Trust as in the Case of Wardship formerly which always went to the Executor of the Grantee and which was of greater consideration in the Law than the feeding or clothing of an Ideot and of that Opinion was the Court that the King had a good Title to dispose of both the Ward and the Ideot one till he was of Age and the other during his Ideocy Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Reeves versus Winnington THE Testator was a Citizen and a Freeman of London A Devise of all his Estate passed a Fee and being seised in Fee of a Mesuage c. and likewise possessed of a considerable personal Estate made his Will in which there was this Clause viz. I hear that John Reeves is enquiring after my Death but I am resolved to give him nothing but what his Father hath given him by Will I give all my Estate to my Wife c. The Question was Whether by these words the Devisee had an Estate for Life or in Fee in the Mesuage It was argued that she had only an Estate for life because the Words All my Estate cannot be construed to pass a Fee for it doth not appear what Estate was intended and Words in a Will which go to disinherit an Heir must be plain and apparent A Devise was in these Words viz. Sid. 191. Bowman versus Milbank I give all to my Mother all to my Mother and it was adjudged that a Fee did not pass which is as strong a Case as this for by the word All it must be intended All that was in his power to give which is as comprehensive as if he had said All my Estate 'T is true Kerman and Johnson Stiles 281. 1 Rol. Abr. 834. Cro. Car. 447. it hath been adjudged that where a Man devised his whole Estate to his Wife paying his Debts and Legacies that the word Estate there passed a Fee because it was for the benefit of the Creditors there being not personal Assets sufficient to pay all the Debts But that is not found in this Case therefore the Word Estate being doubtful and which will admit of a double construction shall not be intended to pass a Fee Mr. E contra Pollexfen contra The first part of this Sentence consists in negative words and those which are subsequent explain the intention of the Testator viz. That John Reeves should take nothing by the Will The Word Estate doth comprehend the whole in which the Owner hath either an Interest or Property like a Release of all Actions which is a good discharge as well of real as personal Actions In common understanding it carries an interest in the Land and then 't is the same as if he had devised all his Fee-simple Estate In the Case of Bowman and Milbank it was adjudged that a Fee-simple did not pass by the Particle All because it was a Relative Word and had no Substantive joined with it and therefore it might have been intended All his Cattle All his Goods or All his personal Estate for which incertainty it was held void yet Iustice Twisden in that Case said that it was adjudged that if a Man promise to give half his Estate to his Daughter in Marriage that the Lands as well as the Goods are included The Testator devised all his Tenant-right Estate held of such a Manor 3 Keb. 245. Mod. Rep. 100. and this being found specially the Question was Whether any more passed than an Estate for Life because he did not mention what Estate he intended but it was held that the Devisee had a Fee-simple because the Words were as comprehensive as if he had devised all his Inheritance and by these Words a Fee-simple would pass Curia It plainly appears that the Testator intended nothing for John Reeves therefore he can take nothing by this Will and that the Devisee hath an Estate in Fee-simple for the Words All my Estate are sufficient to pass the same Rex versus Sir Thomas Armstrong Saturday June 14th THE Defendant was outlawed for High-Treason and being taken at Leyden in Holland was brought into England and being now at the Bar he desired that he might have leave of the Court to reverse the Outlawry and he tried by virtue of the Stature of Ed. 6. which Enacts 5 6 E. 6. cap. 11. That if the Party within one year after the Outlawry or Judgment thereupon shall yield himself to the Chief Justice of England and offer to traverse the Indictment upon which he was outlawed he shall be admitted to such Traverse and being acquitted shall be discharged of the Outlawry He alledged that it was not a year since he was outlawed and therefore desired the benefit of this Law But it was denied because he had not rendered himself according to the Statute but was apprehended and brought before the Chief Iustice Whereupon a Rule was made for his Execution at Tyburn which was done accordingly DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Hebblethwaite versus Palmes Mich. 36 Car. II. in B. R. Rot. 448. AN Action on the Case was brought in the Common-Pleas Possession is a sufficient cause to maintain an Action against a wrong doer for diverting of a Watercourse The Declaration was That the Defendant Primo Augusti c. injuste malitiose did break down an ancient Damm upon the River Darwent by which he did divert magnam partem aquae ab antiquo solitu cursu erga molendinum ipsius quer c. ad dampnum c. The Defendant pleaded that before the said Breach made he was seised in Fee of an ancient Mill and of six Acres of Land adjoyning upon which the said Damm was erected time out of mind to turn the Water to his said Mill which Damm was always repaired and maintained by the Defendant and the Tenants of the said Land that his Mill was casually burnt and he not intending to Re-build it suffered the Damm to be broken down and converted the Timber to his own use being upon his own Soil prout ei bene licuit c. The Plaintiff replied that by the breaking of the Damm the Water was diverted from his Mill c. The Defendant rejoyned and justified his Plea and Traversed that the Mill of the Plaintiff was an ancient Mill. And upon a Demurrer to this Rejoynder Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and a Writ of Error now brought to reverse that Iudgment and for the Defendant in the Action it was argued 1. That the Declaration is not good because the Plaintiff had not set forth that his Mill was an ancient Mill. 2. Because he had not entituled himself to the Watercourse 3. That the Plea was good in Bar to this Action because the Defendant had sufficiently justified having a Right to the Land upon which the Damm was erected and always repaired it As to the first Point it
hath been the constant course for many years in such Actions to set forth the Antiquity of the thing either in express terms or in words which amount to it In 8 Eliz. such an Action was brought Dyer 248. B. Quod defendens divertit multum aquae cursum per levationem constructionem Waerae c. per quod multum aquae quae ad molendinum of the Plaintiff currere consuevit e contra recurrit Which word consuevit doth imply that it was an ancient Mill for otherwise the Water could not be accustomed to run to it Anno 25 Eliz. the like Action was brought 1 Leon. 273. Russel versus Handford wherein the Plaintiff declared Quod cum molendinum quoddam ab antiquo fuit erectum whereof he was seized and the Defendant erected a new Mill per quod cursus aquae pred coarctatus fuit And eighteen years afterwards was Lutterell 's Case in this Court 4 Co. 86. wherein the Plaintiff shewed that he was seized of two old and ruinous Fulling Mills and that time out of Mind magna pars aquae cujusdam rivoli did run from a certain place to the said Mills and that during all that time there had been a certain Bank to keep the current of the said Water within its bounds c. That the Plaintiff did pull down those old Mills and erected two new Mills and the Defendant digged down the Bank c. The like Action happened 14 Car. I. Cro. Car. 499. Palm 290. it was for diverting an ancient Watercourse Qui currere consuevisset debuisset to the Plaintiffs Mill. In all which Cases 1 Roll. Abr. 107. tho' there are various ways of declaring yet they all shew that the constant course was to alledge that the Mills were ancient for 't is that which intitles the Party to his Action 'T is for this reason also that if two Men have contiguous Houses and one stops the other's Lights if they are not ancient an Action will not lye for stopping of them up There may be some seeming difference between a Right to a Watercourse and to Lights in a Window for no Man can prescribe to Light Quatenus such because 't is of common Right to all Men and cannot be claimed but as affixed to a particular thing or purpose A Watercourse may be claimed to several purposes but Water is of as universal use and benefit to Mankind as Light and therefore no particular Man hath a Right to either but as belonging to an antient House or ruunning to an ancient Mill or for some other antient Vse Anno 15 Car. Cro. Car. 575. Sands versus Trefusis I. The Plaintiff Sands declared that he was seised in Fee of a Mill and had a Watercourse running thro' the Defendants Lands to the said Mill and that he stopped it up There was a Demurrer to this Declaration and the same Objection as now was then taken to it viz. that he had not shewed that it was an ancient Mill. And though the Court seemed to over-rule that Objection yet no Iudgment was given The Case of Sly and Mordant was there cited which is Reported by Mr. 1 Leon. 247. id 1 Rol. Abr. 104. Leonard and is this viz. That the Plaintiff was seised in Fee of certain Lands c. and the Defendant had stopped a Watercourse by which his Land was drowned it was adjudged that the Action would lie for this Injury but that is no Authority to support this Declaration 2. The Plaintiff hath not entituled himself to this Water-course either by Prescription or that the Water debuit vel consuevit currere to his Mill for so is the Pleading in Lutterell 's Case and in all the other Cases before cited 3. Therefore the Plea in Bar is good the Defendant having sufficiently justified his Right and the Plaintiff having not Prescribed to it here can be no Trespass done and so concluded that Iudgment ought to be reversed This Case depends upon the Declaration Ex parte Quer. for the Plea in Bar is only argumentative 't is no direct answer to it and the Replication and Rejoynder are not material The Plaintiff hath a good cause of Action for it cannot be denied but where an injury is done to another and Damages ensue 't is sufficient to maintain an Action of Trespass or upon the Case 'T is plain that an Injury was done to the Plaintiff and the Damage is as manifest by diverting of the Watercourse and the loss of his Mill and the Fact is laid to be injuste malitiose The Defendant gives no reason why he injured him but only that he had no use of the Water because his Mill was burnt This is an Action brought by the Plaintiff upon his Possession against a wrong doer Roll. 339 394. Palm 290. in which it is not necessary to be so particular as where one prescribes for a Right A Man may have a Watercourse * Bracton lib. 4. cap. 32. by Grant as well as by Prescription and in such case be need not set forth any particular use of the Water as that it ought to run to his Mill neither is it absolutely necessary to mention the Mill for that is only to inform the Court of the Damages In the Printed Entries there are many Forms of Declarations without any Prescription Rast Ent. 9. B. or setting forth that the Mill was antient as where an Action was brought against the Defendant De placito quare vi armis stagnum molendini ipsius the Plaintiff fregit and this was only upon the Possession Antea The Case in Dyer is a good Authority to support this Action for 't is as general as this viz. for diverting a Watercourse per Constructionem Waerae and doth not shew where it was erected or what Title he had to it So where the Action was for disturbing the Plaintiff 2 Cro. 43. Dent vers Oliver Nota This was after Verdict in collecting of Toll and doth not shew what Title he had to it either by Prescription or Grant but declared only that he was seised in Fee of a Manor and Fair and held good And it was the Opinion of my Lord Hobert That a Declaration for breaking down of a Bank generally includentem aquam Hob. 193. Biccot versus Ward running to the Plaintiffs Mill was good The Authorities cited on the other side do rather maintain this way of Pleading than the contrary for those Cases are wherein the Plaintiff declared that the Water currere consuevit debuisset to the Plaintiffs Mill time out of mind Cro. Car. 499. which words are of the same signification as if he had shewed it to be an antient Mill and that agrees in substance with this Case for the Water cannot be diverted ab antiquo solito cursu if the Mill was not ancient The word solet implies Antiquity Reg. 153. The Writ De secta admolendinum is
general as this Case There are many instances where Breaches have been generally assigned and held ill that in Croke is so but the later Opinions are otherwise Affirmetur Judicium Pye versus Brereton A Lease was made of Tythes for three years rendring Rent at Michaelmas and Lady-day and an Action of Debt was brought for Rent arrear for two years Vpon Nil debet pleaded the Plaintiff had a Verdict and it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was too general for the Rent being reserved at two Feasts 2 Cro. 668. the Plaintiff ought to have shewed at which of those Feasts it was due But the Council for the Plaintiff said That it appears by the Declaration that two years of the three were expired so there is but one to come which makes it certain enough Curia This is helped by the Verdict but it had not been good upon a Demurrer DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. MEmorandum That in Trinity-Vacation last died Sir Francis North Baron of Guilford and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England at his House in Oxfordshire being a Man of great Learning and Temperance And Sir George Jefferies Baron of Wem and Chief Justice of the Kings-Bench had the Seal delivered to him at Windsor and was thereupon made Lord High Chancellor of England And Sir Edward Herbert one of the Kings Council succeeded him in the Place of Chief Justice There died also this Vacation Sir Thomas Walcott one of the Justices of the Kings-Bench and he was succeeded by Sir Robert Wright one of the Barons of the Exchequer Sir John Newton al' versus Stubbs IN an Action on the Case for Words Words laid to be spoke ad tenorem effectmu sequen ' not good The Plaintiffs declared that they were Iustices of the Peace for the County of Gloucester c. and that the Defendant spake these scandalous Words of them Viz. Sir John Newton and Mr. Meredith make use of the Kings Commission to worrie Men out of their Estates postea eodem die c. they spoke these words Viz. Sir John Newton and Mr. Meredith make use of the Kings Commission to worrie me and Mr. Creswick out of our Estates And afterwards these words were laid in Latin without an Anglice ad tenorem effectum sequen ' c. There was a Verdict for the Plaintiffs and entire damages and now Mr. Trindar moved in Arrest of Iudgment 1. That the words in the Declaration are laid in Latin Roll. Abr. 74. pl. 2. without an Anglice and without an Averment that the hearers did understand Latin 2. 'T is not expressly alledged that the Defendant spoke those very words for being laid ad tenorem effectum sequen ' something may be omitted which may alter the sense and meaning of them Cro. Eliz. 857. and for this very reason Iudgment was staied though the Court held the words to be actionable Rex versus Ayloff al' THey were Outlawed for High-Treason Treason and on Tuesday the 27th day of October they were brought to the Bar and a Rule of Court was made for their Execution on Fryday following The Chief Iustice said that there was no hardship in this proceeding to a Sentence upon an Outlawry because those Malefactors who wilfully flie from Iustice and a new Crime to their former Offence and therefore ought to have no benefit of the Law for tho' a Man is Guilty yet if he put himself upon his Tryal he may by his submissive Behaviour and shew of Repentance incline the King to mercy In Felonies which are of a lower nature than the Crimes for which these persons are attainted flight even for an Hour is a forfeiture of the Goods of the Criminal so likewise a Challenge to three Iuries is a defiance to Iustice and if that be so then certainly flying from it is both despising the mercy of the King and contemning the Iustice of the Nation They were both Executed on Frday the 30th of October following Dominus Rex versus Colson al' AN Information was exhibited against the Defendants Information for a Riot not good setting forth that they with others did riotously assemble themselves together to divert a Watercourse and that they set up a Bank in a certain place by which the Water was hindred from running to an antient Mill in so plentifull a manner as formerly c. Vpon Not Guilty pleaded it came to a Tryal and the Iury found that Quoad factionem Ripae the Defendants were Guilty and quoad Riotum not Guilty And now Mr. Williams moved in arrest of Iudgment because that by this Verdict the Defendants were acquitted of the charge in the Information which was the Riot and as for the erecting of the Bank an Action on the Case would lie and the Iudgment was accordingly arrested Mason versus Beldham Trin. 1 Jac. Rot. 408. THE Plaintiff brings his Action against the Defendant Quantum meruit will lie for Rent and sets forth That in consideration that he would suffer the Defendant to enjoy a House and three Water-Mills c. he promised to pay so much yearly as they were reasonably worth and avers that they were worth so much And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether this Action would lie for Rent It was argued for the Defendant that it would not lie Cro. Eliz. 242. 786 859. 2 Cro. 668. because it was a real Contract 'T is true there is a Case which seems to be otherwise 't is between Acton and Symonds Cro. Car. 414. which was in consideration that the Plaintiff would demise to the Defendant certain Lands for three years at the Rent of 25 l. by the year he promised to pay it this was held to be a personal Promise grounded upon a real Contract and by the Opinion of three Iudges the Action did lie because there was an express promise alledged which must also be proved But Iustice Croke was of a contrary Opinion Mr. Pollexfen contra If a Lease be made for years reserving a Sum in gross for Rent and which is made certain by the Lease in such case an Action of Debt will lie for the Rent in arrear But if where no Sum certain is reserved as in this Case a Quantum meruit will lie and no reason can be given why a Man may not have such an Action for the Rent of his Land as well as for his Horse or Chamber And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus THere was a Libel in the Spiritual Court for scandalous Words Prohibition for words where some are actionable and others not Viz. She is Bitch a Whore an old Bawd And a Prohibition was now prayed by Mr. Pollexfen because some of the words were actionable at Law and some punishable in the Spiritual Court and therefore prayed that it might go Quoad those words which were actionable at Law The Chief Iustice granted
the one took 70 l. and the other 30 l. damages shall be assessed severally It was admitted that regularly the damages ought to be entire especially where the Action is joint but where the Facts are several damages may likewise be so assessed but in this Case the Iury hath done what the Court would do had it béen in a Criminal Cause Curia This is all but one Fact which the Iury is to try 'T is true when several Persons are found Guilty criminally then the damages may be severed in proportion to their Guilt but here all are equally guilty of the same offence and it seems to be a contradiction to say that the Plaintiff is injured by one to the value of 50 l. and by the other to the value of 1000 l. when both are equally Guilty Every Defendant ought to answer full as much as the Plaintiff is damnified now how is it possible he should be damnified so much by one and so little by the other But notwithstanding this Opinion Iudgment was afterwards given for the Plaintiff Peak versus Meker IN an Action on the Case for Words the Plaintiff declared that he was a Merchant and bred up in the Church of England and that when the present King came to the Crown the said Plaintiff made a Bonfire at his Door in the City of London and that the Defendant then spoke of him these words for which he now brought this Action viz. He innuendo the Plaintiff is a Rogue a Papist Dog and a pitiful Fellow and never a Rogue in Town has a Bonfire before his Door but he The Plaintiff had a Verdict and 500 l. Damages were given A Writ of Error was brought but it was adjudged without argument that the words were actionable Joyner versus Pritchard AN Action was brought upon the Statute of R. II. Admiralty for prosecuting of a Cause in the Admiralty Court which did arise upon the Land it was tried before the Chief Iustice in London and a Verdict for the Plaintiff Mr. Thompson moved in Arrest of Iudgment for that the Action was brought by Original in which it was set forth that the Defendant prosecut fuit adhuc prosequitur c. in Curia Admiralitat now the prosequitur is subsequent to the Original and so they have recovered Damages for that which was done after the Action brought Curia These words adhuc prosequitur must refer to the time of suing forth this Original like the Case of a Covenant for quiet Enjoyment and a breach assigned that the Defendant built a Shed whereby he hindred the Plaintiff that he could not enjoy it hucnsque which word must refer to the time of the Action brought and not afterwards Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Dominus Rex versus ........ AN Information was brought against the Defendant for Forgery Forgery setting forth that the Defendant being a man of ill fame c. and contriving to cheat one A. did forge quoddam scriptum dated the 16th day of October in the year 1681. continens in se scriptum obligatorium per quod quidem scriptum obligatorium praed A. obligatus fuit praed Defend in quadraginta libris c. He was found Guilty and afterwards this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment Viz. That the Fact alledged in the Information was a contradiction of it self for how could A. be bound when the Bond was forged 2. It is not set forth what that scriptum obligatorium was whether it was scriptum sigillatum or not Curia The Defendant is found Guilty of the forging of a Writing in which was contained quoddam scriptum obligatorium and that may be a true Bond. Iudgment was arrested MEMORANDUM On Tuesday April the 27th Sir Thomas Powes of Lincolns-Inn was made Sollicitor General in the Place of Mr. Finch and was called within the Bar. Hanchet versus Thelwal IN Ejectment a special Verdict was found Devise What words in a Will make an Estate for Life and what in Tail in which the Case did arise upon the construction of the words in a Will Viz. The Testator being seised in Fee had Issue Two Sons and Four Daughters He made his Will and devised his Estate being in Houses by these words Viz. Irem I give and bequeath to my Son Nicholas Price my Houses in Westminster and if itplease God to take away my Son then I give my Estate to my four Daughters naming them share and share alike and if it please God to take away any of my said Daughters before Marriage then I give her or their part to the rest surviving And if all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then I give my said Houses to my Sister Anne Warner and her Heirs Nicholas Price entred and died without Issue then the four Sisters entred and Margaret the eldest married Thellwel and died leaving Issue a Son who was the Lessor of the Plaintiff who insisted upon his Title to a fourth part of the Houses The Question was what Estate the Daughters took by this Will whether joint Estates for Life or several Remainders in Tail If only joint Estates for Life then the Plaintiff as Heir to his Mother will not be entituled to a fourth part if several Remainders in Tail then the Father will have it during his Life as Tenant by the Curtesie This Case was argued this Term by Mr. Pollexfen for the Plaintiff And in Hillary Term following by Councel for the Defendant The Plaintiffs Council insisted that they took joint Estates for Life and this seemed to be the intent of the Testator by the words in his Will the first Clause whereof was Viz. I give and bequeath my Houses in W. to Nicholas Price Now by these words an Estate for Life only passed to him and not an Inheritance for there was nothing to be done or any thing to be paid out of it 2. The next Clause is Viz. If it please God to take away my Son then I give my Estate to my four Daughters share and share alike Now these words cannot give the Daughters a Fee-simple by any intendment whatsoever but if any word in this Clause seems to admit of such a Construction it must be the word Estate which sometimes signifies the Land it self and sometimes the Estate in the Land But here the word Estate cannot create a Fee-simple because the Testator gave his Daughters that Estate which he had given to his Son before and that was only for Lise Then follow the words share and share alike and that only makes them Tenants in Common 3. The next Clause is Viz. If it please God to take away any of my said Daughters before Marriage then I give her or their part to the rest surviving These words as they are penned can have no influence upon the Case 4. Then followeth the last Clause Viz. And if all my Sons and Daughters dye without Issue then I give c. These words create no Estate tail in the
my Lord Coke to be an allowance by the King 's Grant to any person for the sole buying or selling of any thing restraining all others of that Liberty which they had before the making of such a Grant 3 Inst 181. and this he tells us is against the ancient and fundamental Rights of this Kingdom This Patent agreeth exactly with that Definition 9 E. 3. cap. 1. 18 E. 3. c. 3. 25 E. 3. c. 2. Roll. Abr. 180. 2 R. 2. c. 1. 11 R. 2. c. 7. and therefore it must be against Law 't is against an Act of Parliament which gives Liberty to Merchants to buy and to sell in this Realm without disturbance and 't is expresly against the Statute of 21 Jac. cap. 3. which declares all such Letters Patents to be void That which may give some colour to make such Grants good 2 Inst 540. 11 Rep. is a pretence of Order and Government in Trade but my Lord Coke was of Opinion that it was a hinderance to both and in the end it produced Monopolies There is a great difference between the King's Grant and his Prohibition for the one vests an Interest which is not done by the other and all Prohibitions determine by the King's death but Grants still remain in force Adjornatur Langford versus Webber IN Trespass for the taking of a Horse Justification upon a bare possession good against a wrong doer the Defendant justified for that Joseph Ash was possessed of a Close c. and that the Defendant as his Servant took the Horse in that Close Damage fesant And upon a Demurrer to this Plea for that the Defendant did not shew what Title Ash had to this Close The Councel for the Defendant insisted that it being in Trespass 't is sufficent to say that Ash was possessed because in this Case possession is a good Title against all others But it might have been otherwise in Replevin The Title of the Close is not in question Cro. Car. 138. Yelv. 74. Cro. Car. 571. pl. 10. the possession is only an inducement to the Plea and not the substance thereof which is the taking of the Horse and the Law is plain that where the interest of the Land is not in question a Man may justifie upon his own possession against a wrong-doer Mr. Pollexfen on the other side alledged that damage fesant would bring the Title of the Land in question But the Court gave Iudgment for the Defendant Perkins versus Titus A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given in the Common-Pleas Fine upon an Admittance where it must be certain in Replevin for taking of the Plaintiff's Sheep The Defendant avowed the taking damage fesant The Plaintiff replied that the Lands where c. were Copy-hold held of the Manor of Bushy in Com. Hertf. the Custom whereof was that every Tenant of the said Manor qui admissus foret to any Copyhold Estate should pay a years Value of the Land for a Fine as the said Land is worth tempore Admissionis And upon a Demurrer the Question was 1. Whether this be a good Plea or not as 't is pleaded 2. If it be good as pleaded then whether such a Custom may be supported by Law 1. It was for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error now and in Michaelmas Term following argued that it was not a good Custom The substance of whose Arguments were that Fines are either certain or incertain those which are incertain are arbitrary and therefore cannot be due of Common Right nor by Custom for there can be no Custom for an incertain Fine and such is this Fine for the value of the Land cannot be known because as this Custom is pleaded it doth not appear whether it shall be a years value past or to come at the time of the admittance of the Tenant A Custom to assess rationabilem denariorum summam for a Fine upon an admittance that is to say 13 Rep. 1. being two years Rent of a Tenant of the yearly value of 53 s. 4 d. is no good Custom A Lease is made for so many years as a third person shall name this is altogether incertain 13 Edw. 3. Fitz. Abr. 273. but when the Term is named then 't is a good Lease but this can be done but once How can this Fine be assessed It cannot be by Iury for then it stands in need of the Common Law and will be therefore void for a Custom must have nothing to support it but usage 1. Neither can this be a good Custom as 't is pleaded because all Customs are made up of repeated Acts and Vsages and therefore in pleading them it must be laid time out of mind which is not done here for admissus foret hath a respect to future admissions and are not to those which are past 2. Here is no time laid when this Fine shall be paid for 't is said Quilibet tenens qui admissus foret c. solvet tantam denariorum summam quantum terra valebat per Annum tempore admissionis c. which last words must be taken to relate to the value of the Land and not to the time when the Fine shall be paid so that if there be such a Custom which is Lex loci and not fully set forth and expressed the Common Law will not help it by any Construction 2. Point Whether such a Custom can be good by Law And they argued that it cannot Where the Fine is certain the Lord may refuse to admit without a tender of it upon the prayer of the person to be admitted 4 Rep. 27. b. but where 't is incertain the Lord is first to admit the Tenant and then to set the Fine the reasonableness whereof is to be determined by Iudges before whom the Case shall depend or upon Demurrer or by a Iury upon proofs of the yearly value of the Land but for non payment of an unreasonable Fine the Lord cannot enter Cro. Eliz. 779. Cro. Car. 196. The Law admits of no Custom to be good but such as is very certain for incertainty in a Custom as well as in a Grant makes both void and therefore 't is held a void Custom for an Infant to make a Feoffment when he can measure an Ell of Cloth Rol. Abr. 565. 6 Rep. 60. Davies Rep. 37. It may be objected that certum est quod certum reddi potest the meaning of which saying must be quod certum reddi potest by something which is certain for if this Rule should be taken to be an answer to incertainties it would destroy all the Books which say a Custom must be certain The Law is very clear Fitz. Bar. 177. 2 Rol. Abr. 264. that a Custom is void for the incertainty therefore this Custom must be void for the value of Land is the most incertain thing in nature and therefore Perjury will not lye for swearing to the value Serjeant Fuller and Mr.
