the special matter alledged by the Defendant And so a traverse in such a case may be upon a Traverse when falsity is used to oust the Plaintiff of that benefit which the Law gives him Hillary Term 38 Eliz. Wood versus Matthews 1. IN a writ of Error brought by Owen Wood against Griffeth Matthews upon a judgment given in the common Pleas the case was briefly thus The Issue in the Common Pleas was whether one were taken by a Cap. ad satisfaciendum or not and upon the triall therof at the Nisi prius the Jury found for the Plaintiff in this Action to wit that the party was not taken by the said Capias and upon the back of the Pannell entred dicunt per Quer. but on the back of the Postea the Clark of the Assises certified the Pannell thus to wit That the Jury say that no Capias was awarded which was otherwise then was put in Issue or found by the Jury and the Roll of the Record was according to the Postea and upon this Judgment given for the said Matthew then Plaintiff upon which amongst other Errors this variance between the Issue and Verdict was assigned for Error and after deliberation had upon this point and this matter alledged by the Defendant in the Writ of Error and certified out of the Common Pleas the Court awarded as to this point that the Record sent up out of the Common Pleas by the Writ of Error shall be amended according to that which was endorsed on the back of the Pannell for the endorsement upon the Pannell is the Warrant for the certifying of the Postea aâ—d so this Warrant over to him that makes the Entry in the Roll And therfore wheras it was alledged that the Postea was amended in the Common Pleas aftâ—r the Record removed it was holden to be well done there for although the Record were removed by the Writ of Error yet the Nisi prius the Postea and the like remain still there as it is of the Warrant of Attorney and the like And if the Postea had not been amended there but sent up with that which was endorsed upon the Pannel all shal be amended here according to that which was indorsed upon the Pannel and according to this there was a Presidâ—nt shewn Tr. 35. H. 8. between Whitfeild and Wright where the Issue was whether a quantity of Grain were delivered between two Feasts and endorsed upon the Pannel Dicunt pro quaer and yet the Postea certified and the Rolls also made that the delivery was made ad festa and upon this matter alledged in Banco Regis and the Error in this point assigned and certified out of the Common Pleas the Record removed by the Writ of Error was by award of the Court amended and the word Ad razed out and the word Inter written in lieu of it according as it appeareth it ought to have been by the Note upon the back of the Pannel And the like amendment was made lately in the Checquer Chamber upon Error brought there upon a Iudgment given in Banco Regis where the Iudorsment upon the back of the Writ was pro Quer. and the Postea and Roll was that the Plaintiff was guilty and there amended the last Term. Slanings Case 2. NIcholas Slaning of Bickley was seised in his Demesn as of Fee of the Mannor of Bickley and of a Mill in Walkhampton in the County of Devon called a blowing Mill and of another Mill there called a knocking Mill and of an acre of Land there also and of divers other Mannors and Lands in the said County of Devon the said Mills and acres of Land in Walkhampton then being in the possession of one Peterfeild and Atwill of an Estate for divers years then to come and being so seised he with Margaret his Wife levied a Fine of the said Mannor of Bickley and of other Lands omitting the said Lands in Walkhampton to certain Câ—nuzees who rendred the same back again to the said Margaret Slaning for her life with the remainder over to the said Nicholas and his Heirs After which the said Nicholas by Indenture daied 30. Octob. 21 Eliz. gave and enfeoffed all the said Mannors and Premisses to John Fits and others and the Heirs of the said Fits to the Vses Provisoes and Limitations mentioned in the said Indenture which was to the use of himself and the Heirs Males of his body by any other Wife the remainder to Nicholas Slaning of Newton Ferries and the Heirs Males of his body with divers remainders over with this Proviso to wit Provided and it is the intent of these presents and of the parties therunto that the said John Slaning and the Heirs Males of his body or the said Nicholas Slaning of Newton-ferries and the Heirs Males of his body in whomsoever of them the Inheritance in tail of all the Premisses shall happen to be by force of these presents shall pay to Agnes the Daughter of the said Nicholas Slaning of Bickly 200 l. or so much therof as shall be unpaid at the time of the death of her said Father according to the intent of his last Will with a Letter of Attorney to it by which he ordains John Hart and Robert Fort joyntly and severally his Attorney to enter into the said Mannor of Bickley Walkhampton c. and all other the Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the said Indenture mentioned and possession for him to take and after such possossion taken for him and in his name to deliver full possession and seisin of the Premisses to the said John Fits c. according to the form and effect of the said Indenture wherupon possession and seisin was given of all but that which was in possession of the said Peterfield and Atwill And the said Pererfield and Atwill nor either of them never attorned to the said Grant After which Nicholas Slaning of Bickly made his last Will by which devised to the said Agnes his Daughter 200 l. to be paid in form following
and not otherwise to wit 100 l. therof in thâ—se words On that day twelvemonth next after the day of his death and the other 100 l. that day twelvemonth next after c. and made the said John Slaning his Executor and afterwards to wit the 8. day of April 25 Eliz died without Issue Male of his body the said Agnes took to Husband one Edmund Marley and upon the 8. day of April 26 Eliz. the said John Slaning paid the first 100 l. to Agnes then being living and upon the 8. and 9. daies of April 27 Eliz. Nicholas Slaning of Plumpton Son and Heir of the said John Slaning who died in the mean time an hour before the Sun set and untill the Sâ—n was set came to the House where the said Edmund and his Wife inhabited in London and tendred the last 100 l. and that neither the said Edmund nor Agnes his Wife were there to receive it but that the said Edmund voluntarily absented himself because he would not receivâ— the 100 l. and that therupon the Wife of the said Edmund died having Issuâ— two Daughters the Lands being holden by Knights-service in Capite and the said Daughters being yet within age and all this being found by Office by the opinions and resolutions of Popham and Anderson and the rest of thâ— Councel of the Court of Wards the said Heirs now in Ward shall have nothing but that which doth not passe by the conveyance to John Fits and his joynt Feoffees which was only that which was in the possessions of Peterfield and Atwill and that the Livery was good of the rest albeit the Attorny did nothing of that which was in Lease notwithstanding the words of the Warrant that they should enter into all and then shall make the Livery And they agreed that the Condition doth not â—ind neither the said John Slaning nor Nicholas his Son because they had not all the Land according to the purport of the Condition which was that he who had all therof should pay the 200 l. wheras here that which was in the possession of Peterfeild and Atwill did not passe to them for want of Attornment for a Condition ought to be taken strictly And further the payment was referred by the Indenture to be according to the Will or by the Will and the 200 l. was devised as a Legacy which ought to be paid but upon demand and not at the peril of the Executor and therfore the nature of the payment of it is altered by the intent of the Will and being