determined and Hanbury and Cookrells case is not adjudged but if it be it is on my side and Mich. 37 38. C. B. rot 1149. It was adjudged upon solemn argument at the Bar and on the Bench contrary to the Iudgement in Pell and Browns case if lands be devised to one and his Heirs and if he dye without issue that the land shall be to another and his Heirs this is no Estate tail for it cannot stand with the rules of Law to devise â—uth an Estate for it is but a possibility and if it should be more it must be a Fee upon a Fee and so a perpetuity and it cannot be known within what bounds it shall end either in case of years or life or other contingencies and the comparison of Lampets case is not like to this case for that was or a Term but this is of a freehold and a contingent devise of a freehold is not good since the Statute of 32 H. 8. and Brook tit devise 2 Dyer 28 H. 8. f. 3â— is not an opinion against this And though there could be such a devise of other lands yet Copyhold lands cannot be so devised as the case is here for there cannot be so much as a possibility of reverter for there is no custom to warrant it Hill 5. Car. King and Leyden in this Court and Dyer 264. and though there might be a reverter yet he cannot devise it by will and if he could yet here the conbeyance is made up by surrender admittance and devise and the party is here in by the surrender and not by the devise and so is a Copyholder in by Act executed and not upon the contingency and the will is but to direct and though all this be otherwise yet the Plaintiff cannot have Iudgement for it appears not that the surrender is presented at any Court at all and here is nothing but a recitall found Ierman Iustice said by the Common Law there ought to be a presentment at the next Court Roll chief Iustice and Nicholas Iustice There is no certain time for the presentment but it is according to the Custom of the Manor so that it be within the life of the Tenant Roll chief Iustice said it is an inconvenience to devise such a contingent Estate Nicholas doubted for he said it would shake many wills if it might not be and so said Hales The Court would advise Hales confessed the verdict was imperfect but prayed it might be amended But Latch answered it is good enough for us the Defendants for we have primer possession The Court answered it would be good to have it amended and not to have a venire de novo Venire for that will be chargeable but if the verdict be imperfect to bring the matter in Law into question we can grant a new venire although it hath been heretofore doubted Therefore be advised so that it may be argued Antea Heal against Green Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Hill 1649. rot 370. THe case between Heal and Green upon a special verdict formerly argued by Latch was again spoken to and argued by Twisden Argument upon a special verdict upon construction of words of a Will and he held that the Feme had power by the Will to make the lease notwithstanding that she hath but an Estate for life and cited 11 Car. B. R. Hill rot 810. Iob and Whites case and 21 Iac. Danyel and Vgnel and he said that the remainder limited to the daughter doth not hurt for it may very well stand with the will and the intent of the Testator appears upon the whole to be to give such a power to his wife to make this lease and cited 8 Car. Perd and Bensams case And there is a clause in the will that shews that the Testator did intend to advance his wife by this devise And the Feme shall be in by the power which shall make the estate of the lease good and it is not necessary to recite the power as it is held in Rogers case Maynard on the other side said he would not dispute the power but here is no such power given to the wife as it appears by the expresse words of the Will which doth only describe that she shall only make Estates but for her life otherwise she might make Estates in Tail or in Fee and if this should be the last part of the Will which doth limit the remainder would be destroyed and generals in a Will shall not revoke an express devise but they ought so to be construed that all the Will may stand together as Bonhams case is 8. rep Roll chief Iustice It is a difficult thing to shew the meaning of the Testator here but the general must not destroy the particular devise to which Nicholas Iustice assented and Roll enclyned that the Feme had power by the Will to make this Estate otherwise the words of the Will must be idle and void and it may be the Baron intended to give his wife such a power that she might destroy the remainders and otherwise there cannot be any construction made of the Will Ask Iustice differed in opinion and said it was unreasonable the remainder should be destroyed which is expresly limited by the Will and a Will doth differ from a conveyance Nicholas Iustice said that the words shall be expounded to shew his bounty to his wife but not to give her power to destroy the remainder Ierman Iustice There are expresse words for the Feme and the daughter and the Feme hath a power but not to destroy the Estate of the daughter Curia advisare vult Antea Booth against Lambert Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Hill 1649. rot 201. VPon a speciall verdict upon these words Argument and judgement upon special verdict the question whether dower well assiâ—gâ—ed or not viz. I do endow you of a third part of all the lands my Cosen I. S. your husband dyed seised of The question was whether the feme were well endowed by these words because he doth not say that he endows her by metes and bounds Chase held she was not well endowed and cited 8 Ed. 2.15 and said that here is incertainty which begets dissention which ought not to be and the thing is not here entire but may be devided And this is an assignment of dower which differs from a demand of dower for a demand may be general as in the cases of Thyn and Thyn in this Court and of Fairefax and Fairefax and so the book of 8 E. 2. entry congeable S 5. which seems to prove the contrary that is not to our case for it differs from it Merifield of Councell on the other side held the feme was well endowed and agreed the cases put by Chase That of Common right a feme ought to be endowed by metes and bounds yet sometimes it is otherwise as 3 Eliz. Dyer 27. a feme endowed in Common And the feme that is to be endowed and the
enough 2ly It doth not appear that there are divers Churches in New-Sarum where the Proclamation was made To the third exception the Proclamation is said to he made prout breve postulaâ— and that shall be supposed duly done and implies all requisite circumstances and he cannot make another return and it is impossible to be otherwaies To the fourth it is not necessary to retorn the place of the Summons and it is said that it was made secundum formam Statuti which supplies the rest And to this the Court said that the words secundum formam Statuti extend far And Roll Iustice said that Proclamaiton in one place was good in all Holhead of Councel with the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error proceeded and took these exceptions in the demand of the Dower 1. The demand is generally de rectoria which is not good Demand Rector for the incertainty of it for there may be a Rector of a College of a Province of a Bishoprick as well as of a Parish-Church and therefore it ought to have been de Rectoria Ecclesiae parochialis de c. 12 H. 4. f. â—9 pl. 1. 2ly The demand decimarum is too general and not good and it ought to have been decimarum granorum soeni c. for the demand de omnimodis decimis quibuscunque is too general 11 Rep. Herberts case 1. To these exceptions Hales answered that a demand in a Writ of Dower need not to be so exact as in other original Writs for original Writs are not alterable but ought to answer the forms in the Register To the second he said that rectoria shall be intended the Rectory of a Church and the Statute extends not to this besides the place of the Rectory is described which makes it certain enough To the third it is not necessary to express the Tithes particularly and the demand being of the Rectory it compriseth all the Tithes also the demand is de omnimodis decimis which is a general demand and compriseth all and is not de decimis only for that might be incertain Holhead The demand is de rectoria de omnimodis decimis which is a demand of one thing twice and that is not convenient for by this means the party may recover dammages twice and the Court will be also inveagled by this means and it matters not though we have not pleaded to this for the Court ought to take notice of it Notice because it is in the original Writ Next there is no form in the Count for cum pertinentiis is informal for it refers to the Parish and not to the Mannour 27 E. 3. f. 86. Pl. 3. Haleâ— This is but a variance in form and is not material and also it shall be intended to refer to the Mannour and not to the Parish Holhead The demand is not warranted by the Writ for the Vill and Parish are not named in the Writ but are named in the demand 11 Rep. Arondels case Hales The demand is not de rectoria in Tymsbury but de Tymsbury and is the denomination of the thing demanded Tithes Parissi and not of the Vill where it lyes Holhead It is not said where the Tithes extend and they may extend to divers Vills as a Parish may 19 E. 3. f. 9. Hales Here is one demand and it includes all the Tithes Roll Iustice You have demanded the Rectory in Tymber and not the Rectory of Tymber and by the grant of ones Mannour in Dale no more of it passeth than what doth lye in Dale and here it shall be intended so much of the Tithes as are in Tymber Holhead Here is a demand of Dower of such things whereof Dower lyes not viz. of a quarry of Stones and it appears not that the Quarry was open in the life of her Husband and if it were yet it is improper to demand it by the name of a Quarry Hales the word Quarry is a good word well-known what it means for Quarrera is an old wel-known Latine word for it Dower and she is as well dowable of it as of a Mine of Coles and it shall be intended to be open because she demands it by that name of a Quarry Holhead The demand of the Dower is also of a Hundred of which a Woman is not dowable because it is an entire thing and cannot be divided and the demand should have been de tertia parte proficuorum hundredi To this Roll Iustice answered then by your reason she shall never keep a Court. Hales It is well enough demanded for a demand shall be of the thing it self and not of the profits of it for the profits were not in the Husband but he was seised of the Hundred and the profits are a thing incertain Holhead The execution of the Habere facias fesinam is not well executed for by it two third parts are assigned for Dower and that is more than the demand Hales That is but a repetition of the thing demanded Holhead A thing not demanded at all is assigned for Dower viz. view of Frank pledge Hales That is but an incident to another thing that is demanded viz. the Hundred and by the demand of the Hundred the view of Frank-pledge is demanded and all other incidents to the Hundred Holhead Here is an assignment also of all tenures and she cannot have Homage because she is a Woman Hales She shall have all tenures which she is capable of and so all shall be understood in this place and no other she shall have Holhead The Iudgement is also if 15 Copiholds Tenements which lately were Copiholds Roll Iustice This is good enough and what loss have you by it Holhead The Assignment is also of the 3d. part de Copicia de Structuris and other words there are which are also incertain And there is error in the assignment of dammages for the dammages are assigned ultra valorem terrae which is against the Statute Roll Iustice Dammages Iudgement the Statute is an addition of the value and dammages for the Iudgement is perfect without returning the Writ of the dammages and so hath been adjudged in the Common pleas Holhead Here is an ill suggestion of the Feme for the suggesteth that her Husband dyed seised in fee of all the Lands out of which she demands her Dower and that is not true for he dyed seised of part of them in tayl To this the Court said that is not material if he dyed so seised that she ought to have Dower Holhead Dammages are given ultra valorem which I conceive is not good Roll Iustice It is well enough for dammages are given and the value by the Statute Holhead The retorn of the Elegit is not good Hales That is another Record and appears not now in the Court Roll Iustice The Elegit hath no reference to the former Record Holhead There is one error in fact and that is confessed by your joyning in demurrer Doubleness Roll
