Issue a Son which selleth this Remainder and afterwards I. S. dyed this Son being his Heir notwithstanding his Sale he shall have this Remainder not his Grantee because it was not in him at the time of his Grant but by a matter which cometh Ex post facto to wit the death of his Father and afterwards Iudgment was given in the first case that the Grantee shal have the term granted to him by the Husband and that the Wife shall not have the term during this Leese Hunt Versus Gateler Mich. 34. and 35 Eliz. in Commun Banco IN a Replevin between Hunt Plaintiff and Gateler Avowant in the Common Pleas which was adjorned for difficulty into the Exchequer Chamber the Case was thus Tenant in tail Remainder in Fee he in Remainder in Vide this case Cook lib. 1. 61. by the name of Capeâ—s case Fee grants a Rent-charge in Fee out of the same Land to begin after the Estate tail determined Tenant in Tail suffer a common Recovery with a Voucher over to the use of the sayd Hunt in Fee and dyed without Issue inheritable to the intail and whether Hunt shall now hold the Land charged with the Rent was the question and after that it had long depended and was many times argued in the Common Pleas and Exchequer Chamber at Hertford Term it was at last resolved by all the Iustices and Barons unanimously that the sayd Rent charge wss gone by the Recovery although the Estate tail was expired because that he which is in is in under this Intail And therefore Popham sayd suppose thâ—t the Tenant in tail himself before the Recovery had granted a Rent charge out of the same Land or had made a Lease for yeers or had acknowledged a Statute all those had been good and to be executed against him which cometh in under the Recovery notwithstanding that the Estate tayl had been determined for want of an heir inheritable to the intail for he which recovereth cannot lay that he against whom he recovered had but an Estate in tail and if his Lease remain yet good as all agreed it did how can the Lease a Rent granted by him in the Remainder be good also for the one and the other cannot stand together and therefore all the Leases Charges or Statutes acknowledged or made by him in the Remainder are gon and avoided by the Recovery had against Tenant in tail To which opinion all the other agreed and Popham sayd further That he in the Remainder upon an Estate tail cannot by any means plead to defend his Remainder unless the Tenant will as by vouching of him and therefore shall be bound by the Act of Tenant in Tail where the Estate it self is bound as here it is by the Voucher and then they which come in by him in the Remainder by way of Lease Charge or Statute which are not so much favoured in Law as Tenant in tail himself be in better condition then he in the Remainder himself is for he in the Remainder upon an Estate tail cannot put more into the Mouth of the Lessee or Grantee to defend their Estates then he himself could have to defend his Remainder and this is the reason that such a Termer or Grantee shall never falsifie the Recovery had against Tenant in tail as the Grantee or Termer shall do which cometh in under Tenant in tail against whom the Recovery was had for there as the Tenant in tail may plead to defend his Possession and Estate so may his Termer or Grantee of a Rentcharge do for by the Demise or Grant made the Tenant in tail hath put all the Pleas into their mouthes for their Interests which he himself had to defend his Right and Possession which they may plead for the time to defend their Possessions and Rights as well as the Tenant in tail himself may do and this is the reason that such may falsifie Recoveries against their Lessors or Grantors if they be not had upon the meer right Paramount which he that cometh in by such a Remainder as before cannot do for such a one in Remainder cannot be received to defend his Right but his mouth is meerly foreclosed to do it and by the same reason are all those which come in by such men foreclosed to defend their Interests or Estates and upon this Audgement was given in the same Tearm in the common Pleas. Gibbons versus Maltyard and Martin IN an Ejectione firmae brought in the Kings Bench by John Gibbons Vide this case in Cook lib. 8. 130 Thetford Scholies case Plaintiff upon a Demise made by Edward Peacock the Son of Lands in Croxton in the County of Norfolk against Thomas Maltyard and John Martin upon a speciall verdict the case appeared to be thus to wit that Sir Richard Fulmerston Knight was seised of the sayd Lands amongst others holden in soccage in his Demesne as of Fee and being so seised by his last Will in Writing made 9 Eliz. Ordained that a Devise shall be made by his Executors that a Preacher shall be found for ever to preach the Word of God in the Church of Saint Maries in Thetford four times in the year and to have for his Labour ten shillings for every Sermon And further he devised to his Executors and their heirs certaine Lands and Tenements in Thetford aforesaid to this intent and upon this condition that they or the Survivor of them within seven years after his decease should procure of the Queens Highness to erect a free Grammar School in Thetford for ever to be had and kept in a house by them to be erected upon part of the sayd Land that they shal assure three of the said ienements for the house and Chamber of the Schoolmaster and Vsher and their Successors for ever and for the other tonement that they shall make an assurance of it for the Habitation of font poor people two men and two women for ever And for the better maintenance of the sayd Preacher Schoolmaster Vsher and Poore people he devised amongst others his sayd tenements in Croxton to his Executors for ten years for the performance of his Will and after this he devised them to Sir Edward Cleer and Frances his Wife the Daughter and Heir of the sayd Sir Richard and to the Heirs of the sayd Sir Edward upon Condition that if the sayd Sir Edward his Heires or Assignes before the end of the sayd ten years shall assure Lands or Tenements in possession to the value of five and thirty pounds a year to the sayd Executors or the Survivor of them their Heirs and Assignes or to such persons their heirs or Successors as his sayd Executors or the Survivor of them shall name or assigne for and towards the maintenance of the sayd Preacher Schoolmaster and Vsher in the sayd School house c. and for the releif of the sayd poor people in the one of the sayd houses according to the Ordinance as he
as a memorandum and afterwards there is an order that the Iudgement shall not be filed if the Iudgement upon this shall be stayd and speaks to it and by him the Case of 15. E. 4. 7. is nothing to this purpose for Iustices in Eyre were Iustices by commission and they had not the custody of their Records and so it differs from this case And Jones Justice which was not denyed if a Iudgement be pronounced here and be not entered the Iudges may alter it the next Term. It was said by Noy in this case that all Franchises in England are against common Right and execution of Iustice and for the present purpose he cited one Sir John Wells Case where in a Quo Warranto the Defendant had day to plead or otherwise that judgement should be entered to seise and he failed to plead at the day and the Iudgement was not filed and yet he could not be relieved But it was sayd by some of the Iustices that this was a case of great extremity But by Hendon it was affirmed in the Exchequer in one Sandersons Case and in the principall case the matter was adjourned for a fortnight and ordered that the plea should be accorded Mich. Term 2. Car. in the Kings Bench. Sharp versus Rust IN an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit between Sharp Plaintiff and Walter Rust Defendant upon non-Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and it was moved in arrest of judgement upon these words in the Declaration the Defendant being Father to the Plaintiffs Wife for whom the Apparrel was bought said to the Plaintiff deliver the Apparrel to my Daughter and I will pay for them and saith not to whom the payment shall be made And it was argued by Woobrich of Grayes-Inne that this is no sufficient cause to stay the Iudgement for by necessary implication and reference of the words precedent the certainty of the pers on appeareth to whom the payment ought to be made And he observed that in our Law the time the estate the thing and the person not being sufficiently expressed Where a thing incertain may be made certain both in time estate and person yet by necessary coherence and relation to matter precedent they are sometimes made certain enough 1. For the time Perkins P. 496. puts the Rule if a condition hath relation to an act precedent and no time is limited when it shall be done yet if ought to be done when the act precedent is done and therefore if I. S. be bound to me in 20 l. upon condition that if I enfeoff him of black acre that then he wil pay me 10 l. c. in this case presently when I have enfeoffed the obligor of black acre he ought to pay the 10 l. notwithstanding there be no time limited when it should be payd 2. For the thing being put incertainly yet the communication precedent makes this certain 30. H. 8. Dyer 42. in the Case of the Executors of Greenliffe where it is agreed that albeit it is not shown what thing is granted yet it shall be the Land of which the communication was 3. For the Estate although it be incertain yet sometimes it is made certain by the matter precedent as in the Case Co. lib. 8. A Stewardship was granted for life and afterwards an Annuity was granted for the exercise of that Office without declaring what Estate he should have in that Annuity and resolved that he should have the Annuity for life because he had the Office for life 4. For the person the consideration sometimes ascertains the person and therefore if land he given to one by Deed habendum sibi una cum filia donatoris in frankmariage this shall enure to both because the Feme is Causa donationis and by intendment of law the Land and the feme shal be given together to the man for the advancement of the Feme as it is Mich. 2. 3. Ph. Mary Dyer 126. a 4. E. 3. 4. Plow Com. 158. enfeoff him another and bind him and his heirs to warrant doth not say to whom he shall warrant yet the Feoffee and his heirs shall have advantage of this warranty for it cannot have any other intendment 6. E. 2. Voucher 258. 22. E. 4. 16. Kelleway 108. Co. lib. 8. Whitlocks Case In a Lease for years reserving rent it is the surest way to make the reservation to no person in certain but to leave it to the general intendment of the Law 15. H. 7. A man deviseth that his Land shall be sold for the payment of his debts and doth not say by whom they shall be sold by his Executors because they are lyable for the payment of his debts but if one devise that his land shall be sold saith not for the payment of his debts the devise is void because the Law doth not intend in this case to make the sale 40 E. 3. 5. 4. E. 3. Fitzherbert Obligation 16. Nota if a man be bound in debt or Covenant by writing and puts such a clause in the writing Et ad majorem hujus rei securitatem invenit fidei jussores quorum unusquisque in tot in solido se obligavit that although none speak there but the principall in the writing if the others put to their seals they accept that which the principal spake so become principal 2. E 4. 20. and here in our Case it appeareth that the Deed was so therefore it is reason that the Declaration should be so for there cannot be a material difference between the Declaration the deed especially being upon an agreement which is to be ruled according to the intention of the parties as it is in Plow Com. 140. a. In our Law if any parties be agreed upon a thing and words are expressed or written to make the agreement although they be not apt words yet if they have substance in them tending to the effect intended the Law shall take Intention of parties to be observed them of the same substance as words usuall for the Law regards the intention of the parties and here the intent appeareth that the assumption shall be mâ—de to the Plaintiff although there want expresse words and therefore he prayed Iudgement for the Plaintiff And afterwards the same Term Iudgement was given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Beven versus Cowling IN an Action upon the Case Littleton mooved in arrest of Iudgment for the Defendant wherein the Case was this the Defendant assumed that if the Defendant would defer the payment of a bond in which one A. was bound to him and would not implead him upon it then he promised to pay it and he doth not say that he deferred the payment untill such a day and therefore this is no valuable consideration so that the action doth not lye for notwithstanding Action upon the Case upon a â—romise that if â—e would not sue such a
guided according to that which may be collected to be the purpose and intent of the parties And therefore if a man make an Estate of his Land without limitation of any Vse or confidence the Law shall say that it is to his own use but if it be upon confidence then it shall be to the Vse of the party to whom it is made or according to the confidence which shâ—ll be absolute or according to that which is limitted which may alter that which otherwise shall be taken upon the generall confidence as 30 H. 6. Fitz. Devise If a man devise Lands to another in Fee he hath the use and Title of it but if it be limitted to his use for his life only the use of the Fee shall be to the Heir of the Devisor for by the limitation his intent shall be taken to be otherwise then it should be taken if this limitation had not been and in as much as in this case the Earl reserves to himself but the use for years it is evident that his intent never was to have the Fee to surrender this Term which perhaps he intended to be for the benefit of his will which shall be defeated contrary to his purpose if the Fee shall be also in him by the death of the sayd Iohn without Issue Male and therefore the sayd Daughters ought to have the Land And on the other part it was argued by Glanvil Serjeant and Egerton the Attorney Generall that this limitation made to the right Heirs is void in the same manner as if a man give Lands to another for life the Remainder to the right Heirs of the Feoffor in this case the Heir shall take by descent as a Reversion remaining to the Feoffor and not as a Remainder devested out of him for the ancient right priviledge the Estate which he may take and therfore he shall take it by descent and not by purchase for the name of right Heir is not a name of purchase betwixt the Ancestor and his heir because that doth instance that he happeneth to be heir he takes it by descent and then it comes too late to take by purchase And another reason that the Daughters shall not have it is because that when Sir Iohn Russell dies without Issue Male which Estate might have preserved the Remainder if it shall be a Remainder there was not any right heir of the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford to take this Remainder because that the sayd Earl survived him And therefore it is to bee resembled to this Case Land is given in Tail the Remainder to the right Heirs of I. G. the Donee dyes without Issue in the life of I. G. in this case albeit I. G. dyes afterwards having an heir yet this heir shall never have the Loud because he was not heir in Esse to take it when the Remainder fell and for the mean Estate for years this cannot preserve a Remainder no more then when Land is given for years the Remainder to the right heirs of I. G. this Remainder can never be good if I. G. be then living because such a Remainder cannot depend but upon a Free-hold precedent at least and therefore the Inheritance here shall go to the now Earl of Bedford by the second assurance And upon consideration of the Case and severall Confirmes had upon this amongst the Iudges and Barens it was at last resolved by all but Baron Clarke that the Daughters shall not have the Mannors in the County of Doâ—set but the now Earl of Bedford and principally upon this reason because there was nor right Heir to take as Purchasor where the mean Estate Taile was determined which was by the Lord Iohn without Issue Male for they agreed that the Remainder to the right Heirs if it be a Remainder cannot be preserved by the mean Estate for years for it ought to be a Free-hold at least which ought to preserve such a Remainder untill there be one to take it by name of Purchasor as right Heir And at this day they did not think there was any diversity between the Case of a Remainder in Possession limitted to the right heir of one and of a Remainder in use so limited over to another Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz In the Kings Bench. 3. IN Ejectione firmae upon speciall verdict the case was thus A man possessed of a Term of years in right of his wife made a Lease for years of the same Land to begin after his death which was the Lessor and afterwards he dyed and his wife survived him and the question was whether the wife shall have the Land after the death of the husband or the Lessee for if the husband had devised the same Land to an estranger yet the Wife shall have it and not the Devisee as it happened in the Case of Matthew Smith who made first such a Devise of a Term of his Wife and yet the Wife had it because that by the death of the husband before which the Devise did not take effect the wife had it in her first Right not altered in the life of her Husband but it was agreed in this case by all the Court that the Lessee shall have it during his Term for as the husband during his life might contract for the Land for the whole term which the wife had in it so might he do for any part of the term at his pleasure for if he may devise the Land for one and twenty years to begin presently he also may make it to begin at any time to come after his Death if the term of the Wife be not expired but for the Remainder of the term of the husband made no disposition during his life the Wife shall have it which by Popham this Case happened upon a specialll Verdict in the County of Somerset about 20 Eli. Where he and Sergeant Baber were Practisers in the Circuit there to wit the Lands were demised to husband and wife for their lives the Remainder to the Survivor of them for years the Husband granted over this term of years and dyed and the question was whether the Wife shall have the term of years or the Grantee and adjudged that the Wife shall have it and it was upon this reason because there was nothing in the one or the other to grant over untill there was a Survivor And the same Law had been if the Wife bad dyed after the Grant and the Husband had survived yet he shall have the term against his own Grant as if a Lease were made for Life the Remainder for years to him which first cometh to Pauls if A. grant this Term for years to another and afterwards A. is the first which commeth to Pauls yet the Grantee shall not have this Term because it was not in A. by any means neither in Interest nor otherwise untill he came to Pauls As if a man make a Lease for life the Remainder to the Right heirs of J. S. J. S. hath
himself in the sayd Will had declared or otherwise as by his Executors or the Survivor of them shall be prescribed And if the sayd Sir Edward and his Heirs shall make default in the assurance of the sayd Land by him to be assured as aforesayd then hee will that immediatly upon such default his Estate and the Estate of the sayd Frances shall cease in the sayd Lands in Croxton c. and then he devise the same Lands to his Executors and their Heirs for ever to the use of them and their heirs upon trust and confidence that they or the Survivor of them and their Heirs shall assure the same or otherwise yearly dispose the profits of them in finding the sayd Preacher and other charitable works as aforesayd and made Edward Peacock Father to the Lessor whose Heir the Lessor is and others his Executors and dyed 9. of the Queen after whose Death all the Executors refuse to be Executors The seven years passe without the establishing of the School and other things according to the Will for the first part of it whereby the Land in Thetford was forfeited to the heir for the Condition broken and within the ten years Sir Edward Cleer made a Feoffment of Land to the value of 35. l. a year to the surviving Executor for the use of the School but with acondition contrary to the Will and no Livery waâ— made upon the sayd Feoffment but it was inrolled of Record in the Chancery whereby the sayd Sir Edward had broken the Condition annexed to his Estate and also during all this time neither the Executors nor their Heirs had done any thing in finding the Preacher or the other works of charity with the profits of the sayd Lands in Croxton or in assuring of it according to the Will and yet the sayd Edward Peacock the Son in September 32. Eliz. being Heir to the surviving Executor entred into the Land in Croxton and demised it to the Plaintiff for seven years upon which the Defendant as Servant and by the commandement of Sir Edward Cleer and of Edmund the Son and Heir of the sayd Frances who was then dead entred upon which entry and Efectment the Action was brought and it was mooved by Godfrey and others that the entry of the Defendants was lawfull first in the right of the sayd Sir Edward because that his Estate by the Statute of 23. H. 8. cap. was without condition or determined because that by this Statute all the uses limited in such a manner are made void because they are in the nature of a Mortmain as may appear by a Proviso at the end of the same Statute for a certain person of Norwich who had Devised Lands for the case of the poor Inhabitants of the same Citty in Taxes and Tallages and for cleansing of streets there and for discharge of toll and Custome within the City all which were good uses and not tending to Superstition and yet if it had not been for the Proviso they had been gon by the body of the Statute And the Statute ordained also that every penalty and thing which shall be devised to defraud this Statute shall be void and if this do not help them yet the Entry made in the right of the sayd Heir of Sir Richard Fulmerston is good for the estates of the sayd Executors are also bound as with a tacite condition that these things shall be performed which are not done and therefore the entry in right of the heir is lawfull for the words Ad propositum ea intentione and the like in a Will are good Conditions which Gaudey agreed vouched the case 28. Sess Pl. but it was after often argument agreed by all the Court that the first exception was to no purpose for they conceived that this Statute was to be taken to extend only to the uses which tend to Superstition as might be collected as well by the words of it in the very body of the Act at the beginning as by the time in which it was made for at this time they began to have respect to the ruine of the authority of the Pope and to the dissolution of the Abbies Chantries and the like And by Popham the Proviso was put in the Statute but for satisfaction of the Burgesses of the same City at this time and not for any necessity as oftentimes it happens And for the other point he sayd that it appeareth fully by the Will that it was not the intent of the sayd Sir Richard to have the Land in Croxton bound with any condition in the possession of his Executors or with any other matter which determine their Estate for the Words that they shall have it upon trust and confidence exclude all constraint which is in every condition and the Will is that they shall have it to the use of themselves and their Heirs for ever which câ—nnot be if it shall be abridged by any Limitation or Determination And he sayd that the Lord Anderson demanded of him a Case which was adiudged in the Common Pleas 29. Eliz. Rot. 639. which was thus One Michel made a Lease for years rendring Rent and for default of payment a re-entry with Covenants on the part of the Lessee to repair the Messuages c. and the term continuing the sayd Michel by his Will in Writing devised the same Land to the sayd Lessee for more years then hee had to come in it rendring yearly the like Rent and under the same Covenants which he now holds it and dyed and afterwards the first term expired the Lessee does not repaire the Houses and the question was whether by this he hath forfeited his term and adjudged that as to this it was not any condition and a Covenant it could not be for a Covenant ought alwaies to come on the part of the Lessee himself which cannot be this case for he doth not speak any thing in the Will to bind him but they are all the words of the Devisor himself which comprised in a Will and it never was his intent to have it to be a condition and therefore void as to the Lessee to bind him either by way of Covenant or Condition so here c. And for the sayd Feoffment enrolled without Livery it was agreed by all that it was not of any force to make the Land to passe to the Executors but the enrolment conclude him to say not his Deed And also that the Executors refuse to be Executors this shall not hinder them to take by Devise as to the Inheritance whereupon it was adjudged that the Plaintiff shall recover as appears Thomson Versus Trafford Hillary Term 35 of Queen Eâ—izabeth IN an Ejectione firmae between John Thomson Plaintiff and Thomaâ— Trafford Defendant the case was thus The President and Schollers of Magdelen Colledge in Oxford 20 Decemb. 8. Eliz Did let a Messuage uâ— the Burrough of Southwark to which no Land appertained to William Staâ—dish for twenty years from the Feast of
Saint Michael next ensuing rendring the ancient Rent and 25. Octob. 21. Eliz they did let the same Messuage to the same Standish for twenty years from the Feast of Saint Michaeâ— then next ensuing rendring also the ancient Rent and 31 August 30. Eliz. The President and Schollers made a new Lease of the same Messuage to Sir George Carew Knight for twenty years from making of the Lease rendring the ancient Rent which Lease was conveyed by mean Assignments to the Plaintiff upon which the Action was brought against the sayd Trafford which had the Interest of the sayd Standish by mean Assignments Popham said that Ipso facto upon the last Lease made and annexed by Standish the first Leass was determined and gone for this last contract dissolves the first when the one and the other cannot stand together as they cannot here because the one intermix with the other and so was the opinion in the Common Bench about 1 Eliz. in the case of the Abby of Barking of which I have seen a Report And here Standish before Michaelmas next after the second Lease made to him could not grant over his first term to be good to the Grantee for if this should be the second term shall not be good to Standish but for the remnant of the years after the first term finished which cannot be because it standeth in the power of the Grantor with the assent and acceptance of the Grantee to make the second Grant good for the whole term to wit from Michaelmas and this cannot be but by a determination in Law of the first term immediatly which is made by his own acceptance and therefore a prejudice to none but himself and Volenti non fit injuria and the first Term cannot have his continuance untill Mich. but is gone presently by the acceptance of the second Lease in the whole for the first contract which was entyre cannot be so dissolved in part but in the whole as to that which the party hath and therefore the first Term as the case is here is gone in the whole to which Clench and Gaudy agreed And if so then this last Lease to Standish was but as a Lease made to begin at a time to come which is made good by the Stat. of 14 Eliz. if it do not exceed the time of 40 years from the making of the Lease for the purpose of this Act was that Colledges and the like shall not make Grants in Reversion albeit it be for a year and the reason was because that by such Grants in Reversion they shall be excluded to have their Rent of the particular Tenants for the time And therfore in the case of the Countesse of Sussex who had a Ioynture assured to her for her life by Act of Parliament with a Provise that the Earle her Husband might demise it for one and twenty yeares rendring the usuall Rent where the sayd Earle had made a Lease for one and twentie yeares according to the Statute within a yeare before the end of the same Lease the said Earle made a new Lease of the same Land to Wroth his Servant for one and twentie yeares to begin after the end of the former Lease rendring the usuall Rent and died the said Countesse avoided this last Lease by Iudgement given in this Court because it shall be intended to be a Lease in Possession which he ought to make by the Proviso from the time of the making of it otherwise by such perverse construction the true intent of the Statute shall be utterly defrauded But here to make a Lease for twentie yeares to one in Possession and to make another Lease to another for twentie yeares to begin after the end of the former Lease is good because that the one and the other do not exceed the fortie yeares comprised in the Statute And the Iustices of the Common Bench the same day at Sergeants Inn agreed to the opinion of Popham for the determination of the whole first Term by the taking of the second Term by Standish Ward versus Downing 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Miles Word against Robert Downing the case was thus Oâ—e Robert Brown was seised of certain Lands in in the County of Norfolk in his Demesne as of Fee which were of the nature of Gavelkinâ— and had Issue George his eldest Son William his middlemost Son and Thomas his youngest Son and being so seised 6 Decem. 1559. made his Testament in writing by which he devised the sayd Tenements in these words Item I give unto Alice my wife the use and occupation of all my Houses and Lands as well free as copy-hold during her naturall life Item I will that George my Son shall have after the decease of his Mother all those my Houses and Lands wherof the use was given to his sayd Mother for the term of her life To have and to hold to him and his Heirs for ever and if the sayd George dye without Issue of his body lawfully begotten then I will my sayd Lands shall in like manner remain unto William my Son and his Heirs for ever And I will that all such money as shall be payd of any Legacy by the sayd George shall be allowed by the sayd William to whom the sayd George shall appoint Item I will that if the sayd George and William depart the world before they have Issue of their bodies lawfully Then I will that all my sayd Houses and Lands shall remain unto Thomas my Son and to his Heirs for ever Item That if the sayd George shall enjoy my sayd Houses and Lands then I will the sayd George shall pay out of the sayd Lands to William and Thomas his Brother 26 l. 13 s. 4 d. that is to say at his first entry into the sayd Lands to pay unto the sayd William his Brother 40 s. and so to pay yearly untill the summ of 13 l 6 s. 8 d. be fully answered and payd and then immediatly to pay unto Thomas his Brother 13 l 6 s. 8 d. to be payd unto the sayd Thomas when the sayd William shall be fully answered by 40 s. a year in like proportion as is aforesayd And if my sayd Son George shâ—ll refuse to pay unto William and Thomas his Brother the summs of 26 l 13 s. 4 d in manner and form as is before limitted Then I will that all my Houses Lands and Tenements with the Appurtenances remain to Willâ—am my Son and his Heirs for ever paying therfore 26 l. 13 s. 4 d. viz. 13 l. 6 s. 8 d. to George my Son and 13 l. 6 s. 8 d. to Thomas my Son in such manner and sort as the sayd George shall pay if he should enjoy the sayd Lands And if it fortune the sayd William to enjoy the sayd Lands then the sayd William shâ—ll pay unto Thomas his Brother the whole summ of 26 l. 13 s. 4 d. as is â—foresayd After which the sayd Robert dyed seised of the sâ—yd Tenements in
Law or meerly of another nature then the Rent it self with which it is conjoyned by the word or then it is erroneous for albeit a common Recovery be now a common assurance of Land past by the assent of parties and therfore hath another conservation then that which passeth by pretence of Title yet we are not to omit grosse absurdities in such common Recoveries as to demand an acre of Land or Wood in the Mannor of Sale or Dale or black acre or white acre these are not good in common Recoveries because there is no certainty in the demand which of them the party is to recover which kind of absurdity is not to be admitted in these Recoveries for this is but a meer ignorance in the Law and the Ministers of it And to this Gawdy and the other Justices agreed but they sayd that a Pension issuing and a Rent shall be taken for all one for if a man grant a Pension of 20 s. a year issuing out of the Mannor of D. or of the Rectory of S these are Rents issuing out of them and if the demand had been of an annuall Rent or Annuity of 20 s. a year issuing out of the Rectory this had been good To which Popham agreed and yet sayd if it had been an annuall Rent of 20 s. c. or of an Annuity of 20 s. it had nof been good because that the word issuing is not referred to the Annuity but to the Rent only and therfore are meerly generall and not as the same but if the demand were of an annuity rent or payment of 20 s. issuing out of a Rectory it is good for this is but one and the same Then it was alledged that notwithstanding that which appears to the Court it cannot be taken that this was a common Recovery for upon the assignment of the Error it is not averred that it was a common Recovery to which Popham said that common Recoveries are such common Assurances to all persons that are well known to all and especially to us that they need not be averred for they are known by certain Marks to wit by the voluntary entry into the Warranty the common Voucher and the like And at last they all agreed that the Iudgment shall be affirmed 2. In Wast by Thomas Haydock against Richard Warnford the case was this One Michael Dennis was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of the third part of a Messuage and of certain Lands in Bury Blunsden in the County of Wilts and being so seised the last of April 9 â—liz demised them to Susan Warnford for 41. years from the Feast of S. Michael the Arch-angel then next ensuing who assigned this over to Richard Warnford after which the said Michael Dennis by bargain and sale enrolled according to the Statute conveyed the Reversion to John Simborn Esquire and his Heirs the said Iohn being then seised of another third part therof in his Demesne as of Fee after which to wit the first day of Iune 17 Eliz. the said Iohn Simborn demised the said third part which was his before his said purchase to the said Richard Warnford for 21 years then next ensuing and afterwards the said Iohn Simborn died seised of the Reversion of the said two parts and this descended to Barnaby Simborn his Son and next Heir who the 20 of Iune 28 Eliz. by bargain and sale enrolled according to the Statute conveyed be Reversion of the said two parts to the said Thomas Haydock and his Heirs after which the said Richard Warnford committed Wast in the said house wherupon the said Thomas Haydock brought an action of Wast against him according to the said two severall Leases and assigned the Wast in suffering the Hall of the price of 20 l. a Kitchin of the price of 20 l. and so of other things to be uncovered wherby the great Timber of them became rotten and so became ruinous to the disinherison of the Plaintiff and upon a Nihil dicit a Writ was awarded to enquire of Damages in which it was comprised that the Sheriff shall go to the place wasted and there enquire of the said Damages who returned an inquisition taken therof at Bury Blunsden without making mention that he went to the place wasted and that it was taken there wherupon Iudgment was given in the common Bench that the said Plaintiff shall recover his Seisin against the Defendant of the said places wasted with their Appurtenances Per visum Iurator Inquisitionis predict damna sua occasione vastâ— in eisdem locis in triplo secunâ—uÌ„ formam statuti c. And upon this a Writ of Error was brought in the Kings Bench and there by all the Iustices it was agreed that it was but Surplusage to comprehend in the Writ of enquiry of Damages that the Sheriff shall go to the place wasted and there enquire of the Damages in as much as by the not denying therof the Wast is acknowledged and therfore he need not go to the place wasted But where a Writ is awarded to enquire of the Wast upon default made at the grand Distresse there by the Statute of West 2. cap. 24. the Sheriff ought to go in person to the place Wasted and enquire of the Wast done and therfore in that case it is needfull to have the clause in it that the Sheriff shall go to the place wasted and there enquire of it for by the view the Wast may be the better known to them but where the Wast is acknowledged as here that clause need not and albeit it be comprehended in the Writ yet the Sheriff is not therby bound to go to the place wasted and to enquire there but he may do it at any place within his Bayliwick where he will and therfore it is no error in this point And they agreed also that the Wast is well assigned in the entire Hall c. although the Action were brought but upon the Demises of two third parts of it and it cannot be done in these parts but that it is done in the whole and also it cannot be done in the whole but that it is also done in the three parts but yet the doing therof is not to the disinheritance of the Plaintiff but in these two third parts and therfore no error in this manner of assigning of the Wast And they also agreed that the Action is well brought upon these severall Demises because neither the interest of the Term nor of the Inheritance was severed nor divided to severall persons at the time of the doing of the Wast but the two Terms in the one to wit in Warnford and the Inheritance of these immediatly in the other to wit in Haydock And by Popham also the thing in which the Wast is assigned is one and the same thing and not diverse to wit a Messuage and therfore by Brudnell and Pollard 14 H. 8. 10. if severall Demises are made of one and the same Messuage by one and the same person as
Tales might be of the other County only Davies versus Gardiner 3. AN Action upon the case for a Slander was brought by Anne Davies against Iohn Gardiner That wheras there was a Communication of a Marriage to be had between the Plaintiff and one Anthony Elcock the Defendant to the intent to hinder the said Marriage said and published that there was a Grocer in London that did get her with Child and that she had Vide this case reported Cook lib. 4. 16. b the Child by the said Grocer wherby she lost her Marriage To which the Defendant pleaded not guilty and was found guilty at the Assises at Aylesbury to the Damages of 200. marks And now it was alledged in Arrest of Iudgment that this matter appeareth to be meerly spirituall and therfore not determinable at common Law but to be prosecuted in the spirituall Court. But per Curiam the Action lies here for a woman not maried candot by intendment have so great advancement as by her Marriage wherby she is sure of maintenance for her life or during her Marriage and Dower and other benefits which the temporall Laws gives by reason of her Marriage and therfore by this slander she is greatly prejudiced in that which is to be her temporall advancement for which it is reason to give her remedy by way of Action at common Law As if a woman keep a Victualling house to which divers of great credit repair wherby she hath her livelyhood and one will say to her Guests that as they respect their credits they take care how they they use such a house for there the woman is known to be a Bawd wherby the Guests avoid her house to the losse of her husband shall not she in this case have an Action at common Law for such a slander It is cleer that shee will So if one saith that a woman is a common Strumpet and that it is a slander to them to come to her house wherby she looseth the adâ—antage which she was wont to have by her Guests she shall have her Action â—or this at common Law So here upon these collaterall circumstances wherby it may appear that she hath more prejudice then can be by calling of one Harlot and the like And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Hillary Term 36 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. IN Michaelmas Term 33 34 Eliz. Rot. 181. William and Joane his wife Administratrir of Andrew Stock brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit made to the Intestate for the payment of 5 l. to William Stock who imparled untill Tuesday next after Octa. Hillary next which was the 24th day of January and then the Defendâ—nt demanded Oyer of the Letters of Administration which were entred in haec verba Wherby it appeareth that the Letters of Administration were committed to the said Joane by Thomas Taylor Batchelor of Law Commissary to the Bishop of London c. wherby the Defendant pleaded that after the last continuance â—he said Letters Patents of Administâ—ation sealed with the Seal of the Vicar Generall of the said Bishop which he useth in this behalf and brought here into Court bearing date the 27th day of January 1591. which was three daies after the continuance committed the Administration to the said Defendant And pleaded further the Act of 37 H. 8. which sayes that it shall be lawfull hereafter for any person being a Doctor of the Law to be Chancellor Commissary or to exercise Ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction albeit he were a meer Lay person so that such a person be a Doctor as aforesaid and avers that at the time of the committing of the Administration to the said Joane the said Thomas Taylor was a meer Lay person and not Doctor Legis civilis nec minister allocatus according to the Laws of the Church of England wherby he had no lawfull power to commit the Administration Vpon which it was demurred generally and by all the Court the Plaintiff had Iudgment to recover for we are to consider what our Law was in this case before this Statute of 37 H. 8. And albeit a Doctor then affirmed that the Canon Law was that there was a meer nullity in such Administration so although the party that did it not being a Clark nor Doctor according to the Stat. of 37 H. 8. yet all the Iustices agreed that the Administration so committed will be adjudged in our Law to be of force and effect being shewn under the Seal of the Officer and committed by him who is reputed the Officer who ought to do it and is invested in the Office untill it be avoided by sentence and yet such an avoidance shall not make a mans act to be made void no more then if a meer Lay-man be presented to a benefice albeit this be a meer nullity in our Law and void yet we adjudge the Church full according to the publike admission constitution and induction and not according to the capacity of the person which is a thing secret untill such a one be deprived for it by sentence in the spirituall Court and yet the Church shall be in our Law void but from the time of deprivation of which notice ought to be given to the Patron So here he remains as to our Law an Officer untill his authority be defeated by sentence of the spirituall Court otherwise great mischief will happen for an infinite number of Administrations may be drawn in question by Averment that he who granted them was a meer lay person and so make such Garboils in the Common-wealth which is not to be suffered for the inconveniency which will happen by it and therfore our Law which is founded upon reason shall judge of it according to the open appearance of the Officer to wit that he hath a grant made to him and not according to the private capacity of the person and this is not altered by the said Statuts which is made in affirmation of it and makes the authority of a Doctor of Law absolute not to be defeated by the Civill or Canon Law which is not in the other case But yet it doth not make this case of worse condition then it was at Common Law And by all the pleading of the Administration committed to the Defendant is not good because it appeareth by the date of it that it was made after the day of the last continuance and therfore could not have been pleaded untill a new continuance after And by the Doctor the last Administration does not avoid the first but in case where there is an especial revecation of the first But they did not speak of the doublenesse because the Demurrer was generall and not speciall and also because the other matters were so cleer 2. IN Trespasse for carrying away certain Loads of Hay the case hapned to be this The Plaintiff pretending Title to certain Hay which the defend had standing in certain Land to be more sure to have the Action passe for Property him
to the use of Dennis May his Son and Heir apparant and his Heirs upon condition that the said Dennis and his Heirs should pay to one Petronell Martin for his life an annuall Rent of 10 l. which the said Thomas had before granted to the said Petronell to begin upon the death of the said Thomas And upon condition also that the said Thomas upon the payment of 10 s. by him to the said Feoffees or any of them c. might re-enter After which the said Thomas May and Dennis by their Deed dated 30. May 19 Eliz. granted a Rent-charge out of the said Mannor of 20 l. a year to one Anne May for her life after which the said Thomas May paid the said 10 s. to the said Feoffees in performance of the Condition aforesaid and therupon re-entred into the Land and enfeoffed a stranger And whether by this the Rent were defeated was the question And it was mooved by Coke Attorney-generall that it was not but that in respect that he joyned in the part it shall enure against the said Thomas by way of confirmation which shall bind him as well against this matter of Condition as it shall do against any Right which the said Thomas otherwise had And therfoâ—e by Littleton If a Disseisor make a Lease for years or grant a Rent-charge and the Disseisor confirm them and afterwards re-enters albeit Lit. there makes a Quaere of it yet Cook said That the Disseisor should not avoid the Charge or Lease which was granted by the whole Court And by him the opinion is in P. 11. H. 7. 21. If Tenant in Tail makes a Feoffment to his own use upon Condition and afterwards is bound in a Statute upon which Execution is sued and afterwards he re-enter for the Condition broken he shall not avoid the Execution no more the Rent here Fennor agreed with Cook and said further That in as much as every one who hath Title and Interest have joyned in the Grant it remains perpetually good And therfore if a Parson at Common Law had granted a Rent-charge out of his Rectory being confirmed by the Patron and Ordinary it shall be good in perpetuity and yet the Parson alone could not have charged it and the Patron and Ordinary have no Interest to charge it but in as much as all who have to intermeddle therin are parties to it or have given their assent to it it sufficeth Gawdy was of the same opinion and said That there is no Land but by some means or other it might be charged and therfore if Tenant for life grant a Rent-charge in Fee and he in the Reversion confirm the Grant per Littleton the Grant is good in property so here To which Clench also assented but Popham said That by the entry for the Condition the Charge is defeated And therfore we are to consider upon the ground of Littleton in his Chapter of Confirmation to what effect a Confirmation shall enure and this is to bind the right of him who makes the Confirmation but not to alter the nature of the Estate of him to whom the Confirmation is made And therfore in the case of a grant of a Rent-charge by the Disseisor which is confirmed by the Demisee the reason why the Confirmation shall make this good is because that as the Disseisee hath right to defeat the right and the Estate of the Disseisor by his Regresse in the same manner hath he right therby to avoid a Charge or a Lease granted by the Disseisor which Right for the time may be bound by his confirmation But when a man hath an Estate upon condition although the Feoffor or his Heirs confirm this Estate yet by this the Estate is not altered as to the Condition but it alwaies remaineth and therfore Nihil operatur by such a confirmation to prejudice the Condition And so there is a great diversity when hewho confirmeth hath right to the Land and where but a Condition in the Land And by him if a Feoffee upon condition make a Feoffment over or a Lease for life or years every one of these have their Estates subject to the Condition and therfore by a Confirmation made to them none can be excluded from the Condition And the same reason is in case of a Rent granted by a Feoffor upon Condition it is also subject to the Condition and therfore not excluded from it by the Confirmation as it shall be in case of a Right And to prove this diversity suppose there be Grand-father Father and Son the Father disseise the Grand-father and makes a Feoffment upon Condition and dies after which the Grand-father dies now the Son confirms the Estate of the Feoffee by this he hath excluded himself from the Right which descended to him by his Grand-father but not to the Condition which descended to him from his Father And of this opinion were Anderson and other Iustices at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet for the principall Case upon the Case moved there by Popham this Term And as the case is it would have made a good question upon the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances if the Avowry had been made as by the grant of Thomas May in as much as the Estate made to the use of Dennis was defeasable at the pleasure of the said Thomas in as much as it was made by the Tenant of the Land as well as by him who made the Conveyance which is to be judged fraudulent upon the Statute But this as the pleading was cannot come in question in this case And afterwards by the opinion of other three Iudges Iudgment was given that the Grant should bind the said Thomas May and his Feoffees after him notwithstanding his regresse made by the Condition in as much as the Grant of the said Thomas shall enure to the Grantee by way of confirmation And by Gawdy If a Feoffee upon Condition make a Feoffment over and the first Feoffor confirm the Estate of the last Feoffee he shall hold the Land discharged of the Condition because his Feoffment was made absolutely without any Condition expressed in his Feoffment But Popham denied this as it appeareth by Littleton Tit. Descents because he hath his Estate subject to the same Condition and in the same manner as his Feoffor hath it into whomsoever hands it hapneth to come and therfore the Confirmation shall not discharge the Condition but is only to bind the right of him who made it in the possession of him to whom it is made but not upon Condition Morgans Case 7. RObert Morgan Esquire being seised in his Demesne as of Fee of certain Lands called Wanster Tenements in Socage having Issue John his eldest Son Christopher his second Son and William his youngest Son by his last Will in writing demised to the said Christopher and William thus viz. Ioyntly and severally for their lives so that neither of them stall alienate the Lands and if they do that they shall remain to his Heirs Robert the Father
