the Person and to that purpose he cited 15 E. 4. 29. And he agreed the Case That if the Lord improve part of the Common that he shall not have common for the Residue because of the same Land newly improved for he cannot prescribe for that which is improved by 5. Ass 2. But here he doth prescribe not in the person or in or for a new thing but that the usage of the Towne hath been That the Inhabitants shall have common and that common is not appendent nor appertinent nor in grosse by Needham 37 H. 6. 34. b. Besides he said That if the house of a Freeholder who hath used to have such common fall down and he build it up again in another place of the Land that he shall have common as before And he put a difference betwixt the case of Estovers and this Case where a new Chimney is set up for that makes a new matter of charge and he much stood upon the manner of the Prescription Gaudy Serjeant contrary and he took Exception to the Prescription for he saith that it is antiqua villa and doth not say time out of mind and such is the Prescription in 15. E. 4. 29. a. and if it be not a Town time out of mind c. he cannot prescribe that he hath used time out of mind c. And he said That if it should be Law that every one who builds a new house should have common it should be prejudiciall to the Ancient Tenants or impaire the common And so one who hath but a little land might build 20 houses and so an infinite number and every house should have common which were not reason Anderson chief Justice He who builds a new house cannot prescribe in common for then a prescription might begin at this day which cannot be and he insisted upon the generall loss to the ancient Tenants Pâ—riam Justice If it should be Law that he should have common then the benefit of improvement which the Statute giveth to the Lord shall be taken away by this means by such new buildings which is not reason So as all the Justices were of opinion That he should not have common but Judgement was respited untill they had copies of the Record And Hillary Term following the Case was moved again and Anderson and Periam were of Opinion as they were before and for the same reasons But Windham Justice did incline to the contrary But they did all allow That he who new bulids an old Chimney shall have Estovers so a house common So if a house fall down and the Tenant build it up again in another place Periam If a man hath a Mill and a Watercourse time out of mind which he hath used to cleanse if the Mill fall down and he set up a new Mill he shall have the liberty to cleanse the Watercourse as he had before And that Terme Judgement was given for the Defendant to which Windham agreed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 111 IN a Replevin the parties were at Issue upon the Property and it was found for the Plaintiff and Damages intire were assessed and not for the taking by it self and for the value of the Cattell by themselves for the Judgement upon that is absolute and not conditionall and also if the Plaintiffe had the Cattell the Defendant might have given the same in Evidence to the Jury and then they would have assessed Damages accordingly viz. but for the taking Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 112 A. bargaines with B. for twenty Loads of Wood and B. promises to deliver them at D. if he fail an Action upon the Case lieth But Periam Justice said That upon a simple contract for wood upon an implicative promise an Action upon the Case doth not lie Rodes Justice If by failer of performance the Plaintiff be damnified to such a sum this Action lieth Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 113 A Lease of Lands is made excepting Timber-Woods and Under-woods And the question was Whether Trees Sparsim growing in Hedge rowes and Pastures did passe And difference was taken betwixt Timber-wood being one Wood and Timber Woods being severall Words although it bee Arbor dum crescit lignum dum crescere nescit yet in common speech that is said Timber which is fit to make Timber Then it was moved Who should have the Lops and Fruits of them and the Soile after the cutting of them downe and also the Soile after the Under Woods and as to that a difference was taken where the words are generally All woods and where they are his woods growing And in speaking of that case another case was moved viz. If a stranger cut down woods in a Forrest and there is no fraud or collusion betwixt him and the owner of the Land Whether the King should have them or the owner of the Soile And it was holden That the owner of the Soile should have them and yet the owner could not cut them downe but is to take them by the Livery of one appointed by the Statute Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 114. A. makes a Lease of Lands to B. for ten years rendring rent And B. covenants to repaire c. Afterwards A. by his Will deviseth that B. shall have the Lands for thirty years after the ten years under the like Covenants as are comprised in the Lease Fenner moved it as a question If by the Devise those which were Covenants in the first Lease should be Conditions in the second for they cannot bee Covenants for want of a Deed And if they should not be Conditions the heir of the Lessor were without remedie if they were not performed A Devise for years paying ten pounds to a stranger is a Condition because the stranger hath no other remedy Gaudy Justice By the Devise to him to do such things as he was to do by the Lease makes it to be a Condition which was in a manner agreed by all the other Justices Yet Periam and Rodes Justices said That the first Lease was not defeisable for not performance of the Covenants nor was it the intent of the Devisor that the second should be so notwithstanding that his meaning was that he should do the same things Periam The Covenant is in the third person viz. Conventum Aggreatum est And see 28. H. 8. Dyer where the words Non licet to the Lessee to assigne make a Condition Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 115. BARBER and TOPESFEILD'S Case A. being Tenant in taile of certain Lands exchanged the same with B. B. entred and being seised in Fee of other Lands devised severall parcels thereof to others and amongst the rest a particular estate unto his heir Proviso That he do not re-re-enter nor claim any of his other Lands in the destruction of his Will And if he do that then the estate in the Lands devised to him to cease A. dieth his issue entreth into the Lands in
taile and waives the Lands taken in Exchange and before any other entry the heir of B. enters upon the Land which was given in Exchange and the opinion of the whole Court was That it was no breach of the Condition because that was not the Land of the Devifor at the time of the devise therefore it was out of the Condition Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 116. PLYMPTON'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought by one Plympton and his wife Executors of one Dorrington upon a Bond with Condition to perform Covenants of an Indenture of Lease whereof one Covenant was That he should pay forty shillings yearly at the Feast of the Annunciation or within fourteen days after And the breach assigned was for not payment at such a Feast in such a year The Defendant said That hee paid it at the Feast upon which they were at issue And upon evidence given to the Jury it appeared That the same was not paid at the Feast but in eight dayes after it was paid And the opinion of the Court was That by his pleading that hee had paid it at such a day certain and tendring that for a speciall issue That hee had made the day part of the issue and then the Defendant ought to have proved the payment upon the very day But if the Defendant had pleaded That hee paid it within the fourteen dayes viz. the eighth day c. that had not made the day parcell of the issue but then hee might have given evidence that he paid it at another day within the fourteene dayes Then for the Defendant it was moved That the Plaintiffe had not well assigned the breach in saying that he had not paid it at the Feast without saying Nor within the fourteen dayes But the Court said That the Jury was sworn at the Barre and bid the Councell proceed and give in their evidence for the time to take exception was past Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 117. IT was the opinion of Anderson Chiefe Justice and so entred by the Court That if a Copie-holder doth surrender to him who hath a Lease for years of the Mannor to the use of the same Lessee That the Copie-hold estate is extinct For the estate in the Copie-hold is not of right but an estate at will although that custome and prescription had fortified it And Wray said That it had been resolved by good opinion That if a Copie-holder accept a Lease for years of the Mannor that the Copie-hold estate is extinct for ever Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 118. Anderson Chiefe Justice and Periam Justice being absent in a Commission upon the Queen of Scots Shuttleworth moved this case to the Court. If the Queen give Lands in taile to hold in Capite And afterwards granteth the Reversion how the Donee shall hold Windham Justice and Fenner Serjant The tenure in this case is not incident to the Reversion and the Donee shall hold of the Queen as in grosse and so two Tenures in Capite for one and the same Land And thereupon Windham Justice cited 30. H. 8. Dyer 45 46. That the Queen by no way can sever the tenure in chiefe from the Crown And therefore if the Queen do release to her Tenant in Capite to hold by a penny and not in Capite it is a void Release for the same is meerly incident to the Person and Crown of the Queen But Rodes Justice held the contrary viz. That the Tenure in Capite doth not remain But it was said by Windham That if the Queen had reserved a Rent upon the gift in tail the Grantee of the Reversion should have it Also he said That the Queen might have made the Tenure in such manner viz. to hold of the Mannor or of the Honor of D. Shuttleworth If Lands holden of the Mannor of D. come to the King may he give them to be holden of the Mannor of S that should be hard Windham I did not say That Lands holden of one Mannor may be given to be holden of another Mannor perhaps that may not bee but Lands which is parcell of any Mannor may be given Vt supra Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 119 SErjeant Fenner moved Case If Lands be given to the Husband and Wife and to the heirs of their two bodies and the Husband dieth leaving Issue by his Wife and the Wife makes a Lease of the lands according to the Statute of 32. H. 8. If the Lease be good by the Statute Windham and Rodes Justices conceived that it is a good Lease Fenner The Statute saith that such Lease shall be good against the Lessor and his Heirs and the Issue doth not claim as Heir to the Wife onely but it ought to be Heir to them both and he cited the case That the Statute of R. 3. makes Feoffments good against no heirs but those which claim onely as Heirs to the same Feoffors c. So here Rodes Justice There the word only is a word efficacy And Windham agreed cleerly That the Lease should binde the issue by the said Statute of 32. H. 8. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 120 WAlmesley Serjeant moved this Case If a man deviseth Lands in taile with divers Remainders over upon condition that if any of them alien or c. that then he who is next heir to him to whom the land ought to come after his decease if the said alienation had not been made might enter and enjoy the land as if he had been dead But Ady of the Temple said That the words of the Devise are viz. That if any of them alien or c. that then his estate to cease and hee in the next Remainder to enter and retain the land untill the aliener were dead Rodes Justice The Devise is good and an estate may cease in such manner so as it shall not be determined for ever but that his Heir after him shall have it And he put the case of Scholastica Plow Com. 408. where Weston fo 4. 14. was in some doubt that if the Tenant in talle had had Issue if the Issue should be excluded from the land or whether hee should have the land by the intent of the Devisor And therefore if it were necessary to shew that the Tenant in taile had not Tssue But Dyer said that the words of the Will were that such person and his Heirs who alien or c. should be excluded presently so as the estate by expresse words is to be determined for ever But it is otherwise in this Case Windham doubted of the Devise Fenner cited the Case 22. E. 3. 19. Where a Rent was granted and that it should ceâ—se during the Nonage of the Heir of the Grantee and it was good Windham When a thing is newly created he who creates it may limit it in such manner as he pleaseth Fenner 30. E. 3. 7. Det. 10. A Feoffment was made rendring Rent upon
E. 3 17 a. Persay Executors cannot make a Feoffment but they ought to make a Sale and the Vendee viz. the Bargainee is in without Livery and Seisin But if they do make a Feoffment by the Livery all their right is given away But if an Attorney giveth Livery in the name of his Master nothing of his own right to the same Land is given away by the Livery and Seisin but if he maketh Livery in his own name then he giveth away his own right and the Statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 1. maketh the Feoffment good which is made by Cestuy que use against him and his heirs C. 1. pt 111. By Livery and Seisin his whole right is given away Com. 352. The Feoffees of Cestuy que use are disseised the Disseisor enfeoffeth Cestuy que use who enfeoffs a stranger And the Question was If by this Feoffment made by Cestuy que use the right of the first Feoffees were determined and extinct Fitzherbert held that the right was gone and in that case the Uses were raised after 1 R. 3. and before 27 H. 8. cap. 10. Although Yelverton held that it was meant of a Feoffment before the Statute of 1 R. 3. Jus recuperandi was in Francis Bigot Then the question is Whether this Right were given away by the Statutes of 26 31 H. 8. The Statute of 26 H. 8. 31 H. 8. are several and distinct Statutes The words of the Statute of 26 H. 8. are That the party offending shall forfeit all his Possession and Vse but there is no word of Right in the Statute and that Statute doth not extend to give any land but that which was in possession or use And the cause was because before that Statute of 26 H. 8. Uses were not given unto the King for Attaindor for Treason they being but a Trust and Confidence C. 11. part 36 b. The Statute sayes By any wayes title or means But observe when this Statute was made It is a penal Statute and therefore shall be taken strictly Stamford 129 b. C. 11. part 36 b. The Statute of 5 6 E. 6. takes away Clergy but if a stranger be in the house by licence of the Owner the party shall have his Clergy because out of the words and being a penal Law it shall be taken strictly The Statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 20. forfeits for Treason Right to the Land viz. right of Entry but the Statute of 26 H 8. giveth not any Right Before the Statute of 33 H. 8. a right of Entry was not given to the King for Treason à fortiori a right of Action was not forfeited to the King It is the Statute of 31 H. 8. the private Act which hurteth us which expresly gave Rights But this Right in our Case is not forfeited by this Statute which giveth Rights which a man hath But in our Case Francis Bigot had not the Right but the Right was in abeyance Statutes in points of Forfeiture forfeit no more then a man hath But yet a Statute may give to the King that which a man hath not C. 11. part 13. The statute of Monasteries gave that to the King which was not viz. Monasteries in reputation saving to none but strangers no not to the Donors Hussies Case Tenant in tail doth bargain and sell to the King and a statute gave it to the King saving to strangers but neither the Donor nor his issue were within the saving Old Entries 423. b c d. It was enacted That the Duke of Suffolk should forfeit for Treason all his Lands Rights and Tenements and all such Rights and Titles of Entry which he had But thereby rights of Action were not given to the King but only rights of Entries The statutes of 31 33 H. 8. are alike in words If Tenant in tail the Remainder over forfeit c. the Remainder is saved without words of saving But if the statute giveth the land by name unto the King then the Remainder is not saved but is destroyed If a Right of Action be given unto the King the statutes of Limitation and Fines are destroyed for he is not bound by them C. 485 486. in point of forfeiture Stamf. 187 188. There is a difference betwixt real and personal Rights given to the King C. 3. part 3. A right of Action concerning Inheritances are not forfeited by Attaindor c. But Obligations Statutes c. are forfeited by Attaindor C. 7. part 9. A right of Action is not given to the King by general words of an Act because it lieth in privity And it would be a vexation to the subject if they should be given C. 4. pt 124. Although that a Non compos mentis cannot commit Felony yet he may commit Treason for the King is Caput salus reipublicae If Non compos mentis maketh a Feoffment and then committeth Treason the King shall not have an Action to recover the Land of the Non compos mentis as the party himself may have But if Non compos mentis be disseised and then be attainted of Treason then the King may enter into the Lands because the party himself had a right of Entry which is given to the King It was objected That a right of Action clothed with a possession might be given to the King Tenant in tail discontinues and takes back an estate and is attainted of Treason This right of Action shall not be forfeited to the King for his right of Action was to the estate tail In our Case the right of Action was to Katherine for she was Tenant for life The Attaindor was 29 H 8. and the Act which forfeited the Right was made 31 H. 8. and then the right and possession were divided 30 H. 6. Grants 91. The King may grant the Temporalties of a Bishop before they happen to be void And so he may grant a Ward But the King cannot grant the Lands of J. S. when he shall be attainted of Treason for the Law doth not presume that J. S. will commit Treason The Devise of a Term the Remainder over is good But if the Devise be of a Term to one in tail the Remainder over the Remainder is void because the Law doth presume that an estate in tail may continue for ever C. 8. part 165 166. The Law did not presume that Digby at the time of the Conveyance intended to commit Treason It was objected That whatsoever may be granted may be forfeited I deny that C. 3. part 10. by Lumley's Case If the issue in tail in the life of his Father be attainted of high Treason and dyeth it is no forfeiture of the estate tail But if the issue in tail levieth a Fine in the life of his Father it is a bar to his issues C. 3. part 50. Sir George Brown's Case 10 E. 4. 1. there Executors may give away the goods of the Testator but they cannot forfeit the goods of their Testator Com. 293. Osborns Case Guardian in
of the Justices was That the Fee was executed for a moitie Manwood If the Land be to one for life the Remainder for yeers the Remainder to the first Tenant for life in Fee there the Fee is executed so as if he lose by default he shall have a Writ of Right and not Quod ei deforceat for the term shall be no impediment that the Fee shall not be executed As a man may make a lease to begin after his death it is good and the Lessor hath Fee in possession and his wife shall be endowed after the Lease And I conceive in the principall case That the term shall not be extinct for that it is not a term but interesse termini which cannot be granted nor surrendred Mounson If he had had the term in his own right then by the purchase of the Fee the Term should be extinct But here he hath it in the right of another as Administrator Dyer If an Executor hath a term and purchaseth the Fee the term is determined So if a woman hath a term and takes an husband who purchaseth the Fee the term is extinct Manwood The Law may be so in such case because the Husband hath done an act which destroyes the term viz. the purchase But if the woman had entermarried with him in the Reversion there the term should not be extinguished for the Husband hath not done any act to destroy the term But the marriage is the act of Law Dyer That difference hath some colour But I conceive in the first case That they are Tenants in common of the Fee Manwood The Case is a good point in law But I conceive the opinion of Manwood was That if a Lease for yeares were to begin after the death surrender forfeiture or determination of the first lease for yeares that it shall not begin in that part for then perhaps the term in that part shall be ended before the other should begin Pasc 20. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 3. A Man seised of Copyhold land descendable to the youngest Son by Custome and of other Lands descendable to the eldest Son by the common Law leaseth both for yeers The Lessee covenanteth That if the Lessor his wife and his heirs will have back the land That then upon a yeers warning given by the Lessor his wife or his heirs that the Lease shall be void The Lessor dieth the Reversion of the customary Land descends to the younger son and the other to the eldest who granteth it to the younger and he gives a yeers warning according to the Covenant Fenner The interest of the term is not determined because a speciall heir as the youngest son is is not comprehended under the word Heir but the heir at common Law is the person who is to give the warning to avoid the estate by the meaning of the Covenant But Manwood and Mounson Justices were cleer of opinion That the interest of the term for a moity is avoyded for the Condition although it be an entire thing by the Descent which is the act of Law is divided and apportioned and the warning of any of them shall defeat the estate for a moity because to him the moity of the Condition doth belong But for the other moity he shall not take advantage by the warning because that the warning is by the words of the Condition appointed to be done by the Lessor his wife or his heirs And in that clause of the Deed the Assignee is not contained And they agreed That if a Feoffment of lands in Borough-English be made upon condition That the heir at common Law shall take advantage of it And Manwood said that hee would put another question Whether the younger son should enter upon him or not But all Actions in right of the Land the younger son should have as a Writ of Error to reverse a Judgment Attaint and the like quod nota Pasc 22. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 4 IT was holden by Meade and Windham Justices of the Common Pleas That a Parsonage may be a Mannor As if before the Statute of Quia emptores terrarum the Parson with the Patron and Ordinary grant parcel of the Glebe to divers persons to hold of the Parson by divers Services the same makes the Parsonage a Manor Also they held That a Rent-Charge by prescription might be parcel of a Manor and shall passe without the words cum pertinentiis As if two Coparceners be of a Manor and other Lands and they make partition by which the eldest sister hath the Manor and the other hath the other Lands and she who hath the Lands grants a Rent-charge to her sister who hath the Manor for equality of partition Anderson and Fenner Srjeants were against it Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 5. THis Case was moved by Serjeant Periam That if a Parson hath Common appendant to his Parsonage out of the lands of an Abby and afterwards the Abbot hath the Parsonage appropriated to him and his Successors Whether the Common be extinct Dyer That it is Because he hath as high an estate in the Common as he hath in the Land As in the case of 2 H. 4. 19. where it is holden That if a Prior hath an Annuity out of a Parsonage and afterwards purchaseth the Advowson and then obtains an Appropriation thereof that the Annuity is extinct But Windham and Meade Justices conceived That the Abbot hath not as perdurable estate in the one as in the other for the Parsonage may be disappropriated and then the Parson shall have the Common again As if a man hath a Seignorie in fee and afterwards Lands descend to him on the part of the Mother in that case the Seignory is not extinguished but suspended For if the Lord to whom the Land descends dies without issue the Seignorie shall go to the heir on the part of the Father and the Tenancy to the heir on the part of the Mother And yet the Father had as high an estate in the Tenancy as in the Seignory And in 21 E. 3. 2. Where an Assize of Nusance was brought for straightning of a way which the plaintif ought to have to his Mill The defendant did alledg unity of possession of the Land and of the Mill in W. and demanded Judgment if c. The plaintif said that after that W. had two daughters and died seised and the Mill was allotted to one of them in partition and the Land to the other and the way was reserved to her who had the Mill And the Assize was awarded And so by the partition the way was revived and appendant as it was before and yet W. the Father had as high an estate in the Land as he had in the Way Hill 23 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 6. A Man makes a Feoffment in Fee of a Manor to the use of himself and his Wife and his heirs In which Manor there are Underwoods usually to be cut every one and twenty yeers and
a Prohibition And Suit and Clenche Justices He shall have a Prohibition for he claims onely a portion of Tithes and that by prescription and not meerly as Parson or by reason of the Parsonage but by a collaterall cause viz. by Prescription which is a Temporall cause and thing And it is not materiall whether it be betwixt two Parsons Vide 20. H. 6. 17. Br. Jurisdiction 80. and 11. H. 4. and 35. H. 6. 39. Br. Jurisdiction 3. Where in Trespasse for taking of Tithes the Defendant claimed them as Parson and within his Parish and the Plaintiffe prescribed That he and his predecessors Vicars there had had the Tithes of that place time out of minde c. And the opinion of the Court was that the right of Tithes came in debate betwixt the Vicar and the Parson who were Spirituall persons who might try the right of Tithes And therfore there the Temporall Court should not have the Jurisdiction Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 56 IN an Indictment upon the Statute of 8. H. 6. of Forcible Entry the Case was this One was Lessee for yeers and the Reversion did belong unto the Company of Goldsmiths And one was indicted for a forcible Entry and the words of the Indictment were That expulit disseisivit the Company of Goldsmiths quendam I. S. tenentem expulit Cooke took exception to the Indictment and said that a disseisin might be to one although not in possession as to a Reversioner upon a term for yeers or upon a Wardship but he could not be expulsed if he were not in possession for privatiâ— praesupponit habitum And after it saith that the Tenant was expulsed and two cannot be expulsed where one onely was in possession therefore it ought to have said that the Tenant of the Free-hold was disseised and the Termor expelled and it applyes the word expulit to both And Fuller took another Exception that the Cart is set before the horse For he who had the Free-hold could not be disseised if his Termor were not first ousted and the Indictment is That the Tenant of the Free-hold was expulsed and disseised and then the Termor was expelled But Sui Justice as to that said that the later clause scil et quendam I. S. tenentem c. is but surplusage For if one enter with force and expell the Tenant of the Free-hold it is within the Statute of 8. H. 6. Then Fuller moved that the Indictment doth not shew the place where he expelled him But Cleâ—ch Justice said that that was not material for he could not expell him at another place then upon the Land As a man cannot make a Feoffment by livery and seisin at another place but upon the Land unless a Feoffment with Livery within the view And as to the Objection of Cook that the Indictment is that he disseised and expelled the Tenant of the Free-hold out of the possession of the Free-hold To that he answered that the possession of the Termor is the possession of him in the Reversion Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 57 A Man seised of a Copy-hold in Fee made his Will and thereby he devised the same unto his Wife for her life and that after her death his Wife or her Executors should sell the Land He surrendred to the use of his Wife which was entred in hac forma viz. to the use of his Wife for life Secundùm formam ultimae voluntatis The Woman sold the Land during her life The question was Whether she might sell or not Suit Justice said That the intent doth appear that she might sell during her life for when it saith That she or her Executors should sell after her death it is meant the Estate which is to come after her death for the Wife after her death could not sell The second Point was When the surrender is to the Wife for life secundùm formam ultimae voluntatis Whether here she have the Land for life and the Fee also to sell Clenche If she had not the Fee to sell then the words Secundùm formam ultimae voluntatis should be void for the Surrender to the use of the wife for life gives her an Estate for life without any other words Suit If it were ad usum ultimae voluntatis without speaking what Estate the Wife should have no doubt but shee should have for her own use for life and that afterwards she might sell the Land but he said As the Case is put it is a pretty Case And it was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 58 THis Case was moved in Court A Copy-holder committed Waste by which a forfeiture accrued to the Lord who afterwards did accept of the Rent The question was Whether by this acceptance he were concluded of his Entrie for the Forfeiture Cook said He was not for it is not as the Case 45 E. 3. where a Lease is made upon Condition that the Lessee shall not do Waste and he commits Waste and then the Lessor accepts the Rent there he cannot enter But otherwise is it of a Copy-hold for there is a condition in Law and here in Fait and a condition in Fait may save the Land by an Acceptance but a condition in Law cannot for by the condition in Law broken the Estate of the Copyholder is meerly void And the Court agreed That when such a Forfeiture is presented it is not to Entitle the Lord but to give him notice for the Copy-hold is in him by the Forfeiture presently without any Presentment A man made a Lease for years upon condition that he should not assign over his Lease and it was reserving Rent and after he did assign it and then the Lessor accepted the rent there he shall not enter for the condition broken Lessee for years upon condition that he should not do Waste and the Lessor accepts of the Rent for the quarter in which the Waste was done yet he may enter but if he do accept of a second payment of the Rent then it is otherwise but if it were upon condition That if he do waste that his Estate shall cease There no acceptance of the Rent by the Lessor can make the Lease good It was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 59 THE Lord Admirall did grant the Office of Clark or Register of the Admirall Court to one Parker and Herold for their lives eorum diuâ—ius viventi And Herold bound himself in a Bond of Five Hundred Pound to Parker that the said Parker should enjoy the Office cum omnibus proficuis during his life And afterwards Herold did interrupt the said Parker in his Office upon which he brought an Action of Debt upon the Bond. The Defendant pleaded That such is the custome That the Admirall might grant the same Office for the life of the Admirall only and that he is dead and so the Office void and that he did interrupt him as it was lawfull
not have an Action without cause and if he were convicted then there is no cause of Action and he hath not shewed whether he was convicted or acquitted And he said that there was no difference betwixt an Action on the Case and a Conspiracie in such case but onely this That a Conspiracy ought to be by two at the least and an Action upon the Case may lie against one and he said that in both he ought to shew that he was legitimo modo acquietatus See 11. H. 7. 25. An Action of Conspiracy founded upon the Statute of 8. H 6. Cap. 10. where it is grounded upon a Writ of Trespasse brought against one onely But such a Conspiracy which is grounded upon an Indictment of Felony must be against two at the least for the same is an Action founded upon the Common Law Mich. 28 29. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 92. BONEFANT against Sir RIC. GREINFIELD BOnefant brought an Action of Trespasse against Sir Richard Greinfield The Case was this A man made his Will and made A. E. I. O. his Executors and devised his Lands to A. E. I. and O. by their speciall names and to their heirs and further willed that his Devisees should sell the Land to I. D. if he would give for the same before such a day an hundred pound and if not that then they should sell to any other to the performance of his Will scil the payment of his debts I. D. would not give the hundred pound One of the Devisees refused to entermeddle and the other three sold the Land and if the Sale were good or not was the question Cooke The Sale is not good 1. Let us see what the Common Law is At the Common Law it is a plain case that the Sale is not good because it is a speciall trust and a joynt trust and shall never survive for perhaps the Devisor who is dead reposed more confidence in him who refused then in the others Vide 2 Eliz. the Case of the Lord Bray who covenanted That if his son marry with the consent of four whom he especially named viz. A. B. C. and D. that then he would stand seised to the use of his son and his wife and to the heirs of their two bodies begotten One of the four was attainted and executed The other did consent that he should marry such a one he married her yet no estate passed because the fourth did not consent and it was a joynt trust 38. H. 8. Br. Devises 31. A man willeth that his Lands deviseable shall be sold by his Executors and makes four Executors all of them ought to sell for the trust which is put upon them is a joynt Trust But Brook conceiveth that if one of them dieth that the others may sell the Lands The Case betwixt Vincent and Lee was this A man devised That if such a one dieth without issue of his body that then his Sons in law should sell such Lands and there were five sons in law when the Testatour died and when the other man died without issue there were but three sons in law and they sold the Lands and it was holden that the Sale was good because the Land was not presently to be sold Also he said that in the principall Case here they have an Interest in the Lands and each of them hath a part therefore the one cannot sell without the other But if the devise were that four should sell they have not an Interest but onely an Authority As to the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. he said that that left our Case to the Common Law For that Statute as it appeareth by the preamble speaks onely of such Devises by which the Land is devised to be sold by the Executors and not devised to the Executors to sell And goes further and saith Any such Testament c. of any such person c. therefore it is meant of such a devise made unto the Executors and then no Interest passeth but onely an Authority or a bare Trust But in our Case they have an Interest for he who refused had a fourth part Then when the other sell the whole the same is a disseisin to him of his part If a Feoffment be made to four upon condition that they make a Feoffment over and two of them make the Feoffment it is not good Also the words of the Will prove that they have an Interest for it is that his Devisees shall sell c. Laiton contrary And he said That although the Devise be to them by their proper names and not by the name Executors yet the intent appeareth that they were to sell as Executors because it was to the performance of his last Will and that may be performed as well by the three although that the other doth refuse and the Sale of the Land doth referre to the performance of his Will in which there are divers Debts and Legacies appointed to be paid 2. H. 4. and 3. H. 6. A man devised his Lands to be sold for the payment of his debts and doth not name who shall sell the same the Lands shall be sold by his Executors 39. Ass A Devise is of Lands unto Executors to sell for the performance of his Will the profits of the Lands before the Sale shall be assets in the Executors hands 15. H. 7. 12. is That if a man devise that his Lands shall be sold they shall be sold by his Executors Also if I devise that my Executors shall sell my Lands and they sell it is an Administration and afterwards they cannot plead that they never were Executors nor never administred as Executors And although there are divers Authorities to be executed yet it is but one Trust 39. Ass 17. is our very Case A man seised of Lands deviseable devised them to his Executors to sell and died having two Executors and one of them died and the other entred and sold the Land and the Sale was good 49. E. 3. 15. Isabell Goodcheapes Case Where a man devised that after an Estate in taile determined that his Executors should sell the Lands and made three Executors and one died and another refused the third after the taile determined sold the Land and the Sale was holden good and that it should not escheate to the Lord for the Land was bound with a Devise as with a Condition as to the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. the preamble of the Statute is as it hath been recited and although for exmaple the Lands in use are only put yet the Statute is not tied only to that As in the Statute of Collusion of Malbridge Examples are put only of Feoffments and Leases for years yet there is no doubt but that a Lease for life or a gift in taile to defraud the Lord is within the Statute So the Statute of Donis Conditionalibus puts onely three manner of estate tailes But Littleton saith That there are many other estate tailes which are
Condition that if the Rent be behinde the Feoffor might enter and retain quousque there the estate shall be determined pro tempore and afterwards revived again Windham There the Feoffor shall have the land as a distress and the Free-hold is not out of the Feoffee Fenner The Book proves the contrary for the Feoffor had an Action of Debt for the Rent Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 121 IN a Formedon the Tenant pleaded a Fine with proclamations The Plaintiff replyed No such Record It was moved that the Record of the Fine which remained with the Chyrographer did warrant the Plea and the Record which did remain with the Custos Brevium did not warrant the Plea and both the Records were shewed in Court and to which the Court should hold was the question Shuttleworth To that which was shewed by the Custos Brevium and he cited the Case of Fish and Brocket where the Proclamations were reversed because that it appeared by the Record which was shewed by the Custos Brevium that the third proclamation was alledged to be made the seventh day of June which seventh day of June was the Sunday and yet hee said It appeared by the Record certified by the Chyrographer that it was well done and yet the Judgment reversed Rodes Justice There is no such matter in the same case And 26. El. by all the Justices and Barons of the Exchequer in such case the Record which remains with the Custos Brevium shall be amended and made according as it is in the Record of the Office of Chyrographer Windham agreed And afterwards the said President was shewed in which all the matter and order of proceedings was shewed and contained and all the names of the Justices who made the Order And by the command of the Justices it was appointed that the said President should be written out and should remain in perpetuam rei memoriam And the reason of the said Order is there given because the Note which remains with the Chyrographer is principale Recordum Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 122. AN Infant was made Executor and Administration was committed unto another durante minore aetate of the Executor and that Administrator brought an Action of Debt for money due to the Testator and recovered and had the Defendant in Execution and now the Executour is come of full age Fenner moved that the Defendant might be discharged out of Execution because the Authority of the Administrator is now determined and he cannot acknowledge satisfaction nor make Acquittances c. Windham Justice Although the Authority of the Plaintiffe bee determined yet the Recovery and the Judgement do remaine in force But perhaps you may have an Audita querela But I conceive That such an Administrator cannot have an Action for he is rather as a Bayliff to the Infant Executor then an Administrator Rodes agreed with him and he said I have seen such a Case before this time viz. Where one was bound to such a one to pay a certaine sum of money to him his Heirs Executors or Assignes And the Obligee made an Infant his Executor and administration was committed during his minority and the Obligor paid the money to that Administrator And it was a doubt whether the same was sufficient and should excuse him or not And whether he ought not to have tendred the money to them both Fenner That is a stronger Case then our Case One who is Executor of his own wrong may pay Legacies and receive Debts but he cannot bring an Action Windham Doth it appear by the Record when the Infant was made Executor and that Administration was committed as before Fenner No truely Windham Then you may have an Audita querela upon it Fenner said So we will Note Hil. 33. Eliz. in the Exchequer Miller and Gores Case An Infant pleaded in a Scire facias upon an Assignement of Bonds to the Queen That Saint-Johns and Eley were Administrators during his minority And it was holden by the Court to be no plea. But he ruled to answer as Executor Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 123 SUggestion was made that a Coroner had not sufficient Lands within the Hundred for which a Writ issued forth to choose another and one was chosen It was moved by Serjeant Snag If theâ—eby the first Coroner did cease to be Coroner presently untill he be discharged by Writ Rodes and Windham Justices He ceases presently for otherwise there should be two Officers of one Coronership which cannot be Also the Writ is Quod loco I. S. eligi facias c. unum Coronatorem and he cannot be in place of the first if the first do not cease to be Coroner So if any be made Commissioners and afterwards others are made Commissioners in the same cause the first Commission is determined Snagg said That in the Chancery they are of the same Opinion but Fitz. Nat. Brevium 163. N. is That hee ought to be discharged by Writ Mich. 28 29 Eliz in the Common Pleas. 124 IN an Action of Debt brought against Lessee for years for rent he pleaded That the Plaintiff had granted to him the reversion in Fee which was found against him Walmesley Serjeant moved Whether by that Plea he had forfeited his terme or not Rodes and Windham Justices He shall not forfeit his Term and Rodes cited 33. E. 3. Judgement 255. Where in a Writ of Waste the Tenant claimed Fee and it was found against him that he had but an Estate for life and yet it was no Forfeiture Fenner and Windham It is a strong Case for there the Land it selfe is in demand but not so in our Case Rodes The Tenant shall not forfeit his Estate in any Action by claiming of the Fee-Simple but in a Quid juris clamat Walmesley and Fennèr Where he claimes in Fee generally and it is found against him there perhaps hee shall forfeit his Estate but where he shewes a speciall conveyance which rests doubtfull in Law it is no reason that his Estate thereby should bee forfeited although it be found against him Rodes 6. R. 2. Quid juris clamat 20. The Tenant claimed by speciall conveyance and yet it was a forfeiture But in the principall Case at Bar he and Windham did agree cleerly That it was no forfeiture Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 125 AN Action upon the Case was brought because that the Defendant had spoken these words viz. That the Plaintiffe hath said many a Masse to J. S. c. Anderson Chief Justice Primâ facie did seem to incline That no Action would lie for the words although that a Penalty is given by the Statute against such Masse-Mongers For he said That no Action lieth for saying That one hath transgressed against a Penall Law Periam Justice contrary Anderson If I say to one That he is a disobedient Subject no Action lieth for the words Windham Justice That is by reason of the generality Puckering
Gardian pleaded that the plaintiff was within age And the plaintiff did maintain his Declaration that by the Custome of such a place An Insant of 18. yeares might bring an Action of Account against his Gardian in Socage and it was there holden to be no Departure I conceive that an Infant cannot have an Account against his Gardian before his full age But I conceive that they held that it was by Statute That an Infant should not have an Account against Gardian in Socage until he was of the age of 21. yeares Wray Chief Justice was of opinion that it was no Departure For he said it should be frivolous to shew the whole in his Declaration viz. That he was an Infant And that by Custome he might make a Covenant which should beinde him But quaere of his opinion for that many doubt of it Vide the Case 118. R. 2. Hill 29 Eliz. in the King's Bench 144 CONEY's Case AN Action of Trespass was brought against John Coney for digging of the plaintiffs Close and killing of 18. Coneys there The Defendant Pleaded as to all the Trespas but killing of two Coneys Not Guilty And as to them he said that the place where c. the Trespass is supposed is a Heath in which he hath common of pasture and that he found them eating of the Grass and that he killed them and carried them away as it was Lawfull for him to do c. Cook The Point is Whether a commoner having common of pasture may kill the Coneys which are upon the ground and he said hemight not And first he said it is to be considered what interest he who hath the Freehold may have in such things as are ferae Naturae Secondly What authority a commoner hath in the ground in which he hath common To the first he said that although such Beasts are ferae Naturae yet they are reduced to such propertie when they are in my ground by reason of my possession which I then have in them that I may have an action of Trespass against him who takes them as 42. E. 3. 24. If one have Deer in his Park another taketh them away he may have an action of Trespas forthe taking 12. H. 8. If a Forrester follow a Buck which is chased out of the Park or Forrest although that he who hunteth him killeth him in his own ground yet the Forrester or Keeper may enter into his ground retake the Deer for the propertie and possession which he hath in it by the pursuit 7. H. 6. 38. It is holden that if a wilde Beast go out of the Park then the owner of the ground hath lost the propertie in it Brook thereupon collects that he had a propertie in it whilest it was in his Park 18. E. 4. 14. It is doubted whether a man can have propertie in things which are ferae Naturae But 10. H. 7. 6. It is holden that an Account lieth for things ferae Naturae Vide 14. H. 8. 1. The Bishop of Londons Case and 22. H. 6. 59. as long as they are in his ground they are in his possession and he shall have an Action of Trespass for the taking of them and the Writ shall be damas suas by Newton And in the Register 102. It is Quare ducent's cuniculos suos precij c. cepit But it is said that he hath common there What then Yet he cannot meddle with the Wood Sand Grass but by taking of the same with the mouthes of his Cattel If he who hath the Freehold bring an action against the Commoner for entring into his Land If he plead Not guilty he cannot give in Evidence that he hath Common there 22 Ass A Commoner cannot put in Cattel to Agist So is 12. H. 8. And of late it was holden in this Court That where the Commoners did prescribe that the Lord had used to put but so many of his Cattel upon the Lands That it was a void prescription Godfrey Contrary That it is Lawfull for the Commoner to kill them And he agreed the Cases which were put by Cook And he said that the owner of the ground had not the very propertie but a kind of propertie in them 3. H. 6. and F. N. B. If the Writ of Trespass be Quare cuniculos suos c. The Writ shall abate And yet he hath a propertie in them or rather a possession of them I grant that against a stranger he might have this Action of Trespas but not against the Commoner for he hath a wrong done unto him by their being upon the Land and therefore he may kill them although he may not meddle with the Land because he hath not an Interest in it and yet he may meddle with the profit of it as 15. H. 7. A Commoner may distrain damage feasant 43. E. 3. Coneys dig the Ground and eate the Grass of the Commoner c. I grant that it is not lawfull for the Tenant for life for to kill the Coneys of him who hath a free Warren in the ground For if a man bring an Action of Trespas Quare Warranem suum intravit cuniculos suos cepit c. It is no Plea that it is his Free-hold L. 5. E. 4. In Trespass Quare clausum fregit cuniculos cepit The Defendant said that the plaintiff made a lease at will unto such a man of the Land and he as his Servant did kill the Coneys and it was holden no Plea and yet it is there said that by the grant of the Land the Coneys doth not pass but the reason as I conceive is because it tends to his damage and therefore that he may kill them And so in this Case 2. H. 7. and 4. E. 4. If I have Common of pasture in Land and the Tenant plougheth the Land I shall have my Action upon the Case in the Nature of a quod permittat 9. E. 4. If one hath Land adjoyning to my Land and levy a Nusans I may enter upon his Land and abate the Nusans So if a man take my goods and carrie them into his own Land I may enter thereupon and retake my goods So if a Tenant of the Freehold plough the Land and sow the same with Corn the Commoner may put in his Cattel and there whit eate the Corn growing upon the Land and may justifie the same because the wrong first begins by the Tenant So if a man do falsly imprison me and put me in his house I may break his house to get forth 21. H. 6. in Trespass All the Inhabitants of such a Town do prescribe to have Common in such a field every year after harvest And one froward fellow amongst the rest will not gather in his Corn within convenient time If the Townsmen put in their Cattel and they eate the Corn he hath no remedie for it And he asked what remedie the Commoner should have for the eating of the Grass which his Cattel is to have if he
the case which implyed their opinions to be for the Universitie And 21. H. 7. was vouched That the Patronage was only matter of favour and was not a thing valuable And in this case Cook chief Justice said That Apertus haereticus melius est quam fictus Catholicus Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 310 BOND and GREEN's Case AN Action of Debt was brought against an Administrator the Defendant shewed how that there were divers Judgments had against him in 〈◊〉 Aâ—d â—â—so that there was another Debt due by the Testator which was assigned over unto the Kings Majesty and so pleaded That he had fully Administred Barker Serjeant took Exception to the pleading because it was not therein shewed that the King did assent to the Assignment and also because it was not shewed that the Assignment was enrolled The Court said nothing to the Exceptions But whereas he Defendant as Administrator did alledge a Retayner in his own hands for a debt due to himselfe The opinion of the whole Court was that the same was good and that an Administrator might retayne to satisfie a debt due to himselfe But it was agreed by the Court That an Excecutor of his own wrong should not Retayne to satisfie his own debt See to this purpose C. 5. part Coulters Case Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 311 STROWBRIDG and ARCHERS Case IN An Action of debt upon a Bond the Defendant was Outlawed And the Writ of Exigent was viz. Ita quod habeas corpus ejus hîc c. whereas it ought to be coram Justiciariis nostris apud Westminster And for that defect the utlagary was reversed and it was said that it was as much as if no Exigent had been awarded at all And upon the Reversall of the utlagary a Supersedeas was awarded and the party restored to his goods which were taken in Execution upon the Capias utlagatum It was also resolved in this Case That if the Sheriffe upon a Writ of Execution served doth deliver the mony or goods which are taken in Execution to the Plaintiffs Atturney it is as well as if he had delivered the same to the Plaintiff himself for the Receipt by his Atturney is in Law his own Receipt But if the Sheriff taketh goods in Execution if he keep them and do not deliver them to the paâ—â— at whose suit they are taken in Execution the party may have a new Execution as it was in the principal Case because the other was not an Execution with Satisfaction Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 312 CHAVVNER and BOVVES Case BOwes sold three Licences to sell Wine unto Chawner who Covenanted to give him ten pounds for them and Bowes Covenanted that the other should enjoy the Licences It was moved in this Case whether the one might have an Action of Covenant against the other in such Case And the opinion of Warburton and Nichols Justices was That if a Man Covenant to pay ten pound at a day certain That an action of Debt lyeth for the money and not an action of Covenant Barker Serjeant said he might have the one or the other But in the principall Case the said Justices delivered no opinion 313 Note That this Day Cooke Chief Justice of the Common Pleas was removed to the Kings Bench and made Lord Chief Justice of England And Sir Henry Hobart who was the Kings Aturney generall was the day following made Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. Sir Francis Bakon Knight who before was the Kings Solicitor was made Atturney Generall And Mr Henry Yelverton of Grays-Inn was made the Kings Solicitor and this was in October Term. Mich. 11 Jacobi 1613. Mich. 11. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 314 THis Case was put by Mountague the Kings Serjeant unto the Lord Chief Justice Hobart when he took his place of Lord Chief Justice in the Common Pleas viz. Tenant in tail the Remainder in taile the Remainder in Fee Tenant in tail is attainted of Treason Offence is found The King by his Letters Patents granteth the lands to A who bargaineth and selleth the land by Deed unto B. B. suffers a common Recovery in which the Tenant in tail is vouched and afterwards thâ— Deed is enrolled And the question was Whether it was a good Bar of the Remainder And the Lord Chief Justice Hobart was of opinion That it was no barre of the Remainder because before enrollment nothing passed but only by way of conclusion And the Bargainee was no Lawfull Tenant to the Precipe Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 315 WHEELER's Case IT was moved for a Prohibition upon the Statute of 5. E. 6. for working upon Holy days and the Case was That a man was presented in the spirituall Court for working viz. carriage of Hay upon the feast day of Saint John the Baptist when the Minister preached and read divine service and it was holden by the whole Court of Common Pleas That the same was out of the Statute by the words of the Act it self because it was for necessity And the Book of 19 H. 6. was vouched That the Church hath authority to appoint Holy days and therefore if such days be broken in not keeping of them Holy that the Church may punish the breakers therof But yet the Court said That this day viz. the Feast day of Sr John the Baptist was a Holy day by Act of Parliament and therefore it doth belong unto the Judges of the Law whether the same be broken by doing of such work upon that day or not And a Prohibition was awarded Mich. 11 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 316 REARSBY and CUFFER's Case IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Court of Requests because that a man sued there by English Bill for money which he had layd out for an Enfant within age for his Meat drink necessary apparel and set forth by his Bill that the Enfant being within age did promise him to pay the same And a Prohibition was awarded because as it was said he might have an action of Debt at the common Law upon the contract for the same because they were things for his necessary livelihood and maintenance And it was agreed by the Court That if an Infant be bounden in an Obligation for things necessary within age the same is not good but voidable Quaere for a difference is commonly taken When the Assumpsit is made within age and when he comes to full age For if he make a promise when he cometh of full age or enters into an Obligation for necessaries which he had when he was within age the Law is now taken to be that the same shall binde him But see 44. Eliz. Randals Case adjudged That an Obligation with a penaltie for money borrowed within age is absolutely void Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 317 SMITH's Case SMith one of the Officers of the Court of Admiralty was committed by the Court of Common Pleas to the prison of