is a Iudgement well given Plea and it is too late to assign it for Error But the Court advised Postea Kerman against Iohnson Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Trin. 1649. rot 153. KErman brought an Action of Trespass and Ejectment against Johnson Special verdict in Trespass and Ejectment and upon a special Verdict found the Case was this A man devised to I. S. his whole estate paying his debts and Legacies and dies possessed of Goods and Chattels to the value of five pounds only and dyed also seised in fee of divers lands and was indebted forty pounds at the time of his death The question was whether the lands passed by the Devise Barry of Councel with the Plaintif argued that the lands did pass because that wills ought to receive a favourable construction And 2ly The intent of the Testator is to be considered who by the words all his estate did mean to comprehend as well his land as his goods and chattels for there is no restraint of the words here 7 Ed. 3.10 The word estate is a word of large extent and extends as well to the real as personal estate if it were in Case of grant much more in the case of a Will And there is another word used here to explain the Testators meaning to be to devise his lands as well as his goods and that is the word All which comprehends all manner of estates without exception Next if the land should not pass his debts and Legacies cannot be paid according to the express intent of the Testator and the intent of the party ought to be satisfied although the words be not proper because it is in a will though it might be other wise in a grant And whereas it is objected that the Iuries finding of the value of the debts and Legacies is to no purpose because the will cannot be helped by the averment of the Iury. I answer that averments if they stand with the will may be received to make the Testators intent to appear But besides this is not an averment only but a true stating of the Case to the intent to find out the Testators meaning 3ly The devisee of the land is not made Executor but Trustee or Devisee this is since the Statute of Devises 32 H. 8. The 2. question is what estate the Devisee hath in the lands I conceive he hath Fee simple because he hath all the Estate which must be the largest and that is Fee-simple Hob. rep pl. 280. The word whole goes both to the quantity and quality of an estate also And here the consideration that he is to pay all his Debts and Legacies is a good consideration to pass the fee-simple of his lands and though there may be a surplusage after the Debts and Legacies paid this hinders nothing for it is his intent that the Devisee shall have that surplusage and so he prayed Iudgement for the Plaintif Twisden for the Defendant argued that either nothing passeth by the Will or if any thing then only an estate for life passeth He agreed that improper words may sometimes pais things yet sometimes proper words will not passe things viz. if the intent of the party appear to be contrary 24 Eliz in the Earl of Northumberlands case A Devise of all his Iewels did not pass his Collar of Esses and his Iewels annexed to his Parliament Robes and the words here are not that he deviseth all his estate in his lands but his whole estate generally and if the words here should pass the lands yet the fee simple passeth not but only an estate for life in the lands which do pass nor do the words paying his Debts and Legacies cause the Fee-simple to pass for here is no likelyhood of any loss to the Executor for the words are not that he shall pay all his Debts and Legacies and if he be an Executor as the contrary appears not he shall not be charged with more than the personal estate will discharge The words do amount to a Condition and it is not found that there are any Debts or Legacies paid and so it is not performed and the heir may well enter into the lands in question for the Condition broken 2ly The Verdict doth not find how the lands are held whether in Socage or by Knights service and so it appears not whether they can be devised or no and they shall not be intended to be Socage lands Dyer f. 207. Hill 32 El. rot 2. and Pell and Browns case 3ly It is not found that the Testator dyed seised of the lands as it ought to have been and he prayed Iudgement for the Defendant Special Verdict Roll. chief Iustice to the second Exception to the Verdict answered that in a Special verdict it is not necessary to find whether lands be held in Sorage or by Knights Service and he said that the words in the Will do goe to the nature and extent of the estate as Barry urged and he doubted how the verdict shall supply the Will if it be defective for that is only to make the intent of the Will certain Adjourned to be argued again Postea Marshal against Ledsham Trin. 1651. Banc. sup MArshal as Administrator brings an Action of Debt for rent Arrest of Judgement in Debt and upon a Verdict found for the Plaintif the Defendant moved in Arrest of Iudgement and takes exception that the Plaintif had not shewn by whom the Letters of Administration were granted unto him as he ought to do but only says that the Administration debito more commissa fuit But it was answered that it is too late to move this Exception after a Verdict for the Iury have now found that the Administration was duly granted and the Letters of Administration were produced in Court and therefore not necessary to shew who granted them Declaration and it was said that in a Declaration it is not necessary to shew by whom Letters of Administration are granted or to say they were granted by him Cui pertinuit or per loci illius Ordinarium But in a Plea in Bar it is otherwise for this is not the cause of the Action Plea and effect of the sute but to shew they have been in the Spiritual Court Judicium nisi pro quaerente was afterwards given Antea Giles against Timberley Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Mich. 1650. rot 176. AN Ejectione firmae vi et armis was brought in the Common Pleas Error to reverse a judgement in an Ejectione firmae and a judgement given for the Plaintif upon a nihil dicit and in a writ of Error brought in this Court to reverse the judgement the Error assigned was in the judgement which was entred thus Ideo consideratum est quod recuperet and the word Capiatur was omitted which ought not to be because the Action is a Trespass vi et armis Roll chief Iustice said It is an ill course they use in the Common Pleas to enter
one as if the party had appeared for if he had appeared the Case would have béen otherwise So Iudgement was given for the Plaintif nisi c. Pasch 1652. Banc. sup MEmorandum One brought by Habeas Corpus from the Fleet remaâ—â—ed One was brought into the Court by the Mareschall of the Fléet by vertue of a habeas Corpus directed to him out of this Court and because it did appear upon Record that the party was charged with divers debts when he was turned over to the Fleet he was not suffered to put in Bail here but was remanded Gossage against Tayler Pasch 1652. Banc. sup Hill 1650. rot 117. IN an Ejectione firmae upon a Lease for years of a Messuage Special verdict in Trespass and Ejectrueâ—â— and certain lands in Hatfield Broad-Oak in the County of Essex upon a special verdict found the case fell out to be this Rich. Frank seised amongst other lands and Tenements of the Messuage and lands in question upon the mariage of his Son Leventhorp Frank with Susan Cotele levies a fine of the lands to the use of himself during his own life and the life of Leventhorp his Son and after during the life of Susanna Cotele the wife of Leventhorp the remainder to the use of the heirs to be begotten upon the body of Susanna by Leventhorp her Husband The question here was whether the word heirs shall be intended the heirs of Leventhorp and Susanna his wife or whether the estate shall be intended to be limited to the heirs of Susanna only and that Leventhorp shall have barely an estate for life in the lands Serjeant Glyn of Councel with the Plaintif held That Susanna Cotele hath an estate tayl executed in the lands and that the word heirs shall relate only to the heirs of Susanna and not to the heirs of Leventhorp 1. Because that here is an estate limited for life unto Susanna by an express limitation and her heirs shall take immediately after the estate for life ended and they shall not come in as purchasors By express Terms the word heirs is not limited to any person but it is left to the construction of the Law and that doth apply it to Susanna as to a person to whom Richard that setled the lands hath expressed most affection as appears by the Deed Lit. f. 6. Sect. 28. There is an expression of the party to whom the word heirs shall relate but so is not here and therefore the cases differ In 3 Ed. 3. f. 31 32. It is ruled that both parties have an estate tayl because the estate is limited to both but so it is not in our case so those books are not against me In our case it doth not appear that Richard did intend to advance the Husband of Susanna and therefore it is not reason that the word heirs should relate to him but to Susanna his wife only for in case of limitation of estates the intention of the party is to be considered and doth direct the matter and the preceding limiting of the estate to Susanna and not to Leventhorp doth shew that the party did mean to promote the heirs of Susanna Lit. Sect. 27. Dyer 27. A second reason is drawn from the penning of the déed which in the limitation of it doth encline more that the word heirs should be applyed to Susanna than to Leventhorp for the words upon her is as much as to say of her and then it is the same case with Littletons case 3ly The Intention of the Donor appears to be such by the circumstances of the entire limitations which do shew that he did intend that Leventhorp should not have such an estate whereby it should be in his power to deprive his issue and therefore the word heirs are to be applyed to Susanna and not to Leventhorp for if it should be applyed to both then Leventhorp might destroy the estate of the issue contrary to the Donors intent And whereas Dyer 99 is objected against me I answer that case is not against me for there the word heirs is expresly limited to a certain person viz. to the heirs of the body of both of them but so it is not in our case and whereas Hill 13 Iac. Lane and Panels case in this Court is also objected against me I answer that that case is in effect the same case with Dyer and the question in our case came not in dispute And the will of the Donor in deeds is to be ohserved Lit. 22. C. Tayl. 1. rep Shelleys case 103. 〈◊〉 Notwithstanding in gifts in tayl this rule holds not so that a gift in tayl may be limsted contrary to the rule of the Common Law And I know not of any authority in print or writing against me but in 13 Ed. 3. Fitz. tit variance 81 there is an expresse authority for me and 4 H. 4. Fitz. br 448. in my experience I have known many estates limited as this is in the Southern parts held good estates tayl if it should be otherwise many estates would be shaken Roll chief Iustice We have delivered our opinions before against you viz. that it was not the meaning of the donour to apply the word Heirs to the body of Susanna only for this construction would offer violence unto the words as appears by Littleton who interprets that they are to be applyed to the Heirs of both the partyes and your reason is founded upon a wrong ground and expresly against Litletons case and for your second reason it is of no waight for the words are all one as if he had said to the Heirs of the Husband and wife begotten upon the wife 3ly We are not to frame a meaning against plain words which shew the Donors intent to be against you And the Baron cannot Bar the Estate tayl as you suppose Tayl. for the Feme hath an Estate for life and if she survive she may revive the remaining Estate and we must not consider of inconveniences which possibly may happen against the expresse words of the deed and the multitude of conveyances made in this manner are of no force to alter the Law Ierman Iustice as Roll. That the word Heirs shall be applyed to the Heirs of both partyes because voluntas donatoris secundum formam chartae expressa est observanda Nicholas and Ask Iustices of the same opinion Garland against Yarrow Pasc 1652. Banc. sup THis case being in arrest of Iudgement formerly spoken unto in an Action upon the case for these words Arrest of Iudgement in an Act on for words you are a knave and keep a Bawdy house was again moved by Christ Turner who held that the words are not actionable 1. Because they are of spiritual cognisance 2ly It is not said that he kept a common Bawdy house 3ly here is no special damage laid 10 Car. These words he is a pimp adjudged not actionable in Lewis and Whittons case 4ly It is not alleged that he