Finch contra The chief Objection is the incertainty of this Custom now if a Custom as incertain as this hath been held good in this Court 't is a good Authority to support this Custom And as to that it was said that a Custom for a person whom a Copy holder should name to have his Land after his death and that he should pay a Fine for his admitance And if the Lord and Tenant cannot agree about the Fine that then the rest of the Tenants should assess it 1 Rol. Rep. 48. 2 Cro. 368. 4 Leon. 238. Noy 3. 2 Brownl 85. this was adjudged a good Custom by the Court of Common-Pleas and affirmed upon a Writ of Error in this Court It was the Case of Crab and Bevis cited in Warne and Sawyers Case Adjornatur Afterwards the first Iudgment was affirmed and all the Court held the Custom to be a good Custom Hacket versus Herne JVdgment was had in Debt upon a Bond against Father and Son Where the Defendants in the Action must joyn in a Writ of Error and afterwards the Father alone brought a Writ of Error and the Error assingned was that his Son was under Age but because the Son did not join in the Errors the Court ordered the Writ to be abated If a Quare impedit be brought against a Bishop and others and Iudgment be against them all they must likewise all join in a Writ of Error unless it be where the Bishop claims only as Ordinary 'T is true Rol. Abr. 929. pl. 30. this is against the Opinion of my Lord Rolls in his Abridgment who puts the Case that where a Scire Facias was brought against four Executors who pleaded plene administraverunt the Iury find Assets in the Hands of two of them and that the other eant inde sine die two bring a Writ of Error and altho' at the opening of the Case it was held that the Writ should abate for that reason because brought only by two yet he says the Iudgment was afterwards affirmed and the Writ held good But there is a difference where a Writ of Error is brought by the Plaintiffs in the original Action 5 Co. 25. a Ruddock's Case and when by the Defendants for if two Plaintiffs are barred by an erronious Iudgment and afterwards bring a Writ of Error the Release of one shall bar the other because they are both actors in a personal thing to charge another and it shall be presumed a Folly in him to join with another who might release all But where the Defendants bring a Writ of Error 't is otherwise for it being brought to discharge themselves of a Iudgment the Release of one cannot barr the other because they have not a joint Interest but a joint burthen and by Law are compelled to join in Errors Mosse versus Archer COvenant by an Assignee of an Assignee of Lands which were exchanged the Breach assigned was Breach not well assigned that a Stranger habens jus titulum did enter c. There was a Uerdict for the Plaintiff and it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Plaintiff had not shewed a sufficient breach for he sets forth the Entry of a Stranger habens jus titulum but doth not shew what Title and it may be he had a Title under the Plaintiff himself 2 Cro. 315. Hob. 35. after the Exchange made and to prove this the Case of Kirby and Hansaker was cited in point and of that Opinion was all the Court. Nota It was said in this Case that an Exchange ought to be executed by either Party in their Life-time or else it is void Taylor versus Brindley THE Original in Trespass was quare Clausum fregit Variance between the Original and Declaration where 't is no Error and the Plaintiff declared quare Clausum Domum fregit and had Iudgment in the Common-Pleas and a Writ of Error was brought in this Court and the variance between the Original and Declaration was assigned for Error and that one was not warranted by the other But Serjeant Levinz argued that because the Original was certified three Terms since 2 Cro. 674. 1 Rol. Abr. 790. n. 7. Cro. Car. 272. 18 Eliz. cap. and no Continuances between it and the Declaration therefore that could not be the Original to this Action and that the Court might for that reason intend a Verdict without an Original which is helped by the Statute of Jeofails But he argued that where the Original varies from the Declaration and is not warranted by it 't is not aided by this Statute Iudgment was affrmed DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Sawyer Attorny General Powis Sollicitor General Mathews versus Cary Pasch 3 Jac. Rot. 320. TRespass for entring of his House and taking of a Silver Tankard Where the Defendant justifies by way of excuse he must set forth the Warrant and that he took the Goods virtute Warranti The Defendant made conusance as Bayliff of the Dean and Chapter of Westminster for that the place where c. was within the Iurisdiction of the Leet of the said Dean who was seised of a Court Leet which was held there such a day c. And that the Iury did present the Plaintiff being a Tallow-Chandler for melting of stinking Tallow to the annoyance of the Neighbours for which he was amerced and that the Amerciament was affered to 5 l. which not being paid the Defendant by a Mandate of the said Dean and Chapter distreined the Tankard c. The Plaintiff replied de injuria sua propria absque hoc that he did melt Tallow to the annoyance of the Neighbours c. And upon a Demurrer to this Replication it was argued this Term by Mr. Pollexfen for the Defendant and Tremaine for the Plaintiff and afterwards in Michaelmas Term 1 Will. Mariae by Mr. Bonithan and Serjeant Thompson for the Defendant It was said for the Defendant that a Presentment in a Court Leet which concerns the person as in this Case and not the Free hold 5 H. 7.3 Fitz. Bar. 271. Bro. Abr. tit Travers sans ceo pl. 183. Presentment in Court pl. 15. was not traversable and that the Amerciament was a Duty vested in the Lord for which he may distrain or bring an Action of Debt Co. Entr. 572. But on the other side it was said that if such a Presentment is not traversable the party hath no remedy 't is contrary to the Opinion of Fitzherbert in Dyer Dyer 13. b. who affimed the Law to be that it was traversable and that if upon such a Presentment a Fine should be imposed erroniously 11 Co. 42. 1 Rol. Rep. 79. it may be avoided by Plea and this agrees with the second Resolution in Godfrey 's Case 2. It was objected to the Plea that it was not good for it sets
Indebitatus Ass will lye for a Fine upon an Admission c. That a Fine was due to him for an admission That upon the death of the said Lord the Manor descended to W. as his Son and Heir who died and the Plaintiff as Executor to the Heir brought an Indebitatus Assumpsit for this Fine He declared also that the Defendant was indebted to him in 25 l. for a reasonable Fine c. The Plaintiff had a Verdict and entire Damages and it was now moved in arrest of Iudgment that an Indebitatus will not lie for a Customary Fine because it doth not arise upon any Contract of the Parties but upon the Tenure of the Land for upon the death of the Lord there is a Relief paid for there must be some personal Contract to maintain an Action of Debt or an Indebitatus Assumpsit 2 Cro. 599. Jones 339. and therefore it was held that where the Plaintiff locasset a Ware-house to the Defendant he promised to pay 8 s. per Week An Assumpsit was brought for this Rent and a Verdict for the Plaintiff And a Motion was made in Arrest of Iudgment that this was a Lease at Will and the weekly payment was in the nature of a Rent and it was agreed that an Assumpsit would not lie for a Rent reserved because it sounds in the Realty but because it was only a Promise in consideration of the occupying of the Warehouse the Action was held to be well brought 2. Where the Cause of an Action is not grounded upon a Contract but upon some special Matter there an Indebitatus Assumpsit will not lie and therefore it will not lie upon a Bill of Exchange or upon an Award or for Rent though there is a Privity both of Contract and Estate without a special Assumpsit E contra E contra It was argued that the Action lies for though a Fine savours of the Realty yet 't is a certain Duty In all Cases where Debt will lie upon a simple Contract there an Assumpsit will lie likewise 't is true this doth concern the Inheritance but yet 't is a Contract that the Tenant shall be admitted paying the Fine It hath been also maintained for Mony had and received out of the Office of Register for the Plaintiffs use and for Scavage Mony due to the Mayor and Commonalty of London 3 Keb. 677. which is also an Inheritance 'T is a Contract implyed by Law and therefore the Action is well brought Afterwards in Michaelmas Term 1 Willielmi Mariae by the Opinion of Iustice Dolben 2 Leon. 79. Eyre and Gregory Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff But the Chief Iustice was of another Opinion for he held that if the Defendant had died indebted to another by Bond and had not Assets besides what would fatisfie this Fine if the Executor had paid it to the Plaintiff it would have been a Devastavit in him Suppose the Defendant promiseth that in consideration that the Plaintiff would demise to him certain Lands that then he would pay the Rent If the Defendant pleads Non Assumpsit Cro. Car. Acton versus Symonds the Plaintiff must prove an express Promise or be Non suit Also here is no Tenure or Custom set out Yet by the Opinion of the other three Iustices the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Rex versus Johnson INformation upon the Statute of 29 30 Car. 2. cap. 1. Pardon after a Verdict for the King excuseth the Forfeiture prohibiting the Importation of several French Commodities and amongst the rest Lace under the Penalty of 100 l. to be paid by the Importer and 50 l. by the Vendor and the Goods to be forfeited The Information sets forth that a Packet containing so many yards of Lace was imported by the Defendant from France and that he did conceal it to hinder the Seisure and that he did privately sell it contra formam Statuti Vpon Not-Guilty pleaded the King had a Verdict and on the 2d of October there came forth a general Pardon in which were these Words viz. That the Subjects shall not be sued or vexed c. in their Bodies Goods or Chattels Lands or Tenements for any Matter Cause or Contempt Misdemeanour Forfeiture Offence or any other thing heretofore done committed or omitted against us Except all Concealments Frauds Corruptions Misdemanours and Offences whereby we or our late Brother have been deceived in the Collection payment or answering of our Revenues or any part thereof or any other Mony due or to be due to us or received for us or him and all Forfeitures Penalties and Nomine Poena's thereupon arising and all Indictments and Informations or other Process and Proceedings now depending or to be depending thereupon The Question now was whether this Forfeiture was excused by this Pardon The Attorney General argued that it was not because an Interest is vested in the King by the Iudgment and that no particular or general Pardon shall divest it without words of Restitution So was Tooms's Case who had Iudgment against another 1 Sand. 361. and then became Felo de se his Administrator brought a Scire Facias quare Executionem non haberet The Debtor pleaded that after the Iudgment the Intestate hanged himself which was found by the Coroners Enquest returned into this Court. The Plaintiff replied the Act of Pardon But it was adjudged for the Defendant for when the Inquisition was returned then the Debt was vested in the King which could not be divested without particular words of Restitution and which were wanting in that Act of Pardon The most proper word in the Body of this Pardon which seems to excuse the Defendant is the word Offence but the same word is likewise in the Exception viz. Except all Offences c. in collecting or paying of Mony due to us and all Forfeitures c. Now the concealing of forfeited Goods from Seisure is an Offence excepted for 't is a remedy for the King's Duty of which he was hindred by the Concealment 'T is true the first part of the Pardon excuseth all Misdemeanours comitted against the King in his standing Revenue but this Exception takes in all Concealments and Frauds in answering of the Revenue and this Information is principally grounded upon Fraud 5 Co. 56. so that the Exception ought to be taken as largely for the King as the Pardon it self to discharge the Subject No Fraud tending to the diminution of the Revenue is pardoned for it excepts not only all Concealments in collecting the Revenue but other Mony due or to be due to the King If therefore when the King is entituled by Inquisition Office or Record there must be express and not general words to pardon it and since this Fact was committed before the Pardon came out and so found by the Iury whose Verdict is of more value than an Enquest of Office so that the King by this means is entituled to the Goods by Record
so his Son is justly and rightly sued as Son and Heir In some Cases the persons are to be named not by way of a Title but as a Pedigree as if there be Tenant for Life the Reversion in Fee to an Ideot and an Vncle who is right Heir to the Ideot levied a Fine and died living the Ideot leaving Issue a Son named John who had Issue William who entred the Question was whether the Issue of the Vncle shall be barred by this Fine It was the Opinion of two Iudges that they were not barred because the Vncle died in the life-time of the Ideot and nothing attached in him March 94. Cro. Car. 524. and because the Issue claim in a collateral Line and do not name the Father by way of Title but by way of Pedigree But Iustice Jones who hath truly Reported the Case Jones 456. was of Opinion that the Issue of the Vncle were barred because the Son must make his Conveyance from the Father by way of Title The Iury have found that the Reversion did descend to the Defendant as Heir to the last John 't is true it descends as a Reversion but that shall not charge him as Heir to the Father Jenk's Case 1 Cro. for the other was seised of the Estate Tail which is now spent and the last who was seised of the Fee was the Father and so the Defendant must be charged as his Heir 'T is likewise true that where there is an actual Seisin you must charge all but in this Case there was nothing but a Reversion Tremaine Serjeant for the Defendant In this Case the Plaintiff should have made a special Declaration for the Estate-Tail and the Reversion in Fee are distinct and seperate Estates John the Nephew might have sold the Reversion and kept the Estate Tail if he had acknowledged a Statute or Iudgment it might have been extended and if so then he had such a Seisin that he ought to have been named A Man becomes bound in a Bond and died Debt is brought against the Heir it is not common to say that he had nothing by descent but only a Reversion expectant upon an Estate Tayl. In the Case of Chappel and Lee Covenant was brought in the Common-Pleas against Judith Daughter and Heir of Robert Rudge She pleaded Riens per descent Issue was joyned before Sir Francis North then Chief Iustice and it appearing upon Evidence that Robert had a Son named Robert who died without Issue a Case was made of it and Iudgment was given for the Defendant the Plaintiff took out a new Original and then the Land was sold so the Plaintiff lost his Debt Adjornatur Afterwards in Hillary Term a Gulielmi Mariae Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff by the Opinion of three Iustices against Iustice Eyre who argued that the Defendant cannot be charged as immediate Heir to his Father 't is true the Lands are Assets in his Hands and he may be charged by a special Declaration Dyer 368. pl. 460. In this Case the intermediate Heirs had a Reversion in Fee which they might have charged either by Statute Iudgment or Recognizance they were so seised that if a Writ of Right had been brought against them they might have joyned the Mise upon the Mere right which proves they had a Fee and though it was expectant on an Estate Tail 3 Co. 42. Ratcliff's Case yet the Defendant claiming the Reversion as Heir ought to make himself so to him who made the Gift The person who brings a Formeden in Descender must name every one to whom any Right did descend 8 Co. 88. F.N.B. 220. c. Rast Ent. 375. otherwise the Writ will abate A Man who is sued as Heir or who entitles himself as such must shew how Heir The Case of Duke and Spring is much stronger than this 2 Rol. Abr. 709. 2 Cro. 161. for there Debt was brought against the Daughter as Heir of B. She pleaded Riens per descent and the Iury found that B. died seised in Fee leaving Issue the Defendant and his Wife then with Child who was afterwards delivered of a Son who died within an hour and it was adjudged against the Plaintiff because he declared against the Defendant as Daughter and Heir of the Father when she was Sister and Heir of the Brother who was last seised But the other three Iudges were of a contrary Opinion The Question is not whether the Defendant is lyable to this Debt but whether he is properly charged as Heir to his Father or whether he should have been charged as Heir to his Nephew who was last seised It must be admitted that if the Lands had descended to the Brother and Nephew of the Defendant in Fee that then they ought to have been named but they had only a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate Tail which was incertain and therefore of little value now though John the Father and Son had this Reversion in them yet the Estate Tail was known only to those who were Parties to the Settlement 'T is not the Reversion in Fee Bro. Fit Descent pl. 30.37 Ass pl. 4. but the Possession which makes the party inheritable and therefore if Lands are given to Husband and Wife in Tail the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Husband then they have a Son and the Wife dies and the Husband hath a Son by a second Venter and dies the eldest Son enters and dies without Issue and his Vncle claimed the Land against the second Son but was barred because he had not the Remainder in Fee in possession and yet he might have sold or forfeited it But here the Reversion in Fee is now come into possession and the Defendant hath the Land as Heir to his Father t is Assets only in him and was not so either in his Brother or Nephew who were neither of them chargeable because a Reversion expectant upon an Estate Tail is not Assets Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 1 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1689. Young versus Inhabitants de Totnam AN Action was brought against the Hundred for a Robbery in which the Plaintiff declared that he was Robbed apud quendam locum prope Faire Mile Gate in such a Parish He had a Verdict And now Serjeant Tremaine moved in arrest of Iudgment and the Exceptions taken were these viz. 1. That it doth not appear that the Parish mentioned in the Declaration was in the Hundred 2. Neither doth it appear that the Robbery was committed in the High-way 3. The Plaintiff hath not alledged that it was done in the day time for if it was not the Hundred is not lyable by Law But these Exceptions were all disallowed because it being after a Verdict the Court will suppose that there was Evidence given of these Matters at the Trial so the Plaintiff had his Iudgment Eggleston al' versus Speke alias Petit.