not demanded there is no default in the said Nicholas Slaning of Plumpton to prejudice him of his Land if it had been a Condition for then it shall be but a Condition to be paid according to the nature of a Legacy upon demand and not at the peril of the party And whether the word twelve-month shall be taken for a year or twelve months according to 28. daies to the month as it shall be of eight or twelve months or the like And they agreed that in this case it shall be taken for the whole year according to the common and usuall speech amongst men in such a case and according to this opinion Wray who is dead Anderson and Gawdy made their Certificate to the late Chancellor Sir Christopher Hatton in the same case then being in the Chancery and a Decree was made accordingly And many were of opinion that by his absence by such fraud he shall not take advantage of the Condition being a thing done on purpose if it had been to be performed at his peril Kellies Case WIlliam Kelly and Thomasine his Wife were seised of certain Lands in S. Eth in the County of Cornwall called Karkian to them and to the Heirs of their two bodies between them lawfully begotten by the Gift of one William Dowmand Father of the said Thomasine 11 H. 8. a long time after which Gift to wit 25 H. 8. A Fine Sur conusance de droit come ceo que il ad per was levied by Peter Dowmand Son and Heir of the said William Dowmand to William Kelley of the Mannor of Dowmand and of a 100. acres of Land 300 acres of Meadow 300. acres of Pasture and a 1000. acres of Furzse and Heath in Dowmand S. Eth. Trevile and divers other Towns named in the Fine who rendred the same back again to the said Peter in tail with diverse Remainders over and this Fine was with proclamations according to the Statute after which the possession of Karkian continued with Kelly and his Heirs according to the first Intail and the Mannor of Dowmand and the Remainder of the Lands in these Towns which were to the said Peter Dowmand to him and his Heirs according to the render untill nine years past that by Nisi prius in the Country upon the opinion of Manwood late chief Baron the Land called Karkian was recovered against the Heir of the said William Kelly by virtue of the said Fine and Render because all the Land which the said Peter Dowmand and the said William Kelly also had in all these Towns named in the Fine were not sufficient to supply the Contents of acres comprised in the said Fine And what the Law was in this case was referred to the chief Iustices the Master of the Rolls Egerton and the now chief Baron â—ut of the Chancery who all agreed upon all this matter appearing that nothing shall be said to be rendred but that which indeed was given by the Fine and Karkian does not passe to the said William Kelly by the Fine for as to it the Fine is but as a release of Peter to him and therfore shall not be said to be rendred to the said Peter by the Fine where no matter appeareth wherby it may appear that it was the intent of the parties that this shall be rendred And therfore Popham said that by so many Fines which have been levied in such a manner and to such who have Land in the same Towns where the Conusance hath been considering that alwaies more Land is comprised in Fines by number of acres then men have or is intended to passe by them at some time or in some age it would have come in question if the Law had been taken as Manwood took it but in all such cases the Possession hath alwaies gone otherwise which shews how the Law hath been alwaies taken in such cases And therfore if a man be to passe his Mannor of D. to another by Fine Executory and he levy the Fine to him by the name of the Mannor of D. and of so many acres of Land in D. and S. being the Towns in which the Mannor lies after which the Conuzor purchaseth other Lands in these Towns the Fine before the Statute of Vses shall not be executed of these Lands purchased after the Conusance and the Fine shall work to these which he had power and intent to passe and no further And it seemed to them that an
it shall not be taken by intendment that the Messuages had such a Curtilage to it if it be not specially named Fennors Case 5. IN Trespasse brought by Fennor in the common Bench against for breaking his Close in c. the Defendant pleads a Bar at large to make the Plaintiff assign the place in certain where he supposeth the Trespasse to be done the Plaintiff therupon alledgeth that the place where he complaineth is such c. and sheweth in certain another then that in which the Defendant justifies the Defendant avers that the one and the other are all one and known by the one name and the other and therupon the Plaintiff demurs and adjudged there for the Plaintiff because that in such a case upon such a speciall assignment it shall be taken meerly another then that in which the Defendant justifies in as much as the Plaintiff in such a case cannot maintain it upon his evidence given if the Defendant had pleaded not guilty to this new Assignment that the Trespasse was done in the place in which the Defendant justifies although it be known by the one and the other name and that the Plaintiff hath good Title to it because that by his speciall Assignment saying that it is another then that in which the Defendant justifies he shall never after say that it is the same in this Plea for it is meer contrary to his speciall Assignment And upon this a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and the Iudgment was there affirmed this Term for the same reason Quod nota Scot versus Sir Anthony Mainy 6. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 200 l. brought by John Scot Gent. against Sir Anthony Mainy Knight the Condition wherof being to perform the Covenant comprised in an Indenture of Demise made by the said Sir Anthony to the said Plaintiff of his Capitall Messuage in Holden with the Lands to it belonging c. amongst which Covenants one was that wheras by the same Indenture he had demised it to him for 21. years that the said Sir Anthony covenanted with the said John Scot that the said Sir Anthony from time to time during the life of the said Sir Anthony upon the surrender of this Demise or any other Demise hereafter to be made by the said Sir Anthony of the said Messuages and Lands and to be made by the said John Scot his Executors or Administrators and upon a new Lease to be made ready ingrossed to be sealed and offered by the said John Scot his Executors or Administrators to the said Sir Anthony for the like tearm and number of years in the aforesaid Indenture comprised for the same Rent c. to seal and deliver to the said John Scot his Executors and Administrators And the said Sir Anthony as to this Covenant pleaded did not surrender nor offer to surrender to him the said Demise nor offer to him any new Demise of the Premisses ready engrossed for to seal it for the like Term c. as it is in this Covenant And for the other Covenants he pleads performance of all To which the Plaintiff replies that the said Sir Anthony after the Obligation and before the Action brought had rendred the said Messuages and Lands by Fine to one Walter Savage and William Sheldon their Executors and Assigns for eighty years from the Feast of Easter next before the Fine which was Pasch 36 Eliz. wherby he said that the said Sir Anthony had disabled himself to renew his Lease according to the Covenant upon which it was demurred in the Commen Bench and the Iudgment given for the Plaintiff as appeareth Trin. 37. Eliz. Rot. 2573. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and agreed this Term. And it was moved that the Iudgment given was erroneous in as much as the first act was to be done by John Scot before the new Lease was to be made to wit the surrender of the former Lease and the drawing of the new one ought to have been done by the Plaintiff which not being done on his part the said Sir Anthony is not bound to make the new Lease And also it was moved that as the case is here the said John Scot might surrender to the Defendant notwithstanding the intervening of this Lease between the Lease of the Plaintiff and the Inheritance of the Defendant as if a man make a Lease for years in possession and afterwards make another Lease to a stranger to begin after the end of the former Lease this shall not hinder but that the first Lease may be surrendred to him who was the Lessor notwithstanding the said Term intervening To which it was answered by the Court that the Plaintiff here need not to make any offer of the surrender of his Term to the said Sir Anthony in as much as the said Sir Anthony hath disabled himself to take the Surrender or to take the Lease according to the purport of the Condition and by this disabling of himself the Obligation is forfeited Come per 44 E. 3. 8. and by Littleton also If a man make a Feoffment upon condition to re-enfeoff him this is not to be done untill request therof be made by the Feoffor yet if in the mean time the Feoffee suffer a fained recovery of the Land grant a Rent charge acknowledgeth a Statute taketh a Wife or the like the Feoffor may re-enter without request made to re-enfeoff him and the reason is because that by any of these the Feoffee hath disabled himself to perform the Condition in the same plight as he might have done at the time of the Feoffment in the same manner here for by this render by the Fine the Reversion passe in right so that the Termor in possession attorning to it they shall have the Rent reserved upon the first Lease and therfore the Plaintiff cannot now surrender to the said Sir Anthony but to the Grantees of the Reversion and therfore there shall be no prejudice to the Plaintiff because the Defendant was the cause of disabling the Plaintiff to make the Surrender to him And suppose it be but a Term to begin at a day to come yet by this the Obligation is forfeited because the Obligor hath therby disabled himself to perform the Condition in such a plight as he might have done it when the Obligation was made wherby the Obligation is presently forfeited albeit the Plaintiff never surrender nor offer to do it And therfore the Iudgment there was affirmed Mounson versus West 7. IN an Assise brought in the County of Lincoln before Gawdy and Owen by Thomas Mounson Esquire Demandant against Robert West Tenant for Lands in Sturton Juxta Stu. The Defendant West pleaded Nul Tenant del Frank-tenant named in the Writ and if that be not found then Nul tort nul Disseisin And the Assise found that the said Defendant was Tenant of the Tenements now in Plaint and put in view to the Recognitors of
given for the Defendant The same Term in the same Court. Laurking and Wildes Case THe Rector of the Church of livelled in the spirituall Court for the Tithes of a riding Nag where the case was That a man let his Land reserving the running of a Horse at some time when he had occasion Tithes for a riding Nag to use him there The Defendant shewed this matter in the Court by his Counsell and prayed a Prohibition and avers that for the same Land in which the Horse went he paid Tithes And by the Court nigh London a man will take a 100. or 200. Horses to Grasse now he shall pay Tithes for them or otherwise the parson shall be defeated But in this case if the Defendant alledge and prove that it was a Nag for labour and not for profit a Prohibition lies The same Term in the same Court. Havergall versus Hare IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Havergal against Hare the Case was thus Afterwards fol 55. A Rent of 20 l. per annum was granted out of Green acre to one and his Heirs to be paid at Michaelmas and the Annunciation of our Lady by equall portions and the Grantor covenants that if the Rent of 20 l. be arrear by the space of twenty daies that the Grantee may distâ—ain and that if there be not sufficient distresse upon the Land or iâ— there be a Rescous Replevin or Pound-breach that then it shall be lawfull for the Grantee and his Heirs to enter and retain the Land to them and their Heirs untill the 20 l. be paid 10 l. for one half years Rent was in arrear and for it an entry was made Mountague chief Iustice and Doderidge Iustice there can be no entry made when 10 l. only is behind for the words of the Deed are that if the Rent of 20 l. be behind that the Grantee and his Heirs may enter and if he shall enter now he shall retain the Land for ever for the 20 l. shall never be paid Crook and Haughton Iustices contrary for if 10 l. be arrear the Rent of 20 l. is arrear for Haughton said In an Assise of Rent of 40 l. where part is arrear yet he ought to bring his Assise for the whole Rent of 40 l. for the Writ ought to agree with the Deed. Doderidge agreed with him in the case of an Assise but not in the principall point And for the second point it was agreed by them all that upon the entry of the Grantee he shall have a Fee-simple determinable admitting the entry for the 10 l. to be good The same Term in the same Court and it is entred 14 Jac. Rot. 1484. Robinson versus Walter RObinson brought an Action of Trover and Conversion against Walter and upon the whole matter the case appeared to be this A Stranger took the horse of the Plaintiff and sent him to a common Inn and there he remained for the space of half a year at which time the Plaintiff had notice where his Horse was and therupon he demanded him of the Inn-keeper who answered that a person unknown left the Horse with him and said that he would not deliver the Hoâ—se to the Plaintiff unlesse he would pay for his meat which came to 3 l. 10 s. for all the time and also would prove that it was his Horse upon which the Plaintiff demurred in An Inn-keeper may detain a Horse untill he be satisfied for meat albeit he be left by a stranger Law And it was resolved by Mountague chief Iustice Crook and Doderidge Iustices Haughton Iustice dissenting that the Defendants plea was good for the Inn-keeper was compellable to keep the Horse and not bound at his peril to take notice of the Ownder of the Horse And by the custom of Lond. if a horse be brought to a common Inn wher he hath as it is commonly said eaten out his head it is lawfull for the Inn-keeper to sell him which case of the custom implies this case And there is a difference where the Law compels a man to do a thing and where not As if the Lievtenant of the Tower brings an Action of debt for Dyet against one who was his Prisoner in this case the Defendant cannot wage his Law because the Law compels the Lievtenant to give Victuals to his Prisoner otherwise if another man brings an Action of debt for Dyet and in the case at the Bar the Inn-keeper was compellable And Doderidge said that if the Law were as the Plaintiff would have it it were a pretty trick for one who wants a keeping for his Horse And Mich. 6 â—ac in the Kings Bench between Harlo and Ward the like was resolved as was cited by Barkesdels of Counsell with the Defendant Mich. 14. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Rawlinson versus Green A Copyholder surrendred out of Court according to the custom of the Mannor which at the next Court was presented and entry therof made by the Steward Scilicet Compertum est per homagium c. but no admittance Afterwards Cestuy que use surrenders before admittance and the first Copyholder surrenders to the Plaintiff And in this case there were two questions 1. Whether he may surrender before admittance 2. Who shall have the Land whether the first Copyholder or the Lord Haughton Iustice held that he could not surrender before admittance and the entry of the surrender doth not make an admittance for this being the A â—urâ—ender of Copyhold cannot surrender before admittance sole act of the Steward shall not bind the Lord and it is not like to the usuall foâ—m of an admittance for that is Dat Domino de fine fecit fiâ—elitatem admissus est inde tenens Doderidge Iustice agreed and said that in Hare and Brickleys case the admittance of a Copyholder was compared to the induction to a Benefice which gives the possession Hillary 14. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Sir John Pools Case Three Executors brought an Action of Debt and one only declared and they were ready for a triall in the Country and now it was moved that the Declaration might be amended and the names of the other Executors incerted but per Curiam this cannot be without the assent of the parties Pasch 15. Iac. In the Kings Bench. Cooper versus Smiths AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz Waterman Action for these words Thou hast killed thy Masteâ—s Cook and thou Innuende the Plaintiff hast killed thy Masters Cook Innuende c. and I will bring thee in question for thy life And after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment by the Counsell of the Defendant that the words were not actionable for the incertainty inasmuch as it doth not appear who was his Master nor that his Master had a Cook Mountague chief Iustice said that the words were actionable and albeit Inâ—uendo cannot maâ—e a thing that is uncertain certain an Innuendo cannot make a
doth much concern the Infant in as much as by his false plea he shall be bound to â—nswer of his own Goods if he hath no Goods of his Testator and therfore in a 11 E. 4. 1. he hath remedy against his Guardian for pleading a false Pâ—ea And by Doderidge if he hath no Guardian the Court shâ—ll appoint him a Guardian And if an Infant bring an action as Executor by Attorney and hath Iudgment to recover this is not erronious because it is for his benefit so per Curiam the difference is where he is Plaintiff and where he is Defendant And there is another difference where he is Executor and where not for being Executor his Plea might have been more prejudiciall to him and Coke lib 5. Russels case was agreed for good Law for an Infant may be Executor and may take money for a Debt and make a Release and give an Acquittance but not without a true consideration and payment of the money The same Term in the same Court. Thomas Middletons Case THomas Middleton alias Strickland was condemned for a Robbery at the Where a Felon is condemned and elcapeth and is re-taken upon confession that he is the same party execution may be awarded The Sheriff of Middlesex fined for not attending the Court. Assises in Oxford after which he made an escape and being taken again he was brought to the Bar and upon his own confession that he was the same party who did the Robbery and that he was condemned for it the Court awarded execution And Mountague chief Iustice said thâ—t was no new case for it had been in experience in the time of E. 3. and 9 H. 4. and 5. E. 4. that the Court might so do upon his own confession And because the Sheriff of Middlesex did not give his attendance upon the Court in this case nor came when he was called the Court fined him 10 l And Mountage said that it shall be levied by proces out of the Court and also all other Fines there assessed and not estreated into the Exchequer for then the party might compound for a matter of 20 s. and so the King be deceived The same Term in the same Court. Gouldwells Case IOhn Gouldwell seised of Land in Socage Tenure devised them to his Wife for life the Remainder to John Gouldwell his Son and his Heirs upon Condition that after the death of his Wife he shall grant a Rent-charge to Steven Gouldwell and his Heirs and if John Gouldwell dye withâ—ut Heirs of his body that the Land shall remain to Steven Gouldwell in Tail the Wife dieth John Gouldwell grants the Rent accordingly Stephen Gouldwell grants the Rent over John Gouldwell dies without Heir of his body and the second Grantee distrains for the Rent arrear and Stephen Gouldwell brings a Replevin And it was urged by the Counsell for the Plaintiff that this Rent shall not have continuance longer then the particular Estate and cited 11 H. 7. 21. Edriâ—ks case that if Tenant in Tail acknowledge a Statute this shall continue but during his life and Dyer 48. 212. But it was agreed per Curiam that the Grantee was in by the Devisor and not by the Tenant in Tail and therfore the Grant may endure for ever But for the second point this being to him in Remainder the intent of the Demisor is therby explained that he shall have the Rent only untill the Remainder come in possession for now the Rent shall be drowned in the Land by unity of possession 3. It was agreed and resolved that by the granting of the Kent over this was a confirmation And Mountague said that it was a confirmation during the Estate Tail and shall enure as a new grant afterwards And Haughton and Doderidge said that they would not take benefit of the grant over by way of confirmation for as Haughton said this enures only ought of the Devisor and he hath power to charge the Land in what manner he pleaseth and it is like to an usuall case as if a man makes a Feoffment in Fee to the use of one for life the Remainder over with power to make Leases and after he makes a Lease this is good against Tenant for life and him in the Remainder also And I have considered what the intent of the Devisor should be in granting of this Rent and it seems to me that in as much as the Land is limited in Tail and the Rent in Fee that by this the Grantee shall have power to grant or dispose of the Rent in what manner he would but if the Land had been in Fee I should have construed his intent to have been that the Grantee should have the Rent only untill the Remainder fall to which Doderidge agreed who said that we are in the case of a Will and this construction stands with the intent of the Devisor and stands with the Statute which saies Quod voluntas Donatoris est observanda The same Term in the same Court. Baskervill versus Brook A Man became Bail for another upon a Latitat in the Kings Bench and before Iudgment the Bail let his Lands for valuable consideration Difference between baile in the Kings Bench and the Common Pleas. And how a bail shall relate And afterwards Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And now it was debated whether the Land Leased shall be liable to the Bailment and it was said by Glanvill of Councell with the Lessee that it ought not to be liable and he put a difference between a Bailment in this Court and a Bailment in the Common Pleas for there the Suit cometh by originall and the certainty of the debt or demand appeareth in the declaration and therfore then it is certainly known from the begining of the Bailement for what the Bail shall be bound But in this Court upon the Latitat there is not any certainty untill Iudgment given before which the Land is not bound and now it is in another mans hands and therfore â—ot liable and he puts Hoes case Co. lib. 5. 70. where iâ— was resolved that where the Plaintiff releaseth to the Bail oâ— the Defendant upon a Suit in the Kings Bench before Iudgment all Actions Duties and Demands that this Release shall not bar the Plaintiff for there is not any ceâ—tain duty by the Bail before Iudgment and therfore it cannot be a Release and he citeâ— the case of 21 E. 3. 32. upon an account and said that it was like to a second Iudgment in that which reduceth all to a certainty and therfor c. But it was said by Mountague and Crook that the Lessee shall be bound for otherwise many Bailments and Iudgments shall be defeated which will bring a great Inconvenience And Mountague said that it was like to the case of a bargain and sale of Land which after it is Inrolled within six moneths shall relate to the beginning of the Bargain so upon the Iudgment given relation is made from the time