mony and thereupon the Defendant moved to have the moniés out of Court Roll chief Iustice Peremptory The Plaintiff hath lost his mony â—y this verdict therefore let him shew cause why the Defendant should not have them for it is peremptory to the Plaintiff Franklin Mich. 1653. Banc. sup IN an Action of Accompt the Defendant was adjudged to accompt Motion for Merchants to be joyned to Auditors assigned to receive an accompt and Auditors were assigned The Court was moved that they would order to joyn some Merchants to the Attorneys on either side to help them to mannage the Accompt because the Attorneys were not skilfull in such businesses Roll chief Iustice We can make no rule for this but you may by consent advise with Merchants to assist you in drawing up the Accompts Mich. 1653. Banc. sup BY Roll chief Iustice One burned in the hand may be a Witness one that hath been burned in the hand for Felony may notwithstanding be a witness in a Cause for he is in a capacity to purchase Lands and his fault is purged by his punishment Townsend and Barker Mich. 1653. Banc. sup Trin. 1653. rot 743. TOwnsend brought an Action upon the Case against Barker Arrest of judgement in an action for words that had béen a Copartner with him in trade for speaking these words of him You are a cosening Knave and did cosen me of 1200 l. at one time and that was in making an accompt in the year 1648. Vpon a verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of Iudgement that the words are not actionable because though they he spoken of a Tradesman yet they are not spoken of him in reference to his Trade but in reference to an Accompt and although by way of reduction and consequence they may reflect upon his honesty yet they are not actionable and though his reputation be impaired by speaking them yet he cannot be endicted for cosening in his Trade by reason of them because they are spoken of a singular and particular abuse and not of a general cosening used in his Trade and an Action upon the Case lies not for words which are only scandalous by way of reduction and if the words should hinder the party to get a Partner hereafter to trade with him yet he may use his Trade and so cannot be prejudiced nor are the words that he cheated him but that he cosened him which are not of so violent a construction Wild on the other side said that here is a Partnership which is necessary to the driving of a Trade and without which it cannot be so well driven and the Accompt is incident to all Partnerships and prayed for Iudgement Roll chief Iustice If the Copartnership continued the words were actionable without doubt for then they must be spoken of him in the way of his Trade Case but here the Partnership being ended makes the matter more considerable but yet as it is the words are scandalous and may hinder him from getting a Partner for the time to come and it may be he cannot mannage his Trade without a Partner and although an Accompt be a private thing yet the Plaintiff is disgraced by the speaking of the words and none will deal with a man that will cosen his own Partner and we must countenance Trade and Traffique and mens credits and the Accompt is not so collateral a thing to trade as Hales objects as is the hiring of a shop to trade in or the like German Iustice ad idem and said that Copartnership is necessary to support Trade and the keeping of a true Accompt is the principal thing between Partners Nicholas and Ask Iustices ad idem Judicium nisi pro querente Bird and Christopher Mich. 1653. Banc. sup IN this Case upon giving of an evidence in a Trespass and Ejectment Extinguishment of a Proviso in a Deed. it was said by Roll chief Iustice that if I do enfeoff I. S. with a Proviso contained in the Deed that it shall be lawfull for me to revoke this Feoffment and afterwards I levy a fine to I. S. of the same Land this is an extinguishment of the Proviso of revocation Olive and Tong. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup Trin. 1651. rot 1426. Vpon a special Verdict in an Action of Trespass and Ejectment Special Verdict in a Trespass and Ejectment the Case in effect was this One whose Sirname was Mills seised of gavelkind-Gavelkind-lands in Kent in fee by his last Will and Testament devised these Lands to Elizabeth his Daughter in tayl with a Proviso in the Will that if his Daughter Elizabeth did mary one of his own Sirname that then she should have the Lands in fee-simple Elizabeth maried one whose Sirname was Mill but commonly called and known by the name Mills also The question was whether she had maried one of such a Sirname whereâ—â— according to the Proviso in the Will she had a fee-simple in the Lands â—evised unto her or whether his Sirname should be accompted a distinct name from the Testators so that Elizabeth by the Will could only have an Estate in tayl in the Lands devised unto her It was argued first that the name Mill and Mills shall not be said to be one and the same name no more than if she had maried one of a clear differing Sirname in sound yet commonly called also Mills could she have been said to have maried one of his own Sirname and the Proviso here is not a particular pointing out of the person whom his Daughter should mary but a general limitation directing her to mary one of his own Sirname and this ought to have been punctually followed because the name was used to induce the affection of the Devisor to enlarge the estate given by him If he had devised his Land to his Daughter E. if she shall mary a Protestant or an Earl she must mary one that is really so and not one called or only reputed so And as to the objection that this construction would make contrariety in the Will which is not to be admitted this will not be if the Will be taken compositive as it is penned or together and not abstractive and taken to pieces and if it should not be intended that she should mary one who in truth was of his name there would be a contradiction in the Will and here is an Emphasis in the word Own which must be meant his real name and not of a reputative name Roll chief Iustice If a Iuror be retorned by the name of Mills and is sworn by the name of Mill shall this be a mistryal quasi non and the words found alike as Baxter and Backster At an other day the Case was put again by Hales and argued for the Plaintiff and he made divers points in the Case but I could not well hear him but the only point insisted on was the point formerly spoken to and the sum of his Argument was that we are in
secrets of his Clyents cause Not to disclose a Clyents cause and thereupon he was forborn to be examined Pilkinton and Bagshaw Pasch 1655. Banc. sup VPon a tryal to be had at the Bar between Pilkington and Bagshaw Tryal at the Bar. the Plaintif would not put in his writ that the tryal might goe on Whereupon Roll chief Iustice bid the Cryer to call the Attorney of the Plaintif to appear and to bring in the writ upon pain of 20 l. and said Pain of 20 l. Attorney put out of the Roll. Non-sute upon the Record that if he brought it not in he should be put out of the Roll. Serjeant Maynard moved that if he brought not in the writ that the Plaintif might be called non-sute upon the Record which Roll chief Iustice answered might well be because the parties have day in Court by the Record or Roll afterwards the Sollicitor who had the writ brought it in yet Roll chief Iustice said There shall notwithstanding the writ be brought in be 20 l. fine set upon him for his trifling with the Court. The Protector and Sumner Pasch 165â— Banc. sup SErjeant Bernard moved that Sumner that appeared in Court upon his habeas corpus directed to the Kéeper of Northampton Gaol might be bailed To bail a prisoner denied for that having killed two men upon the Highway the Iury had found it Man-slaughter se defendendo Roll chief Iustice answered The Iuries conclusion is contrary to their premises Therefore let the prisoner be sent to Northampton Gaol whence he came yet that may not be for the fact was done in Peterborough Tryal Writ ad reâ—piendum and therefore he cannot be tryed at Northampton therefore let him be sent to Peterborough Gaol with a writ ad recipiendum to the Gaoler there to take charge of him Pilkington versus Bagshaw Pasch 1655. Banc. sup IN a Tryal at the Bar in a Trespass and Ejectment betwixt Pilkington and Bagshaw Trespass and Ejectment the question being whether Copyhold lands may be entailed by the custom of the Manor It was said that if Tenant in tail and the issue in tail of Copyhold lands in tail joyn in a surrender in a Court Baron of the Copyhold lands Estopel Copyhold lands in tail Customary entail Fine State enjoyed Seisure of Cepyhold lands that this is not an estopel for it ought to be by fine or deed indented And Roll chief Iustice said that Copyhold lands in tail are not within the Statute of Westm 2. but it is a Customary entail like in its nature to another entail and such an estate must be docked by fine or by some other customary way It was also said by him that if Copies of Court Rolls be shewed to prove a Customary estate the enjoynment of such estates must also be proved otherwise the proof is not good It was also said upon the evidence That a seisure by the Lord made of Copyhold entailed lands within the Manor of Wakefield in Yorkshire is in the nature of a recovery to deck the entail and that the manner of doing it is either for the Copyholder to let his Copyhold for more years than he ought or to refuse to do his service and then the Lord seifes the lands for a forfeiture and grants it to another by the consent of the Copyholder that made the forfeiture It was then also said by Roll chief Iustice Custom that a Custom cannot be urged for a thing that had its beginning since Rich. the 1. if a Record can be shewed to the contrary Common recovery Recompense in value Custom Copyhold destroyed It was also said by him that a common recovery suproseth a recompence in value to all persons who lost the estate by the recovery He said also that he conceived that there could be no such Custom to cut off entails of Copyhold lands by the forfeiture and seisure of the Lord for his seisure upon the forfeiture destroys the Copy-hold estate by the Common Law for it is in the Lords election after the seisure whether he will grant the estate again or no and you do not prove that the Custom binds him to it Nota. Harris and Pasch 1655. Banc. sup THe Court was moved in the Case of one Harris To amend an old judgement Denied that the entry of a judgement twelve years past might be amended upon the Roll. But Roll chief Iustice answered It cannot be after