a Capias lay upon a force although it did not lie in case of Debt Agreement c. The King is Parens Legum because the Laws flowed from him he is Maritus Legum For the Law is as it were under Covert Baron he is Tutor Legum For he is to direct the Laws and they desire aid of him And he said that all the Land of the Kings Debtor are liable to his Debt The word Debitor is nomen equivocum and he is a Debtor who is any ways chargeable for Debt Damages Dutie Rent behind c. The Law amplifies evry thing which is for the Kings benefit or made for the King If the King releaseth all his Debts he releases only debts by Recognizance Judgment Obligation Specialtie or Contract Every thing for the benefit of the King shall be taken largely as every thing against the King shall be taken strictly and the reason why they shall be taken for his benefit is because the King cannot so nearly look to his particular because he 〈◊〉 intended to consider ardua regni pro bono publico The Prerogative Laws is not the Exchequer Law but is the Law of the Realm for the King as the Common Law is the Law of the Realm for the Subject The Kings Bench is a Court for the Pleas of the Crown The Common Pleas is for Pleas betwixt Subject and Subject and the Exchequer is the proper Court for the Kings Revenues 13. E. 4. 6. If the King hath a Rent-charge he by his Prerogative may distrein in any the Lands of the Tenant besides in the Lands charged with the Rent 44. E. 3. 15. although that the partie purchaseth the Lands after the Grant made to the King but then it is not for a Rent but as for a dutie to the King And the King in such case may take the Body Lands and Goods in Execution See the Lord Norths Case Dyer 161. where a man became Debtor to the King upon a simple Contract N. When he was Chancellor of the Augmentation received a Warrant from the Privy Councel testifying the pleasure of King E. 6. That whereas he had sold to R. c. That the said Chancellor should take Order and see the delivery of c. and should take Bond and Sureties for the King for the payment of the money By force of which Warrant he sent one T. his Clark to take a Bond of W. for the payment of the money and he took Bond for the King accordingly and brought the same to the Chancellor his Master and delivered the same to him to the Kings use and presently after he deliverd the same back to T. to deliver over to the Clark of the Court who had the charge of the keeping of all the Kings Bonds and Specialties And when T. had received the same back he practised with R. and W. to deliver them the Bond to be cancelled and so it was done and cancelled And it was holden in that Case because that the said Bond was once in the power and possession of N. that he was chargeable with the Debt But the Queen required the Debt of R. and W. who were able to satisfie the Queen for the same In Mildmay's Case cited before there it was holden That the Queen might take her Remedy either against the Parties who gave the insufficient Warrant or against Mildmay himself at her Election So a man he said shall be lyable for damages to the King for that is taken to be within the word Debita In Porters Case cited before there was neither Fraud Covin nor Negligence and yet the persons who presented Porter to the King to hold the Office were chargeable for his negligence whom they preferred to be Master of the Mint But in that Case The Bodie and goods of Porter were delivered to his Sureties as in Execution to repay them the monie which the King had levied of them These Cases prove that the word Debitor is taken in a large sence That the King shall have for the Debts due to him the Bodie Goods and Lands in Execution The word Goods doth extend to whatsoever he hath 11. H. 7. 26. The King shall have the Debt which is due to his Debtor upon a simple Contract and therein the Debtor of the Debtor shall not wage his Law For after you say that you sue for the King it is the Kings Debt and the King if he please may have Evecution of it An Ejectione firme was brought in the Exchequer by Garraway against R. T. upon an Ejectment of Lands in Wales and it was maintainable in the Exchequer as well as a Suit shall be maintainable here for an Intrusion upon Lands in Wales upon the King himself and the King shall have Execution of the thing and recover Damages as he shall in a Quo minus in satisfaction of a Debt which is due by his Debtor to the King 8. H. 5. 10. There the Kings Debtor could not have Quo minus in the Exchequer The Case there was That a man Indebted to the King was made Executor and by a Quo minus sued one in the Exchequer who was indebted unto his Testator upon a simple Contract as for his proper debt and the Quo minus would not lie because the King in that Case could not sue forth Execution and every Quo minus is the Kings Suit and is in the name of the King 38. Ass 20. A Prior Alien was arrear in Rent to the King The Prior brought a Quo minus in the Exchequer against a Parson for detaining of Tythes here is a variance of the Law and the Court for the Right of Tythes ought to be determined by the Ecclesiastical Law and it was found by Verdict for the Prior. A Serjeant moved That the Court had not jurisdiction of the Cause To whom it was answered that they had and ought to have Jurisdiction of it For that when a thing may turn to the advantage of the King and hasten his business that Court had Jurisdiction of it and divers times the said Court did hold jurisdiction in the like Case and thereupon issue was joyned there and the Reporter made a mirum of it But it seems the Reporter did not understand the Kings Prerogative For it is true That such Suit for Tythes doth not fall into the Jurisdiction of the Kings Bench or Common Pleas but in the Exchequer it is otherwise And if the Suit be by Quo minus it is the Kings Suit At a common persons Suit the Officer cannot break the house and enter but at the Kings Suit he may And a common person cannot enter into a Liberty but the King may if it be a common Liberty But for the most part when the King granteth any Liberty there is a clause of Exception in the Grant That when it shall turn to the prejudice of the King as it may do in a special Case there the King may enter the Liberty and a house is a Common Liberty and the
thing and shall he be bound by a Conveyance Anno. 16. H. 6. then in the time of Civil War Uses began and of Lands in use the Lord Chief Baron Tanfield in his Argument hath cited diverse cases where the lands in use were subject and lyable to the debt of Cestuy que use in the Kings Case and so was it untill the Statute of 27. H. 8. of Uses was made Babbington an Officer in the Exchequer had lands in the hands of Feoffees upon Trust and a Writ issued out and the lands were extended for the Debt of Babbington in the hands of his Feoffees Sir Robert Dudley having lands in other mens hands upon Trusts the lands were seized into the Kings hands for a contempt and not for debt or damages to the King And in this Case although that the â—nquisition do find the Conveyance but have not found it to be with power of Revocation yet the Land being extended it is well extended untill the contrary doth appear and untill the extent be avoided by matter of Record viz. by Plea as the Lord Chief Baron hath said before Ley Chief Justice of the Kings Bench argued the same day and his Argument in effect did agree with the other Justices in all things and therefore I have forborne to report the same at length And it was adjudged That the Extent was good and the Land well decreed accordingly Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Exchequer Chamber 417. The Lord SHEFFIELD and RATCLIFF'S Case IN a Writ of Error brought to reverse a Judgment given in a Monstrans de Droit in the Court of Pleas The Case was put by Glanvile who argued for Ratcliffe the Defendant to be this 2 E. 2. Malew being seised of the Mannor of Mulgrave in Fee gave the same to A. Bigot in tail which by divers discents came to Sir Ralph Bigot in tail Who 10 Jannarii 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment unto the use of â—is last Will and thereby after his Debts paid declared the use unto his right heirs in Fee and 9. H. 8. dyed The Will was performed Francis Bigot entred being Tenant in tail and 21 H. 8. made a Feoffment unto the use of himself and Katherine his wife and to the use of the heirs of their two bodies Then came the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. by which Tenant in tail for Treason is to forfeit the Land which he hath in tail Then the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses is made Then 28 H. 8. Francis Bigot did commit Treason And 29 H. 8. he was attainted and executed for the same Anno 31 H. 8. a private Act of Parliament was made which did confirm the Attaindor of Francis Bigot and that he should forfeit unto the King word for word as the Statute of 26 H. 8. is saving to all strangers except the Offendor and his heirs c. 3 E. 6. The heir of Francis Bigot is restored in blood Katherine entred into the Mannor and dyed seised 8 Eliz. their Issue entred and married with Francis Ratcliffe and had Issue Roger Ratcliffe who is heri in tail unto Ralph Bigot And they continue possession untill 33. Eliz. And then all is found by Office and the Land seised upon for the Queen who granted the same unto the Lord Sheffield Francis Bigot and Dorothy die And Roger Ratcliffe sued a Monstrans de Droit to remove the Kings hands from off the lands and a Scire facias issued forth against the Lord Sheffield as one of the Terre-Tenants who pleaded all this special matter and Judgment was thereupon given in the Court of Pleas for Roger Ratcliffe And then the Lord Sheffield brought a Writ of Error in the Exchequer-Chamber to reverse the said Judgment And Finch Serjeant argued for the Lord Sheffield that the Judgment ought to be reversed And now this Term Glanvile argued for Roger Ratcliffe that the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas ought to be affirmed There are two points The first If there were a Right remaining in Francis Bigot and if the same were given unto the King by the Attaindor and the Statute of 31 H. 8. Second If a Monstrans de Droit be a proper Action upon this matter which depends upon a Remitter for if it be a Remitter then is the Action a proper Action The Feoffment by Ralph Bigot 6 H. 8. was a Discontinuance and he had a new use in himself to the use of his Will and then to the use of his Heirs Then 9 H. 8. Ralph Bigot dyed And then Francis Bigot had a right to bring a Formedon in the Discendor to recover his estate tail 21 H 8. then the point ariseth Francis Bigot having a right of Formedon and an use by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 1. before the Statute of 27 H. 8. by the Feoffment he had so setled it that he could not commit a forfeiture of the estate tail When a man maketh a Feoffment every Right Action c. is given away in the Livery and Seisin because every one who giveth Livery giveth all Circumstances which belongs to it For a Livery is of that force that it excludes the Feoffor not only of all present Rights but of all future Rights and Tytles v. C. 1. par 111. and there good Cases put to this purpose 9 H. 7. 1. By Livery the Husband who was in hope to be Tenant by Courtesie is as if he were never sised 39 H. 6. 43. The Son disseiseth his Father and makes a Feoffment of the lands the Father dyeth the hope of the heir is given away by the Livery It was objected by Serjeant Finch 1. Where a man hath a right of action to recover land in Fee or an estate for life which may be conveyed to another there a Livery doth give away such a Right and shall there bind him But an estate in tail cannot be transferred to another by any manner of Conveyance and therefore cannot be bound by such a Livery given I answer It is no good Rule That that which doth not passe by Livery doth remain in the person which giveth the Livery 19 H. 6. Tenant in tail is attainted Office is found The estate tail is not in the King is not in the person attainted but is in abeyance So it is no good Rule which hath been put When Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment Non habet jus in re neque ad rem If he have a Right then it is a Right of Entre or Action but he cannot enter nor have any action against his own Feoffment 19 H. 8. 7. Dyer If Discontinuee of Tenant in tail levieth a Fine with proclamations and the five years passe and afterward Tenant in tail dyeth his issue shall have other five years and shall be helped by the Statute for he is the first to whom the right doth accrue after the Fine levied for Tenant in tail himself after his Fine with Proclamations hath not any right But if Tenant in tail be
then the Court is to abate the Petition but after Judgment to find such a fault he must have a Scire facias and not a new Petition and in our Case there was none who gave in such matter for the King Now I come to the Statute of 31. H. 8. The particular Act for the Attainder of Francis Bigot and that he should forfeit all such Lands c. Conditions Rights c. in Fee and Fee tail saving c. and as the lands of Francis Bigott stood stated at the time of the making of this Act of 3. H. 8. the Statute did not extend to him to make him forfeit any thing In the Statute of 33. H. 8. Cap. 20. there were as many words as in this Statute of 31. H. 8. and many Cases upon the Statute of 33. H. 8. are adjudged upon the words shall lose and forfeit There is a difference betwixt an Act of Assurance and an Act of Forfeiture If the words be That the King shall enjoy and have it is then an Act of Assurance and the lands are given to the King without Office but by an Act of Forfeiture the Lands are not in the King without Office found Exceptio firmat regulam but our Case is out of the Rule Savings in Acts of Parliaments were but of late days 1. E. 4. there was a private Act A Petition was preferred against divers in Parliament for sundry misdemeanours and it was Enacted that they should forfeit unto the King and his heirs c. in that Act there was no exception of saving for it was but a forfeiture of their Rights and Savings were but of late times Trin. 8. H. 8. Rot. 4. A Petition of Right in the Chancery upon that was a plea which was after the Attainder of the Duke of Suffolk That the Duke did disseise him it was shewed that the Attainder was by Parliament and he shewed no saving to be in the Statute in the Petition and yet it was well enough Com. 552. Wyat Tenant in tail of the Gift of the King made a Feoffment and by Act of Parliament 2 Mariae was attainted of Treason by which he was to forfeit c. as in our Case I answer That within two years after that Judgment upon solemn argument it was adjudged contrarie Com. 562. It was objected that in that Case a Writ of Error was brought Com. 562. and that the Judgement was affirmed in the Case of Walsingham I answer that the same was by reason of the Plea in Barr And Com 565. there Plowden confesseth that the Judges were not agreed of the matter in Law and the Lands in question in Walsingams Case do remain with Moulton and at this day are enjoy'd contrary to the Judgment given in Walsinghams Case It was objected That although this Act of 31. H. 8. was made after the Attainder yet that it should relate to all the Lands which Francis Bigot had at the time of the Treason committed I answer That this Act of 31. H. 8 is but a description what Lands he shall forfeit viz. all the Lands which he had at the time of the Treason committed The second Point is upon the Remitter of Roger Ratcliff before the Inquisition for there was a discent to Roger Ratcliff When Tenant in Tail is attainted of Treason his blood is not corrupted C. 9. part 10. Lumleys Case And the Statute of 33. H. 8. is the first Statute which vests Lands forfeit for Treason in the King without Office found So as according to the Lord Lumley's Case C. 3. part 10. before this Statute of 33 H. 8. the Land did discend to the issue in tail The Rule of Nullum tempus occurrit Regi is to be meant for the preserving of the Kings Right but not to make the King to do wrong Com. 488. there the Remitter is preferred before the King 49. E. 3. 16. there the Devise of a Common person was preferred before the Right of the King 3. H. 7. 2. the Lord Greistock's Case The Dean of York did recover against him and before Execution the Lord died his heir within age the Dean shall have his Execution notwithstanding that the King hath right to have the Ward A fortiori a Remitter shall be preferred before the Kings Title C. 7. part 28. The Rule Nullum tempus occurrit Regi is to be intended when the King hath an Estate or Interest certain and permanent and not when his Interest is specially limited when and how he shall take it and not otherwise The third Point was Whether Ratcliff hath brought his proper Action The words of the Act of 2 E. 6. cap. 8. which giveth the Monstrans de Droit are to be considered A Remitter is within the words of the Act. Divers Errors were assigned by the other side for matter of Form 1. Because the Venire facias want these words tam milites quam alios Sheffield being a Noble man and a Peer of the Realm It appeareth by the Register 7. that the same was the ancient Form in every common persons Case but of late that Form was left 2. Admit that it were a good Exception then it ought to have been taken by way of Challenge as it appeareth 13. E. 3. Challenge 115. Dyer 107. 208. 3. The Statute of 35. H. 8. Cap. 6. makes a new Law and prescribes a Form Precipimus c. quod Venire facias coram c. 12 Liberos Legales homines c. and then if it ought to be by the Register tam milites quam alios yet here is a new Statute against it And by the Statute of 2. E. 6. Cap. 32. this Statute of 35 H. 8. is made perpetual And by the Statute of 27. Eliz. Cap. 6. the Statute of 35. H. 8. is altered in parvo and augmented in the worth of the Jurors and by the Statute of 18. Eliz. Cap. 14. It is Enacted That after Verdict c. the Judgment thereupon shall not be stayed or reversed by reason of any default in Form or lack of Form or variance from the Register The second Error assigned was because that there are two Venire facias and two Distringas after that Issue was joyned The Lord Sheffield sueth unto the King to have the first Venire facias and first Distringas quashed and it was quashed with Ratcliff's consent Secondly admit there were two Venire facias yet it ought to be intended that the proceedings was but upon one of them and that the best M. 17. Jacobi in the Common Pleas Bowen and Jones's Case In Error upon a Recovery in Debt there were two Originals certified and there the one was good and the other naught the Judges did take it that the Judgment and proceedings were upon the good Original and the Judgment was affirmed in the Kings Bench M. 15 H. 8. Rott 20. the same Case Two Originals one bearing date after the Judgment the other before the Judgment and upon a Writ of Error brought the
Tenements of one attainted in a Premunire shall be forfeited to the King Yet Tenant in Tail in such Case did not forfeit his Lands C. 11. part 63. b. as the Statute of West 2. Cap. 1. saith in particular words That Tenant in Tail shall not prejudice his issue Therefore the Statute of 26. H. 8. in particular words saith That Tenant in Tail shall forfeit his Lands for Treason The Right of Francis Bigot is not a right in gross but a Right mixed with a possession The Statute of West 2. Cap. 1. brought with it many mischiefs For by that Statute the Ancestor being Tenant in Tail could not redeem himself out of prison nor help his wife nor his younger children and that mischief continued untill 12. E. 4. Taltaram's Case and then the Judges found a means to avoid those mischiefs by a common Recovery and this Invention of a common Recovery was a great help to the Subject Then came the Statute of 32. H. 8. Cap. 36. which Enacted That Fines levied by Tenant in Tail should be a good barr to the issue of any Estate any way entailed If the Son issue in tail levieth a Fine in the life of his Father who is Tenant in tail it shall be a barr to him who levieth the Fine and to his issues And both these viz. the Common Recovery and the said Statute did help the Purchaser And shall not this Statute of 26. H. 8. help the King The Statute of 26. H. 8. Cap. 13. hath not any strength against the Ancestor but against the Child For the Construction of Statutes I take three Rules First When a Case hapneth which is not within the Letter then it is within the intent and equity of the Statute Com. 366. 464. Secondly All things which may be taken within the mischief of the Statute shall be taken within the Equity of the Statute 4. H. 6. 26. per Martin Thirdly When any thing is provided for by a Statute every thing within the same mischief is within the same Statute 14. H. 7. 13. The Estate tail of Francisâ— Bigot and Katharine his wife is forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. There is a difference when the Statute doth fix the forfeiture upon the person As where it is enacted that J. S. shall forfeit his lands which he had at the time of his Attaindor The Judges ought expound that Statute only to J. S. But the Statute of 26 H. 8. doth not fix the forfeiture upon the person but upon the land it self And Exposition of Statutes ought to extend to all the mischiefs 8 Eliz. Sir Ralph Sadler's Case in B. R. where an Act of Parliament did enact That all the lands of Sadler should be forfeited to the King of whomsoever they were holden Sadler held some lands of the King in that case the King had that land by Escheat by the Common-Law and not by the said Statute Com. 563 The Law shall say that all the rights of the tail are joyned together to strengthen the estate of the King Tenant in tail before the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 14. of Chauntries gave lands to superstitious uses which were enjoyed five years before the said Statute of 1 E. 6. made Yet it was adjudged that the right of the issue was not saved but that the land was given to the Crown for the issue is excluded by the saving in the said Statute If Tenant in tail give the lands to charitable uses the issue is barred For the saving of the Statute of 39 Eliz. cap. 5. excludes him And he is bound by the Statute of Donis So the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. and the private Act of 31 H. 8. do save to all but the heirs of the Offenders The third Objection was That Ratcliffe was not excluded by the saving for it was said That the same doth not extend but to that which is forfeited by his Ancestors body And here Ratcliffe had but a Right and that was saved And the Statute doth not give Rights I answer first The Statute of 26 H. 8. is not to be expounded by the letter for then nothing should be forfeited but that only which he had in possession and use Tenant in tail is disseised and attainted for treason By the words of the said Statute of 26 H. 8. he forfeits nothing yet the issue in tail shall forfeit the lands for the issue in tail hath a right of Entrie which may be forfeited 6 H. 7. 9. A right of Entrie may escheat and then it may be forfeited Secondly The Statute is not to be construed to the possession but if he hath a mixt right with the possession it is forfeited but a right in grosse is not forfeited Tenant in tail of a Rent or Seignorie purchaseth the Tenancie or the Land out of which the Rent is issuing and is attainted He shall forfeit the Seignorie and Rent or the Land for the King shall have the Land for ever And then the Seignorie or Rent shall be discharged for otherwise the King should not have the Land for ever For the King cannot hold of any Lord a Seignorie 11 H. 7. 12. The heir of Tenant in tail shall be in Ward for a Meanaltie descended unto him the Meanaltie not being in esse and yet it shall be said to be in esse because of the King C. 3 part 30. Cars Case Although the Rent was extinguished yet as to the King it shall be in esse The difference is betwixt a Right clothed with a possession and a right in grosse viz. where the Right is severed from the possession there it is in grosse For there the Right lieth only in Action and therefore neither by the Statute of 26 H. 8. nor by the private Act of 31 H. 8. such a Right is not forfeited C. 3. part 2. C. 10. part 47 48. Right of Action by the Common-Law nor by Statute-Law shall escheat and therefore it is not forfeited For no Right of Action is forfeitable because the right is in one and the possession in another Perkins 19. A Right per se cannot be charged 27 H. 8. 20. by Mountague A man cannot give a Right by a Fine unless it be to him who hath the possession C. 10. part Lampits Case Sever the possibility from the right and it doth not lie in grant or forfeiture but unite them as they are in our Case and then the Right may be granted or forfeited for that Right clothed with a possession may be forfeited A Right clothed with the possession 1. It tastes of the possession 2. It waits upon the possession 3. It changes the possession The Bishop of Durham hath all Forfeitures for Treason by the Common-Law within his Diocess viz. the Bishoprick of Durham And if Tenant in tail within the Bishoprick commits Treason and dyeth the Issue in tail shall enjoy the land against the Bishop Dyer 289 a. pl. 57. For the Bishop hath not the land for ever but the Issue
in tail may have a Formedon against the Bishop But in our Case it is otherwise Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and takes back an estate unto himself in tail the remainder in Fee to his right heirs The Bishop in such case shall not have the land forfeited for Treason because that the Bishop cannot have the estate tail but in such case the King shall have the Land by the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. And the Bishop in such case shall not have the Fee because it is one estate and the King shall not wait upon the Subject viz the Bishop The Right waits upon the possession For 11 H. 7. 12. If the son and a stranger disseiseth the father and the father dyeth this right infuseth it self into the possession and changeth the possession And it is a Release in fact by the father to the son 9 H. 7. 25. Br ' Droit 57. A Disseisor dyeth seised and his heir enters and is disseised by A. The first Disseisee doth release unto A. all his right All the right is now in the second Disseisor viz. A. because the right and the possession meet together in A. 40 E. 3. 18. b. Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life with warranty If Tenant for life be impleaded by the heir to whom the warranty doth discend he shall rebut the right in tail being annexed with the possession for that is in case of a saving of the land by that right But where one demands land there all the Right ought to be shewed 11 H. 4 37. If a man be to bring an Action to recover then he ought to make a good title by his best right if he hath many rights But if a man be in possession and an Action be brought against him then he may defend himself by any of his rights or by all his rights 11 H. 7. 21. Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment to his use upon Condition and afterwards upon his Recognisance the land is extended and afterwards the Condition is performed yet the interest of the Conusee shall not be avoided For although the Extent come upon the Fee and not upon the Tail yet when the Extent was it was extracted out of all the rights C. 7. part 41. A Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life now he hath gained a new Fee by wrong and afterwards he makes a Lease for years and Tenant for life dyeth He shall not avoid his Lease for years although he be in of another estate because he had a defeicible title and an ancient right the which if they were in several hands shall be good as the Lease of the one and the Confirmation of the other And being in one hand it shall be as much in Law as a saving of the Right In our Case the Right and Possession both were in Francis Bigot And Ratcliffe is entitled to the old estate tail and to the new also There is a difference betwixt him who claims the land so forfeited to the King and the heir of the body of the person attainted Littâ—719 Land is given to A and the issue males of his body the remainder to the heirs females of his body If the Father commit Treason both heir male and female are barred for they both claim by the Father but if the heir male after the death of his Father be attainted of Treason the King shall have the lands as long as he hath issue male of his body and then the heir female shall have the lands for she shall not forfeit them because she claimeth not by the brother but by the father Com. in Manxels case A man hath three several rights of estate tails and comes in as Vouchee If the Recovery pass it shall bar all his Rights for one Recompence and they shall be all bound by one possession There is a difference where the Kings title is by Conveyance of the party and where for forfeiture for Treason by this Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. v. the Abbot of Colchesters Case The Abbot seised in the right of his house did commit Treason and made a Lease for years and then surrendred his house to the King after the Statute of 26 H. 8. The question was whether the King should avoid the Lease It was adjudged That the King was in by the surrender and should not avoid the Lease and not by the Statute of 26 H. 8. But if the King had had it by force of the Statute then the King should have avoided the Lease Com. 560. Tenant in tail the reversion to the King Tenant in tail maketh a Lease for years and is attainted of Treason The King shall avoid the Lease upon the construction of the Statute of 26 H. 8. which gives the lands unto the King for ever The third point is upon the Remitter This point had been argued by way of Admittance For as I have argued The ancient right is given away unto the King and then there is no ancient right and so no Remitter There is a difference where the issue in tail is forced to make a Title and where not In point of defence he is not so precisely forced to make his Title as he is in case of demand Whereas the Defendant demands the lands from the King the Discent will not help him because the Attaindor of the Ancestor of Ratcliffe hinders him in point of title to make a demand Dyer 332 b. In this case he ought to make himself heir of the body of Francis Bigot and Katharine C. 8. part 72. C. 9. part 139 140. There Cook couples the Case of Fine levied and the Case of Attaindor together C. 8. part 72. Land is given to husband and wife and to the heirs of their two bodies The husband alone levies a Fine with proclamations Or is attainted of Treason and dyeth The wife before Entry dyeth The issue is barred and the Conusee or King hath right unto the land because the issue cannot claim as heir to them both viz. father and mother for by the father he is barred 5 H. 7. 32 33. C. 9. part 140. Husband and wife Tenants in tail If one of them be attainted of Treason as it was in our Case the lands shall not discend to the issue because he cannot make title And there Cook puts the Case That if lands be given to an Alien and his wife they have a good estate tail and yet it is not discendable to the issue The Consequence then of all this is That if Ratcliffe cannot take advantage of the discent by reason of the disability by Attaindor à fortiori he shall not be remitted And yet I confess that in some Cases one may be remitted against the King Com. 488 489 553. But that is where the King is in by matter of Law by Conveyance but in this Case the King is in by an Act of Parliament and there shall be no Remitter against a matter of Record Another reason is because that
Soccage may grant the Ward but he cannot forfeit him C. 3. part 3. Right of Actions reals because they are in privity by general words of a Statute are not given to the King v. Dyer 67. String fellow's Case That which is in custodia Legis cannot be taken as a Distress in a Pound overt cannot be taken out of the Pound upon another Distress The third Point is If he were remitted And I conceive that he was remitted When Tenant in tail is attainted of Treason the issue at the Common Law should inherit as if he had not been attainted Lit. 747. C. 1. part 103. for as to the Estate tail there was no corruption of blood C. 10. part 10. If Tenant in tail before the Statute of 26. H. 8. commit Treason the land shall discend to his issue for the issue doth not claim by the Father but per formam doni◠C. 8. part 166. such a discent shall take away entrie But in our Case Ratcliff had both possession and right and therefore is remitted the speciall Verdict finds that he was remitted and the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas in the Exchequer was that he was remitted It was objected that the Remitter was destroyed by the relation of the Office but the same is not so for the Office relates only to avoid Incombrances viz. acts done by himself but to devest the Freehold and to settle the same in the King the Office shall not relate And if it should relate then the King should lose many Lands which he now hath Com. Nichols Case Tenant for life upon condition to have Fee c. If the Office shall relate then the same takes away the Freehold out of the person attainted à principio and then the Fee cannot accrue and so by that means the King should lose the lands A Remitter is no incombrance for it is an ancient right and the Act of the King cannot do wrong C. 1. part 44. b. 27 Ass 30. There Tenant for life with clause of re-entrie is attainted the reversioner entreth the Office shall not relate to take the Freehold out of the reversioner C. 3. part 38. Relatio est fictio juris and shall never prejudice a third person and the Office found in the life of Katherine shal not prejudice him C. 9. part Beamounts Case the husband and wife are Tenants in tail the husband is attainted of Treason and dyeth yet the wife is tenant in tail when it is not to the damage or prejudice of the King there tempus occurrit Regi C. 7. part 28. Baskervile's Case From 29 H. 8. untill 33 H. 8. Katherine and afterwards Ratcliff had the possession and then the Law was taken to be that Ratcliff had a lawfull possession For these reasons he concluded that the Judgment ought to be affirmed In Trinity Term following viz. Trin. 21. Jacobi Regis the Case was argued again and then Coventry the Kings Attorney general argued for the Lord Sheffield That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas in the Exchequer ought to be reversed He said I will insist only upon the right of the Case Whether upon the right of the Case Ratcliff may maintain a Monstrans de Droit First If by the Attainder the right of the old Estate tail as well as of the new Estate tail be forfeited Secondly Admitting that the old right of entail be not forfeited then if the Office do overreach the Remitter for then a Monstrans de Droit doth not lie but a Petition for the reason of the discontinuance First it is evident that when Ralph Bigot Tenant in tail in possession 6 H. 8. made a Feoffment that that was a discontinuance and it is as clear that the right of the old Estate tail vested in Francis Bigot The Feoffment made by Francis Bigot 21 H. 8. did not devest the right of the old tail First for the weaknesse of the Feoffment Secondly for the inseparableness of the Estate tail which is incommunicable and not to be displaced by weak assurance That Feoffment was made according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. and not by the Common Law but only by force of the said Statute The Feoffment is without Deed and so nothing passeth but only by way of Livery or else nothing at all Also at the time of the Feoffment in 21 H. 8. the Feoffees were in seisin of the Lands and Ratcliff shews in his Monstrans de Droit that Francis Bigot did disseise the Feoffees and so the Feoffment had no force as a Feoffment at the Common Law but only by the Statute of 1 R. 3. For at the Common-Law if Cestuy que use had entred upon the Feoffees and made a Feoffment nothing had passed There is a difference betwixt a Feoffment at the Common Law and a Feoffment according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. which operates sub modo Feoffments are the ancient Conveyances of Lands but Feoffments according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. are upstarts and have not had continuance above 150 years In case of Feoffments at the Common Law the Feoffor ought to be seised of the lands at the time of the Feoffment but if a Feoffment be according to the Statute of 1 R. 3. in such Case the Feoffor needeth not be in possession Feoffments at the Common Law give away both Estates and Rights but Feoffments by the Statute of R. 3 give the Estates but not the Rights In case of Feoffment at the Common Law the Feoffee is in the Per viz. by the Feoffor but in case of Feoffments by the Statute of R. 3. the Feoffees are in in the Post viz by the first Feoffees 14 H. 8 10. Brudnel says that a Feoffment by Cestuy que use by the Statute of 1 R. 3 is like to fire out of a flint so as all the fire which cometh out of the flint will not fasten upon any thing but tinder or gunpowder So a Feoffment by Cestuy que use by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3 will not fasten upon any thing but what the Statute requires 5 H. 7. 5. 21 H. 7. 25. 8 H. 7 8. 27 H. 8. 13. 23. by these books it appeareth that if Cestuy que use maketh a Leafe for life during the Lease he gaines nothing and after the Lease he gains no reversion for the Lessee shall hold of the Feoffees and of them he shall have aid and unless it be by deed Indented in such a Case a Reservation of Rent is void and the Lessor in such a Case cannot punish the Lessee for waste for he makes the Lease meerly by the power which the Statute gives him 8. H. 7. 9. Cestuy que use makes the Feoffment as servant to the Feoffees and if not as servant to the Feoffees yet at least as servant to the Statute of 1 R. 3. If a man entreth upon another and maketh a Lease for life he gains a reversion to himself and shall maintain an Action of Waste but
be quashed and exonerated and discharged in the possession of the King For it is out of the Rule which is in C. 10 part 48 for the cause of quieting and repose of the Terre-Tenants otherwise it would be a cause of Suits But all Rights Tythes Actions c. might for the same reasons viz. for the quiet of the Terre-Tenants and the avoidance of Suits and Controversies be released to the Terre-Tennants By the same reason here the right of Action of Francis Bigot shall be discharged and exonerated by this forfeiture viz. for the quiet and repose of the Terre-Tenants for the Law delights in the quiet and repose of the Terre-Tenants If Francis Bigot had granted a Rent the ancient right of the tail had been charged C. 7. part 14. Where Tenant in tail makes a lease for life and grants a Rent charge and Tenant for life dieth he shall not avoid his charge although he be in of another Estate because he had a defeisible possession and an ancient right the which c. so as they could not be severed by way of conveyance and charge and no lawfull act Then I admire how he will sever this from himself by his unlawfull act viz. the Feoffment the discontinuance Lit. 169. If a man commit Treason he shall forfeit the Dower of his wife yet he doth not give the dower of his wife but it goes by way of discharge in those Lands 13 H. 7. 17. Tenant by the Curtesie in the life of his wife cannot grant his Estate of Tenant by the Curtesie to another but yet he for Felony or Treason may forfeit it viz. by way of discharge A Keeper of a Park commits Treason there the King shall not have the Office of Keeper for a forfeiture because it is an Office of trust but if he had been Keeper of the Kings Park and had been attainted there he should forfeit his Office by way of discharge and exoneration This Statute of 26 H. 8. hath been adjudged to make Land to revert and not strictly to forfeit Austin's Case cited in Walsingham's Case Tenant in tail the reversion in the King the Tenant makes a Lease for years and dies the issue accepts of the Rent and commits Treason the Lease is avoided for the King is not in by forfeiture by the Statute of 26 H. 8. but by way of Reveter by the Statute of 26 H. 8. It was objected that if Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and takes back an Estate for life and is attainted of Treason that he shall not forfeit his old right I agree that Case For indeed it is out of the Statute of 26 H. 8. which speaks of Inheritance and in that Case the Tenant hath but a Freehold The Statute of 26 H 8. saith that it shall be forfeited to the King his heirs and Successors And if in our Case the old right should remain then it should be a forfeiture but during the life of the Testator When the Common Law or Statute Law giveth Lands it gives the means to keep them as the Evidences So here the King is to have by force of this Statute of 26 H. 8. the Evidences The forfeiture of right is expresly within the Statute of 26 H. 8. as the forfeiture of Estate as by any right title or means for the old Estate tail is the means of Estates since 6 H. 8. And if you will take away the Foundation the Building will fall For all the Estates are drawn out of the old Estate tail The Statute of 26 H. 8. is not an Act of Attaindor for none in particular is attainted by the Act but the Act of 31 H. 8. doth attaint Francis Bigoâ— in particular It was objected that here in this case there needed not to be any express Saving I answer that there are divers Statutes of Forfeitures yet the Statutes have Savings in them so as it seems a saving in such Acts were not superfluous but necessary The Act of 33 H. 8. for the attainder of Queen Katharine there is a saving in the Act and yet an Act of Forfeiture Dyer 100. there the land vested in him in the Remainder by force of a saving in the Act so the saving is not void but operative C. 3. part Dowlies Case vid. the Earl of Arundels Case there the saving did help the wife so it appears savings are in Acts of Parliaments of Forfeiture and Acts of Attaindor Dyer 288 289. The Bishop of Durham had Jura Regalia within his Diocese and then the Statute of 26 H. 8. came now whether the Forfeiture for Treason should be taken away from the Bishop by reason of that Statute and given to the King was the doubt It was holden that of new Treasons the Bishop should not have the Forfeitures for those were not at the Common Law as the Forfeitures of Tenant in tail but that he should have the Forfeitures of Lands in Fee within his Diocese and that he had by force of the saving in the Statute so that a Saving is necessary and operative Com. Nichols's Case there Harpers opinion that there needs no saving to strangers but yet a saving is necessary for the Partie and the Issue if they have any thing as well as strangers vid. C. 3. part Lincoln Colledg Case It is the Office of a good Interpreter to make all the parts of a Statute to stand together Com. 559. By these general words Lose and Forfeit and by excluding of the heir in the saving the heir is bound So the Judges have made use of a Saving for it is operative 2 Ma. Austin's Case cited in Walsinghams Case Tenant in tail the Reversion in the Crown Tenant in tail made a Lease for years and levied a Fine to the King the King shall not avoid the Lease for the King came in in the Reverter but in such Case if he be attainted of Treason then the King shall avoid the Lease So a Statute of Forfeiture is stronger then a Statute of Conveyance By this Statute of 26 H. 8. Church Land was forfeited for so I find in the Statute of Monasteries which excepts such Church Lands to be forfeited for Treason Dyer Cardinal Poole being attained did forfeit his Deanary and yet he was not seised thereof in jure suo proprio for it was jus Ecclesiae 27 E. 3. 89. A writ of Right of Advowson by a Dean and he counteth that it is Jus Ecclesiae and exception that it is not Jus suae Ecclesiae But the Exception was disallowed for the Jus is not in his natural capacitie but in his politique capacitie and yet by this Statute of 26 H. 8. such Church Land was forfeited for Treason this is a stronger Case then our Case Vide C. 9. part Beaumont's Case Land is given to husband and wife in tail and the husband is attainted of Treason the wife is then Tenant in tail yet the Land is forfeited against the issue although it be but a possibility for the whole estate
the Kings Bench by the opinion of the whole Court the Judgment was reversed Trin. 21 Jacobi Intratur Hill 20 Jac. Rot. 137. in the Kings Bench. 444. KITE and SMITH's Case ONe Recovered by Erronious Judgment and the Defendant did promise unto the Plaintiffe That if he would forbear to take forth Execution that at such a day certain he would pay him the debt and damages And Action upon the Case was brought upon that Promise And now it was moved by the Defendants Councel That there was not any Consideration upon which the Promise could be made because the Judgment was an Erronious Judgment It was adjourned But I conceive that because it doth not appear to the Court but that the Judgment is a good Judgment that it is a good Consideration Otherwise if the Judgment had been reversed by a Writ of Error before the Action upon the Case brought upon the Promise for there it doth appear judicially to the Court that the Judgment was Erronious Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 445. TOTNAM and HOPKIN's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought upon an Assumpsit And the Plaintiff did declare That in Consideration of c. the Defendant 1 Martii did promise to pay and deliver to the Plaintiffe 20 Quarters of Barley the next Seed-time Upon Non Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiffe It was moved for the Defendant That the Plaintiffe ought to have shewed in his Declaration when the Seed-time was which he hath not done But it was answered That he needeth not so to do because he brings his Action half a year after the Promise for not payment of the same at Seed-time which was betwixt the Promise and the Assumpsit Dodderidge Justice If I promise to pay you so much Corn at Harvest next If it appeareth that the Harvest is ended before the Action brought it is good without shewing the time of the Harvest for it is apparent to the Court that the Harvest is past And here the Action being brought at Michaelmas it sufficiently appears that the Harvest is past And Judgment was given for the â—laintiffe Trin. 21 Iacobi Iatratur Hill 1â— Iacobi Rot. 652. inter Hard Foy in the Kings Bench. 446. KELLAWAY's Case IN an Ejectione Firme brought for the Mannor of Lillington upon a Lease made by Kellaway to Fey It was found by a special Verdict That M. Kellaway seised of the Mannor of Lillington in Fee holden in Soccage did devise the same by his Will in writing in these words viz. For the good will I bear unto the name of the Kellawayes I give all my Lands to John Kellaway in tail the Remainder to my right Heirs so long as they keep the true intent and meaning of this my Will To have to the said John Kellaway and the heirs of his body untill John Kellaway or any of his issues go about to alter and change the intent and meaning of this my Will Then and in such case it shall be lawfull to and for H. Kellaway to enter and have the Land in tail with the like limitation And so the Lands was put in Remainder to five several persons the Remainder to the right heirs of the Devisor M. Kellaway dyed without issue John Kellaway is heir and entred and demised the same to R. K. for 500 years and afterwards granted all his estate to Hard. Afterwards John Kellaway did agree by Deed indented with W. K. to levy a Fine of the Reversion to W. and his heirs H. Kellaway entred according to the words of the Proviso in the Will and made the Lease to Foy who brought an Ejectione Firme against Hard. And whether H. Kellaway might lawfully enter or no was the Question It was objected That in the Case there is not any Forfeiture because the Fine was without proclamations and so it was a Discontinuance only The first Question is If the Remainder doth continue The second is If it be a Perpetuity or a Limitation John Kellaway is Tenant in tail by Devise untill such time as John Kellaway or any of his issues agree or go about to alter or change the estate tail mentioned in the Will with Proviso to make Leases for 21 years 3 lives or to make Jointures Then his Will is That it shall be lawfull for H. K. to enter and to have the Land with the same limitations If it be a Perpetuity then it is for the Plaintiffe but if it be but a Limitation then it is for the Defendant The Fine was levied without proclamations and H. K. entreth for the Forfeiture Damport It is no Perpetuity but a Limitation which is not restrained by the Law as Perpetuities are Untill such time as c. shall discontinue c. The Jury find an Agreement by Indenture The act which is alleadged to be the breach is Conclusivit agreavit not to levy a Fine with proclamations but to levy a Fine without proclamations which is but a Discontinuance Yelverton If the Fine had been with proclamations then without doubt he in the Remainder during the life of him who levied it had been barred The Devise was To have to them and to the heirs of their bodies so long as they and every of their issues do observe perform fulfill and keep the true meaning of this my Will touching the entailed Lands in form following and no otherwise And therfore I M. Kellaway do devise unto John Kellaway the issue of his body the Remainder c. â—o have to the said John Kellaway and the issue of his body untill he or any of his issue shall go about to conclude do or make any act or acts to alien discontinue or change the true meaning of this my Will That then my Will is and I do give and bequeath to H K in tail And that it shall be lawfull for him the said H. K. or his issue to enter immediately upon such assent conclusion or going about to conclude c. And that H. K. and his issue shall leave it untill he or any of them go about c. C. 9 part Sundayes Case 128. where it was resolved That no Condition or Limitation be it by act executed or by limitation of an Use or by a Devise can bar Tenant in tail to alien by a common Recovery v. C. 3. part acc The Case was not resolved but it was adjourned to another day to be argued and then the Court to deliver their opinions in it Trin. 21. Intratur Trin. 20 Jacobi Rot. 811. in the Kings Bench. 447. KNIGHT's Case IN this Case George Crook said That Land could not belong to Land yet in a Will such Land which had been enjoyed with other might pass by the words cum pertinaciis As where A. hath two houses adjoyning viz. the Swan and the Red-Lyon and A. hath the Swan in his own possession and occupieth a Parlour or Hall which belongs in truth to the Red-Lyon with the Swan-house and then leaseth the Red-lyon
pay the money there he shall recover damages besides the dutie Here the Action was brought before the request made and so no damage to the Plaintiff and the Judgment was that the Plaintiff recuperet damna predict viz. the damages laid in the Declaration Dodderidge Justice The Judgment ought to be Consideratum est quod Gleede recuperet damna quae sustinuit and not damna predict which are mentioned in the Declaration and then a Writ is awarded to enquire of the damages quae sustinuit The Judgment was reversed per Curiam Mich. 1 Caroli in the Kings Bench. Rot. 189. 455. TAYLOR and HODSKIN's Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict it was found That one Moyle was seised of divers Lands in Fee holden in Socage and having issue four daughters viz. A B C D. A. had issue N. and died And afterwards Moyle devised the said Lands unto his wife for life and after her decease then the same equally to be divided amongst his daughters or their heirs Moyle died and afterwards his wife died and Hodskins in the right of B C D. three of the daughters did enter upon the Lands N. the daughter of A. married F. who entred and leased the Lands to the Plaintiff Taylor Whitfield for the Plaintiff The only point is Whether N. the daughter of A. one of the sisters shall have the fourth part of the lands or not by reason of the word Or in the Will It is apparent in our books C. 10. part 76 the Chancellor of Oxfords Case C. 3. part Butler and Bakers Case That Wills shall be construed and taken to be according to the intent of the Devisor And therefore Br. Devise 39. A devise to one to sell to give or do with at his will and pleasure is a Fee-simple And in our Case if N. shall not take a fourth part the word heirs should be of no effect C. 1. part in Shellies Case All the words in a Deed shall take effect without rejecting any of them and if it be so in a Deed à fortiori in a Will which is most commonly made by a sick man who hath not Councell with him to inform or direct him In this Case the three sisters who were living at the time of the Devise took presently by way of remainder and the word heirs was added only to shew the intent of the Devisor That if any of the three sisters had died before his wife that then her heir should take by discent because her mother had taken by purchase And by reason of the word heirs the heir of A. shall take by purchase and the disjunctive word or shall be taken for and as in Mallories Case C. 5. part A reservation of a Rent to an Abbot or his Successors there the word or shall be taken for and reddendo singula singulis Trin. 7. Jacobi in the Common Pleas Arnold was bound in a Bond upon Condition that he suffer his wife to devise Lands of the value of 400l to her son or her daughter and she devised the Lands to her son and her daughter And it was resolved that it was a good performance of the Condition And there the word or was taken for and And there Justice Warburton put this Case If I do devise all my goods in Dale or Sale it shall be a Devise of all my goods in both places and or shall be taken for and. In this Case the word heirs was not added of necessity for the heir of any of the sisters to take by purchase but only to make the heir of A. to take part of the Lands The Court was of opinion that it was stronger for the Plaintiff to have it or in the disjunctive For they said that if it were and then it would give the three sisters the Fee and not give the heir of A. a fourth part but being or there is more colour that she shall take a fourth part by force of the Devise It was adjourned Trin 2 Caroli Rot 913. in the Kings Bench. 456. ASHFIELD and ASHFIELD's Case THe Case was An Enfant Copyholder made a Lease for years by word not warranted by the Custome rendring Rent The Enfant at his full age was admitted to the Copyhold and afterwards accepted of the Rent The question was Whether this Lease and the acception of the Rent should bind or conclude the Enfant Crawley Serjeant argued That it was a void Lease and that the acception should not bar him It is a ground in Law That an Enfant can do no Act by bare contract by word or by writing can do any Act which is a wrong either to himself or unto another person or to his prejudice In this Case if the Lease should be effectual it were a wrong unto a stranger viz. the Lord and a prejudice unto himself to make a forfeiture of the Inheritance If an Enfant commandeth A. to enter into the land of I. S. and afterwards the Enfant entreth upon A. A is the Disseisor and Tenant and the Enfant gaineth nothing So if A entreth to the use of the Enfant and the Enfant afterwards agreeth to it in this Case here is but a bare contract and an agreement will not make an Enfant a Disseisor No more shall he be bound by a bare Deed or matter in writing without Livery 26 H. 8. 2. An Enfant granteth an Advowson and at full age confirmeth it all is void Br. Releases 49. Two Joynt-Tenants one being an Enfant releaseth to his Companion it is a void Release 18 E. 4. 7. An Enfant makes a Lease without reserving Rent or makes a Deed of grant of goods yet he shall maintain Trespass nay though he deliver the goods or Lease with his own hand the same will not excuse the Trespass nor will it perfect the Lease or make the grant of the goods good If the Contract have but a mixture of prejudice to the Enfant it shall be void ◠Jacobi in the Kings Bench Bendloes and Holydaies Case An Obligation made by an Enfant with a Condition to pay so much for his apparel because the Bond was with a penaltie it was adjudged void If Tenant at Will make a Lease for years he was a Disseisor at the Common Law before the Statute of West 2. cap. 25. 12 E. 4 12. Tenant at Will makes a Lease for years 10 E. 4. 18. 3 E. 4. 17. But if an Enfant be Tenant at will and he maketh a Lease he is no Disseisor In our Case if he had made Livery then I confess it had been a defeisible forfeiture and he mignt have been remitted by his entrie upon the Lord. Farrer for the Plaintiff The Lease is not void but voidable 7 E. 4. 6. Brian 18 E. 4. 2. 9 H. 6. 5. An Enfant makes a Lease for years and at full age accepts of the Rent the Lease is good because the Law saith that he hath a recompence Com. 54. A Lease for years the remainder