the money coming therof a prohibition shall be granted to the Ecclesiasticall Iudge in such a case wherby the Court granted a speciall consultation in the Case to wit that they proceed for the Legacy provided that they charge the Executor no further then he hath in Goods and Chattels of the Testator after his true and due Debts are satisfied And that in the case of the proof of these Debts they allow such proofs as by the Law of the Land are holden to be sufficient in such a case Quod nota benâ— as to the restraining of Ecclesiasticall Courts in their proceedings to bind any subject touching his private temporall Estate against all reason And as to it that they do not intermeddle in any thing belonging to the Common Law of the Realm as Debts and the like against the due course of the Common Law Cawdry versus Atton 5. IN Trespasse brought by Robert Cawdry Clerk against George Atton Vide this Case Coke lib. 5. 1. pa. for breaking his Close at North Luffenham in the County of Rutland upon not guilty and a speciall Verdict the Case appeared to be this to wit that the Plaintiff was Rector Ecclesiae de North Luffenham aforesaid of which the place was parcell and being so seised was deprived of his Rectory by the late Bishop of London and his Colleagues by virtue of the high Commission to them and others diverted because he had pronounced and uttered slanderous and contumelious words against and in depravation of the Book of Common-prayer But the form of the sentence was that the said Bishop by and with the assent and consent of five others of the said Commissioners his Companions and namely which deprived him And further it was not found that the Commissioners named were the naturall Subjects born of the Queen as the Statute enacts that they should be And if the deprivation be void then they find the Defendant guilty and if it were good then they find him not guilty And it was moved that the deprivation was void First Because that wheras the Commission is to them or any three of them of which the said Bishop to be one amongst others it ought to have been the sentence of them all according to the authority given to them which is equall and not that it was done by one with assent of the other Then because it is not found that the Commissioners are the naturall Subjects of the Queen born as by the words of the Statute they should be Another is because the punishment which the Statute provides for those of the Ministry which deprave this Book is to loose the profits of all their Spirituall Promotions but for a year and to be imprisoned by the space of six months and not to be deprived untill the second Offence after that he had been once committed and therfore to deprive him for the first offence was wrongfull and contrary to the Statute But by the whole Court for the form of the deprivation it is that which is used in the Ecclesiasticall Courts which alway names the chief in Commission that are present at the beginning of the Sentence and for the other they mention them only as here but of their assent and consent to it and in such cases we ought to give credit to their form and therfore t is not to be compared to an authority given at Commen Law by Commission And for the matter that is not found that the Commissioners were the naturall Subjects of the Queen born it is to be intended that they were such unlesse the contrary appear But here at the beginning it is found that the Queen secundum tenorem effectum actus predict had granted her Commission to them in causis Ecclesiasticis and therfore it appeareth sufficiently that they were such as the Statute wills them to be And for the deprivation they all agreed that it was good being done by the authority of the Commission for the Statute is to be understood where they prosecute upon the Statute by way of Inditement and not to restrain the Ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction being also but in the Affirmative And further by the Act and their Commission they may proceed according to their discretion to punish the offence proved or confessed before them and so are the words of their Commission warranted by the clause of the Act. And further the Ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction is saved in the Act. And further all the Bishops and Popish Priests were deprived by virtue of a Commission warranted by this clause in the Act And now lately it was agreed by all the Iustices that a Fine of 200. marks set upon one for a vitious liver by the high commission was warranted by virtue of the Commission and Act And therfore if the Act with the Commission are to be consdered in this case wherupon it was agreed that the Plaintiff should take nothing by his Writ Which you may see Hill 33. Eliz. Rot. 315. Hall versus Peart 6. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by William Hall Plaintiff for Land in D. in the County of Somerset upon a Lease made by William Dodington against John Peart and other Defendants upon a speciall Verdict the case appeared to be this That one Iohn Brown was in possession of certain Lands in D. aforesaid Vide this case in Cook lib. 2 32 33. by the name of Dodingâ—ons case which before were parcel of the possessions of the Hospitall or Priory of S. Iohns in Wells the Inheritance therof then being in the late King H. 8. by the Act of dissolutions And the King being so seised by his Letters Patents dated 26. of March 30 H. 8. ex gratia speciali certa scientia mero motu suo granted to Iohn Ayleworth and Ralph Duckenfield omnia illa Messuagia Ter. Tenemt gardina sua quaecunque tune in separabilibus tenuris diversarum personarum which he named particularly amongst which the said Iohn Brown was one in Civitate Wellen. ac in suburbiis ejusdem Civitat exira eandem civitat within the Jurisdictions and Liberties of the said City late parcell of the possessions of the said Hospitall and that the said Iohn Brown had not then any other Lands late parcel of the possessions of the said Hospitall but this in D. and that this Land was quite out of the said City of Wells and of the Suburbs therof and also out of the Liberties and Jurisdiction of the said City and yet it was found that it was in the particular and parcell of the value and valued in it in the Tenure of the said Iohn Brown at 6 s. 8 d. a year and the grant was to the said Iohn Ayleworth and Ralph Duckenfield and to the Heirs of the said Iohn Ayleworth forever And it was moved that the Grant was good to the said Ayleworth and Duckenfield because of the Statute of non-recitall and mis-recitall because it appeareth by the particular and value that it was intended to be passed
be avoided and in the same manner here But Popham took a diversity where the Possession or the Estate of the Queen is determined and where not for where the Estate is determined there the Subject may enter into the Land without Office or ouster le main But where the Possession continues there the party shall not come to it unlesse by petition Monstrans de droit officio or the like and therfore hee said that if the Queen had an Estate pur auter vie or depending upon any other Limitation if it be determined according to the Limitation the party who hath interest may enter so in the case of the Devise put before And if a Lease be made for life the Remainder in Tail the Reversion in Fee and he in the Remainder in Tail levy a Fine Sur conusance de droit come ceo que il ad de son done to a stranger with proclamations according to the Statute and afterwards the stranger convey the Remainder to the Queen her Heirs and Successors and after the Tenant for life dies and after he in the Remainder in tail dies without Issue now may he in the Remainder in Fee enter because the Estate of the Queen is determined But here the Queen hath a Fee-simple in her self but determinable upon the Estate-tail which yet remaineth which Fee-simple in Reversion cannot be divested out of the possession of the Queen but by matter of Record of so high nature as it is in her to wit by Petition Monstrans de droit or the like As if a Reversson or Remainder be alienated in Mortmain the claim of the Lord sufficeth therâ— to vest the Reversion in the Lord for the Alienation but if the Reversion or Remainder of which such a claim was made be conveyed to the King his remedy is now by Office Monstrans de droit or Petition for claim will not now serve him for this shall be to divest the possession out of the Queen which by such means cannot be done no more then where a Reversion or Remainder is granted to the Queen upon Condition but he ought to have an Office to find the performance of it if it be to be performed by matter in pais and without Monstrans de droit or otherwise it shall not be divested out of the Queens possession yet in the case of a common person a claim will divest it out of them but not so of the Queen And these cases Gawdy agreed but he conceived that in the case in question the claim made determines the Estate of the Queen which is made by means of the Fine upon the Statute And Popham denied the case put in 7 H. 6. to be Law as it is put upon the opinion of Strange there for it is cleer that the claim there does not divest any possession which was in the King by means of the Wardship and if this be not therby defeated the claim does not help the Disseisee against the Descent and this appeareth fully by Littleton who saith so of a Claime which avoids a Descent to wit that it ought to be such upon which the Disseisee may upon every such Claim made have an Action of Trespasse or Assise against the Dissessor or him who is in possession if he continue his possession after such Claim made which cannot be in this case where the possession is in the King which cannot be defeated by such a Claim And in the Lord Dyer where the Feoffee or Mortgagee of Lands holden of the Queen in Capite by Knights Service died before the day of Redemption his Heir being within age wherby upon Office found the Queen had the Wardship of the body and land of the Heir after which the Mortgagee at the day of redemption made payment and of this also an Office was found yet he could not enter either before or after Office but upon Monstrans de droit therupon he had his Ouster le main And the reason why a Claim shall serve in this case between common persons is because that by such Claim the thing it self is devested out of him who had it before and therby actually vested in him who made the claim As where a Villain purchase a Reversion by the Claim of the Lord the Reversion is actually in him as it is of a Possession by Entry But where he is put to his Claim to devest any thing out of a common person he is put to his Suit to devest it out of the Queen Aad to say that Bret should not take advantage of this Conveyance made to make it good by the Fine I think the Law to be clear otherwise as to this point for the Statute of Fines was made tor the security of Purchasors and Possessors of Land and therfore taken more strongly against them who pretend Right or Title and for the greatest advantage that may be for the Possessors of Lands and therfore the Possessor by what ever means he can may make his Fine to be forceable And therfore the Fine upon this Statute differeth much from a Fine at Common Law for where at Common Law an Infent being a Disseisor was disseised by one who levies a Fine and the year and the day passe without claim of the first Disseisee now was the first Disseisee barred yet if afterwards the Infant who was not bound by the Fine enter the first Disseisee may enter upon him because that by this entry the Fine at Common Law was utterly defeated But now by the Statute such a Fine being levied with Proclamations the first Disseisee not pursuing according to the Statute is barred for ever And although the Infant enter at full age and undoes the Fine as to himself yet this Fine remains alwaies to bar the first Disseissee and makes that the Infant hath now Right against all the world and so now takes advantage therof And this is the intent of the Statute for the repose of Controversies and Suits and the quiet of the people And if I procure a Fine to be levied on purpose to bar another of his Action which he may have against me for the Land yet I shall take advantage of this Fine and the other shall have no advantage against me because of this Covin for if this should be admitted it will countervail the benefit which is intended to be by means of the Statute of Fines And if a Disseisor enfeoffee another upon Condition to the intent that a Fine with Proclamations shall be levied to the Feoffee to bar the Disseisee and after the Disseisee is barred the Disseisor enter for the Condition he shall yet take advantage of the Fine against the Disseisee And Popham put a case which was in this Court 23 Eliz. upon a speciall Verdict which was between Okes Plaintiff upon the Demise of John late Lord Sturton of Cottington which was this The Lord Sturton was Tenant for life of certain Lands in Lighe in the County of Somerset the remainder in Tail
not properly said an Use untill that it be said in Esse to take the Profits themselves But I am to turn this Argument against him who made it for if it be so the Use can never be in suspence and iâ— so it follows that no Possession by means of any such Use can be in suspence but staies where it was before to be executed when the Use happens to be in beeing But as to that that a Reversion or Remainder may be of that which we call an Use so also may such a Use be in suspence in the same manner as the Possession it self but not otherwise And as to Cramners Case formerly put the Law is so because nothing appeareth in the case to be done to the disturbance of this contingent Vse in the interim before it happen But upon the Case put of the Lady Bray upon which it hath been so strongly relied it was thus The Lord Bray made an assurance of certain Lands to the use of certain of his Councell untill the Son of the said Lord Bray should come to the age of 21. years for the livelyhood of the said Son and of such a Wife as he shall marry with the assent of the said Councell and then to the use of the said Son and of the said Wife and of the Heirs of the body of the said Son The Father dies the Son was become in Ward to the King after which one of the said Councellors dies the King grants over the Wardship of the said Son after which the said Lord Bray by the assent of his Guardian and of the surviving Councellors marries the Daughter of the then Earl of Shrewsbury after which the Husband aliens the same Land to one Butler and dies and upon Action brought by the said Lady against the said Butler for the same land she was barred by Judgment and upon what reason because she was not a person known when the Statute was made which must be in every case of a Freehold in Demesne as well in case of an Use as in case of a Possession And therfore a Lease for years the Remainder to the Heirs of I. S. then living is not good and the same Law of an Vse And so it was agreed by all the Iustices very lately in the case of the Earl of Bedford but in these Cases it remaineth to the Feoffor and because it doth not appear at the time of the assurance who shall be the Wife of the said Son so that there was not any to take the present Free-hold by name of the Wife of the Son she takes nothing by the assurance but this reason makes for our side to wit That if there were none to take the Free-hold in Demesne from the Use when it falleth he shall never take it The other reason in this Case was because she was not married by the consent of all the Counsellors for that one was dead nor according to the power given by the agreement but by the authority of the Guardian that the power which the Father had upon his Son was ceased And Nota That by a Disseisin the contingent Use may be disturbed of his Execution but there by the regresse of the Feoffee oâ— his Heirs when the Contingent happen it may be revived to be executed But by the release of the Feoffee or his Heirs the Contingent in such a case by Popham iâ—â—â—â—red oâ— all possibility at any time to be executed And to that which hath been said that the generall and universall Assurances of men throughout all the Realm at this â—ay arâ— by means of Vses and that it shall be a great deal of danger and inconvenience to draw them now in question or doubt and that it now trembleth upon all the Possessions of the Realm and therfore it shall be too dangerous to pull up such Trees by the roots the Branches wherof are such and so long spread that they overshadow the whole Realm Popham said That they were not utterly against Uses but only against those and this part of them which will not stand with the publike Weal of of the Realm and which being executed shall make such an Estate which cannot stand with Common Law of the Realm or the true purport of the Statute and therfore he said that it was but to prune and cut off the rotten and corrupt branches of this Tree to wit that those which had not their substance from the true Sap nor from the ancient Law of the Realm nor from the meaning of the Statute and so to reduce the Tree to its beauty and perfection The same reason he said might have been made in the time of Edw. 4. against those Arguments which were made to maintain the common Recoveries to bar Estates-tail But if such a reason had been then made it would have been taken for a bare conceit and meer trifle and yet Vses were never more common then Estates-tail were between the Statute of Donis conditionalibus and the said time of Edw 4. But the grave Iudges then saw what great trouble hapned amongst the people by means of Intails and what insecurity happened by means therof to true Purchasors for whose security nothing was before found as we may see by our Books but collaterall Warranty or infinite delay by Voucher and thus did the Iudges of this time look most deeply into it wherupon upon the very rules of Law it was found that by common Recovery with Vouchers these Estates-tail might be barred which hath been great cause of much quiet in the Land untill this day that now it begins to be so much troubled with the cases of Vses for which it is also necessary to provide a lawfull remedy But he said plainly That if the Exposition made on the other side shall take place it will bring in with it so many mischiefs and inconveniencies to the universall disquiet of the Realm that it will cast the whole Common-wealth into a Sea of troubles and endanger it with utter confusion and drowning And to that which was said That a Remainder to the right Heirs of I. S. or to the Heirs of the body of I S. or to the first Son as here are so in the custody of the Law that they cannot be drawn out that therfore no forfeiture can be made by the Feoffment made by him who hath the particular Estate To that he said That a Disseisin made to the particular Estate for life draws out such Remainders to the right Heirs as is proved expresly by 3 H. 6 where it is holden that a collaterall Warranty bars such a Remainder in obeyance after a disseisin And by Gascoigne 7 H. 4. If such a Tenant for life makes a Feoffment in Fee it is a Forfeiture but he conceived that in the life time of I. S. none can enter for it but this is not Law and when by the Feoffment the particular Estate is quite gone in possession and in right also the remainder shall never take
it was not an immediate descent in Deed but upon the operation of Law which gave Wardship and the like but not to prejudice any third person And he said that although the Queen or other Lord upon eviction of the Land descended or the determination of the Estate therof may resort to Lands devised or assured and take a third part therof yet therby the Devise or Assurance remains effectuall against the Heir but this is by a speciall clause in the Statute of 34 H. 8. which gives it to them but no such remedy is given to the Devisee to help him if his part be abridged or evicted And the words are precise to wit If the part left or assigned to the King or to any Lord at any time during their Interest therin be evicted c. that they shall have so much oâ— the two parts residue as shall make a full third part of the remainder not evicted c. Wherby it appeareth that this is given only for the benefit of the Lords and not of the Heir nor of the Devisee fâ—r if after the Interest of the Queen or other Lord be determined this which was left he evicted from the Heir it shall not be helped against the devise but the Devise remains good to the Devisee against the Heir for the whole Land devised wherby it appeareth that it was the very purport and intent of the Statute that the Devise remain as it was at the time of the death of the Devisor without having regard to that which hapneth Ex post facto unlesse for this point helped by this speciall clause of the Statute and this is for the Lord and his Interest only and for no other And by him also cleerly the Statute which is an explanatory Law shall never be taken by equity in the precise point explained to impugne the point of explanation as here the Statute wills that the Estate of Inheritance comprised in the former Statute shall be explained to be Fee-simple it cannot now by any equity be as to the power to make a Devise which is meerly given by the authority of the Statute said to be of any other Estate then Fee-simple of which a Devise may be made And therfore if Land be given to another and his Heirs for the term of another mans life a Devise cannot be made of this because it is not an Inheritance in Fee-simple but only the limitation of a Free-hold And where the Statute saith having a sole Estate we cannot by any equity that it shall be taken of any joynt Estate as to make any disposition of that which she had in Ioynture and therupon the greater part resolved that Iudgment shall be given against the Plaintiff for the Defendants Southwell versus Ward 4. IN a second deliverance between Richard Southwell Esquire Plaintiff and Miles Ward Avowant by Demurrer upon the Avowry the Case appeared to be this That Iohn Prior of the Church of Saint Faiths in Horsham in the County of Norfolk was seised in his Demesne as of fee in the right of his said Priory of 8. Messuages 300. acres of Land 30. acres of Meadow 60. acres of Pasture and 200. acres of Wood with their Appurtenances in Horsham aforesaid And so seised the said Prior with the assent of his Covent by their Deed indented shewn forth bearing date the first day of Ianuary 13 E. 4. and by licence of the King aforesaid granted to William then the Master of the Hospitall of St. Giles in Norwich and to the Brothers of the same Hospitall and to their Successors 200. Fagots and 200. Focalls called Astle-wood yearly to be taken of all the Lands and Tenements of the said Prior and Covent in Horsham aforesaid by the Servants of the said Prior and Covent and their Successors yearly to be carried to the said Hospitall at the costs and expences of the said Prior and Covent and their Successors at the Feast of St. Michael or 20 s. of lawfull money for them at the election of the said Master and Brethren and their Successors to take yearly in the same Lands and Tenements in Horsham to the use of the poor and infirm persons there being or coming So that if it happen the said Fagots and Focalls or the said 20 â— for them to the said Master and Freres in form aforesaid to be arrear in alâ—o part c. then they may distrain in the said Lands and Tenements and the Distresse detain until they be fully satisfied of the said Fagots and Focals or of the said 20 s. for them as is aforesaid with this Proviso further That if at any one or more times the said Master and Brethren have chosen to have the Fagots and Focals yet at any other time they make the 20 s. for them and although they have taken the 20 s. for them once or oftner yet at any other time they may take the Fagots and Focals themselves and that they may so vary tâ—ties quâ—ties and dâ—strain for them accordingly reasonable notice being given of their Election in form aforesaid And the said Master and Brethren granted by the same Deed to the said Prior and Covent and their Successors that they or others sufficiently warranted by them would give sufficient notice of their election yearly the first Sunday of April in the Church of the said Hospital to some Officer of the said Prior and Covent and their Successors if they send any thither for this cause By force of which Grant the said Master and Brethren were seised of the said yearly rent of the said 200. Fagots and 200. Facals called Astlewood accordingly and so being seised they by their sufficient Writing enrolled of Record in the Chancery in the first year of the late King Ed. 6. gave and granted to the same King the said Hospitall all the Lands Tenements and Hereditaments of the said Hospitall To have and to hold to him and his Heirs and Successors for ever wherby the said King was therof and of the said annuall Rent seised accordingly and so seised the 7. day of May in the same year the said King Edw. by his Letters Patents bearing date the same day and year granted the said Hospitall and the rent of the said Fagots and Focals and other the Premisses to the Major Sheriff Citizens and Commons of the City of Norwich and to their Successors for ever and for 1600. Fagots and 1600. Focals of the said annuall rent of 200. Fagots and 200. Focals being arrear at the Feast of S. Michael the Arch-angel 23 Eliz. the said Ward took the Distresse and made Conusance as Bailiff to the said Major Sheriff c. And it was moved that the Avowry was not good first because it being matter of Election which was granted to the Master and Brethren and their Successors to wit the Fuell or the 20 s. it doth not appear that they ever made any election of the one or the other and untill it appeareth that they have
and not otherwise to wit 100 l. therof in thâ—se words On that day twelvemonth next after the day of his death and the other 100 l. that day twelvemonth next after c. and made the said John Slaning his Executor and afterwards to wit the 8. day of April 25 Eliz died without Issue Male of his body the said Agnes took to Husband one Edmund Marley and upon the 8. day of April 26 Eliz. the said John Slaning paid the first 100 l. to Agnes then being living and upon the 8. and 9. daies of April 27 Eliz. Nicholas Slaning of Plumpton Son and Heir of the said John Slaning who died in the mean time an hour before the Sun set and untill the Sâ—n was set came to the House where the said Edmund and his Wife inhabited in London and tendred the last 100 l. and that neither the said Edmund nor Agnes his Wife were there to receive it but that the said Edmund voluntarily absented himself because he would not receivâ— the 100 l. and that therupon the Wife of the said Edmund died having Issuâ— two Daughters the Lands being holden by Knights-service in Capite and the said Daughters being yet within age and all this being found by Office by the opinions and resolutions of Popham and Anderson and the rest of thâ— Councel of the Court of Wards the said Heirs now in Ward shall have nothing but that which doth not passe by the conveyance to John Fits and his joynt Feoffees which was only that which was in the possessions of Peterfield and Atwill and that the Livery was good of the rest albeit the Attorny did nothing of that which was in Lease notwithstanding the words of the Warrant that they should enter into all and then shall make the Livery And they agreed that the Condition doth not â—ind neither the said John Slaning nor Nicholas his Son because they had not all the Land according to the purport of the Condition which was that he who had all therof should pay the 200 l. wheras here that which was in the possession of Peterfeild and Atwill did not passe to them for want of Attornment for a Condition ought to be taken strictly And further the payment was referred by the Indenture to be according to the Will or by the Will and the 200 l. was devised as a Legacy which ought to be paid but upon demand and not at the peril of the Executor and therfore the nature of the payment of it is altered by the intent of the Will and being not demanded there is no default in the said Nicholas Slaning of Plumpton to prejudice him of his Land if it had been a Condition for then it shall be but a Condition to be paid according to the nature of a Legacy upon demand and not at the peril of the party And whether the word twelve-month shall be taken for a year or twelve months according to 28. daies to the month as it shall be of eight or twelve months or the like And they agreed that in this case it shall be taken for the whole year according to the common and usuall speech amongst men in such a case and according to this opinion Wray who is dead Anderson and Gawdy made their Certificate to the late Chancellor Sir Christopher Hatton in the same case then being in the Chancery and a Decree was made accordingly And many were of opinion that by his absence by such fraud he shall not take advantage of the Condition being a thing done on purpose if it had been to be performed at his peril Kellies Case WIlliam Kelly and Thomasine his Wife were seised of certain Lands in S. Eth in the County of Cornwall called Karkian to them and to the Heirs of their two bodies between them lawfully begotten by the Gift of one William Dowmand Father of the said Thomasine 11 H. 8. a long time after which Gift to wit 25 H. 8. A Fine Sur conusance de droit come ceo que il ad per was levied by Peter Dowmand Son and Heir of the said William Dowmand to William Kelley of the Mannor of Dowmand and of a 100. acres of Land 300 acres of Meadow 300. acres of Pasture and a 1000. acres of Furzse and Heath in Dowmand S. Eth. Trevile and divers other Towns named in the Fine who rendred the same back again to the said Peter in tail with diverse Remainders over and this Fine was with proclamations according to the Statute after which the possession of Karkian continued with Kelly and his Heirs according to the first Intail and the Mannor of Dowmand and the Remainder of the Lands in these Towns which were to the said Peter Dowmand to him and his Heirs according to the render untill nine years past that by Nisi prius in the Country upon the opinion of Manwood late chief Baron the Land called Karkian was recovered against the Heir of the said William Kelly by virtue of the said Fine and Render because all the Land which the said Peter Dowmand and the said William Kelly also had in all these Towns named in the Fine were not sufficient to supply the Contents of acres comprised in the said Fine And what the Law was in this case was referred to the chief Iustices the Master of the Rolls Egerton and the now chief Baron â—ut of the Chancery who all agreed upon all this matter appearing that nothing shall be said to be rendred but that which indeed was given by the Fine and Karkian does not passe to the said William Kelly by the Fine for as to it the Fine is but as a release of Peter to him and therfore shall not be said to be rendred to the said Peter by the Fine where no matter appeareth wherby it may appear that it was the intent of the parties that this shall be rendred And therfore Popham said that by so many Fines which have been levied in such a manner and to such who have Land in the same Towns where the Conusance hath been considering that alwaies more Land is comprised in Fines by number of acres then men have or is intended to passe by them at some time or in some age it would have come in question if the Law had been taken as Manwood took it but in all such cases the Possession hath alwaies gone otherwise which shews how the Law hath been alwaies taken in such cases And therfore if a man be to passe his Mannor of D. to another by Fine Executory and he levy the Fine to him by the name of the Mannor of D. and of so many acres of Land in D. and S. being the Towns in which the Mannor lies after which the Conuzor purchaseth other Lands in these Towns the Fine before the Statute of Vses shall not be executed of these Lands purchased after the Conusance and the Fine shall work to these which he had power and intent to passe and no further And it seemed to them that an
first Attainder by way of Plea but acknowledged the Deed in which case the Accessary may well be Arraigned But if the principall had pleaded his former Attainder whether now he shall be put to answer for the benefit of the Queen having regard to this Accessary who otherwise shall go quit because there was not any principall but he who was formerly attainted And it seemed to Popham and some others that it shall be in the same manner as if the same person so formerly attainted should be tried now for Treason made before his Attainder as appeareth by 1 H. 6. 5. because it is for the advantage of the King in his Escheat of the Land and notwithstanding that it is moved by Stamford in his Pleas of the Crown it seemed to Popham that there was no diversity where the Treason was made before the Felony of which he is attainted and where after and before the Attainder And by the same reason that he shall be again tried for the benefit of the King in this case because of the Escheat by the same reason in this case here because of the forfeiture which accrueth to the Queen by the Attainder of the accessary and for the Iustice which is to be done to a third person who otherwise by this means shall escape unpunished But he agreed that the party Attaint shall not be again Arraigned for any other Felony done before the Attainder in case where no Accessary was touched before the Statute of 8 Eliz. cap. 4. he who is convict of Felony and hath his Clergy after his purgation made shall be Arraigned for another Felony done before the conviction if it be such for which he cannot have his Clergy and was not convicted or acquitted of the same Felony before the Attainder But upon this Statute it appeareth that he who shall have his Clergy in such manner shall not be drawn in question for any other Felony done before his Attainder for which he might have his Clergy And of this opinion as Clark and others of the Iustices said were all the Iustices in the time of Wray And as to the Statute of 18 Eliz. cap 7. It is not to be understood but that he who hath his Clergy and delivered according to this Statute shall be yet arraigned for any other Felony done before his former Conviction or Attainder if it be such for which he cannot have his Clergy for the words are That he shall be put now to answer c. in the same manner as if he had been delivered to the Ordinary and had made his Purgation any thing in this act to the contrary notwithstanding Pollard versus Luttrell 2. IN an Ejectione firmae between Pollard and Luttrell for Lands in Hubury and Listock upon the Title between the Lord Audeley and Richard Audeley it was agreed by the chief Iustices that if the Disseisor levy a Fine with Proclamations according to the Statute of 4 H. 7. and a stranger within five years after the Proclamations enter in the right of the Disseisee without the privity or consent of the Disseisee that this shall not avoid the Bar of the Fine unlesse that he assent to it within the five years for the words of the Statute are so that they pursue their Title Claim or Interest by way of Action or lawfull Entry within five years c. and that which is done by another without their assent is not a pursuing by them according to the intent of the Statute for otherwise by such means against the will of the Disseisee every stranger may avoid such a Fine which was not the intent of the Statute Mountague versus Jeoffreys and others 3. IN Trespasse by Edward Mountague Plaintiff against Richard Jeoffreys and others Defendants for a Trespasse done in certain Lands called Graveland in Hailsham in the County of Sussex the Case upon a special Verdict was thus Sir John Jeoffreys late chief Baron bing seised in his Demesn as of Fee amongst others of the said Land called Graveland having Issue but one only Daughter by his Will in writing devised all his Land of which he was seised in fee except the said Graveland to his said Daughter for 21. years c. and the said Land called Graveland which was then in Lease for divers years to one Nicholas Cobb which years at the time of the death of the said Sir John Geoffreys continued he devised to the said Richard Jeoffreys his Brother and his Heirs and by the same Will he disposed divers Legacies of his Chattels and the Remainder he gave to his said Daughter and made her Executrix of his said Will after which the first Wife of the said Sir John Jeoffreys being dead he covenanted with Mr. George Goring to take the Daughter of the said George to Wife and covenanted with the said George amongst other Lands to assure the said Land called Graveland to the said George Goring and Richard Jeoffreys and their Heirs to the use of the said Sir John Jeoffreys and Mary Goring Daughter of the said George and the Heirs of the said Sir John Jeoffreys by a certain day before which day the marriage being had the said Sir Io Ieoffreys made a Deed and sealed it and delivered it containing a Feoffment of the said Land called Graveland amongst others to the said George Goring and Richard Ieoffreys and their Heirs to the Uses aforesaid in performance of the said Covenants with a Warrant of Attorney to make Livery accordingly and the Attorney made Livery in other parts of the Land and not in Graveland and this was in the name of all the Lands compriâ—â—d in the Deed and the said Nicholas Cobb never attorned to this Deed After which Sir Iohn Ieoffreys interlined in the said Will that the said Mary then his Wife should be joynt Executrix with his Daughter And in the Legacy of the rest of his Goods c. he interlin'd the said Mary his Wife to be Joynt-tenant with his said Daughter without other publication therof and afterward the saâ—d Sir Iohn died the said Daughter being his Heir who took to Husband the said Edward Mountague 4. IN Trespasse the Plaintiff supposeth the Trespasse to be done in the breaking of his House and Close in such a Town the Defendant justifies in a House and Close in the same Town and shews which to put the Plaintiff to his new Assignment to which the Plaintiff replied that the House and Close of which he complains is such a House and gives it a speciall name upon which the Defendant demurs and adjudged that the Plaintiff take nothing by his Writ for albeit a House may have a Curtilage which passeth by the name of a Messuage with the Appurtenances yet this shall not be in this case for by the Bar the Plaintiff is bound to make a speciall demonstration in what Messuage and what Close he supposeth the Trespasse to be done as to say that the House hath a Curtilage the which he broke and
where the Plaintiff shews a speciall Title under the Possession of the Defendant As for example In trespasse for breaking of his Close the Defendant pleads that J. G. was seised of it in his Demesne as of fee and enfeoffed J. K. by virtue of which he was seised accordingly and so being seised enfeoffed the Defendant of it by which he was seised untill the Plaintiff claiming by calour of a Deed of Feoffment made by the sayd J. G. long before that he enfeoffed J. K. where nothing passed by the sayd Feoffment entred upon which the Defendant did re-enter here the Plaintiff may well traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made by the sayd J. G. to the sayd I. K. without making Title because that this Feoffment only destroies the Estate at will made by the sayd I. G. to the Plaintiff which being destroyed he cannot enter upon the Defendant albeit the Defendant cometh to the Land by Disseisin and not by the Feoffment of the sayd I. K. for the first Possession of the Defendant is a good Title in Trespasse against the Plaintiff if he cannot shew or maintain a Title Paramounâ— But the Feoffment of the sayd I. G. being traversed and found for him he hath by the acknowledgment of the Defendant himself a good Title against him by reason of the first Estate at will acknowledged by the Defendant to be to the Plaintiff and now not defeated But in the same case he cannot traverse the Feoffment supposed to be made to the sayd I. K. to the Defendant without an especiall Title made to himself for albeit that I. K. did not enfeoff the Defendant but that the Defendant disseised him or that he cometh to the Land by another means yet he hath a good Title against the Plaintiff by his first Possession not destroyed by any Title Paramount by any matter which appeareth by the Record upon which the Court is to adjudge and with this accord the opinion of 31 4. 1. That the materiall matter of the Bar ought alwaies to be traversed or other wise that which upon the pleading is become to be materiall and that which the Plaintiff traversed here to wit the Lease made by Wright to the Defendant is the materiall point of the Bar which destroyeth the Title Paramount acknowledged to the Plaintiff by the colour given in the Bar which is good without another Title made So note well the diversity where in pleading in Trespasse the first Possession is acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar and where it appeareth by the pleading to be in the Defendant and where and by what matter the first Possession acknowledged in the Plaintiff by the Bar is avoided by the same Bar And upon this Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff as appeareth in 34. and 35. Eliz. Rol. Earl of Bedford versus Eliz. Anne Russell Mich. 34. and 35. Eliz. 2. IN tho Court of Wards the Case was thus between the now Earl of Bedford In the Court of Wards and Elizabeth and Anne the Daughters and Heirs of John late Lord Russell which was put ten times to all the Iustices to be resolved Francis late Earl of Bedford was seised of the Mannor of Baruake Chaldon c. in Commitatu Dorset in his Demesne as of see and so seised the fourth year of Queen Eliz. of it enfeoffed the Lord S. John of Bletsoe and others in see to the use of himself for forty years from the date of the sayd Deed and after to the use of the sayd John then his second Son and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue then to the use of the right Heirs of the sayd Earl the Feoffor for ever Afterwards Edward Lord Russell Son and Heir apparant to the sayd Earl dyed without Issue and after the sayd John Lord Russell dyed without Issue Male having Issue the sayd two Daughters afterwards to wit 27 Eliz. the sayd Francis Earl of Bedford by Indenture made between him and the Earl of Cumberland and others in consideration of the advancement of the Heirs Males of the body of the sayd Earl which by course of descent should or might succeed the sayd Earl in the name and dignity of the Earldome of Bedford and for the better establishment of his Lordships Mannors and Hereditaments in the name and blood of the sayd Earl covenanted and grantes with the sayd Covenantees that he and his Heirs hereafter shall stand seised of the sayd Mannors amongst others to the use of himself for life without impeachment of Waste and after his decease to the use of Francis the Lord Russell and the Heirs Males of his body for default of such Issue to the use of Sir William Russell Knight his youngest Son and the Heirs Males of his body with diverse Remainders over after which the sayd Francis Lord Russell tyed having Issue Edward the now Earl of Bedford and after this the sayd Francâ—s late Earl of Bedford dyed also and after the Daughters of the sayd John Lord Russell or the now Earl of Bedford shall have these Mannors of Barunke c. was the question and upon this it was argued by Cook Sollinton and others for the Daughters that an use at Common-law was but a confidence put in some to the benefit and behoof of others and that Conscience was to give remedy but for those for whose availe the confidence was and that was in this Case for the sayd Daughters which were the right Heirs to the sayd Francis late Earl of Bedford upon the first conveyance made 41 Eliz. for the confidence that he put in the Feoffees as to the profits that he himself was to have was but for the forty years and how can any other say that he shall have any other Estate when he himself saith that he will have it but for forty years and therefore in this case his right Heir shall take as a Purchasor by the intent of the Feoffor which hath power to make a disposition of the use at his pleasure and his pleasure as appeareth was to have it so and it is not as if the use had been limitted to be to himself for life with such a Remainder over in which Case the use of the Fee by the operation of Law ought to execuse in himself for the Free-hold which was in him before As where Land is given to one for life the Remainder to his right Heirs he hath a Fee-simple executed but here he shall have but an Estate for forty years precedent and that the Fee-simple cannot be executed by such a limitation made to the right Heirs but in case of an Estate for years only precedent such a limitation to his right Heirs afterwards is not good but in case of an use it is otherwise for it may remain to be executed to be an use in Esse where the right Heir shall be and therefore not to be resembled to an Estate made in Possession And an Vse is alwaies to be
to the West eighteen foot ten inches which Messuage so newly built stood the day of the Writ purchased and yet stands c. And if upon the whole matter the said Demise of the said John Bradley and Anne be and in Law ought to be adjudged the Demise of the said Messuage newly built upon the said part of land where the Messuage of the said John Bradley and Anne stood then the Iury find that the said John Bradley demised to the said Thomas and Iohn Allen the said house newly erected as aforesaid as the Plaintiff hath alledged and if not then they find that he did not demise And upon this Verdict Iudgment was given there and an especiall Writ of Habere facias seisinam awarded of the said Messuage with the Appurtenances viz. 18 foot of it from the North to the South and 12 foot and an half of it from the East to the West upon which a Writ of Error being brought in the Kings Bench it was alledged for Eror by Coke Sollicitor that upon this Verdict Iudgment ought to have been given for the Tenant and not for the Demandant for what was remaining of that which was of the house is not a house but only a peece of a house and therfore it ought to have been demanded by the name of a peece of Land containing so much one way and so much another for a house wasted and utterly drawn away cannot be demanded by a Messuage but by the name of a Curtilage or so much Land of such contents for a Praecipe lies of a peece of Land containing so many feet in length and so many in breadth And also Land built during the possession of him which hath it by Tort cannot be demanded by the name of Land by him which hath right but by the name of a house nor e contra for every demand of Land ought to be made according to the nature of which it is at the time of the Action brought be it a Messuage Land Meadow Pasture Wood c. And if the Walls of a house be made upon the Land without any covering yet it shall be demanded but by the name of Land for he said that it cannot be a house without its perfection to be habitable which he said is not here because it stands upon the Land of the said Anne which hath not the perfection of a house habitable without the remnant But this notwithstanding the first Iudgment was affirmed for it was said by Popham and other Iustices that that which is erected upon the Land of the said Anne shal be said a house as to the right of the Heir of the said Anne for a house may be such to be demanded by the name of a house albeit it hath not all the perfection of a house as if it hath no doors so if it hath part of the side wals not made drawn away or fallen yet the remainder continues to be demanded by the name of an house so if part of the covering be decayed yet it shall be demanded by the name of an house and the rather here because with that which is upon the other Land it is a perfect house And I may have a perfect house although the side Walls belong to another as in London where a man joynes his house to the side walls of his Neighbours he hath a perfect house and yet the side walls belong to another and this commonly happens in London but it is otherwise if it were never covered or if the covering be utterly fallen or drawn away for without a covering a house cannot be said to be a house for the covering to keep a man from the Storms and Tempests over head is the principall thing belonging to a house And further suppose that a man hath a Kitchin or a Hall upon Land to which another hath right he which hath right ought to demand it by the name of a house suppose then that there is adjoyning to this upon other land a Parlor a Buttery a Shop a Closet and the like with Chambers over them this doth not change the form of the Writ that he is to have which hath right although before it was built by the name of a house and yet as to the rent both the one and the other was but a house but as to the demandant it is otherwise for they are severall so here And the Demise which before was made of the house drawn away shall be now upon the matter a Demise as to this part of it a new Messuage for if a man make a Lease for years of a house and the Tetmor pull it down and erect there a new house or if land be demised and the Lessee build a house upon it in an Action of Wast for Wast done in this new house the Writ shall suppose that he did wast in the Houses c. which were demised to him and yet in the one case it is not the Messuage which was demised to him and in the other the house was not demised but the Land only But he hath no term in the house but by the Demise before made And it seems to Popham that Allen the Defendant cannot pull down this part of the house erect upon his own land to the prejudice of the house which Hayes demands if this which is erected upon the land of Allen be of such a necessity that without it the house of Hayes cannot stand for a house but if he dies after that Hayes hath built it then Hayes shall have an Action upon the case against him for the damages which he sustained by it As if a man agree with me that I shall set the outer wall of my house upon his land and I do it accordingly and afterwards the party which grants me this licence breaketh it down if the Grant were by Deed I shall have an Action of Covenant for it and if but by Paroll yet I shall have an Action upon the case against him And here this being done by him which was then Owner and Possessor of the one and the other land it shall be taken as a licence in Law to the benefit of him which hath right which he cannot pull down after it is once made but he shall be subject to Hayes his Action for it or otherwise Hayes shall be at great mischief and prejudice by the Act of him which did the wrong which the Law will not suffer but rather shall turn this to the prejudice of him which did the wrong then to the prejudice of the other which shall have wrong by the doing of it for Volenti non fit injuria As if I am to inclose between my Neighbour and my self and my Neighbour pull down this inclosure or part of it wherby my Cattell escape into the land adjoyning and depasture there I shall be excused of this Trespasse in the same manner as if he had licenced me to have occupied it and whatsoever hapneth to this Land adjoyning