so long time past Pasch 1655. Banc. sup VPon a writ of Error brought to reverse a fine levied by an Infant being a Feme Covert Day to inspect an Infant The Court was moved for a day to bring in the party that levied the fine to be inspected by the Court which was granted and at the day she was brought into the Court and viewed and two witnesses deposed that she was within age at the time of the fine levied Entry upon the Roll. which was entred upon the Roll upon which the Issue was tryed Pasch 1655 Banc. sup IT was said by Roll chief Iustice Election That if there be two Kinsmen in equal degree of kindred to the Intestate it is in the election of the Ordinary to which of them he will grant Letters of Administration Pasch 1655. Banc. sup AN Outlawry was reversed Outlawry reversed because the place where the County Court was held is not shewed in the secundo exactus Pasch 1655. Banc. sup IT was moved that there was a judgement given in the Common Pleas To affirm a judgement a writ of Error depending and thereupon the Defendant brought his writ of Error to reverse the judgement in this Court and since pending the writ of Error the partses were agréed and therefore they desired the judgement might be affirmed because that otherwise satisfaction of the judgement cannot be acknowledged upon the Roll because the Court of Common Pleas were forclosed to do any thing further upon the judgement given there by reason of the writ of Error But Roll chief Iustice answered It cannot be Denied for you shew no cause why we should affirm the judgement and therefore we will make no rule in it but enter satisfaction upon the Roll if you will at your own peril Pasch 1655. Banc. sup IT was said by Roll chief Iustice that an Action upon the case will lie against one that brings vexatious actions against another Action upon the Case for vexation or for entring of Actions of a great value to force his adversary to put in great bail where he hath but small cause of Action Nota. Trevanian and Penhollow Trin. 1655. TRevanian brought an Action upon the case against Penhollow for speaking of these words of him Plea to an Action on the Case Thou hast taken a false Oath at the Assizes and art false forsworn The Defendant pleads that the Plaintif had agréed to accept of 3 Iuggs of Beer from him in satisfaction The Plaintif
the mony is not paid a Iudgement is obtained against White for the mony White makes his will and makes his Heir at law his Executor and dyes leaving lands to descend White as Heir brings a Writ of Error to reverse this Iudgement It was argued by the Councell of the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error that the Writ did lye because although the Action in the former Iudgement was but a personal Action yet in this Case the Land of the Heir may be charged by the Iudgement Heir Elegit for an elegit may be thereupon taken out to charge â—is Lands and therefore the Iudgement concerns him as Heir as well as Executor and therefore it is reason he should bring a Writ of Error to reverse the Iudgement because he may be prejudiced by it Executor And a Case in Trin. 29 Eliz. rot 631. Banc. Reg. was cited that the Heir is pridy to the Iudgement and therefore shall have a Writ of Error Error and he is not meerly terr-Tenant 13 E. 4.2 Roll Iustice the terr-Tenant sole shall not have a Writ of Error upon an extent Error And in the Case at the barr the Heir is not privy to the Iudgement and the extent is only upon him as terr-Tenant and he is not made privy to the Iudgement by the extent but after Execution he may have a Writ of Error and he said Bail the Bail cannot bring a Writ of Error upon the Iudgement given against the Principal and the same reason is here and it will be very hard to maintain this Writ of Error Adjourned to the next term Terry and Baxter Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc 23 Car. rot 394. TErry brings an Action of Debt upon an Assumpsit against Baxter Demurrer upon an Dclaration in Assumpsit to stand to an award to stand to an Award The Defendant pleads nul arbitrement the Plaintiff sets forth the award and assigns a breach The Defendant demurs and for cause shews that part of the award was to pay 5 l. to the poor of the Parish of D. which was not within the submission and so the award was not good Rolle Iustice answered if the award be void to the 5 l. Award good in part i a good award awarded to be paid to the poor yet it is good to the rest for it is perfect as to the ending of all differences between them which are submitted and therefore shew cause on Monday next why judgement should not be given for the Plaintiff Morefield and VVebb Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc 23 Car. rot 50. VVEbb brings an Action upon the Case against Morefield in the palace Court at Westminster Error to reverse a Iudgement in an Action upon the Case and hath a Iudgement Morefield brings a Writ of Error in this Court to reverse the Iudgement and Assigns these Errors 1. It is not shewed in the Declaration that the cause of Action was infra jurisdictionem palatii But Rolle Iustice answered Iurisdiction that it was shewed to be infra jurisdictionem Curiae and that was good enough for the Court is alleged to be held by Letters patents Retorn A 2d Exception was that there was not fifteen dayes for the retorn of the Venire facias as there ought to be But to this Rolle Iustice also answered that the Court is held by Letters patents and therefore it may be retornable within fifteen dayes though by the usual course of the Common law it cannot And therefore ordered the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error to shew better matter otherwise Iudgement should be affirmed against him The King and Holland Trin. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Case between the King and Holland was moved again For quashing an inquisition for the King Inquisition and the Councell against the King moved that the inquisition found for the King to entitle him to the use of the Copyhold might be quashed because the King cannot be intitled to such a use because it is a thing in privity only and cited the Statute of 27 H. 8. of uses Vse and Cooks 1. rep 123 and said that the King cannot be intitled ot Copyhold lands of an Alien much lesse to the use of Copyhold lands Copyhold King VVrong Protection Trust if he should 1. The Lord would be wronged which the King ought not to do but to protect his subjects for the protection of the subject is not only matter of honour to the King but also of trust in the Crown 2ly A stranger is wronged by it 3ly The Copyholder of the Manor cannot have remedy for the injury done him Sute for he ought to sue in the Lords Court and not else where and here he cannot do it and the rule in law is de minimis non curat lex and it is much lesse for the honnour of the King to have a Copyhold estate Honour which is a base tenure But it may be objected that if the King shall not have this use he shall be in a worse condition than a subject To this it is answered that he shall be so in cases which touch his royalty and may be a disparagement to him Copyhold which indeed doth not make him in a worse condition though it may seem so but it is more for his honor and a Copyhold is an estate at the will of the Lord and ought to be protected by the Lord and the King cannot be Tenant at will to any Alien Trust and therefore cannot have a Copyhold estate and an Alien is not capable of a trust because it is a thing in Action which an Alien cannot have and therefore he cannot derive it from him Twisden for the King in his Argument considered 1. Whether the King can have a use at the Common law which is for an Alien 2. Whether a trust differs from a use for the first he said that an Alien may purchase lands Alien Praerogative and a use at the Common law but he cannot retain them therefore the King shall have them by his Praerogative and a use is not a thing in privity but is an Antient inheritance at the Common law 2ly There is no confidence annexed to cestui que use or to the Feoffor but may be disposed of 3ly Things privity in Action may be given to the King Privity and a use is an inheritance in the nature of a Chattell 4ly A use is grantable over Privity and therefore may be given to the King and the meaning of the word lost in the Statute is to be intended that it may be lost for the difficulty of finding such subtile conveyances and not that the right was really lost Trust And for a trust it is but a new name given to a use and invented to Defraud the Statute of uses and a trust of a Copyhold is all one with another trust for it is the taking of the profits of the land and not the Estate in
That the law doth take notice of an Arch-deacon being a publique Ordinary and therefore it is not needfull to expresse that the letters were granted per Archidiaconum of such a place Ordinarium illius loci or cui administratio pertinuit but otherwise it were if they were granted within a peculiar jurisdiction Therefore he ordered to shew better matter or elce Iudgement should be given for the Plaintiff Eeles and Lambert Mich. 23 Car. Benc Reg. vid. antea THe Case between Eeles and Lambert was again moved Argument up on a speciall verdict which upon a speciall verdict found was this Sir Molton Lambert makes a lease of certain lands to Eeles for 21 years by deed and Covenants for himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns that the lessee shall peaceably and quietly enjoy the lands let during all the Term the Lessor makes his Will and thereby makes Lambert the Defendant his Executor and dyes and by the Will divers goods in specie are devised to sundry persons Lambert the Executor delivers the goods bequeathed to the Legatees Eeles is ousted of the lands by I. S. and thereupon brings an Action of Covenant against Lambert the Executor who pleads fully administred The question was whether the paying of these legacies by the Executor were a devastavit Devastavit and so the Executor to be charged de bonis propriis to satisfie the Covenant broken or no Green of Council with the Plaintiff argues that it was a devastavit notwithstanding that the devise was of goods in specie and that the Executor had only delivered them because that the Legatees had no property in the goods bequeathed them Property before the Executor had delivered them no more than if they had never been devised and cited 2 H. 6. f. 16. and Cooks Lit. 111. and he said the finding of the Covenant broken was nothing to the purpose and he said it was a Devastavit because it shall be intended that the Executor might know of the Covenant made by the Testator which he was bound also to keep or else to satisfie for the breach of it Covenant and the contingency whether the Covenant would be broken or no makes no difference in the Case for if it should it would prove mischievous in destruction of Covenants which are to be accompted of as Debts Doct. Stud. lib. 2. C. 10. Dyer f. 324. Hob. â— 363 397. But it may be objected that if this should be a Devastavit then Legacies could not be paid which would be dangerous to Executors by reason of being lyable to sutes for them Executors 21 E. 4 f. 21. Brook Tit. Proces S. 10. To tâ—is I answer It may be dangerous yet it is not to the purpose for an Executor should consider of such dangers when he takes upon him an Executorship and take notice of them and he is not compellable to pay Legacies and the Law will not protect him if he pay them against Law Hob. 246. and if the Court Christian endeavour to compel him he may have a Prohibition Prohibition 3ly The Executor peradventure might conceive that there would be Assets afterwards and in that consideration did pay the Legacies and if the 5 Rep. Green and Harisons case and 15 Iac. Robsons case be objected I answer this Case differs from them for here the Question is betwéen Legacies and Debts and there between one Debt and another to wit betwéen a Debt of a higher nature and a Debt of a lower nature Hales for the Defendant argued that it was no Devastavit 1. He agrées Property that the Legatees have no property in the Goods by the devise 2ly If the Covenant had béen broken when the Legacies were paid it would have been a Devastavit 3ly He held that the matter is as well found in the special verdict as it might have béen pleaded and not put at all to the Iury to find The Question here is whether the administration of the Goods before the Covenant broken be good after it is broken and there is good matter before the Court found in the special verdict though it might have been found better The first Argument I will draw from the nature of that upon which the Action is founded namely the Covenant The Action depends partly upon the Déed of Covenant partly upon the breach of it and here is no ground of Action at the time when the administration of the Goods was made and Harisons case cannot be avoided for a Statute is a present duty Duty Star Obligation and ought to be paid before an Obligation Robsons case 14. 