for years rendring Rent by an Enfant and afterwards at his full age he accepts the Rent of the particular Tenant it is a good comfirmation of the estate of him in the remainder Litt. 547. If he at full age confirm it is good which could not be if the Lease were void and yet in that Case it doth not appear that there was any Rent reserved The Enfant being a Copyholder makes no difference in the Case And in Murrels Case C. 4. part It is said That if a Copyholder make a Lease not warrantable by the Custome it is a forfeiture which proves it is a good Lease otherwise it could not be a forfeiture Hill 37 Eliz. in the Kings Bench Rot. 99. East and Hardings Case A Copyholder makes a Lease for three years by word to begin at Michaelmas next ensuing it is a forfeiture of the Copyhold and a good lease betwixt the parties Hill 18 Jacobi Haddon and Arrowsmiths Case One licensed his Copyholder for life to make a Lease for 20. if he should so long live and he made a lease for 20 years and left out the words if he should so long live yet because he was a Copyholder for life and so the lease did determine by his death and so he did no more then by Law he might do it was adjudged a good Lease and no forfeiture otherwise if he had been a Copyholder in Fee All Conditions in Fact shall bind an Enfant but not Conditions in Law C. 8. part 44. Whittinghams Case An Enfant Tenant for life or years makes a Feoffment in Fee it is no forfeture For if the Lessor entreth the Enfant may enter upon him again yet it is a good Feoffment but he shall avoid it by Enfancy but if it be by matter of Record then it is otherwise For if an Enfant be Lessee for life and levieth a Fine it is a forfeiture and in that case if the Lessor enter for the forfeiture the Enfant shall not enter again The same Law if an Enfant committeth Waste which is against a Statute it is a forfeiture and if the Lessor recovereth the place wasted the Enfant shall not enter again 9 H. 7 24. A woman an Enfant who hath right to enter into lands taketh a husband and a discent is cast yet she shall avoid the discent after the death of her husband The Court said That if in the Case at Barr the Enfant had been Tenant in Fee at the Common Law and made a lease without Deed and had accepted the Rent at his full age that the same had been good for that there he had a recompence but being a Copyholder it is a question Jones Justice It was adjudged in the Common Pleas in Peters Case That if a Copyholder without licence maketh a Lease not warranted by the Custome That such Lessee should maintain an Ejectione firme The Councel against the Enfant in the Case at Barr said That the Enfant made the Lease as Tenant by the Common-Law for that he made it by Conveyance of the Common-Law And so the Lease was voidable and not void and then the acceptance of the Rent had made the Lease to be good It was adjourned to another day Hill 2. Caroli Rot. 389 in the Kings Bench. 457. GEORGE BUSHER against MURRAY Earl TILLIBARN A Scire facias was brought dated 28 Junii retornable in Mich. Term 2 Car. Regis why Execution should not be awarded against the Defendant upon a Iudgment had against him in this Court The Defendant pleaded That King Charles 7 Octob. in the second year of his Reign did take him into his protection for a year and did grant unto him that during that time he should be free from all manner of Plaints but Dower Quare Impedit and Placit coram Justiciariis Itinerantibus It was said that this Protection was not warrantable by Law for three causes 1. Because it is after the purchase of the Scire facias and before the Retorn 10 H. 6. 3. 11 H. 4. 7. A Protection depending the Suit is not allowable although it make mention that the party is to go a voyage with the Kings Son 2. Because he doth not specifie any particular cause why the Protection was granted unto him All our books do express a cause viz. Quia moratur c. quia profecturus c. Register 22 23. there three Protections are Quia incarceratus 39 H. 6. 38 39 40. per Curiam The Protection ought to express a special cause otherwise it is not good Fitz. 28. a. b. the cause is expressed 1. R. 2. cap. 16. The particular cause ought to be in the Protection A Protection being general the party hath no remedy against him to traverse it or to procure it to be repealed 3. This Court is greater then a Iustice in Eyre and he is excepted in placitis itinerantibus That Court was of opinion that there was no colour for allowing of the Protection A Safe-conduct will only keep the party safe from harm but will not protect him from Actions Mich. 2 Caroli Intratur Pasch 18. Jur. Rot. 298. in the Common Pleas. 458. ROYDEN and MOULSTER's Case IN Trespass for entring into his Close called Dipson in Suffolk upon Not guilty pleaded the Jury gave a special verdict That the said Close was parcel of the Mannor of Movedon and demisable by Copy of Court-Roll and that the same was granted to G. Starling in Fee by Copy of Court-Roll who had issue two sons John and Henry And that 35 Eliz. George Starling did surrender the same to the use of his Will and thereby demised the same to John and the heirs males of his body with divers Remainders over and dyed seised And that the Surrender was presented according to the Custom and that John was admitted to have to him his heirs And that the said John had issue 3 sons Harry George and Nicholas And that the said John 43 Eliz. did surrender to the use of his Will and thereby devised the same to Katherine his wife and dyed and that the said Surrender 9 Martii 4t Eliz. was presented and the said Katherine was admitted Harry George and Nicholas dyed without issue They further found That the Custom of the Mannor is That the youngest brother is to have the Copyhold by discent And also That no Copyholder by the Custome could make any Estate in feodo and that the said Katherine took to her husband Francis Robinson who 1 Sept 17 Iacobi leased the same to Royden the Plaintiffe for one year who entred and was thereof possessed untill Moulster the Defendant by the commandment of c. did out him c. In which case the only Question was Whether a Copyhold be within the Statute of West 2. so as an estate thereof so limited should be a Fee tail or a Fee conditional And by the opinion of the Justices of the Common-Pleas it was adjudged That a Copyhold could not be entituled within the
removed but if the VVrit of Error want only form but is sufficient for the matter in substance the VVrit shall not abate but the partie may have a new VVrit of Error coram vobis residet c. Trin. 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 464. MILL's Case ACtion upon the Case for these words Thou hast Coyned Gold and art a Coyner of Gold Adjudged the Action will not lie for it may be he had Authority to Coyn and words shall be taken in mitiori sensu Pasch 3 Car in the Kings Bench. 465. BROOKER's Case THe question was VVhether the Feoffee of the Land might maintain a VVrit of Error to reverse an Attaindor by Vtglary and the Case was this William Isley seised in Fee of the Mannor of Sundridge in Kent had issue Henry Isley who was Indicted of Felony 18 Eliz. and 19. Eliz. the Record of the Indictment was brought into this Court and thereupon 20 Eliz. Henry Isley was outlawed William Isley died seised Henry Isley entred into the Mannor and Land as son and heir and being seised of the same devised the Mannor and Lands to C. in Fee who conveyed the same to Brooker and Brooker brought a Writ of Error to reverse the Outlawry against Henry Isley Holborn argued for the King and said that Brooker was no way privy to the attaindor of Henry Isley but a meer stranger and therefore could not maintain a Writ of Error And first he said and took exception that he had not set himself down Terre-Tenant in possession Secondly he saith in his Writ of Error That the Mannor and Lands descended to Henry Isley as son and heir when as he was attainted The third exception was That he saith that Henry Isley did devise the Lands and that he could not do because he was a person Attainted Fourthly he said that Brooker was not Tenant so much as in posse 4 H. 7. 11. If it were not for the words of Restitution the partie could not have the mean profits after the Judgment reversed 16 Ass 16. Lessee for years pleaded to a Precipe and reversed it the question was whether he should be in statu quo vi Librum for it is obscure If this Attaindor of Henry Isley were reversed yet it cannot make the devise good For there is a difference betwixt Relations by Parliament which nullifie Acts and other Relations Vi. 3 H. 7. Sentlegers Case Petition 18. The violent Relation of Acts of Parliament If a Bargain and Sale be the Inrollment after will make Acts before good but a Relation by Common Law will not make an Act good which was before void C. 3. part Butler and Bakers Case A gift is made to the King by Deed enrolled and before the enrollment the King granteth away the Land the Grant is void yet the enrollment by Relation makes the Lands to pass to the King from the beginning Admit in this Case that Brooker were Terre-Tenant yet he is not a party privy to bring a Writ of Error to reverse the Attaindor of him who was Tenant of the Land and I have proved That although the Attaindor were reversed yet he hath nothing because the Devise was void and is not made good by Relation It is a rule in our Books that no man can bring a VVrit of Error but a partie or privy 9 E. 4. 13. 22 E. 4. 31 32. 9 H. 6. 46. b. Ass 6 C. 3. part in the Marquiss of Winchesters Case The heir of the part of the mother cannot have the VVrit of Error but the heir of the part of the father may So if erronious Judgment be given in the time of profession of the eldest son and afterwards he is dereigned he shall have the Writ of Error In 22 H. 6. 28. The heir in special taile or by Custom cannot have Error But yet M. 18 Eliz. in Sir Arthur Henninghams Case it was adjudged That the special heir in tail might have a Writ of Error The Baile cannot maintain a Writ of Error upon a Judgment given against the Principal because he was not privy unto the Judgment therefore it shall be allowed him by way of plea in a Scire facias I never find that an Executor can have Error to reverse an Attaindor but for the misawarding of the Exigent Marshes Case was cited C. 5. part 111. Fitz 104. Feoffee at the Common Law could not have an Audita Quaerela in regard he was not privy 12 Ass 8. 41. Keâ—laway 193. There the Terre-Tenant brought a Writ of Error in the name of the heir and not in his own name 24 H. 8. Dyer 1. There it is said That he who is a stranger to the Record shall have Error To that I answer That he in the Reversion and the particular Tenant are but one Tenant for the Fee is demanded and drawn out of him But in the principal Case at Barr no Land is demanded but a personal Attaindor is to be reversed Also there it is put That if the Conusee extend before the day there it is said that the Feoffee may have Error 17 Ass 24. 18 E. 3. 25. Fitz. 22. To that I answer That the Feoffee is privy to that which chargeth him for the Land is extended in his hands and if the Feoffee there should not have a Writ of Error the Law should give him no manner of remedy for there the Conusor himself cannot have Error because the Lands are not extended in his hands Also it is there said that the Feoffee brought a Scirefacias against him who had execution of the Land To that I answer That that is by special Act of Parliament Also there it is said That if the Parson of a Church hath an Annuity and recovereth and afterwards the Benefice is appropriated to a Religious house the Soveraign of the house shall have a Scirefacias I answer That in that Case he is no stranger for that he is perpetual Parson and so the Successor of the Parson who recovered 12 H. 8. 8. There a Recovery was against a Parson and there Pollard said that the Patron might have Error I answer That Pollard was deceived there for it is said before that the Parson hath but an Estate for life and then he viz. the Patron is as a Recoverer who shall have a Writ of Error Dyer 1. But the Parson hath the Fee and therefore Pollard was mistaken as it appeareth by Brook Fauxi fier de Recovery 51. 19 H. 6. 57 Newton A false verdict is had against a Parson the Patron cannot have an Attaint There is a difference if one be partie to the Writ although not partie to the Judgment Error 72. A Quare Impedit was brought by the King against the Patron and the Incumbent and Judgment only was had against the Patron and the Incumbent Parson brought a Writ of Error but if he had not been partie to the Writ he could not have maintained Error So in Attaint the partie to the Writ though not to the Judgment shall
The want of a letter out of a word is out of the Statutes C. 8. part You should have alleadged some place The Statute of 21 Jacobi is not of any Venire facias which is misawarded generally but the Statute helpeth when there are two places and the visne ought to come from both places and the visne comes but from one place and when there is but one place and the visne comes from two places If Enfancie be to be tryed sc If he were at such a time within age it ought to be tryed by the Country This matter is collateral to the first Record and it is a new Record sc upon Error The whole Court was of opinion that it was out of the Statute and a Repleader was granted Whitlock Justice There is no Trial at all for there is no Venire facias at all Dodderidge Justice If the Defendant in Error plead an ill plea he shall replead But if in this Action he had alleadged a place of his Enfancie sc at Dale and the Venire facias had been of Sale there it had been good trial and there he should not replead for that he hath pleaded well but there he shall have a Venire facias de novo Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 470. DAY 's Case DAY was Indicted for erecting of a Cottage It was moved that the Indictment was insufficient for that the words of the Statute of 31 Eliz. cap. 7 are Shall willingly uphold maintain and continue And the Indictment is only That he continued and so wants the words voluntarily upheld according to the Statute 2. It did not appear in the Indictment that it was newly erected for it is only that he continued but not that he erected The Indictment was quashed because being a penal Law it was not pursued Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 471. MAN's Case MAN was Indicted That he fuit adhâ—â—c est a common Barrettor and no place is expressed where he was a Barrettor so as no trial can be Dodderidge Justice If he be a Barrettor in one place he is a Barrettor in all places The Indictment was Per quod he did stir up contentions Jurgia And no place alleadged where he did stir up Jurgia contentions And it was said that in that case the place was very material And so the Indictment was quashed for want of setting forth the place where he did stir up many Contentions Jurgia c. Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 472. GREEN and MOODY'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought for Rent and it was found for the Plaintiff Thyn Serjeant moved in arrest of Judgment and set forth the Case to be That a Lease was made for years to begin at Michaâ—lmaâ— after And the Plaintiff in the Action of Debt for the Rent did declare Virtuâ—e cujus the Lessee did enter and did not shew what day according to Cliffords Case 7 E. 6. Dyer 89. But the Court said It is said in this Case Virtute cujus dimissionis he did enter and was possessed and that must be intended at Michaelmas Alexander and Dyer's Case 33 Eliz. was resolved accordingly And Cliffords Case Dyer 89. is not virtute cujus dimissionis And the Court held a difference betwixt Debt and Ejectione firme Cliffords case was an Ejectione firme but here it is Debt Jones Justice If he did enter before Michaelmas yet Debt will lie for the Rent upon the privity of contract for the Lessee cannot destroy the contract unless he make a Feoffment It was adjudged for the Plaintiff Quaere If when the Lessor in the case which Jones put hath brought his action and recovered when the Lessee hath entred before the day If the Lessor shall put him out as a Disseisor by reason of the Recovery in the action of Debt in which he hath admitted him to be Lessee for years Or if the Lessor after he hath recovered in Debt dyeth whether his heir shall be estopped by the Record to say otherwise then that he is in by the Lease Or whether the Recovery in Debt hath purged the wrong Like unto the Case 14 H. 8. 12. by Carret If one entreth into my lands and claims 20 years therein and I suffer him to continue there and accept of the Rent and afterwards he committeth Waste I shall maintain an action of Waste and declare upon the special matter If one entreth into my Land claiming a Lease for years per Curiam he is a Disseisor and he cannot qualifie his own wrong Dyer 134. Traps case But Sir Henry Yelverton said That I may admit him to be Tenant for years if I accept of the Rent or bring Waste as Carret said 14 H. 4. But he hath not but for years in respect of his claim But I am concluded by acceptance of the Rent or by bringing of the action of Waste So here by the bringing of the action of Debt the Lessor is concluded But Quaere if it shall bind his heir It was conceived it shall because it is by Record the strongest conclusion that is Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 473. SMITH's Case A Lease for years was made of Lands in Middlesex and the Lessor brought Debt in London against the Assignee The opinion of the whole Court was that it was not well brought but the Action ought to have been brought in Midd. Jones Justice Debt for Rent upon the privity of Contract may be brought in another County but if it be brought upon the privity of Estate as by the Grantee of the Reversion or against the Assignee of the Lessee then it ought to be brought in the County where the Land is Quod nota Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 474. CREMER and TOOKLEY's Case AN action of Debt was brought for suing in the Court of Admiralty against the Statutes of 13 R. 2. cap. 5. 15 R. 2. cap. 3. whereby it is enacted That of manner of Contracts Pleas and Complaints arising within the body of the Counties as well by land as by water the Admiral shall in no wise have conusans And the Statute gives damages part to the party and part to the King And the Plaintiff in the action of Debt did declare That the Defendant Tookley did implead Cremer the Plaintiff in the Court of Admiralty And in his Declaration set forth That one Mullâ—beck was Master of a Ship c. and that the Contract was made in London And that Tookley the Defendant did force the Plaintiff to appear and prosecuted the suit upon the Contract in the Admiral Court And by special Verdict it was found That a Charter-party was made betwixt Mullibeck and Cremer at Dunkirk And that Tookley did prosecute Cremer in the Admiral Court by vertue of a Letter of Attorney and so that he as Attorney to Mullibeck did prosecute the suit there The Case was argued by Andrewes for the Plaintiff There are two points The first upon the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty the Contract
reasonable Herbage Here the Grant is not De omnibus grossis arboribus bonis catellis Felonum and of the Goods of Felons themselves and in the former Patent these were granted and so the Grant is for the Kings benefit and to the prejudice of the Patentee Also this Patent is ad proficuum Domini Regis For here is a Rent reserved and here is a Proviso for the committing of Waste in the premisses which were not in the first Letters Patents and in these Letters Patents there are divers Covenants which were not in the former Patents and so it is in forma sequente And so the Lease of Philip and Mary is good The King seised of a Manor to which he hath a Park doth grant the Stewardship of the Manor and the Custodie of the said Park with reasonable Herbage Afterwards in the same Letters Patents hee grants the said Manor of O. and all the Lands in O. excepting grosse trees in the Park If this Grant be not good for the Manor it is not good for the Park that was the Objection It is good for the Manor and also for the Park It was objected That the King grants the custody of the Park and so not the Park it selfe for how can the King grant the custody of the Park if he grant the Park it selfe it is dangerous that upon an implication in one part of a Patent the expresse words which follow should be made void the subsequent words in this Case are The King grants the Manor and all the Lands to the same belonging now the Park doth belong to it and the King excepts only the Deer C. 10 part 64. The King at this day grants a Manor unto a man as entirely as such a one held the same before it came into his hands c. the Advowson doth passe without words of grant of the Advowson for the Kings meaning is That the Advowson shall passe The meaning of the King is manifest in our Case C. 3. Part 31 32. Carr's Case There the Rent was extinct betwixt the Parties yet for the benefit of the King for his tenure it hath continuance for a thing may be extinct as to one purpose and in esse as to another purpose 38. Ass 16. a Rent extinct yet Mortmain Dyer 58 59. The Exception ought to be of the thing demised In our Case the Park doth passe but the King shall have the liberties in it and so here the Park shall passe and the Exception is of the liberties Com. 370. the Exception ought to be of that which is contained in the former words in the former Patents the Offices were first granted and in the same Letters Patents the Manor was afterwards granted But now King James grants the Manor first and then the Offices Construction of Statutes ought to be secuncundùm intentionem of the makers of them and construction of Patents secundùm intentionem Domini Regis C. 8. part 58. You ought to make such a construction as to uphold the Letters Patents C. 8. part 56. Auditor Kings Case There the Letters Patents were construed secundùm intentionem Domini Regis and adjudged good But to make void the Patent they shall not be construed secundùm intentionem but to make a Patent good they shall be construed secundùm intentionem Domini Regis The Case was adjourned till Michaelmas Terme next Note I have heard Sir Henry Yelverton say That it was the opinion of the Judges in this Case That he had but the custody of the Park and not the interest of the Park for that by the acceptance of the custody of the Park when he had a Lease of the Park before it was a surrender of his Lease Trinit 21. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 492 SHORTRIDGE and HILL's Case SHortridge brought an Action upon the Case against Hill for ravishing of his Ward and the Writ was contra pacem without the words Vi armis Lib. Dent. 366. where three Presidents are of Actions upon the Case without Vi armis An Action upon the case for doing of any thing against a Statute must be contra pacem Ley Chief Justice Recovery in this Action may be pleaded in Barre in a Writ of Ravishment of Ward brought Dodderidge Justice The Action of Trespasse at the common Law is only for the taking away of the Ward and here he hath elected his Action at the common Law and then he shall not have an Action upon the Statute viz. a Ravishment of Ward but here the Action upon the Case is brought for the taking and detaining of the Ward so as he cannot preferr him in marriage and upon this speciall matter the Action upon the Case lieth without the words Vi armis A Writ of Ravishment of Ward ought to be brought in the Common Pleas but yet you may bring a Writ of Ravishment of Ward in this Court if the Defendant be in the custody of the Marshal of the Marshalsey for in such special Case it shall be brought in this Court if there be an extraordinary matter besides the Trespass then an Action upon the Case lieth as when A. contracts with B. to make an estate unto B. of Bl. Acre at Michaelmas if C. enter into Bl. Acre A. may have an Action upon the Case against C. for the speciall damage which may happen to him by reason that he is not able to perform that contract by reason of the entry of C. and he shall declare contra pacem but not Vi armis Trinit 21. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 493 BAKER and BLAKAMORE's Case IN Trespass the Defendant pleaded That J. S. being seised in Fee gave the Lands unto Baker and the Heirs of his body and conveyed the Lands by descent to four Daughters and Blakamore the Defendant as servant to one of the Daughters did justifie The Plaintiff did reply That the said J. S. was seised in Fee and gave the same to Baker and the Heirs Males of his Body and conveyed the Land by descent to himself as Heir Male absque hoc that J. S. was seised in Fee Henden Serjeant did demur in Law upon the Replication and took Exception to the Traverse for that here he traverseth the Seisin of J. S. whereas he ought to have traversed the gift in tail made by J. S. for the being seised is but an inducement not traverseable and therefore he ought to have traversed the gift in taile for then he had traversed the seisin for he could not give the Lands in tail if that he were not seised thereof in Fee L. 5. E. 4 9. there in Formedon the Tenant would have traversed the Seisin of the Donor but the book is ruled that the Traverse ought to be of the gift in tail and that includes the Seisin Bridgment for the Plaintiffe and said That the Serjeant is of opinion contrary to the Books when he saith positively that you ought to traverse the gift in tail and not the seisin of the Donor
certain Farme Lands called Estons and that a Fine was levied of Lands in Eslington Eston and Chilford whereas Eston lay in another Parish appell D. Calthrope argued That the Land in Eston did passe by the Fine although the Parish was not named for that the Writ of Covenant is a personall Action and will lie of Lands in a Hamlet or lieu conus 8. E. 4 6. Vide 4. E. 3. 15. 17. Ass 30. 18. E. 3. 36. 47. E. 3. 6. 19. E. 3. Brev. 767. 2. He said That it was good for that the Plea went only to the Writ in abatement but when a Concord is upon it which admits it good it shall not be avoided afterwards 3. He said That a Fine being a common assurance and made by assent of the parties will passe the Lands well enough 7 E. 4. 25. 38. E. 3. 19. And he vouched Pasch 17. Jacobi in the Kings Bench Rot. 140. Monk and Butlers Case Where it was adjudged that a Fine being but an arbitrary assurance would passe Lands in a Lieu conus and so he said it would do in a common recovery And Richardson said That if a Scire facias be brought to execute such a recovery Nul tiel ville ou Hamlet is no plea and the Fine or recovery stands good Vide 44. E. 3. 21. 21 E. 3. 14 Stone And the opinion of the Court was That the Lands did well passe by the Fine Mich. 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench 509 CAWDRY aud TETLEY's Case CAwdry being a Doctor of Physick the Defendant Praemissorum non ignorans to discredit the plaintiff with his Patients as appeared by the Evidence spake these words to the plaintiffe viz. Thou art a drunken Fool and an Asse Thou wert never a Scholer nor ever able to speak like a Scholer The opinions of Jones and Crook Justices were that the words were actionable because they did discredit him in his Profession and hee hath particular losse when by reason of those words others do not come to him And Palmers Case was vouched Where one said of a Lawyer Thou hast no more Law then a Jackanapes that an Action did lie for the words Contrary if he had said No more Wit And William Waldrons Case was also vouched where one said I am a true Subject thy Master is none that the words were actionable Mich. 4. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 510 The King and BAXTER SIMMON's Case THE Case was this Tenant in tail the Remainder in taile the Remainder in Fee to Tenant in tail in possession Tenant in tail in Remainder by Deed enrolled reciting that he had an estate tail in Remainder Granted his Remainder and all his estate and right unto the King and his Heirs Proviso that if he pay ten shillings at the Receipt of the Exchequer that then the Grant shall be void Tenant in tail in possession suffers a common Recovery and afterwards deviseth the Lands to I. S. and dieth without Issue 18. Jacobi Afterwards 21. Jac. he in the Remainder in tail dieth without issue but no seisure is made nor Offence found that the lands were in the Kings hands Noy who argued for the King The first Point is When Tenant in taile recites his estate and grants all his estate and right to the King and his Heirs what estate the King hath And if by the death of Tenant in tail without issue the estate of the King be so absolutly determined that the Kings possession needs not to be removed by Amoveas manum And he argued That when the Lands are once in the King that they cannot be out of him again but by matter of Record 8. E. 3. 12. Com. 558. And a bare entry upon the King doth not put the King out of possession of that which was once in him And so was it adjudged 34. Eliz. in the Lord Paget's Case as Walter chief Baron said And Noy took this difference 8. H. 5. Traverse 47. and 8. E. 2. Traverse 48. If a particular estate doth determine before that the King seise there the King cannot afterwards seise the Lands But if the King hath once the Lands in his hands or possession there they cannot be devested out of him but by matter of Record So F. Nat. Br. 254. If a man be seised of Lands in the right of his Wife and be outlawed for Felonie for which the Lands come into the Kings hands and afterwards hee who is outlawed dieth there a Writ of Diem clausit extremum shall issue forth which proveth That by the death of the Husband the Lands are not immediately out of the King and setled in the Wife againe 22. E. 4. Fitz. Petition 9. Tenant in taile is attainted of Treason and the Lands seised into the Kings hands and afterwards Tenant in taile dieth without Issue he in the Remainder is put to his Petition which proveth that the Lands are not presently after the death of Tenant in taile without issue out of the King But he agreed the Cases If Tenant in taile acknowledgeth a Statute or granteth a Rent charge and dieth that the Rent is gone and determined by his death as it is agreed in 14. Assisarum The second point argued by Noy was That although that there was not any seizure or Offence found which entituled the King Yet the Deed enrolled in the Chancery which is returned in this Court did make sufficient title for the King as 8. E. 3. p. 3. is The Judges of Courts ought to Judge upon the Records of the same Courts In 8. H. 7. 11. a Bayliff shewed That a Lease was made to T. his Master for life the Remainder to the King in Fee and prayed in Ayd of the King And the Plaintiff in Chancery prayed a Procedendo And it was ruled That a Procedendo should not be granted without examination of the Kings title Thirdly he said That in this case he who will have the Lands out of the possession of the King ought to shew forth his title and in the principall case it doth not appear that the Defendant had any title Vide 10. H. 7. 13. Athowe Serjeant argued for the Defendant he said That in this case the King had an estate but for the life of Tenant in tail And therefore he said That If Tenant in tail grant totum statum suum that an estate but for his own life passeth as Litt. is 145. and 13. H. 7. 10. acc So If Tenant for life the remainder in taile bee and he in the Remainder releaseth to Tenant for life in possession nothing passeth but for the life of Tenant in tail 19. H. 6. 60. If Tenant in tail be attainted of Treason or Felonie and Offence is found and the King seiseth the lands he hath an estate but for the life of Tenant in tail And he cited 35. Eliz. C. 2 part 52. Blithmans case Where Tenant in tail Covenanted to stand seized to the use of himself for his own life and after his death to the use
of his eldest son in tail and afterwards he married a wife and died that the wife should not be endowed for when he had limited the use to himself for his life he could not limit arâ— Remainder over And Edwards Case adjudged in the Court of Wards which was That there was Tenant for life the Remainder in tail he in the Remainder granted his Remainder to I. S. and his heirs and afterwards Tenant for life dyed and then the grantee dyed his heirs within age it was adjudged that the heir of the garntee should not be in ward because the Tenant in tail could not by his Grant grant a greater estate then for his own life But he said That in the principall Case it appeareth That the Tenant in tail in Remainder hath particularly recited his estate And where it appeareth in the Conveyance it self that he hath but an estate in tail a greater estate shall not passe As if Tenant for life granteth a Rent to one and his heirs the same at the first sight seems to be a good Rent in Fee but when it appeareth in the Conveyance that the grantor was but Tenant for life there upon the Construction of the Deed it self it cannot be intended that he granted a Fee but that an estate for life passed only in the Rent Secondly he argued That although the estate in tail in the principall case was an abeyance Yet a Common Recovery would barr such estate tail in abeyance And therewith agreeth C. 2. part Sr Hugh Cholmleys Case 3. He said That the estate was out of the King and vested in the party without any Offence found as 49. E. 3. Isabell Goodcheaps case A man devised houses in London holden of the King in tail and if the Donee dyed without Issue that the Lands should be sold by his Executors The devisee died without Issue The bargain and sale of the Lands by the Executor doth divert the estate out of the King without Petition or Monstrans de Droit So If there be Tenant in tail the Remainder in tail and Tenant in tail â—n Remainder levieth a fine of his Remainder to the King and afterwards dyeth without Issue the Kings estate is determined and there needs no Petition or Monstrans de Droit 4. He said That in the principall case nothing was in the King because it doth not appeare that there was any seisure or Offence found to entitle the King And the Tenant in tail in the Remainder died in the life of King James and then if the Kings estate were then determined as before by the death of the Tenant in taile the King which now is never had any title And hee said that he needed not to shew a greater title then he had And hee took a difference when Tenant in taile doth onely defend or make defence and when he makes title to Lands in the one Case he ought for to shew That the Tenant in taile died without issue and in the other Case not And therefore in the principall case he demanded Judgment for the Defendant The Case was adjourned to another day Mich. 4. Caroli in the Star-Chamber 511 TAILOR and TOWLIN's Case A Bill was preferred against the Defendant for a Conspiracy to Indict the plaintiff of a Rape And the Plaintiff aleadged in his Bill That an Indictment was preferred by the Defendant against the Plaintiff before the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius in the County of Suffolk And did not lay it in his Bill that the Indictment was preferred before the Justices of Oyer and Terminer and Gaole delivery and the same was holden by the Court to be a good Exception to the Bill for that the Justices of Assise and Nisi prius have not power to take Indictments But afterwards upon veiw of the Bill because the Conspiracy was the principall thing tryable and examinable in this Court and that was well layd in the Bill the Bill was retayned and the Court proceded to Sentence And in this Case Richardson Justice said That in Conspiracy the matter must bee layed to be falsè et malitiosè and if it be layed for a Rape It must be layd that there was recens persecutio of it otherwise it will argue a Consent And therefore because the Defendant did not preferre an Indictment of Rape in convenient time after the Rape supposed to be done but concealed the same for half a years time and then would have preferred a Bill of Indictment against the plaintiff for the same Rape he held that the Indictment was false and malitious And Hyde Chief Justice said That upon probable proof a man might accuse another before any Justice of Peace of an Offence and although his accusation be false yet the Accuser shall not be punished for it But where the Accusation is malitious and false it is otherwise and for such Accusation he shall be punished in this Court Trinit 8. Caroli in the King Bench. 513 JONES and BALLARD's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz These Jones are proper Witnesses they will sweare any thing They care not what they say They have already forsworn themselves in the Chancery and the Lord keeper Committed them for it Jermyn took Exceptions because it was not said to be in the Court of Chancery nor that it was in any Deposition there taken upon Oath But it was adjudged per Curiam That the Action would lie and Jones Justice said that the Addition in the Chauncery was as much as if he had said he was perjured there And Hâ—msies case was vouâ—hed by him Where one said of a Witness presently after a Tryall at the Guild Hall in London You have now forsworn your self That it was adjudged that the words were actionable Trinit 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 513. SYMME's and SMITH's Case A Woman being entituled to copyhold Lands of the Manor of D did covenant upon reasonable request to be made unto her to surrender the Copy-hold Land according to the Custome of the Manor And it was found That the Custome of the Manor is That a surrender may be made either in person or by Letter of Atturney and that the plaintiff did request the woman to make the surrender by a Letter of Atturney which shee refused to do And whether shee ought to surrender presently or might first advise with her Councell was the Question It was argued for the plaintiff that shee ought to do it presently And Munser's Case C. 2. part and 16. Eliz. Dyer 337. Sir Anthonie Cooks Case were vouched that she was to do it at her perill And the Election in this Case was given to the Covenantee and hee might require it to be done either in Court in person or by Letter of Atturney And C. 2. part Sir Rowland Heywards Case and C. 5. part Hallings Case was vouched to that purpose Rolls contrary for the Defendant And he said That the woman was to have convenient time to do it and
and Slingbyes case 361 Londons case 374 Ludlow and Stacies case 377 Loxe case 345 Lee and Grissels case 442 Leonards case 451 Lone and Hills case 458 Litfield and Melhers case 459 Langley and Stotes case 478 Lancaster and Kigleys case 507 Lovegrave and Brewens case 514 M MOuntjoyes Case 24 Macrowes Case 38 Marsh and Palfords Case 53 Megods Case 77 Miller and Gores Case 122 Mayes Case 173 Mannocks Case 191 Meâ—r and Ridouts Case 241 Marriots Case 248 Morris Case 265 Mounteagle and Pemeddocks Case 266 Meades Case 274 Miller and Reignolds Case 293 Manwoods Case 301 Maior of Yorks Case 360 Mildmays Case 416 Morgans Case 416 Morris and Clarks Case 435 Mellon and Herns Case 435 Mills Case 464 Marshes Case 465 Manns Case 471 Mutle and Does Case 480 Mole and Carters Case 484 Monk and Butchers Case 508 Moor and Hawkins Case 486 N NOrris and Salisburies case 154 Newton and Richards case 240 Newmans case 242 Newman and Babbingtons Case 250 Norton and Lysters case 291 Norton and Symms case 303 O OSborne and Trittels Case 99 Occoulds case 268 Owen alias Collins case 363 Owfield and Sheirts case 430 Ognels case 483 Offlies case 517 P POles case 13 Prideaux case 44 Plymptons case 116 Proctors case 168 Pinders case 185 Peto and Chitties case 193 Perepoints case 217 Piggot and Goddens case 221 Pitts and Wardels case 230 Prrrot and Kebles case 281 Porters case 302 Paynes case 308 Piggot and Pigots case 330 Prat and Lord Norâ—hs case 358 Paginton and Huets case 370 Plotts case 380 Pollyes case 403 Sir Iohn Parkingtons case 416 Pritchard Williams case 423 Philpot and Fielders case 427 Pye and Bonners case 443 Peters case 456 Pits and Horkley's case 458 Proctor and Cliffords case 468 Payn and Colleges case 490 Parks case 502 Palmers case 509 Perpoynt Thimblebys case 513 Pages case 717 Plats case 518 L. Pagets case 510 Q Quodds case 246 R ROots case 139 Rushwels case 186 Royley and Dormes case 260 Read and Hewes case 269 Rosseâ— and Walshes cass 296 Reorsbies and Cuffs case 316 Roe and Gloves case 332 Roberts and Hills case 434 Randal and Harveys case 452 Royden and Moulstons case 458 Roper and Roydons case 491 Roy and Hills case 517 S Skipwiths case 22 Savel and Cordels case 35 Sydenham Worlingtons case 40 Savacres case 47 Stargies case 75 Smith and Smiths case 88 Shotbolts case 91 Stransam and Colborns case 97 Strangden and Barcels case 163 Sayland and Ridlers case 177 Skipwith and Sheffields case 178 Stowels case 182 Sir John Spencer and Poyntz case 203 Stebbings case 239 Stones case 247 Sancford and Havels case 263 Sprat and Nicholsons case 283 Seymors case 307 Stowhridge Archers case 311 Smiths case 317 Sherloes case 347 Sheriff and Bridges case 349 Simpsons case 364 Smith and Staffords case 379 Slyes case 390 Spicer and Spicers case 398 Stewry and Stewryes case 410 L. Sheffield Ratcliffs case 417 Sadlers case 417 Snell and Bennets case 426 Shooter and Emets case 435 Stone and Roberts case 435 Sely and Flayles case 448 Seignior and Wolmers case 453 Stanton and Barneys case 458 Sherrington Worsleys case 465 Suttons case 476 Symmes case 477 Samson and Gatefields case 482 Scots case 487 Sommers case 489 Shortridge and Hills cases 492 Shirtford and Berrowes case 502 Syms and Smiths case 513 Simpsons case 518 Shackbolts 495 Spurlings case 479 T. THrogmorton and Terringhams case 37 Taylor and Ribera's case 90 Taylor and James case 195 Traherns case 321 Totnam and Hoskins case 445 Taylor and Askies case 455 Tollyn and Taylors case 469 Tanfield and Hirons case 486 Treventries case 488 Tucker and Carrs case 491 Taylor and Tomlyns case 511 Tennants case 507 Tompsons case 369 U. VIcar of Pancras case 63 Vernon and Grays case 145 Vaughans case 327 Veseys case 406 Vrry and Bowyers case 479 Vinior and Viniors case 515 W. VVEbb Potters case 25 Windsmore Hulberts Case 64 Wiseman and Wallmyers case 107 Wood and Ashes case 135 Warrens case 138 Widdal sir John Ashtons case 142 Winkefields case 152 Warners case 183 Whitlock and Hartwells case 184 Wilson and Wormels case 226 Woolseys case 249 Wekers case 257 Wright and Wrights case 262 Wetherell and Greens case 280 Wedlock and Hardings case 295 Wheelers case 315 Wormleighton and Hunters case 338 Whorewoods Case White and Moores case 340 Wrotesley Candishes case 354 Winscomb and Dunches case 376 Webb and Tucks case 392 Waite and Inhabitants of Stokes case 397 Webb and Paternosters case 401 Williams and Gibbs case 409 White and Edwards case 412 Wiseman and Denhams case 424 Waterer Montagues case 429 Wheeler Appletons case 434 Waterman and Cropps case 467 Whittie and Westons case 479 VVillis case 483 VVilliams and Floyds case 495 VValdrons case 509 Y. YArram and Bradshawes case 145 Yate and Alexanders case 408 Young and Englesfields case 422 Z. ZOuch and Bramports case 165 Zouch and Mitchels case 225 Zouch and Moores case 491 Mich. 17. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 1. THis Case was moved to the Court. If an Abby hath a Parsonage appropriate in D. which is discharged of payment of Tithes and afterward the Abbot purchaseth part of the lands in the same Town and Parish where the Parsonage is That this land so purchased is discharged of Tithes in the hands of the Abbot For the Tithes were suspended during the possession of the Abbot in his own hands But after that the Abby was surrendred into the hands of the King Anno 30. H. 8. And afterwards the same possessions c. were given to King H. 8. by the Statute of 31. H. 8. cap. 13. as they were in the hands of the Abbot The question was Whether the Land so purchased by the Abbot before the surrender were discharged of payment of Tithes by the Statute or not And the opinion of Mr. Plowden was That they were not discharged of Tithes by the Statute For that no lands are discharged by the Statute but such lands as were lawfully discharged in right by composition or other lawfull thing And the lands in this case were not discharged in right but suspended during the possession of the Abbot in his own hands And so hee said it is when the Land is purchased by one and the Parsonage by another the right of Tithes is revived and the lands charged as before the purchase of the Abbot And so he said it had been adjudged Pasc 17. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 2. A Man makes a Lease for Life and afterwards makes a Lease unto another for Years to begin after the death of Tenant for life The Lessee for yeers dieth intestate The Ordinary commits Administration The Administrators and the Tenant for life joyn in the purchase of the Fee-simple Two questions were moved The first was Whether the Fee were executed in the Tenant for life for any part 2. Whether the Term were gone in part or in all And the opinion
the Nisi Prius the Defendant gave in Evidence That he had paid the Money to the Plaintiff before the day and that the Plaintiff had accepted of it all which Matter the Jury found specially and referred the same to the Justices And it was said by the whole Court That that payment before the day was a sufficient Discharge of the Bond but because the Defendant had not pleaded the same Specially but Generally that he had paid the Money according to the Condition the Opinion was That they must find against the Desendant for that the Speciall Matter would not prove the Issue and the Lord Dyer Chief Justice said That the Plaintiffs Councel might have demurred upon the Evidence Mich. 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 15 AN Action was brought upon the Statute of 1 2 Phil. Mar. And the Statute is That no Distresse shall be driven out of the Rape Hundred Wapentake or Laith where such distresse is or shall be taken except it be to the Pound Overt within the said County not exceeding three Miles distant from the place where the Distresse was taken and the Plaintiff declared of a Distresse taken in a Hundred in such a County and that he drove it six miles out of the County and because a Hundred may be in diverse Counties and the Statute is That the driving ought not be more then 3 miles out of the Hundred and that it might be that the driving was six miles from the place where the Distresse was taken in another County and yet not three miles from the Hundred where the taking was for that Cause it was not adjudged against the party And that was after Verdict in arrest of Judgment Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 16. A Feme sole seized of a Manor to which there were Copyholds One of the Copyholders did entermarry with the woman and afterwards he and his wife did suffer a Recovery of the Manor unto the use of themselves for their lives and afterwards to the use of the heires of the wife The Question was Whether the Copyhold were extinct And Anderson the Chief Justice said That if a Copyholder will joyn with his Lord in a Feoffment of the Mannor that thereby the Copy-hold is extinct The same Law is if a Copyholder do accept a Lease for years of his Copyhold which was agreed by the whole Court Pasc 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 17. I. N. Doth Covenant with I. S. by Indenture to pay him forty pounds yearly for one and twenty years and afterwards I. S. doth release to I. N. all Actions The Question was Whether the whole Covenant were discharged And it was holden by all the Justices that only the Arrerages were discharged because the Covenant is executory yearly to be executed during the Term of one and twenty years for he may have several Actions of Covenant for every time that it is behind and if it be behind the second year he may have a new Action for that and so of every year during the Term several Actions for nothing shall be discharged by the release of all Actions but that which was in Action or a Dutie at the time of the release made As in 5. E. 44. and L. 5. E. 4. 41. In debt for Arrerages of an Annuity the defendant pleaded a release of all Actions which bore date before any arrerages were behind And the opinion of the Justices was there That it was no Plea and so it was adjudged for it is not a thing in Action nor a Duty untill the day of paiment comes And it is there holden by Arden That if a man make a Lease for two years rendring Rent and that the Tenant shall forfeit twenty shillings nomine poenae for not paiment at the day there a release of all Actions personals made to the Tenant before the penalty be forfeited is no Bar for it is neither Duty nor thing in Action before the failer of paiment And in 42. E. 3. 33. A man did release to his Tenant for term of life all his Right for the Term of the life of the same Tenant for life And that he nor his heirs might any right demand nor challenge or claim for the life of the Tenant for life in the said Land and afterwards he died and the Tenant committed Waste and the heir brought an Action of Waste and the Tenant pleaded the same Release and it was holden no Plea for nothing was extinct by the same Release but that which was in Action at the time of the Release made and that the Waste was not Rhodes Serjant put a Case which he vouched to be adjudged 4. Eliz. which was That if a man Covenant with I. S. that if he will marry his daughter that then he will pay him twenty pounds If a Release were made by I. S. before the marriage the same will not determine the twenty pounds if he marry her afterwards because it was not a Duty before the marriage So in the principal Case notwithstanding that the Covenant was once broken for the non-paiment at the first day yet because a several Action of Covenant lieth for every day that it was arreare the Release shall extinguish but only that which was Arreare at the time of the Release made And so Note That a Release doth not discharge a Covenant which is not broken Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 18. UPon a special Verdict in an Action of Debt The Case was this I. S. and I. N. did submit themselves to the Award Order Rule and Judgemant of A. and B. for all Matters Quarrels and Debates and the Bond was made to perform the Award Order Rule and Judgement ment made by them And they Award Order Rule and Adjudge That I. S. shall pay to W. N. who was a Stranger twenty shillings The first Question was Whether the Award were good And it was holden by Anderson Chief Justice Meade and Periam Justices That the Award was void because it was out of their Submission for they cannot Award a man to do a thing which doth not lye in his power for in this Case W. N. to whom the money is to be paid is a Stranger and it is in his Election if he will accept of the money or not And so it is holden in 22. H. 6. 46. and 17. E. 4. 5. but vid. cont 5. H. 7. 2. Then if the Award be void The second Question was If yet the Bond to performe it be good or not And it was holden by the whole Court that it was void also against the Book of 22. H. 6. 46. because that the Condition was to performe that which was against the Law Quaere that Case for it seemes not to be Law at this day And it was then holden That Awards concerning Acts to be performed by them which have not submitted are void And in all Cases where each of the parties which submit have not some thing the Award is void Pasch
24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 19. IN an Action upon the Case upon a Promise The consideration was Where I. S. had granted a Term to I. D. That afterwards upon the request of I. S. I. D. did make to W. an Estate for four years upon which W. brought his Action And after Verdict it was moved in stay of Judgement that there was no good consideration and a difference taken where the Promise was upon the Grant and where afterwards If it were before then the Condition was good but if it were afterwards it was not good And it was adjudged That the Plaintiffe Nihil capiat per billam Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 20. AN Action upon the Case upon a Promise was The Consideration was That in consideration that the Plaintiffe Daret diâ—m solutionis the Defendant Super se assumpsit and because he doth not say in facto that he had given day It was adjudged that no sufficient Consideration was alledged But if the Consideration were Quod cum indebitatus c. the same had been a good Consideration without any more for that implies a Consideration in it self Pasch 24. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 21. IT was said by Cooke That the Chancellor or any Judge of any of the Courts of Record at Westminster may bring a Record one to another without a Writ of Certiorare because one Judge is sufficiently known one to the other as 5. H. 7. 31. where a Certificate was by the Chancellor alone and to this purpose is 11. H. 4. But that other Judges of base Courts cannot do nor Justices of the Peace as 3. H. 6. where the certificate by Suitors was held void Pasch 25. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 22. SKIPWITH'S Case IT was found upon a speciall verdict in an Action of Trespass that the place where c. was Copy-hold land And that the Custome is That quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit devise lands whereof she is seised in Fee according to the custome of the Manor to her Husband and surrender it in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons And that I. S. was seised of the land where c. and had issue two Daughters and died and that they married husbands and that one of them devised her part to her husband by Will in writing in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons and afterwards at another day shee surrendred to the Husband and he was admitted and she died and her Husband continued the possession And the Husband of the other Daughter brought an Action of Trespasse Rodes Serjeant The Custome is not good neither for the Surrender nor for the Will for two causes One for the uncertainty of what estate shee might make a Devise and because it is against reason that the Wife should surrender to the Husband Where the Custome shall not be good if it be uncertain he vouched 13. E. 3. Fitz. Dum fuit infra aetatem 3. The Tenant saith that the lands are in Dorset where the Custome is that an Enfant may make a Grant or Feoffment when he can number twelve pence And it was holden that because it is uncertain when he can so do the Custome is not good 19. E. 2. in a Ravishment of Ward the defendant pleaded that the custome is that when the Enfant can measure an ell of cloth or tell twelve pence as before that he should be out of Ward and it is holden no good custom for the cause aforesaid 22. H. 6. 51. a. there a man prescribed That the Lord of D. had used to have Common for him and all his Tenants And because it is not shewed what Lord whether the Lord mediate or immediate it is adjudged no good custome And as to the Surrender it is against reason that the Wife should give to the Husband for a Wife hath not any Will but the Will of her Husband For if the Husband seised in the right of his Wife make a Feoffment in Fee and the Wife being upon the land doth disagree unto it saying that shee will never depart with it during her life yet the Feoffment is good and shall binde during the life of the Husband as it is holden in 21. E. 3. And therefore it is holden in 3. E. 3. Tit. Devise Br. 43. That a Feme covert cannot devise to her Husband for that should be the Act of the Husband to convey the land to himself And in the old Natura Brevium in the Additions of Ex gravi quaerela it is holden so accordingly And the Case in 29. E. 3. differs much from this Case For there a woman seised of lands devisable took an Husband and had issue and devised the lands to the Husband for his life and died and a Writ of Waste was brought against him as Tenant by the Courtesie and it was holden that it did lie and that he is not in by the Devise for the reason there is because he was in before by the Courtesie But as I conceive that Case will disprove the Surrender for in as much as he had it in the Right of his wife he could not take it in his own Right Also he took another Exception in the principal Case because that the wife was not examined upon the Surrender but none of the Justices spake to that Exception but when the Record was viewed it appeared that it was so pleaded Further He said That the devise was void by the Statute of 34. H. 8. Cap. 5. where it is said It is enacted That Wills and Testaments made of any Lands Tenements c. by women Coverts or c. shall not be taken to be good or effectual in Law And he said That this Statute doth extend to customary Lands And as to that all the Justices did agree That it is not within the Statute And as to the Statute of Limitations Andâ—rson chief Justice said That if a Lease for years which perhaps will not indure sixty years shall be taken strong this shall Anderson moved That if the Lord Lease Copyhold land by Word Whether the Lessee might maintain an Ejectione firme and he conceived not for in an Ejectione firmâ— there ought to be a Right in Fact And although it be by conclusion it is not sufficient for that the Jury or Judge are not estopped or concluded And he conceived That if Tenant at Will make a Lease for years that it is no good lease betwixt him and the Lessor but that he may well plead that he had nothing in the land Meade contrary but they both agreed That the Book of 14. E. 4. which saith That if Tenant at Will make a lease for years that he shall be a Disseisor is not Law Anderson said That the prescription in the principal Case was not good for it is Quod quaelibet foemina viro cooperta poterit c. and it ought to be that feme Coverts possunt and by the Custome have used to devise to the