case who agreed that the wife shall not have it The same Term in the same Court. Dennis versus Sir Arthur Mannaring and others IN the great case between Gabriel Dennis Plaintiff in Trespasse against Sir Arthur Mannaring and Brimblecomb and others the Verdict was found for the Defendants And now it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment for the Plaintiff because no Bail was entred for Brimblecomb one of the Defendants A Verdict is given in B â— before any bail entred not good for every Defendant is supposed in Custodia Marescalli and in this case the Venire facias is awarded to try the Issue between the Plaintiff and Defendants where one of the Defendants is no party in Court And Serjeant More put the case of the Lord Chandoys and Sculler and other Defendants where the Iudgment in such a case was resolved to be erroneous Mountague we ought Discernere per legem quid sit justum and here Brimblecomb being no party in Court no Verdict could be given Doderidge I have seen in this Court where upon a Writ of Error brought in such a case we have compelled him to put in his Bail because he should not take advantage of his own wrong and folly But because that here no fraud appeared to be in the Plaintiff he shall not be bound to stand to the Verdict Haughton agreed but Crook seemed to the contrary But it was agreed that if Brimblecomb had appeared at the Suit of any other the same Term it had been sufficient And these Books were cited to be in the point 32 H. 6. 2. 8 E. 4. 5. 21 H. 6. 10. The same Term in the same Court Hide versus Whistler WIlliam Hide made a Lease for years of certain Lands to Whistler excepting Exception of all Wood under-wood Coppices and Hedgerows to the Lessor all his Wood and under-wood Coppices and Hedgerows and in a Replevin the question was whether the Soil shall passe ther by for the Lessee put his Beasts into a Coppice and the Lessor distrained them wherupon c. And the words of the exception were further standing growing and being in and upon the Premisses And the Lessee covenanted to make Fences but if the Lessor made new Coppices that the Lessee should net make Fences about them And it was said that a Coppice signifies a parcell of Land fenced for the safegard of young Trees And it was said for A Coppice what it is the Plaintiff that Premisses are Pre dimissa and by these words growing and being in the Premisses it shall be intended that the Soil did not passe for it is pre-demised But it was resolved that the Soil it self was excepted by the exception of the Wood and Coppice 14 H. 8. 1. The Bishop of Londons case Co. lib. 5. Ives case and lib. 11. Lyfords case And by the reserving of a Coppice the Soil it self is reserved for by Mountague that which is reserved is not demised and so the Distresse well taken Crook agreed and he said the difference was good between Wood and Trees for by the excepting of Wood the Soil it self is excepted otherwise of Trees Haughton agreed that the Soil it self is excepted in this case and so it was adjudged The same Term in the same Court. Talbot versus Sir Walter Lacen IN a Writ of Covenant brought by Margaret Talbot against Sir Walter Lacen upon a Lease made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant of a Park Covenant to leave the Premistes in repatations at the end of the Term. c. for five years if she should live so long in which the Lessee covenants for him his Executors and Assigns to keep the Premisses in good Reparations and so to leave them at the end of the Term and also to deliver to the Plaintiff upon notice given four Bucks and four Does in season during the life of the Plaintiff in every of the said years And after the expiration of the aforesaid term of five years she brought a Writ of Covenant and assigned the breach because that in the end of the term he committed Wast and because that after the end of the term the Defendant refused to deliver the Deer And albeit the words of the delivery of the Deer are during the life of the Plaintiff yet they are also every of the aforesaid years and therforeit was resolved that she shall not have them during her life in this case And for the other point it was objected that in Fine termini was incertain for it may extend after the term but Ad finem termini had been sufficient Old book of Entries 169. for when he covenants that at the end of the term he would leave the Premisses in reparations and Ad finem termini he did wast this ought of necessity to be intended a breach of the Covenant and therfore it was adjudged that the action of Covenant well lies Mich 16. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Havergall and Hares Case IN this Case which see before fol. 1. b. four points were observed 1. Whether Fisher the Assignee of the Rent were such a person who Before fol. 1. b shall take benefit of the entry 2. When 10 l. is only in arrear whether the Rent of 20 l. shall be said in arrear 3. Whether these advantages which were first granted with the Rent may be granted over 4. When the Vse shall rise whether upon the first Indenture of the grant of the Rent or afterwards For the case was that the Grantee of the Rent of 20 l. covenanted by the same Indenture that if the said rent of 20 l. were in arrear for the space of twenty daies after any day of payment that the Grantee shall distrain and if there be not sufficient distresse upon the Land or if there be a Rescous Replevin or Pound-breach that then it shall be lawfull for the Grantee and his Heirs to enter into the same Land and to retain it untill he be satisfied And the said Rent was granted 9 Jac. it was arrear 11 Jac. the Fine for the better assurance of the Rent was levied 12 Jac. and 13 Jac. the Distresse was taken There were four Causes which give an entry and upon the Distresse and Replevin brought the Assignee enters As to the three first points it was resolved by the whole Court 1. That Fisher was such an Assignee who shall take benefit of the Entry 2. When 10 l. is only arrear the Rent of 20 l. shall be said arrear wherupon there shall be a Title of Entry 3. That these advantages granted with the Rent may be granted over And as to the fourth point it was holden by Mountague and Crook that the Vse riseth upon the first Indenture and not upon the entry after the Replevin brought although the words are that then it shall be lawfull for the Grantee and his Heirs to enter wherby the use is only awaked as it is in the principall point in Shelleys case and although a Fine is afterwards
Execution shall be sued against him as Ter-tenant 2. There is not any lien as Heir for the Iudgment doth not mention the Heir and therfore he cannot be charged unlesse he be expresly bound and in the Record of the Recovery it doth not appear that the first lien shall bind the Heir for he declares that he bound himself and not that he bound himself and his Heirs 3. If the Heir were bound in the Obligation so that he were once bound as Heir yet the Iudgment determines the specialty so that now he is not bound and in the Iudgment the Heir is not mentioned as in 10 H. 4. 21. 