15 Iac. And it is as agréeable to Law to pay a Legacy as a Debt upon a Covenant and the mischief to the Lessee in our case is not so material as the mischief may be on the Executors part it is not materially objected that he might take security Security for he cannot compel it For the Objection that our Law takes notice of a Legacy I answer that the Law takes notice of a Legacy as to give an interest in it to the Legatee Interest although he may not take it without the Executors consent 2ly It takes notice of it as remediable by the Law of the Kingdom though not by the Common-law and therefore consider the Statute 21 H. 8. of Administrations Common law Civil law and the Common-law is Iudge of the Statute concerning Administration and not the Spiritual-law Hill 17 Iac. Hinson Buttons Case The Common-law gives not a remedy fora Legacy Legacy but the Spiritual-Court is supported by the Common-law to do it and by the antient Common-law there was remedy to recover a Legacy 2 Rich. 3. f. 14. Glanv lib 7. C. 6.7 and the power of the Ecclesiastical Court is derived from the Common-law and the Common-law will take notice of a compulsary way in the Ecclesiastical-Court to pay a Legacy And the payment in our case is executed and now the Law takes notice of it because the Defendant was compellable to it Pâ—omise If an Executor promise to pay a Legacy an Action upon the case will lye against him if he do not pay it Roll Iustice the Testator may defeat all Covenants by this means and Greens reason is not answered which is the great doubt in the case It was Necton Sharps case 38 Eliz. that Legacies ought to be paid conditionally viz. to be restored if the Covenant should be broken When you argue again argue to this point Bacon Iustice cited a Case 32 Eliz. in the Exchequer against the opinion of Roll and said if the Legacies should not be paid it might be a loss to the Common-wealth for it may be the Goods will perish with kéeping them and the keeping of them may be a charge to the Executor and no body shall have any benefit of them for they may cost more to keep than they are worth and a Devastavit lies not against an Executor of
supposed to be done in fee and so seised did demise the same for years by deed to the Plaintiff reserving rent in which deed was a clause of reentry for non payment of the rent and afterwards made his last Will in writing and dyed by which will be gave the said land in qua c. to the Defendant and that after the rent was behind and that he for the non payment of the rent according to the Covenant in the deed by virtue of the clause of reentry did enter intot he lands which is the same breaking of the Fence and entry for which the Plaintiff brings his Action and demands Iudgement if the Plaintiff ought to have his Action To this Plea the Plaintiff demurs and shews for cause That it doth not shew that the lease made to the Plaintiff is a lease of the land in which the Trespasse is supposed to be done 2ly Licence The Defendant doth not shew that he did â—nter into the land by leave of the Executor which he ought to have done for though the land was devised to him by will yet he cannot enter into the land without leave of the Executor The Court ordered the Defendant to shew cause why Iudgement should not be given against him upon his plea. and Long. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Case for these words spoken of him Arest of Iudgment in an action for words Long is a murtherer and hath bewitched my Child and was the death of my Child and obteins a verdict The Defendant moves in arrest of Iudgement and takes these exceptions to the Declaration 1. That it is not said that the Child was bewitched to death 2ly It doth not express whether the Child bewitched was born alive or not To this the Court said Felony that the bewitching of the Child is Felony though it do not dye by it And to the second exception That the Court doth not take notice of a Child if it be dead-born and they will intend it was born alive and Roll Iustice said that these words Thou didst kill my Masters Cook Averment have been adjudged actionable although the Plaintiff did not aver that his Master had a Cook Therefore let the Plaintiff take his Iudgement if better matter be not shewn Saturday next Carver against Pierce 23 Car. Banc. Reg. CArver brings an Action upon the Case against Pierce for speaking these words of him Arrest of Iudgement in an action for VVords Thou art a Thief for thou hast stollen my Dung and hath a Verdict The Defendant moved in arrest of Iudgement that the words were not actioanble for it is not certain whether the Dung be a Chattel or part of the Free-hold and if so it cannot be Theft to take it but a Tresspass and then the Action will not lye Chattel Bacon Iustice Dung is a Chattel and may be stollen But Roll Iustice answered Dung may be a Chattel and it may not be a Chattel for a heap of Dung is a Chattel but if it be spread upon the Land it is not and said the word Thief here is actionable alone Felony and there are no subsequent words to mitigate the former words for the stealing of Dung is Felony if it be a Chattel Bacon Iustice said It doth not appear in this Case of what value the Dung was and how shall it then be known whether it be Felony or pety Larceny To this Roll answered the words are scandalous notwithstanding and actionable though the stealing of the Dung be not Felony The rule was to move it again Tuesday next Mich. 23. Car. Banc. Reg. A Writ of Error was brought in this Court to reverse a Iudgement given in the Marshals Court Error to reverse a Iudgment for discontinuance in the Process Discontinuance and the exception taken was that there was a dicontinuance in the process and so there ought to have been no Iudgement and therefore the Iudgement given is erroneous and that there was a Discontinuance it thus appears The Continuance was ad proximam Curiam and it appears upon the retorn of the Venire facias that that was no Court day for it was the three and twentyeth day of the Month whereas Friday on which day the Court was held was not the 23 day and so there is Error in the continuance Roll Iustice said the former Continuance was to the 9th day and from thence to the 15th and that is but six daies and so wants of the time Iudgement Bacon Iustice Where there is a Discontinuance the Court hath no power to give Iudgement and so the Iudgement is here erroneous and therefore let it be reversed nisi causa c. Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. LEssee for years of Lands by Deed Demurrer to a Plea in an action of Covenant brings an Action of Covenant against the Lessor and declares that the Lessor had covenanted that he should peaceably and quietly enjoy the Lands let during the Term and that a Stranger entred upon him and ousted him within the Term. To this Declaration the Defedant demurs Roll Iustice said that the Covenant in this Case is broken though it be a Stranger that entered and ousted the Lessee Walker of Councel with the Defendant took this difference where a Stranger enters upon the Lessee and doth a Trespass and where he enters and outs the Lessee in the former Case he said Covenant the Covenant is not broken but in latter it is broken Iudgement was given for the Plaintiff except cause should be shewn Monday next Thynn against Thynn Mich. 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Hill 23 Car. rot 1658. THynn brought an Action of Dower against Thynn Error to reverse a Iudgement in Dower Return Proclamation and hath a Iudgement by default and thereupon a Writ of Enquiry issued out to the Sheriff who delivered seisin of the Dower recovered and returned the Writ upon this Iudgement The Defendant brings a Writ of Error and assigns these Errors in the Record 1. The original Writ appears not to be returned according to the Statute for the year doth not appear when it was returned 2ly The Proclamation made by the Sheriff appears not to be where the Land lyes 3ly Summons The return doth not mention that the Proclamation was after the Summons as it ought to be as it is Hob. Reports in Allens Case 4ly It is not said that he did make Proclamation upon the Land 5ly It appears not that the Proclamation was in the Parish where the Summons was as the Statute directs To these exceptions Hales of Councel on the other side answered To the first Return that the retorn of the original Writ shall be intended to be in the year of the Reign and not of the Age of the King though the word Reign be omitted To the second the Lands lye in divers Parishes and Proclamation at the Church of any of the Parishes is good
Parish shall not be intended larger than a Vill if the contrary do not appear but here the contrary doth appear by the words of the Demand which are de rectoria de Imber Tymesbury infra parochia de Imber 3 4 Phillip Mary Dyer 142. and the different penning and expression of the Demand is to be observed Grant Abatement Variance for by that it appears there is a difference betwéen Imber and the Parish of Imber Grants Fitzh 87. by granting a Mannour with the appurtenances an Advowson will pass 19 E. 2. Tit. brief the Writ abated for variance betwéen the Writ and the Count. A 4th Error is to avoid the execution because of the Error in fait for the Hundred of Warmister doth extend to Sutton parva which is not named in the Writ and so the dammages are given for more than is demanded Dammages Intendment and it shall not be interpreted by Intendment and the Hundred is not demanded for the Vill relates to the Land and not to the Hundred 6 E. 3. 12. 8 Rep. 119. Bonhams Case and prays Iudgement for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error Maynard of Councel with the Defendant desired time to argue and it was granted Postea Chambers against VVollaston Hill 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Mich. 22 Car. rot 21. CHambers brought an Action of Assault and Battery Demurrer upon the Custom of London pleaded and false imprisonment against Wollaston Wollaston pleads a special Plea of Iustification by vertue of a Custom in the City of London whereby he had authority to take and imprison him for disturbing an Election of Wardens of a Company and untill he would promise not to disturb such Elections afterwards To this Plea the Plaintiff demurs and takes these Exceptions 1. Custome The Custom pleaded is against Law for it appears not that there was any sute depending either by Bill or Endictment or otherwise and so the Custome is against Law Stat. 25 E. 3. C. 4. 