husband and therefore the prescription is not good that Potest ponere retes upon the land of another upon the Custome of the Sea for prescription must be in a thing done also by him the devise is not good according to the Custome for that is that she may devise and surrender and that ought to be all at one time and that in the presence of the Reeve and six other persons as well as the Surrenderer and the words of a Custome shall be so far performed as they may be Meade contrary And that these Witnesses shall be referred to the surrender onely for a devise may be without Witnesses And he said that sometimes the latter clause shall not refer to all the precedent matter but unto the latter onely as 7. H. 7. is Where a Praecipe was brought of lands in A. B. and C. in Insula de Ely the Clause in Insula de Ely is referred onely to C. And it was said That if in the principal Case the Will were good that then the husbands are Tenants in common and then the Action of Trespass is not maintainable Pasch 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 23. THis Case was moved by Serjant Gawdy Thomas Heigham had an hundred Acres of lands called Jacks usually occupied with a house and he leased the house and forty Acres parcel of the said hundred Acres to I. S. for life and reserved the other to himself and made his Will by which he doth devise the house and all his lands called Jacks now in the occupation of I. S. to his wife for life and that after her decease the remainder of that and all his other lands pertaining to Jacks to R. who was his second son Whether the wife shall have that of which her husband died seised for her life or whether the eldest son should have it and what estate he shall have in it Meade The wife shall not have it for because that he hath expressed his Will that the wife shall have part it shall not be taken by implication that she shall have the whole or the other part for then he would have devised the same to her And therefore it hath been adjudged in this Court betwixt Glover and Tracy That if Lands be devised to one and his heirs males and if he die without heirs of his body that then the land shall remain over that he had no greater estate then to him and his special heirs viz. heirs Males and the reason was because the Will took effect by the first words Anderson Chief Justice It was holden in the time of Brown That if lands were devised to one after the death of his wife that the wife should have for life but if a man seised of two Acres deviseth one unto his wife and that I. S. shall have the other after the death of the wife she takes nothing in that Acre for the Cause aforesaid For the second matter If the Reversion shall pass after the death of the wife to the second son we are to consider what shall be said land usually occupied with the other and that is the land leased with it But this land is not now leased with it and therefore it cannot pass Windham The second son shall have the Reversion for although it doth not pass by these words Usualy Occupied as Anderson held yet because the devise cannot take other effect and it appeareth that his intent was to pass the land the yonger son shall have it Anderson Jacks is the intire name of the house and lands And that word when it hath reference unto an intire thing called Jacks and is known by the name of Jacks shall pass to the second son for words are as we shall construe them And therefore If a man hath land called Mannor of Dale and he deviseth his Mannor of Dale to one the land shall pass although it be not a Mannor And if I be known by the name of Edward Williamson where my name is Edward Anderson and lands are given unto me by the name of Edward Williamson the same is a good name of purchase And the opinion of the Court was that the Reversion of the land should pass to the second son Pasc 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 24. The Lord MOUNTJOY and the Earle of HUNTINGTON'S Case NOte by Anderson Chief Justice and Periam Justice If a man seised of any entrie Franchises as to have goods of Felons within such a Hundred or Mannor or goods of Outlaws Waifes Strares c. which are causual There are not Inheritances deviseable by the Statute of 32. H. 8. for they are not of any yearly value and peradventure no profit shall be to the Lord for three or four years or perhaps for a longer time And such a thing which is deviseable ought to be of annual value as appeareth by the words of the Statute And also they agreed that the said Franchises could not be divided and therefore if they descend to two coparceners no partition can be made of them And the words of the Statute of 32. H. 8. are That it shall be lawful c. to divise two parts c. and then a thing which canot be divided is not diviseable And they said That if a man had three Manors and in each of the three such Liberties and every Manor is of equal value that yet he cannot devise one Mannor and the Liberties which he hath to it Causá quâ supra but by them an Advowson is deviseable because it may be of annual value But the Lord Chancellor smiling said That the Case of the three Manors may be doubted And there also it was agreed by the said two Justices upon Conference had with the other Justices That where the Lord Mountjoy by deed Indented and Inrolled did bargaine and sell the Manor of â—amford to Brown in Fee and in the Indenture this Clause is contained Provided alwayes And the said Brown Covenants and Grants to and with the Lord Mountjoy his Heirs and Assigns that the Lord Mountjoy his Heirs and Assigns may digg for Ore within the land in Camford which was a great Waste and also to digg Turffe there to make Allome and Coperess without any contradiction of the said Brown his Heirs and Assigns They agreed That the Lord Mountjoy could not devide the said Interest viz. to grant to one to digg within a parcel of the said Waste And they also agreed That notwithstanding that Grant That Brown his Heirs and Assigns owners of the Soile might digg there also like to the Case of Common Sans number The Case went further That the Lord Mountjoy had devised this Interest to one Laicott for one and twenty years and that Laicott assigned the same over to two other men And whether this Assignment were good or not was the Question forasmuch that if the Assignement might be good to them it might be to twenty and that might be a surcharge to the Tenant of the soile And as to that
agree in the Services Walmesley He shall have the traverse for the mischief which otherwise would follow for if he should traverse the seisin thereby he should confesse the Tenure Periam concessit and said That the difference which is commonly taken in our Books is That where they agree in the Tenure there the Seisin is traversable but where they do not agree in the Tenure there the Tenure is traversable So is 26. H. 8. 6. 7. E. 4. 27. 12. E. 4. 7. 20. E. 4. 16. And he conceived here that the payment at two dayes doth alter the tenure so as now it is another tenure then before Also he said That if Wh. acre and Bl. acre be adjoyning and are holden the one of I. S. and the other of I. D. and I. S. distrein and avow for both acres that he may well traverse the tenure Meade 8. H. 7. 5. a. It is said by Brian That if avowry be made for a tenure of two acres by twenty shillings and the Plaintiffe saith that he holdeth these two and two other acres by twelve shillings without that that he holdeth the two acres by twenty shillings that that is good for that he cannot do otherwise And it is no reason that for a false avowry the Plaintiffe should be at a mischief But the Book is not ruled for Keble is contrary Vide Librum Trinit 26 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 35 SAVELL and CORDELL's Case HEnry Savell Lessee for years of the Manor of M. grants the same Manor Habendum for so many years which should be to come after his death to Cordell Master of the Rolls if Dorothy his Wife so long should live And afterward Henry Savell and he in the Reversion levied a Fine The Case went by many Conveyances further But two points were here moved 1. If it were a good Grant for so many yeers c. Shuttleworth argued that it was But Cooke contrary And Cooke said to that which hath been said That Leases which have uncertain beginning may be by act of matter ex post facto made certain and so good As a lease for so many years as I. S. shall name if he name it is a certain lease but if the Lessor die before I. S. name and after hee name all is void as it is in the Commentaries put by Weston and granted by Dyer 273. And the reason is that it behoves that the interest passe out of the Lessor during his life and the Deed ought to have its perfection in the life of the Lessor But in our case here the Lessor or Grantor is dead before the certaintie of the beginning is known and before any perfection of interest out of him and therefore the reason in the common case 40 Ass and 16. E. 3. that there behoveth to be Attornment in the life of the Lessor proves our case for the reason of that is that it behoveth that some interest passe out of the Lessor or Grantor during his life and that perfection of his Grant be in his life or else the Grant is void Vide 31. E. 3. alb 20. and 33. E. 3. Confirmation 22. If the Chapter confirm the Grant of the Bishop after his death it is void for it ought to have perfection in the life of the Bishop otherwise it is void And upon that reason is the case put by Popham Com. 520. b. That where a man grants all his term which shall be to come after his death that it is a void Grant because no interest passeth during the life of the Grantor And to this purpose is 7. E. 6. Br. Leases 66. Temps H. 8. 339. If a man will take by Livery within the view it behoves the Feoffee to enter during the life of the Feoffor and yet that is a more strong case for by the Livery being a ceremony of the Law it is presumed that the land passed and yet there ought to be an entry to fortifie the Grant otherwise it is void The second point was If by the Fine levyed the possibilitie aswell as the right of possession of the term did passe And I conceive that it doth therefore we see in many cases a man may grant by his Deed a possibility to come As 19. H. 7. 1. where a man seised in the right of his Wife made a Feoffment in see and after they had issue and the Wife died that he should not be Tenant by the Courtesie and yet the Wife was remitted but by his own Grant he had granted from him the possibility he might have had to be Tenant by the courtesie And here If Cordell had entered and made a Feoffment in fee or levied a Fine the possibility which he had to have the term had been cleerly gone 39. H. 6. 43. If I disseise my Eather and make a Feoffment in fee and afterwards my Father dieth although that a new Right descends unto me yet I shall be barred of this possibilitie which I had at the time of the Grant But otherwise it had been if this discontinuance or grant had been defeated by entry or otherwise in my life by my Father or any other in that case I may shew the speciall matter as 15. E. 4. 5. is and so avoid my own Deed. And 44. E. 3. 4. is That tenant for years and he in the Reversion disclaim and it is holden a good Disclaimer which proves that a possibility may also pass by Disclaimer And 21. E. 3. and 35. H. 6. is That if he who hath cause to have a Writ of Error if he enter into the Land and make a Feoffment the Writ of Error is gon for ever so by these Cases it is proved and appeareth That a Possibility may passe by grant And so in the Principall Case the Possibility to have the terme is by this Fine granted and the Grant is a good Grant And it was adjourned Pasch 26. Eliz. in the Kings Beneh 36. LUDDINGTON and AMNER'S Case Intratur Mich. 25. Eliz. Rott 495. IN a Writ of Error the Case was this Perepoynt possessed of a Lease for 99 years devised the same unto his Wife for Life and that after her Decease that it should go to his Children unpreferred the Wife took Sir Thomas Fulster to her Husband and the Lease was put in Execution by Fiery facias for the Debt of Sir Thomas Fulster and afterwards Sir Thomas died and the Wife died The Administrators of Sir Thomas Fulster did reverse the Judgement upon which the Lease was taken in Execution And afterwards A. the Daughter of Perepoynt entred supposing her selfe to be the only Daughter of Perepoynt alive unpreferred by her Father in his life time And the Pleading was That the Wife of Perepoynt was his Executrix and that she entred into the Lease after the death of Perepoynt Virtute legationis donationis praedict Cook There is a difference in our Books That the Devise of the Occupation of a Term may be with the Remainder over but not a Devise
King And as to the second Point they held the Law to be cleer That after that he hath retained as many as by the Law he may retaine and they are sub Signo and Sigillo testified to bee his Chaplains and by reason thereof have qualification to have two Benefices and have two Benefices by vertue thereof although that afterwards they are removed for displeasure or otherwise out of service yet during their lives their Master cannot take other Chaplains which may by this Statute be qualified for so every Baron might have infinite of Chaplains which might be qualified which was not the meaning of the Statute and of that opinion is the Lord Dyer in his Reports And as to the third Point they held That although he were removed from the Domesticall Service of the Family yet hee did remaine Chaplain at large and so a Chaplain within the Statute And further the Opinion of the Court was in this Case That if the party qualified to die the Queen or other Master mentioned in the Statute might qualifie another againe Quod nota The Case was entred Pasch 28. Eliz. Rot. 1130. Scot. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 48. ONE made a Deed in this forme Noverinit c. that I have demised and to Farme letten all my Lands in D. to I. S. and his Wife and to the Heirs of their two Bodies for thirteen years And it was moved That it was an Estate in taile and 5. E. 3. and 4. H. 4. were vouched But Clenche Justice who was only present in Court was of Opinion That it is but a Lease for years although it was put that Livery was made secundùm formam chartae and his said That if one make a Lease for forty years to another and his Heirs and makes Livery that it is but a Lease for years and he said It is no Livery but rather a giving of Possession But he would have it moved again when the other Justices came Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 49 AN Action upon the Case was brought against an Inn-keeper upon the Custome of England for the safe keeping of the things and Goods of their Guests and he brought his Action in another County then where the Inn was and it was said by Clench Justice That if it be an Action upon the Case upon a Contract or for words and the like transitory things that it may be brought in any County but in this Case he said It ought to be brought where the Inn is Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 50. ONE charged two men as Receivers The Question was Whether one of them might plead Ne unque son Receiver and it was moved That he could not but ought to say Nâ— unque son Receiver absque hoc that he and his Companion were Receivers Clenchè and Suit Justices held That it was well without Traverse and Vide 10. E. 4. 8. Where an Account was brought against one supposing the receipt of Two hundred Marks by the hands of I. P. and R. C. The Defendant as to One hundred Marks pleaded That he received it by the hands of I. P. tantùm without that that he received it by the hands of I. P. and R. C. And as to the other One hundred Marks he received them from the hands of R. C. only without that that he received I. P. and R. C. And there it was doubted Whether it be good or not But in the end of the Case by Fitz. Accompt 14. If an Account be brought against two and one saith He was sole his Receiver and hath accounted before such an Auditor if the Plaintiffe answer unto his Bar he shall abate his Writ because the Receipt is supposed to be a joint Receipt And it is not like unto a Praecipe quod reddat against two Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 51. AN Action upon the Case was brought against one for that he said to another I will give thee Ten Pound to kill such a one and the Question was Whether the Action would lie It was said by Sir Thomas Coâ—kaine that such a Lady had given poyson to such a one to kill her Child within her that the words were not Actionable Also one said That another had put Gun-Powder in the Window of a house to fire such a house and the house was not fired adjudged that the words were not Actionable The Case was betwixt Ramsey of Buckinghamshire and another who said That he lay in wait to have killed him it was found for the Plaintiffe and he had Forty Pound Damages given him But of the Principall Case the Court would advise Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 52 IT was holden by the Court That the Habeas corpus shall be alwayes directed to him who hath the custody of the Body Therefore whereas in the case of one Wickham it was directed to the Maior Bailiffs and Burgesses Exception was taken unto it because the pleas were holden before the Maior Bailiff and Steward but the Exception was dissallowed But otherwise it is in a Writ of Error for that shall be directed to those before whom the Judgment was given In London the Habeas corpus shall be directed Majori Vicecomit London because they have the custodie and not to the whole Corporation But I conceive that the course is that the Writ is directed Majori Aldermannis Vicecomitibus c. Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 53 MARSH and PALFORD's Case OWen moved this Case That one had an upper chamber in Fee and another had the neather or lower part of the same house in Fee and he who had the upper chamber pulled it down and he which had the lower room would not suffer him to build it up again But the opinion of the Justices was that he might build it up again if he did it within convenient time And there it was said that it had been a Question Whether a man might have a Free-hold in an upper chamber Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 54. A Question was moved to the Court Whether Tithe should be paid of Heath Turf and Broom And the opinion of Suit Justice was That if they have paid tithe Wool Milk Calves c. for their cattell which have gone upon the Land that they should not pay tithe of them But some doubted of it and conceived That they ought to say that they have used to pay those Tithes for all other Tithes otherwise they should pay tithe for Heath Turf Broom c. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 55. TWo Parsons were of two severall Parishes and the one claimed certain Tithes within the Parish of the other and said That he and all his Predecessors Parsons of such a Church scil of D. had used to have the Tithes of such Lands within the Parish of S. and that was pleaded in the Spiritual Court and the Court was moved for to grant
any remedy in this Court. Also he saith That he hath paid but doth not shew where and the other may say nâ—n solvit and so an issue shall be and no place from whence the Visne shall come Godfrey contrary If one be a lay man and the other a spirituall man then the tryall shall be at the common Law as it is holden 31. H 6. and 2. E. 4. And the defendant here is a lay man who makes prescription of a Modus decimandi for the discharge of Tithes in kind As to that which Cook said That he prescribes that he hath used to pay to the Parson and doth not say That it was due to the Parson and if he pay the Vicars Tithes to the Parson he doth wrong to the Vicar He saith That he hath paid and used to pay 4d. to the Parson in full satisfaction c. and reddâ—ndo singula singâ—lis it is good enough As to the doublenesse or repugnancy of the Prescription he said That the prescription is set forth according to the truth of the matter As to the place for that no issue can be taken upon it he answered That he conceived the issue will bee upon the Custome or Modus decimandi And Gawdy Justice agreed to that Suit Justice There is no Modus decimandi alledged for when he saith That he hath paid to the Parson that which the Vicar demands that is no answer Gaudâ— Justice The prescription is repugnant as Cook said and he said That the herbage is for all Kine as well for those which have Calves as those which have not No Prohibition granted Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 64. WINDSMORE and HULBORD's Case THe Case was this A man gave lands to J. S. Habendum to him and to three other for their lives â—t eorum diutius viventi successivè The question was What estate J. S. had and if after his life there were any occupancy in the Case Cooke That J. S. had an estate but for his life onely because he cannot have an estate for his life and for the life of another where the interest commenceth both in praesenti but he may have an estate for his own life in present interest and the remainder thereof for anothers life But this Habendum by no means can create a Remainder And he said that as a Lease to one for life Habendum to him primogâ—nito filio suo was no Remainder primogenito filio although some held to the contrary So a Lease for years Habendum to him and to another was no Remainder to the other Also the word successivè doth not make a Remainder as 30. H. 8. Br. Joynâ—ts 53. where a Lease for life to three or for yeers to three Habendum successivè yet they have a joynt estate and successivè is void for he said It is uncertain who shall have it first and who secondly Also one cannot have an estate for his own life and for the life of another at the same time in present interest for the greater will drown the lesser But if the greater be in praesenti and the lesse in futuro as a lease for his own life the Remainder to him for another mans life it is otherwise As a lease for his own life the Remainder for yeers is good But if I make a lease to you for your own life and 100 years both to begin at the same time the Lease for yeers is drowned and an estate for his own life is greater then an estate for anothers life and shall drown the estate for anothers life Vide 19. E. 3. Surr. 8. where Tenant for life of a Manor did surrender to Tenant for life in Reversion And 12. H. 7. 11. and Perkins 113. That if there be a Lease for life to one the Remainder to another for life and the Lessee for life doth surrender to him in the Remainder it is good So Dyers Reports A lease is made to one for the term of another mans life without impeachment of Waste the Remainder to him for his own life he is now punishable for waste for the first estate is surrendred Gaudy Justice If a lease be made to one for his life and so long as another man shall live quaere what estate he hath 2. If there can be any Occupancy in the Case for if the estate be void the limitation upon the estate is void therefore if the estate for the other mans life be drowned in the estate for his own life that can be no Occupancy Also the Occupancy is pleaded That such a one entred and doth not say claiming as occupant For if one come hawking upon the land he shall not by such entry be an Occupant and in the book of Entries it is pleaded that he entred clayming as Occupant Clenche Justice Every Occupancy ought to be in possession for otherwise the Law casts the interest of it upon him in the Reversion But Gaudy and Suit Justices were utterly against him in that for then they said there should be no occupancy if the party were not in by Lease or such like means Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 65. DIKE and DUNSTON'S Case IN an Action of Trespasse brought the defendant did justifie as Lessee to the Lord Mountagu and said that the Lord Mountagu for him and his Farmors had used to have a way over the land in which the trespass is supposed to be done And that by rooting of a cart wheel the way was so digged and drowned that he could not so wel use his way as before and that therefore he did fill up the cart roots and digged a trench to let out the water upon which the plaintiffe did demur in law For 15. H. 7. is that a Commoner cannot meddle with the soil so is 12. 13. H. 8. So he who hath Warren in the land of another man cannot meddle with the soile and as to that that he could not use his way so well as before it is not good for he ought to have said That he could not use his way at all otherwise the plea is not good As 6. E. 4. One is to lop his tree and he cannot do it unless it fall upon the Land of another there he may well justifie the felling of it upon the others Land because otherwise he could not lop it at all So if I give to one all the fish in my Pond he cannot dig a Trench to draw out the water unlesse he cannot otherwise take the fish as with Nets c. Also he justifies by reason that the Lord Mountagu for him and his Farmors c. And he was a Lessee and paid no rent therefore no Farmor Cowper contrary He shall not have an Action of Trespass for it is no losse or hinderance unto him but it is for his profit for the Land is the worse being drowned with water If a man do disseise me and fells trees upon the Land and doth repair the houses in an
the Defendant as Bailiffe of his Shop curam habens administrationem bâ—norum The Defendant answered as to the Goods only and said nothing to the Shop And Tanfield moved the same for Error in Arrest or Judgment as 14. H. 4. 20. One charged another as Bailiffe of his house cuâ—am habens bonorum in â—â—â—existentium the Traverse was That he was not Balivus of the house prout that is good and goeth to all but he cannot answer to the Goods and say nothing to the house so 49. E. 3. 7. Br. Accompt 21. A man brought an Account against the Bailiffe of his Manor habens curam of twenty Oxen and Cowes and certain Quarters of Corne. And by Belknap If he have the Manor and no Goods yet he shall account for the Manor and it shall be no Plea to say That the Plaintiffe sold him the Goods without Traversing without that that he was his Bailiffe to render Account and as to the Manor he may say That the Plaintiffe leased the same to him for years without that that he was his Bailiffe And he took another Exception That the Plaintiffe chargeth him with Monies ad Merchandizandum and he Traverseth that he was not his Receiver denariorum ad computandum prout And so he doth not meet with the Plaintiffe and so it is no issue and if it be no issue it is not helped by the Statute of Jeofailes 32. H. 8. but mis-joyning of Issue is helped by that Statute 19. Eliz. W. Atturney of the Common Pleas did charge another Atturney of the same Pleas with a Covenant to have three years board in marriage with the Defendants Daughter and he pleaded That he did not promise two years board and so issue was joyned and tryed and the same could not be helped by the Statute because it was no issue and did not meet with the Plaintiffe So if one charge one with debet detinet and he answer to the debet only it is no issue and therefore it is not helped In 29. H. 6. in Trespasse for entring into his house and taking of his Goods the Defendant pleaded non intravit and the issue was tried and Damages given and because the taking of the Goods was not also in issue all was void 4. E. 3. One shall not account by parcells because the Action is entire Vid. 3. E. 3. 8. acc lib. Deut. 202. A President 14. H 7. That the Verdict was not full and did not go to the whole and therefore was not good Helâ— contrary And he said as to the first That there is a Case 9. E. 3. Accompt 35. Where the Plaintiffe chargeth the Defendant in Account as Bailiffe of his house and that he had Administration of his Goods viz. forty Sacks of wool And the Jury found that he was not Bailiffe or his house but they found that he had received the Sacks of Wooll to render account c. and he had judgement for the Goods although it was not found for the house Vide 5. H. 7. 24. a. Where if a Jury be charged with several issue and the one is found and the other not it makes no discontinuance or if one be discontinued yet it is no discontinuance of the whole But if the same be not helped by the common Law yet it is helped by the Statute of 32. H. 8. which sayes Non obstante Discontinuance or miscontinuance Daniel ad idem And he said That the books before of 14. H. 4. and 49. E. 3. were not ruled in the one book the Defendant pleaded That the Plaintiff gave the goods to him in the other that he sold them to him and demanded Judgement of the Action and it is no good answer for they are Pleas only before the Auditors and not in an Action of Account and although the Verdict be found for part only yet it is good for no Damages are to be recovered in an Account In Trespasse it is true if one be found and not the other and joint Damages be given the Verdict is naught for all but if severall Damages be given it is good as it is ruled in 21. H. 6. Cook 26. H. 8. is That he cannot declare generally of an house curam habens administrationem bonorum but he ought further to say viz. Twenty Quarters of Corn and the like c. In the Principal Case it is a joint charge and one charge for the Shop and Goods and he answers unto one only but he ought to answer to all or else it is no answer at all See 10. E. 4. 8. But Cook found another thing scil That there is thing put in issue which is not in the Verdict nor found nor touched in the Verdict and that makes all that which is found not good and that is not helped by any Statute I grant that discontinuances are helped by the Statute of 32. H. 8. of Jeofailes but imperfections in Verdicts are not helped It was a great Case argued upon a Writ of Error in the Exchequer Chamber and it was 〈◊〉 Case An Information was against Brache for entring into a house and one hundred Acres of Land in Stepney he pleaded Not guilty the Jury found him guilty for the one hundred Acres and said nothing for the house upon which Error was brought and the Judgement reversed and he said That it was not a discontinuance but no Verdict for part Daniel That was the fault of the Clark who did not enter it and it hath been the usge to amend the default of the Clark in another terme All the Justices said True if the Postea be in and not entred but here it is entred in the Roll in this forme Daniel Where I charge one in Accompt with so much by the hands of such a one and with so much by thehands of such a one although there be one absque hoc to them all yet they are severall issues The Court answered Not so unlesse there be severall issue joyned to every one of them But by Gaudy Justice If there be severall issues yet if one be found and the other not no Judgement shall be given Clenche Justice It is not a charge of the Goods but in respect of the Shop therefore that ought to be traversed Suit Justice The traverse of the Shop alone is not good The Queens Solicitor said That the books might be reconciled and that there needed not a traverse to the goods for the traverse of the Shop prout answers to all but now he charges him as Bailiffe of his Shop and Goods and he takes issue upon the Goods only which issue is not warranted by the Declaration And he said That if one charge me as Bailiffe of his Goods ad merchandizandum I shall answer for the encrease and shall be punished for my negligence But if he charge me as his Receiver ad computandum I shall not be answerable but for the bare money or thing which was delivered Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's
Bench. 70 GILE'S Case A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Judgement given in an Action upon the Case The Action upon the Case was brought against one Quare exaltavit stagnum per quod suum pratum fuit inundatum and he pleaded Not guilty and the Jury found Quod erexit stagnum and if Errectio be Exaltatio then the Jury find that the Defendant is guilty and thereupon Judgement was given for the Plaintiffe Glanvile alledged the generall Error That Judgement was given for the Plaintiffe where it ought to have been given for the Defendant And he said That erigere stagnum est de novo facere Exaltare est erectum majoris altitudinis facere Deexaltare is ad pristinam altitudinem adducere prosternere stagnum est penitus tollere And the precise and apt word according to his Case in an Action upon the Case ought to be observed that he may have Judgement according to his damage and his complaint viz. either Deexaltare or Posternere c. 7. E. 3. 56. An Assize of Nusans Quare exaltavit stagnum ad nocumentum liberi tenementi sui The Defendant pleaded That he had not inhaunced it after it was first levyed And by Trew There is not any other Writ in the Chancery but Quare exaltavit stagnum Herle said That he might have a Writ Quare levavit stagnum and there by that book Levare stagnum exaltare stagnum do differ And therefore he conceived That the Writ should abate for using one word for another 8. E. 3. 21. Nusans 5. by Chauntrell In a Writ of Nusans Quare levavit if it be found that it was tortiously levied the whole shall be destroyed But in a Writ Quare exaltavit nothing shall be pulled down if it be found for the Plaintiffe but the inhauncing shall be abated only So 8. Ass 9. Br. Nusans 17. the same Case and difference is put and 16. E. 3. Fitz. Nusans 11. If the Nusans be found in any other forme then the Plaintiffe hath supposed he shall not recover And in 48. E. 3. 27. Br. Nusans 9. The Writ was Quare divertit cursum aquae c. and shewed that he had put Piles and such things in the water by which the course of the water was streitned wherefore because he might have had a Writ Quare coarctavit cursum qquae the Writ was holden not to be good Cook took another Exception viz. That the Assize of Nusans ought to be against the Tenant of the Free-hold and therefore it cannot be as it was here brought against the Workmen and it is not shewed here that the Defendant was Tenant of the Soil for 33. H. 6. 26. by Moile If a way be streitned and impaired an Action upon the Case lieth but if it be altogether stop'd an Assize of Nusans lieth But Prisoit said If the stopping be by the Terr-Tenant an Assize of Nusans lieth but if it be by a Stranger then an Action upon the Case but for common Nusanses no Action lieth but they ought to be presented in the Leet or Turne Drew We have shewed That he who brought the Assize of Nusans hath a Free-hold in the Land and if the Tenant be named it is sufficient although it be not shewed that he is Tenant of the Free-hold And to that all the Justices seemed to incline But then it was shewed to the Court that one of the Plaintiffes in the Writ of Error had released And if that should bar his Companions was another question And it was holden That the Writ of Error shall follow the nature of the first Action and that Summons and Severance lieth in an Assize of Nusans and therefore it was holden that it did the like in this Action therefore the Release of the one was the Release of the other But then it was asked by Glanvile What should become of the Damages which were entire Note Pasch 29. Eliz. the Case was moved again and Drew held exaltare and erigere all one and that erigere is not de novo facere for that is Levare But the Justices were against him who all held That erigere is de novo facere and exaltare is in majorem altitudinem attollere and at length the Judgment was affirmed That Erectio and Exaltatio were all one For the Chief Justice had turned all his Companions when he came to be of Opinion that it was all one And so the Case passed against Glanviles Client Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 71 THE Lady Gresham was indicted for stopping the High-way and the Indictment was not laid to be contra pacem And Cook said That for a mis-feasance it ought to be contra pacem but for a non-feasance of a thing it was otherwise and the Indictment was for setting up a gate in Osterly Park And Exception also was taken to the Indictment for want of Addition for Vidus was no Addition of the Lady Gresham and also Vi armis was left out of the Indictment And for these causes she was discharged and the Indictment quashed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 72. IN an Ejectione firme Exception was taken because the Plaintiffe in his Declaration did not say Extratenet For in every Case where a man is to recover a possession he ought to say extra tenet And in Debt he ought to say Debet dâ—tinet And in a Replevin Averia cepit injustè detinet But all the Justices agreed That in an Ejectione firme those words were not materiall For if the Defendant do put out the Plaintiff it is sufficient to maintain this Action And Kempe Secondary said that so were all the ancient Presidents although of late times it hath been used to say in the Declaration Extra tenet and the Declaration was holden to be good without those words Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 73 IN a Case for Tithes the Defendant did prescribe to pay but ob q for the Tithes of all Willows cut down by him in such a Parish Cooke It is no good prescription for thereby if he cut down all the Willows of other men also but ob q. should be paid for them all But he ought to have prescribed for all Willows cut down upon his own land and then it had been good But as the prescription is it is unreasonable and of that opinion was the whole Court Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 74 DEIGHTON and CLARK'S Case IN an Action of Debt upon a Bond the Condition of the Bond was That whereas the Plaintiff was in possession of such Lands If I. S. nor I. D. nor I. G. did disturb him by any indirect means but by due course of Law that then c. The Defendant pleaded That nec I S. nec I. D. nec I. G. did disturb him by any indirect means but by due course of Law Godfrey The plea in Bar is not good for it is a Negative pregnans viz. such a Negative
found amongst the Latinists Snag said What then yet one is a word which is received in the Law and is vox artis but the other not and therefore it is not in the same degree Also he said That when the Indictment comes to the Accessories It said Felonicè praesentes abbâ—ttentes assistentes and felonicè cannot be applied to praesenteâ— Also when it comes to the Accessories it doth not say Ex malitia praecogitata abbetâ—entes assistentes c. Cook contrary and he said That if Indictments have sufficient substance they are not to be overthrown for trifles As to the first he said If you will have it to be coram Coronatore de Comitatu perhaps it was a Liberty and then coram Coronatore of the Liberty cannot be coram Coronatore of the County Gaudy Justice said that was no answer But as to this point the Justices desired that Presidents might be searched and said that they would follow the greater number of them Clenche If one say that such a one is a Justice of Peace in Hertfordshire it is all one as if he had said a Justice of Peace of Hertfordshire As to the 2d. Jurati that is no Exception for it is true that it must be so in an Assize but not in an Indictment also no President can be shewed where ex malitia propensa sua shall be applied to every word when it runs in sense to all by Conjunctions copulative As to the Exception that there ought to be the length breadth c. Kempe the Secondary said That it was not worth the standing upon and as to the word Murdredi if it had been left out the Indictment had been sufficient and that shall not make the Indictment void for if it be left out it doth no hurt to it For if many come together to make an Assault ex malitia praecogitata and one of them onely strikes the partie mortally and he dieth it is murder in them all And that was Doctor Ellis case in the Commentaries and the Indictment needs not say that they were praesentes abbettantes auxiliantes and as to the word felonicè it goes to all the words although not particularly applied Note all the Justices did incline that the Indictment was good notwithstanding the Exceptions but yet they said they would advise of it and look upon Presidents Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 79. A Writ of Error was brought against two upon a Recovery in a Precipe quod reddat c. and one of them died The question was Whether the Writ should abate Cook moved that it might not abate for he said That the Writ of Error is but a Commission for to examine the Record and the partie shall recover nothing therby but shall be onely discharged from the first Recovery and he said It is not like unto a Precipe Then the Justices demanded of him if the Recovery were in a reall Action and he said that it was Then they said that 3. H. 7. 1. is That if Error be brought upon a Recovery in a personall Action that death shall not abate the Writ but otherwise if it were upon a reall Action for there the Judgement shall be that he shall be restored to the Land Quere Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 80 AN Appeal of Mayheme was that Percussit super manum dextram viz. inter manum dextram brachium dextrum And Exception was taken to it that it was repugnant for if it was inter brachium manum dextram therefore it could not be super manum dextram for the word inter excludes both Cook It is certain enough because it saith Super manum dextram And an Indictment shall not abate for forme if it be sufficient in substance of matter and also being upon the Wrist it was upon the rising of the hand Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 81 A Man made a Lease for years rendring rent at the Feast of Saint Michael th'Arch-Angel and if it were behind by ten days after being in the mean time lawfully demanded and no sufficient distresse to be found upon the Land that then it might be lawfull for the Lessor to re-re-enter The last of the ten dayes at the hour of two afternoon the Rent was demanded and there was a sufficient distresse upon the Land before the Demand but not after and whether the Lessor might enter or not was the question Daniel These words Sufficient distresse ought to be referred to the time of the Demand viz. to the last instant at which time the Demand is only materiall Upon a Cessavit if there be a sufficient distresse the last instant of the two years it is sufficient Clenche Justice held That there ought to be a sufficient distresse upon the Land for all the ten dayes But Suit Justice held That it was sufficient if there were a distresse for a reasonable time so as it might be presumed that the Lessor might have knowledge of it But if a distresse be put upon the Land only for an hour or by nights he held it was not a sufficient distresse Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 82 Sir EDWARD HOBBYE'S Case IN this Case the question was Whether the Death of one of the Defendants should abate the whole Writ of Error Cook The Writ shall not abate for no Defendant is to be named in the Writ which see in the forme of the Writ of Error and 2 R. 3. 1. it is holden That the Writ shall not abate for it is in its nature but a Certiorari and Judgement only is to be reversed Atkins Although that the Defendants have not day in Court by the Writ of Error yet by the Scire facias which is sued upon it as in our Case it is they have day and see 3. H. 7. and 14. H. 7. a difference where it is a Writ of Error upon a reall Action and where upon a personall Cook That holds Where the first Writ is abated and so is 3. H. 7. See the Case a little before Gaudy and Clench Justices bring a new Writ of Error for that is the surest way Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 83 LOVELL and GOLSTON'S Case IN a Writ of Error brought upon a Record removed out of the Court of Kingston where the first Judgement was given in an Action of Debt for an Amercement in a Court Baron The first Error which was assigned was That he in the Action of Debt did declare That whereas at a Court holden before William Fleetwood Steward c. whereas it ought to have been holden before the Suitors for they are the Judges The second Error was That the Presentment upon which the Amercement is grounded saith That Golston the Defendant had cut down more Trees quam debuit extra boscum Domini 1. That it is repugnant for he could not cut wood extra boscum but in bâ—sco 2. When it saith many and doth
not shew what trees nor how many he might cut and that he hath cut down more then he ought and also he doth not shew when the cutting of them was Vide 6. E. 4. By prescription they may prescribe to hold a Court before the Steward but if there be no custome or Prescription to warrant it then as 4. H. 6. is it is coram Senescalio Sectatoribus Gaudy Every Court Baron is to be holden before the Suitors if there be no Prescription to the contrary But a Leet alwayes before the Steward The Action of Debt was upon the Presentment and the Error is brought upon the defects in the Presentment for if that be not good all is naught Notwithstanding it was said by one at the Bar That the forme of pleading in the book of Entries is That the Court was holden before the Steward if the Action be for debt or Trespass for Amercements or such personall things But if the Action be brought for reall things then it is before the Suitors But notwithstanding that the Judgement for the Causes aforesaid was reversed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 84 BARKER and FLETWEL'S Case BArker of Ipswich brought an Action of Covenant against the Assignee of his Lessee for years one Fletwell And set forth That whereas he had made a Lease for years reserving Rent with re-entry for non-payment of the Rent and that the Lessee did covenant to build a house upon the Land within the first ten years and that he assigned over his terme And he brought the Action against the Assignee who pleaded That the Lessor did enter and had the Possession for part of the ninth year and if thereby the Covenant were discharged was the demurrer in Law Godfrey Who argued for the Lessor said That by this entrie of the Lessor the Covenant was not suspended As 20. E. 4. 12 BY. Extinguishment 34. The Abbot of D. did grant to W. S. a Corrodie viz. so much bread c. for the term of his life faciend ' talia servitia prout J. N. alii usi sunt focere The Grantee leased back again the Corrodie unto the Abbot for 10. years rendring 3â— rent per annum and he brought Debt for the rent and the Abbot said That he did not the Services and the Grantee said That he was not bound to do them for that by the Lease the Corrodie was suspended And it was holden that it was not suspended Godfâ—â—y held the reason to be because that the service is a Collaterall thing And therefore he said He ought to do it notwithstanding that the Abbot had the Corrodie So in 8. H. 7. 7. Br. Conditions 134. Where Tenant in taile makes a Feoffment in Fee and takes back an estate in Fee and afterwards was bounden in a statute Merchant and then made a Feoffment in Fee upon Condition and died his Issue within age who enters for the Condition broken he was remitted notwithstanding that execution upon the statute was sued against the Father in his life So if Lease be made of a Manor except Herriots Fines and Amercements and that the Lessee shall collect them during the Term although that the Lessor entreth yet the Lessee ought to collect them during the term Also he pleades here That Barker did enter and that generall pleading is doubtfull and the Plea shall be taken strictly against him that pleadeth it and it may be that he entred by wrong and so it may be that he entred by right viz. for not payment of the Rent as in truth his entry was And if Barker did enter lawfully then it was no suspension or extinguishment of the Covenant As 19. R. 2. If Lessee for life commit waste and afterwards alieneth and the Lessor entreth for the Alienation yet after his entry he shall have an Action of Waste against the Lessee So 8. H. 6. 10. Waste 8. but with this difference If the Lessor enter wrongfully there although Waste be done before he shall not have Waste to punish it but otherwise if he enter for the Forfeiture done by the Tenant Also if the Covenant was suspended it was only for the time that the Lessor had the Possession and the Party hath not answered for the time before or after As 16. H. 7. If one be bound to find a Chaplain to say Divine Service within such a Chappel and the Chappel fall down it is a good excuse for the time but if it be built again he must find a Chaplain there Clarke contrary If Lessee for years covenanteth to repair the houses I grant that the same shall charge his Assignee But a Collateral thing as if the Lessee covenant to pay such a sum in gross or to enfeoffe him of the Manor of D the same shall not charge the Assignee no more shall a Covenant to build a new house But here it was said That he had time to build it both before and after the entry of the Lessor Barker To that he answered Not so for if he once disturbed the Covenant is destroyed Godfrey This Case was this Terme in the Common Pleas. Lessee for five years covenanted to build a Mill within the terme and because he had not done it the Lessor brought an Action of Covenant and the Defendant pleaded That within the last three years the Lessor forcibly held him out c. so as he could not build it and by the Opinion of all the Justices he ought to plead That the Lessor with force held him out otherwise it would be no Plea Cook As amicus curiae vouched 35. H. 6. Tit. Barr. If one be bounden to enfeoffe me of such land before Michaelmas there the Obliger in Debt brought upon the Bond pleaded That the Obligee before the day had entred with force into the land so as he could not enfeoffe him and there it was holden That he ought to prove that he was holden out by force Gaudy In the principall Case he ought to have shewed That he would not suffer him to build And the other Justices seemed to be of the same Opinion but yet they said That they would advise upon the Case Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 85 OWen took Exception to a Declaration in an Ejectione firme because it was à Possessione sua ejecit where it ought to be according to the supposal of the Writ Quod à firma sua ejecit Also it was of three closes naming them with a Videlicet containing by estimation 30. Acres and that he said did contain no certainty where he ought to have alledged in Fact that they did contain so many Acres But it was holden by all the Justices That although he doth not put in the Declaration the certainty of the Acres if he give a certain name to them as Green-Close c. that it is good And as to the other Exception viz. Ejecit à Possessione inde that the word inde had relation to the Farme and shall be as much as
if he had said à Possessione firmae and the Declaration was ruled to be good notwithstanding the Exceptions Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 86 A Man was indicted upon the Statute of 5. Elizab. of Perjury in a Court Leet and the Indictment was That hee at the Court Leet of the Earle oâ— Bathe Super Sacramentum suum coram Senescallo c. And Exception was taken because it said At the Leet of the Earle of Bathe Whereas every Leet is the King's Court although that another hath the profit and commodity of it And it was said That the Steward of a Leet was an Officer of Record And also his Oath was if he had made any Rescous or not with which he was charged Drew It is not within the Statute of 5. Eliz. for then it ought to be before a Jury in giving of Evidence or upon some Articles But the Court was clear of Opinion against him Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 87 The Earle of KENT's Case THE Case was this Three severall persons did occupie three severall houses in Brackley to which another man had right and he who had right went to one of the houses and entred and afterwards went away leaving him who occupied the said house upon the land and then he entred into another of the houses and then went from that leaving him who occupied the same before upon the land and then he entred into the third house and there sealed a Lease for years unto another man of that house and naming the two other houses and the Lessee brought an Ejectione firme for the two houses in which the Lease was not delivered and the Opinion of the Court was against him that he was barred in the Action for the entrie or continuance of him who occupied the same before did defeat the entrie of the Plaintiffe or Lessor and the Plaintiffe was forced to be Non-suit Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 88 SMITH and SMITH's Case ONE I. S. did assume and promise That whereas I. N. was indebted to J. D in Forty Pounds by Bond That if J. D. ne implacitaret the said J. N. that if the money be not paid such a day that J. S would pay it to J. D. The money was not paid and after the day J. D. brought an Action upon the Case upon the promise and shewed Quod ipse non implecitavit c. Kingsmill He cannot have his Action upon the Case till J. N. be dead for during his life there is a time in which he might implead him As if I promise unto another That if he will be Nonsuit in his Action which he hath against a third person that if he doth not pay the money before such a day that then he will pay the money there if the day of payment be before the time that he can be Non-suit as before the Terme beginneth yet he cannot presently have his Action before that he is Non-suit And therefore in the principall Case he ought to shew That he hath discharged the other of the Bond and then the Action lieth for then he cannot implead him but as this Case is pleaded though he hath not yet impleaded pleaded him yet in posterum he may implead him Clench Justice That is implied that he will never implead him and then he ought to shew the Bond discharged Suit That is not so for if hereafter he sue him against his promise then the other to whom the promise was made shall have his Action upon the Case and shall recover to the value of the sum in the Bond. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 89 BILFORD and DODDINGTON's Case A Writ of Error was brought by Richard Bilford against Robert Doddington to reverse a common recovery in the City of Worcester upon a Writ of Right Patent And for Error it was assigned 1. That no Warrant of Atturney was entred but that such a one posuit loco suo W. H. and did not write the name at length but in the Plea Roll it was at length The second Error was That the Writ was De tribus messuagiis sive tenementis and that doth containe no certainty for sive is a word uncertaine The third Error It was in the time Philippi Mariae and petit processum Domini Regis Reginae and it was â—orundum Regis and that was in the default of Voucher that the Recovery was had but if it were in the Recovery in which he did appear and plead it was otherwise The Counsell of the other side as to the first said That all the Records of the City are of the same form viz. That such a one Poâ—uit loco suo W. H. c. and if it were not good they should be all overthrown and avoided and if it should be otherwise it should be contrary to the ancient custome of the City As to the second Quod petit processum corundum Regis the same is the misrecitall of the Clark for the Writ upon which it is grounded is well and as to the Process the party did appear gratis As to the word sive the same is good for tenementum is but Surplusage As in an Action of Waste if the party do expresse some things which are not waste and some things which are those which are not waste are but Surplusage Also he said That the Writ of Error by which the Record is removed is insufficient for the Writ is That there is Error manefestus and doth not say ut dicitur and therefore it is not good for otherwise the King should forejudge us And also in the Writ it doth not say Errorem siquis fuerit and it ought not precisely to say That there is Error Also the Writ of Error is to certifie a Record de tribus messuagiis tenementis and the Record is De tribus messuagiis sive tenementis and therefore the Record is not well removed for it is not such Record As 12. Ass 2. in Attaint Exception was taken that the Writ of Attaint did not agree with the first originall but because it did agree with the Record it was good although it did not agree with the first Originall for the first Originall was of the Manor of Ansti and the Attaint was of Anesti and so was the whole Record But if the Attaint had disagreed with the Record it had been Error Also the Writ was good although tenementis were out of the Writ for it is but surplusage And also Tenementum is not a thing demandable as 11. H. 7. 25. it is said That Tenementum is not a name to demand a Messuage by but in Trespass of Nusance to it there Tenementum is sufficient Suit Justice The Record is now before us and therefore the Writ of Error is not materiall For if my Lord Anderson bring before us a Record although no Writ of Error be awarded yet wee may proceed to examine Whether there be Error in it or not