24. If an Abbot contract to the use of the house without consent of the Covent this shall bind if he dies but if he takes an Obligation of the Abbot and then he dies this shall not bind the house for the Contract is determined by the Obligation and this is the reason that in the time of E. 3. in a recovery upon debt the Obligation was cancelled 4. Here he cannot be charged as Heir for it appeareth by the Record Where a debt is recorded upon bond the Obligation was cancelled that his Father is living for it is brought against him as Heir apparant which he cannot be but during the life of his Father And as to the objection that in this case he shall have his age and therfore shall be charged as Heir Non sequitur for if execution be sued against the Heir of a Purchasor he shall have his age and yet he is not Heir neither can charged as Heir to the Conusor But because it is a rule in Law that the Heir which hath by discent shall not answer where his Inheritance may be charged during his Nonage Whitlock to the same intent because the Heir is not charged here as Heir but as Ter-tenant wherby his false Plea shall not hurt him with which Jones also agreed and said that he here considered three things 1. That the lien of the Ancestor binds the Heir 2. How the Heir shall behave himself in pleading 3. Our point in question For the first there are two things requisite to bind one as Heir 1. A lien expresse for if one bind himself and not his Heir this shall not bind his Heir in any case 2. A discent of Inheritance for without this he shall not be bound by the act of his Ancestor and he is bound no longer then Assets discend for he alien before the Writ purchased the lien is gone 2. He ought to behave himself truly and plead truly and confesse the assets discended to him when debt is brought against him as heir otherwise his own Lands shall be charged with the debt as it is in Pepys case in Plow Com. But where it is said in Pepys case that upon a Nihil dicit or Non sum informatum c. If the Iudgment passe upon them that it shall be generall I am not of that opinion for the common experience of the Courts is that such a generall Iudgment shall not be given against the Heir unlesse it be upon a false plea pleaded with which agrees Lawsons case Dyer 81. and Henninghams case Dyer 344. where the Iudgment passed by Nihil dicit so that the saying in Plow 440. a. that what way soever the Heir be condemned in debt if he do not confesse the Assets c. that it shall be his proper debt is not now taken for Law And I also hâ—ld that if the Heir plead falsly and there is found more Assets Where upon a false plea by an Heir the Plaintiff may elect to take the Assets in execution or an Elegit of all his Land that yet it is in the election of the Plaintiff to charge him and to take execution of the Assets only or to take an Elegit of all his Land and he is not bound to take an Elegit of all his Land in this case for otherwise this inconvenience may arise If the Heir hath a 100. acres by discent and two by purchâ—se if upon the false Plea of the Heir the Plaintiff cannot have any other execution but an Eligit of the Moyety of his Lands then he by this is prejudiced for otherwise he might have all he Assets in execution and so the Heir by this way shall take advantage of his false plea. 3. He held as Whitlock before and for the same reason Doderidge Iustice How the Heir shall be bâ—und by the act of his Father is worthy of consideration upon which Prima facie the Books seem to disagree but being well considered accord with excellent harmony I have considered this case it was moved at Reading Term and because my Notes are not here I will speak more briefly and will consider 1. Hâ—w an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father and as to that in debt against an Heir he is charged as Heir so that at this day it is taken as his proper debt wherby the Writ is in the Debet and Detinet How an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father but in the Detinet only against Executors But in former time from the 18. of Ed. 2. till 7 H. 4. if an Executor had Assets the Heir was not chargable but in 7 H. 4. the Law changed in this point for now it is accounted his own debt and debt will lye against his Executor as it is said in Plow Com and so against the Heirs of the Heir to many generations albeit of this Plowden makes a doubt and his plea that he had nothing at the day of the Writ purchased nor ever after is good for if he alien the Assets he is discharged of the debt in regard he is not to wait the action of the Obligee 2. The Heir shall be châ—â—ged upon or Recognisance not as Heir but as Ter-tenant for he is not bound in the Recognisance but only the Conusor grant that the debt shall be levied of all his Lands and Tenements but not against his Heirs And here he is not meerly as Ter-tenant for he shall not have contribution agâ—â—st â—her ter-Ter-tenants but only against those who are Heirs as himself is but to all other intents he is Ter-tenant and so charged Why an Heir is not chargable for debt after he hath fold the assets as 32 E. 3. and 27 H. 6. aâ—â— 3. That upon a Iudgment as our case is the Heir shall be charged as Ter-tenant and not otherwise The Book which hath been cited viz 33 E. 3. Execution 162. is expresse in the point the broken years of Fitzherbert are obsâ—urely reported but by comparing of cases it will appear to be our case exâ—resly 4. That albeit an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Ancestor where he is particularly bound yet upon his false plea no execution shall be but upon the assets So it seems to me that in the principall case the Iudgment shall be speciall and it seems to be a
covenant to pay joyntly and severally according to the quantity of the Wares there an action of Covenant may be brought against one alone for the Deed is severall And by Crew chief Iustice it cannot be a good Traverse for a circumstance cannot be traversed for wind is alterable and a thing materiall is only traversable and here the Covenant is severall for their severall Fraughts and it may be that others have paid him Jones Iustice the traverse is not good and for the other matter he cited Mattheusens case Co. lib. 5. 22. Where upon a Charter party if one seal be broken all is gone If three are bound ioyntly and an action is brought against one and it appeareth that others have sealed the Writ shall abate But in this case an action lies against him alone although the other be named in the Indenture The same Term in the same Court intr Hill 22. Jac. Rot. 1019. Millen versus Fandrye AN action of trespasse was brought for chasing of Sheep the Defendant pleaded that they were trespassing upon certain land and he with a little Dog chased them out and as soon as the Sheep were cut of the land he called in his Dog and upon this the Plaintiff demurred The point singly was but thus J chase the Sheep of another out of my ground and the Dog pursues them into another mans land next adjoyning and J chide my Dog Iustification in trâ—spase and the Owner of the Sheep brings trespasse for chasing of them And it was argued by Whistler of Grays-Inne that the justification was not good and he cited Co. lib. 4. 38. b. that a man may hunt Cattell out of his ground with a Dog but cannot exceed his authority and by him an authority in Law which is abused is void in all and to hunt them into the next ground is not justifiable The Books differ if Cattell stray out of the high way involuntarily whether Trespasse lies 7 H. 7. 2. and H. 7. 20. but all agree that they ought to be chased out as hastily as may be Littleton argued for the Defendant that Cattell may be chased out into another mans ground and he said that a man cannot have such a power upon his Dog as to recall him when he pleaseth and a Dog is ignorant of the bounds of Land and he resembled this case to other cases of the Law first to 21 E. 4. 64. In Trespasse of Cattell taken in A. in D. the Defendant saith that he was seised of four acres called C. in D. and found the Cattell there Damage feasant and chased them towards the Pound and they escaped from him and went into A. and he presently retook them which is the same Trespasse and admitted for a good plea and 22 E. 4. 8. In trespasse the Defendant justifies by reason of a custom that they which plow may turn their Plow upon the Land of another and that for necessity and it was allowed for a good justification and he hath more government of his Oxen then in our case he can have of his Dog If a man be making of a lawfull Chase and cannot do it without damage to another this is Damnum absque injuria 21 H. 7. 