Occupant and let the Land to the Plaintiff until c. Et hoc paratus est verificare The Defendant demurred to this Replication and had Iudgment The Matter now in Debate was upon Exceptions to the Barr. 1. For want of a Traverse that Sir Peter Werburton was seised in Fee at the time of the taking c. 2. For want of a sufficient Title alledged in the Plaintiff for that by the Statue of Frauds all Occupancy is now taken away It was argued that the Replication was good without a Traverse Co. Ent. 504. for where the Plaintiff hath confessed and avoided as he hath done here if he had traversed likewise that would have made his Replication double He confesseth that Sir P. W. was seised in Fee of the Mannor but afterwards the Seisin was expresly alledged to be in Sir George the Father and that the place where was parcel thereof which is a Confession and an Avoidance The Avowant should have traversed this Lease but the Traverse of the Plaintiff upon him had made it a worse Issue Agreeable to this Case in reason is that which was adjudged in this Court in Michaelmas-Term 10 Car. 1. It was in Trespass Cro. Car. 384. the Defendant pleaded that the locus in quo was the sole Freehold of John c. and justified by his Command The Plaintiff replyed that the Land was parcel of the Mannor of Abbots Anne and that W. was seised in Fee and levied a Fine to the use of himself and Wife for their Lives the Remainder to E. for 100 years if he lived so long who after the death of the Cognizors entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiff And upon a Demurrer to this Replication the same Exception was then taken as now viz. that the Plaintiff did not confess and avoid the Freehold of John but the Plaintiff had Iudgment for the Barr being at large and the Title in the Replication being likewise so too the Plaintiff may claim by a Lease for years without answering the Freehold The not concluding with a Traverse is but a form and the Court will proceed according to the Right of the Cause without such form 27 Eliz. c. 5. 't is a defect which after a Ioinder in Demurrer is expresly helped by the Statute of Ieofails which enables the Court to amend defects and want of Forms other than such for which the party hath demurred The Case of Edwards and Woodden is in point Cro. Car. 323. 6 Co. Heyley 's Case Dyer 171. b. 1 Leon. 77 78. contra it was in Replevin the Defendant made Cognizance as Bailiff to Cotton for that the place where c. was so many Acres parcel of a Mannor c. that Bing was seised thereof in Fee who granted a Rent Charge out of it to Sir Robert Heath in Fee who sold it to Cotton c. The Plaintiff in Barr to the Conusance replied and confessed that the Land was parcel of the Mannor c. and that Bing was seised in Fee prout c. and granted the Rent to Sir R. H. but that long before the Seisin of Bing c. one Leigh was seised thereof in Fee who devised it to Blunt for a Term of years which Term by several Assignments came to Claxton who gave the Plaintiff leave to put in his Cattel c. And upon a Demurrer to this Replication an Exception was taken to it for that the Plaintiff did not shew how the Seisin and Grant of Bing to Sir R. H. was avoided for having confessed a Seisin in Fee prout c. that shall be intended a Fee in possession and notwithstanding he had afterwards set forth a Lease for years in Leigh by whom it was devised to Blunt c. and so to Claxton it may be intended that the Grantor was only seised in Fee of the Reversion and therefore the Plaintiff ought to have traversed the Seisin aliter vel alio modo But three Iudges seemed to encline that the Replication was good and that the Plaintiff had well confessed and avoided that Seisin in Fee which was alledged by the Defendant for he had shewed a Lease for years precedent to the Defendants Title and which was not chargeable with the Rent and his pleading that the Grantor Bing was seised in Fee must be only of a Reversion expectant upon that Lease But if his Confession that Being was seised in Fee prout c. shall be intended a Seisin in Fee in possession yet the Replication is good in substance because the Charge against the Plaintiff is avoided by a former Estate and in such Case 't is not necessary to take a Traverse But after all it was held that if it be a defect 't is but want of a Form which is aided by the Statute and that is this very Case now in question The want of a Traverse seldom makes a Plea ill in substance but a naughty Traverse often makes it so because the adversary is tied up to that which is material in it self so that he cannot answer what is proper and material and therefore in Ejectment upon a Lease made by E. I. Yelv. 151. Bedel versus Lull the Defendant pleaded that before E. I. had any thing to do c. M. I. was seised in Fee after whose death the Land descended to his Heir and that E. entred and was seized by Abatement The Plaintiff replied and confessed the Seisin of M. but saith that he devised it in Fee to E. I. who entred absque hoc that E. I. was seized by Abatement and upon a Demurrer this was held to be an ill Traverse for the Plaintiff had confessed the Seisin of M. and avoided it by the Devise and therefore ought not to have traversed the Abatement for having derived a good Title by the Devise to his Lessor 't is an Argument that he entred lawfully and it was that alone which was issuable and not the Abatement therefore it was ill to traverse that because it must never be taken but where the thing traversed is issuable Then it was said that the Conusance was informal because the Avowant should have said that the Locus in quo c. contains so many Acres of Ground c. he only saith that it was parcel of a Mannor besides he neither prays Damages nor Retorn ' Habend ' 2. As to the 2d Point it was said that the Statute of Frauds doth not take away all Occupancy it only appoints who shall be a special Occupant Besides here is a Title within the Statute for a Lease for Lives is personal Assets so is a Term in the Hands of an Executor de son tort and in this Case the entring of one Brother after the death of the other made him an Executor de son tort More 126. Sid. 7. and it was never yet doubted but that there may be such an Executor of a Term. Whereupon it was concluded that the Barr was good both as to the Form
Demise and the Word Assignes is in the Deed yet they are not bound if they have no Estate so that 't is not the naming of them but by reason of the Estate in the Land they are made chargeable No Iudgment is entred upon the Roll. FINIS ERRATA FOlio 88. Line 13. for Defendant read Plaintiff f. 106. l. 26. for no r. an f. 119. l. 7. after must be r. Error f. 147. l. 13 18 38. for coram r. quorum f. 189. l. 23. for reasonable r. unreasonable f. 196. l. 28. for devises r. demises f. 199. l. 1. for 23. r. 13. f. 201. l. 14. before merged r. not f. 218. l. 17. for 1672. r. 1679. f. 203. l. 31. after Berkley r. and Mr. Killigrew f. 222. l. 31. leave out and marrieth f. 226. l. 21. leave out she marrieth f. 237. l. 29. for devise r. demise f. 255. l. 31. for Father r. Nephew f. 256. l. 12. for joyned r. tryed f. 287. l. 6. after delivered r. tied f. 303. l. 16. for Grantee r. Guarantee f. 307. l. 36. for voidable r. void A TABLE to the Third Part of Modern Reports A. Abatement See Ioint Action 8. 1. DEBT was brought by four Plaintiffs one of them died before Judgment the Action is abated as to the rest 249 2. Waste is brought against Tenant pur auter vie and pending the Writ Cestui que vie dieth the Writ shall not abate because no other person can be sued for the Damages ibid. 3. Two Jointenants are Defendants the death of one shall not abate the Writ for the Action is joint and several ibid. 4. Where two or more are to recover in a personal thing the death of one shall abate the Action as to the rest ibid. 5. But in Audita Querela the death of one shall not abate the Writ because it is in discharge ibid. Abeiance See Acceptance 1. Resignation of a Benefice passes nothing to the Ordinary but putteth the Freehold in Abeiance till his acceptance 297 See Acceptance Resignation Surrender Acts of Parliament See Iustice of Peace 2 Pardon 2 Ought to be construed according to the intention of the Law-makers and ought to be expounded according to the Rules of the Common Law 63 2. Where a particular punishment is directed by a Statute Law it must be pursued and no other can be inflicted upon the Offender 78 118 3. When an Act is penal it ought to be construed according to Equity 90 157 312 4. Preamble is the best Expositor of the Law 129 169 Action upon the Ease Assumpsit A Feoffment was made upon Trust that the Feoffee should convey the Estate to another the Cestuy que Trust may have an Action if the Feoffee refuseth to convey 149 2. In consideration that the Plaintiff would let the Defendant have Meat Drink c. he promised to pay as much as it was reasonably worth the word valerent was in the Declaration it should have been quantum valebant at the time of the Promise but held good after Verdict 190 3. Where a personal promise is grounded upon a real Contract the Action will lie 73 4. It will not lie for Rent reserved upon a Demise but where a Promise is made to pay Rent in consideration of occupying a House it will lie 240 Action on the Case See Bankrupts 2 Indictment 2 Slander where it lieth 1. He is a Papist spoken of a Deputy Lieutenant 26 2. Where the words injure a person in his Profession or bring him in danger of punishment 27 3. He stole the Colonel's Cupboard Cloth there being no precedent Discourse either of the Colonel or his Cloth 280 4. He is broken and run away and never will return again spoken of a Carpenter 155 5. He is a Rogue a Papist Dog and a pitiful Fellow and never a Rogue in Town has a Bonfire before his door but he spoken of a Merchant who made a Bonefire at the Coronation of King James 103 6. He owes more Mony than he is worth he is run away and is broak spoken of an Husbandman 112 7. The Wife was called Whore and that she was the Defendant's Whore the Husband and she brought the Action and concluded ad dampnum ipsorum it lies without allegding special Damages 120 8. Sir J. K. is a buffle headed Fellow and doth not understand Law he is not fit to talk Law with me I have baffled him and he hath not done my Client Justice spoken of a Justice of Peace 139 9. J. P. is a Knave and a busie Knave for searching after me and other honest men of my sort and I will make him give satisfaction for plundering me spoken of a Justice of Peace no Colloquium was laid the Court was divided 163 Where it doth not lie Words were laid to be spoken ad tenorem effectum sequen ' which is not an express allegation that they were spoken 71 72 Action on the Case against a Common Carrier Where it was brought against him upon an Assumpsit in Law and likewise upon a Tort the Declaration is not good 322 Action on the Case for a wrong See Pleading For diverting of a Water-course the Antiquity of the Mill must be set forth 49 2. It lies against a wrong doer upon the bare possession only and the Plaintiff need not set forth whether he hath a Title by Grant or Prescription for that goes to the right 51 52 132 3. If the Declaratien is for the diverting of the Water ab antiquo solito cursu this amounts to a Prescription which must be proved at the Trial or the Plaintiff will be non-suited 52 4. Whether it lieth for the making of a scandalous Affidavit in Chancery 108 5. For selling of Oxen affirming them to be his own ubi revera they were not but doth not say sciens the same to be the Goods of another or that he sold them fraudulenter or deceptive 't is naught upon a Demurrer but good after Verdict 261 6. Where several are guilty of a wrong the Action may be brought against either 321 7. Debt upon the Statute of Ed. 6. for not setting out Tithes brought against two Tenants in Common one of them did set out the Tithes and the other carried them away it ought to be brought only against the wrong doer 322 8. For disturbing of a Man in a Common Passage or Common High-way no Action on the Case lieth without a particular damage done to himself for the proper remedy is a Presentment in the Leet 294 Administrator Vide Infant 18 Ordinary Interest 2 Pleading 2 Administrator durante minore aetate hath no power over the Estate 24 2. Administration could not be granted by the Spiritual Court before the Statute of Ed. 3. 24 3. Where 't is once granted whether it ought to be repealed 25 4. Administrator had the whole Estate in him before the Statute of Distributions 60 5. He then gave Bond to distribute as the Ordinary should direct ibid. 6. The Father died
day of Appearance he is to see that he appear at the day either by keeping of him in Custody or letting of him to Bail the end of the Arrest is to have his Body here If he had not been bailed then he had still remained in Custody and the Plaintiff would have his proper remedy but being once let to Bail and not appearing in Court according to the Condition of the Bond that seems to be the fault of the Defendant who had his Body before the day of Appearance Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 1 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1685. Serjeant Hampson's Case BY the Statute of Queen Elizabeth 't is Enacted 5 Eliz. c. 23. That if the person excommunicated have not a sufficient Addition or if 't is not contained in the Significavit that the Excommunication proceeds for some cause or contempt or of some original Matter of Heresie refusing to have his Child baptized to receive the Sacrament to come to Divine Service or Errors in Matters of Religion or Doctrine Incontinency Usury Simony Perjury in the Ecclesiastical Court or Idolatry he shall not incurr the Penalties in the Act. Serjeant Hampson was excommunicated for Alimony and now Mr. Girdler moved that he might be discharged because none of the aforesaid Causes were contained in the Significavit Curia He may be discharged of the Forfeiture for that reason but not of the Excommunication Anonymus ONE who was outlawed for the Murder of Sir Edmund Bury Godfrey now brought a Writ of Error in his Hand to the Bar praying that it might be read and allowed It was read by Mr. Astry Clerk of the Crown The Errors assigned were viz. That it did not appear upon the Return of the Exigent in the first Exact ' that the Court was held pro Comitatu That the Outlawry being against him and two other persons 't is said in the last Exact ' that Non comperuit but doth not say nec eorum aliquis comperuit For these Reasons the Outlawry was reversed and he held up his Hand at the Barr and pleaded Not-guilty to his Indictment and was admitted to Bail and afterwards he was brought to his Trial and no Witness in behalf of the King appearing against him he was acquitted The Mayor and Commonalty of Norwich versus Johnson A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment given for the Plaintiff in the Common-Pleas in an Action of Waste Waste lies against an Executor de son tort of a Term. The Declaration was that the Plaintiff demised a Barn to one Took for a certain Term by vertue whereof he was possessed and being so possessed died that the Defendant was his Executor who entred and made Waste by pulling down of the said Barn The Defendant pleaded that Took died intestate and that he did not administer The Plaintiff replyed that he entred as Executor of his own Wrong and to this Plea the Defendant demurred and the Plaintiff joined in the Demurrer This Case was argued by Mr. Appleton of Lincolns-Inn for the Plaintiff who said That an Action of Waste would not lie against the Defendant because the Mayor and Commonalty c. had a remedy by an Assise to recover the Land upon which the Barn stood and a Trover to recover the Goods or Materials and that such an Action would not lie against him at the Common Law because he neither was Tenant by the Curtesie nor in Dower against whom Waste only lay So that if the Plaintiff is entituled to this Action it must be by vertue of the Statute of Gloucester 6 Ed. 1. c. 5. but it will not lie against the Defendant even by that Statute because the Action is thereby given against the Tenant by the Curtesie in Dower for Life or Years and treble Damages c. But the Defendant is neither of those and this being a penal Law which not only gives treble damages but likewise the Recovery of the place wasted ought therefore not to be taken strictly but according to Equity Tenants at sufferance or at Will by Elegit or Tenants by Statute Staple 11 H. 6. c. 5. and also Pernors of Profits were never construed to be within this Statute and therefore a particular Act was made to give him in Reversion an Action of Waste where Tenant for life or years had granted over their Estates and yet took the Profits and committed Waste Then the Question will be Co. Lit. 371. what Estate this Executor de sontort hath gained by his Entry And as to that he argued that he had got a Fee-simple by Disseisin and that for this reason the Plaintiff was barred from this Action for if the Son purchase Lands in Fee and is disseised by his Father who maketh a Feoffment in Fee to another with Warranty and dieth the Son is for ever barred for though the Disseisin was not done with any intention to make such a Feoffment 1 Roll. Abr. 662. yet he is bound by this Alienation So where a man made a Lease for life and died and then his Heir suffered a Recovery of the same Land without making an actual Entry this is an absolute Disseisin because the Lessee had an Estate for life but if he had been Tenant at Will it might be otherwise But admitting that the Defendant is not a Disseisor then the Plaintiffs must bring their Case to be within the Statute of Gloucester as that he is either Tenant for life or years If he is Tenant for Life he must be so either by right or by wrong He cannot be so by right because he had no lawful Conveyance made to him of this Estate besides 't is quite contrary to the Pleading which is that he entred wrongfully Neither can he be so by wrong for such particular Estates 6 Co. 25. as for life or years cannot be gained by Disseisin and so is Heliar's Case in 6 Co. Then if this should be construed an Estate for years it must be gained either by the Act of the Party or by the Act of the Law but such an Estate cannot be gained by either of those means First it cannot be gained by the Act of the Party Moor 126. Kendrick versus Burges because an Executor de son tort cannot have any interest in a Term and for this there is an express Authority in this Court which was thus viz. A Lease in Reversion for years was granted to a man who died intestate his Wife before she had administred sold this Term to the Defendant and afterwards she obtained Letters of Administration and made a Conveiance of the same Term to the Plaintiff and Iudgment was given for the last Vendee because it was in the case of a Reversion of a Term for years upon which no Entry could be made and of which there could be no Executor de son tort though it was admitted by the Court that such an Executor might make a good sale of
that is to make them Iudges whether this Duty is payable or not and so the Courts of Westminster who are the proper Iudges of the Revenue of the King who by this means will be without an Appeal will be excluded Curia This Court may take Cognizance of this Matter as well as in Cases of Bastardy 't is frequent to remove those Orders into this Court though the Act says That the two next Justices may take order as well for the punishment of the Mother as also for the relief of the Parish where it was born except he give Security to appear the next Quarter Sessions The Statute doth not mention any Certiorari which shews that the intention of the Law-makers was that a Certiorari might he brought otherwise they would have enacted as they have done by several other Statutes that no Certiorari shall lie Therefore the meaning of the Act must be that the determination of the Iustices of the Peace shall be final in Matters of Fact only as if a Collector should affirm that a person hath four Chimnies when he hath but two or when the Goods distrained are sold under the value and the Overplus not returned but the Right of the Duty arising by virtue of this Act was never intended to be determined by them Then the Order was filed and Mr. Pollexfen moved that it might be quashed for that by the Statute of 14 Car. 2. 14 Car. 2. c. 10. the Occupier was only chargeable and the Land-Lord exempted Now by the Proviso in that Act such a Cottage as is expressed in this Order is likewise exempted because 't is not of greater value than 20 s. by the year and 't is not expressed that the person inhabiting the same hath any Lands of his own of the value of 20 s. per annum nor any Lands or Goods to the value of 10 l. Now there having been several abuses made of this Law to deceive the King of this Duty occasioned the making of this subsequent Act. The abuses were these viz. The taking a great House and dividing it into several Tenements and then letting them to Tenants who by reason of their poverty might pretend to be exempted from this Duty The dividing Lands from Houses so that the King was by these Practices deceived and therefore in such Cases the charge was laid upon the Land-Lord but nothing of this appearing upon the Order it was therefore quashed Brett versus Whitchot IN Replevin Lands not exempted from repairing of the High-ways by grant of the King The Defendant avowed the taking of a Cup as a Fine for a Distress towards the repairing of the High-way The Plaintiff replyed and set forth a Grant from the King by which the Lands which were chargeable to send Men for the repairing c. were exempted from that Duty And upon a Demurrer the Question was Whether the Kings Letters Patents are sufficient to exempt Lands from the Charge of the repairing of the High-ways 2 3 Ph. Mar. c. 8. which by the Statute of Philip and Mary and other subsequent Statutes are chargeable to send Men for that purpose And it was argued that such Letters Patents were not sufficient because they were granted in this Case before the making of the Statute and so by consequence before any cause of Action and to prove this a Case was cited to this purpose In 2 E. 2 Inst 569. 3. an Action was brought against an Hundred for a Robbery upon the Statute of 13 E. 1. The Bishop of Litchfield pleaded a Charter of R. 1. by which that Hundred which was held in Right of his Church was exempted c. But it was held that this Charter could not discharge the Action because no such Action was given when the Letters Patents were made but long afterwards Iudgment was given for the Avowant Upton versus Dawkin TRespass quare vi armis liberam piscariam he did break and enter and one hundred Trouts ipsius Quer. Trespass for taking Fish ipsius querentis in libera piscaria not good in the Fishery aforesaid did take and carry away Vpon Not guilty pleaded there was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and this Exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment viz. For that the Plaintiff declared in Trespass for taking so many Fish ipsius Quer. in libera piscaria which cannot be because he hath not such a property in libera piscaria to call the Fish his own Pollexfen contra If there had not been a Verdict such a Construction might have been made of this Declaration upon a Demurrer but now 't is helped and the rather because a Man may call them pisces ipsius in a free Fishery for they may be in a Trunk so a Man may have a property though not in himself as in the Case of Iointenants where 't is not in one but in both yet if one declare against the other unless he plead the Iointenancy in Abatement the Plaintiff shall recover But notwithstanding the Iudgment was reversed Dominus Rex versus ...... THE Defendant was indicted for Barretry Barretry the Evidence against him was that one G. was arrested at the Suit of C. in an Action of 4000 l. and was brought before a Iudge to give Bail to the Action and that the Defendant who was a Barrister at Law was then present and did sollicite this Suit when in truth at the same time C. was indebted to G. in 200 l. and that he did not owe the said C. one farthing The Chief Iustice was first of Opinion that this might be Maintenance but that it was not Barretry unless it appeared that the Defendant did know that C. had no cause of Action after it was brought If a Man should be arrested for a trifling Cause or for no Cause this is no Barretry though 't is a sign of a very ill Christian it being against the express Word of God But a Man may arrest another thinking he hath a just cause so to do when as in truth he hath none for he may be mistaken especially where there hath been great dealings between the Parties But if the design was not to recover his own Right but only to ruine and oppress his Neighbour that is Barretry A Man may lay out mony in behalf of another in Suits at Law to recover a just Right and this may be done in respect of the Poverty of the Party but if he lend mony to promote and stirr up Suits then he is a Barretor Now it appearing upon the Evidence that the Defendant did entertain C. in his House and brought several Actions in his Name where nothing was due that he was therefore guilty of that Crime But if an Action be first brought and then profecuted by another he is no Barretor though there is no cause of Action The Defendant was found guilty DE Termino Paschae Anno 2 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1686. Coram Edwardo Herbert Mil ' Capital ' Justic