not recited in the Statute So here our Case is within the Mischiefe of the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. although it be not within the Example So the Statute of West 1. is That if the Gardien or Lessee for years maketh a Feoffment in Fee Tam Feofator quam feofatus habeantur pro disseisoribus yet 22. Ass is That if Tenant by Elegit make a Feoffment it is within the Statute Also it may be a doubt Whether Land devisable onely by custome bee intended in the Statute of 21. H. 8. Cap. 4. And whether Land devisable by the Statute of 32. H. 8. be within it or not viz. If a Statute of a puâ—sne time shall be taken by Equity within a more Ancient Statute and I conceive it may as 12. H. 7. the Statue of 4. H. 7. which sayes that the heire of Cestuy que use shall be in Ward shall extend to the Statute of Praerogativa Regis for if he be in Ward to the King he shall have Prerogative in the Lands to have other Lands by reason thereof Gaudy Justice did rely very much upon the word Devisees viz. that they have an Interest and that the Sale was not good Suit Justice They are both Executors and Devisees of the Lands Devisees of the Lands and Executors to performe the Will Cook he who refused to sell cannot waive the Freehold which is in him by a refusall in pars as 7. H. 2. and 7. E. 4. but ought to waive it in a Court of Record therefore he hath an Interest remaining in him Clenche Justice What if he had devised the Lands to four and made one of them his Executors and willed that he should sell could not he sell All the Court agreed that he might Cook When a man deviseth that his Executors shall sell the Fee descends to the heir yet they may sell that which is in another but the same is not like to our Case It was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 93. A Judgement was given upon a Bond for four thousand pound And the Scire facias was sued for three thousand pound and he did not acknowledge satisfaction of the other thousand pound Haughton moved That the Scire facias should abate As if a man brings Debt upon a Bond of twenty pound and shews a Bond for forty pound and doth not acknowledge satisfaction for 20l l it is not good The Justices would advise of it And at another day it was moved againe Whether the Scire facias was good because it doth recite Quod cum nuper such a one recuperasset four thousand pound and doth not shew in what Action or at what day the Judgment was given or the Recovery had Piggot That is not material for such is the Form in an Audita querela or Redisseisin As to the other That he doth not acknowledge satisfaction as in the Case before cited by Haughton which Case is in 1. H. 5. That is not like to an Execution for an Execution is joint or severall at the will of him who sues it forth as in 19. R. 2. Execution 163. hee may have part of his Execution against one in his life time and if he dieth other part against his Heir or Executor Note the Execution was of the whole but because the Defendant had not so much he had but part against him who had no more and therefore of the residue he had Execution against the Heir Gawdy Justice I conceive that he cannot have an Execution unlesse he acknowledge Satisfaction There is no difference as to that betwixt the Action of Debt upon a Bond and a Scire facias and the intendment viz. that it shall be intended that he was paid because he sued but for Three thousand Pound will not help him Piggot as to that vouched a Case out of 4 5. Mary in Dyer which I cannot find Suit Justice said That if the Defendant in the Scire facias say nothing by such a day that Judgement should be entred for the Plaintiffe Quod executio fiet Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 94 JUdgement was given against an Infant by default in a reall Action of Land And a Writ of Error was thereupon brought and it was argued That it is not error for in many cases an Infant shall be bound by a Judicious act as 3. E. 3. Infant 14. Where an Infant and a Feme Covert bring a Formedon and the woman was summoned and severed And it was pleaded That where the Writ doth suppose the woman was Sole she was Covert and Judgment was demanded of the Writ and that the Infant could not gainsay it but confessed it this Confession of the Plea which abated his Writ was taken And 3. H. 6. 10. Br. Saver Default 51. An Infant shall not save his default for he shall not wage his Law See there that the Default shall not be taken against him therefore that book seems rather against it then for it Vide 6. H. 8. Br. Saver Default 50. That Error lieth upon a Recovery by default against an Infant otherwise if it be upon an Action tried so is 2 Mar. Br. Judgment 147. It was said That a generall Act of Parliament shall bind an Infant if he be not excepted The Justices did seem to incline That if Judgement be given by default that it shall bind an Infant but there was no rule given in the Case Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 95 A Clark of the King's Bench sued an Officer of the Common Pleas and he of the Common Pleas claimed his Priviledge and could not have it granted to him for it is a generall rule That where each of the persons is a person able to have Priviledge he who first claimes it viz. the Plaintiffe shall have it and not the Defendant As if an Atturney of the Common Pleas sueth one of the Clarks of the Kings Bench yet he of the Kings Bench shall not have Priviledge although the Kings Bench be a more high Court because the other is Plaintiffe and first claimeth it Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 96 AM Action upon the Case upon a Promise was brought but the Case was so long that I could not take it But in that Case Tanfield who argued for the Defendant said That it is not lawfull for any man to meddle in the cause of another if he have not an Interest in the thing for otherwise it will be Maintenance But if a Custome be in question betwixt the Lord of the Manor and Copy-holder all the other Copy-holders of the Manor may expend their money in maintenance of the other and the Custome and the Master may expend the money of the servant in maintenance of the servant So he in the Remainder may maintain him who hath the particular Estate Maintenance is an odious thing in the Law for it doth encrease troubles and Suites He argued also How that Bonds Obligations and Specialties might be
in the Point But I will put you as strong a Case A Judgement is given upon an Exigent by the Coronor yet by 28. Ass 49. If there be no Returne of the Exigent it is no sufficient Out-lawry and one Pleaded the same in the plainplaintiffe and said that it appeared by the Record and vouched the Record and because the Exigent was not returned it was not allowed And so was the Case of Procter and Lambert 4 5. Philip and Marie adjudged As to the Reports which are not printed vouched by Tanfield eâdem facilitate negantur quâ affirmantur Upon an Elegit if there be goods sufficient the Sheriff is not to meddle with the Lands and if there be not sufficient goods yet hee is not to meddle with the beasts of the plough If a man have an Authoritie and he doth lesse then his Authoritie all is void as here the Return of the Writ is part of his Authority As 12. Ass 24. If a man have a letter of Atturney to make Livery and Seisin to two and he makes it to one all is void and he is a disseisor to the Feoffor So 4. H. 7. If he have a letter of Atturney to make Livery of three Acres and he makes onely Livery of two Acres and not of the third Acre it is void for the whole Also the Elegit is Quod extendi facias liberari quousque the Debt be satisfied and therefore if the land be extended onely and there be no delivery made of the land ut tenementum suum liberum according to the Writ then there is no execution duly done And in the principall Case there was no delivery made of the land It was adjourned Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 97 STRANSAM against COLBURN STransam brought a Writ of Error against Colburne upon a Judgment given in a Writ of Partitione facienda and divers Errors were assigned The first Error assigned was That the party doth not shew in his Writ nor in his Declaration upon what statute of Partition hee grounds his Action And there are two Statutes viz. the Statute of 31. H. 8. chap. 1. and the Statute of 32. H. 8. chap. 32. And yet hee groundeth his Action upon one of the Statutes As 3. H. 7. 5. Where the servants of the Bishop of Lincoln were indicted of Murder eo quod ipsi in Festo Sancti Petri 2. H. 7. felonicè apud D. murdraverunt c. and because there are two Feasts of Saint Peter viz. Cathedrae Ad vincula therefore the Indictment was not good 21. E. 3. One brought a Cessavit by severall Precipes viz. of one Acre in D. and of another in S. and of the third in Villa praedicta and because it was uncertain to which praedict shall be referred it was not good 5. H. 7. Br. Action upon the Statute 47. An Information was in the Exchequer for giving of Liveries and the partie did not declare upon what Statute of Liveries and Exception was taken to it and the Exception was not allowed because that the best shall be taken for the King but if it had been in the Case of a common person it had not been good So if a man bring an Action against another for entry into his Land against the forme of the Statute it is not good because hee doth not shew upon what Statute hee grounds his Action Whether 8. H. 6. which gives treble damages or 2. H. 2. which gives Imprisonment and single damages The second Error which was assigned by Weston was That the Declaration doth shew Quod tenet pro indiviso and doth not shew what estate they held pro indiviso And there is a Statute which gives Partition of an estate of an Inheritance viz. 31. H. 8. Cap. 1. And another which gives partition for years or for life and he doth not shew in which of the Statutes it is As if one claime by a Feoffment of Cestuy que use as 4. H. 7. is he ought to shew that the Cestuy que use was of full age at the time of the Feoffment c. for it is not a good Feoffment if he be not of full age So here he ought to shew that he is seized of such an estate of which by the Statute he may have a Writ of Partition For in many Cases there shall be Joynt-Tenants and yet the one shall not have a Writ of Partition against the other by any Statute As if a Statute Merchant be acknowledged to two and they sue for the execution upon it I conceive that the one shall not have partition against the other So if two Joynt-Tenants bee of a Seignorie and the Tenant dieth without heir so as the Lands escheat to them they are joynt-Joynt-Tenants and yet Partition doth not lye betwixt them by any Statute Therefore one may be seised pro indiviso and yet the same shall not entitle him to a Writ of Partition Shuttleworth contrary The Statute doth not give any forme of Writ but the Writ which was at the Common Law before And therefore it is not to be recited what kind of Writ he is to have As to the second point It is not necessary to shew the estate because it cannot be intended that he hath knowledge of the estate of the Defendant For if one plead Joynt-tenancy on the part of the Plaintiffe hee shall not shew of whose gift but if the Defendant or Tenant plead Joynt-tenancy of his part he ought to shew of whose gift and how 7. E. 6. Plo. Com. Partridges case In a Case upon the Statute of Maintenance The Plaintiffe may say That he accepted a Lease and shall not be forced to shew the beginning or the end of it or for what years it is In the Case of the Indictment before and the Case of severall Precipes of severall Acres in severall Towns that lyeth in the Plaintiffs Cognisance But here how can the Plaintiffe know the Defendants estate because he may change it as often as he pleaseth and therefore it is uncertain for if before he had a Fee hee might passe away the same unto another and take back an estate for years Also the Plaintiffe hath appeared and pleaded to the Declaration And therefore he shall not have a Writ of Error Gaudy Justice That is not so Shuttleworth True if there be matter of Error apparant Gaudy Justice Cannot you take notice of your own estate Cook The Declaration is not good therefore the Writ of Error is maintainable By the Common Law No partition lieth betwixt Tenants in common as these are And the Statute of 31. H. 8. gives Partition onely of an estate of Inheritance and prescribes also that the Writ shall be devised in the Chancery there he conceived the Ancient Writ is not to be used I grant for a generall rule That if a Statute in a new Case give an old Writ he shall not say Contra formam Statuti because it is not needfull to recite the Statute
licence be to A. and B. or C. some conceived that A. or B. might alien but not C. Et èâ—converso Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 105 IT was agreed by the whole Court That a Partition made by word betwixt Joyntenants is not good See Dyer 29. Pl. 134. and 350. Pl 20. doth agree and see there the reason of it Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 105 IT was holden by the whole Court That if the Father do devise Lands unto his Son and Heir apparant and to a stranger that it is a good Devise and that they are Joyntenants for the benefit of the Stranger Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 106 FULLER'S Case A. Promises unto the eldest son that if he will give his consent that his Father shall make an Assurance unto him of his Lands that he will give him ten pounds If he give his assent although no assurance be made yet he shall maintain an Action upon the promise But at another day Periam Justice said that in that case the son ought to promise to give his assent or otherwise A. had nothing if his son would not give his consent And so where each hath remedy against the other it is a good Consideration In Hillary Term after Fenner spake in arrest of Judgment upon the speciall Verdict That because that the Assumpsit is but of one part and the other is at liberty whether he will give his consent or not that therefore although that hee do consent that hee shall not recover the ten pounds Also he said That the promise was that if hee would give consent that his Father should make assurance to him and here the assurance is made to A. to the use of the Defendant and his Wife in taile so as it varies from the first Communication and also it is in tail Shuttleworth contrary in as much as he hath performed it by the giving of consent then when he hath performed It is not to the purpose that he was not tyed by a crosse Assumpsit to do it but if he had not given his consent he should have nothing At length Judgment was given for the Plaintiff And Periam Justice said in this Case That if a covenant be to make an Estate to A. and it is made to B. to the use of A. that he doubted whether that were good or not Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. Intratur Hill 28. Eliz. Rot. 1742. 107 WISEMAN and WALLINGER'S Case A Man seised of two Closes called Bl. Acre makes a Lease of them rendring Ten Shillings rent The Lessee grants all his Estate in one of them to A. and in the other to B. The Lessor doth devise all his Land called Bl. Acre in the tenure of A. and dieth The Devisee brings an Action of Debt for the whole Rent against the first Lessee And the Opinion of the whole Court was That the Action would not lie because they conceived That but the Reversion of one Close passed and also that the rent should not be apportioned in that Case because a terme is out of the Statute and a Rent reserved upon a Lease for years shall not be apportioned by the act of the Lessor as where he takes a Surrender of part of it But otherwise by Act in Law as where the Tenant maketh a Feoffment in Fee of part of the Land and the Lessor entreth And at another day Anderson Chief Justice said That if the Lessor of two Acres granteth the Reversion of one Acre that the whole Rent is extinct Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas 108 A Lease for years is made of Land by Deed rendring Rent the Lessee binds himselfe in a Bond of Ten Pound to perform all Covenants and Agreements contained in the Deed the Rent is behind and the Lessor brings an Action of Debt upon the Bond for not payment of the Rent the Obligor pleads performance of all Covenants and Agreements the Lessor saie That the Rent is behind it was holden That it is no Plea for the Obligor to say That the Rent was never demanded But in this Bar he ought to have pleaded That he had performed all Covenants and Agreements except the payment of the Rents And as to that That he was alwayes ready to have paid it if any had come to demand it but as the first Plea is it was held not to be good And as to the demand of the Rent the Court was of opinion That it was to be demanded for the payment of the Rent is contained in the word Agreements and not in the word Covenants and then if he be not to performe the Agreements in other manner then is contained in the Deed of that agreement the Law saith That there shall be a demand of the Rent But if the Lessee be particularly expressed by covenant to pay the Rent there he is bound to do it without any Demand Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 109 HOLLENSHEAD against KING THomas Hollenshead brought Debt against Ralph King upon a Recovery in a Scire fâ—cias in London upon a Recognizance taken in the Inner or Ouster Chamber of London and doth not shew That it is a Court of Record and that they have used to take Recognisances and Exception was taken unto the Declaration and a Demurrer upon it and divers Cases put That although that the Judgement be void that yet the Execution shall be awarded by Scire facias and the party shall not plead the same in a Writ of Error But Periam Justice took this difference Where Execution is sued upon such a Judgement and where Debt is brought upon it for in Debt it behoves the Party that he have a good Warrant and ground for his Action otherwise he shall not recover but upon a voidable Judgement he shall recover before it be reversed Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. Intratur Trinit 28. Eliz. Rot. 507. 110 COSTARD and WINGFIELD'S Case IN a Replevin the Defendant did avow for Damage Feasans by the commandment of his Master the Lord Cromwell The Plaintiffe by way of Replication did justifie the putting in of his Cattell into the Land in which c. by reason that the Towne of N. is an ancient Town and that there hath been a usage time out of mind That every Inhabitant of the same Towne had had common for all his cattel Levant and Couchant in the same Town and so justified the putting in of his cattell The Defendant said That the house in which the Plaintiffe did inhabite in the same Towne and by reason of Residency in which house he claimed common was a new house built within 30 years and within that time there had not been any house there and upon that Plea the Plaintiffe did demurr in Law Shuttleworth Serdeant for the Plaintiffe That he shall have common for cause of Resiance in that new house and the Resiancy is the cause and not the Land nor
here is not mis-joyned for if the Counties could joyne the issue were good but because that the Counties cannot joyne it cannot be well tried But the issue it selfe is well enough Windham and Rodes were of the same opinion that it was not helped by the Statute but Periam doubted it Anderson said That if an issue triable in one Countie be tried in another and judgement given upon it it is errour And afterwards Lutrich the Atturney said That it was awarded that they should re-plead Nota quia mirum for 1. The Statute of 32. H. 8. Cap. 30. speaks of mis-joyning of processe and mis-joyning of issues and admit that this case is not within any of those clauses each of them being considered by it selfe yet I conceive it is contained within the substance and effect of them being considered together Also I conceive That it is within the meaning of both Statutes viz. 32. H. 8. Cap. 30. and 18. Eliz. Cap. 14. for I conceive the meaning of both the Statutes was to oust delayes circuits of actions and molestations and that the partie might have his judgement notwithstanding any defect if it were so that notwithstanding that defect sufficient title and cause did appeare to the Court. And here the Plaintiffe hath sufficient cause to recover If any of the points of the issue be found for him For if it bee found that the matter and substance of the oath be found true which might be tried well enough by those in London the Plaintiffe hath cause to recover Wherefore I conceive that the verdict in London is good enough and effectuall And note That Rodes said that hee was of Councell in suh a case in the Kings Bench betwixt Nevell and Dent. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 128 IN an Action of Trespasse the Defendant pleaded that at another time before the Trespasse he did recover against the same Plaintiffe in an Ejectione firme and demanded judgement And the opinion of the whole Court was That it is a good plea primâ faciâ— and that the possession is bound by it for otherwise the recovery should be in vaine and uneffectuall And Anderson chiefe justice said That if two claime one and the same Land by severall Leases and the one recovereth in an Ejectione firme against the other that if afterwards the other bring an Ejectione firme of the same Land the first recovery shall be a barre against him Rodes said That hee can shew authority that a recovery in an Ad terminum quem praeteriit shall bind the possession Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 129 IN Trespasse the Defendant did justifie as Bailiffe unto another The Plaintiffe replied that he took his cattell of his own wrong without that that he was his Bailiffe Anderson chiefe Justice If one have cause to distreine my goods and a stranger of his own wrong without any warrant or authority given him by the other take my goods not as Bailiff or servant to the other And I bring an Action of trespasse against him can he excuse himself by saying that he did it as my Bailiffe or Servant Can he so father his mis-demeanours upon another He cannot for once he was a trespasser and his intent was manifest But if one distrein as Bailiffe although in truth he is not Bailiffe if after he in whose right he doth it doth assent to it he shall not be punished as a trespassour for that assent shall have relation unto the time of the distresse taken and so is the book of 7. H. 4. And all that was agreed by Periam Shuttleworth What if hee distraine generally not shewing his intent nor the cause wherefore he distrained c. ad hoc non fuit responsum Rodes came to Anderson and said unto him If I having cause to distrain come to the Land and distraine and another ask the cause why I do so if I assigne a cause not true or insufficient yet when an Action is brought against me I may avow or justifie and assigne any other cause Anderson That is another case but in the principall case clearly the taking is not good to which Rodes agreed Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 130 HOODIE and WINSCOMB'S Case IN an Attaint brought by Hoodie against Winscombe c. One of the Grand Jury was challenged because he was a Captain and one of the Petie Jury was his Lieutenant And it was holden by the whole Court that that was no principall challenge Windham It hath been holden no principall challenge notwithstanding that one of the Jurours was Master of the Game and one of the Petit Jury was Keeper of his Park And in that case it was holden by all the Justices That if a man make a Lease rendring rent upon condition that if the rent be behind and no sufficient distresse upon the Land that then the Lessor may re-re-enter If the Rent be behind and there be a piece of lead or other thing hidden in the Land and no other thing there to be distrained the Lessor may re-enter for the distresse ought to be open and to be come by for if it should be otherwise said a sufficient distresse one might inclose money or other things within a wall and thereby the Lessor should be excluded of his re-entry Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 131 IN a Quare Impedit the Plaintiffe counted That the Defendant being Parson of the Church in question was presented to another Benefice and inducted 15 Aprilis and that the other Church became void c. The Defendant said That he was qualified at such a day which was after 15 Aprilis without that that he was inducted 15 Aprilis And the Court was of opinion Anderson being absent that it was no good Traverse for he ought to have said generally without that that he was inducted before the day in which he is alledged to be qualified As if one declare in Trespasse done 1 Aprilis and the Defendant plead a Release 1. Feb. he ought to traverse without that that the Trespasse was done before the Release by Periam Justice Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 132 HALES and HOME'S Case IN an Avowry for Damage feasance one pleaded a Lease made unto him by I. S. the other said that before the Lease â— S. did enfeoff him the other replied and maintained the said Lease absque hoc quod J. S. seiâ—itus feoffavit Gawdy The Traverse is not formall for the word seisitus is idle and ought to be left out for he cannot enfeoff if that he were not seised and it hath never been seen that the seisin in such Case hath been traversed but generally in Pleading the Traverse hath been absque hoc that Feoffavit without speaking of seisin which is superfluous And so was the opinion of the whole Court Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 133 THE Queen granted Lands unto the Earle of Leicester by her Letters Patents the Patentee made a Lease of
the Land unto another Shuttleworth moved it to the Court Whether the Patentee ought to shew the Letters Patents and he conceived He need not because he hath not any interest in them but the same do belong only to the Earle As if a Rent be granted to one in Fee and he taketh a wife and dieth and the Wife bringeth a Writ of Dower she is not bound to shew the first Deed by which the Rent was granted to her Husband because the Deed doth not belong unto her So hee who sues for a Legacie is not tied to shew the Will because the same belongs to the Executor and not him Periam Justice The Cases are not alike for they are Strangers and not Privies but the Lessee in the principall Case deriveth his interest from the Letters Patents and therefore he ought to shew them Rodes Justice remembred Throgmorton's Case Com. 148. a. where a Lease was made by an Abbot to J. S. and afterwards the same Abbot made a Lease unto another to begin after the determination of the first Lease made to J. S. and exception was taken That he ought to have shewed the Deed of the first Lease and the Exception was disallowed by the Court Periam That case is not like this case and he said That as he conceived the Lessee in this case ought to shew forth the letters Patents and if any Books were against his Opinion it was marvellous Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 134 ONE intruded after the death of Tenant for life and died seised and the land descended to his Heire and a Writ of Intrusion was brought in the Per against the Heir and Gawdy Serjeant prayed a Writ of Estrepment against the Tenant And first the Court was in doubt what to do but afterwards when they had considered of the Statute of Gloucester Cap. 1. in the end of it Anderson said If the Writ be in the Per take the Writ of Estrepment but if the Writ be not in the Per we doubt whether a Writ of Estrepment will lie or not Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 135 WOOD against ASH and FOSTER CErtain Lands with a Stock of Sheep was leased by Indenture and the Lessee did covenant by the same Indenture to restore unto the Lessor at the end of the Terme so many Sheep in number as he took in Lease and that they should be betwixt the age of two and four years Afterwards the Lessee granted the same Stock unto a Stranger viz. to Elizabeth Winsor who was the wife of Ashe whereas in truth all the ancient Stock was spent And it was holden by all the Justices upon an Evidence given unto a Jury at the Bar That when such a Stock of Sheep is leased for years the principall Property doth remain in the Lessor as long as those Sheep which were in esse at the time of the Lease should live but if any of them do die and other come in their roomes then the property of those new Sheep doth belong to the Lessee and therefore they held that the second Lessee should have so many of the Sheep as were left and did remaine at the end of the Lease and no other And yet it was objected by Walmesley That the Stock was entire and that as soon as any other came in the room of the ancient Sheep which were dead that they were accounted part of the same stock and although they be all dead and so changed successively two or three times yet he said it shall be said the same stock And he resembled the same to the case of a Corporation which although all the Corporation die and other new men come in their places it shall be said the same Corporation But notwithstanding his Opinion all the Justices were of opinion as before Walmesley said That agreeing with his opinion was the opinion of all the civill Lawyers but the Court was angry and rebuked him that he did in such manner crosse their opinions and that he cited the opinion of Civilians in our Law and they resolved the contrary and they said there is a difference betwixt the Lease of other Goods and a lease of live Cattel for in the first Case if any thing be added for mending repairing or otherwise by the Lessee at the end the Lessor shall have the additions for of them he hath alwayes the property and they are annexed to the principall but Lambs Calves c. are severed from the principall and are the Profits arising of the Principall which the Lessee ought to have else he should pay his Rent for nothing And as to the issue upon the Cepit by Foster it was shewed That he did but stay the Sheep in his Manor where he had Fellons Goods Waifes and Strayes and that the Sheep were stayed upon a Huy and Cry and that he had taken Bond of one to whom he had delivered the Sheep to render them to him who had the right of them And that stay was holden by the Court to be out of the point of the Issue For that he who doth stay doth not take Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 136. The Heirs of Sir ROGER LEWKNOR and FORD's Case Intratur Pasch 28. El. Rot. 826. SIR Roger Lewknor seised of Wallingford Park made a lease thereof unto Ford for years and died the Lessee granted over his term to another excepting the Wood the term expired and now an action of Waste was brought against the second lessee by the two Coparceners and the Heir of the third Coparcener her Husband being tenant by the courtesie And Shuttleworth and Snag Serjeants did argue that the action would not lie in the form as it was brought And the first Exception which was taken by them was because the action was generall viz. Quod fecit Vastum in terris quas Sir Roger Lewknor pater praedict ' the plaintiffs cujus haeredes ipsae sunt praefat ' defend ' demisit c. and the Count was that the Reversion was entailed by Parliament unto the Heirs of the body of Sir Roger Lewknor and so they conceived that the Writ ought to have been speciall viz. cujus haeredes de corpore ipsae sunt For they said that although there is not any such form in the Register yet in novo casu novum remedium est apponendum And therefore they compared this case to the case in Fitz. Nat. Brevium 57. c. viz. If land be given to Husband and Wife and to the Heirs of the body of the Wife and the Wife hath issue and dieth and the Husband committeth Waste the Writ in that case and the like shall be speciall and shall make speciall recitall of the estate And so is the case 26. H. 8. 6. where Cestuy que use makes a lease and the lessee commits Waste the action was brought by the Feoffees containing the speciall matter and it was good although there were not any such Writ in the Register cujus
haeredes de corpore and we are not to devise a new form in such case but it is sufficient to shew the speciall matter to the Court. Also the words of the Writ are true for they are Heirs to Sir Roger Lewknor and the count is sufficient pursuant and agreeing to their Writ for they are Heirs although they are not speciall Heirs of the body and so the Court was of opinion that the Writ was good notwithstanding that Exception And Anderson and Periam Justices said That the case is not to be compared to the case in F. Nat. Br. 57. c. for there he cannot shew by whose Demise the Tenant holdeth if he doth not shew the speciall conveyance viz. that the land was given to the Husband and Wife and the Heirs of the body of the Wife Nor is it like unto the case of 26. H. â— 6. for the same cause for alwayes the demise of the Tenant ought to be especially shewed and certainly which it cannot be in these two cases but by the disclosing of the Title also to the Reversion Another Exception was taken because that the Writ doth suppose quod tenuerunt which as they conceived is to be meant that tenuerunt joyntly whereas in truth they were Tenants in common Walmesley contrary because there is not any other form of Writ for there is not any Writ which doth contain two Tenuerunts And the words of the Writ are true quod tenuerunt although tenuerunt in Common But although they were not true yet because there is no other form of Writ it is good enough As Littleton If a lease be made for half a year and the Lessee doth waste yet the Writ shall suppose quod tenet ad terminum annorum and the count shall be speciall 40. Ed. 3. 41. E. 3. 18. If the Lessee doth commit waste and granteth over his term the Writ shall be brought against the Grantor and shall suppose quod tenet and yet in truth he doth not hold the Land 44. Ed. 3. and Fitz. If one make divers leases of divers lands and the Lessee doth waste in them all the Lessor shall have one Writ of waste supposing quod tenet and the Writ shall not contain two Tenets And such was also the opinion of the Court The third Exception was because that the Writ was brought by the two coparceners and the Heir of the third coparcener without naming of the Tenant by the Courtesie And thereupon Snagg cited the Case of 4. Ed. 3. That where a Lease is made for life the Remainder for life and the tenant for life doth waste he in the Reversion cannot have an Action of waste during the life of him in the Remainder So in this case the Heir of the third coparcener cannot have waste because the mean estate for life is in the Tenant by the courtesie And to prove that the Tenant by the courtesie ought to joyn he cited 3. E. 3. which he had seen in the Book it self at large where the Reversion of a tenant in Dower was granted to the Husband and to the Heirs of the Husband and the tenant in Dower did waste and they did joyn in an Action of waste and not good And so is 17. E. 3. 37. F. N. B. 59. f. and 22. H. 6. 25. a. Walmesley contrary for here in our case there is nothing to be recovered by the tenant by the courtesie for he cannot recover damages because the disinheresin is not to him and the term is expired and therefore no place wasted is to be recovered and therefore it is not like unto the Books which have been cited for in all those the tenant was in possession and the place wasted was to be recovered which ought to go to both according to their estates in reversion But it is not so here for in as much as the term is expired the land is in the tenant by the courtesie and so he hath no cause to complain And such also was the opinion of the whole Court viz. that because the term was ended that the Writ was good notwithstanding the said Exception Then concerning the principall matter in Law which was Whether the Writ were well brought against the second Lessee or whether it ought to have been brought against the first Lessee It was argued by Shuttleworth that it ought to have been brought against the first Lessee for when he granted over his term excepting the trees the Exception was good Ergo c. For when the Land upon which the trees are growing is leased out to another the trees passe with the Lease as well as the Land and the property of them is in the Lessee during the term and therefore when he grants his term hee may well except the trees as well as the first Lessor might have done And that is proved by the Statute of Marlebridge Cap. 23. for before that Statute the Lessee was not punishable for cutting downe the trees and that Statute doth not alter the properties of the trees but onely that the Lessee shall render damages if he cut them down c. Also the words of the Writ of Wast proveth the same which are viz. in terris domibus c. sibi dimissis Also the Lessee might have cut them down for reparations c. and for fire-wood if there were not sufficient underwoods which he could not have done if the trees had been excepted And in 23. H 8. in Brooke It is holden that the excepting of the trees is the excepting of the Soile And so is 46. E. 3. 22. Where one made a Lease excepting the woods and afterwards the Lessee did cut them down and the Lessor brought an Action of Trespasse quare vi armis clausum fregit c. and it was good notwithstanding that Exception was taken to it And it is holden in 12. E. 4. 8. by Fairfax and Littieton That if the Lessee cut the trees that the Lessor cannot carry them away but he is put to his Action of Waste Fenner and Walmesley Serjeants contrary and they conceived that the Lessee hath but a speciall property in the trees viz. for fire-boot plough-boot house-boot c. And if he passe over the Lands unto another that he cannot reserve unto himselfe that speciall property in the trees no more then he who hath common appendant can grant the principall excepting and reserving the Common or grant the Land excepting the foldage The grand property of the trees doth remain in the Lessor and it is proved by 10. H. 7. 30. and 27. H. 8 13. c. If Tenant for life and he in the reversion joyne in a Lease and the Lessee doth wast they shall joyne in an Action of Wast and Tenant for life shall recover the Free-hold and the first Lessor the damages which proves that the property of the trees is in him As to that that he was dispunishable at the common law that was the folly of the Lessor and although it was so at the
Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 146 LONDON doth prescribe to have a Custom That after Verdict given in any of the Sheriffs Courts or such like Court there that the Maior may remove any such Suit before himself and as Chancellor secundùm bonam sanam conscientiam moderate it and it was moved whether it were a reasonable custom or not because that after tryal by ordinary course at Law he should thereby stay judgment Gaudy Justice It ought to be before judgment otherwise it cannot be for the Statute of 4. H. 4. is that judgment given in any Court shall not be reversed but by Error or Attaint Vide Rastal Tit. Judgment Mich. 28. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 2619. 147 GREENE and HARRIS Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict it was found that one John Brenne was seised of a Manor where there were Copyholders for life and by Indenture leased a copyhold called Harris Tenure parcel of the Land in question to Peter and John Blackborow for eight years to begin after the death of Brenne his Wife and by the same Indenture leased all the Manor to them as before The Copyholder did surrender and Brenne granted a copy to hold according to the custom of the Manor Brenne and his Wife died So as the lease of Blackborow was to begin Peter entred and granted all his Interest unto a stranger and died John entred into the whole as Survivor and made a lease thereof to the Plaintiff and the Copyholder entred and he brought the action Shuttleworth for the plaintiff The question is whether the plaintiff shall have Harris Tenure as in gross or as parcel of the Manor and he conceived that because it is named by it self that it shall pass as in gross for so their intent appeareth to be In 33. H. 8. Dyer 48. A Feoffment was made of a Manor to which a Villein was Regardant by these words viz. Dedi unam acram c. And further Dedi concessi Villanum meum and there it was holden that the Villein should pass as in gross and that they were several gifts although there was but one Deed. The same Law shall be of an Advowson appendant 14. and 15. El. Dyers Husband and Wife were joint-tenants in Fee of a Manor out of which the Queen had a Rent of twenty pound per annum and she by her Letters patents in Consideration of Money paid by the Husband did give grant release and remise unto the Husband and his heirs the said twenty pound Rent habendum percipiendum to him and his heirs The Husband did devise the Rent unto another and his heirs and dyed There it is debated whether the Wife should pay the Rent or not and it was holden that she should pay it for the deed having words of grant and release it shall be referred to the Election of the Husband and for his best avail how he will take it and there is no necessity that the Rent be extinguished in his possession for it is a maxime in Law that every grant shall be taken beneficially for the grantee so is it if it contain words of two intents he may take that which makes best for him 21. and 22. H. 6. A deed comprehending Dedi concessi was pleaded as a Feoffment In 5. E. 3. A Rent issuing out of Lands in Fee was granted to Tenant by the courtesie to have and to hold to him and his heirs It shall not be taken as extinct but the Rent shall go to his heires although he himself could not have it Then in our Case because it is more beneficial for the Termor he shall have it in gross And so he shall avoid the Estate of the Copyholder afterwards and here is an Election made by Peter so to have it by the grant of his Interest over Our Case is not like unto the Case of 48. E. 3. 14. Where a Cessavit was brought supposing that the House was holden of the Plaintiff by five Shillings and the Defendant pleaded that the Ancestor of the Plaintiff by his deed which he shewed forth gave the house to him and a shop which are holden by one intire service and demanded judgment c. And there it was holden that that deed did not prove but that the shop might be parcel of the house and not a shop in gross by it self And there Finchdon saith That if a man grant the Manor of F. to which an Advowson is appendant and the Advowson of the Church of F. so as it is named in gross yet it shall pass as appendant I yeild to that for there it is not more beneficial for him the one way or the other as it is in our Case It may be perhaps objected That the Plaintiff here shall not recover at all for the cause alleadged in Plo. Comm. 424. in Bracebridges Case because that the action is brought for a certain number of Acres as one hundred Acres and it is found that the Plaintiff hath right but to a moyty of them But it hath been ruled against that viz. that he shall recover Walmesley Sergeant contrary Notwithstanding that this Copy-hold be twice named yet it shall pass as parcel of the Manor and not as a thing in gross and there is but one Rent one Tenure and one reversion of both 45. E. 3. A Fine was levyed of a Manor unto which an Advowson was appendant wherein a third part was rendred back to one for life with divers Remainders over And so of the other two parts with the advowson of every third part as abovesaid and there it is debated who shall have the first avoidance And it is holden notwithstanding the Division as aforesaid and the naming of one before the other that they are all Tenants in common of it So as if they cannot agree to present that Lapse shall incurre to the Bishop and there no Prerogative is given to him who is first named nor any prejudice to the last named for being by one Deed it shall passe uno flatu 14. H. 8. 10. A Lease was made for a year Et sic de anno in annum c. And there it was debated whether it were a severall Lease for every year and it was ruled That an Action might be brought supposing that he held for one and twenty years if in truth by force of the same Demise the Lessee occupy the Land so long And if I by my Deed grant unto A. and B. the services of I. D. and by the same Deed the services of I. S. are also granted unto them they are Joyn-tenants of the Services or Seignories So if I lease a Manor reciting every parcell of the Land of the Manor for the whole consists in severall parcels In 33. H. 8. before remembred It is said That the Advowson shall be appendant if the whole Manor be granted c. But if it be admitted that there be severall Leases and that it passeth as a thing in grosse
yet in the interim during the life of Brenne and his wife it is one entire Manor For if Blackborow had levied a Fine thereof before entry his Interest in the Land had not passed And if a Fine be levied of the Manor and the Conusee render back part to one for life and another part to another for life the remainder of the whole to a third until the Two enter it is one entire Manor in the hands of the Conusee If I devise that my Executors shall sell such Lands which are parcell of a Manor and dye untill they sell it remains parcell of the Manor So if the heir selleth the Manor that Land shall passe for it is but executory and remains parcell untill it be executed Wherefore in the principall Case here the Copy-hold is good The reason of the Case 33. H. 8. Dyer 48. is because before the grant the advowson was not appendant to that acre onely but to the whole Manor and to that acre as parcell of it Also he said that the Copy-hold shall be good against the Lessee being granted before execution of his term when as the Manor was entire For he who hath a Manor but for one year may grant Copies and the grant shall be good to bind him in the Reversion And if one recovereth an acre parcell of a Manor before execution it is parcell of the Manor and by grant of the Manor shall passe Periam Justice But yet now being executed by the death of the Lessor and his wife it is no part of the Manor if they be severall Leases Walmesley But the Defendant is in by Custome by one who is Dominus pro tempore Anderson Chief Justice The Case of 48. E. 3. is like our Case And I conceive clearly here is no severance but if there had been any severance it had been otherwise but I doubt of the other point Periam Justice In 13. H. 4. the difference is taken betwixt a grant of a Manor una cum advocatione and a grant of a Manor et ulterius a grant of the Advowson In 14. Eliz. Dyer 311. in the Case of the Lord Cromwell and Andrews it is moved If a man bargain and sell give and grant a Manor and Advowson to one and afterwards levieth a Fine or inrolleth the Deed Dyer held that the Advowson shall passe by the Bargain and Sale as in gross before that the Deed be enrolled But I conceive that it cannot pass if the Deed be not enrolled and then it shall pass as appendant by reason of the intent of the parties and so in this Case And for the last matter I conceive very strongly that when the Lease which is executory takes effect that it shall avoid the Copy-hold for although at once viz. during the expectancy of the said Lease to begin at a day to come the Copy-hold be not extinct yet now he may say That all times as in respect to him the Copy-hold Custome was broken I hold That a Tenant in Dower shall not avoid a Copy-hold made during the Coverture and so it hath been adjudged in the Kings Bench. But I conceive there is a difference betwixt that Case and the Case in question for in that Case the title of the wife to have Dower is not consummate till the death of the Husband Anderson Chief Justice I can shew you an Authority That if I grant unto you such Land and the Manor of D. there the Land shall pass as parcell of the Manor Periam True there for it doth enforce the first grant But here the intent of the parties doth appear and the same is to be respected Anderson But their intent ought to be according to the Law as in 19. H. 8. it is holden it shall be in a Devise Anderson upon the Argument of this Case said That if a Warranty be to a whole Manor and also to an Advowson the party cannot have Two Warrantia Chartae Periam If he had further said in the Deed That his intent was that it should be severall the same had altered the Case Anderson No truely because his intent did not stand with the rule of Law As if a man devise that his Lands shall be sold and doth not say by whom it is void and yet the intent is expressed If the Lease had been by severall Deeds Periam said The Copy-hold had beene severed Windham denied that If both the Deeds bee delivered at one time It was adjourned Hill 29. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 148 AN Information was upon the Statute of 5. 6. E. 6. for buying of seed Corn having sufficient of his own and not bringing so much unto the Market of his own corn and a generall issue was found upon it And it was delivered for Law to the Jury by the Justices That a Contract in Market for corn not in the Market or which was not there that day is not within the Branch of the Statute But if corn or graine be in the Market although that the Contract be made in a house out of the Market and delivered to the Vendee out of the Market yet it is within the Statute And in the Argument of that Case Anderson said That the Market shall be said The place in the Town where it hath used to be kept and not every place of the Town And a Sale in Market overt in London ought to be in a Shop which is open to the street and not in Chambers or inward rooms otherwise the property is not altered And so it is of all Statutes in open Markets And the Recorder of London said That such was their Custome in London Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 149 It was holden by Anderson chiefe Justice That if one deviseth Lands to the heirs of I. S. and the Clerk writes it to I. S. and his heirs that the same may be holpen by averrment because the intent of the Devisor is written and more And it shall be naught for that which is against his intent and against his will and good for the residue But if a Devise be to I. S. and his heirs and it is written but to the heirs of I. S. there an averrment shall not make it good to I. S. because it is not in writing which the Statute requires anâ— so an averrment to take away surplusage is good but not to encrease that which is defective in the Will of the Testator Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 150 A Feoffment was made unto A. unto the use of him and his wife dis-punishable of Wast during their lives one died and the Survivor committed Wast It was the opinion of the whole Court that an Action of Wast would not lie by him in the Reversion for it is a Priviledge which is annexed to the Estate which shall continue as long as the Estate doth continue Mich. 29 Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 151 A. grants annualem redditum out of Lands in which he hath nothing The opinion of
the Court was That it is a good grant of an Annuity by these words annualem redditum But whether the Husband shall have a Writ of Annuity after the death of the wife for an Annuity during the Coverture they were in some doubt because it is but a thing in Action as is an Obligation Otherwise were it of a Rent which she had for life Note in pleading for a Rent he shall plead That he was seised c. Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 152 WINKFEILD'S Case Winkfeild devised Land in Norfolk to one Winkfeild of London Goldsmith and to his heirs in Fee And afterwards he made a Deed of Feoffment thereof to divers persons unto the use of himselfe for life without impeachment of waste the Remainder unto the Devisee in fee. But before he sealed the Deed of Feoffment he asked one if it would be any prejudice to his Will who answered No. And the Devisor asked again if it would be any prejudice because he conceived that he should not live untill Livery was made And it was answered No. Then he said that he would seale it for his intent was that his Will should stand And afterwards Livery was executed upon part of the Land and the Devisor died Rodes and Periam Justices The Feoffment is no Countermand of the Will because it was to one person but perhaps it had been otherwise if it had been to the use of a stranger although it were not executed Anderson Chiefe Justice and others the Will is revoked in that part where the Livery is executed And he said It would have been a question if he had said nothing And all the Justices agreed That a man may revoke his Will in part and in other part not And he may revoke it by word and that a Will in writing may he revoked by word Periam said It is no revocation by the party himselfe but the Law doth revoke it to which Windham agreed But he said That if the party had said nothing when he sealed the Feoffment it had been a revocation of the party and not of the Law Periam If the Witnesses dye so as he cannot prove the words spoken at the sealing of the Feoffment the Feoffment will destroy the Will and so he spake to Anderson who did not deny it All this was delivered by the Justices upon an Evidence given to a Jury at the Barre Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 153 NOte That it was said by Anderson Chiefe Justice That if one intrude upon the possession of the King and another man entreth upon him that he shall not have an Action of Trespasse for he who is to have trespasse ought to have a possession and in this case he had not for that every Intruder shall answer the King for his time and therefore he shal not answer to the other party To which Walmesley and Fenner Serjeants agreed Periam doubted of it for he conceived That he had a possession against every stranger Snagg Serjeant conceived That he might maintain an Action of Trespasse but Windham and Rodes Justices were of opinion that he could not maintain Trespass Walmesley he cannot say in the Writ Quare clausam frâ—git c. Rodes vouched 19. E. 4. to maintain his opinion Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 154 NORRIS and SALISBURIE'S Case IN an Action of Debt upon a Bond the Case was this Norris was possessed of wools for which there was a contention betwixt the Defendant and one A. And Norris promised A. in consideration that the goods were his and also that he should serve processe upon Salisbury out of the Admiral Court that he would deliver the goods to A. And afterwards he delivered the goods to Salisbury the Defendant who gave him Bond with Condition to keep him harmlesse from all losses charges and hinderances concerning and touching the said wools Afterwards A. served processe upon him and he did not deliver to him the goods for which A. brought his Action upon the Case against Norris who pleaded That he made no such promise which was found against him And afterwards Norris brought an Action of Debt upon the Bond against Salisbury because he did not save him harmlesse in that Action upon the Case And the opinion of the whole Court was That the Action of Debt would not lie because that the Action upon the Case did not concern the wools directly for the Action is not brought but for breach of the promise And that is a thing of which the Defendant had not notice and it was a secret thing not concerning the wools but by circumstances and so out of the Condition Anderson Chiefe Justice said That if A. promise B. in Consideration that B. is owner of goods and hath them to deliver them to C. the same may be a good consideration yet he somewhat doubted of it But Walmesley did affirme it to be a good Consideration Mich. 29 Eliz in the Common Pleas. 155 IT was holden by the whole Court That in an Action of Trespasse It is a good plea in barre That the Plaintiffe was barred in an Assize brought by him against the Defendant and issue joyned upon the Title But otherwise if it were upon the generall issue viz. Nul tort nul disseisin For then it might be that the Plaintiffe was never ousted nor disseised and so no cause to recover In which case it was no reason to put him from his Writ of Right Mich. 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Intratur Mich. 27. Rot. 1627. 156 BRAGG'S Case A Woman having cause to be endowed of a Manor in which are Copy-holders doth demand her Dower by the name of certain Messuages certain Acres of land and certain Rents and not by the name of the third part of the Manor and she doth recover and keeps Courts and grants Copy-holds It was holden by the whole Court that in such Case that the Grants were void for she hath not a Manor because she hath made her demand as of a thing in grosse Otherwise if the demand had been of the third part of the Manor for then she had a Manor and might have kept Courts and granted Copies And the pleading in that Case was That she did recover the third part of the Manor per nomen of certain Messuages and Acres and Rents which was holden to be no recovery of the third part of the Manor Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 157 NOte it was holden for Law That the Justices may increase but not decrease damages because the party may have an Attaint and so is not without remedy But note contrary by Anderson and Periam Justices Hill 39. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 158 SErjeant Fenner moved this Case That the Lord of a Manor doth prescribe That if the Tenant do a Rescous or drive his Cattel off from the Land when the Lord comes to distrain that the Tenant shall be amerced by the Homage and that the Lord may distrain for the same Anderson