there which to their Office of Sheriff appertaineth or any waies to intermeddle with it except only for the Sheriff of the County of Glocester to hold their County-Courts as is aforesaid And that the Major Aldermen of the said Town for the time being their Successors having power and authority to enquire here determine all things which Iustices of P. or Iustices assigned to hear determine Trespasses and Misdemeanors within the County of Glocest before this time have made or exercised And that the Iustices of Peace of him his Heirs or Successors within the said County of Glocester should not intermeddle with the things or causes which belong to the Iustices of Peace within the said Town c. And upon this Charter divers things were moved by Sir William Periam Knight now chief Baron of the Exchequer before his going into the Circuit 1. Whether by the saving of the Charter they have sufficient power reserved to them to fit within the Town being now exempted from the said Town of Glocester to enquire there of the Felonies done in the said County of Glocester And so for the Assises and Nisi prius taken there of things made in the County of Glocester Then if the the Sheriffs may execute their Warrants made there at the time of the Assises or Goal-delivery notwithstanding the exemption given to them by the Patent And it was agreed by all the Justices that the saving in the Patent is sufficient for the Iustices of Assise and Goal-delivery to sit there for the things which happen within the County of Glocester for as the King may by his Letters Patents make a County and exempt this from any other County so may he in the making of it save and except to him and his Successors such part of the Iurisdiction or priviledge which the other County from which it is exempted had in it before As in divers places of the Realm the Goal of a Town which is a County of it self or which is a place priviledged from the County is the Goal of the County and the place where the Assises or Goal-delivery is holden is within the County of the Town and yet serve also for the County at large as in the Sessions Hall at Newgate which serves as well for the County of Middlesex as for London and yet it stands in London but by usage it hath alwaies been so and nothing can be well prescribed unto by usage which cannot have a lawfull beginning by Award or Grant and this by the division of London from Middlesex at the beginning might be so And so the Goal of Bury c. And although that the words are saving to him and his Heirs yet by the word Heirs it shall be taken for a perpetual saving which shall go to his Successors which is the Queen and the rather because it is a saving for Iustice to be done to the Subjects which shall be taken as largely as it can be And albeit the expresse saving for the Sheriff is but for to hold his turn yet in as much as the authority of the Iustices of Assise and Goal-delivery in holding their Sessions as before was accustomed is saved it is Included in it that all which appertain to the execution of this Service is also saved or otherwise the saving shall be to little purpose And therfore that the Sheriff or other Minister made by the authority of these Courts is well made there and warranted by the Charter And wee ought the rather to make such exposition of the Charter because it hath been alwaies after the Charter so put in execution by all the Iustices of Assise But it seems that by this Commision for the County a thing which happens in the Town cannot be determined albeit it be Felony commited in the Hall during the Sessions but by a Commission for the Towne it may 7. SIr Francis Englefield Knight being seised in his Demesne as of Fee of Vide this case reported in Coke lib. 7. 12 13. the Mannor of Englefield in the County of Berks and of divers other Lands in the first year of Queen Eliz. departed out of the Realm by licence of the Queen for a time and remained out of the Realm in the parts beyond the Seas above the time of his licence wherby the Queen by her Warrant under her privy Seal required him to return upon which he was warned but did not come wherupon the Queen seised his Land for his contempt After vvhich the Statute of Fugatives was made 13. year of the Queen upon which by Commissions found upon this Statute all his Lands were newly seised and afterwards 17 Eliz. by Indenture made between him and Francis Englefield his Nephew and sealed by the said Sir Francis at Rome the said Sir Francis covenanted with his said Nephew upon consideration of advancement of his Nephew and other good considerations to raise an use that he and his Heirs and all others seised of the said Mannor c. shall hereafter stand seised of them to the use of himself for term of his life without impeachment of Wast and afterwards to the use of his Nephew and of the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue to the use of the right Heirs and Assigns of the said Francis the Nephew for ever with a Proviso that if the said Sir Francis shall have any Issue Male of his body that then all the said Vses and Limitations shall be void and with a Proviso further that if the said Sir Francis by himself or any other shall at any time during his life deliver or tender to his said Nephew a King of Gold to the intent to make the said Vses and Limitations void that then the said Vses and Limitations shall be void and that therafter the said Mannors c. shall be as before Afterwards the said Francis was attainted of Treason supposed to be committed by him 18 Eliz. A Le umures in partibus transmarinis le attainder fuit primerment utlagary apres per act de Par. 28 Eliz. by which the forfeiture of the Condition was given to the Queen and at the same Parliament it was also enacted that all and every person or persons which had or claimed to have any Estate of Inheritance Lease or Rent then not entred of Record or certified into the Court of Exchequer of in to or out of any Mannors Lands c. by or under any Grant Assurance or Conveyance whatsoever had or made at any time after the beginning of the Raign of her Majesty by any persons attainted of any Treasons mentioned in the said Act after the 8. day of February 18 Eliz. within two years next ensuing the last day of the Session of the said Parliament shall openly shew in the said Court of Exchequer or cause to be openly shewn there the same his or their Grant Conveyance or Assusance and there in the Term time in open Court the same shall offer
remain good and of force against the Patentee and also to say that the Lease might have its continuance after that it is determined by the Limitation comprehended in the Writing by reason of a reservation is also too absurd for so it may be said that if the Queen make a Lease for years if J. S. shall live so long rendring rent that this Lease may have continuance after the death of J. S. which cleerly is not Law And the Patentee here shall take the advantage to avoid the Lease hapned before his Patent made because that no Office need to be found of the not payment before it passed from the Queen to make it voyd and the reason is because this Proviso as it is penned is a meer Limitation of the Estate and not any manner of Condition And therfore if the Queen make a Lease for 100. years if the Lessee shall so long lawfully pay the Rent reserved at the day of payment if he fail of payment of the Rent reserved at the day limited the Lease is ipso facto determined and it need not be found by Office And what diversity is there where the Limitation is conjoyned to the estate it self and where it cometh in by a Proviso afterwards all being in one and the same Deed and therfore spoken at one and the same time for the one and the other case manifesteth that the contract and agreement is that the Lease shall not continue longer then the default of the payment of the Rent And in this case suppose that the Queen had granted over the Land shall not the Patentee have advantage to avoid the Lease because that no Office was found before It is cleer that he shall or otherwise this is now become to be an absolute Lease for a hundred years which is not Law for it is meerly contrary to the Contract and therfore absurd to be maintained I agree with the generall rule that nothing shal passe to or from the Queen but by matter of Record but this makes nothing against me in this case for here the same Record which passeth the Estate to the party to wit the Patent of the Lease contains the time how long it shall endure longer then which it cannot continue And therfore by 9 H. 7. If the King makes a Gift in tail and the Donce dies without Issue the Land is in the King without Office so in every other case where the Estate is determined according to the limitation for he cannot be put out of possession wrongfully and now hath right to hold it against him And I say that no warrant or authority can be found throughout the whole Law where a Lease or Estate made by the King is determined by an expresse limitation comprised in the Patent it self of the Grant that there need not any Office or other thing to determine it for that which is comprised in the same Patent may determine it of it self And further wheras the Proviso is that the re-entry shall be for default of payment of the Rent and the like there the Term continues untill the re-entry be made notwithstanding the Condition be broken as appeareth by all the Iustices 28 H. 8. because it is expresly limited that it shall be defeated by the re-entry there before re-entry be made the Action of Wast shall be quod tenet And by 12 H. 7. where a common person is put to his Entry there the Queen is put to an Office with which agrees Stamford in his Book of Prerogative But in this case if it were between common persons the Lease shall be determined upon default of payment of the Rent and before any re-entry and therfore in the Queens case it shall be determined without Office But if the case had been that if the Rent had been arrear and not paid that then upon re-entry made it ought to cease there an Office had been necessary to countervail the Entry in case of the Queen or otherwise the Lease shall not cease because the Queen cannot make an Entry but by such means and therfore it ought to be by matter comprised in the Patent It hath been said that this shall be a conditionall Limitation and that therfore an Office is necessary but I say that here is not any matter or quality of a Condition but meerly of a Limitation and t is rather a contingent Limitation then any manner of Condition and this is well proued by 11 H. 7. which is that the Grantee of a Reversion shal take advantage of it at common Law the which he cannot do if it savour any way of a Condition and by 27 H. 8. a Proviso in a Deed ought alwaies to be expounded according to the purport because that it is placed in a Deed somtimes for a Condition as where a Proviso is that the Lessee shall not alien somtimes for an exception as where a Proviso is that the Lease shall not extend to such an acre or such a thing somtimes for a Limitation as here and in the like cases And in this case the release of the Rent shall make it that the Lease shall never be determined for the not payment of it because thaâ—â—â—terwards there cannot be any such default of payment and therfore in such a case the Limitation remaineth absolute and discharged of the contingent which otherwise had determined it As if a man make a Lease for a 100. years if the Lessee in the mean time do not cut such a Tree a release of all Conditions will not serve yet if the Lessor himself or any other but the Lessee cut it the Lease is become absolute for a 100. years And so upon this point my conceit appeareth But the most colourable thing which hath been alledged on the other side was by my Brother Drew which was that in counting upon an Ejectione firmae and pleading in such a Lease as here it shall be as an absolute Lease for the years comprised in the Habendum without making any mention of the Prouiso upon which he enforced it that it shall be taken to be of more efficacy then if it stood meerly upon the Contingent for he said that upon a Lease made for years if the Lessee shall so long live and the like in the count and also in the pleading mention ought to be made of the life of the Lessee I agree it to be true that the pleading shall be so for in count counting and in plea pleading if the matter of the Contingent procede the Limitation or be anncred to the Limitation there a man ought to speak to the Contingent or otherwise it is not good as by 14 H. 8. it shall be of a Condition where it is precedent But in case of a Condition it is quite otherwise for if â— man make a Lease to another for years Si tamdiu vixerit or Dummodo solverit c. or the like which are annexed to the limitation of the Estate in all these cases in counting
for the case of Sir Rob. Chester 4 Eliz. there is great diversity between that this case for it is ordained by the Act that upon the default of paym which is not limited there to be made at the receit the office shal be forfeited not that the estate in the office shall cease And of a thing forfeited it is at the election of him who is to take advantage of the forfeiture whether he will take it or not and till the advantage taken therof the party still remains an Officer And therfore if the Queen make a Lease for years and the Termer makes a Feoffment in Fee the Term by this is extinct as was agreed upon an Evidence in the Exchequer 28 El. in the case of Drayton Basset and before that in the same case in the Kings Bench and yet no reversion is drawn therby out of the Queen Suppose then that the Queen before any Office found therof grant the Land over in Fee shall not the Patentee take advantage therof by extinguishing the Term It is cleer that he shall and albeit a Termer holdeth over his Term yet the Patentee of the Queen and also the Bargainee of a common person after the Inrolement of the Bargain shall take advantage of this determination of the Term. And for the not reciting of Throgmortons Lease in the Letters Patents made to Finch and Audeley it is to no purpose to speak to it because the Estate was finished before the Grant And further because there was a Non obstante in the Patent that it shall be effectuall notwithstanding any not recitall of any Lease being of Record or not being of Record mis-recitall c. which was by all at the Bonch admitted to be good and not contradicted by any And for the Office found after the Grant made I did not speak to it because it is of no purpose to help the Patentee but yet shall serve the Queen for the mean profits as hath been said See more of this case Trin. 36 Eliz. pl. 2. Trinity Term 35 Eliz. Hughes versus Robotham 1. MEredith Hughes brought an Action upon the Case against William Robotham Executor to Ja. Robotham for that the Plaintiff in the life time of the sayd Testator to wit the 12th of Apâ—il 28 Eliz at London in such a Parish and Ward was possessed of a Messuage with the Appurtenances in the same Parish and Ward for divers years then to come And whereas also the said Testator was then possessed of the reversion therof after divers years then also to come and so possessed the said Testator the said 12th day of April at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid in consideration that the Plaintiff at the instance and request of the Testator in his life time would surrender all his Estate and Term of years which he then had to come in the said Messuage with the Appurtenances and procure one Thomas Thornell to give to the said Testator a 100. marks for a Lease therof to be made by the said Testator to the said Thornell he assumed and promised to pay to the Plaintiff 30 l. of the said 100. marks when he should be therunto required by the Plaintiff And the Plaintiff alledged in facto that he at the instance and request of the said Testator in his life time afterwards to wit the 20th day of April 28 Eliz. at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid surrendred to the said Testator all the Estate and term of years which he then had to come in the said Messuage c. and that he the same 20th day of April in the same Parish and Ward procured the sayd Thornell to give to the said Testator 100. marks for a Lease of the said Messuage c. by the Testator to the said Thornell then and there made for 19 years from the Feast of the Annunciation of our Lady then last past and that yet the said Testator in his life time nor the said Defendant after his death have not paid to him the said 30 l. albeit the said Testator in his life time to wit the 24. day of April aforesaid at London in the Parish and Ward aforesaid as therunto required by the said Plaintiff and albeit the Defendant after the death of the said Testator to wit the 10th day of April 32 Eliz. in the Parish and Ward aforesaid was also therunto required by the said Plaintiff And albeit there were sufficient Goods and Chattels of the said Testator at the time of his death to pay as well the said 30 l. as all other Debts of the said Testator and also to discharge the Funerals of the said Testator which Goods and Chattels came to the said hand of the said Defendant c. And after Non assumpsit pleaded and a Verdict for the Plaintiff exception was taken in arrest of Iudgment that the Declaration was not good 1. Because it is that the Plaintiff the 20th day of April 28 Eliz. surrendred all the Estate and term which he had then to come and this for any thing shewn may be another Term then he had the 12th day before for it is not said and so being possessed the 20th day he surrendred but generally as before And further the consideration was that he ought to surrender all the Term which he had the 12th day of April which cannot be made the 20th day for in the mean time part of the Term is incurred and therfore the purpose was that the surrender should have been made immediatly as soon as might be so as by the delay therof the â—â—d Robotham should not loose any part of the Term to come And it was further alledged that a term for years cannot be surrendred to another Termer for years Gawdy The consideration is that the Plaintiff at the request of the Testator in his life time should surrender so that it is not to be done untill he be required by the Testator and not instantly at his perill without request precedent and here it is alledged that the Plaintiff at the request of the said Testator the 20th day of April surrendred which is well done and according to the agreement and albeit it had been more formall to have said that the said Plaintiff so being possessed afterwards to wit the 20th day of April surrendres c. yet it shall not be intended that he had any other term then that which he had before if it be not shewn on the other side in his Bar and especially here where the Action is not grounded upon the Term but upon the Assumpsit and the consideration is nothing but an inducement to the Assumption which is not so formall to be made as if the Action had been grounded upon the Term it self And therfore in an Action upon the case upon an Assumpsit it sufficeth to say that wheras the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff in divers summs of money amounting in all to a 100 l. the Defendant assumed to pay him the 100
that it shall be then holden as if no Adjournment had been the Essâ—ines had been the first day of Tres Trin. and the full Term had not been untill the fourth day which was the last day of the Term quod nota and so it was of the Adjournment which hapned first at Westminster and afterwards at Hertford from Michaelmas Term now last past Michaelmas Term 35 and 36 Eliz. Gravenor versus Brook and others 1. IN an Ejectione firmae by Edward Gravenor Plaintiff against Richard Brook and others Defendants the case appeared to be this Henry Hall was seised in his Demesne as of Fee according to the custom of the Mannor of A. in the County of D. of certain customary Tenements holden of the said Mannor called Fairchildes and Preachers c. In the third year of Henry the 8th before which time the customary Tenements of the said Mannor had alwaies been used to be granted by Copy of Court Roll of the said Mannor in Fee-simple or for life or years but never in Fee-tail but then the said Henry Hall surrendred his said Copy-hold Land to the use of Joane his eldest Daughter for her life the remainder to John Gravenor the eldest Son of the said Joane and to the Heirs of his body the Remainder to Henry Gravenor her other Son and the Heirs of his body the Remainder to the right Heirs of the said Henry Hall for ever wherupon in 3 H. 8. at the Court then there holden a grant was made by Copy of Court Roll accordingly and Seisin given to the said Joane by the Lord accordingly Henry Hall died having Issue the said Joane and one Elizabeth and at the Court holden within the said Mannor 4 H. 8. the death of the said Henry Hall was presented by the Homage and that the said Daughters were his Heirs and that the Surrender made as before was void because it was not used within the said Mannor to make Surrenders of Estates tails and therupon the said Homage made division of the said Land and limited Fairchilds for the purparty of the said Joane and Preachers for the purparty of the said Elizabeth and Seisin was granted to them accordingly Elizabeth died seised of her said part after which 33 H. 8. Margaret her Daughter was found Heir to her and admitted Tenant to this part after which Joane dyed seised of the said Tenements as the Law will And after the said Margaret takes to Husband one John Adye who with his said wife surrendred his said part to the use of the said John Adye and of his said wife and of their Heirs and afterwards the said Margaret died without Issue and the said John Adye held the part of his said wife and surrendred it to the use of the said Richard Brook and of one John North and their Heirs who were admitted accordingly after which the said John Gravenor died without Issue and now the said Henry Gravenor was sole Heirs to him and also to the said Henry Hall who had Issue Edward Gravenor and dyed the said Edward entred into the said Lands called Preachers and did let it to the Plaintiff upon whom the said Richard Brook and the other Defendants did re-enter and eject him And all this appeareth upon a speciall Verdict And by Clench and Gawdy an Estate tail cannot be of Copyhold Land unlesse it be in case where it hath been used for the Statute of Donis conditionalibus shall not enure to such customary Lands but to Lands which are at common Law and therfore an Estate tail cannot be of these customary Lands but in case where it hath been used time out of mind and they said that so it hath been lately taken in the Common Bench But they said that the first remainder limited to the said John Gravenor here upon the death of the said John was a good Fee-simple conditional which is well warrantes by the custom to demise in Fee for that which by custom may be demised of an Estate in Fee absolute may also be demised of a Fee-simple conditionall or upon any other limitation as if I. S. hath so long Issue of his body and the like but in such a case no Remainder can be limited over for one Fee cannot remain over upon another and therfore the Remainder to the said Henry was void But they said that for all the life of the said John Gravenor nothing was in the said Elizabeth which could descend from her to the said Margaret her Daughter or that might be surrendred by the said Margaret and her Husband and therfore the said Margaret dying without Issue in the life time of the said John Gravenor who had the Fee-simple conditionall nothing was done which might hinder the said Edward Son to the said Henry Gravenor of his Entry and therfore the said Plaintiff ought to have his Iudgment to recover for they took no regard to that which the Homage did 4th year of Hen. 8. But Fennor and Popham held that an Estate tail is wrought out of Copy-hold Land by the equity of the Statute of Donis conditionalibus for otherwise it cannot be that there can be any Estate tail of Copyhold Land for by usage it cannot be maintained because that no Estate tail was known in Law before this Statute but all were Fee-simple and after this Statute it cannot be by usage because this is within the time of limitation after which an usage cannot make a prescription as appeareth 22 23 Eliz. in Dyer And by 8 Eliz. a Custom cannot be made after Westm 2. And what Estates are of Copyhold land appeareth expresly by Littleton in his Chapter of Tenant by Copyhold c. And in Brook Title Tenant by Copyhold c. 15 H. 8. In both which it appeareth that a Plaint lyeth in Copyhold Land in the nature of a Formedon in the Descender at common Law and this could not be before the Statute of Donis conditionalibus for such Land because that before that Statute there was not any Formedon in the Descender at common Law and therfore the Statute helps them for their remedy for intailed Land which is customary by equity Add if the Action shall be given by equity for this Land why shall not the Statute by the same equity work to make an Estate intail also of this nature of the Land We see no reason to the contrary and if a man will well mark the words of the Statute of Westm 2. cap. 1. he shall well perceive that the Formedon in Descender was not before this Statute which wills that in a new case a new remedy may be given and therupon sets the form of a Formedon in Descender But as to the Formedon in the Reverter it is then said that it is used enough in Chancery and by Fitzherbert in his Natura brevium the Formedon in the Descender is founded upon this Statute and was not at Common Law before And the reason is because these Copyholds are now become by usage to be
such Estates that the Law allows them to be good against the Lords themselves they performing their Customs and Services and therfore are more commonly guided by the guides and rules of the common Law and therfore as appeareth in Dyer Tr. 12. Eliz. Possessio fratris of such an Estate facit sororem esse haeredem And to say that Estates of Copyhold Land are not warranted but by custom and every Custom lies in Vsage and without Vsage a Custom cannot be is true but in the Vsage of the greater the lesser is alwaies implyed As by Vsage three lives have been alwaies granted by Copy of Court Roll but never within memory two or one alone yet the grant of one or two lives only is warranted by this Custom for the use of the greater number warrants the lesser number of lives but not è converso And so Fee-simples upon a Limitation or Estates in tail are warranted by the equity of the Statute because they are lesser Estates then are warranted by the Custom and these lesser are implyed as before in the greater and none will doubt but that in this case the Lord may make a Demise for life the Remainder over in Fee and it is well warranted by the Custom and therfore it seems to them that it is a good Estate tail to John Gravenor and a good Remainder over to Henry his Brother and if so it follows that the Plaintiff hath a good Title to the Land and that Iudgment ought to be given for him And for the dying seised of Elizabeth they did not regard it for she cannot dye seised of it as a Copyholder for she had no right to be Copyholder of it And by the dying seised of a Copyholder at common Law it shall be no prejudice to him who hath right for he may enter But here in as much as she cometh in by admittance of the Lord at the Court her Occupation cannot be fortious to him and therfore no descent at common Law by her dying seised for it was but as an Occupation at Will But if it shall not be an Estate tail in John Gravenor as they conceive strongly it is yet for the other causes alledged by Gawdy and Clench Iudgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff and the Remainder which is not good shall not prejudice the Fee-simple conditionall granted to John which is no more then if the Surrender had been to the use of Iohn Gravenor and his Heirs the Remainder over because that we as Iudges see that this cannot be good by Law and therfore not to be compared to the case where the Custom warrants but one life and the Lord grants two joyntly or successively there both the one and the other is void And this is true because the custom is the cause that it was void and not the Law and also it is a larger Estate then the Custom warrants which is not here and upon this Iudgment was given that the Plaintiff shall recover And by Popham it hath been used and that upon good advice in some Maâ—nors to bar such Estates tails by a common Recovery prosecuted in the Lords Court upon a Plaint in nature of a Writ of Entry in the Post 2. JUlius Cesar Iudge of the Admiralty Court brought an Action upon the Case for a Slander against Philip Curtine a Merchant-stranger for saying that the said Cesar had given a corrupt Sentence And upon not guilty pleaded and 200. marks Damages given it was alledged in arrest of Iudgment where it was tryed by Nisi prius at the Guildhall by a partiall Inquest because that upon the default of strangers one being challenged and tryed out a Tales was awarded De circumstantibus by the Iustice of Nisi prius wheras as was alledged a Tale could not have been granted in this case for the Statute of 35 H. 8 cap. 6. which give the Tales is to be intended but of commontryals of English for the Statute speaks at the beginning but of such Iuries which by the Law eught to have 40 s. of Free-hold and wills that in such cases the Venire facias ought to have this clause Quorum quilibet habeat 40 s. in terris c. which cannot be intended of Aliens which cannot have Free-hold And it goes further that upon default of Iurors the Iustices have authority at the Prayer of the Plaintiff or Defendant to command the Sheriff or other Minister to whom it appertaineth to make a return of such other able persons of the said County then present at the same Assises or Nisi prius which shall make a full Iury c. which cannot be intended of Aliens but of Subjects and therfore shall be of tryals which are onely of English and not of this Inquest which was part of Aliens And further the Tales was awarded only of Aliens as was alledged on the Defendants part but in this point it was a mistake for the Tales was awarded generally de circumstantibus which ought alwaies to be of such as the principall Pannell was But Per Curiam the exceptions were disallowed for albeit the Statute is as hath been said yet when the Statute comes to this clause which gives that a Tales may be granted by the Iustices of Nisi prius and is generally referred to the former part of the Act for it is added Furthermore be it enacted that upon every first Writ of Habeas Corpora or Distringas with a Nisi prius c. the Sheriff c. shall return upon every Juror 5 s. Issues at the least c which is generall of all And then it goes further And wills that in every such Writ oâ— Habeas Corpora or Distringas with a Nisi prius where a full Jury doth not appear before the Justices of Assise or Nisi prius that they have power to command the Sheriff or other Minister to whom it appertains to nominate such other persons as before which is generall in all places where a Nisi prius is granted and therfore this is not excepted neither by the Letter nor intent of the Law And where it is said such persons by it is to be intended such as the first which shall be of Aliens as well as English where the case requires it for expedition was as requisite in cases for or against them as if it were between other persons And Aliens may well be of the County or place where the Nisi prius is to be taken and may be there for although an Alien cannot purchâ—se Land of an Estate of Free-hold within the Realm yet he may have a house for habitation within it for the time that he is there albeit he be no Denison but be to remain there for Merchandise or the like And by Gawdy where the default was only of strangers the Tales might have been awarded only of Aliens as where a thing is to be tryed by Inquest within two Counties and those of the one County appear but not those of the other the
took other Hay of his own to wit the Plaintiff and mixed it with the Defendants Hay after which the Defendant took and carried away both the one and the other that was intermired upon which the Action was bought and by all the Court cleerly the Defendant shall not be guilty for any part of the Hay for by the intermirture which was his own act the Defendant shall not be prejudiced as the case is in taking the Hay And now the Plaintiff cannot say which part of the Hay is his because the one cannot be known from the other and therfore the whole shall go to him who hath the property in it with which it is intermired as if a man take my Garment and Embroider it with Silk or Gold or the like I may take back my Garment But if I take the Silk from you and with this face or embroider my Garment you shall not take my Garment for your Silk which is in it but are put to she Action for taking of the Silk from you So here if the Plaintiff had taken the Defendants Hay and carried it to his house or otherwise and there intermired it with the Plaintiffs Hay there the Desendant cannot take back his Hay but is put to his Action against the Plaintiff for taking his Hay The difference appeareth and at the same day at Serjeants Inne in Fleetstreet the difference was agreed by Anderson Peâ—iam and other Iustices there and this case was put by Anderson It a Goldsmith be melting of Gold in a Pot and as he is melting it I will cast Gold of mine into the Pot which is melted together with the other Gold I have no remedy for my Gold but have lost it Bullock versus Dibler 3. IN an Ejectione firmae between Edward Bullock Plaintiff and John Dibler Deâ—endant the case appeared to be this A man was seised of a Copyhold Tenâ—â—ent pâ—rcell of the Mannor of Stratfield Mortimer the County of Berks in right of his wife in his Demesne as of Fee and surrendred this Copy bold Tenement by himself without his wife to the use of a stranger in Fee who was 〈◊〉 by the Loâ—â— accordingly the Husband dies the wife dies the Heir of the wife without any admittance enters upon the stranger and makes a Lease for a year to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant in right of him to whom the Surrender was made re-enters and adiudged that the Plaintiff ought to recover and that the surrender of the Husband was not as a discontinuance against the wise to put the Heir to his Plaint in nature of a Sur Cui in vita for a Discontinuance shall not be by a Deed of Feement only but by it with the Livery ensuing wherby the entire Fee-simple is given what Estate so ever the Feoffor had by reason of the Livery where by Deed of Grant nothing passed but that which the party might lawfully grant And here it shall be taken as if the Grant had been made by the Husband which passed but his Estate to wit that which he might lawfully grant without prejudice to his wife But yet there is this diversity between a surrender of an Estate for life and a surrender of an Estate in Fee to the use of a scranger to wit that by the one the Estate drowned in the Lord by the surrender and by the other it is not drowned in the Lord but is transferred to him to whom it was made upon which he is admitted to it otherwise in the last case it returns to him who surrendred and then upon the admittance he is in the Per by him who surrendred and not by the Lord or by the Surrender made by Tenant for life he to whose use it is made ought to take it of the Lord and he is there in by him and not by him who surrendred And this is the common difference betwixt Customary Estates for lives and Customary Estates of Inheritance And the Plaint of Cui in vita is given where recovery by default is against the husband and wife and not upon the surrender of the husband for suppose the husband had surrendred meerly to the Lord himself yet the wife might have entred after the death of the husband because the surrender goes but to the Estate which the husband might lawfully part with and therfore rather to be resembled to a Grant then to a Feoffment And notwithstanding that he was not admitted yet he might enter and take the profits and make a Lease according to the custom or bring an Action of Trespasse against him who disturbes him But if the Lord require his Fine or his Services and the Heir refuse to do them this may be a forfeiture of his Copyhold But untill lawfull Seisin made by the Lord because it belongeth to him the Heir may intermeddle with the Possession albeit he be not admitted by the Lord where it is an Estate of Iuheritance by the Custom And in this Term also in another case in the same Court it was adjudged that an Infant who surrenders his Copyhold Land within age may enter at his full age without being put any Suit for it And the first case was very well argued by one Brock a Puny utter Barister of the Inner-Temple this Term for the Plaintiff And it was the first Demur that he argued in Court Forth versus Holborough 4. IN an Action of Debt upon an Obligation of 200. marks brought by Robert Forth Doctor of Law and Mary his Wife as Executrix to Doctor Drewry against Richard Holborough the Case upon Demurrer appeared to be this to wit That the said Dr. Drewry was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of the Suit of the Mannor of Goldingham Hall in the County of Essex and so seised the last day of Novemb. 27 Eliz. demised it to the said Richard Holborough for 17. years from the said last day of Novemb. wherby the Defendâ—nt antred into it the next day and was therof possessed accordingly and so possessed the last day of Novemb. 28 Eliz. entred into an Obligation to the said Dr. Drewry with condition that if he his Heirs Executors Administrators and Assignes or any of them should well and truly pay or cause to be paid to Dorothy Goldingham widow or her Assigns at the Mannor-house of Goldingham Hall in the County of Essex for the Term of 17. years from the Feast of S. Michael the Arch-angel then last past or an Annuity or annuall Rent of 20. marks of lawfull English money at the Feast of the Annunciation of our Lady and S. Michael the Arch-angel by equall portions if the said Dororhy shall so long live and the said Richard Holborough or his Assigns or any other claiming by or under the said Richard or his Assigns shal or may so long occupy or enjoy the said Scite of the Mannor of Goldingham Hall that then the Obligation shall be void after which untill the 9th day of May 29 Eliz. the Defendant enjoyed the said Scite
Defendant had nothing to do there the Defendant shall be excused But here it is expresly alledged that it fell by the weight put upon it which ought to be answered As if a man take an Estate for life or years in a ruinous house if he pull it down he shall be charged in Wast but if it fall of it self he shall be excused in Wast so there is a diversity where default is in the party and where not so here the Defendant ought to have taken good care that he did not put upon such a ruinous floor more then it might well bear if it would not bear any thing he ought not to put any thing into it to the prejudice of a third person and if he does he shall answer to the party his damages Collard versus Collard 5. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Constantine Collard against Richard Collard the case appeared to be this Thomas Collard was seised in his Demesne as of Fee of Lands in Winkle in the County of Devon called the Barton of Southcote And having two Sons to wit Eustace the eldest and Richard the now Defendant the youngest and the eldest being to be married the said Thomas in consideration of this marriage being upon the said Barton said these words Eustace stand forth I do here reserving an Estate for my own life and my wives life give unto thee and thy Heirs for ever these my Lands and Barton of Southcote after which the said Thomas enfeoffed his youngest Son of Barton with warranty from him and his Heirs the eldest Son enter and let it to the Plaintiff upon whom the Defendant re-enter upon which re-entry the Action was brought and upon a speciall Verdict all this matter appeared But it was not found by the Verdict that the said Thomas Collard the Father was dead and therfore the Warranty was not any thing in the Case And it was moved by Heale that the Plaintiff ought to be barred because it did not passe by way of Estate in as much as a man cannot passe a Freehold of a Land from himself to begin at a time to come and by it to create a particular Estate to himself and in use it cannot passe because that by a bare parole and Vse cannot be raised and by giving my Land to my Son Cosin and the like nothing will passe without Livery for there is not consideration to raise an Vse Fennor The words shall be taken as if he had said here I give you this Barton reserving an Estate for my life although the words of reservation have priority in their time from the speaking of them because a reservation cannot be but out of a thing granted and therfore the reservation shall be utterly void or otherwise ought to be taken according to their proper nature to wit to be in their operation subsequent and so shall not hurt the Grant and therfore are not to be compared to the case where a man grant that after the death of I. S. or after his own death a stranger shall have his Land which Popham granted And Fennor said further that these words being spoken upon the Land as before amount to a Livery Gawdy said That the words as they are spoken amount to a Livery if the words are sufficient to passe the Estate but he conceived that the words are not sufficient to make the Estate to passe to the said Eustace because his intent appeareth that Eustace was not to have the Land untill after the death of him and his wife and therfore of the same effect as if he had granted the Land to the said Eustace after his death and as an Vse it cannot passe because by a bare word an Vse cannot be raised as appeareth in divers Reports Mich. 12 13 Eliz. which is a good case to this purpose But to say generally that an Vse cannot be raised or charged upon a perfect Contract by words upon good consideration cannot be Law and therfore it is to be considered what the Law was before the Statute of 27 H. 8. And I thinke that none will deny but that by grant of Land for money before this Statute an Vse was raised out of the same Land for a bargain and sale of Land for money and a grant of Land for money is all one and no difference between them And is not a grant of Land made in consideration of marriage of my Son and Daughter as valuable as a grant of it for money It is cleer that it is and much more valuable as my blood is more valuable to me then my money and therfore it is absurd to say that the consideration of money raise or change an Vse at Common Law and not such a consideration of marriage And in such a case at Common Law there was not any diversity that the party who so grant or hargain for the one or the other considerations was fâ—ised of the Land granted or bargained in use or possession but that the Vse by the Contract was transferred according to the bargain in both cases where there is a consideration And where through all the Law shall it be seen that of any thing which might passe by contract there need any other thing then the words which make the contract as writing or the like testifying it And that the Law was so it appeareth by the Statute of Inrolements of bargains and sales of Land made 27 H. 8. which enacts that no Freehold nor Vse therof shall passe by bargain and sale only unlesse it be by deed indented and enrolled according to the Statute Ergo if this Statute had not been it had passed by the bargain and sale by bare words and in as much as the Statute enacts this in case of bargain and sale only the other cases as this case here are as it was before at Common Law And by an exception at the end of the same Statute London is as it was at Common Law and therfore now Lands may passe there at this day by bargain and sale by word without deed for it is out of the Statute And how can we say that the Statute of Vses does any thing to alter the Common Law in this point by any intent of the makers therof wheras at the same Parliament they made an especiall Law in the case of bargain and sale of Lands And at this day for the Lands in London notwithstanding the Statute of Vses the Law hath been put in practice and alwaies holden as to the Lands there to be good if sold by bare Parole as it were at Common Law And I have heard it reported by Manwood late chief Baron of the Exchequer that it was in question in the time of King Edw. the 6th whether the use of a Freehold of Land will passe upon a Contract by Parole without Deed in consideration of marriage upon which all the then Iustices were assembled upon a doubt rising in a case hapning in the Star-chamber and then
resolved by all the Iustices as he said that it shall passe and he said that himself was of this opinion also And to say that by grant of Land at Common Law the use had been raised out of the possessions of the Land which the Grantor then had and by it passe to the Bargainee and that it shall not be raised and passed to another by grant of Land in consideration of marriage which is a more valuable consideration then money is absurd and against all reason And for the solemnity Vses in such cases in respect of marriage were the cause that they alwaies were left as they were at Common Law and not restrained as the case of bargain and sale is which by Common intendment may be made more easily and secretly then that which is done in consideration of marriage which is alwaies a thing publike and notorious but it is not reasonable that every slight or accidentall speech shall make an alteration of any Vse As if a man ask of any one what he will give or leave to any of his Sons or Daughters for their advancement in marriage or otherwise for their advancement this shall be but as a bare speech or communication which shall not alter or change any Vse But where there is upon the Speech a conclusion of a Marriage between the friends of the parties themselves and that in consideration therof they shall have such Lands and for such an Estate there the Vse shall be raised by it and shall passe accordingly to the parties according to the conclusion which Fennor granted But by Popham If it may be taken upon the words spoken that the purpose was to have the Estate passe by way of making of an Estate as by way of Feoffment c. then notwithstanding the consideration expressed the use shall not change nor no Estate by it but at will untill the Livery made therupon And therfore if a man make a Deed of Feoffment with expresse consideration of marriage although the Deed hath words in it of Dedi Concessi with a Letter of Attorney to make Livery therupon there untill Livery made nothing passe but at will because that by the Warrant of Attorney it appeareth the full intent of the parties was that it shall passe by way of Feoffment and not otherwise if it be of Land in possession And if it be of Land in Lease not untill Attornment of Tenants which was granted by all the Iustices But if a man in consideration of money makes a Deed of Gift Grant Bargain and Sale of his Lands to another and his Heirs by Deed indented with a Letter of Attorny to make Livery if Livery be therupon made before Inrolement there it hath been adjudged to passe by the Livery and not by the Inrolement But by Popham where Land is to passe in possession by Estate executed two things are requisite The one the grant of the said Land the other the Livery to be made therupon for by the bare Grant without Livery it doth not passe as by way of making of an Estate And this is the cause that such solemnity hath been used in Liveries to wit if it were of a Messuage to have the people out of it and then to give Seisin to the party by the Ring of the door of the House and of Land by a Turff and a Twig and the like which may be notorious Yet I agree it shall be a good Livery to say to the party Here is the Land enter into it and take it to you and your Heirs for ever or for life or in tail as the case is And albeit Livery by the View may be made in such manner yet by the sealing of the Deed of Grant upon the Land or by grant of it upon the Land without Livery nothing passe but at will But if therupon one party saith to the other after the Grant or upon it Here is the Land enter upon it and take it according to the Grant this is a good Livery But he ought to say this or somthing which amounts to so much or otherwise it shall not passe by the bare Grant of the Land although it be made upon the Land Clench said That when Thomas said to Eustace Stand forth here I do give to thee and thine Heirs these Lands this amounts to a Grant and a Livery also and by the words of the Reservation of the Estate to himself and his wife for their lives in this the Law shall make an use in the said Thomas and his wife for their lives so that by such means it shal enure as if he had reserved the use therof to him and his wife and so it shall enure to them as it may by the Law according to his intent without doing prejudice to the Estate passed to the said Eustace And afterwards Term Mich. 36 37 Eliz. the Case was again disputed amongst the Iustices and then Popham said That the Case of Baâ—gains and Sales of Lands in Cities as London c. as appeareth in Dyer 6. Eliz. are as they were at Common Law To which all the Iustices agreed and therfore shall passe by Bargain by parole without writing And by Bayntons Case in 6 7 Eliz. it is admitted of every side that an Vse was raised out of a Possession at Common Law by Bargain and Sale by parole and otherwise to what purpose was the Statute of Inrolements and by the same case it is also admitted now to passe by parole upon a full agreement by words in consideration of Marriage or the continuance of Name or Blood For it is agreed there that the consideration of nature is the most forceable consideration which can be and agreed also that a bare Covenant by writing without consideration will not change an Vse therfore the force therof is in the consideration of which the Law hath great respect And therfore the Son and Heir apparant ex assensu patris onely may at the door of the Church endow his wife of his Fathers Land which he hath in Fee and this is good by Littleton although the Son hath nothing in it wherby an Estate passe to the wife which is more then an Vse Nature is of so strong consideration in the Law And therupon after advice Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff the Roll of this appeareth in Banco Regis 1 Hill 35. Eliz. Rot. 355. And upon this Iudgment a Writ of Error was brought and the Iudgment aforesaid reversed in the point of Iudgment in the Exchequer by the Statute of 27 Eliz. Kettle versus Mason and Esterby 6. IN a second deliverance between Joh. Kettle Plaintiff and George Mason Vide this case Coke lib. 1. 146 c. and Francis Esterby Avowants the case appeared to be this Thomas May was seised of the Mannor of Sawters and Hawlin in the County of Kent in his Demesne as of Fee and being so therof seised enfeoffed Thomas Scot and John Fremling and their Heirs