25 E. 3. C. 3. and so was the Petition of Right 3 Car. And though the Customs of the City of London are confirmed by Statute-law yet illegal Customs are not confirmed 2ly Iudgement The Iudgement is against Law for by the Iudgement no remedy is given for the offence committed to the party against whom it is commited but only that the offendor shall be imprisoned untill he promise not to disturb Elections again 3ly The party committed is not within the Custom by the Defendants own shewing 4ly The Custome set forth is not prosecuted for the commitment is not for the Disturbance but because the party will not promise not to disturb again 5ly The detension of the party in prison is against Law Hales of Councel with the Defendant desired time to argue and the Court desired to have Books Holdigh against Chace Hill 23 Car. Banc. Reg. Pasc 23 Car. rot 326. HOldigh brought an Action of Debt against Chace A special Verdict upon Non est sactum pleaded to a boad as an Executor upon an Obligation made to the Testator The Defendant pleaded non est factum and upon this Plea an Issue was joyned and a special Verdict found upon which Verdict the Case appeared to be this The Defendant Chace was bound in an obligation for the payment of a certain sum of mony unto A. B. and to I. S. joyntly I. S. dyes A. B. survives and makes Holdigh his Executor and dyes Holdigh brings an Action of Debt in his own name against Chace the Defendant and declares upon this obligation made to the Testator and to I. S. and doth not aver that the Testator did survive I. S. The Defendant pleads non est factum and the question was whether this be a good plea or no and to prove that it is no good plea Plea but that it was the deed of the Defendant the Councel for the Plaintiff cited these books 3. H. 6. 4. 35 H. 6. fol. 39. 46 E. 3. 7. 14 E. 4. fol. 4. 18 E. 2. 2. and put this case Two enfants joyntenants alien and one dies The surviver brings a dum fuit infra aetatem and counts of the Feofment of one of them and there the right was adjudged not to be severed by the Feoffement and so the writ good and in our case the matter of variance alleged goes to the writ and not the Action and it is now too late for the Defendant to take advantage of it and prayes Iudgement for the Plaintiff Roll Iustice said the issue is whether it be the Defendants deed or not and without doubt it is his deed and therefore let him shew cause why the Plaintiff should not have Iudgement Boone against Sheers Hill 23. Ba. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot 288. BOone brought an Action of Debt upon an obligation of 400 l. Demurrer to a Plea against Sheers and declares that the condition of the obligation was that the Defendant should make such a voyage with a Ship and pay certain monyes at his return and other conditions mentioned and for not performing the conditions he brings his Action The Defendant pleads in bar that the Ship was taken in the voyage per homines bellicosos Plea and demands Iudgement of the Action To this plea the Plaintiff demurred and shewed for cause that the Plea did not give answer to all the Declaration Demurrer Yard of Councell with the Defendant said the plea was good for the plea answers the whole condition of the Bond which was first to make the voyage with the Ship and then at his retorn to perform the other conditions and being hindred in the one he was not bound to perform the other Bacon Iustice Let us see a book to consider of Royston against Mees Hill 23 Car. Banc. Reg. ROyston makes a lease for years of certain lands to I. S. rendring rent Arrest of Iudgement in Debt the lessee makes his will and makes Mees the Defendant his Executor and dyes the Executor possesseth himself of the remainder of the term of the lands let and after the rent is behind Royston brings an Action of Debt against the Defendant and declares against him for the rent so behind in the debet and detinet and upon this an issue is joyned and a verdict for the Plaintiff The Defendant moves in arrest of Iudgement Declaration and shews for cause that the Declaration is not good because the Action being an Action of Debt brought against the Defendant as an Executor it ought to have been in the detinet and not in the debet and detinet But Wild of Councell with the Plaintif argued that the Declaration was good and the Action well brought in the debet and detinet and cited Brook title extinguishment 34. and the comment 526. and said it is an Action founded upon a lease by deed which was made by the Testator and cited 20 H. 6.10 H. 7. fol. 50. And that it is the constant form of charging
is scriptum and for the time the Defendant ought to have alleged that he bad not convenient time Tender if the truth were so but here doth appear convenient time and it is not necessary for the Plaintiff to tender the Obligation but the Defendant ought to do it at his own perill and to pay the mony in convenient time after the mariage and the other is not bound to demand it Intendment nor to be at the charge to make the Obligation Bacon Iustice to the same effect and said the words ought to be intended of a writing obligatory according to common intendment Time and the meaning of the parties although it be not so expressed and it cannot be meant of a promise by parol for there are no presidents in Law for verbal securities but only for securities in writing and the word in debita juris forma implies so much otherwise here would be only one promise to make good another promise Pasc 9 Iac. rot 361. Banc. Reg. 21 Iac. upon a Writ of Error in the Exchequer-Chamber the former Iudgement was affirmed and the breach here assigned meets with the Assumpsit for it is that he did not become bound per c. and so the breach is well assigned 2ly Here appears in the Declaration to be two Months for the performing the promise which is a convenient time and there doth not appear any hinderance and the Defendant was bound to do it without request and there is no necessity for the Plaintiff to make an election of the time when he will have it done The Court bid the Plaintiff take his Iudgement except better matter were shewed on Monday following Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment of forcible entry To quesh an Endictment The Exception was that the forcible entry is said is to be made in messuagium sive tenementum which is incertain But Roll Chief Iustice doubted whether the exception was good or not because it was messuagium sive tenementum and the word Messuage may be good though Tenemen tum be not But it was quashed upon another exception The King against VVood. Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. THe Court was moved to quash an Endictment taken at a Sessions against one Wood for getting the horse of another man into his possession To quash an Endictment by using another mans name and a false token The exceptions taken against it were 1. The Endictment doth not say that it was contra Statutum But to this the Court answered that it was an offence at the Comon Law and the Endictment lay at the Common Law and therefore it need not to be expressed to be contra formam Statuti 2ly It doth not shew what the false token was nor in whose name it was used But Roll chief Iustice took another exception viz. that the Endictment was that the Defendant did the fact nuper and that is so general a word that no answer can be given to it And for that it was quashed Twigg against Roberts Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Hil. 22 Car. rot 956. AN Action of Debt was brought against an Executor in Bristow upon a Custom of concessit solvere by him to pay a Debt due by the Testator upon a simple contract and a verdict and a Iudgement for the Plaintiff Error to reverse a Iudgment in Debt against an Executor The Defendant brought a Writ of Error in this Court to reverse the Iudgment and the Error assigned was that the custom of bringing an Action of Debt upon a concessit solvere is not a good custom Custom Wager of Law because it hindrers the party to wage his Law as by the Law he may do Walker of Councel with the Defendant in the Writ of Error argued that it was a good custom because the party is not thereby hindred of a tryal and there are customs in London which are against the Common Law as for example for the Recorder to give Iudgement upon an exigent The Court desired to see the book and to have presidents brought them And said This Custom had been allowed against the party that made the contract but the doubt is whether it be good against an Executor for a concessit solvere is without any consideration And Roll chief Iustice said that this custom doth break three rules of the Law Barker against Denham Mich. 24 Car. Banc. Reg. Trin. 23 Car. rot 1280. BArker brought an ejectione firmae against Denham Special verdict in an Ejectione firmae and upon not guilty pleaded an issue was joyned and the reupon a special verdict was found that by the Custom of the manour whereof the Lands in question were held a Copyholder might surrender his Copyhold out of Court into the hands of two customary Tenants to the use of another and at the next Court the party to whose use the Copyhold was so surrendred used to be admitted and That there was such a surrender made here but that the party to whose use the Copyhold was so surrendred dyed before the next Court and so was not admitted The question was whether he dying before his admittance shall be said to be a Copyholder by the Custom of the manour or no. Descent Hales Argued that he is not a Copyholder within the Custom and then if this Custom hinder not the Lands shall descend according to the rules of the Common Law for so is it of all Copyhold Lands if a speciall custom hinder not and here 1. the words of the Custom are to be considered and 2ly Custom how they are to be expounded and for this he cited 49 E. 3. f. 19.22 E. 3.2 E. 4. f. 24. A Custom shall be construed according to the Common apprehension of the lay gens and a Custom shall be interpreted according to the most effectual operation of the Law 3 H. 7.5 Doct. and Stud. 48.21 H. 7. f. 33.44 Ass f. 10.4 H 8. Dyer 28. A denyal actual by a Copyholder to pay his rent is a forfeiture Forfeiture not an implicative denyal lib. intrat f. 238. And by a surrender of a Copyhold before admittance the surrendree hath no real possession and the heir of a Copyholder before his admittance holds by the Copy of his Ancestor and so he hath title but the surrenderee can have no title before admittance Title and he cited Rawlins and Iones his case and Spurlins case A surrender before admittance is but a a consent of the party to part with the estate but passeth it not and after administration it should have no relation to the surrender Twisden for the Defendant Relation 1. He agreed that a Copyholder before admittance is not perfect in his Estate but yet the admittance shall relate to the surrender and both shall be accounted one entire Act contrary to other learnings 2ly The Son is in by descent and the descent must be ruled by the custom and he is now