28. And he cited a case which was in Mich. 18 Jac. between Jenning and Maystore where a man of necessity chased Sheep for taking one of his own in trespasse he may justifie it And also if a Dog goes into the Land of another as in this case trespasse does not lye but otherwise it is of Cattell Crew chief Iustice it seems to me that he might drive the Sheep out with the Dog and he cold not withdraw his Dog when he would in an instant and therfore it is not like to the case of 38 E. 3. Where trespasse was brought for entring into a Warren and there it was pleaded that there was a Pheasant in his Land and his Hawk flew and followed it into the Plaintiffs ground and there it seems that it is not a good justification for he may pursue the Hawk but cannot take the Pheasant 6 E. 4. a man cuts Thorns and they fell into another mans Land and in tresgasse he justified for it and the opinion was that notwithstanding this justification trespasse lies because he did not plead that he did his best endeavour to hinder their falling there yet this was a hard case But this case is not like to these cases for here it was lawfull to chase them out of his own Land and he did his best endeavour to recall the Dog and therfore trespasse does not lye Doderidge Iustice agreed for here was no hedge and when he saw them out of his own ground he rated the Dog 12 H. 8. this difference is taken if I see Sheep in my Land I may chase them out but if another sees them and chase them out I may have trespasse against him because he hath taken away For an involuntary trespasse action doth not lye my advantage and the nature of a Dog is such that he cannot be ruled suddenly and here it appeareth to be an involuntary Trespasse 8 E. 4. A man is driving Goods through a Town and one of them goes into another mans house and he follows him trespasse doth not lye for this because it was involuntary and a trespasse ought to be done voluntarily and so it is Injuria and a hurt to another and so it is Damnum If Deer be out of a Forest the Owner of the Land where they are may hunt them and if the Deer flye to the Forest and the Hounds pursue him then he ought to call in the Dogs and so I may justifie and trespasse lies not In the time of chief Iustice Popham this case was adjudged in this Court Trespasse was brought for hunting and breaking of hedges and the case was that a man started a Fox in his own land and his Hounds pursued him into another mans Lands and it was holden that he may hunt and pursue him into any mans land because a Fox is a noysom creature to the Common-wealth Bracton saith that when a man is outlawed he hath Caput lupinum and he may be hunted through all the County And he agreed the case of 8 E. 4. If a Tree grow in a hedge and the Fruit fall into another mans land the Owner may fetch it in the other mans land and he also agreed the case of 22 E. 48. of the Plew and so concluded that the trespasse doth not lye Jones Iustice that the trespasse doth not lye vide Co. lib. 8. 67. Crogates case and lib. 4. Terringhams case and he cannot recall his Dog in an instant And the same day Iudgment was given for the Defendant Quod quaerens nil capiat per billam The same Term in the same Court. Marsh versus Newman IN a Replevin the Defendant pleaded that was seised In jure Collegii and doth not say that he was in Dominico suo ut de foedo and the Plaintiff
naturall Jones Iustice There is great difference between a way and a water-course as to this purpose for admit that this water-course after that it had been in the Curtilage of the Plaintiff goes further to the Curtilage of another shall not that other have the benefit of this water-course notwithstanding the unity of possession I think cleerly that he shall Doderidge my opinion is that the water-course is not extinguished by the unity of possession But some conceived that he had declared his opinion in terror to the Defendant And afterwards the same Term Barksedale for the Plaintiff said that he had agreed the case before and therfore would now only indeavour to answer some exceptions which had been taken to the Declaration 1. Exception hath been that no prescription or custom is made for this water-course but only that Currere solebat consuevit But I conceive thaâ— the Declaration is good notwithstanding this because the Plaintiff here doth not claim an interest in the Water-course but in the Land in which c. and therfore it is good and this appeareth by 12 E. 4. 9. the Prior of Lantonies case in a prescription in a Market overt generally and the reason there was because he was a stranger as in our case he is and this pleading appeareth also to be good by Cooks Book of Entries 18. Smiths case which was entred 9 Jac. Rot. 366. in this Court 2. Exception was because it is not said that it was Antiqua Rectoria 3. Exception because it doth not appear that he was a spiritual man to whom the Demise of the Rectory was made 4. Because it is not said that the Water-course Ad predict Rectoriam pertinet 5. Because the Water-course is alledged to be for his customary Tenants of the said Rectory and this is not good as appeareth by 21 Eliz. Dyer 363. Prescription Pro quolibet customar Tenente is not good but I conceive that this case is not our case for here is Customarius tenens Rectoriae and there it is agreed that Quilibet customarius tenens Maner had been good And the plea in Bar hath salved these objections and therfore he prayed judgment for the Plaintiff Jeremy for the Defendant And first for the matter in Law it seemed to him that by the unity of possession the Water-course is extinguished and the Water-course may well be compared to the case of the way for as a way is a passage for men over the land so water hath passage upon the land and a way is extinguished by unity as appeareth by 21 E. 3. 2. 11 H. 4 5. 21 Ass and Davies Reports 5. and in 4 Jac. Jordan and case it was the better opinion that a way was extinguished by unity of possession true it is that there Popham chief Iustice put the difference where the way is of necessity and where not for where the way is of necessity there it shall not be extinguished This case hath been compared to the case of a Warren in 35 H. 6. but I conceive that the cases are not a like because a Warren is a meer liberty 8 H. 7. 5. A man may have a Warren in his own Land and Co. lib. 7. Buts case by a Feoffment of Land a Warren doth not passe but this Water-course hath its originall out of the Land and this case cannot be compared to an ancient Water-course running to a Mill for notwithstanding the unity it shall passe with the Mill for otherwise it shall not be Molendinum aquatinum so that the water there is parcell of the thing and so of necessity ought to passe with the thing but here it doth not appear that it is a Water-course of necessity and for any thing that appeareth it may be filled with another Water-course Also I conceive that the Declaration is not good 1. Because neither prescription nor custom is laid for the Watercourse and it appeareth in Co. Book of Entries Holcome and Evans case and the old Book of Entries 616 617. Mich. 1. Car. Rot. 107. Turner and Dennies case in this Court in trespasse for breaking his Close c. the Defendant justified for a way c. and that he was possessed for years and for him and his Occupiers had a way over the Land the Plaintiff demurred and resolved that the prescription is not good 2. The Declaration is insufficient being an action upno the case for the stopping of a Water-course and it is not Vi armis nor Contra pacem Co. lib. 9. 