dies and afterwards John his Son and Heir dies without Issue the reversion by this descends to the said Christopher who dies leaving Issue And upon this Case made in the Court of Wards the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson agreed first That upon the devise and death of the Father the said Christopher and William were Joynt-tenants of the Land and not Tenants in Common notwithstanding the word severally because it is coupled with the said word joyntly But yet they agreed also that by the descent from John to Christopher the Fee-simple was executed in the said Christopher for the Moyety in the same Mannor as if he had purchased the Reversion of the whole or of this Moyety and that it is not like to the Case where Land is given and to the Heirs of one of them in which case for the benefit of the Survivorship it is not executed to divide the Ioynture because the Estates are made at one and the same time together and therfore not like to the case where the Inheritance cometh to the particular Estate by severall and divided means And a Decree was made accordingly Trin. 36. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 1. IT was agreed by all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchequer upon an Assembly made at Serjeants-Inn after search made for the ancient Presidents and upon good deliberation taken If a man have two houses and inhabit somtimes in one and somtimes in the other if that House in which he doth not then inhabity be broken in the night to the intent to steal the Goods then being in his house that this is Burglary although no person bee then in the House and that now by the new Statute made such an Offender shall not have his Clergy for before the Statutes were made which take away Clergy in case of Burglary where any person was put in fear no mention was made in the Inditements of Burglary that any person was in the House But it was generall that the house of such a one Noctanter fregit and such Goods then there Felonice cepit And the breaking of a Church in the night to steal the Goods there is Burglary although no person be in it because this is the place to keep the Goods of the Parish And in the same manner the house of every one is the proper place to preserve his Goods although no person be there And that the Law was alwaies so it is to be collected by the course of the Statutes therof made for first the Statute of 23 H. 8. doth not take Clergy from any in case of Burglary unlesse some of the same Family be in the house and put in fear And in 5 Eliz. 6. The Offendor shall be ousted of his Clergy if any of the Family be in the house be they sleeping or waking And these Statutes were the cause that it was used of late time to put in the Inditements of Burglary that some person of the Family was then in the house to put them from their Clergy But this doth not prove that it shall not be Burglary but where some person was in the house and by 18 Eliz. Clergy is taken away in all cases of Burglary generally without making mention of any person to be there which enforce the resolution aforesaid and according to it they all agreed hereafter to put it in Execution Finch versus Riseley 2. IN this Term the case betweeen Finch and Riseley was in question before all the Iustices and Barons for this assembled at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where after Arguments heard by the Councell of the parties upon this point only If the Queen make a Lease for years rendring Rent with a Proviso that the Rent be not paid at the day limited that the Lease shall cease without making mention that it was to be paid at the receit whether the Lease shall cease upon the default of payment before Office found therof And by Periam and some of the Iustices the Lease stall not cease untill an Office be found of the default because it is a matter in Fait which determines it to wit the not-payment And by Gawdy it shall be taken as if it had been for the not-payment that the Proviso had been that the Lease shall be forfeited In which case it is not detennined untill Re-entry made for the forfeiture which in the Queens case ought alwaies to be by Office which countervails the re-entry of a common person As where the Queen makes a Lease rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry albeit the Rent be not paid yet untill Office found therof the Rent continues Popham Anderson and the greater part of the Iustices and Barons resolved that it was cleer in this case that Ipso facto upon the default of payment the Lease was determined according to the very purport of the contract beyond which it cannot have any beeing and therfore there needs no Office in the case But where it is that it shall be forfeited or that he shall re-enter there untill advantage taken of the forfeiture in the one case or untill re-entry made in the other case the Term alwaies continues by the contract And where in the case of a common person there is need of a re-entry to undo the Estate there in the case of the King there needs an Office to determine the Estate for an Office in the Kings case countervails an entry for the King in person cannot make the entry And upon this resolution of the greater part of the Iustices in Mich. Term 31 32 Eliz. the same case was in question in the Office of Pleas in the Exchequer between the said Moil Finch Plaintiff and Thomas Throgmorton and others Defendants and there adjudged by Manwood late chief Baron and all the other Barons unanimously after long argument at the Bar and Bench that the Lease was void upon default of payment of the Rent according to the Proviso of the Lease and this immediatly without Office for the reasens before remembred upon which Iudgment was given a Writ of Error was brought before the Lord Keeper of the great Seal and the Lord Treasurer of England where it long depended and after many arguments the Iudgment given in the Exchequer by the advice of Popham and Anderson was affirmed and that upon this reason for the Proviso shall be taken to be a limitation to determine the Estate and not a Condition to undo the Estate which cannot be defeated in case of a Condition but by entry in case of a common person and but by Office which countervails an entry in the case of the Queen And this Iudgment was so affirmed in Mich. Term 36 37 Eliz. Smiths Case 3 IT was found by Diem clausit extremum after the death of Richard Smith that in consideration of a marriage to be had between Margaret Smith and William Littleton a younger Son to Sir John Littleton Knight and of 1300. marks paid by the said Sir John to the said
Richard he made assurance by Fine of his Lands being 174 l. a year viz. Of part therof of the value of 123 l. a year of which part was holden of the Queen by Knights Service in Capite to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use of the said William and Margaret and the Heirs of the body of the said William begotten on the body of the said Margaret and for default of such Issue to the use of the right Heirs of the said William And of the residue therof being also holden in Capite of the Queen to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use of the first Issue Male of the said Richard and to the Heirs Males of his body and then to other Issues of his body and for default of such Issue to the said William and Margaret and the Heirs of the body of the said William on the body of the said Margaret lawfully begotten and for default of such Issue to the right Heirs of the said William with this Prouiso That it shall be lawfull for the said Richard to make a Joynture to his wife of the Lands limited to his Issue Males and for making of Leases for 21. years or three lives for any part of the said Land rendring the ancient Rent except of certain parcels and that William died without Issue and that Gilbert Littleton was his Brother and Heir and that the said Margaret married the said George Littleton youngest brother to the said William which are yet living And that the said Richard married Dorothy and made her a Joynture according to the Proviso And that the said Richard had Issue Iohn Smith and died the said Iohn being his Son and Heir and within age After which a Melius inquirendum issued by which it was found that the said Margaret was the Daughter of the said Richard and that the said Land was of the value of 12000 l. at the time of the assurance And how much of the Land shall be in ward and what Land and what the Melius inquirendum makes in the case was the question put to the two chief Iustices Popham and Anderson who agreed that the Queen now shall have the third part as well of that which was assured to William and Margaret immediatly after the death of the said Richard as of that which was limited to Dorothy for the life of the said Margaret for although money were paid yet this was not the only consideration why the Lands were assured but the advancement of the Daughter and now by the surviving of the said Margaret shee shall be said to be in the whole which was assured to her by her Father and for her advancement and the Land as it appears was of greater value then the money given and may as well be thought to be given for the Remainder of the Fee And agreeable to this was the case of Coffin of Devonshire about the beginning of the Raign of the now Queen which was that the said Coffin for moneys paid by one Coffin his Cosin having but Dâ—ughters himself conveyed his Land to the use of himself and his wife and to the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue to the use of his said Cosin and his Heirs for which his said Cosin was to give a certain sum of money to the Daughters for their marriage Coffin dies his said Daughters being his Heirs and within age and were in ward to the Queen the Lands being holden by Knights Service in Capite And the third part of the Land was taken from the wife of Coffin for the life of the said wife if the Heirs continue so long in Ward And it was also agreed by them and the Councell of the Court that the Melius inquirendum was well awarded to certifie that the said Margaret was the Daughter of the said Richard of which the Court could not otherwise well take Conusance for they thought that it was not matter to come in by the averment of the Attorney-generall as Dyer hath reported it But now by the Statute it ought to be found by Inquisition and being a thing which stands with the former Inquisition it ought to be supplied by the Melius inquirendum for the same Statute which gives the Wardship in case where Land is conveyed for the advancement of the Wife or Infants or for the satisfaction of Debts and Legacies of the party by the implication of the same Statute this may be found by Inquisitton and if it be omitted in the Inquisition it ought to be found by a Melius inquirendum but not to come in by a bare surmise And therfore if in the Inquisition it be found that the Ancestor had conveyed his Land by the Melius inquirendum it may be found that it was for the payment of his Debts or Legacies or that the party to whom or to whose use it was made was the Son or Wife of the party that made it and that by the very purport of the Statutes 32. 34 H. 8. as by Fitzherbert if it be surmised that the Land is of greater value then it is found a Melius inquirendum shall issue and so shall it be if it be found that one is Heir of the part of the Mother but they know not who is Heir of the part of the Father so if it be not found what Estate the Tenant had or of whom the Land was holden so upon surmise made that he is seised of some other Estate or that he held it by other Services by Fitzherbert a Melius inquirendum shall Issue and upon this order given it was decreed accordingly this Term. Morgan versus Tedcastle 4. IN the same Term upon matter of Arbitrement between Morgan and Tedcastle touching certain Lands at Welburn in the County of Lâ—ncoln put to Popham Walmesley and Ewens Baron of the Exchequer Wheras Morgan had granted to Tedcastle a 100. acres of Land in such a field and 60 in such a field and 20. acres of Meadow in such a Meadow in Welburn and Hanstead in which the acres are known by estimations or limits there be shall take the acres as they are known in the same places be they more or lesse then the Statute for they passe as they are there known and not according to the measure by the Statute But if I have a great Close containing 20. acres of Land by estimation which is not 18. And I grant 10. acres of the same Close to another there he shall have them according to the measure by the Statute because the acres of such a Close are not known by parcels or by meets and bounds and so it differeth from the first case And upon the case then put to Anderson Brian and Fennor they were of the same opinion Quod nota Humble versus Oliver 5. IN Debt by Richard Humble against William Oliver for a Rent reserved upon a Lease for years the case was
35 E. Rot. 258. And Popham said further in this case that to erect an Hospitall by the name of an Hospitall in the County of S. or in the Bishopprick of B. and the like is not good because he is bound to a place too large and incertain But a Colledge erected in Accademia Cantabrig or Oxon. is good and sâ—me are so founded because it tends but to a particular place as a City Town c. King versus Bery and Palmer 2. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by William King against John Bery and William Palmer Defendants for two Messuages and certain Lands in Halstead in the County of Leicester upon a Demise alledged to be made by Dorothy Pool and Robert Smith the case upon a speciall Verdict was this The said Dorothy was Tenant for life of the said Tenants the Remainder over to the said Robert Smith and his Heirs and they being so seised made the Lease in the Declaration upon which the Action was brought And per curiam the Lease found by the Verdict doth not warrant the Lease alledged in the Declaration for although they joyned in the Demise yet during the life of the said Dorothy it is her Demise and not the Demise of the said Robert Smith but as his confirmation for that time for he hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land during the life of the said Dorothy but after the death of the said Dorothy then it shall be said to be the Domise of the said Robert Smith and not before because untill this time Smith hath nothing to do to meddle with the Land And in a more strong case If Tenant for life and he in the Reversion in Fee make a Gift in tail for the life of Tenant for life it shall be said to be his Gift but after his death it shall be said the Gift of him in the Reversion and if the Estate tail had expired during the life of the said Tenant for life he shall have the Land again in his former Estate and there shal be no forfeiture in the case because he in the Reversion of the immediate Estate of Inheritance had joyned in it and therfore hath dispensed with that which otherwise had been a meer forfeiture of the Estate for life wherby it was awarded by the Court that the Plaintif take nothing by his Bill in 33 34 Eliz. Rot. And the Judgment is entred Hill 34. Eliz. Ret. 72. 3. In this Term I hapned to see a Case agreed by the Iustices in 3. 4. Eliz. which was this If a man make a Lease of two Barns rendring Rent and for default of payment a Re-entry if the Tenant be at one of the Barns to pay the Rent and the Lessor at the other to demand the Rent and none be there to pay it that yet the Lessor cannot enter for the Condition broken because there was no default in the Tenant he being at one for it was not possible for him to be at both places together And upon this Case now remembred to the Iustices Popham Walmesley and Fennor said That perhaps also the Tenant had not money sufficient to have been ready to have paid it at either of the said places but it is sufficient for him to have and provide one Rent which cannot be at two places together And by the Case reported here also If Lands and Woods are demised together the Rent ought to be demanded at the Land and not the Woood because the Land is the more worthy thing and also more open then the Wood And therfore by the three Iustices aforesaid Rent ought not to be demanded in any private place of a Close as amongst Bushes in a Pit or the like nor in the open and most usuall passage therof as at a Stile Gate and the like 4. Vpon a Prohibition sued out of the Kings Bench the Case appeared to be this The late Lord Rich Father to the now Lord Rich devised to his Daughter for her advancement in marriage 1500. upon condition that she marry with the consent of certain friends and deviseth further that if his Goods and Chattels are not sufficient to pay his Debts and Legacies that then there shall be 200 l. a year of his Lands sold to supply it and dies making the now Lord Rich his Executor his Goods and Chattels not being sufficient to pay the Debts of the Testator as was averred the said Daughter married with a Husband against the will of those who were put in trust to give their assents and the Husband and the Wife sued in the Spirituall Court for the Legacy And it was surmised that they would not allow the proofs of the said now Lord Rich exhihited to prove the payment of the Debts of his Testator and further that they would charge him for the sale of the Land upon which matter the Prohibition was granted to the Delegates before whom the matter depended and now consultation was prayed in the case Vpon which it was affirmed by a Doctor of the Civill Law that they will allow the proofs for the payment of the Debts according to our Law and that the Legacy shall not be paid untill the Debs are satisfied But he said that by the Law if the Executor do not exhibit his Inventory but neglect it for a year or more that then if any omission or default be in the true value of the Inventory exhibited that then such on Executor for this default shall pay all the Legacies of his Testator of what value soever they are not respecting the Debts or the value of the Goods or Chattels how small soever the omission or default be in the Inventory And so he said was the case of the now Sir Richard S. who did not bring in the Inventory for four years after the death of the Testator and that in the Inventory exhibited the values of every thing were found to be too small and therfore to be charged by their Law albeit he hath not Goods and Chattels sufficient of the Testators To which it was answered that this was quite without reason for by such means every Subject of the Realm may be utterly defeated if he take upon him the charge of an Executorship And if this shall be admitted no man will take upon him the Execution of the Will of any and by such a means none will have their Wills performed which shall be too inconvenient And they said further that in as much as Debts are to be proved by the Common Law of the Realm those of the Ecclesiasticall Courts ought to admit in the proof therof such proofs as our Law allows and not according to the precisenesse of their Law And although by their Law such a Condition as before being annexed to a Legacy is void because that marriage oughr to be free without Coercion yet where we are to judge upon the point as we are here if the Execution happen to be charged because of the sale of Land and for
And if this doth not passe nothing can passe which was in the Tenure of the said Brown because he had nothing in the places comprised in the Patent But it was agreed by all the Court that it shall not passe by the said Patent in this case for the word illa is to be restraind by that which follows in the Patent where it depends upon a generality as here and that it refers but to that in Wells as the liberty of that which was parcell of the possessions of the said Hospitall and in the Tenure of the said John Brown And if it were not of these possessions or not in Wells c. or not in the Tenure of the said John Brown it shall not passe for the intent of the King in this case shall not be wrested according to the particular or the value which are things collaterall to the Patent but according to his intent comprised in or to be collected by the Patent it self And Popham said that by Grant of omnia terras Tenementa Hereditamenta sua in case of the Queen nothing passe if it be not restraind to a certainty as in such a Town or late parcell of the Possessions of such a one or of such an Abbey or the like in which cases it passeth as appeareth by 32 H. 8. in case of the King But if it be Omnia terras tenementa sua vocat D. in the Tenure of such a one and in such a Town and late parcell of the possessions of such a one there albeit the Town or the Tenant of the Land be utterly mistaken or that it be mistaken of what possessions it was it is good for it sufficeth that the thing be well and fully named and the other mistakes shall not hurt the Patent And the word of Ex certa scientia c. will nof help the Patent in the principall case And the case of 29 E. 3. is not to be compared to this case for it was thus The King granted the Advowson of the Priory of Mountague the Prior being an Alien to the Earl of Salisbury and his Heirs for ever And also the keeping and Farm with all the Appurtenances and Profits of the said Priory which he himself had curing the War with the keeping of certain Cellâ— belonging to the said Priory the said Earl died William Earl of Salisbury being his Son and Heir and within age wherupon the King reciting that he had seised the Earls Lands into his hands after his death for the Nonage of the Heir he granted to the said Earl all his Advowsons of all the Churches which were his Fathers and all the Advowsons of the Churches which belong to the Prior of Mountague to hold untill the full age of the said Heir quas nuper concessit prefat Comiti patri c. In which case although the King had not granted the Advowsons to the said Earl the Father aforesaid by the former Patent because no mention was of the Advowsons therof yet they passe by this Patent notwithstanding that which follows after to wit and which he granted to the Father of the Grantee But there it is by a Sentence distinct and not fully depending upon the former words as here to wit Omnia illa Messuagia c in Wells in the Tenure of the party parcell of the Possessions of such an Hospitall or Priory Quod nota and the difference And because the Defendant claimed under the first Patent and the Plaintiff by the latter Patent it was agreed that the Plaintiff should recover Which you may see in the Kings Bench. Harrey versus Farcy 7. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Richard Harrey Plaintiff for the Moyety of certain Tenements in North-petherton in the County of Somerset upon a Lease made by Robert Bret against Humfrey Farcy Defendant upon not guilty and a speciall Verdict found the case appeared to be this to wit That Robert Mallet Esquire was seised of the said Tenements in his Demesne as of Fee and so seised demised them to John Clark and Elianor Middleton for term of their lives and of the longer liver of them after which the said Tenements amongst others were assured by Fine to certain persons and their Heirs to the use of the said Robert Mallet for term of his life and after his decease to the use of John Mallet his Son and Heir of his body and for default of such Issue to the use of the right Heirs of the aid Robert Mallet After which the said Robert Mallet having Issue the said John Mallet Christian and Elianor Mallet died the said John Mallet then being within age and upon Office found in the County of Devon for other Lands holden of the Queen in Capite by Knights Service was for it in Ward to the Queen Afterwards the said John Mallet died without Issue during his Nonage and the Lands aforesaid therby descended to his said two Sisters to whom also descended other Lands in the County of Devon holden of the Queen in Capite by Knights Service conveyed also by the same Fine in like manner as the Lands in North Petherton the said Christian then being of the age of 22. years and the said Elianor of the age of 15. yeares upon which the said Christian and Elianor 12. Novemb. 31 Eliz. tendred their Livery before the Master of the Wards and before the Livery sued the said Christian took the said Robert Bret to husband and the said Elianor took to husband one Arthur Ackland after which in the Utas of the Purification of our Lady 32 Eliz. the said Robert Bret and Christian his wife levied a Fine of the said Tenements in North-petherton amongst others to George Bret and John Pecksey Sur conusance de droit come ceo que ils ont de lour done by the name of the Moyety of the Mannor of North petherton c. with warranty against them and the Heirs of the said Christian against all men who tendred it by the same Fine to the said Robert Bret and Christian and the Heirs Males of their bodies the remainder to the Heirs Males of the body of the said Christian the remainder over to the right Heirs of the said Robert Bret which Fine was engrossed the same Term of S. Hillary and the first Proclamation was made the 12th day of February in the same Term the second the first day of June in Easter Term 32 Eliz. The third the 8th day of July in Trinity Term next And the fourth Proclamation was made the 4th day of October in Michaelmas Term next after And the said Christian died without Issue of her body The 9th day of February 32 Eliz. between the hours of 3. 7. in the afternoon of the same day And the 22. of March 32 Eliz. the said Robert Bret by his writing indented dated the same day and year for a certain summ of money to him paid by the Queen bargained and sold gave and granted the said Teuements to the
said Queen her Heirs and Successors for ever which Deed was acknowledged the 25th day of March 32 Eliz. and enrolled in the Chancery the 12th day of May in thâ— same year And there was a Proviso in the same Deed that if the said Robert Bret shall pay to the Queen at the receipt of the Exchequer 5 s. of lawfull money that then the said Gift Grant Bargain and Sale shall be void and that from thence-forward it shall be lawfull for the said Robert Bret and his Heirs to re-enter into the said Tenements and in the mean time between the Inrolement of this Deed And the said 14th day of Octob. to wit the 15th day of September 32 Eliz. the said Arthur upon the said Tenements in North-petherton entred and claimed the Reversion therof in the right of the said Elianor his wife by reason of the death of the said Christian And that afterwards to wit the 30th day of February 33 Eliz. the said Robert Bret to redeem the said Tenements out of the Queen paid the said 5 s. at the receipt of the Exchequer which payment is there recorded and enrolled accordingly after which in September 34 Eliz. the said Arthur and Elianor sued out a speciall Livery of the said Elianor out of the hands of the Queen of all the Lands seised into the hands of the Queen by reason of the Nonage of the said John Mallet And afterwards in the same meneth of September 34 Eliz. the said Arthur and Elianor sued out another speciall Livery as Heir to the said Christian of all the Lands which were in the Queens hands by the death of the said Christian And it was further found that the said John Clark and Elianor Middleton died after the 5 s. paid as before and that the said Robert Bret entred the 8th day of October 34 Eliz. and then made the Lease to the Plaintiff upon which the Defendant by commandment of the said Arthur and with him entred upon the Plaintiff and the generall question was Whether the entry of the Defendant were lawfull But no ouster of the Plaintiff was found And by Clench and Fennor a Fee-simple passe at Common Law by a Fine levied by him in Reversion or Remainder in Tail because a Fine is said to be a Feoffment of Record and by their entry and Feoffment a Fee-simple passe in such a case at Common Law But by Popham and Gaudy a Fee-simple doth not passe nor nothing but that which Tenant in Tail may lawfully grant over which is for his life in which he said that Littleton was plain in all cases of Grant although it be by Fine and a Fee-simple does not passe at Common Law but where the Fee may be drawn out of him who had the Reversion or Remainder in Fee therupon if such a Reversion or Remainder had been in a stranger which had not been in this case if the Reversion or Remainder had been in a stranger and therfore a Discontinuance cannot be of an Intail where the Reversion or Remainder is in the King But by them all however it was at Common Law it is cleer upon the Statute of Fines that a Fee-simple determinable passe by such a Fine as soon as the Fine is levied because every Fine by presumption of Law shall be taken to be such wherupon proclamation is made untill the contrary therof appeareth to the Court. And this is the reason why a Quid juris clamat is at this day maintained upon such a Fine which was not at Common Law before this Statute or otherwise it will never lye And so it was holden lately in the Common Bench in the case of Iustice Wimondham and yet we may see that the Quid juris clamat ought to be brought before that the Fine be engrossed wherby it is manifest that now a Fee-simple shall passe by the Fine levied for the possibility of the Proclamations to wit that the Proclamations shall not be made and to this Fee-simple the Proclamations shall enure to make a bar to the Estate-tail But such a Fine by Popham and Gawdy was not any wrong to him who had the Reversion or Remainder in Fee being levied by him who had a mean Reversion or Remainder in Tail depending upon an Estate for life or in Tail precedent And it is cleer that the Proclamations do not make the Estate but enure to the Estate made by the Fine for if an Estate be granted in Reversion for life or in Tail by Fine with Proclamations by such a Tenant in Tail in Reversion or Remainder the Proclamations work to this Estate and no further for alwaies the Estate passe by the Fine and the Proclamations make the Bar according to the Estate which passe by the Fine before But by Clench Gawdy and Fennor the Fee-simple which was in the Queen after the Fine levied as before was divested by means of this claim made upon the possession of the Queen lo that the Proclamations following are of no force to hurt the Estate tail for they said in divers cases a possession may be invested out of the Queen without Office Petition or Monstrans de droit as the case is where a man devise that his Land shall be sold and in the mean time before the sale the possession of the Land cometh to the Queen and afterwards the Land is sold according to the Will the Vendee enter there the Land passe from the Queen therby and is divested and so in many other cases And in all cases where the Queens Estate is determined the Subject may enter into the Land without Office or Ouster le main c. And they said if it had been in the possession of a common person that by such a claim the force of the Fine had been defeated and this appeareth by the case between Smith and Stapleton in the Commentaries where it is holden that where a Fine is levied with Proclamations by Tenant in Tail of an Advowson Rent or Tithes by claim made by the Issue in Tail before the Proclamations are passed where the Tenant in Tail is dead the same is defeated and that the Proclamations passing afterwards shall not be of force to bar the Intail And they said that the conveyance therof to the Queen after the Fine levied doth not make it to be in worse case And admit it will not serve against the Queen yet the claim will serve against Bret when he had entred by the performance of the Condition And Clench and Gawdy said that Bret shall not take advantage of this covenous Deed made by himself of very purpose to bar the party who had right and to put him without remedy no more then where the Disseisor enfeoff his Father who dies seised he shall not take advantage of this descent or if he who hath cause of Action to recover Lands by Covin causeth another to enter into the Lands to the intent to recover against him and does it accordingly for the Covin the Recovery shall
wit the 6th day of July in the same 6th year by his Deed of the same date the said Christopher enfeoffed the said Sir John Chichester and his Heirs of the said Mannor and by the same Deed warranted it for him and his Heirs to the said Sir John Chichester and his Heirs wherupon the said Sir John Chichester entred into the said Mannor after which to wit the first day of October 12 Eliz. the said Christopher died after which the 7th day of November 13 Eliz. the said Stretchley Chudleigh died without Issue of his body And after the death of the said Sir Richard Chudleigh to wit the 6th day of September 7 Eliz. the said Sir John Chichester enfeoffed one Philip Chichester and his Heirs of the said Mannor to the use of the said Philip and his Heirs And the said Close being Copyhold and Customary Land of the said Mannor demisable by the Lord of the same Mannor or his Steward for the time being for life or lives by Copy of Court-roll according to the custom of the said Mannor The said Philip at a Court holden at the said Mannor for the said Mannor the 8th day of December 15 Eliz. by Copy of Court-roll granted the said Close to the said John Frain for Term of his life according to the custom of the said Mannor after which to wit the 11th day of March 28 Eliz. the said John Chudleigh being now Heir to the said Christopher enfeoffed the said William Dillon of the said Mannor to have and to hold to him and his Heirs to the use of the said William and his Heirs for ever wherby he entred and was seised untill the said John Fraine entred into the said Close upon him the 8th day of February 30 Eliz. upon which entry of the said Fraine this Action is brought And for difficulty of the case it was adjourned into the Exchequer Chamber before all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchequer And there it was agreed by all that a Warranty descending upon an Infant shall not bind him in case that the entry of the Infant be lawfull into the Land to which the Warranty is united But the Infant ought in such a case to look well that he do not suffer a descent of the Land after his full age before he hath made his re-entry for then the Warranty when he is to have an Action for the Land shall bind him And they agreed also that a Copyhold granted by a Disseisor or any other who hath the Mannor of which it is parcel by wrong shall be avoided by the Disseisee or any other who hath right to the Mannor by his entry or recovery of the Mannor And so by Popham it was agreed by the Iustices in the case of the Manner of Hasselbury Brian in the County of Dorset between Henry late Earl of Arundell and Henry late Earl of Northumberland but then he said that it was agreed that admittance upon surrenders of Copyholders in Fee to the use of another or if an Heir in case of a Descent of a Copyhold were good being made by a Disseisor of a Mannor or any other who hath it by Tort because these are acts of necessity and for the benefit of a stranger to wit of him who is to have the Land by the surrender or of the Heir And also Grants made by Copy by the Feoffee upon condition of a Mannor before the Condition broken are good because he was lawfull Dominus pro tempore And for the matter upon the Statute of 27 H. 8. what shall become of this future use â—imited to the first second and other Issues Males not in Esse at the time of the Feoffment Ewens Owen Bateman and Fennor said That an Use at Common Law is Use what it is no other then a confidence which one person puts in another for a confidence cannot be in Land or other dead thing but ought alwaies to be in such a thing which hath understanding of the trust put in him which cannot be no other then such a one who hâ—th reason and understanding to perform what the other hath committed to him which confidence shall bind but in privity and yet the confidence is in respect of the Land but every one who hath the Land is not bound to the confidence but in privity shall be said to be in the Heir and the Feoffee who hath knowledge of the confidence and in him who cometh to the Land by Feoffâ—ent without consideration albeit he hath no knowledge therof and yet every Feoffee is not bound although he hath knowledge of the confidence as an Alien Person Attaint and the like not the King he shall not be seised to anothers use because he is not compellable to perform the confidence nor a Corporation because it is a dead body although it consist of naturall persons and in this dead body a confidence cannot be put but in bodies naturall And this was the Common Law before the Statute of 27 H. 8. Then the Letter of the Statute is not to execute any Vse before that it hapneth to be an Vse in Esse for the words are Where any person is seised to the use of any other person that in such a case he who hath the Vse shall have the same Estate in the Land which he had before in the Vse Ergo by the very letter of the Law he ought to have an Estate in the Vse and there ought to be a person to have the Vse before the Statute intends to execute any possession to the Vse for the words are expresse that in every such case he shall have it therfore not another And therfore the Statute had purpose to execute the Vses in possession Reversion or Remainder presently upon the conveyance made to the Vses But for the future Vses which were to be raised at a time to come upon any contingent as to the Infants here not being then born the Statute never intended to execute such Vses untill they happen to have their beeing and in the mean time to leave them as they were at Common Law without medling with or altering of them in any manner untill this time and if before this time the root out of which these contingent Vses ought to spring be defeated the Vse for this is utterly destroyed and shall never afterwards have his being as here by the Feoffment made by the said Sir John Saintleger and his Co-feoffees who then were but as Tenements pur auter vie to wit for the life of Christopher and which was a forfeiture of their Estate and for which Oliver Chudleigh might have entred it being before that the said Strechley or John Chudleigh were born the privity of them from Estate being the root out of which this future use ought to have risen is gone and destroyed and therfore the Contingent Vses utterly therby overthrown As if before the Statute of 27 H. 8. Tenant for life had been the remainder over in Fee to an Vse
If the Tenant for life had made a Feoffment in Fee and he in the Remainder had released to the Feoffee the Vse had been gone for ever so in all these cases of contingent Vses at this day for he who cometh to the possession of Land by Disseisin or wrong done to the Possessor who is seised to anothers use shall never be seised to anothers use And the case being so that it is out of the letter of the Statute to execute such contingent Vses it is more strong for them out of the meaning of the Statute to execute then before they happen to be in Esse for this shall be to make all mischiefs comprehended in the Preamble of this Statute and against which the Statute intended to provide sufficient remedy in a worse mischief then they were before the making of the same Statute and this shall be but a perverse instruction of the Statute And they said that the subtleties used from time to time by means of those Vses to the great deceit and trouble of the people were the cause of the making of this Statute 27 H. 8. and by all the Statutes formerly made touching Vses it appeareth that they were all taken to be grounded upon fraudulent and crafty devises and therfore this Law had no great purpose to favour them but a Fortiorari not to make them in worse case by means of the Statute then they were before and therfore it shall not be taken that the Vse is executed by the Statute which stands upon a contingency of which a greater mischief will ensue then there was in such a case before the Statute and therfore by the Feoffment made in the interim before the birth of the Infants which otherwise ought to have preserved the Vse this Vse was utterly destroyed and although the Feoffee of Christopher had notice of the Vse yet this doth not now help in the case because the Feoffment did wrong to the Estate first setled which was subject to the Vse and extinct in the same possibility which had been otherwise in the Feoffees to have given livelyhood to the said Contingent Vse And therfore the Iudgment by them ought to be that the Plaintiff shall be barred Walmesley That the great mischief which was at Common Law upon these Feoffments to Uses was that none could know upon the occupation of the Land who was true Owner of the Land for Cestay que Vse was the Pernor of the Profits but in whom the Freehold or Inheritance of the Land was there were not many which knew wherby great mischief came to the assurances which men had of Land which they purchased and by it men knew not against whom to bring their Actions to recover their Rights and by it Wives lost their Dowers Husbands their Tenancy by the Curtesie Lords their Escheats Wardships and the like And this mischief hapned by reason that one had the profit and another the estate of the Land And the Statute was made to put the Land and the Estate quite out of the Feoffee who before did not meddle with the Land to Cestay que Use who before had but the occupation and profits of the Land and to this intent the letter of the Law serves very well which sayes that the Estate of the Feoffee shall be cleerly in Cestuy que Use and therfore nothing by the intent and letter of the Law is now to remain in the Feoffee no more then a Scintilla juris nemor'd in Brents Case in my Lord Dyer Eliz. and the whole Estate in the interim untill the contingent happen shall be in them who have their Vses in Esse and when the Contingent happen the Statute gives place to this Contingent Vse and by the execution therof comes between the Estates before executed and as out of these by the Statute but nothing is now after the Statute in the Feoffees for the purpose of the Statute was as I have said to take away all from the Feoffee for all was devested from him because that betwixt the Feoffor the Feoffee was all the fraud before the Statute and the very letter of the Statute is to extinguish and extirpate the assurances fraudulently made which was alwaies by reason of assurances made between the Estate of the Land in one and the possession therof in another and to cause that now that the Estate shall be to the use where the occupation was before And this Statute was not made to extinguish or discredit Vses but to advance them as by bringing the very Estate in possession to the Vse and by it the trust now taken from all others who were trusted with it before so the Statute doth not condemn the uses but the fraud which was by reason of them before And the Statute being that the Estate Right and Title of the Feoffees shall go to the uses therfore nothing remaineth in the Feoffees but all by authority of Parliament adjudged to be in Cestay que use which is the highest Iudgment that can be given in any Court and the words Stand and be seised at any time refer as well to the future as present uses and the Statute intended as well to help the uses which shall be upon any Contingent as those which are at present for a future or contingent Vse is to be said an Vse according to its nature or quality and it shall be executed according to its quality when it happen And the words are that the Estate which was in the Feoffee shall be in Cestay que use and not the Estate which is and therfore when the use hapneth to be in an instant the Estate which at the first Livery was in the Feoffee to this use shall now be executed in possession to this contingent use albeit it self was altogether executed as I said before in the Vses which were in Esse and if so it followeth that nothing which is done in the mean time by the Feoffee or can be done by any other can prejudice or hurt the execution of this Vse in contingency when the contingency happen And for the case of Brook 30 H. 8. it is plain in paint which is this A Covenant with B. that if B. enfeoff him of three acres of Land in D. that then the said A. and his Heirs and all others seised of such Lands shall stand therof seised to the use of the said B. and his Heirs after which A enfeoffed a stranger of this Land after which B. enfeoffed the said A of the said three acres now the use shall be to the said B. and his Heirs of the said other Land for the Statute so binds the Land to this Contingency when it happens that by no means it can be defeated and this is the cause that Leases made by force of Provisoes comprised in assurances are good and cannot be avoided for the Interests to these Leases is wrought by the first Livery and the Statute atd therfore upon the matter I conceive that Judgment ought
to be given for the Plaintiff Gawdy conceived that it is executed by the intent but not by the letter of the Statute for the purpose was to remove all the Estate from the Feoffee and to put it in Cestay que use wholly to wit in possessions to the Vses which were in Esse and in aleyance as to the Vses which were to come and contingent and now by the same Statute the contingency of the possession shal go in licence of the contingent Vse and now an Vse limited to one for life with Remainder over to the Heirs of the body of I. S. or to the first Son of I. S. shall be in the same manner as if Land at this day had been letten to one for life with Remainder over to the Heirs of the body of I. S. or to the first Son of I. S. and not otherwise for the quality which he had in the Vse the same by the very letter of the Statute he shall now have in the possession and Estate of the Land and the Statute is not to undo any Vse but to transfer an Estate in the Land to the Vse But he said That by the Feoffment made to Christopher the Contingent remainder which was devested in Stretchly and Iohn Chudleigh depending upon the Estate which Sir Iohn Saintleger and his Co-feoffees had for the life of Christopher is utterly gone and destroyed in the same manner as where a Lease is made for life the remainder to the right Heirs of I. S. or to the Heirs of the body of I S. if the Tenant for life dies or aliens wherby he makes a forfeiture and determines his Estate in the life of the said I. S. his Heir shall never have the Land by the remainder afterwards because he was not in Esse as an Heir at the time when the Estate ended for there cannot be a remainder without a particular Estate neither can it stand or be preserved And as in this case without a particular Estate of Free-hold a Remainder cannot be no more in the case now in question being now become by means of the Statute as if it had been an Estate executed in possession and for this cause only he conceived that Judgment ought to be given against the Plaintiff And Clench agreed with this opinion in all and both of them agreed if there be none to take the Vse according to the limitation at the time when it falleth to be in Possessions that he shall never take it although it happen to be in Esse afterwards Clark said that Uses were not at Common Law but grew by sufferance of time as appeareth by the words of the Statute it self and the mischief and subtlety which was before this Statute was not in the Fine Feoffment or other Assurances of Land but by means oâ— the Uses limitted therupon contrary to that which was used in the ancient course oâ— the Common Law and the Statute was made to reduce the Common Law to its ancient force and course and therfore ought to conceive such a construction as may agree with the purpose of the makers of the Statute and therfore the best construction of this Statute is not to execute other manner of Uses but in some cases to extinguish them as where it is such as will make the case in as ill or worse condition then it was before the making of the Statute It hath been agreed by all that the Statute doth not execute any Use which was suspended at the time of the making of the Statute as by reason of a Disseisor or the like hapning before and if it doth not execute the Use which is in suspence for the right which he had in the Use how can it execute the Use which hath not any being for in such cases of Infants not born as here untill they be in Rerum natura the Use cannot have any being And in the same manner in all cases where the Vse is not to rise but upon a future contingent And what good shall this Statute do if these leaping Vses shall arise without being impeached Nothing but alwaies nourish a Viper in the bosom of the Law which is quite against the intent of the makers of the Statute The Law was made to preserve peace amongst the Subjects and to assure their Possessions as many other Statutes did that were made about this time as the Statutes of Fines Wills and others But if the exposition of this Statute shall be as the other side hath taken it it will make the confusion which will happen therupon intollerable and much worse then it was before the Statute was made and as Walsh said if no assurance can be made to be forcible against such a contingent Use this will make it worse then it was before And hesaid that it was not to be compared to the interest of Lands to begin at a time to come nor to the case where a man devise that his Land shal be sold in which case be shall not be impeached by any manner of assurance to be made in the mean time by the Heir and the reason is because the Vendee takes by the Will under the Estate of the Heir and not by the sale and therfore upon the matter he conceived that the Plaintiff ought to be barred Periam said that Uses were at Common Law and to prove it he vouched 24 H. 8. abridged in Brook And he said that there have been alwaies trusts Ergo Uses ab initio but they had not such estimation at the beginning as they have had by continuance of time and so it was of Copyholds And these Uses at Common Law bind but in privity according to the trust but do not bind in the possession of him who cometh to the Land in the Post But now by the Statute all trusts are gone and the Estate of the Land it self transferred to the Use and now the Use guides the Land and not the Land the Use And the Statute did not intend to destroy any Use but to bring it back to the Possession according to the course of the common Law and to avoid the fraud And as before the Statute the Use it self in such a case of Contingency was in obeyance for the time so now the Estate it self is in obeyance by the Statute which wills that he shall now have an Estate in the Land it self of such a quality as he had before in the Use for the Statute puts all cleerly out of the Feoffees and it is not inconvenient to have a Possession so to a Contingent Use and if it had not been in the words of the Statute yet as hath been sayd it shall be so taken by the intent of the Statute for it never was the intent of the makers of the Statute to do wrong to any by means of the Statute And therfore he put the case of Cramner who made a Feoffment to the use of himself for his life and after his decease to the use