Chief Justice did conceive it might be a good custome and so also was the opinion of Rodes Justice and he vouched 11 H. 7. where the Lord had Three Pound for Pound-breach Fenner It is extortion if the amercement be not for a thing which is a common Nusans and cited 11 H. 4. to prove it Periam Justice said That hee said well Pasch 28 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. Rot. 1962. 159 GILE'S and NEWTON'S Case THE Case was That the Queen seised of the Manor of Gascoigne and of the Graunge called Gascoigne Graunge in D. did grant all her Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in D. and it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Manor did not pass And so Anderson Chief Justice said it is if it were in the Case of a common person but an Advowson shall passe by the Feoffment of the Manor without Deed without the words cum pertinentiis for that is parcell of the Manor which the whole Court granted Pasch 23. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 160 J. S. was arrested by force of a Latitat out of the King's Bench at the Suit of J. D. and the Sheriffe took an Obligation of him with two Sureties upon condition that he appear such a day in the King's Bench and also that ad tunc ibidem he answer the said J. D. in a Plea of Trespass It was moved by Rodes Serjeant That the Obligation was void by the Statute of 23. H. 6. by which Statute no Obligation shall be said to be good if not for appearance only and this Obligation is for appearance and also that he shall answer to J. D. which is another thing then is contained in the Statute and therefore it is void But all the Justices were of opinion That the Obligation was good notwithstanding that because that the words of the Writ directed to the Sheriffe are Quod capias such a man It a quod habeas corpus ejus hîc such a day ad respondendum tali in a Plea of Trespasse and so nothing is contained in the Bond which is not comprised within the Writ directed unto him but if any other collaterall thing be put into the Obligation then the Bond shall be void for the whole 31. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 161 BUCKHURST'S Case LEssee for ten years granted a rent charge unto his Lessor for the years Afterwards the Lessor granted the Remainder in Fee to the Lessee It was the opinion of the whole Court that the rent was gone and extinct because the Lessor who had the rent is a party to the Destruction of the Lease which is the ground of the Rent 29. Eliz. In the King 's Bench. 162 ALLEN and PATSHALL'S Case A Copy-holder doth surrender unto the use of a Stranger for ever and the Lord admits the Surrendree to have and to hold to him and his Heirs It was adjudged in this Case That if it were upon a devise that such a one should have the Copyhold in Fee and afterwards a surrender is made unto the Lord to grant the Copy-hold according to the Will and he grants it in Fee to him and his Heirs that the Grant is good But quaere in the first Case for it was there but a bare Surrender only Mich. 27 28. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 163 STRANGDEN and BARNELL'S Case AN Action of Trover and Conversion was brought of Goods in Ipswich the Defendant pleaded That the Goods came to his hand in Dunwich in the same County and that the Plaintiffe gave unto him the goods which came to his hands in Dunwich absque hoc that he is guilty of any Trover and Conversion of Goods in Ipswich And by the opinion of the Court the same is a good manner of Pleading by reason of the speciall Justification Vide 27. H. 6. But when the Justification is generall the County is not traversable at this day Vide 19. H. 6. 6 7. Mich. 27. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 164 BARTON and EDMOND'S Case AN Infant and another were bounden in a Bond for the Debt of the Infant The Infant at his full age did assume to save the other man harmelesse against the said Bond afterwards the Infant died It was resolved by the whole Court that upon this Assumpsit an Action upon the Case would lie against the Executors of the Infant But if a Feme Covert and another at her request had been bounden in such a Bond and after the death of her Husband she had assumed to have saved the other harmelesse against such Bond such Assumpsit should not have bound the Wife Trinit 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 165 ZOUCH and BAMPORT'S Case THis Case was moved When the Defendant pleads in Bar to the Action and the Plaintiffe replies and the Defendant doth demur specially upon the Replication and the Bar is insufficient Whether the Justices shall give Judgment upon the Replication or shall resort unto the insufficient Bar the Replication being also insufficient And the opinion of the Court was That when the Action is of such a nature that the Writ and the Count doth comprehend the Title as in a Formedon and the like then because there is a sufficient title for the demandant by the Writ and the Count so as the Judges may safely proceed to Judgement for the Plaintiffe there they shall resort to the Barr. Contrary in Cases where the Title doth commence only by the Replication as in Assize Trespass and the like 40. Eliz. in the Exchequer 166 NOte it was said by Sir Francis Bacon the King's Solicitor That it was adjudged 40. Eliz. in the Exchequer That where the King had made a Lease for life who was ousted by a Stranger that the same should be said a Disseisin of the particular estate against the common ground which is That a man cannot be disseised of lesse estate then of a Fee-Simple 40. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 167 IT was holden and adjudged by Popham Chief Justice of the Kings Bench That where a Lease was made unto the Husband and Wife for their lives the remainder to the Heirs of the Survivor that the same was a good remainder notwithstanding the uncertainty and that in that Case the Husband after the death of the Wife should have Judgement to recover the Land 33. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 168 PROCTER'S Case IT was adjudged in this Case That the Lachess of the Clark in not entring of the Kings Silver shall not prejudice the King or the Crowne 30 Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 169 HARDING'S Case IT was holden by the whole Court of Kings Bench as it was reported by Sir Robert Hitcham Knight That if a man make a Lease of Copy-hold land and of Free-hold land rendring Rent and the Copy-hold descends to one and the Free-hold to another that the rent shall be apportioned Trinit 25. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 1702. 170 LEONARD and STEPHEN'S Case IN Trespass the issue joyned was Whether it were a Feoffment or not and
upon Evidence to the Jury the Case appeared to be viz. That there was Lessee for years and afterwards the Lessor made a Deed of Feoffment in which were words of Confirmation and in the end of the Deed there was a special Letter of Atturney to make Livery to the Lessee for years and his heirs And it was agreed by all the Justices That the Lessee for years had Election to take the same by way of confirmation or by Feoffment and that the Law doth suspend and expect untill he hath declared his pleasure And it was further adjudged That when he hath made his Election to take it by Livery that it shall be a Feoffment ab initio and by the delivery of the Deed in the mean time nihil operatur Mich. 31. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 171 A Copy-holder did alledge the custome to be That the Lord of the Manor might grant Copies in Remainder with the assent of the Tenants and not otherwise and that Copies in remainder otherwise granted should be meerly void The question was Whether it were a good custome The Justices did not deliver any opinion in the point But Walmesley Serjeant said That it was a void custome for a Copy-hold Estate is an estate of which the Law doth not take notice and Copy-holders are meer Tenants at will by the common Law and therefore to say That he who hath not an interest should have me at his pleasure aswell as I who am interessed should have him at my pleasure is preposterous and repugnant to reason as 2. H. 4. 27. A custome that the Commoner shall not use his Common before that the Lord hath put in his Cattel is not good for the Commoner hath an interest in the Common which is not reasonable to be restrained at the pleasure of another and 19. Eliz Dyâ—r 257. A custome that a man shall not demise or lease but for six years is a void custome Shuttleworth Serjeant contrary and he said That the reason that this Copy-hold is not within Littletons Estates by Copy is no reason for by the same reason you may overthrow all Copy-hold Estates And he said That this custome might have a lawfull beginning and it seems to bee grounded upon the reason of the common Law that a remainder should not be without the assent of the particular Tenant and therefore it is a good custome And so is the custome that a Woman shall not have Dower if she do not claim it within a year and a day And a custome that a free Tenant shall not alien without a surrender in the Court of the Lord is a good custome It was adjourned 31. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 172 Sir RALPH EGERTON'S Case UPon a speciall Verdict the Case was this A man being Tenant for life in the right of his Wife he made a Deed of Feoffment Habendum to the Feoffee and his Heirs ad solum opus usum of the Feoffee and his Heirs for the life of the Wife and the Court was cleer of opinion that it was a forfeiture because the Habendum is absolute and the use is another clause and although he doth not limit the use but for life yet the Law limits the remainder of the use to the party who maketh the Feoffment Trinit 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 173 MAYE'S Case IF a man sendeth a Letter by a Carrier to a Merchant for certain Merchandizes to send them to him by the Carrier receiving certain monies and the Merchant sendeth the Goods by the Carrier without the receipt of the Money the same shall not bind the Buyer as it was holden by the Court because it was but a conditionall Bargain and it was the folly of the Merchant to trust the Carrier and therefore in that Case the Vendee was admitted to wage his Law And so if one writeth for Wares and the party sends them by the same Carrier yet if the Carrier doth not deliver them the other may wage his Law in such Case Mich. 30. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 174 HALTON'S Case THE case was That a Recognizance was acknowleged before Sir N. Read one of the Masters of the Chancery The Recognizee died before the same was enrolled And whether it might be enrolled at the Petition of the Executors of the Recognizee was the question And it was agreed by all the Justices That the same might be enrolled for it was like unto the Conusans of a Fine before a Judge which might be removed out of the hands of the Judge by a Certiorari and yet it is no record untill it be perfected And at that time it was doubted whether the Chancery might help a man who was a purchaser for valuable consideration where there wanteth the word heirs in the Deed of purchase But it was agreed by all the Justices That after a Fine is levied of Land That the Chancery may compell the Tenant to attorne Trinit 31. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 1704. 175 BLAGROVE and WOOD'S Case IN Trespass the Question was If a Copy-hold was surrendred or not And the custome was alledged to be That a Copy-holder might surrender out of the Court to the Steward out of the Manor And the Steward was retained onely by word but had no Patent Walmesley He may be Steward by word well enough But Windham and Anderson held That he might be Steward by word onely in possession that is when he holds a Court in possession But he cannot be Steward out of Court without a Patent because he is then out of possession And therefore it was the opinion of the whole Court That the surrender out of Court to the Steward by word was not good Hill 36. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 176 THe Summons of a Copy-holder to appear at the Lords Court was at the Church and thereupon the Copy-holder did not appear And it was the opinion of the whole Court that the same was no cause of forfeiture of the Copy-hold because it was not especially shewed to be the Custome And it shall be hard to make it a Forfeiture for perhaps the Copy-holder had not notice of it And to that purpose was vouched the Lord Dacres and Harlestoâ—s case And they held that notice ought to be given to the person and the Refusall must be willfull for if a Copy-holder be demanded his rent and he saith that he hath it not the same is no forfeiture but the deniall ought to be a wilfull deniall and so it was said to have been adjudged in one Winters Case Trinit 1. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. Rot. 854. 177 SAPLAND and RIDLER'S Case AFter long Arguments on both sides It was adjudged by all the Justices in this case That where the Custome of a Copy-hold Manor was to admit for life and in remainder for life at any time when there was but one Copy-holder for life in possession and during the minority of the Heir within fourteen years the Gardian in Socage in his own name
condition 3 Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 186 RUSWELL'S Case A Man took away Corne in the night time to which he had a right and was punished for a Riot in the Star-Chamber because of his company only Hillar 3. Jacobi 187 KINGSTON and HILL'S Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for saying these words viz. Thou art an arrant Papist and it were no matter if such were hanged and thou and such as thou would pull the King out of his Seat if they durst Adjudged that the words were not actionable Et quod querens nihil capiat per Billam Pasch 3 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 188 NOte It was holden by the Court That if a Fierifacias go to the Sheriffe to do Execution and he levieth the money and delivereth the same to the party yet if it be not paid here in the Court the party may have a new Execution and it shall not be any Plea to say That he hath paid the same to the party for it is not of Record without bringing of the money in Court Vide 11. H. 4. 50. ar Pasch 3. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 189 DUKE and SMITH'S Case NOte That if he in the reversion suffer a recovery to divers uses his Heirs cannot plead That his father had nothing in the Land at the time of the recovery for he is estopped to say That he was not Tenant to the Praecipe And it was agreed â—That it was a good recovery against him by estoppel Quaere this case Mich. 3. Jacobi in the King's Bench 190 BIRRY'S Case BIrry was committed by the High Commissioners and removed by Habeas corpus into the Kings Bench They returned the Writ with a Certificate That they did commit him for certain causes Ecclesiasticall which generall cause the Court did not allow of They certified at another time That it was for unreverent Carriage and sawcie Speeches to Doctor Newman The Court also disallowed of that cause Birry put in Bail to appear de die in diem and was discharged It was holden That if Birry did not put off his Hat to him or not give him the wall the same were not sufficient causes for them to commit him And it was agreed by the whole Court That whereas the said Commissioners took Bonds of such as they cited to appear before them to answer unto Articles before that the party had seen the Articles that such Bonds were void Bonds Mich. 3. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 191 ANN MANNOCK'S Case ANN Mannock was indicted in Suffolk upon the Statute of 1. El. cap. 2. for not coming to Church twelve Sundayes together which Indictment was removed into the Kings Bench and Exceptions taken unto it 1. That the Statute is That all Inhabitants within the Realme c. and it is not averred in facto that she did inhabit within the Realme and the Exception was disallowed for if it were otherwise it ought to be shewed on the Defendants part The second Exception That by a Proviso of the Statute of 28. Eliz. cap. 6. it is ordained That none shall be impeached for such offence if he be not indicted at the next Sessions and it appears by the Indictment That the Offence was almost a year before the Indictment and in the mean time many Sessions were or debuerunt to have been And that Exception was also disallowed for perhaps the truth is That there was not any Sessions in the mean time although there ought to have been The third Exception That the Indictment was That she was indicted Coram A. B. sociis Justices of Peace and it doth not name them particularly The Exception was disallowed for that it doth not appear that there were any other Justices there and what was their names And therefore it was said That it differs from the Case of 1. H. 7. of a Fine levied Câ—raâ— A. B. â—â—â—iis suis The fourth Exception was That the words of the Statute are Ought to abide in the Church till the end of Common Prayer Preaching or other Service of God in the Disjunctive and the Indictment was in the Conjunctive The Exception was disallowed for although the words are in the disjunctive yet a man cannot depart so soon as the Service is ended if there be preaching but he ought to continue there for the whole time Pasch 4. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 192 AN Enfant did acknowledge a Statute and during his Nonage brought an Audita querela to avoid the Statute and had judgment The Conusee at the fall age of the Enfant brought a Writ of Error and reversed the judgment given in the Audita querela and the Enfant the Conusor prayed a new Audita querela but it was denyed by the whole Court Mich. 4. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 193 PETO and CHITTIE'S Case IT was adjudged in the Court of Common Pleas in this Case That concord with satisfaction is a good plea in Barre in an Ejectione firme Mich. 5. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 194 TWo Men were bound joyntly in a Bond one as principal and the other as surety the principal dyed Intestate the surety took Administration of his goods and the principal having forfeited the Bond the surety made an agreement with the Creditor and took upon him to discharge the Debt In Debt brought by another Creditor the question was upon fully administred pleaded by the Administrator If by shewing of the Bond and that he had contented it with his own proper Mony whether he might retain so much of the Intestates estate and it was adjudged that he might not For Flemming Chief Justice said that by joyning in the Bond with the principal it became his own Debt Pasch 5. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 195 TAYLOR and JAME'S Case IN a Replevin by John Taylor against Richard James for taking of a Mare and a Colt in Long Sutton in a place called H. in the County of Somerset The Defendant did avow the taking and shewed That Sir John Spencer was seised of the Manor of Long Sutton whereof the place where c. is parcel and that he and all those whose estate he hath in the said Manor c. have had all Estrayes within in the said Manor and shewed that the Bailiff of Sir John Spencer seised the said Mare and Colt as an Estray and proclaimed them in the three next Market Towns and afterwards the Baiâ—iff did deliver them to the Defendant to keep in the place where c. And if any came and challenged them and could prove that the same did belong to him and pay him for their meate that he should deliver them unto him and then shewed how that the Plaintiff came and claimed them for his own and because he would not prove that they did belong unto him nor pay him for their meate c. he would not deliver them upon which plea there was a Demurrer in Law After argument by the Serjeants Cook Chief Justice said that it was a
plain Case for the Plaintiff the reason of Estrayes was because when there is none that can make title to the thing the Law gives it to the King if the Owner doth not claim it within a year and a day and also because the Cattel might not perish which are called Animalia vagantia c. But the Defendants plea is not good because the Defendant is to keep them until proof be made unto him and the Law doth not take notice of any proof but by twelve Men which the Defendant cannot take 7. H. 2. Barre 241. But if the Owner can make any reasonable proof as if he shew the Markes c. it is sufficient and the party suo periculo ought to deliver to him the Estray Secondly It is not sufficient to keep the Estray within the Manor but it ought to be kept in a place parcel of the Manor Thirdly It ought to be in Land in the possession of Sir John Spencer and not of any other and it doth not appear that that Land was in his possession Fourthly If they do go in the Land of Sir John Spencer Yet it is absurd to maintain that the Bailff might delegate his power to another to keep them until he be satisfied Walmesley Justice agreeeth for when it is spoken generally of proof it shall be taken for judicial proof which needeth not in his Case for these Vagrant Beasts and the party shall not be his own Judge but as it hath been remembred upon the Statute of Wrecke si docere poterit if he can instruct him and give him any reason wherefore the Estray doth appertain unto him he ought to deliver it suo periculo Also it is cleer that agreement ought to be made with the party for the victual and the quantity thereof shall be tryed in this Court if it come in question as the quantity of Amends in a Replevin Warbarton agreed and said That an Estray ought not to be wrought but the party must agree for his meate also the Lord cannot put the Owner to his Oath but if the party doth tell the Marks it is sufficient and he ought to deliver it at his peril and if he require more then belongs to him for the Meate it is at his peril for this Court shall jugde of that Daniel agreed and said That the Lord ought to proclaim them and in his Proclamation ought to shew of what kinde the Estray is whether sheep Oxe Horse c. and ought to tell his name who seised them so as the Owner might know whither he might resort for his Cattel and then it ought to be kept within the Lordship and Manor which may extend into several Counties Cook said that the Owner ought not to be pressed to his Oath Pr. Cases 217. Pasch 5. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 196 LANGLEY and COLSON'S Case AN Action upon the Case was brought by Langley against Colson for these words viz. Richard Langley is a Bankrupt Rogue I may well say it for I have payed for it and it was adjudged for the Plaintiff for by all the Justices the first words are Actionable although the word Bankrupt be spoken adjectivè because they scandalize the Plaintiff in his Trade At the same time another Action was brought by another Man for speaking these words viz. Thou art a Bankruptly Knave and canst not be trusted in London for a Groat and it was adjudged that the words were not Actionable because the words were spoken adjectivè and adverbialitèr and are not so much as if he had called him Bankrupt Knave but Bankruptly viz. like a Bankrupt Pasch 5. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 197 BALLET and BALLE'TS Case AWarrantia Charta was brought by Thomas Ballet the younger against Thomas Ballet the elder and the Writ was of two Messuages and the moytie of an Acre of Land unde Chartam habet c. and declared whereas himself and the Defendant and one Francis Ballet were seised in the new Buildings and of one piece of Land adjoyning c. in the Tenure c. containing from the East to the West twenty foot by assize and from the North part to the South thirty foot and the said Thomas the elder and Francis did release unto him all their Right in c. the said Thomas the elder for him and his heirs did Warrant tenementa praedict ' to the said Thomas the younger and his heirs The Defendant did demand Oyer of the deed and thereby it appeared that the said Thomas and Francis and one R. did release to him all their Right in c. And that Thomas the elder for him and his heirs did Warrant tenementa praedict ' to Thomas the younger his heirs and that Francis by another clause for him and his heirs did Warrant tenementa praedict ' to Thomas the younger and his heirs upon which it was Demurred in Law and after Argument by the Serjeants some matters were unanimously agreed by all the Justices First that upon such a release with Warranty contra omnes gentes a Writ of Warrantia Charta lyeth Secondly although that every one passeth his part onely viz. a third part yet every one of them doth Warrant the whole and because they may so do and the words are general without restraint by themselves the Law will not restrain them The words are that they do Warrant tenementa praedict ' which is all the premisses Thirdly For the reason aforesaid It needs not to be shewed how they hold in jointure Fourthly that the Writ is well brought against one onely because the Warranties are several But if they had been joint Warranties then it ought to have been brought against them both so against the Survivor the heir of one of them and if they had both dyed against both their heirs so as it differs from an Obligation personal which onely binds the Survivor Fifthly that the Writ was well brought for the things as they are in truth without naming of them according to the Deed. Sixthly that if there be new Buildings of which the Warranty is demanded which were not at the time of the Warranty made and after the Deed is shewed the Defendant shall not have any benefit by Demurring upon it But if he will be aided he ought for to shew the special matter and enter into the Warranty for so much as was at the time of the making of the Deed and not for the residue Vide Fitz. Warrantia Charta 31. Seventhly that a Warrantia Charta doth not lye of a piece of Land no more then a Praecipe quod reddat nor of a Selion of Land Mich. 5. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 198 AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz. Thou hast spoken words that are treason and I will hang thee for them It was adjudged by the whole Court that the words were actionable Mich. 5. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 199 A Man was bound to pay twenty pound to another when he should
commit his house to his servants and the one doth assent to the Livery and departeth the house if the other do continue there and Livery be made it is no good Livery of Seisin Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 216 IT was holden for Law in this Court That if a man do offend against any Penal Law the Informer ought to begin his Suit within one year after the Offence done otherwise he shall not have the moity of the Penalty And if the Informer hath put in his Information although that the party be not served with Process to answer it yet the same doth appropriate the Penalty unto him Hill 6. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 217 PEREPOYNT'S Case PErepoynt procured one to convey the daughter of a Gentleman and to marry her to a Ploughman in the night and procured a Priest to marry them and was there present for which matter he was excommunicate by the Ordinary of the Diocess and after absolution he was for the same committed to Prison by the High Commissioners It was holden by the Court That matters concerning Tithes Marriage or Testaments are not examinable before them yet because that he had suffered imprisonment for such things and that neither the Statute of 23. H. 8. nor the Cannon doth extend to the High Commissioners it was resolved That if upon submission to the Commissioners they would not set him at liberty that this Court would do it Mich 6. Jacobi in the Star-Chamber 218 IT was resolved by the whole Court of Star-Chamber That if a man doth assist one who is a Plaintiffe in that Court that it is not maintenance because that it is for the benefit and advantage of the King But if a man do assist an Informer in another Court in an Information upon a Penall Law the same is such a Maintenance for which he may be punished in this Court 6. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 219 IT was adjudged in this Court That if Land which was sowed be leased to one for life the Remainder to another for 〈◊〉 That if the Tenant for life dieth before the severance of the Corn 〈…〉 in the Remainder shall have the Corn. Mich. 6. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 220 THE Lessee of a Copy-holder was distrained for rent behind in the time of his Lessor and the Lessee did assume and promise That he would satisfie the Lord his rent if he would surcease the suing of him It was adjudged by the whole Court That it was a good Assumpsit and a good consideration Mich. 7. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 221 PIGGOT and GODDEN's Case NOte It was in this Case agreed by the whole Court and so adjudged That in an Ejectione firme a man shall not give colour because the Plaintiffe shall be adjudged in by title Mich. 7. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 222 TWo Tenants in Common brought an Action upon the Case for stopping of a water course against a Stranger whereby the profits of their Lands were lost and it was shewed in pleading that the water had run time out of minde ante diem Obstructionis and Judgment was given for the Plaintiffs And two Exceptions were taken by Coventry First that Tenants in Common ought to have several Actions and not have joyned Secondly that the Custom ought to have been pleaded to continue ante usque die Obstructionis and both the Exceptions were dissallowed by the Court and it is not like the Case of Falsefails in which Action they must join because the same is in the Realty Mich. 7. Jacobi In the King 's Bench. 223 CROSSE and CASON's Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon due Obligation the condition of which was that the Obligee the 18. of August anno 4. Jacobi should go from Algate in London to the Parish Church of Stow-Market in Suffolk within 24. hours and the Obligee shewed that he went from Algate to the said place and because he did not shew in his Declaration in what Ward Algate was It was holden not to be good Mich. 7. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 224 NOte That it was adjudged to be Law by the whole Court that if a man bail goods to another at such a day to rebail and before the day the Bailee doth sell the goods in market overt Yet at the day the Baylor may seise the goods for that the property of the goods was alwaies in him and not altered by the Sale in market overt Mich. 7. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 225 ZOUCH and MICHIL's Case AN Enfant Tenant in tail did suffer a Recovery by his Gardian It was holden by the Court that the same should binde him because he might have remedy over against the Gardian by Action upon the Case But otherwise if he suffer a Recovery by Attorney for that is void because he hath not any remedy over against him as it was adjudged 4. Jacobi in Holland and Lees Case Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 226 WILSON and WORMAL's Case IN an Evidence given to a Jury it was admitted without Contradiction that if judgment in an action of Debt be given against Lessee for years and afterwards the Lessee alieneth his Term and after the year the Plaintiff sueth forth a Scire facias and hath Execution That the Terme is not lyable to the Execution if the Assignement were made bona fide Also in that Cook Chief Justice said that if Lessee for years assignee over his Terme by fraud to defeat the Execution And the Assignee assigneth the same over unto another bona fide that in the hands of the second Assignee it is not lyable to Execution Also in this Case it was said for Law That if a Man who hath goods but of the value of 30. pound be endebted unto two Men viz. to one in 20. pound and to another in 10. pound and the Debtor assignes to him who is in his debt 10. pound all the goods which are worth 30. pound to the intent that for the residue above the 10. pound debt he shall be favourable unto him This Assignement is altogether void because it is fraudulent in part But Foster Justice said that it shall not be void for the whole but onely for the surplusage as Twynes Case C. 3. part 81. Quaere Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 227 BRISTOW and BRISTOWE's Case IN an Action of Covenant the Case was this Lessee for 90. years made an Assignement for part of the Term viz. for 10. years and the Assignee covenated to repair c. The first Lessee devised the Reversion of the Term and dyed the Devisee of the Reversion brought an Action of Covenant against the Assignee for 10. years and the question was If the Devisee of the Reversion being but a Termor were within the Statute of 32. H. 8 of Conditions Secondly whether the Action would lye because no notice was given of the grant of the Reversion Dodderidge Serjeant to the first point said that this
to the extinguishment of the Bond by the release of all Actions But the Court conceived That the Arbibitrament did consist of two matters which were distinct and might be severed For although that the Arbitrament be void as to one matter yet it shall stand good and shall be a good Arbitrament for the other matter And Foster Justice said That in that case the Award to make the Release might be severed viz. That it should be good for all Actions except the Bond. Cook contrary And said That it is so entire that it cannot be divided But the Court conceived That the Arbitrament was good as to the Bond to be made by the Defendant although it were void as to the Arbitrator At another day Dodderidge said That the Plaintiffe had not alledged any Breach of the Arbitrament for he hath put it That the Defendant and the Arbitrator had not entred into the Bond and although they two joyntly had not entred into the Bond yet it might be that the Defendant alone had entred into the Bond and it needed not that the Arbitrator enter the Bond for as to him the Arbitrament was void And that Exception was allowed as a good Exception by the whole Court. For they said That the Plaintiffe ought for to shew and alledge a breach according to the Book of L. 5. E. 4. 108. And they said That although it be after verdict yet it is not remedied by the Statute Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 231 FOLIAMBES Case IN a Writ of Dower brought by the Lady Foliambe It was agreed by the whole Court That if the Husband maketh a Lease for years rendring rent and dieth the wife shall recover her Dower and shall have present Execution of the Land and thereby she shall have the third part of the Reversion and of the Rent and execution shall not cease And all the Justices said That the Sheriffe should serve execution of the Land as if there were not any Lease for years for it may be that the Lease for years is void And although it be shewed in pleading that there is a Lease for years the wife cannot answer to it and it may be there is not any Lease and therefore the Execution shall be generall And he who claimes the Lease for years may re-re-enter into the Land notwithstanding the Recovery and the Execution of the Dower And if he be ousted he shall have his Action Nichols Serjeant who was of Councell against the Demandant said That he would agree that the Case in Perkins 67. was not Law But the Justices said That there is a difference betwixt the Case of Perkins and this Case for in the Case in Perkins the Husband had but an estate in Remainder so as no rent or attendancy was due so as the wife during that Term could not have any benefit Also in this case it was agreed by the Court That after judgement for part the Demandant might be Non-suit for the residue and yet have execution of that part for which he had judgment Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 232 RAPLEY and CHAPLEIN's Case IT was ruled by the whole Court That if a Custome be alledged That the eldest daughter shall solely inherit that the eldest sister shall not inherit by force of that Custome So if the Custome be That the eldest daughter and the eldest sister shall inherit the eldest Aunt shall not inherit by that Custome And so if the Custome be that the youngest son shall inherit the youngest brother shall not inherit by the Custome And Foster Justice said That so it was adjudged in one Denton's Case Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 233 SEAMAN's Case BArker Serjeant prayed the opinion of the Court in this Case Lessee for an hundred years made a Lease for forty years to Thomas Seaman if he should live so long and afterwards he leased the same to John his son Habendum after the Term of Thomas for 23. years to be accounted from the date of these presents The Question is If the Lease to John shall be said to begin presently or after the Term of Thomas And the Justices were cleer of opinion That the Lease to John shall not be accounted from the time of the date but from the end of the Term of Thomas because that when by the first words of the Limitation it is a good Lease to begin after the Term of Thomas it shall not be made void by any subsequent words And Cook Chiefe Justice said That this is no new reason for there is the same reason given in 2. E. 2. Grants And he put the Case in Dyer 9. Eliz. 261. and said That if the Limitation be not certain when the Term shall begin it shall be taken most beneficiall for the Lessee Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 234 WARD and POOL's Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for speaking these words Thou mayest well be richer then I am for thou hast coined thirty Shillings in a day thou art a Coiner of money c. I will justifie it It was moved in arrest of Judgment That the words were not Actionable because he might have a good Authority to coine Money for men who work in the Mint are said to coine Money and are called Coiners of Money And so it was adjudged Quod Querens nihil capiat per Billam Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 235 CHALK and PETER's Case CHalk brought a Replevin against Peter the Defendant did avow the taking as Bailiff of Sir Francis Barrington in sixteen Acres of wood in Hatfield Chase and shewed that an Arbitrament was made by the Lord Burghley late Lord Treasurer betwixt the Lord Rich and the Ancestors of Sir Francis by which it was awarded That the said Ancestors of the said Sir Francis Barrington and his Heirs should have the herbage of a certain number of Acres within the said Chase and also that he should have to him and his Heirs the Trees and Bushes of the said number of Acres within the said Chase and that he might fell and cut sixteen Acres every year of the said Acres and that he should enclose them according to the Laws and Statutes of the Realm and that Assurance was made by the Lord Rich accordingly and that the same was confirmed by a speciall Act of Parliament with a saving of the right and interest of all strangers and said That Sir Francis Barrington did inclose and cut down sixteen Acres and did enclose the same and there took the Defendants cattel Damage feasants upon which the Defendant did demurr in Law The Question in the case was If by the Statute of 22. E. 4. cap. 7. or the Statute of 35. H. 8. câ—p 17. which give Authority to make inclosures of Woods the Commoner shall be excluded Harris Serjeant I conceive That the Commoner shall be excluded by the Statute of 22. E. 4. cap. 7. which gives Authority to inclose and exclude all Beasts and
Statute to enclose For the Statute is When any man fels trees in his proper soile so that he not being owner of the ground he is not within the Statute and that was the effect of his argument And as to the other point he did not speak at all Cook chief Justice I hold that the plaintiffe ought to have judgment all the matter doth consist upon the Statute of 22. E. 4. which is to be considered And first is to be considered what was the common Law before that Statute and that was That one who had a Wood within a Forrest might fell it as it appeareth by the Statute de Forresta and the Statnte of 1 E. 3. 2. by licence and also he might enclose it for three yeers as it appeareth by the Statute of 22. E. 4. but the enclosure was to be cum parvo fossato haia bassa as it appeareth by the Register in the Writ of Ad quod damnum so as before that Statute there was an enclosure But the Law is cleer That before that Statute by the enclosure the Commoner shall not be excluded Then wee are to consider of the Statute And first Of the persons to whom the Statute doth extend and that appeareth by the preamble to be betwixt the King and other owners of Forrests and Chases and the owners of the Soil so as a Commoner is not any person within the meaning of the Statute And for the body of the Statute you ought to intend that the sentence is continued and not perfected untill the end of the Statute and the words Without licence c. prove That no persons were meant to be bounden by the statute but the Owners of the Forrests and Chases and not the Commoners Like the case in Dyer And although you will expound the words of the bodie of the Statute generally yet they shall be taken according to the intent of the preamble and therefore the Case of 21. H. 7. 1. of the Prior of Castleacre although it be not adjudged in the Book yet Judgment is entred upon the Roll which Case is Pasch 18. H. 7. Rot. 460. By which case it appeareth that although that a Statute be made which giveth Lands to the King yet by that statute the Annuity of a stranger shall not be extinguished And the Case which hath been put by Justice Foster upon the Statute of 18. Eliz. was the case of Boswel for the Parsonage of Bridgwater That although that one who hath a lease for years of the King which was void for misrecitall might by the said Statute hold it against the King yet the Patentee in Fee shall not be prejudiced by the said Statute So I conclude That the Commoner is not a person within this Statute of 22. E. 4 Secondly It is to be considered if a Wood in which any one hath Common be within the Statute and I hold it is not but onely severall Woods For as I have said the Wood which before the Statute might be enclosed for three years was onely a severall Wood and not such a Wood in which any one had common And the statute of 22. E. 4. doth extend onely to such Woods which might be felled and enclosed for three yeers and I conceive contrary to my Brother Warburton That the Deer of the Forrest shall well enough be said to be beasts and cattell And whereas by the common Law before this statute the enclosure was onely to be as I have said cum parvo fossato haia bassa by which the Deer were not excluded now by this statute I hold that they may make great hedges to exclude aswell the Deer as other beasts And I agree with Justice Foster that if he will take advantage of the Statute that hee ought to have pleaded that first hee felled and afterwards enclosed and è contrà upon the Statute of 35. H. 8. scil that hee ought first to divide and afterwards to fell c. And also I agree with him that in that point the Statute of 35. H. 8. being contrary doth repeal the Statute of 22. E. 4. if by that Statute the Commoner shall be excluded But I am of opinion with my Brother Warburton cleerly That hee is a Vendee of the Trees and so within the Statute for it is not neeessary that in the Grant there be the word Sell or that money by given nor that it be a contract for a time onely and not to have cantinuance as it is in our case But he who hath the Trees to him and his heirs shall be said to be a Vendee well enough As to the other matter which hath been moved Whether the Statute of 22. E. 4 be a generall law or not I hold cleerly that we are to take knowledg of it although it be not pleaded because it concerneth the King for it is made for the Kings Forrests and of all the Acts made between the King and his subjects wee ought to take knowledg for so was Stowel's Case And also it was adjudged that wee ought to take knowledg of the act concerning the Creation of the Prince because it concerneth the King And Cook in his argument said That if there had not been a speciall proviosin for the Commoner in the Statute of 35. H. 8. the Commoner had not been excluded by that Statute And afterwards Judgment was entred for the plaintiffe Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 236 NOte That it was holden by three of the Justices viz. Walmâ—sley Warburton and Foster Cook and Daniel being abâ—ent for law cleerly That a Tenant at will cannot by any custome make a Lease for life by licence of the Lord and that there cannot be any such custome for a lease for life as there is for a lease for years Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 237 BERRY's Case NOte That upon an Evidence given to a Jury in a Case betwixt Berry and New Colledg in Oxford it was ruled by Walmesley Warburton Foster Justices in an Action of Trespass If it appear upon the Evidence that the plaintiff hath nothing in the land but in common with a stranger yet the Jury ought to finde with the Plaintiff and if the Defendant will have advantage of the Tenancy in common in the plaintiff he ought to have pleaded it Nichols Serjeant was very earnest to the contrary and took a difference where the Plaintiffe and Defendant are Tenants in common and where the Plaintiff is tenant in common with a stranger But he was over-ruled the action was an action of Trespass Quare clausum fregit c. Cook and Daniel were absent Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 238 IT was holden by Walmesley Warburton and Foster Justices That if a Rent be granted to one and his heirs for the life of another man and the grantee dieth that his heir shall not be an occupant of the Rent And Foster said that the reason was because he cannot plead a Que estate of a Rent
And per Curiam a Prohibition shal be awarded And Cook chief Justice said That there were three Causes in the Bill for which a Prohibition should be granted which he reduced to three Questions 1. If a Copy-holder payeth his rent and the Lord maketh a Feoffment of the Manor Whether the Copy-holder shall be compelled to attorn 2. If a man be seised of Freehold Land and Covenants to stand seised to an use Whether in such case an Attornment be needfull 3. If a Feoffment be made of a Manor by Deed Whether the Feoffee shall compell the Tenants to attorn in a Court of Equity And for all these Questions It was said That the Tenants shall not be compelled to attorn for upon a Bargain and Sale and a Covenant to stand seised there needs no attronement And Cook in this case said That in 21. E. 4. the Justices said That all Causes may be so contrived that there needed to be no Suit in Courts of Equity and it appears by our books That a Prohibition lies to a Court of Equity when the matter hath been once determined by Law And 13. E. 3. Tit. Prohibition and the Book called the Diversity of Courts which was written in the time of King Henry the eighth was vouched to that purpose And the Case was That a man did recover in a Quare Impediâ— by default and the Patron sued in a Court of Equity viz. in the Chancery and a Prohibition was awarded to the Court of Chancery Mich. 11 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 298 Sir JOHN GAGE and SMITH's Case AN Action of Waste was brought and the Plaintiffe did declare that contrary to the Statute the Lessee had committed Waste and Destruction in uncovering of a Barn by which the timber thereof was become rotten and decayed and in the destroying of the stocks of Elmes Ashes Whitethorn and Blackthorn to his damage of three hundred pound And for title shewed That his Father was seised of the Land where c. in Fee and leased the same to the Defendant for one and twenty years and died and that the Land descended to him as his son and heir and shewed that the Waste was done in his time and that the Lease is now expired The Defendant pleaded the generall issue and it was found for the Plaintiffe and damages were assessed by the Jury to fifty pound And in this case it was agreed by the whole Court 1. That if six of the Jury are examined upon a Voyer dire if they have seen the place wasted that it is sufficient and the rest of the Jury need not be examined upon a Voyer dire but onely to the principall 2. It was agreed if the Jury be sworn that they know the place it is sufficient although they be not sworn that they saw it and although that the place wasted be shewed to the Jury by the Plaintiff's servants yet if it be by the commandment of the Sheriffe it is as sufficient as if the same had been shewed unto them by the Sheriff himselfe 4. It was resolved That the eradicating of Whitethorn is waste but not of the Blackthorn according to the Books in 46. E. 3. and 9. H. 6. but if the blackthorn grow in a hedg and the whole hedg be destroyed the same is Waste by Cook chief Justice It was holden also so that it is not Wast to cut Quick-set hedges but it shall be accounted rather good husbandry because they will grow the better 5. It was agreed That if a man hath under-woods of Hasell Willowes Thornes if he useth to cut them and sell them every ten years If the Lessee fell them the same is no wast but if he dig them up by the roots or suffereth the Germinds to be bitten with cattel after they are felled so as they will not grow again the same is a destruction of the Inheritance and an Action of wast will lie for it But if he mow the Stocks with a wood-sythe as he did in the principall Case the same is a malicious Wast and continuall mowing and biting is destruction 6. It was said That in an Action of Wast a man shall not have costs of Suit because the Law doth give the party treble damages And when the generall issue Nul Wast is pleaded and the Plaintiff counted to his damages 100l. the Court doubted whether they could mitigate the damage But 7. It was agreed That in the principal Case although the issue were found for the Plaintiff that he could not have judgment because he declared of Wast done in 8. several closes to his damage of 300l. generally and did not sever the damages And the Jury found That in some of the said Closes there was no Wast committed Wherefore the Court said he could not have judgement through his own default But afterwards at another day Hobart then chief Justice and Warburton Justice said That the verdict was sufficient and good enough and so was also the declaration and that the Plaintiffe might have judgment thereupon But yet the same was adjourned by the Court untill the next Term. Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 299 CLARK's Case NOte It was said by Cook chief Justice and agreed by the whole Court and 41. and 43. E. 3. c That if a man deliver money unto I. S. to my use That I may have an Action of Debt or account against him for the same at my election And it was agreed also That an Action of Trover lieth for money although it be not in bags but not an Action of Detinue Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 300 IRELAND and BARKER's Case IN an Action of Wast brought the Writ was That the Abbot and Covent had made a Lease for years c. And it was holden by the Court that it was good although it had been better if the Writ had been That the Abbot with the assent of the Covent made the Lease for that is the usuall form but in substance the Writ is good because the Covent being dead Sons in Law by no intendment can be said to make a Lease But the Dean and Chapter ought of necessity to joyne in making of a Lease because they are all persons able and if the Dean make a Lease without the Chapter the same is not good per curiam if it be of the Chapter Lands And in Adams and Wâ—oâ—â—stey's Case Harris Serjeant observed That the Lease is said to be made by the Abbot and Covent and it is not pleaded to be made by the Abbot with the assent of the Covent Mich. 11 Iacobi In the Common Pleas. 301 The Dean and Canons of Winsor and WEBB's Case IN this Case it was holden by the Court That if a man give Lands unto Dean and Canons and to their Successors and they be dissolved or unto any other Corporations that the Donor shall have back the Lands again for the same is a condition in Law annexed to the Gift and in such Case no Writ of
And it was further said by the Court That if there were but thirty Tythe-sheafs in all that the Owner should not have them for then the Custom should be unreasonable And Day was given to the other side to shew Cause why the Prohibition should not be awarded Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 325. GANDEN and SYMMON's Case NOte That where a Juror is not challenged by one party who had sufficient cause of challenge and afterwards is challenged by the other side and afterwards the party doth release his challenge in that case the first party cannot challenge the same Juror again because he did foreslow his time of challenge and he had admitted the party for to be indifferent at the first Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 326. The Bishop of CHICHESTER and STRODWICK's Case IN an Action of Trespass for taking away of Timber and the Boughs of Trees felled The Defendant as to the Timber pleaded Not guilty And as to the Boughs he made a special Justification That there is a Custom within the Mannor of Ashenhurst in the County of Sussex That when the Lord fels or sels Timber-trees that the Lord is to have only the Timber and that the poor Tenants in Coscagio parte Manerii time out of mind have used to have the Branches of the Trees for necessary Estovers to be burnt in necessario focali in terris tenementis And the Opinion of the Court was That the Custom was not well expressed to have Estovers to burn in terris tenementis for that Estovers cannot be appertaining to Lands but to Houses only And therefore whereas the Defendant in the Case did entitle himself to a house and lands and gave in Evidence that the Custom did extend to Lands it was holden that the Evidence did not maintain the Issue And the Custom was alleadged to be That the Lord should have Quicquid valeret ad maremium and that the Freeholders should have ramillos Which as Hobart Chief Justice said is to be meant all the Arms and Boughs for whatsoever is not maremium is ramillum 2. It was holden in this Case That the Non-use or Negligence in not taking of the Boughs did not extinguish nor take away the Custom as it hath been oftentimes resolved in the like case And note that in this Case to confirm the said Custom the Book-case was cited which is in 14. E. 3. Fitz. t' Bar. 277. and the same was given in and avowed for good Evidence where the Case was That the Bishop of C. which shall be intended the Bishop of Chichester brought an Action of Trespass for felling of Trees and carrying them away where the Defendant pleaded That he held a Messuage and a Verge of Land of the Bishop and that all the Tenants of the Bishop within the Manor of A. ought to have all the Windfals of Trees and all the Boughs and Branches c. Which Case as Harris Serjeant conceived was the Case of the very Mannor now in question and the Tenant there as in this Case made a special Justification and there it was holden that it was good and adjudged for the Defendant Also in that Case it was adjudged That the Lord should have Maremium and that the Tenants should have Residuum which shall be intended the Boughs and Branches And the Custom in the Case was adjudged good But because the Defendant alleadged the Custom to be to have the same as Estovers to be burned in terris and gave Evidence only to the Messuage it was found against the Defendant for that the Evidence did not maintain the Issue Mich. 11. Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 327. VAUGHAN's Case IN a Formedon in the Discender the Tenant had been essoined upon the Summons and also upon the View And after was pleaded Ne dona pas the general issue and thereupon issue was joyned And if he might be essoined again after issue joyned was the Question And the Court was of opinion That in a real action the Tenant may be essioned after Issue joyned but not in a personal action by the Statute of Marlebridge And Hobart Chief Justice said That the Statute of Marlebridge gave not any Essoin but only did restrain Essoins and therefore in real Actions the same is left as it was at the Common Law and by the Common Law the Tenant might be Essoined after Issue joyned And note per totam Curiam That if an Essoin be not taken the first day it shall never after be taken Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 328. CLAY and BARNETS Case IN an Ejectione Firme the Case was this Sir Godfrey Foliamb had issue James his son who had issue Francis And Sir Godfrey Foliamb was seized in Fee of divers Lands as well by purchase as by discent in sundry Towns viz. Chesterfield Brampton c. in the Tenures of A. B. C. c. and dyed James Foliamb his son 7 E. 6. made a Conveyance of divers Lands to Francis Foliamb being his younger son in haec verba viz. Omnia mea Mesuagia terras tentam in Chesterfield Brampton c. modo in tenuri of the said A. B. C. quae pater meus Galfrid Foliamb perquesivit from divers men whom he named in certain And also convey a House called the Hart to the same Francis which came to him by discent by the same Conveyance which was in the occupation of one Celie and not in the Tenures of the said A. B. C. And the great Question upon the whole Conveyance was Whether all the Lands which he had by Discent in the said Towns and in the Occupations and Tenures of the said A. B. C. did pass or only the purchased Lands And it was resolved by the whole Court That the Conveyance did pass only the Lands which he had by purchase except only the said House which was precisely named and conveyed and did not pass the Lands which he had by Discent For if all the Lands which he had by Discent should pass by the general words then the special words which passed the House which he had by Discent should be idle and frivolous and that was one reason ex visceribus causae that only the purchased Lands did pass 2. It was said by Justice Warburton That if a man giveth all his Lands in D. in the Tenures of A. B. and he hath Lands in D. but not in their Tenures that in that case all his Lands in D. passeth So if a man give all his Lands in D. which he had by Discent from his son there all his Lands whatsoever shall pass Hobart acc ' and said That if a man gives all his Lands in the County of Kent if he have Lands within the County they do pass And he said that in a Conveyance every restriction hath his proper operation and in the Conveyance in the principal case there were three restrictions 1. All his â—ands in such Towns viz. Chesterfield Brampton c. 2. All his lands in the