c. yet one Commoner may bring an Action against his Fellow besides in this Case they are not Tenants in Common for every Man is seized severally of his Freehold Adjornatur Ayres versus Huntington AScire Facias was brought upon a Recognizance of 1000 l. Amendment of the word Recuperatio for Recognitio after a Demurrer to shew cause quare the Plaintiff should not have Execution de praedictis mille libris recognitis juxta formam Recuperationis where it should have been Recognitionis praed And upon a Demurrer it was held that the words juxta formam Recuperationis were Surplusage The Record was amended and a Rule that the Defendant should plead over Mather and others versus Mills THE Defendant entred into a Bond to acquir Non damnificatus generally where 't is a good Plea discharge and save harmless a Parish from a Bastard Child Debt was brought upon this Bond and upon Non damnificatus generally pleaded the Plaintiff demurred and Tremain held the Demurrer to be good for if the Condition had been only to save harmless c. then the Plea had been good but 't is likewise to acquit and discharge c. and in such Case Non damnificatus generally is no good Plea 1 Leon. 71. because he should have shewed how he did acquit and discharge the Parish and not answer the Damnification only E contra E contra 2 Co. 3. 2 Cro. 363 364 2 Sand. 83 84. It was argued that if the Defendnat had pleaded that he kept harmless and discharged the Parish such Plea had not been good unless he had shewed how c. because 't is in the affirmative but here 't is in the negative viz. that the Parish was not dampnified and they should have shewed a Breach for though in strictness this Plea doth not answer the Condition of the Bond yet it doth not appear upon the whole Record that the Plaintiff was dampnified and if so then he hath no cause of Action Iudgment for the Defendant DE Term. Sanctae Trin. Anno 1 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1689. Memorandum That on the 4th day of November last past the Prince of Orange landed here with an Army and by reason of the Abdication of the Government by King James and the Posture of Affairs there was no Hillary-Term kept Coram Johanne Holt Mil ' Capital ' Justic Gulielmo Dolben Mil ' Justiciar Gulielmo Gregory Mil ' Justiciar Egidio Eyre Mil ' Justiciar Kellow versus Rowden Trin. 1 Willielmi Mariae Rotulo 796. IN Debt by Walter Kellow Where the Reversion in Fee is expectant upon an Estate Tail and that being spent it descends upon a collateral Heir he must be sued as Heir to him who was last actually seized of the Fee without naming the intermediate Remainders Executor of Edward Kellow against Richard Rowden The Case was this viz. John Rowden had Issue two Sons John and Richard John the Father being seized in Fee of Lands c. made a Settlement to the use of himself for Life the Remainder to John his eldest Son in Tail Male the Remainder to his own right Heirs The Father died the Reversion descended to John the Son who also died leaving Issue John his Son who died without Issue so that the Estate Tail was spent Richard the second Son of John the elder entred and an Action of Debt was brought against him as Son and Heir of John the Father upon a Bond of 120 l. entred into by his Father and this Action was brought against him without naming the intermediate Heirs viz. his Brother and Nephew The Defendant pleaded Quod ipse de debito praed ut filius haeres praed Johannis Rowden Patris sui virtute scripti obligatorii praed onerari non debet quia protestando quod scriptum obligatorium praed non est factum praed Johannis Rowden pro placito idem Richardus dicit quod ipse non habet aliquas terras seu tenementa per discensum haereditarium de praed Johanne Rowden patre suo in feodo simplici nec habuit die exhibitionis billae praed Walteri praed nec unquam postea hoc parat est ' verificare unde pet judicium si ipse ut filius haeres praed Johannis Rowden patris sui virtute scripti praed onerari debeat c. The Plaintiff replied that the Defendant die Exhibitionis billae praed habuit diversas terras tenementa per discensum haereditarium a praed Johanne Rowden patre suo in feodo simplici c. Vpon this pleading they were at Issue at the Assises in Wiltshire and the Iury found a special Verdict viz. that John Rowden the Father of Richard now the Defendant was seized in Fee of a Messuage and 20 Acres of Land in Bramshaw in the said County and being so seised had Issue John Rowden his eldest Son and the Defendant Richard that on the 22th of Januarii 18 Car. I. John the elder did settle the Premisses upon himself for Life Remainder ut supra c. That after the death of the Father John his eldest Son entred and was possessed in Fee-Tail and was likewise entituled to the Reversion in Fee and died in the 14th year of King Charles the II. that the Lands did descend to another John his only Son who died 35th Car. II. without Issue whereupon the Lands descended to the Defendant as Heir of the last mentionted John who entred before this Action brought and was seised in Fee c. But whether upon the whole matter the Defendant hath any Lands by by descent from John Rowden in Fee-simple the Iury do not know c. The Council on both sides did agree that this Land was chargable with the Debt but the Question was whether the Issue was found for the Defendant in regard the Plaintiff did not name the intermediate Heirs It was argued that the Defendant ought to be sued as immediate Heir to his Father and not to his Nephew for whoever claims by descent must claim from him who was last actually seised of the Freehold and Inheritance this is the express Doctrine of my Lord Coke in his first Institutes and if so Co. Lit. 11. the Defendant must be charged as he claims Seisin is a material thing in our Law for if I am to make a Title in a real Action I must lay an actual seisin in every Man 8 E. 3.13 Bro. Assise 6. F.N. B. 212. F. 't is so in Formedons in Descender and Remainder in both which you are to run through the whole Pedegree But none can be Filius Haeres but to him who was last actually seised of the Fee-simple and therefore the Brother being Tenant in Tail and his Son the Issue in Tail in this Case they were never seised of the Fee 1 Inst 14. b. for that was expectant upon the Estate Tail which being spent then John the Father was last seised thereof and
But if any wrong be done in this Case the Party must Appeal so no Writ of Restitution was granted Rex versus Guardianum de le Fleet. AN Inquisition being found to seize the Office of Warden of the Fleet into the King's Hands Inquisition quashed the Court of Chancery assisted with three Iudges was moved that it might be Quashed The Exceptions taken were viz. 1. 'T is found that the Defendant was Warden of the Fleet but doth not say what Estate he had therein whether for Life or years or in Fee c. 2. The Offences which are the causes of the Forfeiture are laid to be committed at the Fleet by suffering Escapes and by Extortion and 't is not found where the Fleet is scituate so there being no Visne those Offences cannot be traversed 3. 39 H. 6.32 They do not find the Escape to be sine licentia contra voluntatem of the Warden the Debts being unpaid 4. Admitting it to be a Forfeiture the Office cannot go to the King but it shall go to the next who hath the Inheritance The Opinion of the Court was that there are two things which entitle the King to this Office neither of which were found by this Inquisition 1. An Estate in the Party offending 2. A cause of Forfeiture of that Estate Now here was no Estate found in the Warden but only that the Office was forfeited by suffering of Escapes c. If this had been an Office of Inheritance ◠Co. 95. then it ought to be found that such a person was seised in Fee c. and so what Estate soever he had in it ought to be expresly found But as this is found 't is void because it doth not answer the end for which the finding of Offices was provided which is to entitle the King to the Offenders Estate An Indictment is but another sort of Office and here being no Estate found 't is much like an Indictment which finds no Offence therefore it must be quashed It might have been objected that no Man can tell what Estate the Warden had in this place and that not being known no Office could be found for the King But this Objection runs to the finding of all manner of Offices in general whose very nature is to find an Estate and to divest the subject thereof and vest it in the King Besides in this Case one of the Indentures by which the Office was granted to the Warden must be enrolled in the Court of Common-Pleas This cannot be helped by a Melius Inquirendum 3 Cro. 895. 9 Co. 95. Keilw 194. which never will support a defective Inquisition and this is such because it doth not appear that the Defendant had any Seisin or Estate in the Wardenship of the Fleet. Barker Mil ' versus Damer Hill 1 Rot. 635. AN Action of Covenant was brought by Sir William Barker who was Defendant in a former Action against Mr. Damer wherein he declared that William Barker his Father was seised in Fee of the Land in Question being in Ireland and made a Lease thereof to one Page for 31 years under the yearly Rent of 200 l. in which Lease Page did Covenant for himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns to pay the Rent to Mr. Barker his Heirs and Assigns That William Barker the Father by Lease and Release convey'd the Reversion to Sir William Barker the now Plaintiff that the Term was vested in the Defendant and assigns the breach for non-payment of the Rent The Defendant pleaded to the Iurisdiction of this Court that the Lands in the Declaration mentioned lay in Ireland where they have Courts of Record c. and so properly triable there To this Plea the Plaintiff demurr'd and the Defendant joyned in Demurrer The single Question was whether an Assignee of the Reversion can bring an Action of Covenant against the Assignee of a Lessee in any other place than where the Land is Those who argued that he may said that this Action being brought upon an Express Covenant is not local but transitory 2 Inst 231. Noy 142. 2 Cro. 142. ibidem Sid. 157. 2 Roll. Ab. 571. 1 And. 82. for debitum contractus sunt nullius loci and if it is a duty 't is so every where therefore it hath been adjudged that upon a Covenant brought in one County the breach may be assigned in another Tremain Serjeant Contra. E contra He admitted that Debt upon a Lease for years upon the Contract it self and Covenant between the same Parties are transitory Actions and may be brought any where but when once that privity of Contract is gone as by assignment of the Lessee or the death of the Lessor Latch 197. and there remains only a Privity in Law there the Action must be brought in the County where the Land lieth the reason is Hob. 37. because the Party is then chargeable in respect of the possession only Therefore it was held that where an Assignee of a Reversion of Lands in Sommersetshire brought an Action of Debt in London Cro. Car. 184. Jones 83. Dyer 40 b. upon a Lease for years made there reserving a Rent payable at London which was in arrear after the Assignment that the Action was not well brought for it ought to have been laid in Sommersetshire where the Lands were because the privity of Contract was lost by the assignment of the Reversion and therefore the Party to whom that assignment was made ought to maintain the Action upon the privity in Law by reason of the Interest which he had in the Land it self and that must be in the County where it lieth Curia There is a difference between an Action of Debt for Rent brought by an Assignee and an Action of Covenant for the first is an Action at the Common Law which hath fixed the Rent to the Reversion and therefore such an Action must be maintained upon the Privity of Estate which is always local But an Assigneé of a Reversion could not bring an Action of Covenant at the Common Law 1 Sid. 402. 3 Cro. 580. 1 Sand. 240. 32 H. 8. c. 34. for 't is given to him by a particular Statute viz. of 32 H. 8. but the Statute did not transfer any Privity of Contract to the Assignee but the intent of it was to annex to the Reversion such Covenants only which concerned the Land it self as to repair the House or amend the Fences and not to anner or transfer any collateral Covenants as to pay a Sum of Mony for that is fixed by the Common Law to the Reversion 'T is true At the Common Law an Assignee of a Reversion might have maintained an Action of Covenant for any thing agreed to be done upon the Land it self Privity of Contract is not thereby transferred so as to make the Action transitory but it must be brought upon the Privity of Estate for if a Man doth covenant to do any collateral thing not in the
eldest Son for sixty years if he so long lived Remainder to Thomas for Life and that John made a Lease to the Plaintiff for a year The Defendant replied that after the Devise R. Frances made a Feoffment in Fee of the same Lands amongst others to the use of himself for Life Then as to the other Lands to divers Vses contained in the Deed but as to those Lands in which the Distress was taken to the same Vses as in the Will in which Conveyance there was this Priviso That if John should disturb his Executors in the quiet Enjoyment c. or if he shall not suffer them to carry away the Goods in his House then the Uses limited to him should be void He did hinder the Executors to carry away the Goods yet it was adjudged that he should keep his Estate because being a Stranger to the Feoffment he shall not lose it without notice of the Proviso But in answer to that Case notice was not the principal matter of that Iudgment it turned upon a point in Pleading for the Avowant had not shewed any special act of disturbance and a bare denial without doing any more was held to be no breach of the Condition Some other Authorities may be cited to prove notice necessary Green's Case 6 Co. 24. as where Tenant for Life of a Mannor to which an Advowson was appendant did in the year 1594. present Durston who neglecting to read the Articles was deprived nine years afterwards by the Ordinary at the Suit of the Patron who presented him who also dyed two years after the Deprivation then the Queen presented by Lapse whose Presentee was inducted and six years afterwards Durston dyed after whose death he in Remainder presented Green now though the Patron was a Party to the Suit of Deprivation and thereby had sufficient notice that the Church was vacant yet it was adjudged that a Lapse should not incurr but only after notice given by the Ordinary himself and not by any other person whatsoever But this Case may receive this Answer viz. That notice had not been necessary at Law but it was provided by a particular Act of Parliament 13 Eliz. ca. 12. that no Title by Lapse shall accrue upon any deprivation but after six months notice thereof given by the Ordinary himself to the Patron 'T is true the Law is very tender in divesting the Rights of the Subject but where an Estate is created by the Act of the Party and restrained by particular limitations without any appointment of notice there the Law will not add notice and make it necessary because the person who made such a disposition of his Estate might have given it upon what conditions he pleased Therefore it may seem hard that this Estate should be determined by the neglect or omission of the Trustees to give notice of this Proviso but 't is apparent that it was the intent of the Father it should be so for by this Limitation the Estate is bound in the Hands of an Infant the reason is because there is a Privity between an Heir and an Ancestor and therefore the Heir is bound to take notice of such Conditions which his Ancestor hath imposed on the Estate 2. This Estate is determined by the Marriage of the Daughter with Mr. Villiers because there is an express Limitation in the Deed for that very purpose she is enjoyned to marry a Fitzgerald or one who should take upon him that name which is still more extensive and she having neglected to do the one and her Husband having refused to do the other the Aunt in Remainder shall take advantage of this Non-performance And 't is this Remainder over which makes it a Limitation 1 Ventr 202. Owen 112. Goldsb 152. Lit. Sect. 723. for if it had been a Condition then the intent of the Father had been utterly defeated for none but the Heir at Law can enter for the breach of a Condition and such was Katharine in this Case The Proviso in this Deed depends upon another Sentence immediately going before 2 Co. 70. to which it hath reference and then by the express resolution in Cromwel's Case 't is a Limitation or Qualification of the Estate and not a Condition which Estate is now determined without Entry or Claim It was argued that in this Case three things are to be considered E contra 1. The Nature of the Proviso 2. That Notice is absolutely necessary 3. That the Notice given was not sufficient being not such as is required by Law As to the 1st The very nature of this Proviso is condemned by the Civil Law and because it works the destruction of Estates it hath never been favoured at the Common Law All Conditions to restrain Marriage generally are held void by both Laws so likewise are such which restrain people from marrying without the consent of particular persons because they may impose such hard terms before they give their consent that may hinder the Marriage it self and therefore a bare request of such without their subsequent assent has been always allowed to preserve the Estate 2. And which was the principal Point Notice in this Case is absolutely necessary both by the intent of the Father and by the construction of the Law There are three things of which the Law makes an equal Interpretation viz. Uses Wills and Acts of Parliament in which if the intention of the Parties and of the Law makers can be discerned the Cases which severally fall under the direction of either shall be governed by the intention without respect to the disagreeing words nay sometimes the Law will supply the defect of words themselves The Books are full of Authorites where Constructions have been made of Acts of Parliament according to the intent of the Makers and not according to the Letter of the Law As in Eyston and Stud's Case in the Commentaries Plowd Com. 2 pt 463. where the Husband and Wife levyed a Fine of the Lands of the Wife and declared the Vses to their Heirs in Tail the Remainder to the Heirs of the Wife they had Issue and the Husband died the Widow married a second Husband and he and his Wife join in a second Fine and declared the Vses thereof to themselves for Life the Remainder to the Husband and his Heirs for sixty years the Remainder in Tail to their Issue the Remainder to the Heirs of the Wife the Issue of the first Husband entred supposing the Estate had been forfeited by the Statute of H. 7. 11 H. 7. c. 20. which Enacts That if a Woman hath an Estate in Dower or in Tail jointly with her Husband or to her self of the Inheritance or Purchase of him and she doth either sole or with another Husband discontinue it shall be void and he in the Remainder may enter Now this Case was directly within the words of the Statute for the Woman had an Estate Tail in possession jointly with her first Husband
upon the Estate which Affidavit was produced in Court but not suffered to be read but as a Note or Letter unless the Plaintiff would produce a Witness to swear that he was present when the Oath was taken before the Master And an Objection was made to the Settlement it self which recited That whereas a Marriage was intended to be had between the said Edmund Goodier and Elizabeth Mees now in consideration thereof and of a Portion he conveyed the said Mannor to the Feoffees to the use of himself for life and after his decease to the use of the said Elizabeth for life but doth not say from and after the Solemnization of the said Marriage so that if she had not married Mr. Goodier yet after his decease she would have enjoyed the Estate for life Vpon the whole matter the Iury found for the Defendant Dominus Rex versus Coney and Obrian THE Defendants were convicted for the Murder of Mr. Murder was pardoned by the name Felonica interfectio and held good 10 E. 3. c. 3. 13 R. 2. c. 1. Tyrrwhite and Mr. Forster in a Duel and now pleaded their Pardon in which there was a Clause Non obstante the Statute of Ed. 3. which appoints him that hath a Pardon of Felony to find Sureties for his Good Behaviour before it shall be allowed and another Non obstante to the Statute of R. 2. which enacts that if the Offence be not specified in the Pardon it shall not be allowed Now the Word Murdrum was not in this Pardon the Offence was expressed by these general Words Felonica interfectione and whether it did extend to pardon Murder was the Question Mr. Astry the Clerk of the Crown informed the Court that one Alexander Montgomery of Eglington pleaded the like Pardon for Murder but it was held insufficient and the Court gave him time to get his Pardon amended which was done likewise in this Case The Defendants came again on another day and Councel being allowed to plead for them insisted that the Pardon was good and that the Murder was sufficiently pardoned by these Words that it is in the power of the King to pardon by general Words and his intent did plainly appear to pardon the Defendants That the murther of a person is rightly expressed by felonious killing though not so properly as by the word Murdrum it self the omission of which word will not make the Pardon void And to prove this he cited the Sheriff of Norfolk's Case 2 R. 3. 7. a. who was indebted to the King during the time he was Sheriff and was pardoned by the Name of J. W. Esquire who was the same person de omnibus debitis computis c. Afterwards he was charged in the Exchequer for 100 l. where he pleaded this Pardon and it was held good though he was not named Sheriff and so not pardoned by the name of his Office yet the Kings intention appearing in his Charter and having pardoned him by his right Name that was sufficient and in that Case the King himself was concerned in point of interest The Books all agree More 752. Lucas's Case 8 Co. 18. 3 Inst 234. that before the Statute of R. 2. the King might pardon Murder by the word Felony now this Prerogative being incident to the Crown and inseparable from the person of the King was not designed to be wholly restrained by that Act for the Parliament only intended that by specifying the Offence in the Pardon the King should be rightly informed of the nature of it and when he understands it to be Murder he would not grant a Pardon But admitting his power to be restrained by that Statute Stamf. 101. yet a Non obstante is a dispensation of it and therefore this Pardon ought to be allowed The Pardon was held good by the whole Court And Jefferies the Chief Justice said that he had proposed this Case to all the Judges of England Sid. 366. and they were all of the same Opinion and that he remembred Dudley's Case where a Pardon in general words was allowed DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 35 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1683 4. Brason versus Dean A Covenant upon a Charter Party for the Freight of a Ship A thing lawful to be done when the party did covenant to do it and afterwards prohibited the Covenant is binding The Defendant pleaded that the Ship was loaded with French Goods prohibited by Law to be imported and upon Demurrer Judgment was given for the Plaintiff for the Court were all of Opinion That if the thing to be done was lawful at the time when the Defendant did enter into the Covenant though it was afterwards prohibited by Act of Parliament yet the Covenant is binding Barnes versus Edgard TRespass for breaking his Close and impounding of his Cattle Where Damages are under 40 s. the Plaintiff must have ordinary Costs Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Plaintiff had a Verdict but Damages under 40 s. Whereupon Mr. Livesay the Secondary refused to tar full Costs alledging it to be within the Statute of 22 23 Car. 2. by which 't is Enacted 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 9. That in all Actions of Trespass Assault and Battery and other personal Actions wherein the Judge shall not certifie upon the back of the Record that a Battery was proved or the Freehold or Title of the Land chiefly in question if the Jury find the Damages under 40 s. the Plaintiff shall recover no more Costs than Damages Mr. Pollexfen moved for Costs alledging that this Act doth not extend to all trespasses but only to such where the Freehold of the Land is in question If the Action had been for a Trespass in breaking his Close and Damages given under 40 s. there might not have been full Costs but here is another Count for impounding the Cattle of which the Defendant is found guilty and therefore must have his Costs The like Case was adjudged in this Court in Hillary Term last Smith versus Batterton Raym. 487. Jones 232. which was Trespass for breaking and flinging down Stalls in the Market place The Plaintiff had a Verdict and 2 d. damages and upon a debate whether he should have full Costs the Court were of Opinion that it was not within that Statute because the Title could not come in question upon the destruction of a Chattle In the principal Case the Plaintiff had ordinary Costs DE Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Marsh versus Cutler THE Plaintiff obtained a Iudgment in an Hundred Court for 58 s. and 4 d. If Debt be brought upon a Specialty for part of the Sum the Plaintiff must shew how the other is discharged 2 Cro. 498 499 529 530. and brought an Action of Debt upon that Iudgment in this Court for 58 s. only and did not shew that the 4 d. was discharged and upon Nultiel Record pleaded and a Demurrer to that Plea the
Declaration was held to be naught for that very reason for if a Debt upon a Specialty be demanded the Declaration must be for the whole Sum if for less you must shew how the other was satisfied The Earl of Macklefield's Case THE Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Statute de Scandalis Magnatum against Sir Thomas Grosvenor Special Bail denied in a Scandalum Magnatum for that he being Foreman of the Grand Iury in Cheshire spoke these Words of the Plaintiff viz. That he was a tedious Man and a Promoter of Sedition and tedious Addresses The Plaintiff desired that the Defendant might put in Special Bail but the Court would not grant it and said it was a discretionary thing and not to be demanded of right It was denied to the Duke of Norfolk unless Oath made of the words spoken and therefore the Court ordered Common Bail to be filed Holloway's Case HE was taken at Nevis in the West-Indies and brought over hither and now appeared in Custody at the Barr being outlawed for High-Treason in the late Conspiracy Sir Samuel Astry Clerk of the Crown read the Indictment upon which he was outlawed and the King by his Attorney General consented that the Outlawry should be reversed which could not have been done without such consent and that he might come to his Trial but he having nothing to alledge in his defence other than that he had made an ingenuous Confession to the King and hoped that he might deserve Mercy the Court made a Rule for his Execution to be on Wednesday following and did not pronounce any Sentence against him and he was executed accordingly Dominus Rex versus Barnes al' THE Defendant Barnes and others were excommunicated for not coming to their Parish Churches who pleaded the Statute of 5 Eliz. 5 Eliz. c. 23. which inflicts pecuniary Penalties for not appearing upon the Capias but enacts That if the excommunicate person have not a sufficient addition according to the Statute of 1 H. 1 H. 5. c. 5. 5. or if in the Significavit it be not contained that the Excommunication proceeds upon several causes in that Statute mentioned and amongst the rest for refusing to come to Divine Service he shall not incurr the Penalties Now Mr. Pollexfen made these Objections 1. The Defendant was excommunicated for not coming to his Parish Church which is not required by this Statute for if he doth not tefuse to hear Divine Service in any Church the Penalties are saved 2. The Statute of Additions requires that the Condition and Dwelling place of the Defendant shall be inserted which was not done in this Case for they are excommunicated by the Names of A. B. Mercator B. C. Scissor ' E. F. de Parochia c. which last Addition of the Parish shall referr to him only last mentioned and not to all the rest and so it was always ruled in Indictments Attorney General contra The Statute of 5 Eliz. is grounded upon that of 1 of the Queen which enjoins every person to resort to his Parish Church or upon lett thereof to some other or to forfeit 12 d. every Sunday and Holy day to be levied by the Churchwardens there for the use of the Poor Now though the Parish is not named in this Act yet the Law must be interpreted as it was then 2. The word Parish goes to all so 't is in Informations for Riots And by Astry Clerk of the Crown t is always so in Significavits Tamen quaere Curia If the Defendant had pleaded below or here that he had heard Divine Service in any other Church though not in his own Parish the Penalties should not have went out but being now incurred there is no remedy and the word Parish goes to all preceding Prodgers versus Frazier IN Trespass The Defendant pleaded The Grant of the Custody of an Ideot passeth an Interest to the Executor of the Grantee that before the time of the Trespass supposed to be committed Bridget Dennis was seized in Fee of the Lands in question who by a Writ de Indeota inquirendo was found to be an Ideot not having any lucid intervals per spacium octo annorum c. by virtue whereof the King was entituled who granted the Custody to Sir Alexander Frazier who died and that the Defendant Mary Frazier was his Executrix The Plaintiff replyed and confessed the Ideocy but that the King granted the Custody of the Ideot to the Plaintiff And upon this Replication the Defendant demurred In this Case it was agreed by the Council on both sides that the King by his Prerogative hath the sole interest in him of granting the Estate of an Ideot to whom he pleaseth without any account but 't is otherwise in case of a Lunatique for there the Grantee shall have nothing to his own use but must put in Security to account to the Lunatick if ever he comes to be capable or else to his Executors or Administrators Vide Frances's Case in Moor fol. 4. But the Questions that did arise in this Case were 1. That there was not sufficient Title found for the King for by the Inquisition the Ideot was found to be so per spatium octo annorum c. which is incertain because before that time she might have lucida intervalla and then she cannot be an Ideot without being naturally so therefore the Iury ought to have found her an Ideot a nativitate for that is the only matter which vests an interest in the King But it was answered and agreed by the Court that the finding her to be an Ideot was sufficient without the addition of any other words and therefore per spacium octo annorum shall be surplusage for in this Case Words are not so much to be regarded as the reason of the Law which doth not allow of Ideocy otherwise than a nativitate But supposing a seeming incertainty in this Office found yet it being said generally that she was an Ideot the subsequent words shall not hurt because the general finding shall be taken in that sense which is most for the advantage of the King As for Example Dyer 155. b. 161. b. 306. b. It was found by Office that a person died seised of two Mannors and that he held one of the Queen by Knights Service generally and the other of a Mesne Lord in Chivalry which is the same Tenure now it was held that the first general finding shall be intended Knights Service in Capite because it was most for the King's benefit that he might thereby be entituled to the Wardship of the Heir who was found to be under Age. 2. Whether the Grant of the Custody of an Ideot will pass any Interest to the Executor of the Grantee because such a Grant carries a Trust with it and the King may have some knowledge and consideration of the Grantee but not of his Executor To which it was answered that here was an interest coupled with a