the Causa Matrimonii prolocuti which as they pretend ought to prove that there was a trust at Common Law And the other the Statute of Marlbridge that the Lord in case of Wards against Feoffments made by Collusion which Feoffments they alledge prove that a trust then was To which it was said that the gift made by a woman to another to the intent that he shal marry her hath in it a Condition more properly implied to wit that if he doe not marry her that she shall have her land back againe for which the Common Law gives her remedy by the Action aforesaid for if it had been but a trust no remedy had been by the Common Law And for the Statute of Marlbridge the contrary therunto is manifestly proved for the Statute speaks but of Feoffments made to Heirs apparants or upon Condition or to the intent to enffeoff the Heir at his full age or the like in which cases the use alwayes goes with the Possessions and is not to the Feffor And the Statute of 4. H. 7. was made in vaine which gives the Wardship of Cestuy que use where no Will is declared which had not been needfull if Feoffments within the Statute of Marlbridge had been said to have been to Uses And without doubt if those who made the Statute of Marlbridge had then had knowledge of these Feoffments to Uses which were so mischievous and more then the other Feoffments by Collusion they then would have provided remedy for these cases of Uses Also the Statute de Religiosis ordains that Nec arte nec ingenio Lands shal not be conveyed in Mortmain and therby it was conceived that a full provision had been made against these Mortmains and yet in 15 Rich. 2. Provision was made against Uses conveyed in Mortmain to Religious or other Corporations of which they took the Profits And without doubt those who were so precise in the making of the Statute of Religiosis against Mortmains would also have made provision for the uses if they had then been known But to cleer this point without all controversie the Statute it self of uses 27 H. 8. makes it plain which saith expresly that by the Common Law of the Realm Lands or Tenements ought not to passe from one to another without solemn Livery matter of Record or writing and that these Feoffments to uses were Errors used and accustomed within the Realm to the Subversion of the ancient Laws therfore it stands not with the ancient Common Law of the Realm as all the Parliment took it which is more to be regarded then any Book vouched But see how and when they began and crept in at Common Law and it shall be easily perceived as it hath been well said by some of those who argued to this point at the beginning that they began by two means to wit by fraud and by fear And he said that the first Book which he had seen in all the Books of the Law which tend to an use is the case of 8. Assise which makes mention that the Counsee of a Fine entred into the Land in the right of another which is to be taken to anothers use And in the Quadragessimâ—s of Edw. 3. mention is made of the Feoffees of the Lord Burglash who sued to the King by petition and by the Statute of 50 Ed. 3. cap. 6. mention is made that divers gave their Lands to their Friends to have the profits and afterwards fled to priviledged places and lived there to the hinderance of their Creditors And therfore it was provided that in such a case execution shall be made as if no such assurance had been made And by 2 Rich. 2. these are called Feoffments to uses and made by craft to deceive Creditors and there is the first mention which is made in any Statute of the word Use So fraud hath been alwaies the chief foundation of these Vses yet in time they began to have some credit in the Law And this was when men saw that the Court of Conscience gave remedy in these cases against such who had not the conscience themselves to perform the trust put in them and to take away the danger which hapned to an infinite number of good Subjects upon the Garboyls which hapned between the time of E. 3. and that of King H. 7. caused that in effect all the Possessions of the Realm were put in Feoffments to uses And the first case in the Law which speaks of this word Use which he ever saw was as he said in 5 H. 4. And in the like case by Gascoign 7 H. 4. no remedy is given by the Law for Cestay que use and afterwards it crept into the Law as appeareth yet as an Error of long time used And if before the Statute of 27 H 8. a Lease had been made for life the remainder in Fee to the use of B. for life the remainder to the use of the first Son of the said B. and so further as here If the Tenant for life had made a Feoffment in Fee to a stranger and had not given the stranger notice of the Use and all this were without consideration and afterwards he in the Remainder in Fee to the Use had released all his Right to the said stranger every one of them had been hereby without remedy for their Uses Were the Son of B. born before or after this wrong done So if it were at Common Law before this Statute as hath been weâ—l said and the Law being so before this Statute then he said it was to be seen what was to be done in the case after the Statute which will stand altogether upon this what will become of these contingent Vses to the Sons not born at the time of the said Feoffment made by Sir John Saintleger and his Co-feoffees by this Statute of 27 H. 8. and it seems to him cleerly that no possession is executed to any contingent use by this Statute untill it comes in being and that as the case is here and in some other speciall cases it shall never be executed And one cause why such a contingent Vse shall not be executed is because it doth not stand with the letter of the Law but rather is against the letter Another cause is because it is utterly against the intent of the Law to execute it as the case is here It doth not stand with the Letter of the Statute for this is Where any person or persons stand seised to the use of any other person or persons c. And it is cleer that none can stand seised to the use of him who is not neither can he who is not in rerum natura have any use therfore the case here doth not stand with the letter of the Statute to be now executed And further the words following are that in every such case every person who hath such an Use in Fee-simples Fee-tail for life for years c. or otherwise in Remainder or
time to come and therfore by this exposition much more to the disinherison of the Heir then it was before the making of this Statute And which is more mischievous if a Feme putein happen to be in such a house who happen to have Children in Adultery these Bastards shall have the Land against the will of the Father to the utter disinherison of the true Heirs and against the intent of him who made the limitation by which we may see the just Judgment of of God upon these who attempt by humane pollicy to circumvent the divine providence of God for the time to come and of this also I have seen an example And now to the mischief that men do not know against whom to bring their Actions to sue for their Rights and it is cleer that now by such an exposition they shall be now in much worse condition then they were before for before the Action was given against him who received the Profits which is now gone by this Statute in the cases of Free-hold and therfore if the other exposition shall hold place it is cleer that untill the Statute of 13 Eliz. men might have been by means of this Statute put out of all remedy to recover their rights by any manner of Action as some put it in practice as to make Feoffments to the use of the Feoffor and his Heirs untill any intend to bring an Action against him for this Land and then over to others upon the like limâ—tation with a Proviso to make it void at his pleasure and the like and what mischief shall then be for the time upon such an exposition such that Justice therby cannot be done to the Subject and what an absurdity shall it be to say that such an Exposition can stand with the intent of the Makers of the Law And to that which hath been argued on the other side and first to that which was said by Walmsley That the Right Estate and Possession is wholly out of the Feoffee and vested to the Vses which have their beeing by the Statute and that upon the Contingents hapning their Estates uncouple and give place to the contingent Vse then executed and that the execution therof shall be by a Possession dâ—awn to it out of the Possession which was before executed by the Statute in another I say that this Statute can by no means have such an exposition for this is as much as to say that an Vse may arise upon an Vse contrary to what is adjudged 36 H. 8. That a Bargain and Sale by a Deed indented and enrolled cannot be at this day of Land to one to the Vse of another And if a man enfeoff another to the use of I. S. and his Heirs and if I. N. pay such a summ that then the said I. S. and his Heirs shall be seised of the same Land to the use of the said I. N. and the Heirs of his body I. â— paies the money yet the Vse doth not rise out of the Possession of the said I. S. But if it had been that upon the payment the first Feoffee and his Heirs shall stand seised to the use of the said I. N. and the Heirs of his body it shall be otherwise therfore somthing remains to the first Feoffee in the Judgment of the Law And I remember that when I was a Counsellor at Law in the time of the Lord Dyer where a Feoffment was made to the Vse of one for life with Remainders over with restraint to alien and with power given to Tenant for life to make Leases for one and twenty years or three lives it was much doubted whether this power so limited to him without words in the Assurance that the Feoffee and his Heirs shall stand seised to these Vses shall be good to make such Leases or not And therfore suppose that a man bargains and sells Land to one for his life by Deed indented and inrolled and make therin a Proviso that the Tenant for life may make such Leases this is to no purpose as to power to make a Lease but the strongest case which he put was that of 30 H. 8. which I agreed to be Law as it is there put whether it were before or after the Statute of 27 H 8. for it is not there put that the Feoffment was made upon any consideration to the stranger in which case although he had no notice of the first Covenant yet in such a case he shall take the Possession subject to the Vse to which it was bound by the present Covenant But if you consider the case well you shall see that it was a case before the Statute for it followeth presently in the same case that it is there said that it is not like the case where the Feoffees in Vse fell the Land to one who hath no notice of the first Vse wherby it appeareth that it was a case before the Statute for otherwise there had been no cause to have spoken then of the Feoffees to an Vse and by the same it appeareth if the Covenantor had bargained and sold the Land to another the same Vse had never risen upon the Covenant and therfore it is cleer against the Law that the Possession shall be bound wâ—th such an Vse in whosoevers hand it comes And to that which Peâ—â—am said in the case of these Contingent Vses they shall now by the Statute be in the same degree as if Land it self had been so conveyed and that now the Land shall be in Contingency in stead of the Vse and that by such manner it shall be executed and that by such means all is utterly out of the Feoffees because the Statute was made to determine all â—â—â—ter of trust to be hereafter reposed in any Feoffee this is well spoken but not well proved for as I have said before it is an exposition quite contrary to the letter and intention of the Law And I agree as hath been said if there be none to take the Use at the time that it falleth to be in possession according to the limitation that he shall never take it afterwards no more of an Use upon the Statute then of â—n Use at Common Law As if an Use be limitted for life the remainder to the right Heirs of I. S. if the Estate for life be determined in the life of I S. the remainder shall never vest afterwards in the right Heirs of I. S. no more then if an Estate had been so made But this makes for me to wit that the Estate upon the Uses executed by the Statute shall be of the same condition as Estates in possession were at Common Law and that they being executed ought also to be such of which the Common Law makes allowance And by way of argument I agree for the time that it is as hath been said by them who maintain that an Use may be in suspence as to that which is an Use in its proper nature for it is
in his custody and offered to the said Sheriff to put him in the Indenture amongst his other Prisoners delivered to the new Sheriff but would hâ—ve had the said old Sheriff to have sent for the said new Sheriff to have taken him into his custody but the new Sheriff refused to receive him unlesse Dabridgecourt would deliver him into the common Gaol of the County which was in the Town of Warwick wherupon afterwards the Prisoner escaped And Dabridgecourt was charged with this Escape and not the new Sheriff for he is not compellable to take the Prisoners of the delivery of the old Sheriff but in the common Goal of the County and the old Sheriff remains chargeable with the Prisoner untill he be lawfully discharged of him and if the Sheriff dies the party shall be rather at a prejudice then the new Sheriff without cause charged with him And in such a case the party who sued the execution may help himself to wit by the remaining of the body by a Corpus cum causa wherby he may be brought to be duly in execution and this under a due Officer And Anderson Periam and other Iustices were also of opinion that the said Skinner and Catcher are to be charged with the escape in the principall case wherupon Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff which was entred Hillar 34 Eliz. Rot. 169. in the B. R. Fulwood versus Ward 2. IN a Writ of Annuity brought in the Common Pleas by George Fulwood Plaintiff against William Ward Defendant the Case was thus The Queen was seised of a Barn and Tithes of Stretton in the County of Stafford for the life of the Lord Paget and being so seised demised it by Letters Patents dated 21. June 29 Eliz. to the said William Ward for 21. years wherupon the said Ward by Writing dated 30. Iune 29 Eliz. granted to the said Plaintiff an Annuity or yearly Rent of 10 l. out of the said Barn and Tithes for 15. years then next ensuing payable yearly upon the 8. day of November with clause of Distresse The Lord Paget died the first day of March 32 Eliz. and for the Arrearages after his death the Plaintiff brought this Writ of Annuity and for the difficulty therof in the Common Pleas the Case came this Term to be argued before all the Iustices and Barons at Serjeants-Inn in Fleetstreet where it was agreed by Walmsley Fennor and Owen that the Annuity was gone by the determination â—â— his Estate in the Land who made the Grant for they said that presently upon the Grant made as before it was a Rent-charge for by such a Rent granted in Fee the Fee shall be in his Heirs albeit the Grantee dies before any Election made and such a Rent is payable from the beginning at the Land as appeareth by 12 E. 4. And by grant of Omnia terras tenementa hereditamenta such â— Rent will passe ergo it is a Rent-charge and not an Annuity untill the Election made and by the determination therof in the nature of a Rent the Election is gone as by Babington and Martin 9 H. 6. by the recovery of Lâ—nd charged with such a Rent by elder Title the Annuity is gone as it seeâ—s by their opinion and by them and by Littleton upon a Rent-charg◠〈◊〉 with Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor 〈…〉 exclude the charge of the person which proves that the Land is charâ—â—â— Originally and not the person for otherwise the Proviso would be void for the repugnancy And if so whensoever the Land is discharged as by 〈…〉 â—â—â—cent or the like the person therby is also discharged and therfore â—he Iuâ—gment here shall be that the Plaintiff shall be barred But by the chief Iustices chief Baron and all the other Iustices and Barons the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment in this case to recover the Annuity for the Law gives him at the beginning an Election to have it as a Rent or an Annuity which matter of election shall not be taken from him but by his own Deed and folly as in case where he purchase part of the land charged in which case by his own Act he hath excluded himself of his Election But if a Feoffee upon condition grant a Rent-charge and presently break the Condition wherupon the Feoffor re-enter shall not the Feoffee be charged by Writ of Annuity surely it shall be against all reason that he by his own act without any folly of the Grantee shall exclude the Grantee of his Election which the Law gives at the beginning And they denied the opinion of 9 H. 6. to be Law But if the Disseisor grant a Rent-charge to the Disseisee out of the Land which he had by the Disseisen by his re-entry before the Annuity brought the Annuity is gone for this was his own act yet in effect all of them agreed that Prima facie it shall be taken as a Rent-charge of which the Wife shall be endowed as hath been said which passe by grant of Omnia hereditamenta and which is payable at the Land but the reason is because it is expresly granted out of the Land and also for the presumption of Law that it is more beneficiall for the Grantee to have it in such a degree then in the other But neither the presumption of Law nor the expresse Grant therof as a Rent shall not take away from the Grantee the benefit of his Election where no default was in him but that upon his Election he may make it to be otherwise as ab initio And therfore by Popham If a Rent-charge be granted in tail the Grantee may bring a Writ of Annuity and therby prejudice his Issue because that then it shall not be taken to be an Intail but as a Fee-simple conditionall ab initio And if a Termer for two years grant a Rent-charge in fee this as to the Land is but a Rent charge for two years and if he avow for it upon the determination of the Term the Rent is gone but by way of Annuity it remains for ever if it be granted for him and his Heirs and assets descend from him who granted it And if a Rent-charge be granted in fee and doth not say for him and his Heirs if the Grantee brings his Writ of Annuity the Heir shall never be charged therwith yet if he had taken it as a Rent-charge the Land had been charged with it in perpetuity And by him the cause why the Proviso that he shall not charge the person of the Grantor upon the grant of a Rent-charge is good is because the person is not expresly charged by such a Grant but by operation of Law But in such a case a Proviso that he shall not charge his Land is meerly void for the repugnancy because there the Land is expresly charged by precised words and therfore if it be expresly comprised in such a Grant that the Grantee may charge the Land or the person of the
Grantor at his Election provided then afterwards that he shall charge his person is not good Causa patet And all agreed that upon a Rent granted upon equality of partition or for allowance of Dower or for recompence of a Title an Annuity doth not lye because it is in satisfaction of a thing reall and therfore shall not fall to a matter personall but alwaies remains of the same nature as the thing for which it is given And afterwards the same Term Iudgment was given in the Common Bench that the Plaintiff shall recover which is entred c. And in the same case Clark vouched that it was reported by Benloes in his Book of Reports where a Rent was granted out of a Rectory by the Parson who after wards resigned the Parsonage that it was agreed in the Common Pleas in his time that yet a Writ of Annuity lies against the Grantor upon the same Grant to which all who agreed on this part agreed that it was Law Butler versus Baker and Delves 3. IN Trespasse brought by John Butler against Thomas Baker and Thomas See this case in Cookes 3. Report foâ— 25 Delves for breaking his Close parcell of the Mannor of Thoby in the County of Essex upon a speciall Verdict the Case was thus William Barners the Father was seised in his Demesne as of fee of the Mannor of Hinton in the County of Glocester holden of the King by Knights-service in Capite and being so seised after the Marriage had between William his Son and heir apparant and Elizabeth the Daughter of Thomas Eden Esquire in consideration of the same Marriage and for the Joynture of the said Elizabeth assured the said Mannor of Hinton to the use of the said William the Son and Elizabeth his Wife and the Heirs of their two bodies lawfully begotten and died by whose death the Reversion also of the said Mannors descended to the said William the Son whâ—rby he was seised therof accordingly and being so seised and also seised of the Mannor of Thoby in his Demesne as of Fee holden also of the Queen by Knights-servivice in chief and of certain Lands in Fobbing in the said County of Essex which Land in Fobbing with the Mannor of Hinton were the full third part of the value of all the Land of the said William the Son and he made his Will in writing wherby he devised to his said Wife Elizabeth his said Mannor of Thoby for her life in satisfaction of all her Joynture and Dower upon condition that if she take to any other Joynture that then the Devise to her shall be void and after her decease he devised that the said Mannor shall remain to Thomas his Son and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue the remainder to Thomas brother of the said William for his life the remainder to hir first second and third Son and to the Heirs Males of their bodies and so to every other Issue Male of his body and for default of such Issue the remainder to Leonard Barners his brother and to the Heirs Males of his body the remainder to Richard Barners and the Heirs Males of his body the remainder to the right Heirs of the Devisor William the Son dies having Issue Thomas his Son and Grisell his Daughter Wife to the said Thomas Baker the said Elizabeth by Paroll in pais moved her Estate in the said Mannor of Hinton and after this entred into the said Mannor of Thoby after which the said Elizabeth died and Thomas the Son and Thomas the Uncle died also without Issue Male after which the said Leonard took one Mary to Wife and died having Issue Anthony Barners after which the said Mary took the said John Butler to Husband and after this the said Anthony assigned to the said Mary the said Mannors of Thoby in allowance for all her Dower wherby the said John Butler as in the right of his Wife entred into the said Mannor of Thoby wherby the said Thomas Delves by the commandment of the said Baker entred into the said Close of which the Action is brought as in right oâ— the said Grisell And whether this entry were lawful or not was the question which was argued in the Court in the time of the late Lord Wray and he and Gawdy held strongly that the entry of the said Delves was lawfull but Clench and Fennor held alwaies the contrary wherupon it was adjourned into the Exchequer Chamber But they all agreed that the Waiver made by the said Elizabeth by parole in pais was a sufficient Waiver of her Estate in Hinton and the rather because of the Statute of 27 H 8. cap. 10. the words of which are That if the Joynture be made after the Marriage that then the Wife surviving her Husband may after his death refuse to take such Joynture And now it was moved by Tanfield that Iudgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff for by the Waiver of the Wife the Inheritance of Hinton is now to be said wholly in the Husband ab initio and therfore that with Fobbing being a whole third part of the whole Land which now is to be said to be left to discend to the Heir of the Devisor as to Thoby is good for the whole and if so then no part therof descends to Grisell and therfore the entry of the said Delves in her right is wrongfull Coke Attorney-general to the contrary for he said That it is to no purpose to consider what Estate the Devisor had in the Mannor of Hinton by reason of this Waiver made by his Wife Ex post facto after his death But we are to see what Estate the Devisor had in it in the view of the Law at the time of his death before the Waiver and according to it the Law shall adjudge that he had power to make his Devise by means of the Statute and at this time none can adjudge another Estate in him but joyntly with his wife of which Estate he had no power to make any disposition or to devise it or to leave it for the third part to his Heir for the Statute which is an explanatory Law in this point saies that he ought to be sole seised in such a case And further the Statute of 34 H. 8. at the end is that the Land which descends immediatly from the Devisor shall be taken for the third part and this Land did not descend immediatly for it survived to the Wife untill she waived it and therfore this Land is not to be taken for any third part which the Statute purposed to have been left to the Heir and therfore so much shall be taken from Thoby as with Fobbin shall be a third part to descend wherbâ— Grisell the Heir hath good right yet to part of Thoby and therfore the entry of the said Delves in her right by commandment of her husband not wronfull Periam chief Baron Clench Clark Walmsley and Fennor That now
by reason of the Waiver in the Devisor shall be sole seised ab initio for the said Elizabeth might have had Dower therof if she would as in the like case it is adjudged in 17 E. 3. 6. and therfore a sole Seisin in the Husband and the descent to the Heir in such a case upon the Waiver shall take away the entry of him who hath right to it And therfore the case now for the Mannor of Hinton is within the very letter of the Statute as well for the sole Seisin which was in the Devisor as for the immediate descent which was from the Devisor to his Heir and therfore remains to the Heir for a good third part of the Inheritance of the Devisor by the very letter of the Statute and if the Letter had not helped it yet it shall be helped by the purport and intent of the Statute which ought to be liberally and favourably construed for the benefit of the Subject who before the Statute of Vses might have disposed of his whole Land by reason of Vses by his Will and the Statute of 27 H. 8. excludes him therof and therfore the Statute of 32. 34 H. 8. are to be liberally expounded as to the Subject for the two parts and the rather because it appeareth by the preamble of the Statute of 32 H. 8. that it was made of the liberality of the King and because that by 34 H. 8. it appeareth that it was made to the intent that the Subject shall take the advantage and benefit purposed by the King in the former Statute by all which it appeareth as they said that the said Statutes shall be liberally expounded for the advantage of the Subject and for his benefit and not so strictly upon the letter of the Law as hath been moved and so they concluded that Iudgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff Popham and Anderson the two chief Iustices and all the other Iustices and Barons held the centrary and that Iudgment ought to be given against the Plaintiff and that by the very letter and purport of the Statutes of 32 34 H. 8. for they said they are to consider what Estate the Devisor hâ—d â—â— the Land at the time of his Devise made without regard to that which might happen by matter Ex post facto upon the Deed of another and if it had beâ—n demanded of any apprised in the Law at the time when the Will wâ—s made what Estate the Devisor then had in the Mannor of Hinton 〈◊〉 is so unlearned to say that he had other Estate in it then joyntly with his Wife And if so it follows that this Mannor was then out of the letter and intent of the Law for he was not then sole seised therof nor seised in coparcenary nor in common and by the words he should be sole seised in Fee-simple or seised in Fee-simple in coparcenary or in common It appeareth that the intent of the Statute was that he shall have full power of himself without the means or aid of another to dispose of the Land of which he is by the Statute to make disposition or to leave it to his Heir and this he hath not for the Mannor of Hinton here And further the words of 32 H. 8. are That the Devisor hath full power at his Will and pleasure to devise two parts of his Land so holden as here and this is to be intended of such Land of which he then had full power to make disposition â—nd this he could not then do for the Mannor of Hinton And further the words of 34 H. 8. are that the devision for the parts shall be made by the Devisor or Owner of the Land by his last Will in writing or otherwise in writing and in default therof by commission c. And can any say with reason that it was the intent of the Statute that he shall make the Devision of other Lands then of those of which he then had full power to devise or to leave to his heir without any future accident to help him or the mean of Anthony by matter Ex post facto It is cleer that reason cannot maintain it And the words following in the Act which are That the King shall take for his third part the Land which descended to the Heir of the â—state tail or of Fee-simple immediatly after the death of the Devisor much enforce the opinion on this side for it cannot be said upon the death before the Waiver that this Mannor of Hinton was immediatly descended ergo it ought not to be taken for the third part And further the words are If the Lands immediatly descended upon the death of the Devisor c. do not amount to a full third part that then the King make take into his hands so much of the other Lands of the Devisor as may make a full third part c. wherby it is cleer that in this case if the wife had not waived her Estate for ten years after the death of the Devisor that for all this time the Queen could not meddle with the Mannor of Hinton and therfore in the mean while she might well have so much of the Mannor of Thoby which might well have made a full third part to her and for so much which she took the Will was alwaies void which shall never be altered nor made good by any Waiver Ex post facto And although the Waiver of the Fame put the Inheritance entirely in the Devisor and in his Heir in relation to divers respects yet as to other respects he shâ—ll not be said in them with such relation and especially upon the Statute in which we now are to respect the power as it was in him at the time of his death before this future Contingent And by Popham If the exposition on the other side shall hold place upon the Statute perhaps a man shall not see by the space of six years or more after the death of a Devisor how his Devise shall work As a Feoffment in Fee is made to I. S. and a Feme Covert and their Heirs of 10 l. Land holden by Knights-service in Capite which I. S. hath 20 l. Land in fee so holden also I. S. makes a Devise of his 20 l. Land the Husband lives 60. years after none will or can deny but that for this time the Devise is not good for two parts now the Husband dies and the Wife waives the Estate made to her this puts the Inheritance therof in the Heir of I. S. with relation to divers respects but not to this respect to make the Will now good for the whole 20 l. Land which therfore was void for the third part therof for the Will which once was void by matter Ex post facto after the death of the Devisor cannot be made good And by him the descent in such a case is not such that it shall take away the entry of him who hath right because
made their Election to have the one or the other it is not to be granted over by generall words But by the dissolution of the Hospitall the grant for want of Election before is gone and determined And further wheras the King made his Grant of the Hospitall and of all the said rent of Fagots and Focals without making mention of 20 s. for the same it was moved that if it doth passe to the King yet it doth not passe from him to the Major c. in as much as he granted it precisely as a Fuell wheras it was in him as a Rent of Fuell or of money at his Election and therfore the King deceived in his Grant And further here he hath made Conusance for the Fuell without making mention of their Election to have it one way or another before the taking but all the Court agreed that the Conusance was good and that the return shall be awarded to him who made the Conusance first because that this case is quite out of the case of Election because the rent which is granted is only out of the Fagots and Astlewood and the 20 s. granted is not as a distinct thing but granted as a recompence or satisfaction of that because the Grant is of the Fagots c. or of 20 s. for the same so that in such a case the Seisin of the 20 s. is a good Seisin of the Fagots and Focals and sufficeth to maintain an Assise upon this Seisin for the Fuell but not for the 20 s. as money paid for Suit of Court is good Seisin of the Suit And the 20 s. here is not granted in nature of a Rent of so much but as an allowance in satisfaction for the Fuell And Popham conceived that he shall have an Action of debt for this 20 s. for the fuell after the Election made if he will as for a Nomine poene because it is not the principall thing granted of which the Inheritance is but a casuall Accident in recompence therof if he will have it or otherwise he may distrain for it because it is so limited to be done by the Grant it self But they shall never have assurance of the 20 s. as a thing of Inheritance because it is not the thing of which the Inheritance is granted but only granted in allowance and satisfaction of it and therfore not to be resembled to the cases where 20. quarters of Corn or 20 s. Rent is granted to one and his Heirs or other such thing which stands meerly in the disjunctive to wit to have or take the one or the other And therfore suppose the Prior was to carry the Fuell yearly to the Hospitall at the Feast of S. Michael and yet then the Master and Brethren might have refused the Fuell and held themselves to have the 20 s. by force of the Grant for then originally the Election ought to have been made there But upon the Covenant which cometh afterwards on the other part the notice ought to have been given in April yearly before but if it be not done there lies but an Action of Covenant for the not doing of it for this will not alter the nature of the Grant which was full and perfect in Law before And here he needs not make this appearance in the Conusance that any Election was made before the taking of the Cattel because the Grant is of the Fuell it self and if the other had made Election before to have the 20 s. for the Fuell this ought to have been shewn on the other side in Bar of the Avowry to wit that he brought to them the Fuell yearly according to the Grant and that they refused it and required the 20 s. every time for it in which case for every such refusall and Election to have the 20 s. for it it had excluded him to have any Fuell for this year so refused And by Popham also you may see a great diversity between this case where a man is to deliver to another 20. Loads of Wood or 20. Loads of Hay yearly out of such Land and he does not tender them for divers years and where a man is to take so much Fuell or Hay out of the Land of another and he takes it not for divers years for in the former case the party who is not satisfied shâ—ll have all the arrears be it never so prejudiciall to the Grantor because it was through his own default that it was not paid but in the other case as appeareth 27 H. 6. 10. he shall not have any remedy for the arrears for the years past because he took them not yearly as they were due which shâ—ll not turn the other party to prejudice that he shall want Fuell or Hay himself by reason of the arrears which hapned through the default of him who ought to take it and the Iudgment was given for him who made the Conusance and it is entred in the Kings Bench Mich. 33. 34. Eliz. Rot. 229. Southwells Case 5. AT the end of this Term upon the proceeding against Southwell the Iesuite it was moved by the Attorney-general to Popham chief Iustice the Master of the Rolls Periam chief Baron Walmsley and Owen Iustices and Ewens one of the Barons of the Exchecquer upon the form of Indictments upon the Statute of 27 Eliz. for Iesuits c If it need be comprehended in the Indictment of a Iesuite who cometh into the Realm of England or any Dominions of the Queen or shall be taken therin 40. daies after the end of this Session of Parliament that if he doth not submit himself within three daies of his landing if he cometh in after the 40. daies according to the Proviso of the Statute or that he was not so infirm of his body where he came in before the 40. daies that he was not able to passe out of the Realm by the time prescribed at first because that it is comprised in the body of the Act that it shall not be lawfull for any Iesuite c. being born within this Realm or any other the Queens Dominions made after the Feast of S. John Baptist in the first year of her Raign or after this to be made by any authority derived c. from the See of Rome to come be or remain in any part of this Realm c. otherwise then in such speciall cases and upon such speciall occasions and for such time only which is expressed in this Act and if he does that this offence shall be adjudged high Treason c. And after deliberation taken and consideration and conference amongst themselves had they all resolved that the better course was to omit this in the Indictment notwithstanding it be comprised in the body of the Act in the same manner as if it had been only in a Proviso in which case it is to the Prisoner to help him by means of such a Proviso if he can do it for the words other then c. are
but as referring to the provision subsequent in the Statute in which case this matter shall be used but as the Proviso it self shall be and according to this it hath been commonly put in practise by all the Iustices in all places after the Statute untill now And they agreed also that it need not be shewn whether he were made a Iesuit or Priest c. either beyond Sea or within the Realm because whersoever it was it is within the Law if he were made by the pretended authority of the See of Rome But they agreed that it ought to be comprised in the Indictment that he was born within this Realm or other Dominions of the Queen but need not to shew where but generally Et quod I. S. natus infra hoc Regnum Angliae c. And the Indictment ought to comprise that he was a Iesuite or Priest c. by authority challenged or pretended from to the See of Rome because that this is in the body of the Act without such reference as in the other point and according to this resolution the proceeding was against the said Southwell Easter Term 37 Eliz. Pigots Case 1. AFter the death of Valentine Pigot Esquire a Commission was awarded in nature of a Mandamus and after the death of Thomas Pigot Father of the said Valentine a Commission was awarded in nature of a Diem clausit extremum and the said Commissions were awarded to one and the same Commissioners who by one Inquest took but one Inquisition upon these severall Commissions in this form Inquisitio indentata captâ— apud c. virtute Commiss in natura brevis de diem clausit extremum eisdem Commiss direct c. ad inquirendum post mortem Thomae Pigot Ar. nuper defuncti patris predict Valentin per sacramentum c. Qui dâ—cunt c. After which all the points of the Câ—mmission after the death of the sâ—id Valentine are enquired of but for the Commissions after the death of the said Thomas Pigot it is imperfect in some points as who is his Heir c. is not found And by Popham and Anderson this Inquisition is void as to Valentine as well as for Thomas for their authorities which are the Commissions are by severall Warrants which cannot be simul semel by one and the same Inquisition executed and satisfied but ought to be divided and severall as the Warrant is severall and yet the same Inquest which found one Inquisition by one Warrant may also find another Inquisition by the other Warrant but divided and severall and not as one for as it is made it does not appear upon which of the Commissions the Inquisition as to Valentine is taken for as it is made it may be as well upon the one as upon the other for it is said to be by vertue of both the Commissions which cannot be and therfore is not good in any part and severall Warrants ought to be severally execused and therfore although the Escheator as appeareth by 9 H. 7. 8. may take â—â— Inquisition Virtue officii and at the same day another Inquisition Virtue brevis by one and the same Inquest yet this cannot be drawn into one Inquisition And that which is found Virtue officii contrary to that which before the same day Virtute libris as that it found more Land is good for the King And this their opinion was certified to the Court of Wards Sir Rowland Haywards Case 2. THis Case was also sent to the same chief Iustices out of the Court of See this case in Coke â— Report 35. Wards Sir Rowland Hayward being seised in his Demesne as of Fee of the Mannors of D. and A. in the County of Salop and of other Lands in the same County part wherof were in Lease for years by severall Indentures rendring certain rent part in the possessions of severall Copyholders and part in Demesne in possession out of Lease by Indenture dated 2. September 34. Eliz. made mention that this was for and in consideration of a certain sum of money to him paid by Richard Warren Esquire and others demised granted bargained and sold to the said Richard Warren and the others the said Mannors Lands and Tenements and the Reversion and Remainder of them and of every part of them and the Rents and Profits reserved upon any Demise therupon for 17. years next ensuing the death of the said Sir Rowland rendring a Rose at the Feast of S. John Baptist yearly if it be demanded which Deed was acknowledged to be enrolled and afterwards by another Indenture covenanted and granted for him and his Heirs hereafter to stand seised of the said Mannors Lands and Tenements to the use of the said Sir Rowland and of the Heirs Males of his body and afterwards and before any Attornment to the said Richard Warren and his Co-lessees or any of them the said Sir Rowland died seised of the said Mannors Lands and Tenements leaving a full third part of other Lands to descend to his Heir And it was moved on the Queens part that for part to wit for that which was in possession it past to the said Richard Warren and the other by way of Demise at Common Law and therfore it doth not passe afterwards by way of Bargain and Sale as to the Remainder and that therfore for the Services of the Mannors and for the Rents reserved upon the Demise these remain to the Heir who was in Ward to the Queen and within age and therfore to the Queen by reason of the Tenure which was in Capite by Knights-service But by Popham and Anderson it is at the Election of the said Richard Warren and his Co-lessees to take it by way of Demise or by way of Bargain and Sale untill that by some act done or other matter it may appear that their intent is to take it another way for the Vse in this case may well passe without the Inrolement of the Deed because the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Inrolements extends but to where a Free-hold is to passe and the Vse so passing this shall be executed by the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Vses and therfore if the said Richard Warren and his Co-lessees after the death of the said Sir Rowland Hayward would elect to take it by way of Bargain and Sale they shall have all the Reversions Remainders Rents and Services as well as the Land in possession executed to them by the Statute of Vses And of the same opinion were all the Iustices in Trinity Term following upon their meeting at Serjeants-Inne for another great cause Trinity Term 37 Eliz. 1. VPon an Assembly of all the Iustices and Barons of the Exchecquer at Where a Justâ—ce of Peace bails one who is not bailable he shall be sined and albeit he be committed but for sufficiâ—â—â— of Felony and haâ—h no notice of his offence Serjeants-Inne in Fleetstreet this Term it was resolved by them and so agreed to be hereafter put
precedent to it which not being done the Estate of Edmund never hapned to be and therfore he who cometh in under a Discontinuance made by the said William Cocksey after the death of Martin and Giles without Issue notwithstanding the Remitter of the said Alice in the case is to have the Land against those who come in by the said Edmund and upon this point only Iudgment was given accordingly in the Kings Bench. Grenningham versus the Executors of Heydon 4. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 200. marks by Richard Grenningham Plaintiff against the Executors of one Ralph Heydon Defendants the case appeared to be this upon Demurrer The said Heydon was bound to the Plaintiff in 200. marks the Condition wherof recites that wheras the said Heydon had received of the said Grenningham 76 l. 6 s 8 d. before the date of the said Obligation of 200. marks in payment and satisfaction of certain Obligations and Bills of debt remaining in the hands of the said Heydon and specified in the Condition what they were in certain and the which said Bills Obligations the said Heydon is to deliver or cause to be delivered to the said Grenningham his heirs or assigns before the Feast of S. Michael next ensuing the date of the said Obligation or otherwise the said Heydon his Executors Administrators or Assigns or some of them before the same Feast shall make or cause to be made and delivered to the said Plaintiff his Heirs and Assigns such good and sufficient Acquittances for the payment of the said summs of money formerly mentioned as the said Plaintiff his Heirs Executors or Assigns shall devise or cause to be devised by the Counsel of the said Plaintiff his Heirs or Assigns before the Feast without fraud or deceit that then the said Obligation shall be void c. And before the Feast the said Plaintiff did not devise any acquittance Whether now the Obligation be saved by the Disjunctive without delivering the Obligations and Bills before named before the Feast of S. Michael Rot. 36 37. Eton and Monney versus Laughter 5. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 400 l. by Thomas Eton and Roger See this Case Coke lib. 5. 21. by the name of Laughters case Monney Plaintiff against Thomas Laughter Defendant who was bound together with one Richard Rainford to the said Plaintiffs the Condition of which Odligation was That if the said Richard Rainford after marriage had between him and Jane Gilman Widow together with the said Jane alienate in Fee or Fee-tail all that great Messuage of the said Jane in London in the Tenure of William Fitz Williams Esquire if then the said Richard Rainford in his life time purchase to the said Iane her Heirs and Assigns Lands and Tenements of good Right and Title and of as good value as the money raised upon the alienanation of the said Messuage amounts unto or leave to the said Iane after his decease as Executrix or by Legacy or other good assurance so much money as he shall receive or have upon the said Sale that then the Obligation shall be void after which the said Richard Rainford married with the said Jane and the said Richard and Jane sold the said Messuage in Fee by Fine for 320 l. received by the said Richard Rainford after which the said Iane died no Lands being purchased to the said Iane by the said Richard and the said Richard yet living Michaelmas Term 37 38. Eliz. Sawyer versus Hardy 1. IN an Ejectione firmae by Christopher Sawyer Plaintiff against Edmund Hardy Defendant for a Messuage in S. Martins upon a Demurrer the case was this A Lease was made of the said Messuage to one Margaret Sawyer for 40. years upon Condition that if the said Margaret should so long continue a Widow she should dwell and stay in the same Messuage the said Margaret continued a Widow and dwelt in the same house all her life and died during the said Term of 40. years making the Plaintiff her Executor and by award the Plaintiff had Judgment to recover For by Popham Gawdy and Clench this now was no Condition nor Limitation for it hath no certain conclusion upon the that if to wit that then the Term shall continue or that she shall pay so much or otherwise what the conclusion shall be none can imagine As if such a Lease be made upon condition that if the Lessee does such a thing without other conclusion it is a good Lease for 40. years for none can imagine what the conclusion shall be in such a case or that then the Lease shal be void or that he shall re-enter or that the Lessee shall forfeit so much or what shall happen upon it for which incertainty it shall be taken as a void Clause But by Popham if it had been Sub conditione si tamdiu vixerit it had been good to determine the Lease but it is otherwise of the word quod si for the incertainty as before And they all agreed that if the Lease had been for 40. years Si tamdiu sols viveret inhabitaret in eodem Messuagio that the Lease had been determined by her marriage or death In the same manner as if it had been Si tam diu vixerit And so in truth had been the case if it had been well pleaded but by pleading the advantage therof was lost and the truth not disclosed But by Popham If a Lease be made for 40. years if he shall dwell in the same for his life there it is good for 40. years upon performance of the Condition the diversity appeareth to wit where it is if he shall dwell there during the Term and where it is if he shall inhabit there during his life Goodale versus Wyat. 2. IN an Ejectione firmae by Cuthbert Goodale Plaintif against John Wyat See this Case Coke lib. 5. fol. 95 96. by the name of Goodales case Defendant for a Meadow in Aylesbury in the County of Buck. called Diggelmore upon a speciall Verdict the case was this Sir Iohn Packington Knight enfeoffed therof one Ralph Woodliff to have and to hold to him and his Heirs upon condition that if the said Sir Iohn within a year after the death of the said Ralph pay to the Heirs Executors or Administrators of the said Ralph the summ of a 100. marks of lawfull money that then the said Feoffment and Seisin made therupon shall be void Ralph Woodliff made a Feoment over to others therof and died intestate and Administration was committed to Anne his Wife and Drew Woodliff his Son and Heir who gave a Warrant of Attorney to Thomas Goodale then seised of the said Meadow by mean conveyances for the receit of the said 100. marks with Covenant that none of them shall do any act or thing that shall be preâ—udiciall or hurtfull to the said Thomas Goodale for the receiving and enjoying of the said summ after which it was certified to the said Sir Iohn Packington by