Tenures of such men viz. A. B. C. 3. All his lands which he had by Purchase c. And the words All my Lands are to be intended all those my Lands which are within the restrictions And he said that the word Et being in the copulative was not material for all was but one sentence and it did not make several sentences and the word Et is but the conclusion of the sentence 3. They resolved That general words in a Grant may be overthrown by words restrictive as is 2 E. 4. and Plow Com. Hill Granges Case And therefore if a man giveth all his lands in D. which he hath by Discent from his Father if he have no lands by Discent from his Father nothing passeth 4. They agreed That a Restriction may be in a special Grant as in C. 4. par Ognels Case but they said that if the Restriction doth not concur and meet with the Grant that then the Restriction is void Note the principal Case was adjudged according to these Resolutions Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 293. COOPER and ANDREWS Case TO have a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court suggestion was made That the Lord De la Ware was seised of 140 Acres of lands in the County of Sussex which were parcel of a Park And a Modus Decimandi by Prescription was said to be That the Tenants of the said 140 Acres for the time being had used to pay for the tythes of the said 140 Acres two shillings in mony and a shoulder of every third Deer which was killed in the same Park in consideration of all tythes of the said Park And it was shewed how that the Lord De la Ware had enfeoffed one Cumber of the said 140 acres of land who bargained and sold the said 140 acres of land to the Plaintiffe who prayed the Prohibition The Defendant said that the said Park is disparked and that the same is now converted into arable lands and pasture-grounds and so demanded tythes in kind upon which the Plaintiffe in the Prohibition did demur Hutton Serjeant By the disparking of the Park the Prescription is not gone nor extinct because the Prescription is said to be to 140 acres of lands and not to the Park and although the shoulder of the Deer being but casual and at the pleasure of the party be gone yet the same shall not make void the Prescription 2. He said that the act of the party shall not destroy the Prescription and although it be not a Park now in form and reputation yet in Law the same still remains a Park And he compared the Case unto Lutterels Case C. 4. par 48. where a Prescription was to Fulling-Mils and afterwards the Mils were converted to Corn-Mils yet the Prescription remained 3. He said Admit it is not now a Park yet there is a possibility that it may be a Park again and that Deer may be killed there again For the Disparking in the principal Case is only alleadged to be that the Pale is thrown down which may be amended For although that all the Park-pale or parcel of it be cast down yet the same doth still remain in Law a Park and a Park is but a Liberty and the not using of a Liberty doth not determine it nor any Prescription which goes with it And if a man have Estovers in a Wood by Prescription if the Lord felleth down all the Wood yet the right of Estovers doth remain and the Owner shall have an Assise for the Estovers or an Action upon the Case Vid. C. 5. par 78. in Grayes Case the Case vouched by Popham Further he said That in the beginning a Modus Decimandi did commence by Temporal act and Spiritual and the mony is now the tythe for which the Parson may sue in the Spiritual Court And a Case Mich. 5. Jacobi was vouched where a Prescription to pay a Buck or a Doe in consideration of all Tythes was adjudged to be a good Prescription And the Case Mich. 6. Jacobi of Skipton-Park was remembred where the difference was taken when the Prescription runs to Land and when to a Park In the one case although the Park be disparked the Prescription doth remain in the other not And 6 E. 6. Dyer 71. was vouched That although the Park be disparked yet the Fee doth remain And so in the Case at Bar although the casual profit be gone yet the certain profit which is the two shillings doth remain Harris Serjeant contrary And he said that the Conveyance was executory and the Agreement executory and not like unto a Conveyance or Agreement executed And said that Tythes are due jure divino and that the party should not take advantage of his own wrong but that now the Parson should have the tythes in kind And upon the difference of Executory and Executed he vouched many Authorities viz. 16 Eliz. Dyer 335. Calthrops Case 15 E. 4. 3. 5 E. 4. 7. 32 E. 3. Anuitie 245. And in this case he said that the Parson hath no remedy for the shoulder of the Deer and therefore he prayed a Consultation Hobart Chief Justice said That the Pleading was too short and it was not sufficiently pleaded For it is not pleaded That the Park is so disparked that all the benefit thereof is lost But he agreed it That if a man doth pull down his Park-pale that the same is a disparking without any seisure of the Liberty into the Kings hands by a Quo Warranto But yet all the Court agreed That it doth yet remain a Park in habit And they were all also of opinion That the disparking the Park of the Deer was not any disparking of the Park as to take away the Prescription The Case was adjourned till another day Mich. 11. Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 330. PIGGOT and PIGGOT's Case IN a Writ of Right the Donee in tail did joyn the Mise upon the meer Right and final Judgment was given against the Donee in which case the Gift in tail was given in Evidence Afterwards the Donee in tail brought a Formedon in the Discender and it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Writ would not lie For when final Judgment is given against the Donee in tail upon issue joyned upon the meer Right it is as strong against him as a Fine with Proclamations and the Court did agree That after a year and day where final Judgment is given the party is barred and also that such final Judgment should bar the Issue in tail Mich. 11 Iacobi in the Exchequer-Chamber 331 AN action upon the Case was brought for speaking these words Thou doest lead a life in manner of a Rogue I doubt not but to see thee hanged for striking Mr. Sydenhams man who was murdered And it was resolved by all the Justices in the Exchequer-Chamber That the words were not actionable At the same day in the same Court a Judgment was reversed in the Exchequer-Chamber because the words were not actionable The words
resolved That although the Award was void as to that part yet for the residue it stood good and therefore for not performance of the same the Bond is forfeited As if J. be bounden to perform the Award of J. S. for White-Acre and that he award that I enfeoffe another of White-Acre and that he give unto me Ten pounds If I tender unto him a Feoffment of White-Acre and he refuseth it and will not give to me the 10l. I shall have an Action of Debt upon the Bond as it is adjudged in Osborn's Case C. 10. par 131. The same Law If J. S. and J. N. submit themselves unto the Award of J. D. who awardeth that J. S. shall surcease all suits and procure J. N. to be bounden with a stranger and make a Feoffment of his Mannor of D. which is a thing out of the Submission In that case there are three things enforcing the Arbitrement the first is only good the second is against the Law and the other is out of the Submission yet being in part good it ought to be performed in that otherwise the Bond is forfeited But this Case was put If J. be bounden to stand to the Award of A. ita quod it be made de super premissis and afterwards A. maketh an Award but of part of the premises there it is void in all because it is not according to the authority given unto him And afterwards in the principal Case Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 353. DOCKWARY and BEAL's Case IN an Essex Jury The opinion of the Court was That Wood will passe by the name of Land if there be no other Land whereby the words may be otherwise supplied Also it was agreed That the Tenant for Years might fell Underwoods of 25 years growth if the same hath used to be felled Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 354. WROTESIEY and CANDISH's Case ELizabeth Wrotesley did recover Dower 6 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas in which Writ she demanded tertiam partem Manerii de D. eum pertinaciis Nec non tertiam partem quarundam terrarum jacent in Hovelan And upon Ne unque seise que Dower the parties were at issue and the Venire facias awarded de Hovelan And it was found for the Plaintiffe and Judgment was given for her And Candish the Defendant brought a Writ of Error in the Kings Bench and assigned for Error That it was a Mis-trial For that the Venire facias ought to have been de Manerio and not of Hovelan 6 H. 7. 3. 11 H. 7. 20. C. 6 par â— 19 H. 6. 19. 19 E. 4. 17. Yet the Councel of the Defendant moved That the Trial was good for the Land in Hovelan And it being found that the Husband was seised of the Mannor of D. that now the Trial was good for the whole Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 355. COWLEY and LEGAT's Case COwley brought an Audita quaerela against Legat and the Case was this Cowley and Bates bound themselves in a Bond of 200l. jointly and severally to Legat And afterwards 6 Jacobi Legat brought an action of Debt upon the Bond against Bates and had Judgment and 7 Jacobi the said Legat brought Debt against Cowley in the Kings Bench upon the same Bond and obtained Judgment and afterwards he sued forth Execution upon the first Judgment by Elegit and had the Land of Bates who was Tenant thereof only for another mans life in Execution and afterwards he took forth a Capias ad satisfaciendum against Cowley upon the Judgment in the Kings Bench And thereupon Cowley brought an Audita quaerela containing in it all the whole matter And the opinion of all the Justices was That the Audita quaerela was well brought And first it was holden That when a man may plead the matter in bar he shall not have an Audita quaerela upon the matter because it was his lachess that he did not take advantage of it by way of plea. But secondly in this Case it was said That he could not have pleaded the special matter and therefore as to that point the Audita quaerela was well brought But the onely doubt in the Case was Whether Legat the Defendant might have a new Execution by Capias ad satisfaciendum after that he had Execution against one of the Obligers by Elegit and the doubt was because the Judgments upon which he grounded his Executions were given at several times and in several Courts and against several persons For it was agreed by the whole Court That a Capias doth not lie after Execution sued by Elegit against the same person but after a Capias an Elegit is grantable And the reason of the difference is because upon the prayer to have an Elegit it is entred in the Roll Elegit sibi executionem per medietatem terrae so as he is estopped by the Record to have another Execution but upon a Capias nothing at all is entred upon Record Yet Cook Chief Justice said That it is the common practice of a good Attorney to deferre the entry in the Roll of Execution upon an Elegit until the Sheriffe hath retorned it served And in such case it was agreed That if the Sheriffe retorn upon the Elegit That the party hath not Lands c. then the party may take forth a Capias Also the Elegit is in it self a satisfactory Execution and by the Common-Law a man shall have but one Execution with satisfaction And therefore at the Common-Law if after Execution the Land had been evicted the party had no remedy And Cook said If part of the Land be evicted the party shall not have remedy upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 5. to which Crook Justice agreed And the Court held it to be no difference although that the Judgments were given in several Courts against persons several and at several times and where it is but one Judgment against one person Vide the Case 43 E. 3. 27. where in Debt the Defendant said That the Plaintiffe had another Action for the same Debt depending in the Exchequer by Bill Judgment c. And by Mowbray and Finchden cleerly it is a good plea although it be in another Court And Dodderidge Justice said That in the first case the said Legat might sue the said Cowley and Bates severally and after Judgment he might choose his Execution against which of them he pleased But he could not have Execution by Elegit against them both And therefore he said That although there be an Eviction of the Land or that the Judgment be reversed by Error after that he hath Execution against one by Elegit yet Legat could not have Execution against the other for by the first Execution he had determined his Election and he could not sue the other which Cook agreed Mich. 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 356. FOX and MEDCALF's Case IN a Writ of Accompt brought in
the time of King Henry the 8. said That if the King should arrest him of High-Treason that he would stab him with his dagger and it was adjudged a present Treason So was it also adjudged in the Lord Stanley's Case in the time of King Henry the 7. who seeing a Young-man said That if he knew him to be one of the Sons of E. 4. that he would aid him against the King In the like manner a woman in the time of Hen. 8. said That if Henry the 8. would not take again his wife Queen Katherine that he should not live a year but should die like a dog So if discontented persons with Inclosures say That they will petition unto the King about them and if he will not redress the same that then they will assemble together in such a place and rebell In these Cases it is a present Treason and he said That in point of Allegiance none must serve the King with Ifs and Ands. Further Cook Chief Justice said That Faux the Gunpowder Traitor being brought before King James the King said to him Wherefore would you have killed me Faux answered him viz. Because you are excommunicated by the Pope How said the King He answered Every Maunday-Thursday the Pope doth excommunicate all Herâ—tiques who are not of the Faith of the Church of Rome and you are within the same Excommunication And afterwards Owen was found guilty and Judgment of Treason was given against him Mich. 13 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 364. SIMPSON'S Case RIchard Simpson a Copy-holder in Fee jacens in extremis made a Surrender of his Copyhold habendum to an Enfant in ventrefamier and his heirs and if such Enfant die before his full age or marriage then to John Simpson his brother and his heirs The Enfant is born and dieth within two moneths Upon which John was admitted and a Woman as Heir-general to the Devisor and to the Enfant is also admitted and entreth into the Land against whom John Simpson brought an Action of Trespasse and it was adjudged against the Plaintiffe And two points were resolved in this Case 1. That a Surrender cannot begin at a day to come no more then a Livery as it was adjudged 23 Eliz in this Court in Clarks Case 2. That the Remaindor to John Simpson cannot be good because it was to commence upon a Condition precedent which was never performed And therefore the Surrender into the hands of the Lord was void for the Lord doth not take but as an Instrument to convey the same to another And it was therefore said That if a Copy-holder in Fee doth surrender unto the use of himself and his heirs because that the Limitation of the use is void to him who had it before the Surrender to the Lord is void Trin. 13 Jacobi in the Chancery 365. The Lord GERARD'S Case IT was holden in the Chancery in the Lord Gerards Case against his Copyholds of Aâ—dley in the County of Stafford That where by antient Rolls of Court it appeareth that the Fines of the Copyholds had been uncertain from the time of King Hen. the 3 to the 19 of H. the 6. and from thence to this day had been certain Except twenty or thirty That these few antient Rolls did destroy the Custome for certainty of Fine But if from 19 H. 6. all are certain except a few and so incertain Rolls before the few shall be intended to have escaped and should not destroy the Custome for certain Fines Hill 13 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 366. BAGNAL and HARVEY'S Case IN a Writ of Partition it was found for the Plaintiffe And a Writ was awarded to the Sheriffe that he should make the partition And the Sheriffe did thereupon allot part of the Lands in severalty and for other part of the Lands the Jurors would not assist him to make the partition All which appeared upon the Retorn of the Sheriffe And an Attachment was prayed against the Jurors who refused to make the Partition and a new Writ was prayed unto the Sheriffe And the Court doubted what to do in the Case whether to grant an Attachment or not and whether a new Writ to the Sheriffe might be awarded And took time to advise upon it and to see Presidents in the Case Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 367. BLANFORD'S Case A Man seised of Lands in Fee devised them unto his Wife for life and afterwards to his two Sons if they had not issue males for their lives and if they had issue males then to their issue males and if they had not issue males then if any of them had issue male to the said issue male The wife died the sons entred into the lands and then the eldest son had issue male who afterwards entred and the younger son entred upon the issue and did trespasse and the issue brought an Action of Trespasse And it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Action was maintainable because by the birth of the issue male the lands were devised out of the two sons and vested in the issue male of the eldest Crook Justice was against the three other Justices Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 368. BROOK and GREGORY'S Case IN a Replevin the Defendant did avow the taking of the Cattle damage feasants And upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiffe in the Court at Winsor being a Three-weeks Court And the Defendant brought a Writ of Error and assigned for Error That the Entry of the Plaint in the said Court was the 7. day of May and the Plaintiffe afterwards did Declare there of a taking of the Cattel the 25. day of May. And whether the same was Error being in a Three-weeks Court was the Question and 21 E. 4. 66. was alleadged by Harris that it was no Error But the Court held the same to be Error because no Plaint can be entred but at a Court and this Entry of the Plaint was mesne betwixt the Court dayes and so the Declaration is not warranted no â—ustome being alleadged to maintain such an Entry 2. It was holden by the Court in this Case That 〈…〉 est erratum is pleaded the Defendant cannot alleadge Dimâ—â—â—tion because there is a perfect issue before 3. It was holden That a 〈◊〉 cannot alleadge Diminution of any thing which appeareth in the Râ—â—â—d to be 〈◊〉 And because the Defendant â—id alleadge Diminution 〈◊〉 Case of the Record and by the Record it was certified that the 〈◊〉 was entred the 25 day of May the same was not good after issue joyned and after Judgment is given upon the â—â—â— Record upon the first Dâ—â—â—aration and Pleading in the said Court of Winsor And therefore the Judgment was reversed by the opinion of all the Justices Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 369. BISSE and TYLER'S Case IN an Action of Trover and Conversion of goods the Defendant said That J. S. was possessed of the said goods and sold them unto him in open market
â—uaere whether it be a good Plea because it doth amount to the general issue of Not guilty Curia avisare vult And v. Tompsons Case 4 Jac. in the Kings Bench It was adjudged that it was no good Plea Hill 6 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 370. PAGINTON and HUET'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme the Case was this That the Custome of a Manor in Worcestershire was That if any Copyholder do commit Felony and the same be presented by twelve Homagers That the Tenant should forfeit his â—opyhold And it was presented in the Court of the Mannor by the Homage That Hâ—â—t the Defendant had committed Felony But afterwards at the Asâ—ises he was acquitted And afterwards the Lord seised the Copyhold And it was adjudged by the Court that it was no good Custom because in Judgment of Law before Attaindor it is not Felony The second point was Whether the special Verdict agreeing with the Presentment of the Homage That the party had committed Felony did entitle the Lord to the Copyhold notwithstanding his Acquital Quaere For it was not resolved Mich. 7 Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 371. THe Custom of a Mannor was That the Heirs which claimed Copy-hold by Discent ought to come at the first second or third Court upon Proclamations made and take up their Estates or else that they should forfeit them And a Tenant of the Mannor having Issue inheritable beyond the Seas dyed The Proclamations passed and the Issue did not return in twenty years But at his coming over he required the Lord to admit him to the Copyhold and proffered to pay the Lord his Fine And the Lord who had seised the Copyhold for a Forfeiture refused to admit him And it was adjudged by the whole Court That it was no Forfeiture because that the Heir was beyond the Seas at the time of the Proclamations and also because the Lord was at no prejudice because he received the profits of the Lands in the mean time Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 372. A Copyholder in Fee did surrender his Copyhold unto the use of another and his heirs which surrender was into the hands of two Tenants according to the custome of the Mannor to be presented at the next Court. And no Court was holden for the Mannor by the space of thirty years within which time the Surrenderor Surrenderee and the two Tenants all dyed The heir of the Surrenderor entred and made a Lease for years of the Copyhold according to the Custome of the Mannor And it was adjudged per Curiaâ—â— That the Lease was good Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 373. FROSWEL and WEICHES Case IT was adjudged That where a Copyholder doth surrender into the hands of Copy-Tenants That before Presentment the Heir of the Surrenderor may take the profits of the Lands against the Surrenderee For no person can have a Copyhold but by admittance of the Lord. As if a man maketh Livery within the view although it cannot be countermanded yet the Feoffee takes nothing before his entry But it was agreed That if the Lord doth take knowledge of the Surrender and doth accept of the customary Rent as Rent due from the Tenant being admitted that the same shall amount unto an Admittance but otherwise if he accept of it as a duty generally Mich. 5 Iacobi in the Exchequer 374. IT was adjudged in the Exchequer That where the King was Lord of a Mannor and a Copyholder within the said Mannor made a Lease for three lives and made Livery and afterwards the Survivor of the three continued in possession forty years And in that case because that no Livery did appear to be made upon the Endorsment of the Deed although in truth there was Livery made that the same was no forfeiture of which the King should take any advantage And in that case it was cited to be adjudged in Londons case That if a Copy-Tenant doth bargain and sell his Copy-Tenement by Deed indented and enrolled that the same is no forfeiture of the Copyhold of which the Lord can take any advantage And so was it holden in this Case Pasch 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench 375. FRANKLIN'S Case LAnds were given unto one and to the heirs of his body Habendum unto the Donee unto the use of him his heirs and assignes for ever In this â—ase two points were resolved 1. That the Limitation in the Habendum did not increase or alter the Estate contained in the premisses of the Deed. 2. That Tenant in Tail might stand seised to an use expressed but such use cannot be averred Hill 13 Iacobi in the Chancery 376 WINSCOMB and DUNCHES Case VVInscomb having issue two sons conveyed a Mannor unto his eldest son and to the daughter of Dunch for life for the joynture of the wife the Remainder to the 〈…〉 The son having no issue his Father-in-law Dunch procured him by Deed indented to bargain and sell to him the Manner The Bargâ—ynor being sick who died before enrolment of the Deed within the 〈…〉 Deed â—ot being acknowledged And 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 coming to be enrolled the Clark who enrolled the same did proâ—â—â—e Waâ—â—â—nt from the Master of the Rolls who under-â—â—â— upon the Deâ—◠〈◊〉 the Deed be enrolled upon Affidavit made of the delivery of the Deed by one of the Witnesses to the same And afterwards the Deed was eâ—â—â—â—d within the six moneths And the opinion of the Court wasâ— That 〈◊〉 Conveyance was a good Conveyance in Law And therefore the younger brother exhibited his Bill in Chanchery pretending the Conveyance to be made by practice without any Consideration Mich. 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 377 LUDLOW and STACIâ—S Case A Man bargained and sold Land by Deed indented bearing date 11 Junii 1 Jacobi Afterwards 12 Junii The same year Common was granted â—nto the Bargainee for all manner of Cattell commonable upon the Land 15 Junii theâ— Deed of Bargain and Sale was enrolled And it was adjudged a good grant of the Common And the Enrolment shall have Relation as to that although for collaterall things it shall not have relation Hill 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 378. NOte that it was held by Dodderidge Justice and Mountagu Chief Justice against the opinion of Haughton Justice That if Lessee for years covenanteth to repair and sustein the houses in as good plight as they were at the time of the Lease made and afterwards the Lessee assigneth over his Term and the Lessor his Reversion That the Assignee of the Reversion shall maintain an Action of Covenant for the breach of the Covenants against the first Lessee Hill 15 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 379. SMITH and STAFFORD'S Case A Man promised a Woman That if she would marry with him that if he dyed and she did survive him that he would leave unto her 100â— They entermarried and then the husband dyed not performing his promise The wife sued the Executor of her husband upon the said promise And whether the
duty did survive with the wife or were extinguished by the entermarriage was the Question And Hâ—bart Chief Justice and Warburton were against Winch and Hutton Justices That the marriage was a Release or discharge of the 100â— Quaere Hill 15 Jacobi in the Kings Bench 380. PLOT' 's Case AN Enâ—ant brought an Assise in the Kings Bench for Lands in Mich depending which The Tenant in the same Assise brought an Assise for the same Lands in the Common-Pleas which last Writ bore date and was recornable after the first Writ And the Demandant in the second Writ did recover against the Enfant by default by the Aâ—â—â—se who found the Seisin and Disseisin And upon a Plea in 〈◊〉 of the first Assise of that Recovery the Enfant by way of Replication set forth all the special matter And that the Deâ—andant at the time of the second Writ brought was Tenant of the Land And prayed that he might 〈◊〉 the Recovery And it was adjudged That he might falsifie the Recovery For in all Cases where a man shall not have Error noâ—â—â—taint he may Falsifie But in this case he could not have Error nor Attaint because the Judgment in the Common-Pleas was not given only upon the Default but also upon the Verdict And it should be in vain for him to bring an Attaint because he shall not be 〈◊〉 to give other Evidence then what was given at the first Trial. Also he shall falsifie the Recovery because it was a practise to defeat and take away the Right of the Enfant and to leave him without any remedy whatsoever Pasch 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 381 INGIN and PAYN'S Case LEssee for years was bounden in a Bond to deliver the possession of a house unto the Lessor his heirs and assignes upon demand at the end of the term The Lessor did bargain and sell the Rendition by Deed enrolled to two One of the Bargainees at the end of the term demanded the Delivery of the Possession The Lessee refused pretending that he had no notice of the bargain and sale It was adjudged that the Bond was forfeited Pasch 16 Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 382. JERMYN and COOPER'S Case A Man by Deed gave Lands to A. and to a Feme sole and to their heirs and assigns for ever Habendum to them and to the heirs of their bodies the Remainder to them and the survivor of them for ever And it was adjudged by the Court That they had an Estate in tail with the Fee-simple Expectant Pasch 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 383. A Man was Indicted De verberationem vulnerationem of J. S. and the words vi armis were left out of the Indictment And the same was adjudged to be helped by the Statute and that the Indictment was good Mich. 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 384. BARNWEL and PELSIE'S Case A Parson did Covenant and grant by Deed with one of his Parishioners That in consideration of Six pounds thirteen shillings and four pence per annum be paid unto him that the said Parishioner should be discharged of all Tythes upon condition to be voyd upon default of payment Afterwards the Parson against his grant did sue the Parishioner in the Spirituall Court for Tythes in kind and it was moved for a Prohibition But the Court would not grant it because that the Originall viz. the Tythes do belong to spirituall jurisdiction But it was said that the Parishioner might have an Action of Covenant against the Parson upon the Deed in the Temporall Court 385. Posch 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. AN Action upon the Case was brought for speaking of these words viz. J. S. 34 years since had two Bastards and hath paid for the nursing of them And the Plaintiff shewed that by reason of these words contention grew betwixt him and his wife almost to a Divorce And it was adjudged That an Action would not lye for the words And the Chief Justice said That an Action upon the Case doth not lye for every ill word but for words by speaking of which the Plaintiff is damnified and that cannot be in this Case the time being so long past And the causes wherefore a man shall be punished for saying that a man hath a Bastard are twoâ— the one because by the Statute of 14 Eliz. the offender is to be punished for the same And secondly because the party by such means is discredited or hindered in his preferment Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 386 HURLSTON and WODROFS Case HEnry Hurlston was Plaintiff against Robert Wodroffe in an Action of Debt upon a Demise of a Messuage with a Sheep-walk the Latin word being Ovile And it was moved in arrest of Judgement after a verdict found for the Plaintiff That the sheepwalk was not alledged to be appurtenant nor pleaded to be by Grant by Deed. But notwithstanding that it vvas ruled by the vvhole Court because it rested indifferent whether there was a grant by Deed or not That when the Jury find that the Sheep-walk did passe it shall be intended that there was a Deed. Dodderidge Justice in the Argument of this Case did hold That by the word Ovile although it be translated in English a Sheep-walk yet a Sheep-walk did not passe by it but a Sheep-Cote and by that the Land it self did passe Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 387. HILL and WADE'S Case HIll brought an Action upon the Case against Wade and declared upon an Assumpsit to pay mony upon request and did not alleadge the Request certain but issue was joyned upon another point and found for the Plaintiffe That the failing of certain alleadging of the Request in the Declaration made the same insufficient And so it was adjudged by the Court with this difference where it was a duty in the Plaintiffe before and where the Request makes it a duty For in the first case the Plaintiffe need not alleadge the Request precisely but otherwise in the later Dodderidge Justice put this Case If I promise J. S. in consideration that he will marry my daughter to give him 20â— upon request there the day and place of the request ought to be alleadged in the Declaration Montagu Chief Justice cited 18 E. 4. and 5 H. 7. to be contrary viz. That the finding of the Jury made the Declaration which was vitious to be good As if Executors plead That they have nothing in their hands the day of the Action brought it is insufficient But if the Jury find Assets it is good and so by consequence the Verdict shall supply the defect of Pleading But the Court held these books to be good Law and not to be contrary and well reconciled with this difference For there the Plea was naught only in matter of circumstance but otherwise it is where it is vitious in substance as in this case it is And a difference also was taken where the Verdict doth perfect all which is material and ought to be expressed
them and held that the Custom might be good Mich. 17 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 400. IN an Evidence in an Ejectione firme for Land in the Countie of Hartford the Case was this A man was married unto a woman and died The wife after 40 weeks and 10 days was delivered with child of a daughter and whether the said daughter should be heir to her Father or should be bastard was the Question and Sir William Padde Knight and Dr Montford Physitians were commanded by the Court to attend and to deliver their opinions in the Case who being upon their Oaths delivered their opinions That such a child might be a lawfull daughter and heir to her Father For as wellas an Antenatus might be heir viz. a child born at the end of 7 months so they said might a Postnatus viz. child born after the 40 weeks although that 40 weeks be the ordinary time And if it be objected that our Saviour Christ was born at 9 months and five days end who had the perfection of Nature To that it may be answered That that was miraeulum amplias And they held that by many Authorities and by their own Experiences a child might be Legitimate although it be born the last day of the 10â—h Month after the conception of it accounting the Months per Menses solares non Lunares Hill 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 401. WEBB and PATERNOSTERS Case A Man gave Licence unto another to set a Cock of Hay upon his Medow and to remove the same in reasonable time and afterwards he who gave the Licence made a Lease of the Medow to the Defendant who put his Cattel into the Medow which did eat the Hay And for that the Paintiffe brought his Action of Trespass And upon Demurrer joyned the Court was of opinion against the Plaintiffe For upon the whole matter it appeared That the said Hay had stood upon the said ground or Medow for 2 years which the Court held to be an unreasonable time Mich. 18 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 402. BROWN and PELL's Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict found the Case was this Browne had issue two Sons and devised his Lands to his youngest Son and his Heirs And if it shall happen his said youngest Son to die without issue living his eldest Son That then his eldest Son should have the Lands to him and his Heirs in as ample manner as the youngest Son had them The youngest Son suffered a Common Recovery and died without issue living the eldest Son The Question was whether the eldest Son or the Recoverer should have the â—ands Montague Haughton and Chamberlain Justices The same is a Fee-simple Conditional and no Estate Tail in the youngest Son Doddridge Justice contrarie Mich. 18. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 403. POLLYES Case IN an Action of Trespass It was agreed by the Court If 2 Tenants in Common be of Lands upon which Trees are growing and one of them felleth the Trees and layeth them upon his Freehold If the other entreth into the â—and and carrieth them away an Action of Trespasse Quaere clausum fregit lyeth against him because the taking away of the Trees by the first was not wrongfull but that which he might well do by Law And yet the other Tenant in Common might have seized them before they were carried off from the Land But if a man do wrongfully take my Goods as a Horse c. and putteth the same upon his Land I may enter into his Land and seize my Horse again But if he put the Goods into his House in such Case I cannot enter into his House and retake my Goods because every mans House is his Castle into which another man may not enter without special Liâ—ence Hill 19 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 404. THe Case was That two Tenants in Common of Lands made a Lease thereof for years rendring Rent and then one of them died And the Question was who should have the Rent And if the Executor of him who died and the other might joyn in an Action for the Rent And as this Case was The opinion of the whole Court was That the Executor and the other might joyn in one Action for the Rent or sever in Action at their pleasures But if the Lease had been made for life rendring Rent The Court was cleer of opinion that they ought to sever in Actions Trin. 20 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 405. A Man was bounden in a Bond by the name of Edmond and his true name was Edward And an Action of Debt was brought against the Executors of Edmond upon the said Bond who demanded Oyer of the Bond and then pleaded that it was not the Deed of their Testator and issue being thereupon joyned It was found by Inquest in London to be his Deed viz. the Deed of Edmond And it was moved in Arrest of Judgment Quod querens nihil caperet per Billam and so it was resolved and adjudged by the Court Doddridge only being absent And a Case was vouched by Henage Finch Recorder of London to prove this case That it was so adjudged in a Case of Writ of ErError brought in the Exchequer-Chamber in which Case the party himself upon such a Misnosmer and after a Verdict and Judgment given in the same Case did reverse the Judgment for this Error Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 406. VESEY's Case VVIlliam Vesey was indicted for erecting of a Dove-house And Serjeant Harvey moved That the Indictment was insufficient the words were That the Defendant erexit Columbare vi armis ad commune nocumentum c. and that he was not Dominus Manerii nes Rector Ecclesiae And the Indictment was quashed because it was not contained in the Indictment that there were Doves in the Dove-cote For the meer erecting of a Dove-cote if there be no Doves kept in it it is no Nusans as it was holden by the Justices Mich. 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 407 Sir WILLIAM BRONKER's Case SIR William Bronker brought an Action upon the Case for slanderous words And he shewed in his Declaration how that he was a Knight and one of the Gentlemen of His Majesties Privy-Chamber And that the Defendant spake of him these scandalous words viz. Sir William Bronker is a Cosening Knave and lives by Cosenage Which was found for the Plaintiffe In arrest of Judgment it was moved that the words were not actionable And so it was adjudged per Curiam Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 408. YATE and ALEXANDER's Case YAte brought an action upon the Case against Alexander Attorney of the Kings Bench and declared That the Plaintiffe in an action of Debt brought against Alexander the Defendant who was Executor to his Father had Judgment to recover against him as Executor and that he sued forth a Fieri facias to the Sheriffe to have Execution and that before the Sheriffe could come to levy the debt and serve the
And if Rent be due and payable unto me by my Lessee for years the same may be taken for the Kings Debt and the special matter shall be a good barr in an Avowry for the Rent 38. E. 3. 28. A Prior Alien was indebted to the King for his Farm Rent And being sued for the same he shewed That there was a Parson who held a certain portion of Tythes from him which were part of the Possessions of the same Priory which he kept in his hands so as he could not pay the King his Farm-Rent unlesse he might have those Tythes which were in the Parsons hands Wherefore a Writ was awarded against the Parson to appear in the Exchequer and to shew cause why he should not pay the same to the King for the satisfying of the Kings Rent And there Skipwith Justice said That for any thing which toucheth the King and may turn to his advantage to hasten the Kings business that the Exchequer had jurisdiction of it were it a thing Spiritual or Temporal V. 44 E. 3. 43 44. the like Case but there it is of a Pension And the Case of 38 Ass 20. was the Case for Tythes See also 12 E. 3. Swalds Case to the same purpose If two Coparceners be in ward to the King upon a suggestion that one of them is indebted to the King the staying of his Livery shall be for his moytie untill the King be satisfied his debt but the other sister shall have Livery of the other moytie which belongs unto her Fitz. N. 5. 263. a. Mich 19 E. 3. and Hill 20. E. 3. which was one and the same Case The Kings Debtor brought a Quo minus in the Exchequer against his Debtor the Defendant appeared And the Plaintiffe afterwards would have been Nonsuit but the Court would not suffer him so to be And it was there said That a Release by the Kings Debtor unto his Debtor would not discharge the Kings Debtor as to that Debt In a Quo minus in the Exchequer upon a Debt upon a simple Contract the Defendant cannot wage his Law because the King is to have a benefit by the suit although the King be no party to the suit C. 4. par 95. The fourth Prerogative which the King hath is That the King shall have an Accompt against Executors because the Law there maketh a privity it being found by matter of Record that the Testator was indebted to the King which Record cannot be denied But in the Case of a common person an Accompt will not lie against Executors for want of privity The Accompt which the King brings is ad computandum ad Dominum Regem c. without setting forth how the party came liable to accompt But a common person in his accompt brought ought to shew how that the party was Receiver Bailiff c. If a man doth entermeddle with the Kings Treasure the King pretending a title to it he shall be chargeable for the same to the King C. 11. part 89. the Earl of Devonshire's case The Master of the Ordnance pretending that the old broken and unserviceable Ordnance belonged unto him by reason of his Office procured a Privy-seal c. and afterwards disposed of them to his own use and dyed And his Executor was forced to accompt for them Sir Walter Mildmay's Case Mich. 37. 38 Eliz. Rot. 312. in the Exchequer Sir Walter Mildmay was Chancellor of the Exchequer and suggested unto the Lord Treasurer of England That his Office was of great attendance and desired the Lord Treasurer that he would be pleased to allow unto him 100l. for his dyet and 40l. per annum for his attendance which the Lord Treasurer did grant unto him and he enjoyed it accordingly and afterwards dyed and his Executors were forced to accompt for it and to pay back the mony for all the time that their Testator received it C. 11. part 90 91. there is cited That Sir William Cavendish was Treasurer of the Chamber of King H. 8. E. 6. and Queen Mary and that he was indebted to K. E. 6. and to Q. Mary and that being so indebted he purchased divers lands and afterwards aliened them and took back an estate therein to himself and his wife and afterwards dyed without rendring any Accompt the Terre-Tenants of the land were charged to answer to Q. Elizabeth for the monies to which they pleaded the Queens special Pardon and it was in conclusion said That the Pardon was a matter of grace ex gratia but in Law the Terre-Tenants were chargeable to the said Queen for the monies v. Com. 321. 5 Eliz. Dyer 244 245. in the Exchequer Mich. 24. E. 3. Rot. 11. ex parte Rememb Regis Thomas Farel Collector of the Fifteenths and Tenths being seised of lands in Fee and being possessed of divers goods and chattels at the time when he entred into the said Office being then indebted to the King did alien them all and afterwards dyed without heir or Executor And a Writ went out unto the Sheriffe to enquire what lands and tenements goods and chattels he had at the time he entred into the said Office and Processe issued forth against the Terre-Tenants and the Possessors of his goods and chattels ad computand pro collectione predict ad respondendum satisfaciendum inde Domino Regi V. Dyer 160 50 Ass 5. A notable Case to this purpose Mich. 30. E. 3. rot 6. William Porter Mint-Master did covenant with the King by Indenture enrolled That for all the Bullion which should be delivered ad Cambium Regis pro Moneta faciend that mony should be delivered for it within eight dayes which Covenant he had broken and therefore the King paid the Subject for the Bullion And afterwards because John Walweyen and Richard Piccard duxerunt praesentaverant dict William Porter in officium illud tanquam sufficientem and that they offered to be Sureties for him but were not accepted of which they did confesse Ideo consideratum est quod predict Walweyen Piccard onerentur erga Dominum Regem And they afterwards were charged to satisfie the King for all the monies which the King had paid for the said Porter And although that none of the Kings treasure came to their hands nor they had not any benefit as appeared by any matter in the Case yet because they were the means and causers that the King sustained damage and losse they were adjudged to be chargeable to the King C. 11. par 93. this Case is there cited Upon these Cases vouched by me I make divers Observations 1. I observe That from Age to Age what care the Judges had for the Advancing and the recovering of the Kings Debts because Thesaurus Regis est vinculum Pacis Bellorum nervus And it is the slowing fountain of all bounty unto the Subject 2. I observe That the King hath a Prerogative for the Recovery of Debts due unto him 3. I observe That although the Debt due to the King be
Execution of Justice is no wrong when it is for the King The King hath the precedency for the payment of his Debts to him as it appeareth in Stringfellows Case cited before by Justice Dodderidge And when Lands are once lyable to the payment of the Kings debts let the Lands come to whom you will yet the Land is lyable â—o his debt as it appeareth in Cavendishes Case Dyer 224 225. which was entred Pasc â— Eliz. Rot. 111. in the Exchequer 50. Ass 5. A man bindeth himself and his heirs and dieth and the heir alieneth the Land the Land is discharged of the Debt as to the Debtee But in the Kings Case if at any time the Land and Debt meet together you cannot sever them without payment of the Kings debt Vid. Littleton Executors and soe Administrators are chargeable in an Account to the King and the Saying of Mr Littleton are adjudged for Law and are Judgments A sale in Market over nor a Fine and Nonclaim shall not bind the King and so it is of things bought of the Kings Villeyn because Nullum tempus occurrit Regi A common person in London by Custom may attach a Debt in anothers hands As he may come into Court and shew that his debtor hath not any thing in his hand to satisfie his debt but only that debt which is in the hands of another man and that Custom is allowable and reasonable And if it shall be reasonable for a Subject so to attach a Debt will you have it unreasonable for the King Before the Statute of 25. E. 3. cap. 19. The King might protect his Debtor as it appeareth by the Register 281. and Fitz. 28. 6. But the Statute of 25. E. 3. gave the Partie a liberty to proceed to Judgement but doth barr him from taking forth of Execution upon the Judgment untill the King be satisfied his Debt In Dyer 296 297. a man condemned in the Exchequer for a Debt due to the Queen was committed to the Fleet and being in Execution he was also condemned in the Kings Bench at the Suit of a Subject upon a Bill of Debt in Custodia Mariscalli Marisâ—alciae Afterwards upon prayer of the Partie a Habeas Corpus cum causa was awarded out of the Kings Bench to the Warden of the Fleet who retorned the Cause ut supra and he was remanded to the Fleet in Execution for the Debt Afterwards a Command was given by the Lord Treasurer upon the Queens behalf to suffer the Prisoner to go into the Countrie to collect and levie monie the sooner to pay the Queen her Debt In that Case the Subject brought an Action of Debt against the Warden of the Fleet upon the Escape who justified the Escape by the said Commandment It was holden in that case That although the Partie was in Execution for both the Debts yet before the Queen was satisfied the Execution for the Subject did not begin For the King cannot have equall to have interest in the Body of the Prisoner Simul cum illo But if the Case were as Lassels case 3. Eliz Dyer then he might be in Execution for the King and for the Subject Lassels was taken in Execution at the Suit of a Subject and before the Writ was retorned a Writ for the Queen came to the Sheriffe and Lassels was kept in Execution for the Queen In that case Lassels was in Execution for them both viz. the Queen and the Subject So there is a difference where the Partie is first taken for the King and where he is first taken for the Subject Now I will consider of the Case at Barr Whether the Land might be extended notwithstanding the Conveyance made The Kings Debt is to be taken largely and so Goods in such case are to be taken largely and so is it likewise of Lands viz. any Land be it Land in Use upon Trust by Revocation By the Law Debts are first to be paid then Legacies then childrens preferments There is a difference where the Land was never in the man and where it was once in him C. 8. Part. 163. Mights Case Might Purchased lands to him and to his heir It was resolved that this original Purchase could not be averred to be by Collusion to take away the Wardship which might accrue after the death of Might for they were Joynts and the survivor shall have the whole Note that there was no fraud for that it was never in him but if it had once been the Lands only of Might and then Might had made the conveyance to him and his heir then it would have been fraud to have deceived the King of the Wardship In the Case at Barr Hatton hath not aliened the land For an Alienation is alienum facere and here he hath not made it the land of another having a power of Revocation Sir John Packington Mortgaged his lands for 100l The Mortgagee enfeoffed W. and within the time of Redemtion Packington and he to whom the money was to be paid agreed that Packington should pay him 30l of the said 100l and no more and yet in appearance for the better performance of the Condition it was agreed that the whole 100l should be paid and that the residue above 30l should be repaid back to Packington which was done accordingly It was resolved in that Case that the same was no performance of the Condition because it was not a payment animo solvendi And so in this Case there was not any allienation animo 〈◊〉 For Sir Christopher Hatton gave the Lands but yet he kept the possession and received the profits of them And if Sir Christopher Hatton had given the land with power of Revocation or reserving as in this Case he did an Estate for his own life it had been all one If a man deviseth the profits of such lands the lands themselves do pass And a Conveyance of lands upon Condition not to take the profits is a void condition in Law Lit. 462 463. A Feoffment is made upon confidence and the Feoffor doth occupie the land at the will of the Feoffees and the Feoffees do release unto the Feoffor all their right Litt. 464. there it was said that such a Feoffor shall be sworn upon an Inquest if the lands be of the value of 40s per annum and that by the Common Law Therefore it seemeth that the Law doth intend That when a man hath Feoffees in Trust that the lands are his own and then if in such case the Commonwealth shall be served shall not the King who is Pater reipublicae be served so as he may be satisfied his debts If the Case of Walter de Chirton had never been yet I should now have the same opinion of the Law in such Case as the Judges then had The King is not bound by Estopels nor Recoveris had betwixt strangers nor by the fundamental Jurisdiction of Courts as appeareth 38. Ass 20. where a Suit was for Tythes in the Exchequer being a meer spiritual
disseised and the Disseisor levieth a Fine with proclamations and five years passe and afterwards Tenant in tail dyeth there the issue in tail is barred for there after the Fine levied the Tenant in tail himself had right so as the issue in tail was not the first to whom the Right did accrue after the Fine levied C. 3. part 87. Com. 374. a. When Ralph Bigot made the Feoffment 6 H. 8. Francis Bigot had a Right by his own Feoffment 21 H. 8. his Right was extinguished The second Objection was upon the Form of pleading in a Formedon viz. Post cujus mortem discendere debet to him viz. the issue Then the Ancestor had such a Right which after his death might have discended to his issue Then that proveth that the Ancestor by his Feoffment hath not given away all the Right I answer The form is not Post cujus mortem but Per cujus mortem and the Post cujus mortem discendere debet is not traversable and therefore it is but matterof form and not of substance Old Entres 240. One dum non fuit compos mentis maketh a Feoffment he shall not avoid the Feoffment because that the Law doth not allow a man to stultifie himself C. 4. part 123. But his heir after his death may avoid the Feoffment of his Ancestor for de ipso discendit jus although the Father had not a Right in his life It was thirdly objected out of C. 4. part 166. b. where it is said That if an Ideot maketh a Feoffment the King shall avoid the same after Office found I answer That the Book it self doth cleer the objection For it is in regard of the Statute of Prerogativa Regis cap. 9. Ita quod nullatenus per eosdem fatuos alienentur c. and not in respect of any Right which the party hath who maketh the Feoffment By the Common Law Tenant in tail viz. He who had a Fee-simple conditional had not any right after his Feoffment Then the Act of West 2 cap. 1. makes such a Fee an Estate in tail and provides for the issue in tail for him in the Remaindor or in Reversion but not for the party who made the Feoffment or Grant for a Grant of Tenant in tail is not void as to himself Magdalen-Colledge Case A Lease by a Parson is good against himself but voidable against his Successor And so the same is no Exception Discendit jus post mortem c. The fourth Objection was That although Tenant in tail had made a Feoffment yet he remained Tenant to the Avowry of the Donor and therfore some right of the old estate tail did remain in him I answer 5 E. 4. 3 a. 48 E. 3. 8. b. 20 H. 6. 9. 14 H. 4. 38. b. C. 2. part 30. a. The matter of the Avowry doth not arise out of the Right or Interest which a man hath in the Land but out of the Privity As when the Tenant maketh a Feoffment he hath neither right nor interest in the Land yet the Lord is not compellable to avow upon the Alienee before notice In a Precipe quod reddat the Tenant alieneth yet he remaineth Tenant as to the Plaintiffe and yet he hath not either a Right or any Estate as to the Alienee The fifth Objection was upon the Statute of 1 R. 3. cap. 1. All Feoffments c. by Cestuy que use shall be effectual to him to whom it was made against the Feoffor and his heirs I answer The words of the Statute are to be considered All Feoffments c I desire to know how this affirmative Law doth take away the power of the Feoffees And the Feoffees are bound by the Feoffment of Cestuy que use and are seised to the use of such Alienees 27 H. 8. 23. b. by Fitzherbert If Cestuy que use enter and maketh a Feoffment with warrantie c. but there are not words that the old rights are given away The Feoffees to use before the Statute of 1 R. 3. c. 1. might only make Feoffments but after that Statute Cestuy que use might also make Feoffments of the Lands And so the Statute of 1 R. 3. did not take away the power of the Feoffees for they yet may make Feoffments but it did enlarge the power of Cestuy que use Com. 351 â—52 Then the Question further riseth If Francis Bigot had any Right in the Tail which might be forfeited by the Statutes by 26 H. 8. and 31 H. 8. A particular Act made for the Attaindor of the said Francis Bigot From the time of West 2. cap. 1â— untill the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. there were many Bills preferred in Parliament to make Lands which were entailed to be forfeited for high Treason but as long as such Bils were unmasked they were still rejected But Anno 26 H. 8. then at a Parliament a Bill was preferred That all Inheritances might be forfeited for Treason so that as under a vail lands in tail were forfeited for Treason which was accepted of The Statutes of 26 H. 8. 31 H. 8. are not to be taken or extended beyond the words of the Statute which are That every Offender hereafter lawfully convict of any manner of high Treason by Presentment confession Verdict or Process of Outlawry shall forfeit c. It doth not appear that Francis Bigot was attainted in any of these wayes For the Inquisition is That he was Indicted and convicted but Non sequitur that he was convict by any of those wayes viz. Verdict Confession or Outlawry And one may be attainted by other means 4 E. 4. in Placito Parliamenti Mortimer was attainted by Parliament 1 R. 2. Alice Percy was attainted by Judgment of the Lords and Peers of the House of Lords in Parliament It was objected That after an Indictment Verdict ought to follow I answer Non sequitur for it may be without Verdict viz. by standing mute And then the Statute of 26 H. 8. doth not extend unto it C. 3. part 10 11. Admit it were an Attaindor within the Statute of 2â— H. 8. yet Francis Bigot had not such lands which might be forfeited C. 3. part 10. For this Statute doth not extend to Conditions or Rights And C. 7. part 34. this Act of 26 H. 8. doth not extend to Rights and Titles And it is cleer that Francis Bigot had not any Estate within the letter of the Act. It was objected That if we have not set forth the full Title of the King in the Monstrans de Droit then is the Monstrans de Droit naught and void I answer 9 E. 4. 51. 16 E. 4. 6. I find no book that in a Monstrans de Droit we should be put to observe that Rule For a Petition were a going about The Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 6. gives the Monstrans de Droit 16 E. 4. 7. If a Petition be void for want of instructing the King and if all his Title be not set forth in it