the Indictment for be it before or after the Offence the Iury ought to find according to the truth of the Case upon the Evidence for they are sworn ad veritatem dicendam c. This must be assigned for Error for if the contrary be said 't is against the Record the Custos Brevium having retorned that the Fine was taken 30 July which could not be in Trinity Term for that ended 8 July otherwise 't is repugnant to it self Econtra It was argued that this is not assignable for Error Dyer 220. b. 12 Co. 124. 't is true if the Party had died before the Entry of the King's Silver it had been Error but if afterwards 't is not so Thus was the Case of Warnecomb and Carril which was Husband and Wife levied a Fine of the Lands of the Wife and this was by Dedimus in the Lent Vacation she being then but 19 years of Age the King's Silver was entred in Hillary Term before and she died in the Easter week and upon a Motion made the first day of Easter Term to stay the engrossing of the Fine it was denied by the Court for they held it to be a good Fine Another reason why this is not assignable for Error 2 Cro. 11. Yelv. 33. is because 't is directly against the Record which is of Trinity Term and can be of no other Term and to prove this he cited Arundel's Case where a Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Fine taken before Roger Manwood Esq in his Circuit he being then one of the Iustices of the Common-Pleas and the Dedimus was returned per Rogerum Manwood Militem for he was Knighted and made Chief Baron the Eerm following the Fine passed and this was afterwards assigned for Trror that he who took the Caption was not a Knight but it being directly against the Record they would not intend him to be the same person to whom the Writ was directed Adjurnatur Afterwards the Fine was affirmed Lock versus Norborne UPon a Trial at Bar in Ejectment for Lands in Wiltshire Verdict shall only be given in Evidence amongst privies the Case was thus Viz. Mary Philpot in the year 1678. made a Settlement by Lease and Release to her self for Life then to Trustees to support contingent Remainders then to her first second and third Son in Tail Male c. then to Thomas Arundel in Tail Male with divers Remainders over It was objected at the Tryal that she had no power to make such Settlement because in the year 1676. her Husband had setled the Lands in question upon her for Life and upon the Issue of his Body c. and for want of such Issue then upon George Philpot in Tail Male with several Remainders over the Remainder to Mary Philpot in Fee Proviso that upon the tender of a Guinea to George Philpot by the said Mary the Limitations as to him should be void George Philpot having afterwards made a Lease of this Land to try the Title the Trustees brought an Ejectment but because the tender of the Guinea could not be proved there was a Verdict for the Defendant And now Mr. Philpot would have given that Verdict in Evidence at this Trial but was not suffered by the Court for if one Man hath a Title to several Lands and if he should bring Ejectments against several Defendants and recover against one he shall not give that Verdict in Evidence against the rest because the Party against whom that Verdict was had may be relieved against it if 't is not good but the rest cannot tho' they claim under the same Title and all make the same defence So if two Tenants will defend a Title in Ejectment and a Verdict should be had against one of them it shall not be read against the other unless by Rule of Court But if an Ancestor hath a Verdict the Heir may give it in Evidence because he is privy to it for he who produceth a Verdict must be either party or privy to it and it shall never be received against different persons if it doth not appear that they are united in Interest Therefore a Verdict against A. shall never be read against B. for it may happen that one did not make a good defence which the other may do The tender of the Guinea was now proved DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 3 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1687 8. Wright Chief Justice Holloway Justices Powel Justices Allibon Justices Powis Attorny General Wm. Williams Sollicitor General THIS Vacation Sir Robert Sawyer had his Quietus and Sir Thomas Powis was made Attorny General and Sir William Williams of Greys-Inn was made Sollicitor General Rex versus Lenthal AN Inquifition was taken in the second year of this King under the Great Seal of England by which it was found that the Office of Marshal of the Kings-Bench did concern the Administration of Iustice and that Mr. Lenthal was seised thereof in Fee and that upon his Marriage he had setled the said Office upon Sir Edward Norris and Mr. Coghill and their Heirs in Truff that they should permit him to execute the same during his Life c. That the said Trustees had neglected to give their attendance or to execute the said Office themselves that this Canveyance was made by Mr. Lenthal without the notice of this Court that he received the Profits and afterwards granted the said Office to Cooling for Life That Cross and his Wife had obtained a Iudgment in this Court against Bromley and had sued forth Erecution for the Debt and Damages for which he was committed to the custody of the said Cooling and being so in Execution did go at large They find that Cooling had not sufficient to answer Cross and his Wise for the said Debt c. whereupon they impleaded Mr. Lenthal in the Common-Pleas for 121 l. 2 s. 4 d. to answer as superior that at the Trial Mr. Lenthal gave this secret Deed of Settlement in Evidence whereupon the Plaintiffs in that Action were non-suited ad dampnum c. They find that Cooling went out of the said Office and the Trustees neglecting the execution thereof Mr. Lenthal granted the same to Glover for Life that during the time he executed this Office one Wordal was convicted of Forgery and commited to his Custody and that he permitted him voluntarily to Escape by which the said Office was forfeited to the King The King had granted the Office to the Lord Hunsdon Sir Edward Norris and Mr. Coghill come in and plead that Mr. Lenthal was seised in Fee and that he made a Settlement of the Office upon his Marriage with Mrs. Lucy Dunch with whom he had 5000 l. Portion viz. upon them and their Heirs in trust prout in the Inquisition and that he did execute the Office by-their permission Mr Lenthal pleads and admits the Grant to Sir Edward Norris and the other Trustee bearing date such a day c. but saith that the next
same to Mrs. Berkley for Life remainder over to Henry Killigrew in Tail and that he made Mrs. Berkley Executrix of his Will which was found in haec verba That afterwards in the year 1645. the said Sir Henry Killigrew made aliud Testamentum in Writing but what was contained in the said last mentioned Will juratores penitus ignorant They find that Sir Henry Killigrew in the year 1646. died seised of those Lands and that Mrs. Berkley conveyed the same to Mr. Nosworthy 's Father whose Heir he is and that the Defendant Sir William Basset is Cosin and Heir to Sir Henry Killigrew c. The Question upon this special Verdict was whether the making of this last Will was a revocation of the former or not It was argued this Term by Mr. Finch and in Michaelmas Term following by Serjeant Maynard for the Plaintiff that it was not a revocation In their Arguments it was admitted that a Will in it's nature was revocable at all times but then it must be either by an express or implied revocation That the making of this latter Will cannot be intended to be an implied revocation of the former for if so then the Land must also be supposed to be devised contrary to the express disposition in the first Will and that would be to add to the Record which finds Viz. that what the last Will was penitus ignorant It is possible that a subsequent Will may be made so as not to destroy but consist with a former for the Testator may have several parcels of Land which he may devise to many persons by divers Wills and yet all stand together A man may likewise by a subsequent Will revoke part and confirm the other part of a former Will and therefore admitting there was such a Will in this case 't is still more natural that it should confirm than revoke the other If the Testator had purchased new Lands and had devised the same by a subsequent Will no person will affirm that to be a revocation of the former Will When a Man hath made a disposition of any part of his Estate 't is a good Will as to that part so is likewise the disposal of every other part they are all several Wills tho' taken altogether they are an intire disposition of the whole Estate Nothing appears here to the contrary but that the latter Will may be only a devise of his personal Estate or a confirmation of the former which the Law will not allow to be destroyed without an express revocation The Case of Coward and Marshal is much to this purpose Cro. Eliz. 721. which was a devise in Fee to his younger Son and in another Will after the Testators Marriage to a second Wife he devised the same Lands to his Wife for Life paying yearly to his younger Son 20 s. It was the Opinion of Anderson and Glanvil that both these Wills might stand together and that one was not a revocation of the other because it appeared by the last Will that he only intended to make a Provision for his Wife but not to alter the Devise to his Son So where a Man had two Sons by several Venters Cro. Car. 24. Hodgkinson vers Whood Co. Lit. 22. b. 1 Co. 104. a. 319. b. and devises the Lands to his eldest Son for Life and to the Heirs Males of his Body and for default of such Issue to the Heirs Males of his second Son and the Heirs Males of their Bodies Remainder to his own right Heirs and then made a Lease of 30 years to his youngest Son to commence after the death of the Testator the youngest Son entred and surrendred the Term to his elder Brother who made a Lease to the Defendant and then dyed without Issue afterwards the youngest Brother entred and avoided this Lease made by his Brother It was held that the Lease thus made to him was not a revocation of the devise of the Inheritance to his Brother tho' it was to commence at the same time in which the devise of the Inheritance was to take effect but it was a revocation quoad the Term only that the elder Brother should not enter during that time for the devise shall not be revoked without express words and that tho' the Testator had departed with the whole Fee without reserving an Estate for Life to himself yet the Law created such an Estate in him till the future Vse should commence and in such case the right Heirs cannot take by Purchase but by Descent so that here the Inheritance in Fee simple was not vested in the elder Brother by Descent for then the Lease which he made would be executed out of the Feé and the younger Brother would be bound thereby But in the Case at the Bar there is no colour of a Revocation 1. Vpon the nature of the Verdict to which nothing can be added neither can it be diminished for whatever is found must be positive and not doubtful because an Attaint lies if the Verdict be false Therefore the Court cannot take notice of that which the Iury hath not found Now here the entry of the Iudgment is Viz. Quibus lectis auditis per Curiam hic satis intellectis c. But what can be read or heard where nothing appears That Case in the Year-Book of the 2 R. 3. 2 R. 3. f. 3. comes not up to this question it was an Action of Trespass for the taking of his Goods The Defendant pleaded that the Goods did appertain to one Robert Strong who before the supposed Trespass devised the same to him and made him Executor c. The Plaintiff replied that the said Strong made his last Will and did constitute him Executor And upon a Demurrer to this Replication because he had not traversed that the Defendant was Executor it was argued for the Plaintiff that this last Will was a Revocation of the former for tho' there were no express words of Revocation yet by the very making another the Law revoked the former and to prove this two Instances were then given viz. That if a Man devise his Lands to two and by another Will gives it to one of them and dies he to whom 't is devised by the last Will shall have it So likewise if the Testator by one Will giveth Lands to his Son and by another Will deviseth the same again to his Wife then makes an Alienation and taketh back an Estate to himself and dieth and in an Assise brought between the Widow and the Son he was compelled by the Court to shew that it was his Father's intention that he should have the Land otherwise the last Devisee will be entituled to it Now both these Instances are not sufficient to evince that the last Will in this Case was a revocation of that under which the Plaintiff claims because those Wills were contradictory to each other for by one the Land was devised to the Son and by the other to
the Wife they both had their existence at one and the same time and it appear'd they were made to distinct purposes but here no body can tell what was designed or intended by the Testator in this subsequent Will And therefore it hath been held Cro. Car. 51. Eyres Case Godolph 443. Perkins 92. b. that where a Man devised Legacies to his two Brothers and afterwards in his sickness was asked to leave Legacies to his said Brothers he replied he would leave them nothing but devised a small Legacy to his Godson and died This Discourse was set down in a Cocidil which together with the Will was proved in common form This Codicil was not a revocation of the Legacies given to the Brothers because the Testator took no notice of the Will which he had made in the time of his Health and non constat what he intended by these words which were set down in the Codicil If therefore doubtful words shall not make a revocation of a former Will a fortiori a subsequent Will especially when the contents of such Will doe not appear shall not revoke a former It was argued for the Defendant E contra And The only Objection is That a latter Will being made and it not appearing to the Iury what was contained in that Will it can be no revocation because no express words of revocation can be found or any thing which is contradictory to the first Will and without the one or the other a former Will cannot be revoked But this is contrary to all the Authorities in the Books Linwood 175. Swinb 7 part Sect. 14. 2 H. 5.8 pl. 3. Offiice of Ex. 443. which shew that a Testament which is good in the beginning may become void by making of a subsequent Will by words of revocation or by words contradicting each other for in such cases 't is not doubted but the first Will is revoked But the meaning must be that by the very making of a latter Will the first is become void This may be collected from the nature of a Will which a Man hath power to alter in part or in all at any time during his Life but when he makes a new Will it must be presumed that he declared his whole mind in it for if his Intentions are to alter any part the Law hath appointed a proper Instrument for that purpose which is a Codicil but when he maketh aliud Testamentutum 't is a sign that he intended nothing of his former Will should take any effect when he had so easie a method to alter it in part Every subsequent act of the Testator shews that he intends a revocation either by word or deed and there is great reason why it should be so because every revocation of a Will is in the nature of restitution to the Heir It cannot be denied but that a Will may be revoked by words without writing before the making of the Statute against Frauds 1 Rol. Abr. 614. Dyer 310. b. c. As if a Man should say that he would alter his Will when he came to such a place and he should dye before he came thither this is a revocation But it never was yet controverted but a revocation may be by Deed as if a Man devise Lands to another 1 Rol. Abr. 614. and afterwards makes a Feoffment to the use of his Will this was always held a revocation So it is if Lands which are well given by a Will are afterwards by another Will devised to the Poor of the Parish 1 Rol. Abr. 614. pl. 4. tho' this last Will is void because the Devisees have not a capacity to take yet 't is a revocation of the first Will and shall a Will which is lost be of less authority than such which is void 'T is not denied but that there may be a subsequent Will which may not contradict the first so is Coward 's Case where both Wills did appear to be consistent but that is not parallel with this because the Iury hath found that the Testator made aliud Testamentum which word aliud imports a distinct Will from the former 'T is agreed also that a Man may make many Wills and that they may stand together and it must also be agreed that such are but partial Wills because they are but pieces of the whole tho' written in several papers but when 't is found in general that aliud Testamentum was made it must naturally be intended of his whole Estate The Case in the Year Book of Richard III. is an Authority in point where in Trespass the Defendant justified the taking of the Goods by vertue of a Will by which they were devised to him and of which Will he was made Executor The Plaintiff replied that the Testator made another Will and thereby did constitute him Executor and this was held a good Replication without a Traverse that the Defendant was Executor because by the making of the second Will the other was void in Law and therefore the shewing that he was Executor was not to avoid the first Will which the Law doth adjudge to be of no force but to make to himself a Title to the Goods taken out of his possession If a Man should make twenty Codicils without dates they may all stand together but if he make two Wills without dates they are both void the reason is because by the making of the later Will the first is destroyed and it being incertain which is the last rather than the Rules of Revocation should be broken they adjudge both to be void It cannot be reasonably objected that this later Will may devise the same Lands to the same person for why should a Man be thought so vain Besides if it was so the Plaintiff should have claimed under that Will But this cannot be the same Will because 't is contrary to the Verdict which hath not found it to be idem but aliud Testamentum besides 't is in the Case of an Heir who shall not be disinherited by an intendment that the later Will is the same with the first Neither can the Statute of Wills have any influence upon this Matter 32 H. 8. c. 1. 34 H. 8. c. 5. 'T is true at the Common Law no Land could be devised by a Will but now by the Statutes of H. 8. Lands c. in Socage may be devised by Will and if held in Knights Service then only two parts in three Godolph 299. but it must be by the last Will. Now how can any Man say that this shall be a Devise of the Lands by the last Will of the Testator when the Iury find he made aliud Testamentum the Contents whereof are not necessary to be shewed because the Defendant claims as Heir and not as Executor It must not be intended that this Will shall confirm or stand with the other because the Law is otherwise and therefore if the Plaintiff would have supported his Will by
Where an Averment may be made of another person so as it consists with the Condition of a Bond. in which Bond the said A. B. the elder and A. B. the younger were joyntly and severally bound in the penal Sum of 1000 l. conditioned that if the above bounden A. B. omitting the word younger do and shall forbear knowingly and wittingly to come to or write Letters unto C. the Wife of D. that then the Obligation to be void The Defendant pleaded that he did not come to or write Letters to the said C. knowingly c. The Plaintiff replied that he exhibited an Information against A. B. the younger shewing in what Term and that it was agreed between them that in consideration that he would forbear to prosecute the same the said A. B. the elder together with A. B. the younger should become bound to the Plaintiff in 1000 l. that the said A. B. the younger should not knowingly or wittingly come into the Company c. then sets forth the Bond and the Condition thereof at large and avers that A. B. in the Condition mentioned is A. B. the younger and farther that the said A. B. the younger did afterwards knowingly come into the Company c. The Defendant re-joyned and said that the Plaintiff ought not to averr that the aforesaid A. B. the younger is the person in the Condition of the said Bond c. And upon a Demurrer the Question was whether the Plaintiff was estopped by the words in the Condition to make such an Averment It was argued for the Plaintiff that he might make such an Averment which is to reduce a thing to a certainty which was very incertain before if it be not repugnant in it self nay sometimes an Averment doth reduce contradictory things to a certainty 'T is plain that A. B. the younger is bound in this Bond the Objection is that A. B. the elder being of the Name and being likewise bound that the Condition might referr to either 'T is agreed there are many Cases where a Man shall be estopped to averr against a Record but this Averment is not contradictory to any thing in the Record for it appears by the Pleadings that the Information was prosecuted against A. B. the younger and therefore he must be intended to be bound not to come to the said C. knowingly c. If an Estate should be devised to A. and the Name of the Testator omitted in the Will 2 Leon. 35. yet the Devise is good by averring of the Name and by proof that it was his intention to give it him by his Will So if the Plaintiff should claim a Title under the Grant of such a person Knight and the Iury find he was an Esquire Lit. Rep. 181 223. but that the Knight and the Esquire are both the same person this is a good Declaration 'T is usual to make an Allegation even against the express words of a Condition to shew the truth of an Agreement Cro. Car. 501. as if Debt be brought upon a Bond of 100 l. conditioned to pay 50 l. within six Months the Defendant pleaded the Statute of Vsury the Plaintiff replied that he lent the Mony for a year and alledged that by the mistake of the Scrivener the Bond was made paiable in six Months The Defendant rejoyned that it was lent for six Months only And upon a Demurrer this was adjudged to be a good Allegation though it was against the very words of the Condition which is a stronger Case than this at the Barr because the Averment consists with the Condition of the Bond. If a Man should levy a Fine and declare the Vses thereof to his Son William and he hath two Sons of that Name 4 Co. 71. 8 Co. 155. a. Dyer 146. then an Averment is made that he intended to declare the Vses to his youngest Son of that Name this Averment out of the Fine hath been adjudged good for the same reason given already which is because it standeth with the words thereof and 't is a good Issue to be tried It cannot be objected that the Bond is illegal being entred into for the not prosecuting of an Information because a Nolle prosequi was entred as to that Matter so 't is the Act of the Court. Lastly It was said that every Estoppel must be certain to every intent which cannot be in this Case for by the words of this Condition 't is incertain which of the Obligors shall be intended E contra It was argued that an Estoppel is as well intended by Law as expressed by Words that if an Averment can be taken yet this is not well because the Plaintiff hath absolutely averred that A. B. in the Condition is A. B. the younger he should have said that A. B. in the Condition is intended A. B. the younger which might have been traversed and Issue taken thereon No Iudgment was given for this Case was ended by Compromise Hoil versus Clerk In the Common-Pleas THIS was a special Verdict in Ejectment for Lands in Wetherfield A subsequent Will though not made pursuant to the Statute is a Revocation of a former in the County of Essex upon the demise of Abigail Pheasant The Iury find that one John Clark was seised in Fee of the Lands in question who by his last Will in writing bearing date the 14th day of September in the year 1666. devised the same to Benjamin Clark for Life so to his first and second Sons c. in Tayl Male and for default of such Issue then to his two Sisters for Life Remainder over c. This Will was attested by one Witness only They find that the said John Clark made another dated the sixth day of February 1672. which was 13 years after the making of his first Will and that by this last Will he revoked all former Wills and Testaments by him made They find an Endorsement on this Will written by the Testator himself in these words Viz. My Will and Testament dated the 6th of February 1679. and then published by me in the presence of three Witnesses They find that this last Will was so published and attested by three Witnesses in his presence but that it was not signed by the Testator in their presence They find that Benjamin Clark entred and devised the Lands to Mary Micklethwaite who made a Lease thereof to the Plaintiff for three years upon whom the Defendant entred This Case was argued at the Bar and in this Term at the Bench Seriatim The single Question was 29 Car. 2. cap. 3. whether this last Will not being duly executed according to the Statute is a Revocation of the first Will or not It was admitted by all that it was a good Will to pass the personal Estate but as to the point of Revocation the Court was divided Iustice Lutwitch argued that it was not a Revocation He agreed that if the last Will hath any respect to the first it must be as a