the said Goodale that this Warrant was made to him After which it was agreed between the said Sir Ioh Packington Drew Woodale that the said Tho. Drew shall have but 32 l. of the said 100. marks wherupon the said Sir Iohn Packington within a year after the death of the said Ralph Woodliff paid to the said Drew Woodliff the 100. marks and presently the said Drew delivered to the said Sir John all the 100. marks but 32 l. And the Verdict stands upon this point whether the 100. marks were well paid or not And by Popham and Gawdy this was meerly a fraud which shall never prejudice a third person for if it be agreed between the Disseisee and I. S. that a stranger shall disseise the Tenant of the Land and enfeoff the said I. S. to the intent that the Disseisee shall recover against him this Recovery shall bind the said I. S. but not him who was disseised and yet he who recovered had a good Title and paramount the other but he shall not come to that to which he had good cause of Action and Title by fraudulent means to the prejudice of a third person not party to this fraud And it was said further that to pay money and take it away again presently before that it is pursed up by re-delivery is not properly a payment but rather a colour of payment And by Fennor and Popham the force of a Deed of Feoffment once effectuall cannot become void or of no effect nor the Livery therupon by such manner of words And it is not like a Bargain of Goods or an Obligation or a Lease for years which by such words may be dissolved and made to be of no force or effect because that as by the sealing a bare Contract it may be made perfect and effectuall without other circumstances so may it be defeated by such bare means without other circumstance But so it is not in case of an Inheritance or Free-hold which cannot be effectual by the bare delivery of a Deed unlesse that Livery be made therupon And all agreed that as this case is notwithstanding the Feoffment made over by the Father the money might have been paid to the Heir to perform the Condition if they had been duly paid and without Covin and that the words had been apt to have defeated the Estate But by Popham and Clench If a Feoffment be made to one upon condition In which case a Condition shall be performed to an Assignee and not to the Heir of payment of money to the Feoffee his Heirs or Assignes and the Feoffee makes a Feoffment over and dies the money ought to be paid to the Feoffee who is the Assignee and not to the Heir for there Heir is not named but in respect of the Inheritance which might be in him but here he is named as a meer stranger to it Bartons Case 3. IN a Writ of Error sued in the Kings Bench by Randall Barton upon a Fine levied at Lancaster 7 Eliz. of Land in Smithall and else where in the County of Lancaster by Robert Barton Esquire to Leven and Browndo where this Writ was brought by the said Randall as Heir in tail to the said Robert to wit Son of Ralph Brother of the said Robert The Defendant plead a Recovery in Bar therof had after the Fine in which the said Robert was vouched who vouched over the common Vouchee And by all the Court this common Recovery with such double Voucher which is the common assurance of Lands is a Bar by reason of the Voucher to every manner of right which the Vouchee or his Heir by means of him is to have to this land which is paramount the Recovery And so it is of every manner of way wherby they are otherwise to come to the Land before the Recovery And if the recovery be erroneous it remains a good Bar untill it be avoided by error But if the Recovery be void or the Voucher not warranted to be pursuing the appearance of the Tenant but precedent to it as was pretended and so no Tenant to warrant the Voucher when the Voucher was made the Recovery shall be no bar in such a case and the case here was informed to be this for the Writ of Entry bears date 1. Mart. 7 Eliz. returnable Die Lunae in 4. septimana quadragessimae propter futur and the Voucher was made in 4. septimana quadragessimae 7 Eliz. the said first day of March being the first week of this Lent 7 Eliz. And upon this it was inferred that the Tenant was not to appear untill Munday in the fourth week of Lent 8 Eliz. which is a long time after that the Voucher appeared and vouched over But by the whole Court the Original Writ shall be taken as it is written to be returnable on Munday in the fourth week of the same Lent 7 Eliz for it shall be taken as it is written shortly most beneficially that it can be to make the Recovery good And if it had been written Proxâ—me it should refer to the week before and so good And if the word Futur had been written at large Futura it also shall refer to Septimana and therfore being written briefly it shall refer as it may best do to make the Recovery good But if it had been in Quarta septimana proximae quadragessimae at large then the word Proxime shall refer to Quadragessimae because of the case But if it had been Proxima it shall refer to Septimana because also of the case But here as the case is it shall be a good reference to make the words Tunc proxima futur to shew what fourth week of Lent to wit that next ensuing the first day of March. As if a man be bound by Obligation bearing date the first day of March to pay the 10. day of March then next ensuing this shall be taken the 10. day of this March because this is next ensuing the first day Paramor versus Verrald 4. IN Trespasse of Assault and false Imprisonment by Robert Paramor against John Verrold and others supposed to be done at such a Parish and Ward in London the 20. day of May 35 Eliz The Defendants justifie by reason of an Erecution upon a Recovery in the Court of Sandwich within the Cinque-Ports Debt and traverse Absque hoc in that they were guilty in London c. The Plaintiff reply and maintain the Assault and Imprisonment as it is said and traverses Absque hoc quod habetur aliquod tale Recordum loqueâ—ae prout the Defendants have alledged Et hoc paratus est verificare per Recordum illud and upon this the Defendants demurred in Iudgment And per Curiam the Defendants plea Prima fâ—cie was good because it was a speciall manner of Iustification which cannot be pleaded and alledged to be in any other place then where it was done in the same manner as if they had justified by force of a Capias directed to the
Sheriff of another County then where the occasion brought or by Warrant of a Iustice of Peace of another County for matter of the Peace and the like which are not like to the case of Partridge who was beâ—ten in the County of Glocester by Sir Henry Pole for which he brought his Action in London And Sir Hen. Pole would have justified by Assault of the Plaintiff in the County of Glocester with a trâ—verse that he was not guilty in London But it was then ruled in this Court that he could not do it to oust the Plaintiff to sue in London but in such a case he might have alledged that the Assault was done in London because it was also a thing transitory of which they shall take notice there and so help himself if the matter had been true But in the case at the Bar if the speciall matter alledged in the forraign County be false as here the Plaintiff may maintain his Action and traverse the special matter alledged by the Defendant And so a traverse in such a case may be upon a Traverse when falsity is used to oust the Plaintiff of that benefit which the Law gives him Hillary Term 38 Eliz. Wood versus Matthews 1. IN a writ of Error brought by Owen Wood against Griffeth Matthews upon a judgment given in the common Pleas the case was briefly thus The Issue in the Common Pleas was whether one were taken by a Cap. ad satisfaciendum or not and upon the triall therof at the Nisi prius the Jury found for the Plaintiff in this Action to wit that the party was not taken by the said Capias and upon the back of the Pannell entred dicunt per Quer. but on the back of the Postea the Clark of the Assises certified the Pannell thus to wit That the Jury say that no Capias was awarded which was otherwise then was put in Issue or found by the Jury and the Roll of the Record was according to the Postea and upon this Judgment given for the said Matthew then Plaintiff upon which amongst other Errors this variance between the Issue and Verdict was assigned for Error and after deliberation had upon this point and this matter alledged by the Defendant in the Writ of Error and certified out of the Common Pleas the Court awarded as to this point that the Record sent up out of the Common Pleas by the Writ of Error shall be amended according to that which was endorsed on the back of the Pannell for the endorsement upon the Pannell is the Warrant for the certifying of the Postea aâ—d so this Warrant over to him that makes the Entry in the Roll And therfore wheras it was alledged that the Postea was amended in the Common Pleas aftâ—r the Record removed it was holden to be well done there for although the Record were removed by the Writ of Error yet the Nisi prius the Postea and the like remain still there as it is of the Warrant of Attorney and the like And if the Postea had not been amended there but sent up with that which was endorsed upon the Pannel all shal be amended here according to that which was indorsed upon the Pannel and according to this there was a Presidâ—nt shewn Tr. 35. H. 8. between Whitfeild and Wright where the Issue was whether a quantity of Grain were delivered between two Feasts and endorsed upon the Pannel Dicunt pro quaer and yet the Postea certified and the Rolls also made that the delivery was made ad festa and upon this matter alledged in Banco Regis and the Error in this point assigned and certified out of the Common Pleas the Record removed by the Writ of Error was by award of the Court amended and the word Ad razed out and the word Inter written in lieu of it according as it appeareth it ought to have been by the Note upon the back of the Pannel And the like amendment was made lately in the Checquer Chamber upon Error brought there upon a Iudgment given in Banco Regis where the Iudorsment upon the back of the Writ was pro Quer. and the Postea and Roll was that the Plaintiff was guilty and there amended the last Term. Slanings Case 2. NIcholas Slaning of Bickley was seised in his Demesn as of Fee of the Mannor of Bickley and of a Mill in Walkhampton in the County of Devon called a blowing Mill and of another Mill there called a knocking Mill and of an acre of Land there also and of divers other Mannors and Lands in the said County of Devon the said Mills and acres of Land in Walkhampton then being in the possession of one Peterfeild and Atwill of an Estate for divers years then to come and being so seised he with Margaret his Wife levied a Fine of the said Mannor of Bickley and of other Lands omitting the said Lands in Walkhampton to certain Câ—nuzees who rendred the same back again to the said Margaret Slaning for her life with the remainder over to the said Nicholas and his Heirs After which the said Nicholas by Indenture daied 30. Octob. 21 Eliz. gave and enfeoffed all the said Mannors and Premisses to John Fits and others and the Heirs of the said Fits to the Vses Provisoes and Limitations mentioned in the said Indenture which was to the use of himself and the Heirs Males of his body by any other Wife the remainder to Nicholas Slaning of Newton Ferries and the Heirs Males of his body with divers remainders over with this Proviso to wit Provided and it is the intent of these presents and of the parties therunto that the said John Slaning and the Heirs Males of his body or the said Nicholas Slaning of Newton-ferries and the Heirs Males of his body in whomsoever of them the Inheritance in tail of all the Premisses shall happen to be by force of these presents shall pay to Agnes the Daughter of the said Nicholas Slaning of Bickly 200 l. or so much therof as shall be unpaid at the time of the death of her said Father according to the intent of his last Will with a Letter of Attorney to it by which he ordains John Hart and Robert Fort joyntly and severally his Attorney to enter into the said Mannor of Bickley Walkhampton c. and all other the Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the said Indenture mentioned and possession for him to take and after such possossion taken for him and in his name to deliver full possession and seisin of the Premisses to the said John Fits c. according to the form and effect of the said Indenture wherupon possession and seisin was given of all but that which was in possession of the said Peterfield and Atwill And the said Pererfield and Atwill nor either of them never attorned to the said Grant After which Nicholas Slaning of Bickly made his last Will by which devised to the said Agnes his Daughter 200 l. to be paid in form following
Vse may be averred without Deed upon a Fine sur Render And all agreed that if there had been a Deed to have declared the purport of the Fine that the Fine shall not be taken to extend further then is comprised in the Deed. And what is the cause therof the Deed or the intent of the parties and none can say but that it is the intent of the parties and not the Deed and the intent may as well appear without the Deed as with it albeit it be not so conclusive by Parole as by Deed. And therfore suppose I have 100. acres of Land in a Close in D. and I. S. hath another 100. acres in the same Close and Town and I. S. hath a 100. acres of Land in the same Town out of this Close and my intent is to levy a Fine to I. S. of the whole Close by the name of 200. acres of Land with a Render as before and I levy it accordingly shall the Render enure to the Land which I. S. had in the same Town It is cleer that it shall not although it be without Deed why then shall the Fine here be taken to work rather to the Land called Karkian then to any other Lands which any other had in the same Towns when it appeareth plainly that it never was the intent of the parties that the Fine should extend to these Lands called Karkian and it was decreed in Chancery accordingly Hall versus Arrowsmith 4. IN the case between Hall and Arrowsmith it was agreed by the whole Court in the Kings Bench That if a Copyholder for life hath licence to make a Lease for three years if he shall live so long and he makes a Lease for three years without such a Limitation that yet this is no forfeiture of his Estate because the operation of Law makes such a Limitation to the Estate which he made to wit that it shall not continue but for his life and then such an express Limitation in the case where the Law it self makes it is but a meer trifle and yet if a Lessee for life makes a Lease for years and he in the Reversion confirm it it remains good after the death of the Tenant for life but this then shall be as if it had been made by him in the Reversion himself and shall be his Lease But if the Lease there had been made determinâ—ble upon the life of Tenant for life the confirmation therof by him in the Reversion will not help him after the death of him who was Tenant for life Causa patet But in the principall case if the Copyholder had had an Estate in Fee by Copy it had been a forfeiture of his Estate to make an absolute Lease because in that case he does more then he was licensed to do And they agreed that such a licence cannot be made to be void by a Condition subsequent to the execution therof to undo that which was once well executed But there may be a Condition precedent united to it because in such a case it is no licence untill the Condition performed but the licence before mentioned is not a condition all Licence but a Licence with a Limitation and therfore hath not been of force if the Limitation which the Law makes in this case had not been and the Limitation in Law shall be preferred before the Limitation in Deed where they work to one and the same effect and not different Arthur Johnsons Case 5. ARthur Johnson was possessed of a Term for years and so possessed assigned this over to Robert Waterhouse and John Waterhouse being Brothers to the Wife of the said Johnson to the use of the said Wife the said Johnson dies and makes his Wife his Executrix after which the said Wife takes Robert Witham to Husband who takes the Profits of the Land during the life of his said Wife the Wife dies Intestate her said Brothers being next of kin to the said Wife took administration as well of the Goods of the said Wife as of her first Husband And whether the said Waterhouses or the said Witham shall have this Lease or the use therof was the question in the Chancery and therupon put to the two chief Iustices upon which they and the chief Baron and all the other Iustices of Serjeants-Inne in Fleetstreet and Beamont also were cleer in opinion that the said Administrators had now as well the Interest as the Vse also of the said Term as well in Conscience as in Law and that they had the use as Administrators to the said Wife and that the said Witham shall not have it because it is as a thing in Action which the Administrators of the Wife alwaies shall have and not the Husband As if an Obligation had been made to the use of the Wife And this opinion was certified accordingly to the Lord Keeper of the great Seal of England and it was so decreed Taunton versus Barrey 6. IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Giles Taunton Plaintiff in the King Bench against Giles Barrey Defendant the Case was thus Iohn Coles Esquire made a Lease of the Lands in question to the Father of the said Barrey for divers years depending upon the life of the Lessee and of the said Defendant and of the Survivor of them upon condition that the said Father should not alien without the consent of the said Coles his heirs after which the said Father devised the Term to the said Defendant and died making his Executor who assented And the question upon this point found upon a speciall Verdict was whether upon the matter the Condition were broken and by the opinion of the whole Court adjudged that it was for in such a case he ought to have left it to his Executor without making any Devise of it for the Devise is an Alienation against him and therfore it was agreed that the Plaintiff shall recover Term 37 Eliz. Rot. between Roper and Roper Michaelmas Term 38 39. Eliz. Everets Case 1. THis Case was moved by the chief Iustice to the other chief Iustices at Serjeants-Inne in Fleetstreet concerning one Everet who before was attaint for stealing of a Horse reprieved after Iudgment and Indited again for stealing another Horse before this Attainder And the Vicar of Pelton in the County of Somerset was Indited as accessary before this Felony for the procurement of it And Everet being again Indited upon this last Inditement did not plead that he was formerly Indited of another Felony c. but acknowledged the Inditement wherby the Accessary was Arrained tried and found guilty and had his Iudgment also as the principall but the Execution of the Accessary was respited And now moved whether upon this matter it shall be fit to execute the Accessary the principall being executed And it seemed convenient to all the Iustices and Barons that he shall be executed and that the matter was cleer in this case because the principall did not take advantage of his
the now Tenant Henry Gee as is before alledged and that the said Henry was then seised of the said Tenements in Fee in right of the said Eliz. then his wife and although that he alledge the said severall Feoffments to be made by Deeds indented with the reservation as aforesaid yet it is not mentioned in the Replication that he shews forth the Deeds wherby the reservation was made To which the Tenant by way of Rejoynder shew the Feoffment made by the said Eliz. Shalcroft to the said William Greenditch wherby he was seised at the time of the payment of the said Rent at the said Feast of the Annunciation of our Lady and traverse Absque hoc that the said Henry Gee was therof then seised in right of his wife in manner and form wherupon it was demurred in Law and adjudged by the Justices of Assise at Lancaster that the Plaintiff should be barred wherupon the Tenants have now brought their Writ of Error And by Popham and Clench the Iudgment is to be affirmed First because that the acceptance of the said Rent had been by the hands of one who was to pay it to wit the Tenant himself yet this shall not bar the right of Intail in the said Robert Holme as a release of his right should do but this acceptance shall only foreclose him of his Action to demand the Land during his life and therfore the right which the said Robert had being barred by the Fine the Son is without remedy for the Son shall never have remedy upon the Fine levied in time of his Father the five years after the Proclamations being passed But in case where the right begin first to be a right in the Son and not where there was right in the Father And further it seemed to them that the payment of him who had not any thing in the Land at the time of the payment as here shall make no conclusion to him who accept it because this payment is as none in Law And by them the Rejoynder of the Traverse Absque hoc that Henry Gee was seised at the time of the payment in Fee in right of his said Wife in manner and form as in the Replication is ailedged is good enough for he traverseth that which the Demandant hath specially alledged to destroy the Bar and contrary to that which is alledged it shall not be intended that they had other particular Estate at the time of the payment which may make the payment to be good And albeit the Traverse had been Absque hoc that the said Henry was seised in right of his said Wife Modo forma prout the Demandant hath alledged without saying in Fee as it is pleaded here yet the Iury shall be put to find it if he were seised in Fee In jure Uxoris and not of any other particular Estate as in 12 E. 4. 4. A Feoffment is pleaded by Deed the other makes Title and traverseth Absque hoc that he enfeoffed Modo forma not shewing forth the Deed yet he who pleads the Feofment by Littleton shall give no other Feoffment in evidence then that which is pleaded by the Deed. And by 18 E. 4. 3. In Trespasse the Defendant justifies the entry and sowing of Corn because that M. was seised in Fee and sowed the Land and the Defendant as his Servant entred and cut it the Plaintiff saith that it was his Free-hold at the time of the sowing Absque hoc that it was the Free-hold of the said M. and per Curiam it is not good for such matter was not alledged by the Defendant but he ought to traverse the Seisin in Fee which was alledged and good and so it is good here But it seems to Clench that the Replication is not good because he doth not say by the Writing upon which the Reservation was made which concludes Robert by his acceptance Hic in Curia prolat as by Hill 15. E. 4. 15. If a man will bar a woman of her Action for her Land after the death of her Husband by Feoffment made by the Baron and Feme during the Coverture by Deed rendring Rent by reason of acceptance of the said Rent after the death of the husband he ought to shew the Deed and say Hic in Curia prolat or otherwise the Plea is not good because that in such a case albeit it were a Gift in Tail the wife shall not be concluded by her acceptance unlesse that the Gift were by Deed. Popham True it is in case the party will demur upon it but suppose in this case the Tenants had expresly acknowledged the said Feoffments and then concluded afterwards as they have done here shall they afterwards take advantage of not shewing the Deed I think that not no more here where they admit it and plead the other matter to avoid the conclusion for if a double Plea be pleaâ—ed if the other party demur upon it he shall take the advantage of the doublenesse But if he passe it over and they proceed in pleading upon another point the doublenesse is gone And Fennor said that the right which is intended to be saved within the first branch of the Statute of 4 H. 7. is that upon which the party may pursue his Action or enter for his remedy the which the said Robert could not do in when the Fine was levied because he had accepted the Rent but the first right which was in such a case was that in the Demandant Stroud versus Willis 9. IN Debt upon an Obligation of 40 l. by William Stroud Plaintiff against John Willis Defendant the Condition wherof was If the said Willis his Heirs Executors or Assigns should pay or cause to be paid yearly to the said William Stroud the Rent or summ of 37 l. 10 s. of lawfull money at the Feasts of S. Michael and the Annuntiation by equall portions according to the Tenor true intent and meaning of certain Articles of agreement indented made between the said parties of the same date that the Obligation was that then the Obligation shall be void and the Defendant shews the Articles which were thus to wit that the said William Stroud had demised to the Defendants all such Tenements in Yeatminster of or in which the said William then had an Estate for life by Copy Anglice Copie des except according to the custom of the Mannor of Yeatminster from the Annunciation of our Lady then last past for forty years if the said William should so long live rendring yearly to the said William 37 l. 10 s. of lawfull money at the Feasts of S. Michael and our Lady by equal portions under the East-gate of the Castle of Taunton in the County of Somerset c. with divers things comprised in the said Articles To which points the Defendant pleaded that at the time of the making of the said Articles the Plaintiff had not any Estate in the Tenements in Yeatminster aforesaid for tearm of his life by Copy
to attend and be assistant to the Iustices Sheriffs or other Ministers of the King in the doing of it 3. AT the same time it was also resolved by them all except Walmsley Fennor and Owen in the Case of one Richard Bradshaw and Robert Burton who with others lately by word entred themselves into an agreement one with another to rise and put themselves into Armes and so to go from one Gentlemans house to another and so from house to house to pull down Inclosures generally that this so appearing by their own confession or by two Witnesses according to the Statute is high Treason by the Statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 1. The words of which Statute are That if any intend to levy War against the Queen and this maliciously advisedly and expresly declare or utter by any words or sayings that this shall be high Treason For all agreed that Rebellion of Subjects against the Queen hath Rebellion of Subjects high Treason been alwaies high Treason at the Common Law for the Statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 1. is that levying of War within the Realm against the King is Treason and Rebellion is all the War which a Subject can make against the King But Walmsley and the others with him said that the Statute of 1 Mar cap. 12. 10. That if any to the number of twelve or more assemble themselves to the intent to pull down Inclosures Pales and the like with force and continuing together after proclamation according to the Statute to go away by the space of an hour or do any of the Offences mentioned in the Statute that this is Felony So that if these Actions had been Treason at the Common Law it had been to no purpose to have made it Felony And it seemed to them that the resistance ought to be with force to the Queen before that such Acts shall be said Treason But all the other Iustices agreed and so it was put in ure lately in the case of the Prentices of London that if any assemble themselves with force to alter the Laws or to set a price upon Victualls or to lay violent hands upon the Magistrate as upon the Major of London and the like and with force attempt to put it in action that this is Rebellion and Treason at Common Law and yet this Statute of 1 Mariae makes it in such a case but Felony And they put a diversity between the cases of pulling down Inclosures Pales c. comprised in the Statute of 1 Mar. for those are to be understood where diverse to the number of twelve or more pretending any or all of them to be injured in particular as by reason of their common or other Interest in the Land inclosed and the like and assembling to pull it down forcibly and not to the cases where they have a generall dislike to all manner of Inclosures and therfore the assembling in a forcible manner and with Armes to pull them down where they have any Interest wherby they were in any particular to be annoyed or grieved is not Treason but the case here tending to a generality makes the act if it had been executed to be high Treason by the câ—uâ—se of the Common Law And therfore the intention appearing as the case is here it is Treason by the Stâ—tute of 13. aforesaid Periam in some manner doubted of the principall case but to intend to rise with force to alter the Laws to set price upon any Victuals or to use force against a Magistrate for executing his Office of Iustice and the like he said that they were cleerly Treason by the Statute of 13. aforesaid if it may appear by expresse words or otherwise as the said Statute mentions for all these tend against the Queen her Crown and Dignity and therfore shall be as against the Queen her self And if it had been put in practice it had been Treason at the Common Law Here ends the LORD POPHAM'S REPORTS An addition of certain Select CASES in the time of KING JAMES and KING CHARLES Trin. 15. Jac. In the Kings Bench entred Hill Jac. Rot. 194. Brooks Case IN an Ejectione firmae brough by one Brook against Brook the Case was thus Iohn Wright a Copyholder in Fee 10 Eliz. surrendred his Land into the hands of the Lord by the hands of Tenants according to the Custom c. without saying to whose use the Surrender should be And at the next Court the said Iohn Wright was admitted Habendum to him and his Wife in Tail the remainder to the right Heirs of Iohn Wright and the Wife of Iohn Wright now Defendant was seised from the time of Where upon surrender of Copyhold land no use is limited to whole use iâ— shall be the admittance untill this day And it was objected by the Counsell of the Plaintiff that the surrender was void because no use was limitted and therfore by constitution of Law ought to be to the use of the Surrender as if a Feoffment be made and no Use limited it shall be to the Use of the Feoffor or as it is in Sir Edward Cleers Case Coke lib. 6. 18. If a Feoffment be made by one to the use of his last Will he hath the use in the mean time 2. That the admittance was not available to passe an Estate to the Wife for she was not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and the Office of an Habendum is to limit the Estate and not the person and therfore it is said in Throgmorten and Tracies Case in Plowd com That if one be named to take an Estate in the Habendum where he was not named at all in the Premisses this is not good But it was resolved by the whole Court for the first point that the subsequent Act shâ—ll explain the Surrender for Quando abest Provisio partis adest provisio legis And when the Copyholder accepts a new admittance the Law intends that the Surrender generally made was to such an Vse as is specified in the admittance and the Lord is only as an Instrument to convey the Estate and as it were put in trust to make such an admittance â—s he who surrenders would hâ—ve him to make And Crook Iustice said Fides adhibita fidem obligat For the second point it was also agreed by the Court that the Wife shall take by this admittance albeit she were not named in the Premisses but only in the Habendum and they agreed that in Feoffments and Grants the party that is not named in the Premisses shall not take by the Habendum and therfore Throgmorton and Tracies Case as to this point is good Law But this case of a Copyhold is like to the case of a Will or to the case of Frank-marriage in which it is sufficient to passe an Estate albeit the party be only named in the Habendum and if it should be otherwise the Estates of many Copyholders would be subverted And so they resolved that Iudg-should be
given for the Defendant The same Term in the same Court. Laurking and Wildes Case THe Rector of the Church of livelled in the spirituall Court for the Tithes of a riding Nag where the case was That a man let his Land reserving the running of a Horse at some time when he had occasion Tithes for a riding Nag to use him there The Defendant shewed this matter in the Court by his Counsell and prayed a Prohibition and avers that for the same Land in which the Horse went he paid Tithes And by the Court nigh London a man will take a 100. or 200. Horses to Grasse now he shall pay Tithes for them or otherwise the parson shall be defeated But in this case if the Defendant alledge and prove that it was a Nag for labour and not for profit a Prohibition lies The same Term in the same Court. Havergall versus Hare IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Havergal against Hare the Case was thus Afterwards fol 55. A Rent of 20 l. per annum was granted out of Green acre to one and his Heirs to be paid at Michaelmas and the Annunciation of our Lady by equall portions and the Grantor covenants that if the Rent of 20 l. be arrear by the space of twenty daies that the Grantee may distâ—ain and that if there be not sufficient distresse upon the Land or iâ— there be a Rescous Replevin or Pound-breach that then it shall be lawfull for the Grantee and his Heirs to enter and retain the Land to them and their Heirs untill the 20 l. be paid 10 l. for one half years Rent was in arrear and for it an entry was made Mountague chief Iustice and Doderidge Iustice there can be no entry made when 10 l. only is behind for the words of the Deed are that if the Rent of 20 l. be behind that the Grantee and his Heirs may enter and if he shall enter now he shall retain the Land for ever for the 20 l. shall never be paid Crook and Haughton Iustices contrary for if 10 l. be arrear the Rent of 20 l. is arrear for Haughton said In an Assise of Rent of 40 l. where part is arrear yet he ought to bring his Assise for the whole Rent of 40 l. for the Writ ought to agree with the Deed. Doderidge agreed with him in the case of an Assise but not in the principall point And for the second point it was agreed by them all that upon the entry of the Grantee he shall have a Fee-simple determinable admitting the entry for the 10 l. to be good The same Term in the same Court and it is entred 14 Jac. Rot. 1484. Robinson versus Walter RObinson brought an Action of Trover and Conversion against Walter and upon the whole matter the case appeared to be this A Stranger took the horse of the Plaintiff and sent him to a common Inn and there he remained for the space of half a year at which time the Plaintiff had notice where his Horse was and therupon he demanded him of the Inn-keeper who answered that a person unknown left the Horse with him and said that he would not deliver the Hoâ—se to the Plaintiff unlesse he would pay for his meat which came to 3 l. 10 s. for all the time and also would prove that it was his Horse upon which the Plaintiff demurred in An Inn-keeper may detain a Horse untill he be satisfied for meat albeit he be left by a stranger Law And it was resolved by Mountague chief Iustice Crook and Doderidge Iustices Haughton Iustice dissenting that the Defendants plea was good for the Inn-keeper was compellable to keep the Horse and not bound at his peril to take notice of the Ownder of the Horse And by the custom of Lond. if a horse be brought to a common Inn wher he hath as it is commonly said eaten out his head it is lawfull for the Inn-keeper to sell him which case of the custom implies this case And there is a difference where the Law compels a man to do a thing and where not As if the Lievtenant of the Tower brings an Action of debt for Dyet against one who was his Prisoner in this case the Defendant cannot wage his Law because the Law compels the Lievtenant to give Victuals to his Prisoner otherwise if another man brings an Action of debt for Dyet and in the case at the Bar the Inn-keeper was compellable And Doderidge said that if the Law were as the Plaintiff would have it it were a pretty trick for one who wants a keeping for his Horse And Mich. 6 â—ac in the Kings Bench between Harlo and Ward the like was resolved as was cited by Barkesdels of Counsell with the Defendant Mich. 14. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Rawlinson versus Green A Copyholder surrendred out of Court according to the custom of the Mannor which at the next Court was presented and entry therof made by the Steward Scilicet Compertum est per homagium c. but no admittance Afterwards Cestuy que use surrenders before admittance and the first Copyholder surrenders to the Plaintiff And in this case there were two questions 1. Whether he may surrender before admittance 2. Who shall have the Land whether the first Copyholder or the Lord Haughton Iustice held that he could not surrender before admittance and the entry of the surrender doth not make an admittance for this being the A â—urâ—ender of Copyhold cannot surrender before admittance sole act of the Steward shall not bind the Lord and it is not like to the usuall foâ—m of an admittance for that is Dat Domino de fine fecit fiâ—elitatem admissus est inde tenens Doderidge Iustice agreed and said that in Hare and Brickleys case the admittance of a Copyholder was compared to the induction to a Benefice which gives the possession Hillary 14. Jac. In the Kings Bench. Sir John Pools Case Three Executors brought an Action of Debt and one only declared and they were ready for a triall in the Country and now it was moved that the Declaration might be amended and the names of the other Executors incerted but per Curiam this cannot be without the assent of the parties Pasch 15. Iac. In the Kings Bench. Cooper versus Smiths AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz Waterman Action for these words Thou hast killed thy Masteâ—s Cook and thou Innuende the Plaintiff hast killed thy Masters Cook Innuende c. and I will bring thee in question for thy life And after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment by the Counsell of the Defendant that the words were not actionable for the incertainty inasmuch as it doth not appear who was his Master nor that his Master had a Cook Mountague chief Iustice said that the words were actionable and albeit Inâ—uendo cannot maâ—e a thing that is uncertain certain an Innuendo cannot make a
thing that is uncertain certain but shall serve as a Predict yet the words import that he had a Master and that his Master had a Cook to which all the Court agreed and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And another Action was brought for these words Scil. Thou hast sacrificed Thou hast sacrificed thy child to the Devill thy Child to the Devill and adjudged that the words were actionable Mich. 15. Iac. In the Kings Bench. Lee versus Brown IN an Ejectione firmae brought by Lee against Brown the Case was this Whether copyhold Lands may be intailed Tenant in Tail of Copyhâ—ld Land surrendred the same into the hands of the Lord to the use of I. S. wherupon two points did arise 1. Whether Copyhold Land be within the Statute of Donis conditionalibus so that iâ— may be intailed 2. Whether the Intail may be cuâ— off by the surrender Doderidge Iustice said as to the first point that it hath been a great doubt whether it may be intailed but the common and better opinion was that by the same Statute co-operating with the custom it may be intailed and with this agrees Heydons case in my Lord Cokes 3. Report and so was the opinion An Intail of copyhold lâ—nd nâ—t to be cut off by â—urrender unlesse by speciall custom of the Court. And for the second point their opinion also was that it could not be cut off by surrender unlesse it were by speciall custom and they directed the Iury accordingly And it was said to maintain this custom it ought to be shewn that a Formedon had been brought upon such a Surrender and Iudgment given that it doth not lye yet it was agreed that it was a strong proof of the custom that they to whose use such Surrenders had been made had enjoyed the Land against the Issues in Tail And it was said by the Counsell of the Defendant that there was a Verdict for them before in the same case which they could prove by witnesses but the Court would not allow such a proof because it was matter of Record which ought to be shewn forth In the same Term in the Common Pleas. May versus Kett. AN Action upon the Case was brought for these words viz. Thou hast Words Thou hast stoln my Corn out of my Earn stoln my Corn out of my Barn And it was moved in Arrest of Iuâ—gment because he had not said how much he had stoln and perhaps it was of small value and yet it was adjudged that the Action would lye for it is at least petit Larceny But if he had said that he had stoln his Corn generally it had not been actionable for it might have been growing and then it had been but a Trespasse The same Term in the Star Chamber Riman versus Bickley and others IOhn Riman exhibited a Bill in the Star Chamber against Thomas Bickley and Anne his Wife Dr. Thorn Mr Goulding and others Defendants the said Anne was first married to Devenish Riman the Plaintiffs Son and between them were many â—ars and disâ—greemâ—nts and the said Devenish was much given to drinking and other Vices and divers times did beat and abuse his Wife and was also jealous of the saiâ— Thomas Bickley and his Wife being at a certain time at Supper with Dr. Thorn Goulding and others spake such words as these having communication thâ—t her Husband did beat and abuse her to wit That she heard that his Father had that quality and being once whipt for it was the better ever after and that if she thought it would do her Husband any goâ—d she would willingly bestow 40 s. on some body to give him a whipping wherupon Gâ—ulding said that he would give him a Medâ—cine for his Mâ—lâ—dy and within two daies after he came in the night in womâ—ns apparrell with a Weapon under his Cloak and with a Rod and wenâ— into the House and Chamber of the said Devenish and would have whipped him and in striving together there was some hurt done on either side but Gâ—ulding not being able to effect his purpose fled and this was conceived to be by the procurement of Anne his wife And not long after Devenish fell sick and sent to his said wife for certain necessaries which she would not send him and presently after Devenish died and she refused to come to his buriall And although it were much disliked that Devenish should abuse his Wife in such uncivill manner as to strike and beat her and as Coke late chief Iustice said it is not lawfull by the Act Military for one man to strike another in the presence of Ladies yet it was resolved by the whole Court that it was a great misde meanor in the Wife and uncivill and undutifull carriage in her to do so to her Husband as they use to do to Children or fools to wit to give them the Whip and so to disgrace and take away the good name of her Husband which viz. A mans good name and his Childrens are the two things which make a man live to Posterity as was said by Sir Francis Bacon Lord keeper and the Court fiâ—ed the Wife 500 l. and it was said that Thomaâ— Bickley her noâ— Husband well deserved to pay this Fine because he was too familiar with her in the time of his Predecessor and as the Bishop of London said Devenish Rimon lay upon her hands and Thomas Bickley upon â—eâ— heart And to aggravate this matter a Letter was shown whiâ—h Devenish Rimon wrote to his Wife in which he called her Whoor and told her somwhat roundly of her faults and she wrote back to him in the Margeâ—t that he lyed and wished him to get a better Scribe for his next Lâ—â—ter for he was a Fool that wrote that wherin she called him Fool by craft And Goldings offence was accâ—vnted the greater because he was a Minister so that he was fined 500 l. also And Coke said that the course of this Court was that if any were fined who is not able to pay it Respondeat superior he that is the principall and chief agent therin must answer it for otherwise poor men might be made Instruments of great mischief who are not able to answer and the greater Offenders shall escape which the Lord Keeper confirmed And as to Doctor Thorn he was acquitted by all And the Bishop of London said that they had thought to have troad upon a Thorn and they gat a Thorn in their foot And by Coke if Devenish Rimon had died upon it it had been capitall in the Wife who procured it for it was an unlawfull Act. The same Term in the Kings Bench. Wescot versus Cotton THe case was this An Infant Executor upon an Action brought against Where an Infant Executor may declare by Attorney but not defend by Attorney but by Guardian him appeared by Attorney where he ought to appear by Guardian and it was resolved by the Court that this was Error for this