50. the Earl of Shrewsburies case when there are two causes of an action upon the case the one Causa causans the other Causa causata causa causans may be alledged Vi armis for this is not the immediate cause of the action but Causa causata F. N. B. 86. H. and 92. E. in the end of the Writ of action upon the case shall be Contra pacem 3. Also he hath prescribed for the Tenants of the Rectory which is not possible for no Lay-man could be Tenant of a Rectory or of Tithes before the Statute of H. 8. and therfore I pray Iudgment for the Defendant Whitlock chief Iustice conceived that the declaration was good the bar is naught both for the form matter the question here is of Aqua profluens and I conceive that there needs no prescription or custome in this case for water hath its naturall course and as is observed by Brudnell in 12 H. 8. Natura sua descendit it may be called Usu captio or Vsage and he conceived that the action upon the case very well lies in this case like to the case where a man bath a house and windows in it and another erect a new house and stop the light then I may have an action upon the case but true it is that I shall not only count for the losse of the aire but also I ought to prescribe that time out of mind light have entred by these windows c. see 7 E. 3. If there be a School-master in a Town and another erect a new School in the same Town an action upon the case doth not lye against him because Schools are for the publike benefit and every private man may have a School in his house And for the exception that a Lay man cannot be possessed of a Rectory I conceive that the Declaration is good notwithstanding for a Lay-man may have a Rectory by Demise And for the Plea in bar it is not good for the form because that Searles entred and enfeoffed Pigot and it is not said that he entred and Expulit and if a man enter and make a Feoffment the owner being upon the Land the Feoffment is void and therfore an actuall Ouster ought to be shown And for the matter in Law he conceived that the Bar was not good for by the unity of possession the water-course is not extinguished and yet I agree the cases of a way and common upon the differences of Rights which are
same time nothing works by the Livery for the reason before given by Jones For the matter of Law he conceived that the unity of possession doth not extinguish the Water-course and that for two reasons 1. For the necessity of the thing 2. From the nature of the thing being a Water-course which is a thing running 1 For the necessity and this is the reason that common appendant by the unity of possession shall not be extinguished for it is appendant to ancient Land-hide and gain arable Land which is necessary for the preservation of the Common-wealth and as in this case there is a necessity of bread so in our case there is a necessity of water And for the case of a way Distinguendum est for if it be a way which is only for easement it is extinguished by unity of possession but if it be a way of necessity as a way to Market or Church there it is not extinguished by unity of possession and accordingly was the opinion of Popham chief Iustice which I take for good Law and the case of 11 H. 7. 25. is a notable case and there a reason is given why a Gutter is not extinguished by unity of possession because it is matter of necessity 2. From the nature of water which naturally descends it is alwais current Et aut invenit aut facit viam and shall such a thing be extinguished which hath its being from the Creation Co. lib. 4. Luttrels case a Mill is a necessary thing and if I purchase the Land upon which the streams goes which runs to this Mill and afterwards I alien the Mill the Water-course remains So if a man hath a Dye-house and there is a water running to it and afterwards he purchase the Land upon which the water is current and sell it yet he shall have the Water-course Dyer Dame Browns case and the principall case in Luttrels case a Fulling-mill made a Water-mill this shall not alter the nature of the Mill but yet it remains a Mill so the water hath its course notwithstanding the unity and he concluded for the Plaintiff Crew chief Iustice I agree that the Declaration is good and also that the Bar is good for the manner but for the matter in Law I conceive that it is not good In our Law every case hath its stand or fall from a particular reason or circumstance For a Warren and Tithes they are not extinguished by unity because they are things collaterall to the Land And for the case of 13 Eliz. in Dyer of an Inclosure I conceive that by the unity the Inclosure is destroyed for the Prescription was interrupted and in Day and Drakes case 3 Jac. in this Court it was adjudged that in the same case the Prescription was gone It may be resembled to the case of Homage Ancestrell 57 E. 3. Fitzherbert Nusans And for our case it is not like to the cases of Common or a Way because the Water-course is a thing naturall and therfore by unity it shal not be discharged also there is a linement out of which every man shall have a benefit and therfore he concluded that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff And Iudgment was commanded to be entred for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Welden versus Vesey AN action of Debt was brought by Welden Sheriff of the City of Coventry against Vesey upon the Statute of 29 Eliz. cap. 4. and declares that it is provided by this Statute that no Sheriff or Minister c. shall take for an execution if the summ doth not exceed 100 l. but 12 d. for every 20 s. and being above the summ of 100 l. 6 d. for every 20 s. and shews that wheras the said Vesey had judgment against one in an action of Debt that the Plaintiff by virtue of a Capias directed to him took the body of the said person condemned and that it was delivered to the Plaintiff and that he for levying of the money had brought this action The Defendant by way of Bar saith that it is provided by this act that it shall not extend to Executions in Towns Corporate and that this was within Coventry and so demurred upon the Declaration And Whitwick argued for the Plaintiff two things are considerable in this case 1. Whether where the summ exceeds 100 l. the Sheriff shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. of the 100 l. and 6 d. for that which is over or 6 d. only for every 20 s. for all the summ 2. Whether this Statute extend to Iudgments in Towns Corporate For the first the letter of the Statute is cleer that he shall have 12 d. for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for the residue for the Statute is that if it be above 100 l. Whether a Sheriff or c. shall have 12 d. in the pound for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for the rest upon an Execution that he shall have but 6 d. therfore if it be under a 100 l. he shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. And the meaning of the Statute is plain also for otherwise the Sheriff shall have a lesser Fee where it is above a 100 l. as where it is a 199 l. then he shall have for 100 l. but this was not the intent of the Statute but the greater the Execution the greater the Fee It was adjudged in one Gores case 10 Jac. that an action of Debt lies upon this Law Pasch 14 Jac. Rot. 351. Brole and Tumblerson Sheriffs of the City of London brought Dabt against Nathanael Michell for execution of 400 l. for 12 l. 10 s. scil 5 l. for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for every 20 1. after But I confesse that the principall question there was whether an action of Debt lies for the money and it was resolved that it did and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff 2. To the Proviso that this doth not extend to Fees in a Town Corporate whether this extend to executions which go out of Iudgments in this Court or in the Common Pleas into Towns Corporate The Statute shews that before that time the Sheriff had taken great Fees which the Parliament considering restrained them to a certainty The words of the Proviso are generall Provided that this Act shall not extend to any Fees to be taken for any Execution within any City or Town Corporate and although the words be generall yet the exposition shall be according to reason as it is said in Fulmerston and Stewards case in Plow Expesition shal be made against the words if the words be against reason 5 H. 7. 7 38 H. 3. Broo. Livery 6. The King shall have primer Seisen of all Lands of his Tenant which he holds of him in Capite but if one holds of the King in Capite in Socage he shall pay no primer Seisen to the King and this Statute shall have this intendment that this Proviso shall extend only to Executions upon Iudgments