the benefit of the Obligor and shall be taken most beneficially for him who had election either to perform the one or the other to save the penalty of the Bond. But the Council for the Plaintiff said that the whole intent of the Condition in that Case was to provide a Security for G. who died before her Husband so that no body could be hurt for the non-performance of that Condition there being no manner of necessity that any thing should be done in order to it after her decease 'T is quite otherwise in the Case at Bar for Hannah Goddard paid Mony for the House and certainly it was never intended that Chappel the Father to whom the Mony was paid should have both House and Mony If she had lived the House ought to have been conveyed to her now she is dead the Mony ought to be paid for 't is not lost by her death In Laughter's Case the person who was to do the thing was the Obligor himself but here the Father undertakes for his Son that he should convey when he came of Age or to repay the Mony so that 't is not properly a Condition in the disjunctive for 't is no more than if it had been penn'd after this manner Viz. The Father undertakes for his Son that he shall convey at the Age of 21 years if he refuse then the Father is to repay what mony he received Besides Cro. Eliz. 399. Laughter's Case is Reported by Iustice Croke and therein he cites two other Cases of Chew and Baker That of Chew was viz. A. promised B. that if C. did not appear at Westminster such a day he would pay him 20 l. The Defendant pleaded that C. died before the day and ruled to be no Plea for he ought to pay the Mony which Case is parallel to this for 't is the same in Reason and Sense That of Baker was viz. A Man was bound that A. should appear the first day in the next Term at the Star-Chamber or he would pay 20 l. A. died before the day so as by the act of God he could not appear yet it was adjudged that the Mony must be paid The like Case was adjudged between Huntley and Allen in the Common-Pleas in my Lord Hale 's time 't is entred Pasch 1658. Rot. 1277. The Rule in Laughter's Case cannot be denied viz. where the Condition is in the disjunctive consisting of two parts and one becomes impossible by the act of God the Obligor is not bound to perform the other but then it must be governed by the subsequent matter As in Greningham's Case Cro. Eliz. 396. Moor 395. viz. Debt upon Bond conditioned that if the Defendant delivered three Bonds to the Plaintiff wherein he was bound to the Defendant or a Release of them as should be advised by the Plaintiff's Council before such a day then c. The Defendant pleaded that neither the Plaintiff or his Council did advise a Release before the day c. and upon Demurrer it was adjudged that the Plea was good for the Defendant had an election to deliver or release as the Plaintiff should devise which if he will not do the Defendant is discharged by the neglect of the Plaintiff for the Defendant being at his choice to perform the one thing or the other 't is not reason that the Plaintiff should compel him to perform one thing only It was argued on the other side E contra that this is a disjunctive condition and not only an undertaking of the Father for the Son Where a Condition is to perform two things and if either be done no Action will lye such Condition is in the disjunctive as in this Case if the Son had conveyed or the Father repaid the Mony By the Condition of this Bond the Father did as much undertake for his Son as Laughter did for Rainsford viz. to convey the House or pay the Mony to Hannah Goddard now the last part of the Condition being discharged by the Act of God he is acquitted of the other Suppose the Condition had been single to convey to Hannah Goddard if she die the Bond is void There is an Authority to this purpose Cro. Eliz. 380. Reported by Iustice Croke which was an Action of Debt was brought by the Plaintiff as Executor c. The Condition of the Bond was for the yearly payment of a Sum of Mony twice in a year viz. at Michaelmas and Lady day during the Life of a Lady or within 30 days after either of the said Feasts the Lady died after one of the Feasts but within the 30 days it was adjudged that by her death that payment which was due at the Feast preceding was discharged In the Case at Bar the Condition is that if the Son should not convey when of Age or otherwise if the Defendant re-pay c. Now certainly these words or otherwise make the Condition disjunctive 'T is like the common Case of Bail entred into in this Court whereby the Parties undertake that the Defendant shall render himself to Prison if condemned in the Action or they shall pay the condemnation mony this is a disjunctive condition and if the Defendant dye before the return of the second Sci. Fa. the Bail are discharged Iustice Allibon said Roll. Abr. tit condition 450. pl. 4. that if a condition be to make an Assurance of Land to the Obligee and his Heirs and the Obligee dies before the Assurance made yet it shall be made to the Heir for this copulative is a disjunctive Sed Adjornatur Franshaw versus Bradshaw Mich. 1 Jac. Rot. 45. DEbt upon a Iudgment obtained in this Court 34 Car. 2. Matter of Form not amendable upon Demurrer setting forth the said Iudgment c. Sicut per Recordum processum inde remanen ' in eadem Curia nuper Domini Regis coram ipso Rege apud Westmonast plenius liquet apparet And upon a Demurrer to the Declaration this Objection was made viz. It doth not appear that the Iudgment was in force or where the Reeord was at the time of this Action brought he should have declared Coram ipso nuper Rege apud Westm sed jam coram Domino Rege nunc residen ' c. plenius liquet c. The Court held it was but matter of form but being upon a Demurrer it was not amendable Letchmere versus Thorowgood al' Vic. London TRespass by the Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupcy for taking of their Goods When a Judgment is once executed the Goods are in Custodia Legis and shall not be taken away by an Exchequer Process or Assignment of Commissioners of Bankrupts upon not Guilty pleaded the Iury find a special Verdict the substance of which was viz. one Toplady a Vintner on the 28th of April became a Bankrupt against whom a Iudgment was formerly obtained the Iudgment Creditor sued out a Fi. Fa. and the Sheriffs of London by virtue thereof did
on the 29th day of April seize the Goods of the said Toplady that after the seizure and before any Venditioni exponas viz. 4 Maij an Extent which is a Prerogative Writ issued out of the Exchequer against two persons who were indebted to the King and by inquisition this Toplady was found to be indebted to them whereupon parcel of the Goods in the Declaration was seized by the Sheriffs upon the said Extent and sold and the Mony paid to the Creditors but before the said Sale or any execution of the Exchequer Process a Commission of Bankrupcy was had against Toplady and that the Commissioners on the second of June assigned the Goods to the Plaintiff The Question was whether this Extent did not come too late And it was held it did or whether the Fi. Fa. was well executed so that the Assignees of the Bankrupts Estate could not have a Title to those Goods which were taken before in Execution and so in Custodia Legis And it was held that they had no Title Fitzgerald versus Villiers WRIE of Error upon a Iudgment in Dower Infant must appear by Guardian and the Error assigned was that the Tenant in Dower was an Infant and no Warrant was alledged of the admission of any Guardian 29 Assise pl. 67. Bridg. 74. Lib. Entr. 45. Hut 92. 4 Co. 53. Lit. 92. Hetl. 52. 3 Cro. 158. Moor 434. Hob. 5. that it might appear to be the act of the Court 't is true an Infant may sue by Prochein Amy but shall not appear by Attorny but by Guardian because 't is intended by Law that he hath not sufficient discretion to chuse an Attorny therefore 't is provided that he appear per Guardianum which is done by the Court who are always careful of Infancy and a special Entry is made upon the Roll. Viz. Per Guardianum ad hoc per Curiam admissum c. 2. The Appearance is by the Guardian in his own Name Viz. Et praedicta Katherina Fitzgerald per Richardum Power Guardianum suum venit dicit quod ipse c. it should have been in the name of the Party quod ipsa c. Adjurnatur Harrison versus Austin A Settlement was made as followeth Viz. What words amount to a Covenant to stand seised That if I have no Issue and in case I dye without Issue of my Body lawfully begotten then I give grant and confirm my Land c. to my Kinswoman Sarah Stokes to have and to hold the same to the use of my self for Life and after my decease to the use of the said Sarah and the Heirs of her Body to be begotten with Remainders over c. The Question was whether this did amount to a Covenant to stand seised so as to raise an use to Sarah without transmutation of the possession The Objection against it was Sid. 26. Moor 687. Dyer 96. 2 Roll. Abr. 786. Winch 59. Plowd 300. that Vses are created chiefly by the intention of the Parties and that by these words grant and confirm the Feoffor did intend the Land should pass at Common Law so it could not be a Covenant to stand seised 't is like the Case where a Letter of Attorny is in the Deed or a Covenant to make Livery there nothing shall pass by way of use but the possession according to the course of the Common Law and therefore there being neither Livery and Seisin or Attornment no use will pass to Sarah It cannot be a Bargain and Sale for that is only where a Recompence is on each side to make the Contract good besides 2 Inst 672. the Deed is not inrolled To this it was answered 1 Vent 137. that it shall be construed to be a Covenant to stand seised though the formal words are wanting to make it so and for that purpose it was compared to Fox 's Case 8 Co. 93. who being seised in Fee devised his Land to C. for Life remainder over for Life reserving a Rent and afterwards by Indenture in consideration of Mony did demise grant and set the same Lands to D. for 99 years reserving a Rent the Lessee for Life did not attorn in which Case there was not one word of any use or any attornment to make it pass by Grant and the Question was whether this Lease for years shall amount to a Bargain and Sale so that the Reversion together with the Rent shall pass to the Lessee without Attornment Hob. 277. and it was held that by construction of Law it did amount to a Bargain and Sale for the words import as much And in this Case it was adjudged that it was a Covenant to stand seised Hexham versus Coniers IN Ejectment the Plaintiff declared de uno Messuagio sive Tenemento An Ejectment will lye for a Tenement and had a Verdict but Iudgment was arrested because an Ejectment will not lye of a Tenement for 't is a word of an uncertain signification it may be an Advowson House or Land but it is good in Dower so is Messuagium sive Tenementum vocat ' the Black Swan for this addition makes it certain that the Tenement intended is a House Rex versus Bunny A Motion was made for a Melius inquirendum to be directed to a Coroner who had returned his Inquisition upon the death of Bunny that he was not compos mentis when in truth he was Felo de se But it was opposed by Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. Pollexfen who said that the Law gives great credit to the Inquest of a Coroner and that a Melius inquirendum is seldom or never granted tho' it appear to the Court upon Affidavits that the Party had his Senses Mod. Rep. 82. It hath been granted where any fault is in the Coroner or any incertainty in the Inquisition returned That there is such a Writ it cannot be denied Cro. Eliz. 371. but 't is generally granted upon Offices or Tenures and directed to the Sheriff 3 Keb. 800. but never to a Coroner in the case of a Felo de se who makes his Enquiry super visum Corporis DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 4 Jac. II. in Banco Regis 1688. In Trinity-Vacation last Mr. Justice Holloway and Mr. Justice Thomas Powell had their Quietus and Mr. Serjeant Baldock and Mr. Serjeant Stringer were made Justices of this Court And Mr. Justice Allibon who was a Roman Catholick died in the same Vacation and Sir John Powell one of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of this Court Sir Thomas Jennor another of the Barons of the Exchequer was made a Justice of the Common-Pleas and Mr. Serjeant Rotheram and Mr. Serjeant Ingoldby were made Barons of the Exchequer Wright Chief Justice Powel Justices Baldock Justices Stringer Justices Shuttleworth versus Garnet Intratur Trin. 1 Willielmi Mariae Rotulo 965. THE Defendant was Tenant of Customary Lands held of the Manor of A. of which Manor B. was Lord
and that before the Pardon for these Reasons it cannot be revested in the party Serjeant Pemberton and Mr. E contra Finch contra The Question is what Interest the King hath by this Verdict for as to the Offence it self 't is within the Body of the Pardon for all Misdemeanours and Offences are pardoned and the Exception doth not reach this Case for that excepts Misdemeanours in answering of the Revenues Now that which arises by a Forfeiture can never be taken to be part of the King's Revenue because the Revenue is properly a stated Duty originally setled on the King and the Penalty to be inflicted for this Misdemeanour cannot be a Revenue because the Court have not yet given Iudgment so that 't is incertain what Fine they will set and this appears more plain because the King may assign his Revenue but cannot grant over a Penalty The Information is not grounded upon any Act of Parliament which establishes the Revenue but for concealing of a thing forfeited to prevent the Seisure thereof which indeed may be a casual Revenue as all Fines are so that if this should be taken as an Offence committed against the King in deceiving him of this Revenue then the first part of the Pardon dischargeth all such Offences and the Exception pardons none 'T is for these Reasons that the Case cannot fall under any of the words in the Exception no not under these Words viz. Mony due or to be due to the King because no Mony is yet due to him 'T is true the Iury have found it a Misdemeanour which is finable but until the Fine is set no Mony is due because the Court may set a greater or less Fine as they shall see cause And if any other Construction should be made of this Exception then every thing for which a Fine may be set is excepted and this will be to make the Pardon signifie nothing for what is meant by Offences and Misdemeanours if they should be pardoned and yet the Fine arising thereon should not But admitting that all Offences relating to the Concealment of collecting of the Revenue are excepted then this Revenue must be either antecedent or it must arise by the Fine 'T is no antecedent Revenue this appears by the Book of Rates wherein the King 's stated Revenue is set down and no mention of this so that the Revenue to which this relates must arise upon the Offence and what an absurd thing is it to say that all Offences are pardoned by one part of this general Pardon and by the Exception none are pardoned Besides the Information is not grounded upon that part of the Statute which inflicts a Penalty upon the person who exposeth prohibited Goods to Sale for then they would sue for the 50 l. therefore it must be upon the Forfeiture which is expresly pardoned and though there is a Conviction yet nothing is vested in the King before Iudgment because it may be arrested and therefore Tooms's Case is in no wise applicable to this for the Debt which was due to him was actually vested in the King by the Inquisition returned here which found him to be Felo de se Adjornatur Anonymus A Libel in the Admiralty against a Ship called the Sussex Ketch A Ship was pawned for necessaries and a Libel was exhibited in the Admiralty though the pawning was at the Land setting forth that the said Ship wanted Necessaries super altum Mare and that the Master took up several Sums of the Plaintiff at Roterdam for which he did hypothecate the said Ship and upon a Suggestion that this Contract was made at St. Katherines infra Corpus Comitatus Council moved for a Prohibition upon which a Question did arise whether a Master of a Vessel can pawn it on the Coast for Necessaries and the person to whom 't is pawned shall sue for the Mony in the Admiralty here By the Common Law a Master of a Ship had neither a general or special property in it Sid. 453. and therefore could not pawn it but by the Civil Law in cases of necessity he may rather than the Voyage should be lost and if any such cause appear 't is within the Iurisdiction of the Admiralty but then the pawning must be super altum Mare Now the Statute of 28 H. Cap. 15. H. 8. which abridgeth the Iurisdiction of the Admiralty in Trials of Pyrates and which appointeth Offences committed on the Sea to be tried by a Commission under the great Seal directed to the Admiral and others according to the course of the Common Law and not according to the Civil Law gives a remedy in this very Case Molloy de Jure maritimo 62. for it provides that it shall not be prejudicial to any person for taking of Victuals Gables Rapes c. in cases of necessity upon the Sea paying for the same So that this is an excepted Case because of the Necessity and 't is like the Cases of suing for Mariners Wages in this Court The Service was at Sea so that the Admiralty hath no proper Iurisdiction over this Matter 'T is true Prohibitions have been denied for Mariners Wages the first is reported by Iustice Winch Winch. f. 8. but the reason seems to be because they proceed in the Admiralty not upon any Contract at Land but upon the Merits of the Service at Sea and allow or deduct the Wages according to the good or bad performance of the Services in the Voyage Besides there is an Act of Parliament which warrants she Proceedings in the Court of Admiralty for Mariners Wages Cotton Abr. f. 340. nu 37. For in a Parliament held in the 14th year of Richard II. the Commons petititioned for remedy against great Wages taken by Masters of Ships and Mariners to which the King answered that the Admiral shall appoint them to take reasonable Wages or shall punish them Now the reason of the Civil Law which allows the pawning of a Ship for necessaries upon the high Sea seems to be plain because there may be an extraordinary and invincible necessity at Sea but not at Land So that this being a Contract beyond Sea and at Land the Court of Admiralty cannot have any Iurisdiction over it 4 Inst 134. Cro. Car. 603. Latch 11. 2 Brownl 37. for where the Common Law cannot relieve in such Cases the Admiralty shall not because they are limited to Acts done upon the Sea and in cases of necessity for if the Law should be otherwise the Master may take up as much Mony as he will Mr. Pollexfen contra 1 Rolls 530. That things arising upon Land may be sued for in the Admiralty is no new thing for so it is in all Cases of Stipulation Mariners Wages are also recoverable in that Court not by vertue of any Act of Parliament Exton Mant. Diraeologiae f. 192. but because it grows due for Services done at Sea which is properly a Maritime Cause though the
Contract for that Service with the Master was at Land But the principal reason why Mariners Wages are sued for in the Admiralty is because the Ship is liable as well as the Master who may be poor and not able to answer the Seamen Curia Take a Trial upon the necessity in this Case Anonymus THE Plaintiff recovered a Verdict against the Defendant in an Action upon the Case The Defendant now moved by his Council The Court will not order a Plaintiff to file the Venire Facias that the Plaintiff should file the Venire Facias and Distringas because all Writs which are returnable in this Court ought to be filed otherwise a Damage may ensue to the Officers and a Wrong to the King upon the Forfeitures of Issues by the Iurors which are always estreated upon the coming in of the Distringas The Council insisted upon it that it was the Common Law of this Realm and that it was the Right of the Subject that all Writs which issue out of the King's Courts should be filed that the Panel of the Venire Facias is part of the Record and that an Attaint could not be brought against the Iury if these Writs were not filed because non constat de personis This matter was referred to some of the ancient Clerks of the Court and to the Secondary Aston who reported that the Court never ordered a Plaintiff to file a Venire Facias against his Will Davies 's Case TRespass against Davies and Powel for breaking of the Plaintiffs Close and chasing and killing of Fowl in his Free Warren Prescription for all the Tenants of a Mannor to fowl in a Warren good though it was objected that it was too large The Defendant as to all the Trespass but chasing and killing of the Fowl pleaded Not-Guilty and as to that he sets forth that the Dean and Chapter of Exeter were seized in Fee of the Mannor of Brampton of which the said Warren was parcel and that they and all those whose Estates they had c. had liberty for themselves their Tenants and Farmers to fowl in the said Warren that the Dean and Chapter did make a Lease of parcel of the said Mannor to the Defendants for one and twenty years reserving a Rent c. and so they justifie as Tenants c. they did fowl in the said Warren The Plaintiff replied de injuria sua propria Vpon which they were at Issue and there was a Verdict for the Defendants Mr. Pollexfen moved in arrest of Iudgment because 't is an unreasonable Prescription for an interest in every Tenant of the Mannor to fowl in that Warren It hath been so ruled for a Common Roll. Abr. 399. without saying for his Cattle Levant and Couchant for it must be for a certain number In this Case the Prescription is not only in the person of the Lord but for all his Farmers and Tenants who cannot prescribe to have a free Warren in alieno solo E contra E contra It was argued that such a Prescription might not be good upon a Demurrer but 't is well enough after a Verdict 'T is not an Objection to say that this Prescription is too large for all Tenants as well Freeholders as Copyholders to prescribe in the Soil of another and so there may not be enough for the Lord himself Yelv. 187. 2 Cro. 256. because this is a Profit apprender in alieno solo and for such the Tenants of a Mannor may prescribe by a Que estate exclusive of the Lord and of that Opinion was the Court so the Defendant had his Iudgment Anonymus NOTA. An Information was brought in this Court for throwing down of Hedges and Ditches in which there were several Defendants who pleaded specially and the Clerk of the Crown Office demanded 13 s. and 4 d. for every Name which came to 17 l. for his Fees in this Plea and by reason of the great charge the Defendants did not plead but let Iudgment go by default Mr. Pollexfen moved that the Plea might be received and that it might be enquired what Fees were due which the Court would not try upon a Motion but advised an Indictment of Extortion if their Clerk was guilty Rex versus Inhabitantes de Malden SErjeant Shaw moved to affirm an Order made upon an Appeal to the Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the County of Essex The Case was viz. Order of Sessions quashed for settling a poor Man because he had not given formal notice in writing John Pain served an Apprentiship at Malden where he married and had several Children His Wife died he marryed another Woman who had a Term for years of an House in the Parish of Heybridge where he lived for a year and left Malden Afterwards he returned to Malden was rated to the Poor and lived there two years then he dyed In a short time after his death his Widow and Children were removed by an Order of two Iustices to Heybridge from which Order they appeal and by the Order of Sessions they were declared to be Inhabitants of Malden It was now moved by Mr. Pollexfen to quash it because it doth not appear that he gave any formal Notice in Writing to the Overseers of Malden when he returned from Heybridge and therefore ought to be settled there and not at Malden for being taxed to the Poor will not amount to Notice and he cited a stronger Case which was viz. The Churchwardens of Covent Garden certified under their Hands that such a person was an Inhabitant within their Parish but because no Note was left with them pursuant to the Statute notwithstanding such Certificate he was held to be no Inhabitant within their Parish and of that Opinion was all the Court. Anonymus IN Replevin three persons made Cognizance as Bayliffs to A. Whether an Infant should make Cognizance per Attorn or per Guardianum and so justifie the taking of the Cattle Damage Feasant in his Ground The Plaintiff replied that the Cattle were taken in his Ground and traverseth the taking in the place mentioned in the Cognizance There was Iudgment for the Defendant upon which a Writ of Error was brought and the Error assigned was that one of the Bayliffs was an Infant and made Cognizance per Attornatum when he ought to do it per Guardianum Mr. 2 Cro. 441. 2 Sand 212. 1 Rol. Abr. 228. 3 Cro. 441. Pollexfen This might be pleaded in Abatement but 't is not Error for an Infant Administrator may bring an Action of Debt per Attornatum because he sues in the Right of another and so his Infancy shall be no impediment to him The Bayliff in this Case is as much a Plaintiff as the Administrator in the other for he makes Cognizance in the Right of another and in such case if two are of Age and one is not they who are of Age may make an Attorney for him who is not So if there are two