doth much concern the Infant in as much as by his false plea he shall be bound to â—nswer of his own Goods if he hath no Goods of his Testator and therfore in a 11 E. 4. 1. he hath remedy against his Guardian for pleading a false Pâ—ea And by Doderidge if he hath no Guardian the Court shâ—ll appoint him a Guardian And if an Infant bring an action as Executor by Attorney and hath Iudgment to recover this is not erronious because it is for his benefit so per Curiam the difference is where he is Plaintiff and where he is Defendant And there is another difference where he is Executor and where not for being Executor his Plea might have been more prejudiciall to him and Coke lib 5. Russels case was agreed for good Law for an Infant may be Executor and may take money for a Debt and make a Release and give an Acquittance but not without a true consideration and payment of the money The same Term in the same Court. Thomas Middletons Case THomas Middleton alias Strickland was condemned for a Robbery at the Where a Felon is condemned and elcapeth and is re-taken upon confession that he is the same party execution may be awarded The Sheriff of Middlesex fined for not attending the Court. Assises in Oxford after which he made an escape and being taken again he was brought to the Bar and upon his own confession that he was the same party who did the Robbery and that he was condemned for it the Court awarded execution And Mountague chief Iustice said thâ—t was no new case for it had been in experience in the time of E. 3. and 9 H. 4. and 5. E. 4. that the Court might so do upon his own confession And because the Sheriff of Middlesex did not give his attendance upon the Court in this case nor came when he was called the Court fined him 10 l And Mountage said that it shall be levied by proces out of the Court and also all other Fines there assessed and not estreated into the Exchequer for then the party might compound for a matter of 20 s. and so the King be deceived The same Term in the same Court. Gouldwells Case IOhn Gouldwell seised of Land in Socage Tenure devised them to his Wife for life the Remainder to John Gouldwell his Son and his Heirs upon Condition that after the death of his Wife he shall grant a Rent-charge to Steven Gouldwell and his Heirs and if John Gouldwell dye withâ—ut Heirs of his body that the Land shall remain to Steven Gouldwell in Tail the Wife dieth John Gouldwell grants the Rent accordingly Stephen Gouldwell grants the Rent over John Gouldwell dies without Heir of his body and the second Grantee distrains for the Rent arrear and Stephen Gouldwell brings a Replevin And it was urged by the Counsell for the Plaintiff that this Rent shall not have continuance longer then the particular Estate and cited 11 H. 7. 21. Edriâ—ks case that if Tenant in Tail acknowledge a Statute this shall continue but during his life and Dyer 48. 212. But it was agreed per Curiam that the Grantee was in by the Devisor and not by the Tenant in Tail and therfore the Grant may endure for ever But for the second point this being to him in Remainder the intent of the Demisor is therby explained that he shall have the Rent only untill the Remainder come in possession for now the Rent shall be drowned in the Land by unity of possession 3. It was agreed and resolved that by the granting of the Kent over this was a confirmation And Mountague said that it was a confirmation during the Estate Tail and shall enure as a new grant afterwards And Haughton and Doderidge said that they would not take benefit of the grant over by way of confirmation for as Haughton said this enures only ought of the Devisor and he hath power to charge the Land in what manner he pleaseth and it is like to an usuall case as if a man makes a Feoffment in Fee to the use of one for life the Remainder over with power to make Leases and after he makes a Lease this is good against Tenant for life and him in the Remainder also And I have considered what the intent of the Devisor should be in granting of this Rent and it seems to me that in as much as the Land is limited in Tail and the Rent in Fee that by this the Grantee shall have power to grant or dispose of the Rent in what manner he would but if the Land had been in Fee I should have construed his intent to have been that the Grantee should have the Rent only untill the Remainder fall to which Doderidge agreed who said that we are in the case of a Will and this construction stands with the intent of the Devisor and stands with the Statute which saies Quod voluntas Donatoris est observanda The same Term in the same Court. Baskervill versus Brook A Man became Bail for another upon a Latitat in the Kings Bench and before Iudgment the Bail let his Lands for valuable consideration Difference between baile in the Kings Bench and the Common Pleas. And how a bail shall relate And afterwards Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff And now it was debated whether the Land Leased shall be liable to the Bailment and it was said by Glanvill of Councell with the Lessee that it ought not to be liable and he put a difference between a Bailment in this Court and a Bailment in the Common Pleas for there the Suit cometh by originall and the certainty of the debt or demand appeareth in the declaration and therfore then it is certainly known from the begining of the Bailement for what the Bail shall be bound But in this Court upon the Latitat there is not any certainty untill Iudgment given before which the Land is not bound and now it is in another mans hands and therfore â—ot liable and he puts Hoes case Co. lib. 5. 70. where iâ— was resolved that where the Plaintiff releaseth to the Bail oâ— the Defendant upon a Suit in the Kings Bench before Iudgment all Actions Duties and Demands that this Release shall not bar the Plaintiff for there is not any ceâ—tain duty by the Bail before Iudgment and therfore it cannot be a Release and he citeâ— the case of 21 E. 3. 32. upon an account and said that it was like to a second Iudgment in that which reduceth all to a certainty and therfor c. But it was said by Mountague and Crook that the Lessee shall be bound for otherwise many Bailments and Iudgments shall be defeated which will bring a great Inconvenience And Mountague said that it was like to the case of a bargain and sale of Land which after it is Inrolled within six moneths shall relate to the beginning of the Bargain so upon the Iudgment given relation is made from the time
Co. lib. 8. Baspoles case and 7 H. 6. 40. accordingly The same Term in the same Court Vaughans Case THomas Dedham had to Apprentice one Holland who got his Main with Child and afterwards departed from his Masters Service and staid a whole night with Vaughan his Kinsman and Dedham procured a Warrant from S. Stephen Soame a Iustice of Peace that the Constable should bring the said Apprentice to order according to Law and because that Vaughan perswaded him to withdraw himself so that he should not be taken by virtue of the Warrant he was indited And it was agreed that it was lawfull for Vaughan to lodge and relieve him albeit he knew his misdeeds they being no Treason or Felony But Haughton Iustice took exception to the Inditement because no place appeared where he perswaded him to withdraw himself from the Warrant or in truth that he did hide himself from the Warrant for if he did not so the perswasion was nothing And Doderidge took another exception to the Warrant because the Statute saith that two Iustices of which one of them shall be of the Quorum shall proceed in such cases against the Malefactor and that they shall compell the party to allow means for the education of the Infant or otherwise the Offendor shall suffer corporall punishment and so this Warrant not being speciall according Pasch 16. Jac. In the Star Chamber Wrennums Case SIr Henry Yelverton Attorney-generall exhibited an Information in the Star Chamber against one Wrennum Ore tenus because he had divers times petitioned the King against Sir Francis Bacon Lord Chancellor pretending that the said Lord Bacon had done great Injustice to him in granting an Injunction and awarding Possession of Land against him for which he had two decrees in the time of the former Chancellor And also he made a Book of all the proceedings in the said cause between him and one Fisher and dedicated and delivered it to the King in which he notoriously traduced and scandalised the said Chancellor saying that for this unjust decree he his Wife and Children were murthered and by the worst kind of death by starving And that now he having done unjustly he must maintain it by speaking untruths and that he must use his authority Wit Art and Eloquence for the better maintenance therof with other such like scandalous words And the Attorney cited a president 2 Jac. Where one Ford for an offence in the like manner against the late Chancellor was censured in this Court that he should be perpetnally imprisoned and pay the fine of 1000 l. and that he should ride upon a Horse with his face to the tail from the Fleet to Westminster with his fault written upon his head and that he should acknowledge his offence in all the Courts at Westminster and that he should stand there a reasonable time upon the Pillory and that one of his ears shall be cut off and from thence shall be carried to Prison again and in the like manner should go to Cheapside and should have his other ear cut off c. And because they conceived that the said Wrennum had wronged the said Lord Chancellor in the said suggestion they all agreed in his censure according to the said President See for such matter 19. Ass 5. 9 H. 8. Sir Rowland Heywards case and 21 H. 8. Cardinall Wolseys case The same Term in the Kings Bench. Mingies Case AWrit of Annuity was brought by Mingy which was granted Pro Consilio impenso impendendo the Defendant pleaded in Bar that he carried a Bill to the Plaintiff to have him set his hand to it and because he refused Annuity pro Consil impenso c. he detained the said Annuity And per Curiam this is no plea for he is bound to give advice but not to set his hand to every Bill for this may be inconventent to him The same Term in the same Court THe Case was this A Lessee for years was bound in a Bond to give up the possession of the Land demised to the Lessor or his Assigns at the end of the Term the Lessor assigns over his Interest and the Assignee requires the Lessee to perform the Condition who answers that he knew not Notice where requisite whether he were the Assignee and therupon refuseth And the question was whether he had broken the Condition and it was adjudged that he had for he hath taken upon him so to do and it is not like a Condition annexed to an Estate as Co. lib. 5. Mallories case or Co. lib. 6. Greens case where the Patron presented his Clark to a deprivation yet the Ordinary ought to give the Patron notice of the deprivation for it is a thing Spirituall of which a Lay-man shall not be bound to take notice It was moved that a man riding upon a Horse through the water was Dead and. drowned and by the Coroners Inquest it was found that his death was caused Per cursum aquae and the Horse was not found a Deodand and per Curiam they did well for the water and not the Horse was the cause of his death The same Terme in the same Court. Wooton versus Bye THe case was this A man made a Lease for years rendring Rent and upon payment of the Rent the Lessor made an Acquittance by a release of all Actions Duties and Demands from the beginning of the World to Release of all Demands bars a future Rent the day of the date And whether the Rent to come were released by it was the question And it was moved by Crook at the Bar that it was not for a Covenant in future shall not be released by such words yet a release of all Covenants will be good in such a case as the Book is in Dyer 57. so Hoes case Co. lib. 5. 70. b. such a release will not discharge a Bail before Iudgment But it was answered and resolved by the Court that such a Release will discharge the Rent to come for this word Demand is the most large and ample word in a Release that may be as Littleton saith and in Co. lib. 8. Althams case and in Hoes case Co. lib. 5. one was Bail for the Defendant the words wherof are conditionable Scil. Si contigerit predict defendent debit damna illa prefat Quer. minime solvere c. So that before Iudment it is altogether incertain and therfore cannot be released but in the case at the Bar he hath Jus ad rem though not in re as Crook Iustice said The same Term in the same Court. Bret versus Cumberland IN a Writ of Covenant the case was thus Queen Elizabeth by her Letters Patents made a Lease of certain Mills rendring Rent in which Lease were these words to wit That the said Lessee his Executors Administrators and Assigns should from time to time repair the Mills and so leave them at the end of the Term the Lessee assigns over his Term the Queen also
grants over the Reversion the first Lessee dies and the Grantee of the Reversion brings a Writ of Covenant against his Executors In which case there were two points 1. Whether these words And the said Lessee his Executors Administrators and Assigns shall from time to time c. make a Covenant or Whether Covenant lies against the Executor of a Lessee after assignment no. 2. Whether as this case is it will lye against the Executors of the Lessee As to the first point it was agreed that it is a Covenant for being by Indenture it is the words of both parties and it is more strong being in the case of the Queen Haughton laid that 25 H. 8. Tit. Covenant Covenant will lye against a Lessee after assignment but Debt lyeth not for Rent after the Lessee hath accepted the Assignee for his Tenant and therfore it seems that by the expresse words of the Covenant that the Action lies Doderidge Iustice contra for between the Queen and the Lessee there is privity of Contract and also of Estate so that the Queen her Heirs and Successors might have had an action against the Lessee or his Executors upon the privity of Contract and where the Lessee â—ssigns over the privity of Contract remains but the privity of Estate is gone to the Assignee and now when the Queen grants over the Reversion the privity of Contract is utterly determined wherby the Action of Covenant cannot be maintained against the first Lessee or his Executors who are more remote to which Mountague chief Iustice agreed see 2 H. 4. 6. 6. H. 4. 1. and Co. lib. 3. Walkers case and the Iudgments there cited Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Bennet versus Westbeck THe Case was thus Tenant for life Remainder for life Reversion in Fee he in Remainder for life gives his Deed of Demise with the assent of the first Tenant for life upon the Land to a stranger in the absence of the Lessor and said that he surrendred to him in Reversion And it was said that this Surrender being without Deed was not good to him who was absent and to confirm it the case was put out of 27 H. 8. Where Mountague chief Iustice said that if a Feoffment be made to four and Livery is made to one in the absence of the other but in name of all if it be by Deed this shall enure to all but if it be without Deed then only to him to whom the Livery was made So here this Surrender doth not enure to him in the Reversion being absent Whether Tenant for life in Remainder may surrender without Deed. But Non aliocatur for the sole point now in question was whether he in Remainder for life can surrender without Deed and as to it this Rule was taken viz. That that which cannot commence without Deed cannot be granted without Deed as a Rent Reversion common Advowson c. as 19 H. 6. 33. 14 H 7. 3. 1 2. Ph. Mar. 110. 22. Ass Pl. 16. But in this case this took effect by Livery and not by Deed and therfore might be determined without Deed. Mountague and Haughton agreed that it might be surrendred without Deed because it had its beginning without Deed but it could not be granted over without Deed. Doderidge Iustice said that it could not be surrendred without Deed but he said that Tenant in possession may or Tenant for life and he in Remainder together may surrender to him in the Reversion but this shall innure as two severall Surrenders first of him in Remainder to the Tenant for life and then by the Tenant for life to him in the Reversion Crook Iustice agreed with Doderidge for the Estate of him in Possession is an Estoppell to the Surrender so that it could not be surrendred without Deed. The same Term in the same Court. Thurman versus Cooper IN an Ejectione firmae brought by John Thurman against William Cooper upon the whole matter the case was thus Lands were given to a man and woman who afterwards inter-marry and to their Heirs and Assigns Habendum to them and to the Heirs of their two bodies engendered the remainder to them and the Survivor of them with warranty to them and their Heirs and Assigns for ever And the question was what Estate this shall be whether an Estate-tail or Fee-simple or a Fee-tail with a simple Expectant And it was said that this shall be an Estate-tail only for the Habendum qualifies the generall words precedent and with this agrees Perkins 35. b. and Co. lib. 8. 154. b. Althams case But it was answered and resolved by the whole Court that this is a Fee-tail with a Fee-simple expectant and they observed these Rules 1. That every Deed shall be taken most strong against him that made it 2. That every Deed shall be construed according to the intent of the maker so that all the parts may be effectuall if they can stand together with the Rules of Law 40 E. 3. 5 Percy saith that it is a Fee-simple 21 H. 6. 7. that it is an Estate-tail with a Fee-simple expectant Dyer 160. and Plow Paramore and Yardleys case the Law shall make an order of words where there is no order put by the parties and the words after the Remainder limited are Tenendum de Capitalibus Dominis feodi c. and therfore it ought to be a Fee-simple for if it were a Fee-tail he should hold of the Donor as it is in Co. lib. 6. Sir John Molins case and other Books And although the Warranty cannot inlarge an Estate yet this expresses his intent to passe a Fee-simple and the Law shall make a construction that the Fee-tail shall precede upon which the Fee-simple shall be expectant according to that which is before said in Paramore and Yardleys case Doderidge If the Habendum had been to a stranger the Premisses had been but a Tail as 7 H. 4. for otherwise the Habendum shall be void But if Land be given to one and his Heirs viz. In Tail or if the said Donce dye without Issue of his body this had been but an Estate-tail only because it immediatly checks and confirms the Premisses to which Haughton agreed Et adjournator The same Term in the same Court. Powels Case POwel an Vtter-Barister of the Temple and also Town-Clark of Plimoth brought an Action upon the Case against for these Words That he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave c. words The Defendant supposing that the Plaintiff had wronged him in the Court of Plimoth said that he was a Puritan Knave a precise Knave a bribing Knave a corrupted Knave and that he would make him answer for that which he had done in another place And after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was now moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the words were not actionable because he doth not scandalize him in his Profession by which he acquires his
Living And Mountague chief Iustice said that this word Bribing doth not import that he took a Bribe and therfore this word and all the other words but corrupted Knave are idle but these words impeacheth him in his Office for it hath reference to that and therfore is actionable And Iudgment was given accordingly The same Term in the same Court Sir Baptist Hickes Case in the Star Chamber SIr Baptist Hickes having done divers Pions and Charitable Acts to wit had founded at Camden in Glocestershire an Hospitall for twelve poor and impotent men and women and had made in the same Town a new Bell tunable to others a new Pulpit and adorned it with a Cushion and Cloath and had bestowed cost on the Sessions House in Middlesex c. one Austin Garret a Copyholder of his Mannor of Camden out of private malice had framed and writ a malicious and invective Letter to him in which in an ironicall and deriding manner he said that the said Sir Baptist had done these charitable works as the proud Pharisee for vain-glory and oftentation and to have popular applause and further in approâ—rtous manner taxed him with divers other unlawfull Acts And it was resolved by the Court that for such private Letters an Action upon the case doth not lye at Common Law for he cannot prove his case to wit the publishing of it but because Where a private Letter is punishable as a Libell it tends to the breach of the Peace it is punishable in this Court and the rather in this case because it tends to a publike wrong for if it should be unpunished it would not only deter and discourage Sir Baptist from doing such good Acts but other men also who are well disposed in such cases and therfore as the Arch-bishop observed this was a wrong 1. To Piety in respect of the cost bestowed on the Church 2. To charity in regard of the Hospitall 3. To Iustice in consideration of the Session House and these things were the more commendable in Sir Baptist because he did them in his life time For as Mountague chief Iustice observed they who do such acts by their Will do shew that they have no will to do them for they cannot keep their Goods any longer And he only took a diversity where such a Letter concerns publike matter as they did or private in which case it is not punishable But the Lord Coke said that it was the opinion of the Iudges in the Lord Treasurers case when he was Attorney that such a private Letter was punishable in this Court and therupon he had instructions to exhibit an Information but the Lord Treasurer Jacens in extremis was content to pardon him and so it was resolved between Wooton and Edwards And Sir Francis Bacon Lord Chancellor said that the reason why such a private Letter shall be punished is because that it in a manner enforceth the party to whom the Letter is directed to publish it to his friends to have their advice and for fear that the other party would publish it so that this compulsary publication shall be deemed a publication in the Delinquent and in this case the party was fined at 500 l. The same Term in the same Court. Bernard versus Beale AN Action upon the case was brought for these words viz. That the Words That the Plaintiff had two Bastards 36. yeaâ—s since Plaintiff had two Bastards 36. years ago upon the report wherof he was in danger to have been divorced And it was resolved that for Defamation there was no remedy but in the Spirituall Court if he had no temporall lesse therby and therfore it is not sufficient to ground an Action to say that he was in danger to be diverced but thâ—t he was De facto divorced or that he wâ—s to have a presentment in marriage as it is in Anne Devies case Co. lib. 4. The same Term in the same Court. Brabin and Tradums Case THe Case was That the Church-wardens of D. had used time out of mind to dispose and order all the Seats of the Church wherupon they disposed of a Seat to one and the Ordinary granted the same Seat to another and his A Prohibition for a Seat in the Church Heirs and excommunicated all others who afterwards should sit in the Seat and a Prohibition was prayed and granted for this grant of a Seat to one and his Heirs is not good for the Seat doth not belong to the person but to the house for otherwise when the person goes out of the Town to dwell in another place yet he shall retain the Seat which is no reason and also it is no reason to excommunicate all others that should sit there for such great punishments should not be imposed upon such small Offenders an Excommunication being Traditio diabola In the same Term in the same Court. Fulcher versus Griffin THe Parson of D. covenanted with one of his Parishoners that he should A Parson covenant that his Parishoners shall pay no Tithes pay no Tithes for which the Parishoner covenanted to pay to the Parson an annuall summ of money and afterwards the Tithes not being paid the Parson sued him in the Court Christian and the other prayed a Prohibition And it was agreed that if no interest of Tithes passe but a bare Covenant then the party who is sued for the Tithes hath no remedy but a Writ of Covenant And the better opinion of the Court in this case was that this was a bare Covenant and that no interest in the Tithes passe The custody of a Copyholder that was a Lunatick was committed to Darcies case in the Common Pleas. I. S. and for Trespasse done upon his Land it was demanded of the Court in whose name J. S. should bring the action and their opinion was that it should be in the name of the Lunatick Trinity 16. Jac. In the Kings Bench. The Earl of Northumberlands Case THe Earl of Northumberland being seised of the Mannor of Thistleworth in which he had a Leet to be holden twice a year to wit within a moneth after Easter and a moneth after Michaelmas and Henry Devell being a Free-holder of the said Mannor erected a new Dove-coat at Heston within the Precinct of the said Leet which was presented at the Leet for a common Nusance for which Devell was amerced 40 s. and was commanded to remove it upon pain of 10 l. for the which a Distresse was taken by Henry Sanders and others as Bailiffs to the said Earl wherupon Devell brought a Replevin and they made Avowry and justified as Bayliffs and prescribed that they used to make by-laws to redresse common Nusances and also prescribed in the Distresse And the point in question was whether the new erecting of a Dove-coat by a Free-holder were a common Nusance punishable Whether the erecting of a Dove-coat be a common Nusance in the Leet And it was resolved by the whole Court upon
est rerum omnium vendendarum mensura Bracton 117. 18 E. 3. Hollinghead 109. 50 E. 3. Rot. Pat. Memb. 7. And for transportation 17 E. 3. 19 E. 3. Rot. Pat. 24. De monetis non transportandis 19 R. 2. Rot. Pat. The Dutches of obtained licence to melt Coin to make Plate And divers of the Defendants were within the Kings generall pardon but in as much as they pleaded it in their Rejoynder and not in their answer as it ought to be the Court over-ruled their Plea so that they could have no advantage therby But in as much as they were strangers and not coâ—usant of our Laws and relyed only upon their Counsell the Court had consideration therof in their censure Hillary 17 Jac. In the Kings Bench. Serle versus Mander SErle brought an action upon the case against Mahder for these words to Words I arrest you upon Felony wit I arrest you upon Felony and after Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment by Richardson that the words were not actionable for he doth not say that the Plaintiff had committed Felony But it was rescived by the Court and so adjudged that the action lieth The same Term in the same Court A Iudgment was obtained against one of the Servants of the Lord Hay Iudgment against a Defendant when beyond Sea with an Ambassador reversed Viscount Doncaster when he was Ambassador in Bohemia and attending upon him there And this matter being disclosed to the Court by the Counsell of the Defendant they would not suffer the Plaintiff to have execution upon the said Iudgment but ordered the Plaintiff to declare De novo to which the Defendant should presently answer Memorand It was said to be against the course of the Court to have an Imparlance Imparlance before the Declaration entred The same Term in the same Court The King against Briggs A Quo warranto was brought by the King against Briggs for exercising A Subject cannot have a Forest of certain Priviledges who justified by virtue of a Forest granted to him And by Bridgeman this is the first Quo warranto which he knew that had been brought against any Subject for a Forest for a Subject cannot have a Forest but he may have a Chase which peradventure may passe under the name of a Forest And there are divers incidents to a Forest which a Subject cannot use nor have there ought to be a Iustice of a Forest which a Subject cannot have and such a Iustice ought to be a man of great Dignity 2. There ought to be Verderors who are Iudges also and by 34 E. 1. Ordinatio Forrestae ought to be by Wait but a Subject cannot award a Writ Also there are three Courts incident to a Forest 1. A Court of Attachments which may be without Verderors 2. The Swanimate Court 3. The Iustice seat and this appeareth in 1. E. 3. cap. 8. 21 E. 4. cap. 8 But by the Statute of 27 H. 8. cap. 7. There are some other incidents to a Forest 2. Admits that a Subject may have a Forest yet it fails in this case because he hath shown the exemplification and not the Letters Patents and see Co. lib. 5. Pains case that neither an exemplification or constat are pleadable at Common Law and Co. lib. 10. Dr. Leyfeilds case The same Term in the same Court Sir William Webb versus Paternoster THe case was this Sir William Plummer licensed Sir William Webb to lay his Hay upon the Land of the said Sir William Plummer untill he could conveniently sell it and then Sir William Plummer did make a Lease of the Land to Paternoster who put in his Cattell and they eat up the Hay And it was two years between the license and the putting in of the Cattell and yet Sir William Webb brought an action of Trespasse against Paternester for this Mountague chief Iustice 1. This is an Interest which chargeth the Land into whosoever hands it comes and Webb shall have a reasonable and convenient time to sell his Hay 2. The Lessee ought to give notice to Notice Sir William Webb of the Lease before he ought to put in his Cattell to which Haughton Iustice agreed in both points But Doderidge Iustice said that Sir William Webb had no certain time by this license yet he conceived that he ought to have notice But it was resolved that the Plaintiff had Convenient time a convenient time to wit two years for the removing of his Hay and therfore Iudgment was given against him But admit that there had not been a convenient time yet the Court was of opinion that the Plaintiff ought to have inclosed the Land at his perill for the preservation of his Hay And it was agreed that a license is countermandable although it be concerning A license whether for profit or pleasure countermandable profit or pleasure unlesse there be a certain time in the license as if I license one to dig Clay in my Land this is evocable and may be countermanded although it be in point of profit which is a stronger case then a license of pleasure see 13 H. 7. The Dutches of Suffolks case for a license The same Term in the same Court SIbill Westerman brought an action upon the case against Eversall and had Error Sibell for Isabell Iudgment and in the entry of the Iudgment she was named Isabell 1 Ass and 3. Ass A Fine was levied by Sibill when her name was Isabell and it was not good for it doth not appear to be the same party so in the case at the Bar And for this the Iudgment was reversed The same Term in the same Court JEne as Executor of brought an action upon the case against Chester An Infant chargable for necessary Apparrell because the Defendant made request to the Testator of the Plaintiff to buy for him certain silk Stuffs for Apparrel and to make him a Cloak the Defendant pleaded that he was within age and George Crook said that the Defendant should not be charged because it is not shewn that the Apparrell was for the Infant himself but he was over-ruled in this for it is sufficiently expressed to be for him And it was agreed by the Court that it ought to be shewn that it was Pro necessario vestitu and it ought to be suitable to his calling and as Doderidge said that there was a case adjudged in this Court between Stone Withipole that where Withipole had taken of Stone certain Stuffs for Apparrel being within age and afterwards he promised payment if he would forbeare him some time and the Assumpsit adjudged not good because he was not liable for the Debt at first for the reason aforesaid Trin. 17. Jac. In the Common Bench. Gilbert de Hoptons Case AN action upon the case was brought for those words viz. Thou art a Words Thou art a Theef and hast stoln my Furze Theef and hast stoln
Execution shall be sued against him as Ter-tenant 2. There is not any lien as Heir for the Iudgment doth not mention the Heir and therfore he cannot be charged unlesse he be expresly bound and in the Record of the Recovery it doth not appear that the first lien shall bind the Heir for he declares that he bound himself and not that he bound himself and his Heirs 3. If the Heir were bound in the Obligation so that he were once bound as Heir yet the Iudgment determines the specialty so that now he is not bound and in the Iudgment the Heir is not mentioned as in 10 H. 4. 21. 24. If an Abbot contract to the use of the house without consent of the Covent this shall bind if he dies but if he takes an Obligation of the Abbot and then he dies this shall not bind the house for the Contract is determined by the Obligation and this is the reason that in the time of E. 3. in a recovery upon debt the Obligation was cancelled 4. Here he cannot be charged as Heir for it appeareth by the Record Where a debt is recorded upon bond the Obligation was cancelled that his Father is living for it is brought against him as Heir apparant which he cannot be but during the life of his Father And as to the objection that in this case he shall have his age and therfore shall be charged as Heir Non sequitur for if execution be sued against the Heir of a Purchasor he shall have his age and yet he is not Heir neither can charged as Heir to the Conusor But because it is a rule in Law that the Heir which hath by discent shall not answer where his Inheritance may be charged during his Nonage Whitlock to the same intent because the Heir is not charged here as Heir but as Ter-tenant wherby his false Plea shall not hurt him with which Jones also agreed and said that he here considered three things 1. That the lien of the Ancestor binds the Heir 2. How the Heir shall behave himself in pleading 3. Our point in question For the first there are two things requisite to bind one as Heir 1. A lien expresse for if one bind himself and not his Heir this shall not bind his Heir in any case 2. A discent of Inheritance for without this he shall not be bound by the act of his Ancestor and he is bound no longer then Assets discend for he alien before the Writ purchased the lien is gone 2. He ought to behave himself truly and plead truly and confesse the assets discended to him when debt is brought against him as heir otherwise his own Lands shall be charged with the debt as it is in Pepys case in Plow Com. But where it is said in Pepys case that upon a Nihil dicit or Non sum informatum c. If the Iudgment passe upon them that it shall be generall I am not of that opinion for the common experience of the Courts is that such a generall Iudgment shall not be given against the Heir unlesse it be upon a false plea pleaded with which agrees Lawsons case Dyer 81. and Henninghams case Dyer 344. where the Iudgment passed by Nihil dicit so that the saying in Plow 440. a. that what way soever the Heir be condemned in debt if he do not confesse the Assets c. that it shall be his proper debt is not now taken for Law And I also hâ—ld that if the Heir plead falsly and there is found more Assets Where upon a false plea by an Heir the Plaintiff may elect to take the Assets in execution or an Elegit of all his Land that yet it is in the election of the Plaintiff to charge him and to take execution of the Assets only or to take an Elegit of all his Land and he is not bound to take an Elegit of all his Land in this case for otherwise this inconvenience may arise If the Heir hath a 100. acres by discent and two by purchâ—se if upon the false Plea of the Heir the Plaintiff cannot have any other execution but an Eligit of the Moyety of his Lands then he by this is prejudiced for otherwise he might have all he Assets in execution and so the Heir by this way shall take advantage of his false plea. 3. He held as Whitlock before and for the same reason Doderidge Iustice How the Heir shall be bâ—und by the act of his Father is worthy of consideration upon which Prima facie the Books seem to disagree but being well considered accord with excellent harmony I have considered this case it was moved at Reading Term and because my Notes are not here I will speak more briefly and will consider 1. Hâ—w an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father and as to that in debt against an Heir he is charged as Heir so that at this day it is taken as his proper debt wherby the Writ is in the Debet and Detinet How an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Father but in the Detinet only against Executors But in former time from the 18. of Ed. 2. till 7 H. 4. if an Executor had Assets the Heir was not chargable but in 7 H. 4. the Law changed in this point for now it is accounted his own debt and debt will lye against his Executor as it is said in Plow Com and so against the Heirs of the Heir to many generations albeit of this Plowden makes a doubt and his plea that he had nothing at the day of the Writ purchased nor ever after is good for if he alien the Assets he is discharged of the debt in regard he is not to wait the action of the Obligee 2. The Heir shall be châ—â—ged upon or Recognisance not as Heir but as Ter-tenant for he is not bound in the Recognisance but only the Conusor grant that the debt shall be levied of all his Lands and Tenements but not against his Heirs And here he is not meerly as Ter-tenant for he shall not have contribution agâ—â—st â—her Ter-tenants but only against those who are Heirs as himself is but to all other intents he is Ter-tenant and so charged Why an Heir is not chargable for debt after he hath fold the assets as 32 E. 3. and 27 H. 6. aâ—â— 3. That upon a Iudgment as our case is the Heir shall be charged as Ter-tenant and not otherwise The Book which hath been cited viz 33 E. 3. Execution 162. is expresse in the point the broken years of Fitzherbert are obsâ—urely reported but by comparing of cases it will appear to be our case exâ—resly 4. That albeit an Heir shall be charged upon the Obligation of his Ancestor where he is particularly bound yet upon his false plea no execution shall be but upon the assets So it seems to me that in the principall case the Iudgment shall be speciall and it seems to be a
very plain case Crew chief Iustice agreed and in his argument he affirmed what Jones said that a generall Iudgment shall not be given against the Heir if he do not plead falsly that he hath no Assets and not upon Nihil dicit And so Iudgment was given that the Plaintiff shall have Execution of the Moyety of the Lands discended to the Defendant and so note the diversity of debt against the Heir and Scire facias against the Heir Dickenson versus Greenhow Hill 1. Car. In the Kings Bench Intr. Hill 18. Jac. Rot. 189. IN an Attachment upon a Prohibition the Plaintiff declared that where Robert the last Abbot of Cokersham in Lancashire was seised in Fee of three acres of Land parcel of his Monastery and that the Abbot and his Com-monks and all the Predecessors of the Abbot were time out of mind of the order and rule of Praemonstratenses and that the order of Praemonstratenses and all Monks therof were time out of mind discharged of payment of tithes for their Lands and Tenements Quamdiu manibus propriis aut sumptubus excolâ—bant And that the said Abbot and all his Predecessors time out of mind had holden the said three acres discharged of payment of Tithes Quamdiu c. and so held them untill the dissolution of the Monastery and shew the surrender to H. 8. and the Statute of 31 H. 8 by force wherof H. 8. was seised and held them discharged and from him derive them to E. 6. and from E. 6. to Queen Mary and from her to Queen Elizabeth and from her in the 42. year of her Raign to Wagstaff and from him by mean conveyances to Dickenson the Plaintiff Quorum pretextu he was seised and enjoyed them in Propria manurantia and shew the Statute of 2 E. 6. cap. 15. wherby it is enacted that Tithes shall be paid as usually they were c. Quorum pretextu the Plaintiff held the three acres discharged of Tithes and that notwithstanding and against the Prohibition the Defendant did draw him into Plea for them in Court Christian and the Iudge therof held plea and the Defendant did there prosecute him to the disinherison of the Crown And upon this the Defendant demurred and prayed a consultation And Sir John Davies the Kings Serjeant argued for the Defendant that a Consultation should be granted because that his matter of discharge is double 1. His Priviledge 2. The prescription and if either of them will not help him then he ought to be charged For the Priviledge he took it that the Praemonstratenses never had such a priviledge It is a Maxime in Law All Lands chargable with Tithes that all persons ought to pay Tithes and all Lands shall be charged with them of common right but also there are divers discharges of them and allowed by our Law as is manifest by the orders of Templers Hospitalers and Cistertians which discharges our Law allows and these are 1. By prescription 2. By reall composition 3. By priviledge obtained and that by two wais 1. Either by the Bull of the Pope for he taking upon himself to be the great Dispensâ—r and Steward of the Church took upon him to discharge them but this as it is holden by the Canon he could not absolutely do but might divert them to a Clergy-man or grant to another to hold them by way of retainer and this ought to be to a Clergy-man also Or 2. By a generall Counsell for some orders were discharged by generall Counsels So some obtained Priviledges by the Popes Bulls which are his Patents some by Counsels which are as his Statutes and Decrees were as Iudgments but yet none of them had ever any force in our Law nor did bind us in England more then voluntarily retained and approved by usage and custom for as it is said in 11 H 4. the Pope cannot alter the Law of England and this is evident for in all cases where the Bulls or Constitutions of the Pope crosse the Law of the Land they have alwaies been rejected The Popes Bulls of four sorts as for instance 1 In the Bulls which are of four sorts 1. Of Provision 2. Of Citation 3. Of Exemption And 4. Of Excommunication And as for those of Excommunication it appeareth that it was Treason at Common Law and that the Treasurer did kneel to E. 2. for one who brought them in and in the perpetuall course of the Books afterwards they have alwaies been disallowed in Pleas. So his Bulls of Citation before the Statute of Provision was a hainous offence and so are Bulls of Provision and Exemption For his Canons where they were against the Law they were neglected It appeareth by the Canon Quod nullus capiat beneficium a Laico and yet notwithstanding continued long after for Benefices and does yet for Bishopricks that the Clergy shall take them from the King and a lay-hand And also there is a Canon for exemption of Clarks out of temporall Iurisdiction but yet as Brain saith 10 H. 7. 18. it was never observed here So the Canon saith that the time of the Laps shall be accounted Per septimanas but our Law not regarding this saith that it shall be accounted Per menses in the Calender as it is expresly adjudged in 5 E. 3. Rot. 100. Rot. claus in turri And there is a great reason for it as it is in 29 H. 3. memb 5. in turri It is not necessary for Bishops of England to go to generall Councells so as in Parliament those that do not â—end Knights or Burgesses shall not be bound by Statutes And the Counsels of Lyons of Bigamis c. are expounded by Statutes how they shal be taken so that it they have a Priviledge as in truth they have by the Popes Bulls if it were not allowed in England they are not of force to priviledge them against the Common Law of the Land for payment of Tithes but this was never here allowed And now for the Prescription this cannot help them for Monks are not of Evangelicall Priesthood to wit capable of Tithes in the Pernamy but meerly Lay-men and then as the Bishop of Winchesters case is they cannot prescribe in non decimando And Bede saith of them that they are Merè laici so that if their Priviledge were allowed their Prescription will not help them The priviledge of Praemonstratenses was by the Counsell generall of for their discharge which denies that all religious persons should be discharged of Tithes of Lands in their own hands Quamdiu c. But afterwards Adrian restrained it to Templars Hospitalars and Cistertians omitting the Praemonstratenses and the decree of Adrian was received also wherby the Law took notice of the discharge of the said three Orders True it is that the Praemonstratenses have a Bull of Pope Innocent the third of discharge and as large liberties as the Cistertians but they never put this in ure And it seems 1. That there were of them 29. Abbots
Abbys and yet their priviledge is not mentioned in all the Books as the Cistertians is 2. They complained to Gregory the nineth that they were not suffered to put it in ure and notwithstanding this complaint and command of the Pope to the Clergy to allow them this priviledge yet 24 H. 3. Complaint was made against them in Parliament for claiming this priviledge But the Statute of 2 H. 4. cap. 4. put this cut of doubt for this put the Cistertians in a premunire for purchasing and putting in execution Bulls of exemption of their Lands purchased afterwards Now if the Praemonstratenses had the same priviledge they should not have been omitted â—ut of this Statute then comes the Statute of 7 H. 4. cap. 6. which terrifies all from putting in execution Bulls of Exemption of their Lands not put in execution before upon which it is not to be presumed that it was put in execution afterwards But admit that the Praemonstratenses had this priviledge I say that the Plaintiff hath not applied this priviledge to himself for he hath not averred in fact that at the time c. Propriis manibus excolebat nec ad firman demitâ—ebat And this he ought to have done if he would take advantage of the priviledge as in Dickensons case Novel lib. intr 542. there it is expresly alledged in the like case as ours is here and where the same priviledge as here is claimed Quod manibus propriis excolebat True it is that it is said here that after the Feoffment to him made he was seised Et gavisus fuit in propria manutenor but he doth not say that at the time of the Tithes due gavisus fuit c. as he ought expresly to have done as appeareth by other cases If one prescribe to have common in arable Land when the Corn is reaped or in Meadow where the Hay is carried away and justifie by reason therof he ought to aver that the Corn or Hay was carried away when he put in his Cattell otherwise he hath not applied the prescription to himself So if one justifie for Common Quandocunque audia sua jerint he ought to aver that his Cattell then went in the place where c. as 17 Ass 7. So if the King pardon all but those who adhere to M. he who plead it ought to aver that he did not adhere to M. so here the priviledge is Quamdiu propriis manibus c. and therfore at the time he ought to aver that he had it propriis manibus c. Also where upon the surrender to H. 8. and the Statute they conclude that the Queen held it discharged this cannot be for this ought to be in such manner as the Abbot held it discharged but this was quamdiu c. and the King cannot be bound to such an unbeseeming condition and therfore he shall hold it dischâ—rged Like to the case where the Abbey hath the presentation and another the nomination the Abbey surrender he who hath the nomination shall have all for the King shall not present for him it being a thing undecent for his Majesty and so he concluded for the Defendant Banks contra 1. That it is a good cause of Prohibition 2. That it is well applied to us 1. That the order of Praemonstratenses is discharged of Tithes that they had once this priviledge hath been allowed by the other party by the Bulls of the Pope and that it was allowed and taken notice of he proved by this that this Bull was confirmed by King John in the 24. year of his Raign the Charter wherof he said he had under Seal and 22 E. 1. membran 5. there were 26. Abbeys of this order and the King took them all into his protection with their Immunities and 22 Rich. 2. John de Gant having Jura Regalia in Lancashire where the Abbey is confirmed to them this Bull and also this hath been divers times allowed and decreed to them in Court Christian for suit of Tithes as in the case of the Abbey of Bigham which was of the same order And as to that which was objected that if the Praemonstratenses had such a priviledge as the Castertians in 2 H. 4. that the like provision would have been against them As to this I answer that such a provision is not against the Templars nor Hospitalars and yet they have such a priviledge 2. It may be that they never enlarged their priviledged above their grant And for the Statute of 7 H. 4. our Priviledge was not then new and it was afterwards allowed in 22 R. 2. And also I conceive that if the Abbey were discharged at the time of the dissolution although not De jure yet this is a sufficient discharge within the Statute of 31 H. 8. as it is taken Co. lib. 11. 14. 2. I hold that they may here prescribe to be discharged of Tithes because they are Spiritual persons and capable of cure of Souls and capable of tithes in Pernamy as if an Appropriation be made to them 3. It is not now to be argued whether they have such a priviledge for they have demurred which is a confession of all matters in Fait c. 4. If there be a matter wherupon the Prohibition may be grounded it will serve vide Dyer 170 171. Co. lib. 11. 10. And 5. The priviledge is well applied because it is shewn that they were once discharged 6. He needs not to shew how he is discharged 22 E. 4. 4. 5 E. 4. 8. 20 E. 4. 15. Also the discharges are temps dont c. and therfore not pleadable so he prayed that the Prohibition might stand Pasch 1. Car. In the Kings Bench. Bowry versus Wallington NOte that in this case upon the Statute of 50 E. 3. 4. it was agreed by the Court that if there be a Suit in the Ecclestasticall Court and a Prohibition awarded and afterwards Consultation granted that upon the same Libell no Prohibition shall be granted again but if there be an Appeal in this case then a Prohibition may be granted but with these differences 1. If he who appeals pray the Prohibition there he shall not have it for then Suits shall be deferred in infinitum in the Ecclesiasticall Courts Where severall Prohibitions may be granted in the same case and where not 2. If the Prohibition and Consultation were upon the body of the matter and the substance of it for otherwise he shall be put many times to try the same matter which is full of vexation And the case was moved again and argued by Noy which was thus Wallington livelled in the Ecclesiasticall Court against Bowry for tithes of Wool and Lamb and Bowry upon suggestion of a Modus derimandi obtained a Prohibition and had an Attachment and declared upon it and are at Issue upon the Modus which is found for the Defendant and Consultation granted wherupon Iudgment was given in the Ecclesiasticall Court against Bowry upon which Bowry appealled and prayed a new