to alter all or any part of the settlement made at any time during his life The verdict finds further that there was an Ordinance of Parliament made in the year of our Lord 1645. that Sir Thomas Morgan should forfeit all his lands and estate which he was then seised or possessed of or had been seised or possessed of from the year 1641. and that by the same Ordinance the lands in question were given to Mr. Pym that by virtue of the said Ordinance he encred was seised pro ut that Mr. Pym died so seised after whose death the Plaintifs lessor as his heir entred made a lease to the Plaintif after that Sir Tho Morgan died Mary the Defendant claiming as tenant in remainder for life after the death of Sir Thomas her father by vertue of the settlement made 13 Carol. entred into the lands in question and the Plaintif as lessée of Pym brings the action Vpon this special verdict the Question was Whether by the Ordinance of Parliament made not till the year 1645. yet looking back to the year 1641. the remainder of the lands in question which was setled 13 Car. being before the making of the Ordinance and also before the time to which the Ordinance looks back be forfeited by the Ordinance or not Forfeiture Latch of Councel with the Defendant argued That it was not forfeited 1. Because that the Ordinance is penal and retrospective or looking back and therefore it is odious in Law and shall not be largely interpreted but as strictly as may be 2ly The preamble of the Ordinance sets forth 2. things as the reasons why the Ordinance was made 1. Mr. Pyms deserts to whom the lands were given 2ly Morgans offences for which he was thus punished and both these grounds for making the Ordinance can extend no further than to the year 1641. and so not to the time of the settlement made 13 Car. by Sir Thomas Morgan for then neither of these causes alleged were in being 2ly The purview of the Ordinance is double 1. punitive 2ly remunerative 1. the punitive part which concerns the punishing of Sir Thomas Morgan 2ly the remunerative part concerning the rewarding of Mr. Pym and the punitiue part made in the year 1645. cannot reach the estate setled upon Mary his daughter so long before viz. 13 Car. for it can reach no further back than to the year 1641. at the most to which time and no further the Ordinance is retrospective and in the Statute of 23 H. 8. general words of an Act are restrained Besides there is a demonstration in the Ordinance that shews the Ordinance doth not extend to the estate of the Defendant as may appear by the provisoes conteined in it for although the children of Morgan are to be punished within the Ordinance by the second proviso of it yet this extends not to so long time as to 13 Car. when the estate was setled but only to the estate as it was in the year 1641. And therefore prayed Iudgement for the Defendant Wadham Windham on the other side argued that the estate of Morgan though it was said to be setled 13 Car. was forseited by the Ordinance Because the estate was not absolutely setled at that time for there was a proviso in the conveyance to revoke the settlement so that at the time of the Ordinance made the estate was in Sir Thomas Morgan absolutely to dispose off as he pleased and by the words of the Ordinance all Morgans estate is passed without any saving and the provisoes of the Ordinance do prove that the Children of Sir Thomas Morgan were excepted out of the savings made to preserve the estates of others Also Boons and Favours bestowed use to be amply expounded and this being a Boon bestowed by the Parliament shall receive as large a construction as is possible Besides Morgan was a Papist therfore it may well be supposed that he intended not this for any real settlement but only by way of subtility for some private reasons for we know that Papists do use to make such settlements as this was to preserve them from penalties of the Law And the words of the Ordinance are accumulative to convey all Morgans estate and there are no restrictive words and if there were they should be void here for the Manor of Callidown being the Lands in question are expresly given by the Ordinance and as to these Lands the rights of all men are bound and therefore if there were a saving it would be void as it is Cook rep Alton Woods Case And an act of Parliament sometimes is as a conveyance sometime as a judgment and both waies a saving in it is void and srivolous 1 Rep. 4. A conditional estate or a right may be saved by Iudgment or fine but not an entire estate or interest Saving and therefore the estate of Mary in the Manor of Callidown cannot be saved by any proviso and he cited Alton Woods Case for authority in the principal Case f. 51. But admitting a general saving had been good to save Maries estate yet as the words of the Ordinance were penned her estate is not saved by it for the words were put in the Ordinance for the advantage of Pym and not to provide for Mary for she claims from Thomas Morgan and so prayed Iudgement for the Plaintif Roll chief Iustice said that the provisoes in the Ordinance are not void to all persons as Windham argued for Strangers are clearly provided for by them But let the Case be argued again Saturday fortnight Postea Hatwood against Payte Mich. 1649 Banc. sup Entred Hill 24 Car. rot 78. THe question insisted upon in this Case was Whether Tithes be extendible upon an Elegit whether upon a recovery in an Action of Debt against a Parson the Tithes be extendible by Elegit Hales of Councel with the Plaintif held that they are because that Tithes may be said to be Tenements and the Parson hath a Free-hold in them although he hold them jure Ecclesiae But Roll chief Iustice said Elegit that a Parsonage cannot be extended but that the Debt may be levyed out of the profits of it by the Sherif as it was wont to be done Extent for now there being no Bishops the profits cannot be sequestred by the Bishop of the Dioces Sequestration as they used to be But Ierman and Nicholas Iustices doubted Clergy Ask Iustice agreed with Roll and said that by the Common-law the Clergy are no more privileged from paying their debts than Lay men are Roll chief Iustice said it hath been heretofore questioned whether a Clergy-man be subject to watch and ward or to contribute to satisfie for a robbery done within the Hundred but now it is no question but they are subject and shall contribute Adjourned till Saturday to be argued again Postea Tyndal and others against Harington Mich. 1649. Banc. sup TYndal brought an Action of Debt
alias Heriots with the appurtenances whereof the said Close called Pipers Down was parcell which tenement and Close were parcell of the said manour and was then and had been time out of mind demised and demiseable in Fee by Copy of Court roll of the said manour did build a new messuage upon the said Tenement and did afterwards by his Letters patents under the great seal grant the office of Keeper and keeping of the said messuage to Iohn Gate for term of his life with all the Lands Tenements c. thereto belonging or adjacent and did also by the same Letters patents give and grant unto the said Iohn Gate amongst other things the Lands belonging to the said new built messuage whereof the said Close called Pipers down was part for Term of his life for the exercising of the said office with an averment in the plea that before that time there was no such office of the keeping of the said house and that the King did not know nor was at the time of the grant enformed that the said Tenement and Lands whereof the said Close was parcell were Copyhold of the said manour After the grant made to Iohn Gate as aforesaid H. the 8. dyed seised of the said manour of the reversion of the said Messuage and Close after the death of Iohn Gate and thereby Ed. the 6. became sofâ—ed of them in like manner and from Ed. the 6. they came to Quéen Mary Then Iohn Gate dyes and after his death Quéen Mary enters upon the said manour and Messuage whereof the said Close was a parcell and afterwards by her Letters Patents under her broad Seal doth grant the Manour and Messuage and Premises unto Susan Tong and her heirs for ever From Susan Tong by mean conveyance the said Manour Messuage and Premises came to Humphry White and his heirs and afterterwards Humphrey White being seized thereof in Fée did by his indenture of lease demise the said Manour Messuage and Premises to Leigh for 60. years to begin from Mich. before the making of the indenture afterward Humphrey White grants away the reversion of the said Manour Messuage Premises to Sir John Branch afterwards Sir Iohn Branch grants this reversion to Vdall Vdall grants it to Bathurst and Bathurst grants it to Thomas Boothby the Ancestor of Thomas Boothby whose Baily doth here make the avowry Afterwards Robert Leigh who had the lease of the said Manour and Premises as aforesaid for 60 years deviseth the residue of this lease then unexpired by his last Will and Testament unto Robert Leigh his Son and dyes Robert Lee the son being possessed of the residue or remainder of this Term for 60. years by virtue of the said Will did at his court held for the said Manour of Chingford grant the said Messuage with the appurtenances and Lands thereunto belonging whereof the said Close was parcell unto Edmund Lee his brother to hold of the same Manour in Fée at the will of the Lord by Copy of Court Roll of that Manour Edmund Lee was thereupon admitted accordingly Afterwards the said lease for 60. years made by Humphrey White unto Robert Leigh the Father expires Afterwards Thomas Boothby who had the reversion of the said Manour and Premises as abovesaid entred as in his reversion upon the said Manour and Premises and dyed seised thereof leaving issue Thomas Boothby his Son Thomas Boothby the Son enters into the said Manour and Premises and claims the said Messuage with the apurtenances with the lands thereunto belonging whereof the Close called Pipers down was parcell and was granted by Robert Leigh unto Edmund Leigh by Copy of Court Roll as aforesaid as parcell of the demaines of the said Manour of Chingford and doth deny it to be Copyhold and to the intent to try the title thereof did by the Avowant his Bailiff distrein the Cattel in the said Close as damage feasant in his soil and Freehold This Case was argued first by Arthur Harris of Lincolnes Inn who argued for the Plaintiff viz. he that brought the replevin and in his argument he made the generall question in the Case to be whether the close called Pipers Down in which the distress was taken were at the time of the distress taken demiseable by Copy of Court Roll or whether the Custom was not destroyed and he held it was demiseable and that the custom was not destroyed and hereupon he made four questions 1. Whether the grant of the new house to Sr. Iohn Gate per nomen officii of keeper thereof were a good grant 2ly Whether the King not being enformed at the time of the grant that the house was Copyhold tenure he was not deceived in his grant 3ly Whether by this grant the Custom was not destroyed 4ly Whether the Kings Patentee hath not the same privilege to grant this house c. again by Copy of Court Roll after the death of Sr. Iohn Gate And as to the 1. of these 4. questions he cited 8 E. 4. by Chock and 21 E. 4.79 and Mich 5 Car. Banc. Reg. Monsons case and Pasc 14 Car. Banc. Reg. Messand and Butterfields Case and 5 E. 4. f. 8. and Dyer 269. Savages Case To the 2d question he held that the King was not here enformed of his right and consequently he was deceived and therefore ought not to be prejudiced by his grant which he should be if he had not liberty to demise this house again by Copy of Court Roll after the death of Sr. Iohn Gate and he said that there are two rights in the King 1. At the Common Law and 2ly a customary right and of this Customary right or his jus concedendi he was not enformed and he cited these books 3 H. 7.10 rep 49.8 H. 625 Br. Ayd 45 4. H. 6.1 2 R. 3. Hunsons Case and he said that the book of 5 H. 7. f. 1. which is objected is not to purpose for the protestation is not well taken 19 H. 6. a protestation is to supply a matter which is not so here 41 E. 3. Fitzh protest 9.22 H. 6.37 Br. protestation 6. Plowd Coment Gresbrooks and Foxes Case and 20 Eliz. Burrell and Holcrofts Case 2ly The King is not enformed here in his grant in matter in Law as he ought to be and therefore his grant shall not turn to his prejudice 1 rep 52.18 H. 8. Lovels Case Pasc 2 Eliz. Sr. Thomas Mores Case 1. rep â—3 16 Jac. Needlers case and whereas it is said that the words ex certa scientia in the patent do declare that the King was enformed I answer that those words do intend no more but that the King was enformed of matters of fact and not of matters in Law and the Kings grant shall only be taken secundum intentionem and whereas it may be objected that by the granting of the Estate for life unto Sr. Iohn Gate the custom is destroyed I answer that this being in the Case of the King it is an extraordinary Case and not