is in the wife but the cause thereof is because it was once coupled with a possession C. 7. part Nevils Case There was a question whether an Earldom might be entailed and forfeited for Treason which is a thing which he hath not in possession nor use but is inherent in the blood And there resolved that the same cannot be forfeited as to be transferred to the King but it is forfeited by way of discharge and exoneration 12 Eliz. Dyer the Bishop of Durhams Case There if it had not been for the saving the Regal Jurisdiction of the Bishop had been given to the King by the Statute of 26 H. 8. This Statute of 26 H. 8. was made for the dread of the Traitor For the times past saw how dangerous Traitors were who did not regard their lives so as their lands might discend to their issue It was then desperate for the King Prince and Subject For the time to come it was worse The Law doth not presume that a man would commit so horrid an act as Treason so it was cited by Mr. Crook who cited the case That the King cannot grant the goods and lands of one when he shall be attainted of Treason because the Law doth not presume that he will commit Treason If the Law will not presume it wherefore then were the Statutes made against it If the Land be forfeited by the Statute of 26 H. 8. much stronger is it by the Statute of 31 H. 8. But then admit there were a Remitter in the Case yet by the Office found the same is defeated Without Office the Right is in the King Com. 486. c. 5. part 52 where it is said There are two manner of Offices the one which vests the estate and possession of the Land c. in the King where he had but a Right as in the case of Attaindor the Right is in the King by the Act of Parliament and relates by the Office Com. 488. That an Office doth relate 38 E. 3. 31. The King shall have the mean profits The Office found was found in 33 Eliz. and the same is to put the King in by the force of the Attaindor which was 29 H. 8. and so the same devests the Remitter Tenant in tail levieth a Fine and disseiseth the Conusee and dyeth the issue is remitted then proclamations pass now the Fine doth devest the Remitter C. 1. part 47 Tenant in tail suffereth a common Recovery and dyeth before Execution the issue entreth and then Execution is sued the Estate tail is devested by the Execution and so here in our Case it is by the Office C. 7. part 8. Tenant in tail maketh a Lease and dyeth his wife priviment ensient without issue the Donor entreth the Lease is avoided afterwards a Son is born the Lease is revived Com. 488. Tenant in capite makes a Lease for life rendring rent and for non-payment a re-entry and dyeth the rent is behind the heir entreth for non-payment of the rent and afterwards Office is found of the dying seised and that the land is hoâ—den in capite and that the heir was within age In the case the Entry for the Condition broken was revived and the Estate for life revived 3 E. 4. 25. A Disseisor is attainted of Felony the Land is holden of the Crown the Disseisee entreth into the Land and afterwards Office is found that the Disseisor was seised the Remitter is taken out of the Disseisee which is a stronger case then our Case for there was a right of Entire and in our Case it is but a right of Action which is not so strong against the King And for these Causes he concluded That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas ought to be reversed And so prayed Judgment for the Lord of Sheffield Plaintiffe in the Writ of Error This great Case came afterwards to be argued by all the Judges of England And upon the Argument of the Case the Court was divided in opinions as many having argued for the Defendant Ratcliffe as for the Plaintiffe But then one new Judge being made viz. Sir Henry Yelverton who was before the Kings Sollicitor his opinion and argument swayed the even ballance before and made the opinion the greater for his side which he argued for which was for the Plaintiffe the Lord Sheffield And thereupon Judgment was afterwards given That the Judgment given in the Court of Pleas should be reversed and was reversed accordingly And the Earl Lord Sheffield now Earl of Mulgrave holdeth the said Castle and Mannor of Mulgrave at this day according to the said Judgment Note I have not set here the Arguments of the Judges because they contained nothing almost but what was before in this Case said by the Councel who argued the Case at the Bar. Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 418. IT was the opinion of Ley Chief Justice Chamberlain and Dodderidge Justices That a Defendants Answer in an English Court is a good Evidence to be given to a Jury against the defendant himself but it is no good Evidence against other parties If an Action be brought against two and at the Assises the Plaintiffe proceeds only against one of them in that case he against whom the Plaintiffe did surcease his suit may be allowed a Witnesse in the Cause And the Judges said That if the Defendants Answer be read to the Jury it is not binding to the Jury and it may be read to them by assent of the parties And it was further said by the Court That if the party cannot find a Witnesse then he is as it were dead unto him And his Deposition in an English Court in a Cause betwixt the same parties Plaintiffe and Defendant may be allowed to be read to the Jury so as the party make oath that he did his endeavour to find his Witnesse but that he could not see him nor hear of him Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 419. THe Husband a wife seised of Lands in the right of the wife levied a Fine unto the use of themselves for their lives and afterwards to the use of the heirs of the wife Proviso that it shall and may be lawfull to and for the husband and wife at any time during their lives to make Leases for 21 years or 3 lives The wife being Covert made a Lease for 21 years And it was adjudged a good Lease against the husband although it was made when she was a Feme Covert and although it was made by her alone by reason of the Proviso Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 420. NOte that Hobart Chief Justice said That it was adjudged Mich. 15 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas That in an Action of Debt brought upon a Contract the Defendant cannot wage his Law for part and confesse the Action for the other part And it was also said That so it was adjudged in Tart's Case upon a Shop-book And vide 24 H. 8. Br. Contract 35. A Contract cannot be divided
then the tender is good But if he be not there but at another place the notice is sufficient Dodderidge The Law requires certainty in a Declaration and the matter cannot be taken by intendment so we ought to have a certainty set forth otherwise no certain Judgment can be given It was adjourned for Dodderidge and Haughton Justices were against Ley Chief Justice But as I have heard the Case was afterwards adjudged for the Plaintiffe There quaere the Record of the Judgment Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 425. A Man made a Lease for life and covenanted for him and his heirs That he would save the Lessee harmless from any claiming by from or under him The Lessor dyed and his wife brought a Writ of Dower against the Lessee and recovered and the Lessee brought an Action of Covenant against the heir And it was adjudged against the heir because the wife claimed under her husband who was the Lessor But if the woman had been mother of the Lessor who demanded Dower the Action would not have layen against the heir because she did not claim by from or under the Lessor And so it was adjudged v. 11. H. 7. 7. b. Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 426. SNELL And BENNET'S Case A Parson did contract with A. his Executors and Assigns That for ten shillings paid to him every year by A. his Executors and Assigns that he his Executors or Assigns should be quit from the payment of Tythes for such Lands during his life viz. the life of the Parson A. paid unto the Parson ten shillings which the Parson accepted of And made B. an Enfant his Executor and dyed The mother of the Enfant took Letters of Administration durante minori aetate of the Enfant and made a Lease at Will of the Lands The Parson libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for Tythes of the same Lands against the Tenant at Will who thereupon moved for a Prohibition Dodderidge During the life of the Parson the Contract is a foot but the Assignee cannot sue the Parson upon this Contract yet he may have a Prohibition to stay the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court and put the Parson to his right remedy and that is to sue here This agreement is not by Deed and so no Lease of the Tythes The Parson shall have his remedy against the Executor for the ten shillings but not against the Tenant at Will and the Executor hath his remedy against the Tenant at Will Crook 21 H. 6. A Lease of Tythes without Deed is good for one but not for more years v. 16 H. 7. And afterwards a Prohibition was granted Trin. 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 427. PHILPOT and FEILDER'S Case THe Parties are at issue in the Chancery and a Venire facias is awarded out of the Chancery to try the issue and the Venire facias was Quod venire facias coram c. duodecim liberos legales homines de vicineto de c. quorum quilibet habeat quatuor lib. terrae tenementorum vel reddituum per annum ad minus per quos rei veritas melius sciri poterit c. And it was moved in arrest of Judgment That the Venire facias is not well awarded for it ought to be Quorum quilibet habeat quadraginta solidos terrae tentorum vel reddit per an ad minus according to the Statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 6. which appoints that every one of the Jurors ought by Law to expend forty shillings per annum of Freehold and it ought not to be quatuor libras terrae c. according to the Statute of 27 Eliz cap. 6. which Statute of Elizabeth doth not speak of the Chancery but only of the Kings Bench Common-Pleas and the Exchequer or before Justices of Assise Before the Statute of 35 H. 8. no certain Land of Jurors was named in the Venire facias but since the Statute of 35 H. 8. it was quadragint solidos untill the said Statute of 27 Eliz. and now it is quatuor libras in the Kings Bench Common-Pleas and Exchequer It was adjourned At another day the Case was moved again That the Venire facias ought to be 40 solidos c. according to the Statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 6. And 10 H. 7. 9. 15 were vouched That if a Statute appoint that the King shall do an act in this form the King ought to do it in the same form and manner So if a Letter of Attorney be to make a Bill in English and the same is made in Latine it is not good although it be the same in form and matter Cook lib Entries 578. Waldrons Case is That in the Chancery the Venire facias was but 40 but that Case was between 35 H. 8. and 27 Eliz. cap 6. Dodderidge and Haughton Justices It is a plain case For the Venire facias ought to be according to 35 H. 8. cap. 6. because the Statute of 27 Eliz. cap. 6. speaks nothing of the Chancery Quod nota Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 428. HEWET and BYE'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme of a house in Winchester the Ejectment was laid to be of a house which was in australi parte vici Anglice the High-street Ley Chief Justice If it had been ex australi parte vici then the South part had been but a Boundary but here it is well laid Then it was moved That the Venire facias is Duodecim liberos legales homines de Winton and doth not say of any Parish in Winton But notwithstanding it was holden good For Dodderidge Justice said That it is not like unto Arundels Case C. 6. part 14. For there the Offence was laid to be done in paroechiae Sanctae Margaret de Westminster therefore the visne ought to be of the Parish but in this case it being laid generally in Winton it is sufficient that the visne come out of Winton Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 429 WATERER and MOUNTAGUE'S Case A Man made a Lease for six years and the Lessor covenanted That if he were disposed to lease the said lands after the expiration of the said term of six years that the Lessee should have the refusal of it The Lessee within the six years made a Lease thereof to J. S. for 21 years Dodderidge Haughton and Ley Chief Justice The Covenant is not broken because it is out of the words of the Covenant But Dodderidge said Temp. E. 1. Covenant 29. The Lessee covenanted to leave the houses trees and woods at the end of the term in as good plight as he found them and afterwards the Lessee cut down a tree that in that case the Covenant was broken and the Lessor shall not stay untill the end of the term to bring his action of Covenant because it is apparant that the tree cannot grow again and be in as good plight as it was when he took the Lease Trin. 21
Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 430. OWFIELD against SHIERT A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Judgment given in an Action of Debt The Action of Debt was upon a Concessit solvere c. pro diversis summis pecuniae and the opinion of the Court was That Debt doth not lie upon Concessit solvere pro diversis summis c. because it is incertainty But the same Term in another Case viz. Stacies Case That by Custom of London it was holden that Debt doth lie upon a Concessit solvere pro diversis summis And it was then said That in an Action upon the Case it was good to say That in consideration de diversis summis Concessit solvere and so it hath been adjudged Trin 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. HAWKSWITH and DAVIES Case Intratur 431. Pasch 19. Jur. Rot. 83. LEssee for years of divers parcels of Lands reservant Rent and for not payment a reentrie The Lessee assignes part of the Land to A. and other part to B. and keeps a part to himself afterwards the Lessee levies a Fine of all the Lands unto the use of the Conusee and his heirs afterwards the Lessee paies the Rent for the whole unto the Conusee and afterwards the Rent becomes behind and the Conusee enters for the Condition broken and made a Lease to the Plaintiffe who thereupon brought an Ejectione firme and all this matter was found by special Verdict and it was moved that by the assigning of the Lessee of part of the lands to one and part to another that the Condition was gone and destroyed but notwithstanding it was agreed by all the Justices that the Condition did remain and was not gone nor destroyed And they said that this Case was not like unto Winters Case in Dyer 308 309. where the Lessor did assigne over part of the Reversion to one and part unto another for that in that Case the Lessor by his own Act had destroyed the Condition but in this Case it is the Act of the Lessee and therefore no colour that the Condition be gone and destroyed And so it was resolved for the Plaintiffe and Judgment given accordingly Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 432. KILLIGREW and HARPER'S Case HArper in consideration of 100l. doth assume and promise to Killigrew That the Lady Weston and her Son shall sell to Killigrew such Lands Proviso that Killigrew such a day certain pay to the said Lady and her Son 2000l At which time the Lady and her Son shall be ready to assure and convey to Killigrew the said lands And for want of payment of the said 2000l at the said day that Killigrew shall lose the said 100l. and that the Contract for the Land shall be void Killigrew brought an Action upon the Case sur Assumpsit against Harper and all this matter was found by special Verdict Athow Serjeant argued that the Action would lie because the Lady and her Son were to do the first act viz. to make the Assurance 22 H. 6. 57. Rent is reserved upon a Lease for years in which are divers Covenants and a Bond is given for the performance of all the Covenants within such Indenture of Lease the Rent is behind the Bond is not forfeited unlesse the Lessor doth make a demand of the Rent because the Lessor is to do the first act viz. to demand the Rent Yelverton contr ' That the Action will not lie The question is Of whose part is the breach The Assumpsit is grounded upon the Consideration and not upon the Promise The Jury find that Killigrew was not ready to pay the 2000l. and that the Lady and her Son were not ready to assure the land The Agreement was for which not time is expressed That the Lady and her Son should convey such lands Then the Agreement was That Killigrew should pay at such a day certain at which day the Lady should be ready c. and if Killigrew made default of the payment of the 2000l. then he was to lose the said 100l. which he gave to Harper to procure the Bargain and also that the Bargain should be void Ley Chief Justice If Killigrew had paid or tendred the 2000l. at the said day and the Lady and her Son had not been ready at that time to have assured the lands Killigrew should have had an Action upon the Case for the 100l. and recovered damages If the Lady had been to have done the first action then the Action would have been maintainable but in this Case Killigrew is to do the first act and therefore the Action will not lie Dodderidge If it had been indefinite then the Assurance and Conveyance is to be before the Payment but here the bargain is to pay the mony first Harper promiseth to Killigrew in consideration of 100l. that Killigrew shall buy such lands then comes the time of payment and assurance of the land at that time shall be made Proviso that if he do not pay the 2000l then Killigrew to lose the 100l. and the Contract to be void so there are two penalties so as of necessity the 2000l must first be paid for otherwise how can the Contract be void for not payment For if the Conveyance shall be first made then it was present before the mony paid and so the clause viz. Then the Contract to be void should be of no effect Haughton Justice agreed Chamberlain Justice You have bound your self with a penalty and the bargain ought to be performed as it was made And so being made that the mony should be first paid at which time the conveyance shall be made and for want of payment that Killigrew should lose the 100l. and also the Contract to be void The opinion of the whole Court was against the Plaintiffe that the Action would not lie and so Judgment was given Quod nihil capint per Billam Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 433. Sir ARTHUR GORGE and Sir ROBERT LANE'S Case AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond for not performance of Covenants The Case was Lane did marry with the daughter of Gorge and in consideration of marriage and also of 3000l portion given in marriage by Gorge Lane did covenant That he within one year would make a Jointure of lands within England then of the value of 500l per annum over and above all Reprises to his said wife so as Sir Henry Yelverton and Sir John Walter Councellors at Law should devise and advise In Debt for the breach of these Covenants Lane pleaded That he did inform Gorge of lands which he was determined should be for her Jointure but neither Yelverton nor Walter did devise the Assurance Paul Crook did demur upon the Plea and first shewed That Lane did not give notice to Yelverton and Walter as he ought to have done by law For in this case it is not sufficient to give notice to Gorge but the notice ought to be to the Councellors otherwise how could
by vertue of the Act of 31 H. 8. A Feoffment in Fee is made unto the use of A. in Tail he hath the Use by the Statute of West â— cap. 1. Now when the Statute of 27 H. 8. cap. 10. came he hath the possession by force of that Act viz. of 27 H. 8. and not by force of the Statute of West 2. If the King be not in by the Statute of 3 H. 8. then he shall not have every of the Priviledges which the Act of 31 H. 8. giveth C. 2. part The Bishop of Canterburies Case The Colledg of Maidstone was Religious but not Ecclesiastical and it was adjudged that the Purchasors of the Lands of the said Colledg were not discharged from the payment of Tythes because the Colledg was not Ecclesiastical but Religious only and Religious and not Ecclesiastical came not to the King by the Statute of 31 H. 8. 18 Jacobi in the Common Pleas Wrights Case The Priory of Hatfield being of small value viz. not having Lands of the value of 200l per annum was dissolved by the Statute of 27 H. 8. and the Lands were not Tythe-free in the hands of the Purchasors because the Priory came not to the King by the Statute of 31 H. 8. and yet they were Tythe-free in the hands of the Prior himself The second point upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. The words are That the King shall have all Rights Interests and Priviledg as it was in the hands of the Abbots Priors c. It is objected To be free from payment of Tythes is a Priviledg I answer That neither Right Interest nor Priviledg do free him from the payment of Tythes First there is no discharge of Tythes by the word Interest in the Statute for that is plain Then the question is if the word Priveledg will discharge the Lands from the payment of Tythes and if that word would have sufficed to have discharged the Tythe what need was there of the special Clause to discharge Tythes The Statute of 27 H. 8. dissolves Chaunteries and there it is said That the King shall have and enjoy c. and there also all Priviledges are given then the Statute of 1 E. 6. came and gave all Chauntries to the King and there the word Priviledg was not in the Act yet by those words the Lands were not discharged from the payment of Tythes The Statute of 31 H. 8. is Conditions and Rights of Entrie yet there was another Act made to give Conditions to the King But admit that the King himself be discharged yet his Patentees are not discharged The Priviledg was personal and personal Priviledges are not transferrable 35 H. 6. 56. A Statute dissolveâ— the Templers and gives the Lands to the Hospitalers to hold by the same service as the Templers did which was Frankalmoign yet the Grantee held by Fealty for that Frankalmoign is a personal priviledg and cannot be transferred by general words The King it's true shall have the priviledg for he is a priviledged person for of his goods he shall not pay Tythes if he do not grant them over and the Grants prove That unless he had granted them he should have paid no Tythes The Statute of 31 H. 8. sayes All Conditions which the Abbots c. have yet untill the Statute of 32 H 8. no Purchasor could take advantage of a Condition Hill 44. Eliz. in the Common Pleas Rot. 1994. Spurlings Case The Purchasors of Lands of the Hospital of St Johns of Jerusalem were not priviledged from the payment of Tythes Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas Vrry and Bowyers Case In a Prohibition it was holden by Cook and Nichols That the Purchasor of St Johns of Jerusalem should pay Tythes but Winch and Warburton cont 18 Jacobi in the Common Pleas All the Judges but Warburton held that the Purchasor should pay Tythes 10 Eliz. Dyer There it doth not appear whether they were of the Order of Templers or Cistertians The third point in this Case The Defendant doth make no title to the Discharge for he hath not averred that the Priory were Ecclesiastical persons If a man plead that A. is professed the Court cannot take notice of it that he is a dead person in Law But if he saith that he was of such an Order he ought to set forth of what Rule the Order is Secondly The manner of their discharge was when they did Till and sow their Lands propriis sumptibus manibus If they grub up Roots and make the Lands fit for Tillage but if their Tenants sow the Lands they shall pay Tythes for they had the priviledg in respect they should not be idle unless all these do concur they shall pay Tythes viz. plough sow reap and carrie the Corn. These Priviledges are to be taken stritly because they are to defeat the Church of her endowment and therefore in this Case the Defendant doth not well entitle himself to the Discharge unless he do shew that he did occupie the Land for one whole year before and that he did plow sow and â—eap the corn But he ought for to have shewed that such time he plâ—â—ed the Land such a time he sowed it and such a time he reaped the 〈◊〉 Otherwise the Court will intend that another man did plow and sow the land and that he only reaped it For if Lessee of the Hospital doth plow the Land and sow it and afterwards doth surrender to the Prior of the Hospital who reaps the same he shall pay Tythe of the same for the Priviledge was granted unto them who were Labourers And the Defendant perhaps might have the Lands to halfs that is to say to have half the Corn growing upon the Lands The pleading is not good When you plead two Bars each Bar must stand of it self and the surplusage of the one Bar shall not help the defect of the other Bar. The word Priviledge in the Act of 32 H. 8. doth not extend to Tythes If it doth yet the Purchasor shall not have the Priviledge Dodderidge Justice The Statute of 32 H. 8. was made because that those of S. Johns of Jerusalem said that they could not surrender their Hospital because they had a Supreme Head over them viz. their great Master the Pope Crawley Serjeant argued for Weston the Defendant The pleading was over-ruled to be good the last day the Case was argued We have well entitled our selves to the Discharge For we have pleaded that we had the occupation of the Lands for one whole year and that Weston the Defendant plowed sowed and reaped the Corn upon the lands at his own costs and charges And the Plaintiff hath not shewed that any other plowed sowed or reaped the same Our title is by prescription which is confessed This Society was erected in the time of King Henry the 1. and it continued untill 32 H. 8. 44 Eliz. in Spurlings case there were two reasons of the Judgment 1. There the Statute of 31 H. 8.
39 H. 6. 9. is ruled in the point there the Attachment is in his own hands there the other pleaded there was no debt It is there ruled that the debt is not traversable for if there be no debt then he shall have restitution in London upon the pledges It was objected That he is to swear his debt to be a true debt I answer It ought to be so intended and then if he lay a Custom to swear the Debt and we say we have sworn our Debt then we have pursued the Custom 3. It was objected that it is not shewed where the goods were whether within the jurisdiction of the City 4 E. 4. 36. there the place came not in question But in our Case we lay That the Custom is that the goods must be in London Old Entries 155 156. there it is not alleadged that the goods were within the City of London at the time of the Attachment If a Precept be awarded to the Officer who retorns that he hath not any thing within the City and upon the allegation of the Plaintiff that such a one hath goods of the Defendant in his hands was the Objection I answer If we have not proceeded well yet the Process is well enough for here is a Judgment against him in London then so long as the Judgment is in force against him he cannot have the goods 21 E. 4 23. b. It is a Rule That a stranger unto a plaint shall not be received to alleadge discontinuance in the process So the Sheriff shall not excuse himself upon an Escape that there was Error in the Judgment nor a privy shall not take advantage of it Ognels Case Trim. 31 Eliz. there lies no process of Capias by the Law upon a Recognisance but Extent or Levari facias Yet there a Capias was awarded and if the party taken escape the Sheriff shall not take advantage of the Erronious process So I desire Judgment for the Defendant And he took an Exception to the Declaration In Detinue if the Declaration be general it is good sc Licet sepius requisitu c. But here he shews that he delivered the Cloak to be redelivered upon Request and he doth not shew any particular Request but sayes generally Licet sepius requisitus Ward There is a difference betwixt Detinue and Action upon the Case For in an Action upon the Case he ought to shew a particular Request 26 H. 6. If I bail goods to redeliver upon request yet I may seise them without request Dodderidge Justice The reseisure of the goods is a Request in Law a Request with a witness a Request with effect and untill Request he hath just cause to keep them Jones Justice In Debt and Detinue the very bringing of the Action and demand of the Writ is a demand and request And if he appear at the first Summons then he excuses himself otherwise he shall be subject to damages but the Request ought not to be so precisely alleadged But if a collateral thing be to be done upon Request there to say sepius requisitus is not sufficient So if I sell a horse for 10â— to be paid upon Request there the Request must be precisely laid for it is parcel of the Contract And in Action upon the Case and upon Debt you must lay a Request Dodderidge Justice The Request is no part of the Debt for the Debt is presently due but if I make the Request to be part of the Contract there it is otherwise As if I deliver goods to redeliver to me there needeth no precise Request but if it be to redeliver upon Request there the Request ought to be alleadged for there the Request is part of the Contract The Case was adjourned till the next Term. Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 484. MOLE and CARTER'S Case IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit it was moved in arrest of Judgment That the Plaintiff declares that he was possessed of certain Goods viz. such c. at London And that in consideration of two shillings That the Defendant at London did promise to carrie the said Goods aboard such a Ship if the Plaintiff would deliver the Goods to him And he shewed that he did deliver the Goods to him and that he had not carried them aboard He shewed that he was possessed of the Goods but did not shew when or where he delivered the said Goods to the Defendant but said only deliberavit c. And then the Law saith that they were not delivered Jones Justice The same is but matter of Inducement to the promise and ought not to be shewed so precisely Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 485. FRYER and DEW'S Case DEW being sued prayed his Priviledg because he is a Commoner in Exeter Colledg in Oxford and brought Letters under the Seal of the Chancellor of Oxford certifying their Priviledg and he certifies that Dew is a Commoner as appeareth by the Certificate of Doctor Prideaux Rector of the said Colledg Whereas he ought to certifie that he is a Commoner upon his own knowledg and not upon the Certificate of another But afterwards Certificate was made of his own knowledg and then it was allowed as good The Declaration came in Hill 2 Caroli The Certificate bore date in the Vacation and he prayed his Priviledg this Easter Term. After Imparlance he comes too late to pray his Priviledg The Certificate is not that at the time of the Action brought he was a Commoner in Exeter Colledg but that now he is a Commoner And the Certificate bears date after the Action brought He ought to have said that at the time of the Action brought and now he is a Commoner in Exeter Colledg The Priviledg was allowed per Curiam Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 486. TANFIELD and HIRON'S Case THe Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Case against the Defendant for delivering of a scandalous Writing to the Prince and in his Declaration he set forth what place he held in the Commonwealth and that the Defendant seeking to extenuate and draw the love and favour of the King Prince and Subjects from him did complain that the Plaintiff did much oppress the Inhabitants of Michel Tue in the County of Oxford and that he did cause Meerstones to be digged up which might be a cause of great contention amongst the Inhabitants of Tue. The Plaintiffe denyed the oppression alledged against him and the Defendant did justifie and said that I. S. being seised of the Mannor of Tue did demise certain Lands parcel thereof unto I. F. for eighty years who made a Lease of the same at Will and afterwards I. S. did Enfeoff Tanfield the Plaintiff of the said Mannor to whom the Tenants did attorn Tenants And the Defendant shewed That time out of mind the Inhabitants of the Town of Tue had Common in the Waste of the said Mannor and that a great part of the said Mannor was inclosed and the Meerstones removed
but doth not shew by whom And shewed that the Lands inclosed out of which the Inhabitants had their Common And said That there were divers other Grievances to the Inhabitants of Tue but did not shew by whom they were nor what they were and shewed that at a Parliament the Defendant did deliver such a Writing to the Prince as one of the Peers of Parliament supposing that the grievances were set upon the Inhabitants by the Plaintiff by reason the Plaintiff occupied the Lands so inclosed and for Reformation thereof that he delivered the Writing to the Prince Absque hoc that he did deliver it in any other manner And upon this Plea in Barr Tanfield the Plaintiff did demurr in Law Noy for the Plaintiff said That the Defendant complains of wrong and doth not shew any wrong to be done by Tanfield the Plaintiff It is a grievous scandal to deliver this Writing for it is a scandalous Writing and no Petition for therein he doth not desire any Reformation but complains generally Betwixt John Frisel and the Bishop of Norwich The Case touched in 21 E. 3. was That Frisel brought a Prohibition to The Bishop and the Bishop excommunicated him for the delivering of it unto him The Bishop was fined And there it is said As Reverence is due to the King so it is due to his Ministers Our Action is brought at the Common Law and not upon the Statute of R. 2. de scandalis magnatum M. 18 E. 3. Rot. 162. Thomas Badbrook sent a Letter to Ferris one of the Kings Councel the effect of which was That Scot Chief Justice of the Kings Bench and his Companions of the same Bench would not do a vain thing at the Command of the King yet because he sent such a Letter to the Kings Councel although he spake no ill yet because it might incense the King against the Judges he was punished for it might be a means to make the King against his Judges We are to see here if the Defendant hath made any good Justification If there were no wrong then there was no cause to complain Secondly If he had demeaned himself as he ought he ought to have had the wrong if there were any reformed and that he did not do 11 H. 4. 5 H. 7. A voice of Fame is a good cause for to Arrest a man of Felony but then some Felony ought to be committed 7 H. 4. 35. A certain person came and said to one that there were certain Oxen stoln and that he did suspect such a one who he arrested upon the suspition It is a good cause of Justification if any Oxen were stoln but if no Fellony was committed if one be arrested upon suspicion that he hath committed Fellony it is not good If Fellony be done then a good cause to suspect him but if no Fellony be done nor he knoweth nor heareth of any Fellony committed there is no cause for to suspect that the partie hath committed Fellony but there ought to be suspition that the partie hath committed such a particular Fellony Where Fellony is committed certainly one may be arrested upon suspition but unless a Fellony be committed he cannot be arrested For where no Fellony is committed at all he shall not be drawn to a Tryal to clear himself of the suspition but if a Fellony be certainly committed and he be arrested upon the suspition there he being forced to answer to the Fellony he may clear and purge himself of the infamy upon his tryal and so the infamy is not permanent as in case when no Fellony is committed for there he may bring his Action upon the Case Here he saith that parcel of the Waste is inclosed and doth not shew what parcel so as no certain issue can be taken upon it Moor and Hawkins Case in an Ejectione firme It was alledged that he entred into parcel of the Land and the Land was alledged to lie in two several Towns and it was not good because no certain issue could be thereupon He saith the same was inclosed but doth not shew by whom it was inclosed viz. whether by the Feoffor or Tanfield the Feoffee he complains of many grievances but doth not shew what they are and he ought not to be his own Judge Secondly He hath not demeaned himself as he ought for he hath not desired in the Letter any Reformation but only he complains of the oppression of Tanfield He ought to have directed the Writing unto the Parliament and he directed the same unto the Prince by name In the Letter he doth not shew that Tanfield the Plaintiff did oppress but that the Plaintiff was an oppressor but he doth not shew in what thing The Case was adjourned Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 487. SCOT'S Case PRoborum legalium hominum is omitted in the Certificate of an Indictment by the Clark of the Sessions Curia If it had been in Trespass the omission of the said words had vitiated the Indictment but not in Case of Felony Quaere the reason Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. Intratur M. 19 Jac. Rot. 322. 488. CROUCH and HAYNE'S Case IN a Writ of Error the Record is removed out of the Common Pleas The Defendant pleads in nullo est Erratum and a Demurrer is joyned and the Defendant afterwards alledgeth Diminution of the Original 7 E. 4. 25. The Assignement of Errors is in lieu of the Declaration 4 E. 4. Error 44. After that in nullo est erratum is pleaded the Defendant shall not alledg Diminution for they are agreed before that that is the Record The Writ of Error was general and did not shew when the Judgment was when the Ejectment was what the Lands were and nothing is certain in the Writ of Error but the persons and the Action He shall not be concluded by the general retorn of the Record by the Chief Judg of the Common Pleas. Fitz. 25. a. C. 6. Entr. 231. The Record was removed and a Scire facias awarded ex recorde and Diminution was alledged for omitting of certain words yet the Retorn there was of the Record omnia ea tangentia Dyer 330. The Court certifie that the partie was not essoigned there then cannot be any Certificate of the Chief Justice to the contrary The Principal Case was An Original bore date in June 18 Jacobi and another Original in September 18 Jacobi and both were retornable S. Mich. And the Trespass was done after the first Original sued forth and before the later and both the Writs are in Court The question was upon which of the Originals the Judges should judge 4 E. 4. 26 27 28. There it is holden that the Judges ought not to suppose any Error 22 E. 4. 45 Error was brought to reverse a Judgment in a Writ of Dower And the Error assigned was That there was not any Issue joyned but because there was sufficient matter upon which the Judges might give their verdict therefore the Judgment was affirmed
with reference to a misrecited Patent is not helped by the Act of 34. H. 8. But when the thing granted is particularized with reference to a thing which is determined in a misrecited Patent then the Statute of 34. H. 8. will help it but in our Case the misrecitall is of a thing which needed not to be recited The second Objection which hath been made is That the King is deceived by reason of the false suggestion And then the Letters Patents made by reason thereof are void I answer That if the false Suggestion tendeth to the detriment of the Crowne and to the apparant prejudice of the King then the Letters Patents may bee avoided But where the Suggestion is of a thing not materiall and doth not tend either to the deceit of the Crowne or to the Kings prejudice neither in his profit nor his Inheritance there it shall not make void the Letters Patents Dyer 352. Where an Abbot Lessee for sixty years of the Queen made a Lease for eighty yeares the sixty years expired the Lessee for eighty years surrendred to the Crown and in consideration of that Surrender to have a new Lease there the second Patent was void for the King was deceived in the reall consideration And Dyer there said That it was but the Suggestion of the party and the Collection of the Queen C. 5. part 93. 94. Where Lessee for yeares of the King did assigne part of his Terme and Land to another and then surrendred the surrender there was the consideration and that was not good If the recital be made of a thing which needeth not to be recited and the Patent is made upon another consideration there the misrecital shall not hurt it C. 1. part 41. where Henry the seventh reciting cum pâ—st c. virtute cujâ—s c. the estate is recited as determined the Reversion shall passe for the King was certified of the estate And in our Case it is determined Where the falsitie of the suggestion is not in deceit nor to the prejudice of the King If the thing misrecited be not materiall it shall not make void the Patent C. 10 part 110. Legates Case Quae quidem c. the false suggestion shall make void the Patent for the King did not intend to abate his Revenue Fitz. Nat. Brev. Grants 58. Falsitie of Tenure of the King shall make void the Kings Licence For the falsitie of suggestion which came from the party did tend to the prejudice of the King in his Tenure C. 10. part 110 Quod quidem manibus c. ratione Escheatae c. It shall make void the grant by this suggestion of the party which doth prejudice the King in his title But where the Suggestion is not to the prejudice of the King in his revenue tenure nor title it shall not make the Letters Patents void C. 10. part 113. MARKHAM's case The King grants the office of Parker quod quidem Officium the Earle of RUTLAN'D late had And the said Earl never had it the Suggestion was of a thing not materiall to the second Patentee nor to the Kings prejudice therefore it was good 10. H. 6. 2. Quod quidem Manerium seisitus fuit in manus nostras the false suggestion there shall not make void the Patent because it was not of a thing materiall If the King grant a Manor quod quidem Manerium nuper fuit in tenura I. S. and in truth it was not in the Tenure of I. S. yet it was adjudged good For Nuper is a Recitall of the thing that was and not of a thing that is For if it had not been in the possession of I. S. whereas in truth he was not seised or possessed thereof there it had not been good It is found in our Case That the Lease is actually surrendred and so the misrecitall is of a thing that was scil nuper and not of a thing that is or in esse The next Exception is to the Letters Patents of Philip and Mary First because thereby the Lease of 36. H. 8. is not fully recited For there was a Proviso That if he did not pay a summe in grosse that it should be void And that it should determine by the Death of Pawlet the Patentee The misrecitall of that Collaterall matter by the Common Law shall not make void the Grant There are three things necessary in Recitalls First The Certainty of the particular estate in esse with the Limitations Secondly The Tenant to whome the particular estate was made or the Tenant which then is in possession Thirdly The thing granted by the same name as it is granted in the first Patent But Covenants Reservations Provisions Conditions and the like need not to be recited The Recitall ought to be of a thing in esse Avowry 112. A Towne was granted by the King And afterwards he granted unto another a Leet in the same Towne the King in this case needed not to recite the grant of the said Towne Secondly The Recitall ought to bee in the same name as it was granted in the first Patent And cannot be helped by averment if it be misrecited Thirdly the Tenant of the Land or the Tenant which was before the grant ought to be recited scil that such a man habuit to whom the first Patent was granted Or that he now hath the Lands or lately had the thing granted in possession Brook Pat. 96. Such things ought to be recited as ought to be pleaded against the King in an Information of Instruction In our Case the misrecitall being of a thing determined and not materiall and not to be the guide of the second Patent doth not make void the Grant to Pawlet It was objected That Queen MARY was deceived for the Grant was de â—isdem praemissis And in the former Patent the Park was excepted but so it was not in the Letters Patents to Pawlet In the first Patent reasonable Herbage was granted but in the second to Pawlet the Grant was of Herbage generally If the King except the Deer as hee doth in this case then hee ought to have sufficient herbage for his Deer The Jury finde That the Letters Patents of 36. H. 8. were absolutely surrendred eâ intentione that the King might make a new Lease in forma sâ—quente which is not de praemissis sed de praementionatis Now the King for two hundred pounds Fine is pleased to grant tam in consideration of the Surrender quà m for the Fine of two hundred pounds And here the King took knowledg that it ought to be in forma sequente and then by reason of the Fine and Surrender hee is pleased to vary from the former Patent and it is to the prejudice of the Patentee The first was reasonable Herbage and here it is Herbage and in the Kings Case it amounts to as much as if hee had said Reasonable Herbage for because the King excepts the Deer it is implyed That the Patentee is but to have
to Thomas Spence and his Wife and the Survivor the Rent of seventeen Pounds yearly and every year during the terme Proviso that if the Rent be arrere by forty daies that Thomas and his Wife or the Survivor of them should enter Thomas Spence died his Administrator did demand the Rent and being denied entred for the Condition broken Calthrope argued That the reservation to the Wife was void because she had not any interest in the Land and also never sealed the Indenture of Assignment but was as a stranger to the Deed and so he said that the Wife could not enter for the condition broken nor make any demand of the Rent The 2l l Point was Admitting that the wife could not enter nor demand the Rent Whether the Administrator of the Husband might demand it and enter for the condition broken because the words are Yeilding and paying to Thomas Spence and Jane his Wife and the Survivor of them during the term and no words of Executors or Assigns are in the Case and he conceived the Administrator could not and so he said it had been resolved in one Butcher and Richmonds Case about 6. Jacobi Banks contrary and he said It was a good Rent and well demanded and the reservation is good during the Term to the Husband and Wife and although the word Reddendo doth not create a rent to the Wife because the Husband cannot give to the Wife yet the Solvendo shall gain a good rent to the Wife during the life of the Wife and the reservation shall be a good reservation to him and his Administrators during the Survivor Vide C. 5. part Goodales Case 38. E. 3. 33. 46. E. 3. 18. and admitting that the rent shall be paid to the Wife yet the condition shall go to the Administrator 2. The word Solvendo makes the Rent good to the Wife and amounts to an agreement of the Lessee to pay the Rent to them and the Survivor of them and that which cannot be good by way of reservation yet is good by way of grant and agreement and many times words of reservation or preception shall enure by way of grant Vide 10 E. 3 500. 10. Ass 40. 8. H. 4. 19. Richard Colingbrooks Case 41. E. 3. 15. 13. E. 2 Feasts and Fasts 108. Richardson Justice The Reservation being during the term is good and shall go to the Administrator Jones Justice contrary It is good only during the life of the Lessor and so was it adjudged in Edwyn and Wottons Case 5. Jacobi Crook Justice accorded The Administrator hath no title and the Wife is no party to the Deed and therefore the Rent is gone by the death of the Husband If it had been durante termino generally perhaps it had been good but durante termino praedicto to him and his Wife it ceaseth by his death And the words durante termino couple it to him and his Wife and the Survivor and it cannot be good to the Wife who is no party nor sealed the Deed neither can it inure to the Wife by way of Grant And the words Reddendo and Solvendo are Synonima and the Administrator is no Assignee of the Survivor for she cannot assign because she hath no right in the Rent Barkley Justice The intention of the parties was That it should be a continuing Rent and Judges are to make such Exposition of Deeds as that the meaning of the parties may take effect I do agree That the Wife could not have the Rent neither by way of Reservation nor by way of Grant if she were not a party to the Indenture but here she is a party to the Deed for it is by Deed indented made by the husband and wife and the husband hath set his Seal to it And 2. The Solvendo doth work by way of Grant by the intent of the parties The Reddendo shall go and relate as to the husband and the Solvendo to the wife and he agreed the Case 33. H. 8. Br. Cases because there expressum facit cessare tacitum but in case of a Lease for years the words Reserving Rent to him shall go to the Executor who represents the person of the Testator and 27. El. it was adjudged in Constables Case and Littleton agrees with it That the Executor shall be possessed and is possessed in the right of his Testator And therefore if an alien be made an Executor in an Action brought by him the Tryal shall not be per medâ—â—tatem lâ—nguae And this Case is the stronger because the Reservation is during the Term. And C. 3. part in Malleries Case That the Law shall make such a construction Upon reservation of Rent upon a Lease as may stand with the intent and meaning of the parties and therefore in that where an Abbot and Covent made a Lease for years rendring Rent yearly during the Term to the Abbot and Covent or to his Successors it is all one as if it had been to him and his Successors and although the words be joint or in the Copulative yet by construction of Law the Rent shall be well reserved during the terme for if the reservation had been only Annually during the terme it had been sufficient and his Successors should have had the Rent Quaere the principall Case for the Judges differed much in their opinions Hill 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 517 The KING against HILL AN Information was by the Kings Atturney against Hill and others upon the Statute of 32. H. 8. of Maintenance Where the Point was A man was out of Possession and recovered in an Ejectione firme in May 2. Car. and Habere Possessionem was awarded and 29. Sept. 4. Car. he sold the Land And whether he might sell presently or not was the Question And it was determined That he being put in possession by a Writ of Habere facias possessionem that he might sell presently Vide Com. Crookers Case and C. Littl. acc and so was it holden in Sir John Offley's Case 7. Car. in this Court Barkley Justice If a Disseisor doth recover in an Ejectione firme if he afterwards sell the Land it is a pretended Title Jones Justice It was adjudged 36. El. in the Common Pleas in Pages Case in the Case of a Formedon That if a man be out of Possession for seven years and afterwards he recover that he may sell the Lands presently Crook Justice There is a difference where the recovery is in a reall Action and where it is in an Ejectione firme It was Master Browneloes Case in the Star-Chamber resolved by all the Judges of England That a Suit in Chancery cannot make a Title pretended nor Maintenance Barkley Justice put this Case If Husband and Wife bargaineth and selleth whereas the Wife hath nothing in the Land and afterwards a Fine is levied of the same Lands by the Husband and Wife it shall have a relation to conclude the Wife and to make the Wife to have a Title ab initio It was
Judgement was affirmed for by intendment the Judgment was given upon the first Original which bore date before the Iudgment Another Error was assigned because the Plea was That such a one was seised of the Castle and Mannor of Mulgrave predictis in the plural number I answer that there is not any colour for that Error for the word predictis doth shew that the Mannor and Castle are not one and the same thing So upon the whole matter I pray that the Iudgment given in the Court of Pleas may be affirmed Sir Henry Yelverton argued for the Lord Sheffield that the Iudgment might be reversed There are three things considerable in the Case First If any right of the ancient estate tail was in Francis Bigot who was attainted at the time of his Attainder Secondly admit that there was an ancient right if it might be forfeited being a right coupled with a Possession and not a right in gross Thirdly Whether such a Possession discend to Francis Bigot that he shall be remitted and if this Remitter be not overreached by the Office First If by the Feoffment of Francis Bigot 21. H. 8. when he was Cestuy que use and by the Livery the right of the ancient entail be destroyed And I conceive it is not but that the same continues and is not gone by the Livery and Seisin made There is a difference when Cestuy que use makes a Feoffment before the Statute of 1 R 3. and when Cestuy que use makes a Feoffment after the said statute of 1 R 3 For before the statute hee gives away all Com 352. but after the statute of R. 3. Cestuy que use by his Feoffment gives away no Right In 3 H. 7 13. is our very case almost For there the Tenant in Tail made a Feoffment unto the use of his Will so in our Case and thereby did declare that it should be for the payment of his debts and afterwards to the use of himself and the heirs of his body and died the heir entred before the debts paid but in our Case he entred after the debts paid there it is said that the Feoffment is made as by Cestuy que use at the Common Law for his entrie was not lawfull before the debts paid But when Francis Bigot made a Feoffment 21 H. 8. he was Cestuy que use in Fee and then is the Right of the Estate tail saved by the Statute of 1. R. 3. And by the Statute of 1. R. 3. he gives the Land as Servant and not as Owner of the Land and so gives nothing but a possession and no Right 5 H. 7. 5. Cestuy que use since the Statute of 1 R. 3. is but as a Servant or as an Executor to make a Feoffment And if an Executor maketh a Feoffment by force of the Will of the Testator he passeth nothing of his own Right but only as an Executor or Servant 9 H. 7. 26. proves that Cestuy que use since the Statute of 1 R. 3 hath but only an Authority to make a Feoffment For Cestuy que use cannot make a Letter of Attorney to make Livery for him for he hath but a bare Authority which cannot be transferred to another Cestuy que use hath a Rent out of Land and by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3. he maketh a Feoffment of the Land yet the Rent doth remain to him for he giveth but a bare possession So in our Case the right of the Estate Tail doth remain in Francis Bigot notwithstanding his Feoffment as Cestuy que use by the Statute of 1 R. 3. If Cestuy que use by force of the Statute of 1 R. 3. maketh a Feoffment without Warranty the Vouchee shall not Vouch by force of that Warranty For as Fitzherbert saith Cestuy que use had no possession before the Statute of 27. H. 8. Cap. 10. 27 H. 8. 23. If Feoffees to Use make a Letter of Attorney to Cestuy que use to make a Feoffment he giveth nothing but as a Servant The Consequent of this Point is That the right of the old Estate Tail was in Francis Bigot at the time of his Attainder and was not gone by the Feoffment made 21 H. 8. The second Point is Whether a right mixt with a possession of Francis Bigot might be forfeited by the Statutes of 26. H. 8. and the private Act of 31. H. 8. The Statute of 31. H. 8. doth not save this Right no more then the Statute of 26. H. 8. For they are all one in words I say that he hath such a right as may be lost and forfeited by the words of the Statute of 26. H. 8. Cap. 13. For that Statute giveth three things First It gives the Forfeiture of Lands and not of Estates Secondly How long doth that Statute give the lands to the King For ever viz. to the King his Heirs and Successors Thirdly It gives the lands of any Estate of Inheritance in Use or Possession by any Right Title or means This Estate Tail is an Estate of Inheritance which he hath by the Right by the Title and by the means of coming to the Right it is forfeited These two Statutes were made for the punishment of the Child For the Common Law was strict enough against the Father viz. he who committed the Treason And shall the same Law which was made to punish the Child be undermined to help the Child The ancient Right shall be displaced from the Land rather then it shall be taken from the Crown which is to remain to the Crown for ever And this Statute of 26 H. 8. was made pro bonoâ— publico and it was the best Law that ever was to preserve the King and his Successors from Treason for it is as it were a hedg about the King For before this Statute Tenant in Tail had no regard to commit Treason For he forfeited his Lands but during his own life and then the Lands went to the issue in Tail But this Statute doth punish the Child for the Fathers offence and so maketh men more careful not to offend least their posterity may beg I take two grounds which are frequent in our Law First That the King is favoured in the Exposition of any Statute Com. 239 240. The second That upon the construction of any Statute nothing shall be taken by equity against the King Com. 233 234. Here in this Case although the Right were not in possession yet it was mixed with the possession from Anno 13. E. 1. untill 26. H. 8. Tenant in Tail feared not to commit Treason For the Statute of West 2. did preserve the Estate Tail so as the Father could not prejudice his issue per factum suum And therefore the Commonwealth considering that a wicked man did not care what became of himself so as his issue might be safe provided this Statute of 26. H. 8. Cap. 13. although the Statute of 16. R. 2. Cap. 5. which giveth the Premunire doth Enact that all Lands and