Intratur Trin. 1 W. M. Rot. 249. THis was a Trial at the Bar A Will shall not be revoked by a subsequent Writing unless that be also a good Will by a Wiltshire Iury in an Ejectment brought by the Plaintiffs as Heirs at Law to Ann Speke who died seized in Fee of the Lands in Question Vpon not Guilty pleaded this Question did arise at the Trial Whether the Answer of a Guardian in Chancery shall be read as Evidence in this Court to conclude the Infant There being some Opinions that it ought to be read and the Defendants Council insisting on the contrary Mr Iustice Eyres being the Puisne Iustice was sent to the Court of Common-Pleas then sitting to know their Opinions who returning made this Report That the Judges of that Court were all of Opinion that such Answer ought not to be read as Evidence for it was only to bring the Infant into Court and to make him a Party Then the Plaintiffs proceeded to prove their Title as Heirs at Law viz. by several Inquisitions which were brought into Court and by the Heralds Office The Defendants Title likewise was thus proved viz. That the Lady Speke being seised in Fee c. did by Will dated in March 1682. devise the Lands to John Petit for Life Remainder to the Defendant and his Heirs for ever That the Lady Speke died so seised that John Speke the Tenant for Life and Father to the Defendant was also dead c. This Will was proved by several Witnesses one of which likewise deposed that my Lady Speke made two other Wills subsequent to this now produced and a Minister prov'd that she burnt a Will in the Month of December which was in the year 1685. Then the Plaintiffs produced another Will made by her at Christmas 1685. attested by three Witnesses but not in the presence of my Lady so that though it might not be a good Will to dispose the Estate yet the Council insisted that it was a good Revocation of the other for 't is a Writing sufficient for that purpose within the sixth Paragraph of the Statute of Frauds The Case of Sir George Sheers was now mentioned whose Will was carried out of the Chamber where he then was into a Lobby and signed there by the Witnesses but one of them swore that there was a Window out of that Room to his Chamber through which the Testator might see the Witnesses as he lay in his Bed Vpon which Evidence the Iury found this special Verdict viz. That Ann Speke being seised in Fee c. did on the 12th day of March 1682. make her Will and devised the Lands to John Pettit for Life and afterwards to George his Son and to his Heirs for ever upon condition that he take upon him the Name of Speke That the 25th of December 1685. she caused another Writing to be made purporting her Will which was signed sealed and published by her in the presence of three Witnesses in the Chamber where she then was and where she continued whilst the Witnesses subscribed their Names in the Hall but that she could not see them so subscribing They find that the Lessors of the Plaintiff are Heirs at Law and that they did enter c. This matter was argued in Easter Term following and the Question was whether this Writing purporting a Will was a Revocation of the former or not and that depended upon the Construction of the sixth Paragraph in the Act of Frauds viz. All Devises of Lands shall be in Writing and signed by the party or some other in his presence and by his express Directions and shall be attested by three or four Witnesses c. and that such devise shall not be revocable but by some other Will or Codicil in Writing or other Writing c. declaring the same Now the want of Witnesses doth not make the last Will void in it self but only quoad the Lands therein devised it hath its operation as to all other purposes It must therefore be a Revocation of the former and this is agreeable to the Resolution of the Iudges in former times for there being nothing in the Statute of Wills which directs what shall be a Revocation 32 H. 8. cap. 1. Dyer 143. the Iudges in Trevilian's Case did declare that it might be by word of mouth or by the very intention of the Testator to alter any thing in the Will for before the late Statute very few words did amount to a Revocation Moor 429. 1 Roll. Abr. 614 615 616. If Lands are devised and afterwards a feoffment is made of the same but for want of Livery and Seisin 't is defective yet this is a Revocation of the Will though the Feoffment is void The Council on the other side argued that this Will was not void by any Clause in the Statute of Frauds E contra for if this is a Revocation within that Statute then this second Writing purporting a Will must be a good Will for if 't is not a good Will then 't is not a good Revocation within that Law No Man will affirm that the latter Writing is a good Will therefore the first being a Devise of Land cannot be revoked but by a Will of Land which the second is not This Statute was intended to remedy the mischief of parol Revocations and therefore made such a solemnity requisite to a Revocation It cannot be denied but that this latter Writing was intended to be made a Will but it wanting that perfection which is required by Law it shall not now be intended a Writing distinct from a Will so as to make a Revocation within the meaning of that Act. If a Man hath a power of Revocation either by Will or Deed and he makes his Will in order to Revoke a former this is a Writing presently but 't is not a Revocation as long as the person is living Therefore a Revocation must not only be by a Writing but it must be such a Writing which declares the intention of a Man that it should be so which is not done by this Writing Vpon the first Argument Iudgment was given for the Defendant that the second Will must be a good Will in all Circumstances to Revoke a former Will Cross versus Garnet THE Plaintiff declared that on such a day and year there was a discourse between him and the Defendant concerning the Sale of two Oxen then in the possession of the Defendant and that they came to an agreement for the same that the Defendant did then sell the said Oxen to the Plaintiff and did falsly affirm them to be his own ubi revera they were the Oxen of another Man The Plaintiff had a Verdict Cro. Eliz. 44. 1 Rol. Rep. 275. 2 Cro. 474 1 Roll. Abr. 91. More 126. Yel 20. Sid. 146. and Serjeant Thompson moved in arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was not good because the Plaintiff hath not alledged that the Defendant did affirm the
Cattle to be his own sciens the same to be the Goods of another or that he sold them to the Plaintiff fraudulenter deceptive or that there was any Warranty for this Action will not lie upon a bare Communication But notwithstanding these Exceptions the Plaintiff had his Iudgment it might have been good upon Demurrer but after Verdict 't is well enough Lea versus Libb IN Ejectione firmae for Lands in Hampshire Two Witnesses to a Will and two to a Codicil one whereof was a Witness to the Will these are not three Witnesses to the Will it self the Iury found a special Verdict the substance of which was this viz. That the Lessor of the Plaintiff was Heir at Law to one John Denham his Ancestor who being seised in Fee of the Lands in question did by Will bearing date the 28th day of January in the year 1678. devise the same to the Defendant which he subscribed and published in the presence of two Witnesses and they likewise attested it in his presence They find that on the 29th day of December 1679. he made another Will or Codicil in Writing reciting that he had made a former Will and confirming the same except what was excepted in the Codicil and declared his Will to be that the Codicil should be taken and adjudged as part of his Will They find that he published this Codicil in the presence likewise of two Winesses one of which was Witness to the first Will bue the other was a new Man They find that these were distinct Writings c. The Question was whether this was a good Will attested by three Witnesses since one of the Witnesses to the Codicil was likewise a Witness to the Will so that the new Man if any must make the third Witness Serjeant Thompson argued that it was not a good Will The Clause of the Statute is That all Devises of Lands shall be in Writing and signed by the Testator in the presence of three Witnesses and they to attest it in his presence But here are not three subscribing Witnesses in the presence of the Testator so that the first Will must be void for one of the Witnesses to the Codicil did never see that Will Besides the Codicil is not the same thing with the Will 't is a confirmation of it and this being in a Case wherein an Heir is to be disinherited ought not to have a favourable Construction Attorney General contra A Will may be contained in several Writings and yet but one entire Will 'T is true if it be attested only by two Witnesses 't is not good but if the Testator call in a third person and he attests that individual Witing in his presence this is a good Will though the Witnesses were not all present together and at the same time for there is the Credit of three persons to such a Will which is according to the intent of the Statute And therefore it cannot be objected that these are distinct Wills or that the Papers are not annexed for no such thing is required by Law for a Man may make his Will in several Sheets of Paper and if the Witnesses subscribe the last Sheet 't is well enough or if he doth put up all the Sheets in a blank piece of Paper and the Witnesses attest that Sheet 't is a good Will In these Cases the intent of the Law-makers must and ought to be chiefly regarded and for what reasons and purposes such Laws were made and what Iudgments have been given in parallel Cases If a Man grants a Rent-Charge to his youngest Son for Life 2 Cro. 144. Noy 117. and afterwards devises that he shall have the Rent as expressed in the Grant Now though the Writing was no part of the Will but of another nature yet the Will referring to the Deed is a good Devise of the Rent-charge within the Statute of Wills But in this Case the Codicil is part of the Will 't is of the same nature and being made animo restandi the end of the Statute is performed for both Will and Codicil joined together make a good Devise the first was a Will to all purposes it only wanted that circumstance of a third Witness to attest it which the Testator compleated after by calling in of a third person for that purpose Curia If a Man makes a Will in several pieces of Paper and there are three Witnesses to the last Paper and none of them did ever see the first this is not a good Will Afterwards in Hillary-Term Iudgment was given that this was not a good Will Tippet versus Hawkey TIppet the Elder and his Son covenant with John Hawkey to sell and convey Land to him free from all Incumbrances and that they will levy a Fine c. and deliver up Writings Where two covenant the Action may be brought in the name of one Item 'T is agreed between the Parties that the said Hawkey shall pay to Tippet the younger so much Mony c. The Action is brought in the name of both and upon a Demurrer to the Declaration it was held ill for the Duty is vested in Tipper the younger and he only ought to have brought this Action Iudgment for the Defendant Rees versus Phelps DEBT upon a Bond conditioned for performance of an Award Award where good Vpon nullum fecerunt arbitrium pleaded the Plaintiff replied and shewed an Award that the Defendant should pay 5 l. to the Plaintiff presently and give Bond for the payment of 10 l. more on the 29th day of November following and that this should be for and towards the Charges and Expences in and about certain differences then depending between the Parties and that they should now sign general Releases And upon a Demurrer it was argued to be a void Award because mutual Releases were then to be given which would discharge the Bond payable in November following 1 Roll. Abr. 259 260. But the Court held it to be good for the Releases shall discharge such Matters only which were depending at the time of the Submission Godfrey al' versus Eversden THere was a Parish Church and a Chappel of Ease in the Parish of Hitchen Prohibition denied upon Suggestion that there was a Chappel of Ease and so ought not to repair the Parish Church the Defendant was taxed towards the Repairs of the Church and a Livel was brought against him for the refusing of the payment of that Tax He now suggests that there was a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish to which the Inhabitants do go and that they have always repaired that Chappel and so prayed a Prohibition But Serjeant Tremain moved for a Consultation because the Parishioners of common right ought to repair the Church and though there is a Chappel of Ease in the same Parish yet that ought not to excuse them from repairing of the Mother Church He produced an Affidavit that there had been no Divine Service there for
place as the Parish of St. James Westminster only And upon a Demurrer it was argued that this Plea was not good for it being in Abatement the Appellee ought to have pleaded over to the Murder Cro. Eliz. 694. so it was adjudged in the Case of Watts and Brain the Pleadings of which Case are at large in my Lord Coke's Entries 2. He ought to have pleaded in person and not by Attorney the Statute of Gloucester is plain in this Point Curia If the Plea is in Abatement and the Party doth not answer over to the Murder yet that doth not oust him of his Plea but the Appellant ought to have prayed Iudgment 'T is a Question whether he ought to plead over to the Felony or not for the Presidents are both ways there is no Iudgment entred Proud versus Piper THere was a Libel brought in the Spiritual Court for a Mortuary Mortuary due only by Custom 21 H. 8. c. 6. The Defendant suggests that by the Statute of H. 8. no Mortuary ought to be paid but in such places where it had been usually paid before the making of that Statute and that there was no Custom in this place to pay a Mortuary and it was thereupon moved for a Prohibition Cro. Eliz. 151. for Mortuaries are not due by Law but by particular Custom of places 'T is true 2 Inst 491. 1 Cro. 237. Seld. of Tithes 287. a Prohibition was denied in the Case of * Sid. 263. Mark and Gilbert but it was because 't was admitted that there a Mortuary was due by Custom but they differed in the person to whom it ought to be paid Curia Prohibitions have been granted and denied upon such Suggestions therefore the Defendant was ordered to take a Declaration in a Prohibition as to the Mortuary and to try the Custom at Law Lutwich versus Piggot IN Ejectment for Lands in Northumberland Lease whether made pursuant to the power in the Reservation tried at the Bar the Case was thus viz. Peter Venables was seised in Fee of the Manor of Long Witton in the said County and being so seised made a Settlement thereof by Lease and Release to the use of himself for Life without impeachment of Waste then to the Trustees for seven years to raise Portions for Daughters then to William Venables and the Heirs Male of his Body and if he dye without Issue then to Ann his Daughter for Life with Remainders over In which Settlement there was this Proviso viz. Provided that it shall be lawful for William Venables by Will or Deed to dispose of any part of the said Manor to his Wife for Life And another Proviso to this purpose viz. Provided that it shall and may be lawful to and for the said William Venables by any Deed in Writing under his Hand and Seal to Demise for 3 Lives or 21 years or under or for any time or term of years upon one two or three Lives or as Tenant in Tail in Possession may do all or any part of the said Manor Lands c. which were in Lease for the space of forty years last past The Defendants Title was a Lease for 99 years made by the said William Venables to one Mary Venables if three Lives should so long live And the Question was whether that Lease was pursuant to the power in the last Proviso It was objected that it was not for it ought to be a Lease for 21 and not 99 years determinable for three Lives But the Plaintiff was Non-Suit Rex versus Fairfax al. AN Order made at the Quarter-Sessions of Gloucester Who shall be bound to take an Apprentice in Husbandry was removed hither confirming another made by the Iustices there for placing of a poor Boy to be an Apprentice in Husbandry and it was moved that it might be quashed Mr. Pollexfen argued that the Iustices had no power given them by the Law to compel a Man to take such an Apprentice and this will depend upon the construction of such Statutes which relate to this matter The first is that of Queen Elizabeth which enacts 5 Eliz. cap. 4. Paragraph 25. that for the better advancing of Husbandry and Tillage and to the intent such who are fit to be made Apprentices to Husbandry may be bound thereunto that every person being an Housholder and having or using half a Plough Land at the least in Till age may take any to be an Apprentice above ten and under eighteen years to serve in Husbandry until the Party be of the Age of twenty one or twenty four years the said Reteiner and taking of an Apprentice to be by Indenture Now before the making of this Statute the practice of putting out poor Children was only in Cities and great Towns to particular Trades and Employments The next Statute is 43 Eliz. by which power is given to the Church-Wardens or Overseers of the Poor 48 Eliz. cap. 2. to raise weekly or otherwise by Taxation of every Inhabitant such competent Sum or Sums of Mony as they shall think fit for relief of the Poor and putting out of Children to Apprentice And then in the fifth Paragraph power is given to them by the Assent of two Iustices of Peace to bind poor Children where they shall see convenient c. which words were the foundation for the making of this Order But the construction thereof can be no otherwise than viz. Whereas before the making of this Act poor Children were bound Apprentices to Tillage now the Church-wardens may raise Mony to bind them out to Trades for if they could compel Men to take them what need was there of raising Mony to place them out This must be the natural construction of that Law 1 Jac. cap. 25. Paragraph 23. which appears yet more plain by the words of a subsequent Statute which continues that of the 43th of Eliz. with this addition that all persons to whom the Overseers of the Poor shall according to that Act bind any Children to Apprentice may take receive and keep them as Apprentices 'T is true the general practice of putting out poor Children seems to warrant this Order but this hath been occasioned upon a Mistake in Mr. Dalton 's Book Dalt 114. who Reported the Resolution of the Iudges in 1633. to be That every Man who by his calling profession or manner of living and who entertaineth and must use Servants of the like quality such must also take Apprentices By this Resolution the Iustices of Peace have been governed ever since But Iustice Twisden would often say that those were not the Resolutions of the Iudges as Reported by Mr. Dalton and therefore the Book was mistaken 2. The Order it self doth not mention that the party to whom this poor Boy was bound Apprentice did occupy any Land in Tillage for so it ought to be otherwise the Overseers of the Poor may bind him to a Merchant or to an Attorny which he called a Free
long a Man may live in one of these ancient Houses Such a Custom might be good in point of Tenure for it might have a reasonable commencement between Lord and Tenant but this cannot be good as laid in this Declaration for several Reasons 1. Because 't is not alledged that the Defendants of right ought to keep a Boat there or that it was necessary for them to be always attending for possibly it might require the use of skilful Men and therefore in all Actions brought for not repairing of Ways 't is alledged that the Defendant reparare debuit 2. Because it brings a Charge without any recompence 8 E. 4.18 Br. Tit. Customs pl. 46. and this must be very unreasonable 'T is true that a Custom for Fishermen to dry their Nets upon another Man's Ground is good which may seem to be a Charge upon the Land without any Reward but the reason is because the catching of Fish is for the publick benefit and every man may have advantage by it A Custom to have solam separalem pasturam hath been formerly doubted whether good or not but 't is now held to be good because the Lord of the Soil might have some other Recompence for it 3. Because 't is unlimited for the Tenants may pass and repass ad libitum according to this Custom but it ought to be laid for their necessary occasions for otherwise the Defendants may be deprived of their Freehold because the Tenants may always keep the Boat in use The 2d Point was not much insisted on which was as to the matter of the Plea only it was said that it was not so well to take away the whole Prescription that the Plea might have been good if it had been quousque the Bridge fall or decayed then the Prescription doth revive again The 3d. Point Then supposing the Declaration to be sufficient yet as this is upon the Record the Plaintiff could not have this Action because he had set forth this to be a publick and common Ferry for all People to pass and that he was hindred but doth not shew any particular damage and therefore can have no cause of Action 'T is like the Case of a common High-way which is out of repair 27 H. 8. 27. a. 1 Inst 56. Moor 108. Cro. Eliz. 664. 5 Co. 104. for which no man can bring an Action unless he hath a particular damage or loss more than the rest of the People passing that way but the Party ought to be indicted and this is to prevent multiplicity of Suits for if one man may have an Action every person traveling that way may have the like Another Exception was taken to the Declaration viz. that all the Custom is laid to be for the Inhabitants of an ancient Vill to pass Toll-Free from Ferry-Lane to Adventurers-Bank and they do not alledge that Bank to be within the Vill. Those who argued for the Plaintiff held this to be a good Custom E contra as set forth by him and as such 't is not confined to the same Rules with a Prescription which must have a lawful commencement but it is otherwise in a Custom for 't is sufficient if it be certain and reasonable The Cases cited on the other side are not to this purpose because they concern only such Customs which relate to some Interest or profit in the Land of another person but this Custom is only in a matter of exemption and easment This was the very difference taken by the Iudges in Gatewood 's Case 6 Co. where it was held to be a good Custom for every Inhabitant of a particular Town to have a Way over such Lands to go to Church or Market because this was matter of easement and no profit Now a Passage over a River is no more than a way and may be tied up to one or more persons according to their comorancy Since therefore no Interest is claimed by the Plaintiff but only an easment this Prescription need not be laid in the Owners but in the Inhabitants of the Vill of Littleport It may be compared to a Case where a Custom was laid for the Inhabitants of a Town to pay a Modus in discharge of Tythes Hob. 118. Yelv. 163. this was held good because it was by way of discharge in the persons Lands without claiming any profit in that of another 'T is also like the common Case of a Market when a Man has pitched his Stall there no person can remove it for he hath a right ratione comorantiae Then as to the first Objection upon the first Point That a Custom to pass and repass ad libitum cannot be good it was answered this passage was in the nature of a High way over which a Man may pass as often as he will and therefore 't is well enough as laid in the Declaration 2. As to the Objection that it ought to be laid in some person and not in the Inhabitants it was said this was an easment to the Plaintiff and no such thing can be to one man but it makes another a Crespasser and 't is no Interest in the Plaintiff to be discharged of a Charge A Custom to grind at the Lords Mill discharged of Toll rules this Case for is it not as much charge for a Lord of a Mannor to keep a Mill as for the Defendant to keep a Boat If the Plaintiff had prescribed then this had come within the the Rules of Gatewood 's Case But he hath alledged a Custom and when such Allegations are made they ought not to be too narrowly searched for No reason can be given why an Infant at 15 years of Age shall be capable to make a Feoffment in one Town and not in another 18 Ed. 4.3 3. Then as to the third point that this being laid to be a Common Ferry the Plaintiff ought to shew some special damage to maintain an Action To which it was answered that the right was on the Plaintiff's side and that was sufficient to maintain the Action 'T is not like the Case of a Common-High-way as mentioned on the other side because this Action is confined to Littleport alone and no Man is intituled to it but such who inhabit that Vill so that every Man cannot bring an Action As to the Exception to the form of the Declaration that Adventurers-Bank is not laid to be in the Vill it was said that the Plaintiff only claimed a right of passage over the River which is laid to be in the Vill of Littleport 2 Cro. 555 557. the Bank is only the terminus ad quem 't is like the Case where the Defendant covenanted to repair a Mill and the Water-courses in a Parish and also the Banks belonging to the Mill in which Case the Plaintiff had Iudgment tho' he did not shew in what Vill the Banks were because it shall be intended to be in the same Vill where the Mill was Afterwards in Trinity Term
the six Months by this means the Conusee of the Statute is defeated for after the inrollment the Land passeth ab initio and the Bargainee in Iudgment of Law was seised thereof from the delivery of the Deed but not by way of Relation but by immediate Conveyance of the Estate by vertue of the Statute of Vses But the Law will not suffer contingent Remainders to waver about and to be so incertain that no Man knows where to find them which they must be if this Doctrine of Relation should prevail Now suppose the Surrendree had made a Grant of his Estate to another person before he had accepted of the Surrender and the Grantee had entred would this subsequent assent have divested this Estate and made the Grant of no effect if it would then here is a plain way found out for any Man to avoid his own acts and to defeat Purchasors Therefore 't is with great reason that the Law provides that no person shall take a Surrender but he who hath the immediate Reversion and that the Estate shall still remain in the Surrenderor until all acts are done which are to compleat the Conveyance Those who argued against the Iudgment E contra held that the Estate passed immediately without the assent of the Surrenderor and that even in Conveyances at the Common-Law 't is divested out of the person and put in him to whom such Conveyance is made without his actual assent 'T is true in Exchanges the Freehold doth not pass without Entry nor a Grant of a Reversion without an Attornment but that stands upon different Reasons from this Case at the Bar for in Exchanges the Law requires the mutual acts of the Parties exchanging and in the other there must be the consent of a third person But in Surrenders the assent of the Surrendree is not required for the Estate must be in him immediately upon the execution of the Deed if he doth not shew some dissent to it If a Man should plead a Release without saying ad quam quidem relaxationem the Defendant agreavit yet this Plea is good because the Estate passeth to him upon the execution of the Deed. It may be a Question whether the actual assent must be at the very time that the Surrender was made for if it should be afterwards t is well enough and the Estate remaineth in the Surrendree till dis-agreement Presumption stands on this side for it shall never be intended that he did not give his Assent but on the contrary because t is for his benefit not to refuse an Estate Therefore where a Feme Sole had a Lease and married Hob. 203. the Husband and Wife surrendred it to another in consideration of a new Lease to be granted to the Wife and her Sons c. this Estate vests immediately in her tho' a Feme Covert and that without the assent of her Husband for the Law intends it to be her Estate till he dissent 't is true in that Case his assent was held necessary because the first Lease could not be divested out of him without his own consent So a Feoffment to three 2 Leon. 224. and Livery made to one the Freehold is in all 'till disagreement So if a Bond be given to a Stranger for my use and I should die before I had agreed to it my Executors are entituled to an Action of Debt and will recover A Feme Covert and another were Ioint-tenants for Life 1 Rol. Rep. 401 441. she and her Husband made a Lease for years of her moiety reserving a Rent during her Life and the Life of her partner then the Wife died this was held to be a good Lease against the surviving Ioint-tenant till disagreement which shews that the agreement of the Parties is not so much requisite to perfect a Conveyance of this nature as a disagreement is to make it void And this may serve as an answer to the second point which was not much insisted on that Mens Titles would be incertain and precarious if after the assent of the Surrendree the Estate should pass by Relation at the very time that the Deed was executed and that it was not known where the Free-hold was in the mean time for if he had agreed to it immediately it had been altogether as private Then as to the Pleadings 't is true that generally when a Surrender is pleaded 't is said ad quam quidem sursum redditionem the Party adtunc ibidem agreavit which implies that the Surrendree was then present and in such Case he ought to agree or refuse Besides those Actions to which an Agreement is thus pleaded were generally brought in disaffirmance of Surrenders and to support the Leases upon which the Plaintiffs declared and then the proper and most effectual Bar was to shew a Surrender and express Agreement before the Action brought It might have been insufficient pleading not to shew an Acceptance of the Surrendree but 't is not substance for if Issue should be taken whether a Surrender or not Cro. Eliz. 249. and a Verdict for the Plaintiff that defect of setting forth an Acceptance is aided by the Statute of Ieofails In this Case there is not only the Word Surrender but * Grant and Release which may be pleaded without any consent to it and a Grant by operation of Law turns to a Surrender because a Man cannot have two Estates of equal dignity in the Law at the same time Neither can it be said that there remained any Estate in Simon Leach after this Surrender executed for 't is an absurd thing to imagine that when he had done what was in his power to compleat a Conveyance and to divest himself of an Estate yet it should continue in him Therefore the Remainder in Contingency to the Lessor of the Plaintiff was destroyed by this Surrender of the Estate to him in reversion for by that means when it did afterwards happen there was no particular Estate to support it But notwithstanding the Iudgment was affirmed and afterwards Anno quarto Gulielmi Mariae upon a Writ of Error brought in the House of Lords it was reversed Idem versus Eundem THIS Point having received a legal determination the same Plaintiff brought another Action of Trespass and Ejectment against the same Defendant Surrender by a person Non compos is void and at a Trial at the Barr in Easter Term nono Gulielmi Regis another special Verdict was found upon which the Case more at large was viz. That Nicholas Leach being seised in Fee of the Lands in question made his Will in these Words viz. In the Name of God Amen c. I devise my Mannors of Bulkworth Whitebear and Vadacot in Devonshire and Cresby Goat and Cresby Grange in Northallerton in Yorkshire unto the Heirs Males of my Body begotten and for want of such Issue Male I devise the same unto my Brother Simon Leach for Life and after his decease to the