the Arbitrators have all of it to agree in and till it is ended the Vmpire hath no power at all otherwise the submission would be repugnant in it self The rest of the Iudges concurred in all and so ruled That the Plaintif all capiat per billam nisi Theoballs against Newton Mich. 1651. Banc. sup ONe was sued upon the Statute of Inmates and the distringas jurata bare date on a Sunday and out of Term and so is erronious The question here was whether it be not helped by the Statutes of Ieofails of 18 Eliz. and 21 Iac. Roll chief Iustice held Ieofails that the Statutes extend not to penal Laws although it be ambiguously penned nor to any processes grounded upon them for the Proviso exempts the Original action and by consequence all processes depending upon it are excepted Venire de novo so that here is no good tryal but there shall be a venire de novo nisi Tayler and Webb Mich. 1651. Banc. sup THe Case of Tayler and Webb which arose upon a special verdict upon these words of Will Special Verdict upon the words of a Will viz. I make my Cosen Giles Bridges my soll ayere and yexecutor was again moved and argued by Hales and he made three questions 1. Whether any estate passeth by the words of the will 2ly If any what estate passeth 3ly Whether the false Orthography doth hurt the Will For the first he said that by making one his sole heir his land passeth to him The word heir is to be considered either in relation to an Ancestor and so one cannot make one his heir or it may be considered in relation to a thing to be inherited to wit lands or tenements and so one may make another his heir and thus a Custom may make one a mans heir as it is in Borough English and an accident may thus also make one a mans heir as it is in the Case of possessio fratris Coundens case Hob. Rep. Case 947. And here it is all one to make one his heir and to make hint heir of hislands and the reasons are First the word heir here cannot have any other relation than to the Testators lands for he cannot make him his heir otherwise and the words may be more reasonably intended so 2ly The words carry in them the plain intention of the Devisor that the party should have his lands although the words are not very proper â— H. 7. A devise of lands to his son after the death of his wife passed an Estate for life to the wife although no such Estate was expressed in the Will so here although no expresse Estate of land be devised yet the Devisee shall have the lands by the intent of the Devisor 3ly In ordinary speech if one make such an one his Heir it is intended that he gives him his lands 8 Car. in the C. B. in Spurt and Bents case A devise of his inheritance was held a devise of his lands and Trin. 3. Iac. in Terryes case A devise of all his rents in tayl passed his lands because in vulgar acceptance it is the rents of lands and in Pits and Sands case in this Court A devise of all his free lands in Holford did passe a portion of Tithes and in the case of one Iohnson a devise of all his estate passed all his lands And the words cannot bear the fence to make him Executor according to the Civill Law as hath been objected for the Will shall be intended as it is to be an English mans Will and so the word Heir in it shall he interpreted according to out Law and not the Civill Law and even in the Civill law to make one his Heir doth convey unto him all his lands for he is haeres testamentarius although not haeres legitimus And in this Will here are two expressions for the party is made Heir and Executor which two words cannot signifie one thing for that would be an idle expression 4ly There are some clauses in the Will which shew the intent of the Testator was to convey his lands if it were needful to make use of them 1. There are several annuities for the Devisee to pay 2ly He directs him where the conveyances and assurances of his lands were laid up which plainly shew he meant he should have his land 3ly The words Heir and Executor are joyned together to shew that he gives him all his lands and goods else one of the words must be imperfect and ineffectual which shall not be intended For Authority 7 E. 6. Br. devise 38. by devising that one Son shall be Heir to the other it shall be intended of lands so in construction of law it shall be here intended that the Devisor made him Heir of his lands Hob. Reports in Sparkes and Burnells case William and Anthony shall be each others Heir and it is not said of land yet adjudged that it shall be so meant and so is it in our case and if I have lands in see simple and make one my heir it shall be intended that he shall have my lands in see simple although I say not that I make him Heir of my lands For the second question the reasons before expressed do also shew that the lands are passed in Fee as it is in Purnells and Hambletons case for the word Heir shall relate to the same Estate that the party had in the land who makes the other his Heir 8 Iac. Inkersals case For the 3d point whether here shall be any good devise at all by reason of the false English he said it was all one and to as good effect as if the words were all true English and neither the incongruity nor the insufficiency of the words shall hurt the Will as it is pretended For 1. This is not in case of pleading or of writs but in conveyance of lands It is true that in the former it doth hurt because writs and pleadings may be amended if they be naught but it is fatal in conveyances for they cannot be amended as in Trotman and Standards case Trin. 1651. in this Court it was held that impropriety of words shall not hurt it they can admit of a good construction Desinet in piscem mulier formosa superne 2ly This is in a Will which is such an instrument that is much favoured in Law and therefore to be favourably construed 3ly This is an English Will and admits of much variety of dialects and therefore is not to be critically interpreted Neither are there here any insignificant or missignificant words as hath been objected but significant for the sound of the word as it is written is the same as if it had been rightly spelled for Ayer and Heir sound both alike As in 3 H. 4. f. 4 Baxter and Baxster sounded alike 2ly If the word Heir might receive any other sence yet it cannot do so here because there are other words joyned to it to declare and signifie that the
for another man he had unwillingly committed a Trespass against the Plaintif in taking away 2 or 3 wheele-barroughs of Earth of the Plaintifs soil and therefore it was prayed that the matter might be referred to the Secondary to tax the damages and Costs for the Trespass which he was ready to pay that the proceedings might be stayed But Roll chief Iustice answered It cannot be but you may confess the Action Reference He le against Green Hill 1651. Banc. sup IN an Ejectione firmae a special Verdict was found upon which the Case fell out to be this A man being Lessee of a Manor for 199 years Special Verdict in an Ejectione firmae deviseth the Term to his wife for life with power to make such estates in as ample manner as he himself might have done during her life and the remainder in Tall to his Daughter and dies the Feme proves the Will and accepts of the Legacy and after makes a Lease for 99 years and dies and the daughter brings an Ejectione firmae against the Lessee of the Feme The question was whether this Lease made by the Feme were a good Lease or not Merifield argued that the Lease was not good after the death of the Feme because she having but an estate for life Lease and the Lease for 99 years being derived out of it when the estate for life ends the estate derived out of it must end also And 2ly If the Feme had any power to dispose of any part of the Term longer than for her life by the same reason she might have disposed of all of it which cannot be intended for the Testator did not mean that she should have power to destroy the Entayl made upon his Daughter And as to the Objection that she hath dissposed of but part of the Term and therefore hath not destroyed the Entayl I answer It matters not what she hath done but what she might have done for by the same reason that she disposed of part she might have disposed of the whole The rest of the Argument I could not hear Henage Finch on the other side argued That the Lease made by the Feme continues after her death because the Feme had a power given her to make such a Lease and by vertue of that power the Lease continues for the power given unto her relates to the Estates to be made by her and not to the continuance of her life And here the intent of the Testator is to be considered which was that his wife should have the power to dispose of all the Term if she would for he trusted her with it because she was his Wife and Mother of his Daughter to whom the Entayl was made and the very subject matter shews his intent to be so and because there is no other power expressed against this in any other part of the Will and the words that give her this power would be idle and trifling if they should receive any other Construction 2 Car. Banc. Reg. Danyel and Ogleys case and Gibs and Whites case 1 Car. nor does the assent of the Feme to the Legacy to have the Term for life destroy her power to make estates 2ly She hath well executed this power for the Iury have found that it is the Lease of the Feme 9 Iac. Suckham and Hawkins case a power given to an Executor may be executed by parts Roll chief Iustice held Lease the Lease was good for a Will ought to be so interpreted that all the parts of it may stand together and if the Feme here have not power to make this Lease the Clause of giving her this Lease is idle and the meaning is so without doubt the Feme hath the sole estate in Law in her and the power given here is but a restoring to her of that which she had before by the Law and her consenting to the Legacy doth not take away her power to make Estates And this limited power and the remainder to his daughter may stand together for it might be that the wife would not make such a lease and then the daughter should have had the land in tayl but if she dispose of it the daughter shall not have it Ierman as Roll. Nicholas Iustice held that the Feme could only dispose of the land during her life and that the Testators intent by the words was that the Feme should not be tyed to occupy the lands her self during her life but might dispose of them Ask as Nicholas that she can dispose of the lands only during her life for the power is only given during her life and this interpetation will make all parts of the Will stand together better than the other interpretation Adjourned Antea Dekins against Latham Hill 1651. Banc. sup Entred Hill 22 Car. rot 946. IN an ejectione firmae a special verdict was found Special verdict in an ejectione firmae upon which the Case fell out to be this One seised of lands covenanted to levy a fine to the use of himself and his wife for life and after he leased the lands for 21 years for 3 l. rent per annum by equal portions and after the death of I.S. to pay a gross sum of 125 l. by way of fine payable by 5 l. a year quarterly with a proviso in the Indenture that for default of payment of the rent or fine or for want of reparations it should be lawfull for the Lessor to re-enter After the Lessor levyes a fine and assigneth over his interest in the reversion The question here was whether the condition of entry be transferred over to the Assignee by the transferring over of the reversion Hales of councell with the Plaintiff held that the lease proceeds from the Husband only and not from the Baron and Feme and the condition is transferred over for the condition runs joyntly as well to the fine reserved as to the rent and is as it were a several condition in Law although it be comprised but in one clause and not several clauses and the condition as to the rent is transferred though not as to the fine In 19 E 4. f. 7. The law makes a several distribution of one praecipe and so may it do here of one condition and Rawlins case in the â— rep cited against this comes not to this case for there the question was of the suspension of a condition but here it is of the transferring over of a condition 2ly If it be but one condition yet it is well transferred by the Statute of 32 H. 8. C. â—4 an extinguishment in part is not extinguishment of all although a suspension of part be a suspension of all and the Grantee of the reversion shall have advantage of the condition because 1. He is within the words of the condition as to the condition 2ly The clause of re-entry is within the words of the Statute and Knights case objected comes not to this case for there