4. It will lie for such words for which an Action will not 139 5. For a Riot in unduly electing of an Alderman of Bristol not being summoned by the Mayor 5 6. Exception to it viz. doth not say that 't is antiqua Villa or whether it was a Corporation by Charter or Prescription of which the Court cannot judicially take notice if not shewn 5 7. Doth not say that any Charter was granted to the City of Bristol where the Riot was supposed to be committed 7 8. Must be very exact and certain for 't is not aided by any Statute of Ieofails ibid. 9. For treasonable words preached in a Sermon viz. We have had two wicked Kings together c. whether good without some preceding discourse of the King 53 54 69 10. For Subornation of Perjury in perswading another to swear and doth not set forth that the Oath was made that it might appear that the thing sworn was false 122 11. Quashed because the words per Sacramentum duodecim proborum legalium hominum were left out ibid. 12. For using a Trade not being an Apprentice upon 5 Eliz. and doth not averr that it was a Trade used before the making of the Act 152 13. For not serving upon a Wardmote Enquest quashed for incertainty 168 14. For Perjury by the Name of A. B. de Parochia de Algate and did not shew in what County it was for which reason it was held not good 139 15. In Indictments there must be an addition to the person and place viz. To the person of what Estate and Degree he is To the place viz in what Hamlet Town Place and County he liveth 139 16. Caption was coram Justiciariis ad pacem dicti Domini Regis conservand ' and did not say nunc whether good ibid. 17. For Burglary the very day need not be set down for if it be either before or after the Offence the Jury ought to find according to the truth 141 18. 'T is sufficient to lay the Fact to be committed in Parochia c. without laying a Vill though Parish is an Ecclesiastical division 158 19. Per Sacramentum 12 praesentat ' existit modo forma sequen ' Midd. viz. Juratores pro Domino Rege praesentant it should have been praesentat ' existit quod c. and not modo forma quashed 201 20. The certainty of the Fact ought to be particularly alledged if for Murder it must be alledged that a Stroak was given 202 21. Pardon was pleaded and Judgment quod Defendens eat sine die but being convicted of Manslaughter his Goods were forfeited and though he was out of the Court by this Pardon and Judgment yet the Indictment was quashed upon a Motion for a fault in it and this was to prevent the Seisure 202 22. Two were indicted for a Confederacy one of them was acquitted and the other found guilty the acquittal of one is the discharge of the other 220 Inducement In Trover the Contract is but Inducement the Cause of Action is upon the Conversion 322 Inferior Court See Court Infant See Copyhold 2. Custom 5 7. Evidence 3. After three Proclamations in a Court Baron of a Mannor he did not come to be admitted to a Copy-hold Estate and held no Forfeiture 223 2. Had an Estate upon Condition to be performed by him and 't is broken during his Minority the Estate is gon for ever 222 224 226 3. The Law will not allow the Priviledge of Infancy to work a wrong to any body 222 226 4. Shall not be prejudiced by the Latches of another but shall be answerable for himself 222 223 5. Custom to be admitted after three Proclamations will not barr him if beyond Sea 222 6. He is not obliged to be admitted during his Infancy 223 7. His Feoffment is no Forfeiture at the Common Law ibid. 8. If he doth not present to a Church within six Months it shall lapse ibid. 9 He may be admitted to a Copy-hold but not obliged to pay the Fine during his Nonage 224 10 May be bound by acts of Necessity and by some Customs ibid. 11 Where he hath a right it shall be preserved after a Fine and Non-claim but he hath no right before admittance to a Copyhold 226 12. Cases of Coverture and Infancy are guided by the same reason of Law so are Cases of Infants and Lunaticks ibid. 13. Where he brought an Audita Querela to avoid a Statute entred into by him in his minority 229 14. A Surrender made by an Infant is void 303 15. Where Acts done by him are void in themselves where voidable 307 16. When he is made Defendant he must appear by Guardian and not by Attorny for he hath not capacity to choose one the appearance by Guardian is the Act of the Court when he is Plaintiff he may sue per Prochein Amy 236 17. Whether in Replevin one of them who made Cognizance being an Infant may do it per Attornatum it may be pleaded in Abatement 248 18. If he is Administrator he may bring an Action of Debt per Attornatum because he sueth in the right of another 248 19. Where he recovers as Plaintiff the Defendant shall not assign infancy for Error ibid. 20. Answer of his Guardian in Chancery shall not be read as Evidence at Law to conclude him 259 21. He is not capable to take a Surrender because he cannot give his assent which is an essential requisite to a Surrender 298 22. Release by an Infant Executor is no bar for it worketh the destruction of his Estate 303 23. Cannot surrender a future Interest by his acceptance of a new Lease or make an absolute Surrender of a Term by Deed 304 Information For a Forgery brought against a Coroner who inserted the Names of two persons in an Indictment upon his Enquest for a Murder whom the Jury had not found Guilty 66 2. For a Riot in breaking a Bank and diverting a Watercourse the Jury found quoad fractionem Ripae guilty and quoad Riotam not guilty for which reason the Judgment was arrested 73 3. For going Armed to terrifie the People 't is an Offence at Common Law 118 4. For forging quoddam scriptum per quod A. was bound which cannot be if the Bond was forged 104 5. For Perjury in a Deposition taken before Commissioners in Chancery whether they ought to be present to testifie that the Defendant is the same person 116 6. An Information of Perjury will not lye against a Person for Swearing to the value of Lands if not true 134 7. Upon the 5th of Eliz. against a Turkey-Merchant for imploying Men in his House to dress Cloath it was held to be exercising the Trade of a Cloath-Worker 315 Inn-Keeper See Pleading 11. Inquisition See Melius Inquirendum Found to be an Ideot per spatium octo Annorum those words are surplusage for he must be so a nativitate 44 2. Quashed because the year of the King was omitted 80 3. Taken
before a Coroner the person having drowned himself it was suffocat ' emergit fuit if it had stood singly upon the word emergit it had been insensible but the word suffocat ' expressing the sense it was held good 100 4. Where nothing is vested in the King before Office found ibid. 5. It must always be found that there is an Estate in the person offending and a cause of Forfeiture of that Estate to vest it in the King 336 Interest in a thing See Pardon 4. Where a Man may have an interest in a Chattel without a Property 61 2. Devise to a Wife and Children after Debts and Legacies paid an interest vests in the Devisees but 't is otherwise in case of Administration for there no Interest vests till actual distribution 65 3. A Man may have a Property tho' not in himself as in the Case of Joyntenancy 97 Intestate See Administration Innuendo The proper office of it is to make the subject matter certain 53 2. It will not help insensible words 54 Joyntenancy and Tenancy in Common See Abatement 3. Baron and Feme 12. Interest 3. If one Joyntenant bring an Action against the other unless he pleads the Jointenancy in abatement the Plaintiff will recover 97 2. If two Coparceners lease a House and the Rent is arrear and one brings an Action and recovers Judgment shall be arrested because both ought to joyn 109 3. Tenants in Common must join in the personalty but 't is otherwise in real Actions for though their Estates are several yet the Damages to be recovered survive to all 109 251 4. Where one Commoner may bring an Action against his Fellow 251 Joint Action See Action for a wrong 6. Ioyntenancy 2 3. Where an Action may be joint or several at the Election of the Plaintiff 86 2. Where 't is brought against three Defendants who plead jointly the Jury may sever the Damages and the Plaintiff may take Execution de melioribus damnis as well as where their Pleas are several and Tryals at several times 101 102 3. Judgment against two and one brought a Writ of Error and assigned the Infancy of the other for Error the Writ was abated because both did not joyn 134 4. The Defendants in the original Action must joyn in a Writ of Error but it seems otherwise where the Plaintiffs bring Error 135 5. Two covenant to sell Lands and the Purchasor agreed to pay the Mony to one of them he alone ought to bring the Action 263 6 Where there are several Proprietors of a Vessel for carriage of Goods which are damaged by carrying the Action must be brought against all or against the Master alone 321 322 7 Where two Tenants in Common were sued for not setting out of Tythes the Action ought to be brought not against him who set them out but against the other who carried them away 322 8. Two are bound joyntly one is sued he may plead in Abatement that he was bound with another but cannot plead Non est factum 323 9 In all Cases which are grounded upon Contracts the Parties who are Privies must be joyned in the Action ibid. 10 Action must be brought against all where a promise is created by Law 324 Issue Must be joyned upon an affirmative and a negative by concluding to the Country 80 Iudges The making altering and displacing of several Judges Serjeants at Law and King's Council 71 99 100 104 125 143 191 239 Iustices of Peace Offences against the Statute of 23 Eliz c. 1. for not coming to Church may be enquired of by them in their Sessions 79 2. Where a Statute appoints a thing finally to be done by them yet the Court of King's Bench may take Cognizance of it 95 3. Conviction for keeping of a Gun before a Justice of Peace the time when he had not 100 l. per Annum must be precisely alledged 280 Iustification See Pleading 4 5. Where 't is pleaded by way of Excuse to an Action of Trespass for the taking of any thing the Defendant must averr the Fact to be done and set forth the Warrant to him directed and the taking virtute Warranti and not generally that he took it by a Mandate c. 138 2. In Replevin where the Defendant made Conusance in right of the Lord he may Justifie the taking generally ibid. Iudgment 1. At the Common Law no Execution could be of a Judgment after a year and a day but the remedy was to bring an Action of Debt upon Judgment 187 189 2. Now a Scire Fac. is given upon a Judgment after the year by the Statue of W. 2. 189 3. When a Judgment is once execucuted the Goods are in custodia legis and shall not be taken away by an Exchequer Process or by the Commissioners of Bankrupts 236 L. Lapse See Notice Lease A Covenant in a Lease for years that the Lessee should pay the Rent without obliging his Executors or Administrators 't is determined by his Death 231 2. For 99 yeas if three persons or any of them so long live reserving a Rent and an Herriot upon the death of either the Beast of the Assignee shall not be taken for a Herriot for the Lessee is to pay his best Beast and that shall not be carried further than to the person named 231 Libel Where a Fine and Corporal punishment was imposed upon the Offender after Conviction 68 Limitation An Estate was setled upon Trustees to the use of A. and her Heirs provided she marry with the consent of Trustees remainder over to B. This is a Limitation and not a Condition 32 Limitation of Action See 21 Jac. 16. Where a Trespass is laid with a continuando for more than six years and the Statute pleaded and entire Damages it must be intended only for that which falls within the six years and that the Jury rejected the beginning of the Trespass 111 2. This Statute relates to a distinct and not to a continued Account 112 3. It provides a Remedy when the Plaintiff is beyond Sea at the time when his Right accrews and saves it till he returns whether it may be extended in a Case where the Defendant is beyond Sea longer than six years from the time the Plaintiff was entituled to the Action 311 312 Local Actions Whether Covenant will lie by an Assignee of a Reversion against an Assignee of a Lessee in any other place than where the Land lieth 337 2. Debitum contractus sunt nullius loci ibid. 3. Debt for Rent upon a Lease for years brought upon the Contract and Covenant between the same Parties are transitory ibid. 4. If Privity of Contract is gone by making an Assignment and only a privity in Law remains the Action must be brought in the County where the Land lieth ibid. M. Mayor See Corporation Marriage See Condition 3. Evidence 7. Limitation Notice A Maid above 12 and under 16 taken from Parents or Guardian and Married forfeits her Estate to the next in
Revocation or not at all which revocation must depend upon the construction and exposition of the sixth Paragraph in the Statute of Frauds c. the words whereof are Viz. That no Devise of Lands c. or any clause thereof shall be Revoked otherwise than by some Codicil in Writing or other Writing declaring the same or by burning cancelling tearing or obliterating the same by the Testator himself or in his presence and by his direction or consent But all devises of Lands c. shall be good until burnt cancell'd torn c. by the Testator c. or unless the same be altered by some other Will or Codicil in Writing or other Writing of the Devisor signed in the presence of three Witnesses declaring the same So that the Question will be whether a Will which revokes a former Will ought to be signed by the Testator in the presence of three Witnesses 'T is clear that a Will by which Lands are devised ought to be so signed and why should not a Will which revokes another Will have the same formality The Statute seems to be plain that it should for it saies that a Will shall not be revoked but by some Will or Codicil in writing or other writing of the Devisor signed by him in the presence of three or four Witnesses declaring the same which last Clause is an entire sentence in the disjunctive and appoints that the Writing which revokes a Will must be signed in the presence of three Witnesses c. Before the making of this Act it was sufficient that the Testator gave directions to make his Will tho' he did never see it when made which mischief is now remedied not in writing the Will but that the Party himself should sign it in the presence of three Witnesses and this not being so signed but only published by the Testator in their presence 't is therefore no good Revocation Iustice Street was of a contrary Opinion that this was a good Revocation That the words in the fifth Paragraph of this Statute which altered the Law were Viz. That all Devises of Lands c. shall be in Writing and signed by the Party so devising or by some other person in his presence and by his express Directions and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the Devisor by three or four credible Witnesses In which Paragraph there are two parts 1. The act of the Devisor which is to sign the Will but not a word that he shall subscribe his Name in the presence of three Witnesses 2. The act of the Witnesses viz. that they shall attest and subscribe the Will in the presence of the Devisor or else the Will to be void But the sixth Paragraph is penn'd after another manner as to the Revocation of a Will which must be by some Codicil in writing or other Writing declaring the same signed in the presence of three Witnesses Now here is a Writing declaring that it shall be revoked not expresly but by implication and though that Clause in the disjunctive which says that the revocation must be by some Writing of the Devisor signed in the presence of three Witnesses c. yet in the same Paragraph 't is said that it may be revoked by a Codicil or Will in Writing and therefore an exposition ought to be made upon the whole Paragraph that the intention of the Law may more fully appear Such a construction hath been made upon a whole Sentence Sid. 328. 1 Sand. 58. where part thereof was in the disjunctive as for instance viz. A Man was possessed of a Lease by disseisin who assigned it to another and covenanted that at the time of the assignment it was a good true and indefeasable Lease and that the Plaintiff should enjoy it without interruption of the Disseisor Or any claiming under him in this Case the Diffeisee re-entred and though the Covenant was in the disjunctive to defend the Assignee from the Disseisor or any claiming under him yet he having undertaken for quiet enjoyment and that it was an indefeasable Lease it was adjudged that an exposition ought to be made upon the whole Sentence and so the Plaintiff had Iudgment The Chief Iustice Herbert was of the same Opinion with Iustice Street Rex versus Grimes and Thompson THE Defendants were indicted for being Common Pawn-Brokers Two are indicted for a Confederacy one is acquitted and that is the acquittal of the other and that Grimes had unlawfully obtained Goods of the Countess of c. and that he together with one Thompson per confoederationem astutiam did detain the said Goods until the Countess had paid him 12 Guineas Thompson was acquitted and Grimes was found Guilty which must be of the first part of the Indictment only for it could not be per confoederationem with Thompsom and therefore it was moved in arrest of Iudgment that to obtain Goods unlawfully was only a private injury for which the party ought not to be indicted To which it was answered that a plain Fraud was laid in this Indictment which was sufficient to maintain it and that tho one was acquitted yet the Iury had found the other guilty of the whole But the Court were of Opinion that the acquittal of one is the acquittal of both upon this Indictment and therefore it was quash'd King versus Dilliston Hill 2 3 Jacobi Rot. 494. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgment in Ejectment given in the Common-Pleas Infant not bound by a Custom for one Messuage and twenty Acres of Land held of the Manor of Swafling There was a special Verdict found the substance of which was viz. That the Land in question was Copy-hold held of the said Manor of Swafling in the County of Suffolk and that Henry Warner and Elizabeth his Wife in right of the said Elizabeth were seized thereof for Life Remainder to John Ballat in Fee That the Custom of the said Manor was that if any Customary Tenant doth surrender his Estate out of Court that such Surrender shall be presented at the next Court of the said Manor and publick Proclamation shall be made three Court days afterwards for the Party to whose use the Surrender was made to come and be admitted Tenant and if he refuseth then after three Proclamations made in each of the said Courts the Steward of the said Manor issueth forth a Precept to the Bailiff thereof to seise the Copyhold as forfeited They find that Henry Warner and his Wife and John Ballat made this Surrender out of Court to the use of Robert Freeman and his Heirs who died before the next Court and that John Freeman an Infant was his Son and Heir That after the said Surrender three Proclamations were made at three several Courts held for the said Manor but that the said John Freeman did not come to be admitted Tenant thereupon the Steward of the said Manor made a Precept to the Bayliff who seized the Lands in
question as forfeited to the Lady who entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant re-entred The single Question upon this special Verdict was whether this was a Forfeiture and so a good seisure to bind the right of an Infant It was argued for the Plaintiff in the Action that it was a good Seisure and a Forfeiture till the Infant should come of Age for as a Copyhold is established by Custom so likewise 't is Custom which obligeth the Infant to the Conditions thereof and therefore where one under Age hath an Estate upon a Condition to be performed by him 8 Co. 44. b. Whittingham 's Case Latch 199. Jones 157. and that Condition is broken during his Minority the Estate is lost for ever In this Case the Custom obligeth the Heir to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine which if he should lose because his Tenant is an Infant then that priviledge of Infancy works a wrong which the Law will not permit 'T is true an Infant shall not be prejudiced by the Laches of another but shall be answerable for himself and therefore if he is Tenant of Lands and the Rent should be unpaid for two years and no Distress can be found a Cessavit lies against him and the Lord shall recover the Land because of the Non-performance which arises by his own default So if one under Age be a Keeper of a Gaol and suffer a Prisoner to escape out of Execution 2 Inst 382. an Action of Debt will lie against him upon the Statute of W. 2. It was agreed that such a Custom and Non-claim will not foreclose an Heir 8 Co. 100. Sir Rich. Letchford 's Case who is an Infant and beyond Sea at the time of his Ancestors Death though he is bound by the Custom to claim it at the next Court but that if he will come over and tender himself though after a Seisure he shall be admitted and so shall the person in this Case if after his Minority he offer himself to be admitted But it cannot be denied 2 Cro. 226. but that the Lord may seize when the Heir is beyond Sea till he return and tender himself to be admitted and by the same reason he may also seize in this case during the Minority A Temporary Forfeiture is no new thing in the Law Cro. Car. 7. for if a Feme Covert be a Copyholder and marrieth and her Husband makes a Lease for years without License of the Lord 't is a Forfeiture and shall bind her during the Coverture So the Law is Cro. El. 351. that the Lord may seize the Land till a Fine is paid for 't is a reasonable Custom so to do It hath been a good Custom for the Lord to assign a person to take the Profits of a Copyhold Estate descended to the Infant during his Minority without rendring an Accompt when he came of Age. 1 Leon. 266. 2 Leon. 239. So that all taht is to be done in this Case is to enforce the Infant to be admitted that the Lord may be entituled to a Fine The Inheritance is not bound but the Land is only seized quousque E contra It was argued that here is a general Seizure E contra which cannot extend to an Infant for he is not bound in a Writ of Right much less in an inferior Court after three Proclamations but if this had been a Temporary Seisure the Iury ought to have found it so which is not done There are many Authorities in the Books which affirm that an Infant is not obliged to be admitted during his Non-age 1 Leon. 100. 3 Leon. 221. or to tender the Fine in order to an Admittance that the Law was settled in this Point and therefore without any further Argument he prayed Iudgment for the Defendant Afterwards in Hillary-Term 1 Willielmi Mariae this Case was argued seriatim at the Bench three Iudges being of a contrary Opinion to the Chief Iustice for the affirming of the Iudgment Iustice Eyre premised two things 1. That he could not intend but that this Verdict had found an absolute Forfeiture the Iury having no way qualified it as to a certain time and therefore he would give a Iudgment upon the whole Record 2. He agreed that a Feoffment of an Infant was no Forfeiture at the Common Law and that as a particular Custom may bind an Infant for a time so it may barr him for ever but whether this Custom as 't is found in general words shall bind an Infant after three Proclamations is now the Question he not coming then to be admitted And he held that it shall not and that for these reasons 1. The Right of Infants is much favoured in the Law and their Laches shall not be prejudicial to them as to Entry or Claim upon a Presumption that they understand not their Right 1 Inst 380. 2 Inst 401. and therefore in a Cessavit per biennium which is a remedy given by the Statute of W. 2. and which extends to Infants Westm 2. c. 31. who have not the Land by descent for if a Cesser be in that Case the Infant shall have his Age because the Law intends that he doth not know what Arrerages to tender 'T is admitted that if an Infant doth not present to a Church within six Months or doth not appear within a year that his Right is bound but this is because the Law is more tender of the Church and the life of a Man than of the Priviledges of Infancy So if an Office of Parkship be given or descends to an Infant if the Condition in Law annexed to such an Office which is skill be not observed the Office is forfeited But that a Proclamation in a base Court should bind an Infant when he is not within the reason of the Custom is not agreeable either to Law or Reason 2. Cro. Jac. 80. Cro. El. 879. Noy 42. 1 Rol. Abr. 568. All Customs are to be taken strictly when they go to the destruction of an Estate and therefore a Custom was that if a Copyholder in Fee surrender out of Court and the Surrendree doth not come in after three Proclamations the Lord shall seize it A Copyholder in Fee surrendred to another for Life the Remainder over in Fee if the Tenant for Life will not come in he in the Remainder shall not be barred for the Custom shall be intended to extend only to those in possession But the Infant in this Case is not within the Letter of the Custom for 't is found that the Surrender was made to one Freeman who died before the next Court-day and that John Freeman the Infant was his Son and Heir so they have found a Title in him for the word Heir is not here a word of Purchase but of Limitation 3. Jones 157. Noy 92. Infants are not bound by other Customs like this as a Custom that every Copyholder