Prohibition and had it and Noy moved for a Consultation 1. Because that a Prohibition and an Attachment upon it are but one Suit for the contempt of the party in bringing his Suit in another Court and translating this from the Kings Court and when it is once tried for the Defendant the same thing shall not be tried again And as to the Statute of 50 E 3. 4. upon the mistake wherof the mistake is raised he confessed that the Printed Books and also in the Extract of the Parliament one Roll remaining in the Tower is the same Iudge but the Parliament Roll it self and the Petition is Liceatque Iudici Ecclesiastico sive diocess eidem an hujusmodi and the answer to the Petition is one Consultation granted sufficeth in this case And the Parliament Roll it self was brought into the Court and viewed but he said that if it were as it is in the printed Book and Extract the same Iudge shall not be intended the same personall Iudge but the same Iudge of Conusance of the same Iurisdiction or cause for otherwise if another Commissary be made as the Bishop may when he will his Successor may be newly prohibited and also one thing may be infinitely tried for in many places the Suit begins in the Arch-deacons Court and from him an Appeal may be brought to the Bishop The same Term in the Kings Bench. Pack versus Methold in a Writ of Error IN Mich. Term 22 Jac. Methold brought an action upon the case in the Common Pleas against Pack and declared that in consideration that the Plaintiff would pay to Playford 52 l. 14 s. to the use of the said Pack such a day c. Pack promised to deliver to him his Bond in which he was bound to him in the said summ when he should be therunto requested And shews that he had paid c. and the Defendant did not deliver to him the Bond albeit the same to do he was afterwards often times requested and upon non assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and now it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment because the request is not laid specially nor the day nor place therof expressed But the Court to wit Hobart chief Iustice Hutton and Harvey gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff and yet they agreed that if he had demurred upon the Declaration it had not been good and also that if it had been generall Licet saepius requisit it had not been good in as much as it is parcell of the promise and therfore ought to be said substantially viz. That it was after the promise and payment of the 52 l. but the time is supplied by these words Postea and there is no defect but in the place and Postea implies that it was after the promise and payment And Hobart said that all the points of the Declaration which have matter and substance are good only there wants the place where the request was made which by the Issue is moved and the request is here well notified to the Court and the defect of the place is now helped by the Statute Hutton said that if the promise had been to pay so much upon request at Easter there the day ought to have been shewn and Postea had not been sufficient but here the Postea refers only to a thing wherby it is certain and he said that upon this Issue such a request shall be given in evidence Harvey said that the request being here laid as it is the Court may well give Iudgment And it seemed to Hobart that such a request cannot be given in evidence where the Issue is upon an Assumpsit And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff and afterwards a Writ of Error Hill 1. Car. Where in an action upon the case there ought to be a speciall request and where not was brought in the Kings Bench and the opinion of the Court was strongly that the Plaintiff ought to have alledged the request specially and ceriainly in time and place because it is traversable and parcell of the Assumpsit and not to be done but upon request Jones Iustice remembred divers Presidents in the point and further day was given to bring in Presidents of either side and two Presidents were produced according to the opinion of this Court Scil. Pasch 30 Eliz. Rot. 464. in 1. Court Old and Estgreens case Trin 16 Jac. Rot. 268. Wales case But in Debt Licet saepius requisit is sufficient for it is not materiall nor traversable for the bringing of the action of Debt which is a Precipe is a sufficient demand in it self and afterwards at another day the Court continued of the same opinion and therfore the Plaintiff in the first action brought a new action Quod nota for albeit the Defendant had pleaded non assumpsit and Issue was joyned upon it yet this did not amend the evill laying of the request according to the Presidents abovesaid Pasch 2 Car. In the Kings Bench in t Hill 1 Car. Rot. 135. Constable versus Clobery IN an action of Covenant the question was upon the Traverse the Plaintiff declared upon the Indenture of Covenant and the Covenant was that a Ship shall go with the next fair wind and that the Merchant shall pay so much for fraught the Defendant saith by way of traverse that he did not go with the next wind and it was obiected by Stone of the Temple of Counsell with the Plaintiff that the Traverse was not good but he ought to have traversed that the Ship did not go at all for that which is materiall shall be traversed and that the Ship did not go is the most materiall thing here and this appeareth by 15 E. 4. 2. where a Gift in tail is traversed and not the death of the Tenant in tail 19 H. 8. 7. 36 H. 6. 16. 2 H. 5. 2. 2 H. 7. 12. and there are cases to this purpose Co. lib. 7. 9. Ughtreds case If a man intitles himself to Land by an Estate which cometh by Condition he ought to shew that the Condition is performed A Covenant against a Covenant will not make an Estoppell but he shall bring his action 3 H. 6. 33. Where he ought to shew that he went to Rome because it is a precedent Condition The principall case in Ughtreds case prove other to wit that which is materiall is alledgable And the difference upon the case of 48 E. 3. 3. 4. Where A. Covenant with B. to serve him with three Esquires in France and B. covenant for it to pay him 42. marks he may chuse to covenant in generall or speciall as he will for there was Covenant against Covenant and here there is a Covenant of one part to go with the Ship and on the other part to pay so much for the Fraught and so Covenant against Covenant And it seemed to Doderidge Iustice that the Traverse is not good for the Traverse here is by permission of God And for another thing where Merchants
covenant to pay joyntly and severally according to the quantity of the Wares there an action of Covenant may be brought against one alone for the Deed is severall And by Crew chief Iustice it cannot be a good Traverse for a circumstance cannot be traversed for wind is alterable and a thing materiall is only traversable and here the Covenant is severall for their severall Fraughts and it may be that others have paid him Jones Iustice the traverse is not good and for the other matter he cited Mattheusens case Co. lib. 5. 22. Where upon a Charter party if one seal be broken all is gone If three are bound ioyntly and an action is brought against one and it appeareth that others have sealed the Writ shall abate But in this case an action lies against him alone although the other be named in the Indenture The same Term in the same Court intr Hill 22. Jac. Rot. 1019. Millen versus Fandrye AN action of trespasse was brought for chasing of Sheep the Defendant pleaded that they were trespassing upon certain land and he with a little Dog chased them out and as soon as the Sheep were cut of the land he called in his Dog and upon this the Plaintiff demurred The point singly was but thus J chase the Sheep of another out of my ground and the Dog pursues them into another mans land next adjoyning and J chide my Dog Iustification in trâ—spase and the Owner of the Sheep brings trespasse for chasing of them And it was argued by Whistler of Grays-Inne that the justification was not good and he cited Co. lib. 4. 38. b. that a man may hunt Cattell out of his ground with a Dog but cannot exceed his authority and by him an authority in Law which is abused is void in all and to hunt them into the next ground is not justifiable The Books differ if Cattell stray out of the high way involuntarily whether Trespasse lies 7 H. 7. 2. and H. 7. 20. but all agree that they ought to be chased out as hastily as may be Littleton argued for the Defendant that Cattell may be chased out into another mans ground and he said that a man cannot have such a power upon his Dog as to recall him when he pleaseth and a Dog is ignorant of the bounds of Land and he resembled this case to other cases of the Law first to 21 E. 4. 64. In Trespasse of Cattell taken in A. in D. the Defendant saith that he was seised of four acres called C. in D. and found the Cattell there Damage feasant and chased them towards the Pound and they escaped from him and went into A. and he presently retook them which is the same Trespasse and admitted for a good plea and 22 E. 4. 8. In trespasse the Defendant justifies by reason of a custom that they which plow may turn their Plow upon the Land of another and that for necessity and it was allowed for a good justification and he hath more government of his Oxen then in our case he can have of his Dog If a man be making of a lawfull Chase and cannot do it without damage to another this is Damnum absque injuria 21 H. 7. 28. And he cited a case which was in Mich. 18 Jac. between Jenning and Maystore where a man of necessity chased Sheep for taking one of his own in trespasse he may justifie it And also if a Dog goes into the Land of another as in this case trespasse does not lye but otherwise it is of Cattell Crew chief Iustice it seems to me that he might drive the Sheep out with the Dog and he cold not withdraw his Dog when he would in an instant and therfore it is not like to the case of 38 E. 3. Where trespasse was brought for entring into a Warren and there it was pleaded that there was a Pheasant in his Land and his Hawk flew and followed it into the Plaintiffs ground and there it seems that it is not a good justification for he may pursue the Hawk but cannot take the Pheasant 6 E. 4. a man cuts Thorns and they fell into another mans Land and in tresgasse he justified for it and the opinion was that notwithstanding this justification trespasse lies because he did not plead that he did his best endeavour to hinder their falling there yet this was a hard case But this case is not like to these cases for here it was lawfull to chase them out of his own Land and he did his best endeavour to recall the Dog and therfore trespasse does not lye Doderidge Iustice agreed for here was no hedge and when he saw them out of his own ground he rated the Dog 12 H. 8. this difference is taken if I see Sheep in my Land I may chase them out but if another sees them and chase them out I may have trespasse against him because he hath taken away For an involuntary trespasse action doth not lye my advantage and the nature of a Dog is such that he cannot be ruled suddenly and here it appeareth to be an involuntary Trespasse 8 E. 4. A man is driving Goods through a Town and one of them goes into another mans house and he follows him trespasse doth not lye for this because it was involuntary and a trespasse ought to be done voluntarily and so it is Injuria and a hurt to another and so it is Damnum If Deer be out of a Forest the Owner of the Land where they are may hunt them and if the Deer flye to the Forest and the Hounds pursue him then he ought to call in the Dogs and so I may justifie and trespasse lies not In the time of chief Iustice Popham this case was adjudged in this Court Trespasse was brought for hunting and breaking of hedges and the case was that a man started a Fox in his own land and his Hounds pursued him into another mans Lands and it was holden that he may hunt and pursue him into any mans land because a Fox is a noysom creature to the Common-wealth Bracton saith that when a man is outlawed he hath Caput lupinum and he may be hunted through all the County And he agreed the case of 8 E. 4. If a Tree grow in a hedge and the Fruit fall into another mans land the Owner may fetch it in the other mans land and he also agreed the case of 22 E. 48. of the Plew and so concluded that the trespasse doth not lye Jones Iustice that the trespasse doth not lye vide Co. lib. 8. 67. Crogates case and lib. 4. Terringhams case and he cannot recall his Dog in an instant And the same day Iudgment was given for the Defendant Quod quaerens nil capiat per billam The same Term in the same Court. Marsh versus Newman IN a Replevin the Defendant pleaded that was seised In jure Collegii and doth not say that he was in Dominico suo ut de foedo and the Plaintiff
demurred upon the Avowry And Andrews argued for the Plaintiff 1. The Defendant ought to have alleadged certainly that they were seised in Fee for Littleton saith that in Counts and pleadings a man ought to shew how he is seised 8 E. 3. 55. 13 Eliz. Dyer 299. Pl. 31. An Inquisition was found upon an extent of a Statute-merchant and doth not shew how the Conusor was seised but only that he was seised and the Inquisition holden void But it may be objected that if Land be given to a Dean and Chapiter that they have fee 11 H. 7. 12. I confesse it But the constant use of pleading hath alwais been in case of a Bishop Colledge c. to say that they were seised in Fee as appears in Hill and Granges case and Co. lib. 6. the Dean and Chapiter of Worcesters case and Co. lib. 11. 66. Magdalen Colledge case and it appeareth by 20 H. 7. in the Abbey of S. Austins case that an Abbey may have a Lease Prae auter vie and so perhaps here the Dean had a Lease but Prae auter vie and therfore ought to have alledged that he was seised in Fee if the truth were so And he moved other exceptions as 1. That the Defendant intitled himself to a Lease as Executor and doth not plead Literas testamentarias 2. That the Defendant entitles himself to a Rent part of which was due in the time of the Testator and part in his own time and doth not shew when the Testator died and therfore the Avowry not good Jermy for the Defendant that the Avowry is good and it cannot be otherwise intended but that they are seised in Fee 11 H. 7. Lands given to a Major and Comminalty is Fee-simple but otherwise of an Abbot and Parson Plow 103. and Dyer 103. A Seisin in Fee is implied by Seisin In jure Collegii and because it hath been objected that he may be seised Prae auter vie this is but a forraign intendment for a Fee is alwaies intended Seisin in Fee-simple For the second objection because Non profert literas testament true it is if he entitle himself meerly as Executor he ought to bring in Literas testamentar but our case is not so for here we are Defendants and we endeavour only to excuse a Tort 36 H. 6. 36. Where a man is Plaintiff he ought to show Literas testamentar that so the Court may see that he hath cause of action but here it is only by way of excuse For the third that the death of the Testator doth not appear is not materiall for if any part be due to him it is due as Executor Doderidge they ought to have pleaded that they were seised in Fee true it is that Land given to a Major and Comminalty is Fee-simple and the reason is because they are perpetuall and if the Estate be not limitted they shall take according to their continuance 11 H. 4. 11 H. 7. and 27 H. 8 Dockrayes case they may be seised Prae terme dauter vie but if they had pleaded that they were seised to them and their Successors this pleading is good Prima facie 17 E. 3. 1. Crew chief Iustice all the authorities are that ther were seised in Fee Injure Collegii and it is good to admit a new way of pleading Jones Iustice Tenant Prae auter vie makes a Lease for years and cestui que use dies he cannot have an action of Debt against Lessee for years for years for he is now Tenant at sufferance But for the first point it seems to him that the pleading is not good for although in point of Creation they take a Fee by a Gift to Dean and Chapiter yet in pleading they ought to alledge their Estate specially for they may have an Estate Prae auter vie And this is in an Avowry which shall be taken strickly And by Crew chief Iustice the Defendant here ought to shew Literas testamentar for he is an especiall Actor in the Avowry And by Doderidge Longissimum vitae tempus est 100. years Co. lib. 10 50. Lampets case and therfore in pleading if the Defendant had said that a Dean and Chapiter were seised and made a Lease for 200. years this implies a Seisin in Fee because a man cannot have so long a life but here the Lease is but for 89. years and it is common to let for 89. years if A. shall so long live yet this is but a slip and the Title is apparant The same Term in the same Court. Hodges versus Moore IN Debt for marriage money the case was this A man was bound to Hedges to pay him a 1000 l. after that he had married his Daughter and afterwards he married her and brought Debt upon this Obligation and it was not averred that he had given notice to him of the marriage but demanded the money And this was moved by Noy in Arrest of Iudgment but quaere if request afterwards doth not implynetice And Doderidge Iustice put this case A man is bound to pay a 100 l. two Where notice is requisite before action and where not moneths after A. return from Rome he ought to give notice of his return before that he can have an action upon this Obligation for he may land at Newcastle or Plymoth where by common intendment the Obligor cannot know whether he be returned or not and this was agreed by the chief Iustice and Jones And Serjeant Davies argued for the Plaintiff that there need not precise notice to be given and he cited 1 H. 7. 18 E. 4. and Co. lib. 8. Where the Obligor shall take notice at his perill and so here because he takes upon him â—or to pay it And it was said that one Blackamores case was adjudged in the point and he conceived also that this request afterwards is a sufficient notice But Noy for the Defendant said that he ought to give notice or otherwise this mischief would ensue that if he had not married her and yet had demanded the money he ought to pay it and he said that where an act is to be done by a stranger the Plaintiff or Defendant ought to take notice therof at his perill as the case E. 4. where a man was bound to stand to the Award of I. C. he ought to take notice of the Award at his perill but where it lies properly in the Conusance and notice of the Plaintiff there he ought to give notice therof to the Defendant Co. lib. 5. Mallories case If a Reversion be bargained and sold to J. S. the Bargainee shall have the Rent without Attornment but if a penalty be to be forfeited he ought to give notice to the particular Tenant of the Grant or otherwise he shall not take advantage therof and he cited a case which was in 17 Eliz. Stephen Gurneys case Lessee for years the Reversion is granted over for years by way of future Interest to begin upon the death forfeiture or determination of the first Lease
provided that if the Rent upon the second Lease be arrear that the Lessor may enter the first Lessee surrender a Rent-day incur the second Lessee doth not pay the Rent the Lessor shall not enter for a Forfeiture because the first Lease determined by an act which lies properly in the Conusance of the Lessor and because he was to take advantage by it he ought to have given notice therof to the Lessee and here he might have well given notice to the Defendant for it lies properly in the Conusance of the Plaintiff The second Objection was that here was an implied notice because the Marriage was at the instance of the Defendant which implies a notice Vnder favour this is no notice for this is before the marriage but if no notice be given after the marriage then there is no notice But by Serjeant Davies there is a sufficient implication and there is no need of notice in our case and see Co. lib. 8. Francis his case where they ought to take notice at their perill and a marriage is an Ecclesiasticall Iudgment of which he ought to take notice and he was interrupted for all the Iustices went to the Parliament And divers Presidents were cited that there need no notice to be given in this case And it was agreed that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff And in Trinity Term next following Iudgment was accordingly given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court Sir George Reynolls Case SIr George Reynoll Marshall of the Marshalsey of the Kings Bench What Bonds a Sheriff or Marshall maâ— take â—rought Debt upon a Bond the Condition wherof was that the Defendant shall be a true Prisoner and it was doubted whether the Bond were within the Statute of 23 H. 6 cap. 10. Doderidge It is not to be understood by this Statute that a Sheriff Gaâ—ler or Marshall shall take no Bond for if the Marshall hath a man in execucution and fear that he will escape and he takes Bond of him this Bond is good Jones The intent of the Statute that the Sheriff or Marshall shall not suffer Prisoners to go at large for that is within the Statute And it was ruled in the Kings Bench that the Marshalsey should be enlarged Within the Rules of Bâ— what it is and this shall be called within the Rule and if the Marshall take a Band to tarry there it is good but if he suffer him to go at large it is not good The same Term in the same Court Sury versus Albon Pigot and three other Defendants Intr. Hill 1. Car. Rot. 1. 24. IN an action upon the case for stopping his Water-course the Plaintiff declares that 14. Octob. 22. Jac. he was possessed of the Rectory of M. in Barkshire of which a Curtilage was parcell and that in this Curtilage is and hath been time out of mind a watering place for the watering of the Cattell of the Plaintiff and others and for other necessary uses and that a certain Watercourse had time out of mind flowed from Mildford stream to this Curtilage and that this water filled the said Pond and further that the Defendant well knowing this and intending to dam up the said Watering-course built a stone Wall therupon wherby the Water-course was stopt up to the Plaintiffs damage of 20 l. and this was laid with a Continuando The Defendant plead that 3 H. 8. the said H. 8. was seised of the Mannor of c. and of the said Rectory in his Demesne as of Fee and of a certain peece of Land called the Hopyard lying between the said watering-place and the said stream and by his Letters Patents granted this to Wiliam Box and his Heirs by virtue wherof he was seised Francis Searles entred upon him and was seised and enfeoffed Pigot 20 Jac. by virtue wherof of he was seised c. and the three others justifie as Servants to Pigot that they the said day and year filled up the said Water-course as it was lawfull for them to do and Whether unity of possession in severall lands shal destroy a Water course that this is the same Trespasse c. The Plaintiff demurs And the question is whether the unity of possession of all in H. 8. hath extinguished the Water-course And by Dorrell for the Plaintiff if it were of a Common it is cleer that it is destroyed because Common ought to be in another mans Land but not in our case for if one prescribe to have Warren if he purchase the Land yet he shall have Warren 11 H. 7. 25. there are two houses and the one prescribe that the other shall mend the Gutter and afterwards they come to the hands of one man and then he alien one of them this unity shall destroy the mending of the Gutter Berd for the Defendant that the unity hath destroyed the custom 21 E. 3. 2. A way is but an easement yet by the purchase of the Land the way is extinguished and also the watering-course is not only an casement but a profit or Prender and he cited Dyer 295. in case of an Inclosure that the Inclosure is extinguished but there is made a quaere and he cited 38 Eliz. in C. B. an opinion that by purchase of a Close the Inclosure is extinguished a fortiori here because it is a profit And for the case of 11 H. 7. it is by the custom of London but there is no custom in our case and the case of a Warren is not like to our case because a man may have Warren in his own Soil And in Michaelmas Term next the case was argued again by Barkesdale for the Plaintiff that the unity of possession in H. 8. had not extinguished the Water-course and that the Terminus ad quem and the Medium also being in one had not distinguished nor destroyed it And 1 Col lib. 4. 26. Benedicta est expositio quando res redimitur a distructione The Law will not destroy things but the Law will somtimes suffer a fiction which is nothing in rerum natura ut res magis valeat I confesse that profit apprender as Common or Rent is extinguished by unity of possession for Common it appeareth in 4 E. 3. and Co. lib. 4. Terringhams case And for Rent it appeareth in 4 H. 4. 7. and in 21 E. 3. 2. it appeareth that a way is extinguished by unity of possession 3 H. 6. 31. Brook Nusance 11. for it is repugnant for a man to have a way upon his own Land But I conceive that our case differs from the case of a way and that for this reason where the thing hath a being and existence notwithstanding the unity there it is not destroyed by the unity but the Water-course hath a being notwithstanding the unity ergo c. I will prove the major proposition by these cases 35 H. 6. 55 56. Where a Warren is not extinct by a Feoffment of the Land for I may hawk and hunt in my
own land as in another mans so the Warren hath existence notwithstanding the unity Dyer 326. Where the Queen was seised of Whaddon Chase and the Lord Gray was Lievtenant there in Fee and he and his Ancestors and their Keepers had by prescription used to hunt wandring Deer in the Demesns of the Mannor of S. adjoyning as in Purlieues the Mannor of S. comes into the Queens hands who grants this to Fortescue in Fee with free Warren within the Demesns c. it was holden that the unity doth not extinguish the Purlieu Dyer 295. Two Closes adjoyn the one by prescription is bound to a Fence the Owner of one purchase the other and suffer the Hedges to decay and dies leaving two Daughters his Heirs who make partition Quaere whether the prescription for the Inclosure be revived true it is that it is made a quaere but he saith see the like case 11 H. 7. 27. of a Gutter which proves our case as I will shew afterwards For the Minor proposition that the watering hath being notwithstanding the said unity I will prove it by 12 H. 7. 4. A Precipe quod reddat of Land Aqua Co-opert Mich. 6. Jac. Challenor and Moores case An Ejectione firmae was brought of a Watering-course and there resolved that it does not lye of it because it is not firma sed currit but of Terra aqua co-operta it doth lye Also I will take some exceptions to the Bar there is no Title in the Bar for the Defendant Pigot and so we being in possession albeit in truth we have no Title yet he who hath no Title cannot oust us neither can stop the said Water-course and it is only shewn in the Bar that Searles entred and enfeoffed Pigot but for any thing as yet appears the true Owner continued in possession 21 Jac. C. B. Cook against Cook in a Writ of Dower the Defendant pleads an Entry after the Darrein continuance and doth not plead that he ousted him and upon this the Plaintiff Demurs and there adjudged that it is no plea in Bar because he doth not say that the Defendant entred and ousted the Tenant 2. Exception the action is brought against four Scil. Pigot Cole Branch and Elyman and Pigot hath conveyed a Title from Searles the three other Defendants justifie but Pigot doth not say any thing but that Searles enfeoffed him 7 H. 6. an action of Wast is brought against many one answers and the other not this is a discontinuance And for the principall matter I will conclude with 11 H. 7. 25. Broo. Extinguishment 60. Two have Tenements adjoyning and the one hath a Gutter in the others Land and afterwards one purchase both and then he alien one to one and another to another the Gutter is revived notwithstanding the unity because it is very necessary and so he prayed Iudgment for the Plaintiff Bear for the Defendant I in a manner agree all the cases which have been put on the other side and I conceive that the Water-course is not Stagnum but Servitium which is due from the one land to the other It is but a liberty and therfore I agree Challenors case which is but a liberty that an Ejectione firmae doth not lye of it but Ejectione firmae lies De stagno For the first exception I answer and confesse that to alledge an Entry after the Darrain continuance without alledging an Ouster of the Tenant cannot abate the Writ for the Defendant may enter to another intent as appeareth in the Commentaries and with the assent of the Tenant But here it was alledged that a Feoffment was made and a Livery which implies another For the matter in Law I conceive that the Water-course is extinguished and it may be compared to 21 E. 3. 2. The case of a way which is extinguished by unity of possession Hill 36. Eliz. Rot. 1332. Hemdon and Crouches case Two were seised of two severall acres of Land of which the one ought to inclose against the other one purchase them both and lets them to severall men and there the opinion was and adjudged accordingly that the Inclosure is not revived but remains extinguished 39 Eliz. Harringtons case the same thing resolved and albeit in Dyer 295. is a quaere yet the better opinion hath been taken according to these resolutions H. 4. Jac. Jordan and Ayliffes Case when one had a way from one acre to another and afterwards he purchased the acre upon which he had the way and afterwards sold it and in that Case the opinion of 3. Iustices was that the way was extinguished also 11 H. 4. 50. and 11 H. 7. 25. prove this case for the said case is compared to the custome of Gavelkind and Burrough English and there the quaere is made whether by the custome it be revived and if it be a custome which runs with the Land the unity of possession doth not extinguish it Co. lib. 4. Terringhams case and 24 E. 3. 2. common appendant is destroyed by unity of possession and yet it is a thing of common right but a Water-course being a thing against common right a fortiori it shall be extinguished Now I will take some exceptions to the Declaration 1. Because he hath laid a prescription for a Water-course as to say that it was belonging to a Rectory to which c. and this is a good exception as appears by 6 E 6 Dyer 70. Ishoms case where exception was taken that before his prescription he doth not say that it was Antiquum parcum which exception as it is there said was the principall cause that Iudgment was given against him and also as the case is here it ought to be a Rectory impropriate and this cannot be before the time of H. 8. which is within time of memory for before the said time no lay person could have a Rectory impropriate and therfore I pray Iudgment for the Defendant Barksedale said that the prescription is well laid and that he would prove by 39 H 6. 32. and 33 H. 6. 26. and per curiam the prescription is good enough and albeit it is not said that it is Antiquae Rectoria yet it is well enough Mich. 1 Car. at Reading Term in Broek and Harris case he doth not say that it was Antiquum Messuage and yet resolved good Doderidge the case of 6 E. 6. differs in this point from this case for a Rectory shall alwaies be intended ancient and so is not a Park for this may be newly created and he put this case suppose I have a Mill and I have a Water-course to this in my own land and I sell the Land I cannot stop the Water-course Crew chief Iustice seemed of opinion that the prescription is gone and that the better opinion in Dyer 13 Eliz. hath alwaies been that the Inclosure is gone by unity of possession but yet the Water-course is matter of necessity Doderidge and Whitlock the way is matter of election but the course of water is
naturall Jones Iustice There is great difference between a way and a water-course as to this purpose for admit that this water-course after that it had been in the Curtilage of the Plaintiff goes further to the Curtilage of another shall not that other have the benefit of this water-course notwithstanding the unity of possession I think cleerly that he shall Doderidge my opinion is that the water-course is not extinguished by the unity of possession But some conceived that he had declared his opinion in terror to the Defendant And afterwards the same Term Barksedale for the Plaintiff said that he had agreed the case before and therfore would now only indeavour to answer some exceptions which had been taken to the Declaration 1. Exception hath been that no prescription or custom is made for this water-course but only that Currere solebat consuevit But I conceive thaâ— the Declaration is good notwithstanding this because the Plaintiff here doth not claim an interest in the Water-course but in the Land in which c. and therfore it is good and this appeareth by 12 E. 4. 9. the Prior of Lantonies case in a prescription in a Market overt generally and the reason there was because he was a stranger as in our case he is and this pleading appeareth also to be good by Cooks Book of Entries 18. Smiths case which was entred 9 Jac. Rot. 366. in this Court 2. Exception was because it is not said that it was Antiqua Rectoria 3. Exception because it doth not appear that he was a spiritual man to whom the Demise of the Rectory was made 4. Because it is not said that the Water-course Ad predict Rectoriam pertinet 5. Because the Water-course is alledged to be for his customary Tenants of the said Rectory and this is not good as appeareth by 21 Eliz. Dyer 363. Prescription Pro quolibet customar Tenente is not good but I conceive that this case is not our case for here is Customarius tenens Rectoriae and there it is agreed that Quilibet customarius tenens Maner had been good And the plea in Bar hath salved these objections and therfore he prayed judgment for the Plaintiff Jeremy for the Defendant And first for the matter in Law it seemed to him that by the unity of possession the Water-course is extinguished and the Water-course may well be compared to the case of the way for as a way is a passage for men over the land so water hath passage upon the land and a way is extinguished by unity as appeareth by 21 E. 3. 2. 11 H. 4 5. 21 Ass and Davies Reports 5. and in 4 Jac. Jordan and case it was the better opinion that a way was extinguished by unity of possession true it is that there Popham chief Iustice put the difference where the way is of necessity and where not for where the way is of necessity there it shall not be extinguished This case hath been compared to the case of a Warren in 35 H. 6. but I conceive that the cases are not a like because a Warren is a meer liberty 8 H. 7. 5. A man may have a Warren in his own Land and Co. lib. 7. Buts case by a Feoffment of Land a Warren doth not passe but this Water-course hath its originall out of the Land and this case cannot be compared to an ancient Water-course running to a Mill for notwithstanding the unity it shall passe with the Mill for otherwise it shall not be Molendinum aquatinum so that the water there is parcell of the thing and so of necessity ought to passe with the thing but here it doth not appear that it is a Water-course of necessity and for any thing that appeareth it may be filled with another Water-course Also I conceive that the Declaration is not good 1. Because neither prescription nor custom is laid for the Watercourse and it appeareth in Co. Book of Entries Holcome and Evans case and the old Book of Entries 616 617. Mich. 1. Car. Rot. 107. Turner and Dennies case in this Court in trespasse for breaking his Close c. the Defendant justified for a way c. and that he was possessed for years and for him and his Occupiers had a way over the Land the Plaintiff demurred and resolved that the prescription is not good 2. The Declaration is insufficient being an action upno the case for the stopping of a Water-course and it is not Vi armis nor Contra pacem Co. lib. 9. 50. the Earl of Shrewsburies case when there are two causes of an action upon the case the one Causa causans the other Causa causata causa causans may be alledged Vi armis for this is not the immediate cause of the action but Causa causata F. N. B. 86. H. and 92. E. in the end of the Writ of action upon the case shall be Contra pacem 3. Also he hath prescribed for the Tenants of the Rectory which is not possible for no Lay-man could be Tenant of a Rectory or of Tithes before the Statute of H. 8. and therfore I pray Iudgment for the Defendant Whitlock chief Iustice conceived that the declaration was good the bar is naught both for the form matter the question here is of Aqua profluens and I conceive that there needs no prescription or custome in this case for water hath its naturall course and as is observed by Brudnell in 12 H. 8. Natura sua descendit it may be called Usu captio or Vsage and he conceived that the action upon the case very well lies in this case like to the case where a man bath a house and windows in it and another erect a new house and stop the light then I may have an action upon the case but true it is that I shall not only count for the losse of the aire but also I ought to prescribe that time out of mind light have entred by these windows c. see 7 E. 3. If there be a School-master in a Town and another erect a new School in the same Town an action upon the case doth not lye against him because Schools are for the publike benefit and every private man may have a School in his house And for the exception that a Lay man cannot be possessed of a Rectory I conceive that the Declaration is good notwithstanding for a Lay-man may have a Rectory by Demise And for the Plea in bar it is not good for the form because that Searles entred and enfeoffed Pigot and it is not said that he entred and Expulit and if a man enter and make a Feoffment the owner being upon the Land the Feoffment is void and therfore an actuall Ouster ought to be shown And for the matter in Law he conceived that the Bar was not good for by the unity of possession the water-course is not extinguished and yet I agree the cases of a way and common upon the differences of Rights which are
put in Bracton lib 4. 221. These are called Servitutes as jus eundi fodendi hauriendi c. sunt servitutes quas praedia ex quibus exunt aliis praediis debent and are called Servitutes praediales and this began by private right to wit by grant or prescription A way or common shall be extinguished because they are part of the profits of the Land and the same Law is of Fishings also but in our case the water-course doth not begin by the consent of parties nor by prescription but Ex jure naturae and therfore shall not be extinguished by unity A Warren is not extinguished by unity because a man may have a Warren in his own Land and in the case of 11 H. 7. the Gutter was not extinguished only by the unity of possession but there also appeareth in the case that the Pipes were destroyed wherby it could not be revived and although the Book of 13 Eliz. Dyer 295. Two Closes adjoyn together the one being by prescription bound to a Fence the owner of the one purchase the other dies having issue two Daughters who make partition it is a quaere whether the inclosure be revived yet I conceive cleerly that by unity of the possession the Inclosure is destroyed for fencing is not naturall but comes by industry of men and therfore by the unity it shall be gone and so briefly with this diversity he concluded that where the thing hath its being by prescription unity will extinguish it but where the thing hath its being Ex jure naturae it shall not be extinguished and therfore the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment Jones Iustice agreed that the Declaration is good and that the Bar also is good in manner but for the matter in Law it is not good As to the first exception to the Declaration I conceive it is good albeit there wants a prescription and this is the ordinary of pleading as appears in Co. lib. 4 Luttrels case and in all the presidents before cited 2. For the exception Vi armis he conceived this difference where the act is a Trespasse and a Nusance there it may be laid to be Vi armis but if it be a Nusance only and not a Trespasse it is otherwise as if I have a way over another mans Land if a stranger dig in the Land so aâ— I cannot have the way now because it is a Trespasse to the Owner of the Soil in my action upon the case against a stranger I may have Vi armis but if the owner stop the way there Vi armis shall not be in my action upon the case For the third exception because he both not say Ad Rectoriam spectandum but I conceive that it shall be intended ad Rectoriam impropriat and so it appeareth 4. Where it is said Watering-course for his Tenants I conceive it is good enough being in an action upon the case where damages only are to be recovered That the Bar also is good in form for although the Tenant here be a Disseisor yet it is a good Bar for it matters not whether he hath a Title or no if the Water-course be extinct by the unity for the matter in Law he conceived that the unity of possession had not extinguished the Water-course A man hath things out of another mans Land either by grant as a Seigniory Rent Common c. and these are distinguished by unity c. and the reason is because one who hath interest as Owner of the Land cannot have a particular interest in the same Land also Or by prescription and those things are extinguished by unity of possession also and not only for the first reason because he is Owner of the Land and so cannot have a particular interest in the same Land also but also because that by the unity the prescription fail And for the case in Dyer 13 Eliz. I conceive that by the unity the inclosure is gone and so it was resolved in 37 Eliz. for every one is not bound to inclose For the case of the way I will suspend my opinion concerning it because Clark and Lambs case is now depending touching it in the same point But now for our case it differs from the other cases for the prescription here is in another manner then is made for Common for it shall be pleaded either as appendant or appurtenant but Currere solebat is only in this pleading for here no interest is claimed but in the other cases an interest is claimed In this case the Land remains as it was before and therfore the unity will not extinguish it and if such a unity by construction of Law should extinguish Water-courses it would be too dangerous for suppose that a man hath a Water-course from Thames to his house in Lambeth if he purchase a parcell of Land in Hendley now because that the Thames come by the same Land his Water-course shall be extinguished Also suppose that the Water-course after it hath been in the Curtilage of the Plaintiff goes into another Curtilage is it reason that by this unity the second man shall lose his Water-course without doubt it is unreasonable And the case of 11 H. 7. of the Gutter warrants this opinion and therfore the Plaintiff ought to have Iudgment Doderidge Iustice I conceive no great difficulty in the case for the exceptions to the Declarations they are not materiall 1. That there wants Prescription or Custom I conceive that it is good enough for here are the words of Currere solebat consuevit and Consuevit is a good word for a Custom 2. That a Lay-man cannot have a Parsonage true it is that a Lay-man cannot be a Parson but he may have a Parsonage for he may be Lessee of it which appeareth many times in our Books 3. That it is not alledged to be Vi armis this is the most colourable exception and the case and rule cited out of Co. lib. 9. the Earl of Shrewsburies case is good Law but it is impossible to plead Vi armis in this case for the unity was in H. 8. and the wrong is supposed after the severance and it is supposed to be done by the Owner of the Land and a man cannot do a thing upon his own Land Vi armis 4. Because it is not alledged to be an ancient Rectory I conceive it need not because the Law presumes all Rectories to be ancient the Patronages wherof are gained Ratione fundi fundationis vel dotationis 5. Because he doth not say that Pertinet ad Rectoriam But he hath said a thing which amounts to as much for it is said that in the Rectory was a certain Curtilage in which there is a Watering-pond and the Curtilage is part of the house and therfore he need not say that it belongs to the house For the Bar I conceive that it is good for the Mannor A man makes a Feoffment of Land the Owner of the Land being present at the
same time nothing works by the Livery for the reason before given by Jones For the matter of Law he conceived that the unity of possession doth not extinguish the Water-course and that for two reasons 1. For the necessity of the thing 2. From the nature of the thing being a Water-course which is a thing running 1 For the necessity and this is the reason that common appendant by the unity of possession shall not be extinguished for it is appendant to ancient Land-hide and gain arable Land which is necessary for the preservation of the Common-wealth and as in this case there is a necessity of bread so in our case there is a necessity of water And for the case of a way Distinguendum est for if it be a way which is only for easement it is extinguished by unity of possession but if it be a way of necessity as a way to Market or Church there it is not extinguished by unity of possession and accordingly was the opinion of Popham chief Iustice which I take for good Law and the case of 11 H. 7. 25. is a notable case and there a reason is given why a Gutter is not extinguished by unity of possession because it is matter of necessity 2. From the nature of water which naturally descends it is alwais current Et aut invenit aut facit viam and shall such a thing be extinguished which hath its being from the Creation Co. lib. 4. Luttrels case a Mill is a necessary thing and if I purchase the Land upon which the streams goes which runs to this Mill and afterwards I alien the Mill the Water-course remains So if a man hath a Dye-house and there is a water running to it and afterwards he purchase the Land upon which the water is current and sell it yet he shall have the Water-course Dyer Dame Browns case and the principall case in Luttrels case a Fulling-mill made a Water-mill this shall not alter the nature of the Mill but yet it remains a Mill so the water hath its course notwithstanding the unity and he concluded for the Plaintiff Crew chief Iustice I agree that the Declaration is good and also that the Bar is good for the manner but for the matter in Law I conceive that it is not good In our Law every case hath its stand or fall from a particular reason or circumstance For a Warren and Tithes they are not extinguished by unity because they are things collaterall to the Land And for the case of 13 Eliz. in Dyer of an Inclosure I conceive that by the unity the Inclosure is destroyed for the Prescription was interrupted and in Day and Drakes case 3 Jac. in this Court it was adjudged that in the same case the Prescription was gone It may be resembled to the case of Homage Ancestrell 57 E. 3. Fitzherbert Nusans And for our case it is not like to the cases of Common or a Way because the Water-course is a thing naturall and therfore by unity it shal not be discharged also there is a linement out of which every man shall have a benefit and therfore he concluded that Iudgment should be given for the Plaintiff And Iudgment was commanded to be entred for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court. Welden versus Vesey AN action of Debt was brought by Welden Sheriff of the City of Coventry against Vesey upon the Statute of 29 Eliz. cap. 4. and declares that it is provided by this Statute that no Sheriff or Minister c. shall take for an execution if the summ doth not exceed 100 l. but 12 d. for every 20 s. and being above the summ of 100 l. 6 d. for every 20 s. and shews that wheras the said Vesey had judgment against one in an action of Debt that the Plaintiff by virtue of a Capias directed to him took the body of the said person condemned and that it was delivered to the Plaintiff and that he for levying of the money had brought this action The Defendant by way of Bar saith that it is provided by this act that it shall not extend to Executions in Towns Corporate and that this was within Coventry and so demurred upon the Declaration And Whitwick argued for the Plaintiff two things are considerable in this case 1. Whether where the summ exceeds 100 l. the Sheriff shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. of the 100 l. and 6 d. for that which is over or 6 d. only for every 20 s. for all the summ 2. Whether this Statute extend to Iudgments in Towns Corporate For the first the letter of the Statute is cleer that he shall have 12 d. for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for the residue for the Statute is that if it be above 100 l. Whether a Sheriff or c. shall have 12 d. in the pound for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for the rest upon an Execution that he shall have but 6 d. therfore if it be under a 100 l. he shall have 12 d. for every 20 s. And the meaning of the Statute is plain also for otherwise the Sheriff shall have a lesser Fee where it is above a 100 l. as where it is a 199 l. then he shall have for 100 l. but this was not the intent of the Statute but the greater the Execution the greater the Fee It was adjudged in one Gores case 10 Jac. that an action of Debt lies upon this Law Pasch 14 Jac. Rot. 351. Brole and Tumblerson Sheriffs of the City of London brought Dabt against Nathanael Michell for execution of 400 l. for 12 l. 10 s. scil 5 l. for the first 100 l. and 6 d. for every 20 1. after But I confesse that the principall question there was whether an action of Debt lies for the money and it was resolved that it did and Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff 2. To the Proviso that this doth not extend to Fees in a Town Corporate whether this extend to executions which go out of Iudgments in this Court or in the Common Pleas into Towns Corporate The Statute shews that before that time the Sheriff had taken great Fees which the Parliament considering restrained them to a certainty The words of the Proviso are generall Provided that this Act shall not extend to any Fees to be taken for any Execution within any City or Town Corporate and although the words be generall yet the exposition shall be according to reason as it is said in Fulmerston and Stewards case in Plow Expesition shal be made against the words if the words be against reason 5 H. 7. 7 38 H. 3. Broo. Livery 6. The King shall have primer Seisen of all Lands of his Tenant which he holds of him in Capite but if one holds of the King in Capite in Socage he shall pay no primer Seisen to the King and this Statute shall have this intendment that this Proviso shall extend only to Executions upon Iudgments
one he would pay it where good where not this he may implead him presently Mich 12. Jac Kebles Case A man promiseth to pay so much in consideration of a Lease at Will and it was holden no good consideration for by the same breath that he creates it he may defeat it Pasch 8. Jac. Austins Case A man promise that in consideration he would forbear another he would pay it and no time was limited and therefore it was holden no good consideration Trin. 38. Eliz. Rot. 523. A man promise quod non implacitabit and avers quod non implacitavit and because of the uncertainty it was holden no valuable consideration Doderidge Justice If there be no consideration at the time or no cause of Action the forbearance afterwards will not make it actionable and he said that it had been adjudged in this Court that a consideration to forbear for a little time is not good but by some to forbear for a reasonable time is good But in the principall Case upon the hearing of the Declaration read it appeared that it was that he should never implead him upon the said obligation so that if the Plaintiff brings an Action upon the obligation the Defendant here may have an Action upon the Case against him Also it was non implacitabit and this shall be taken indefinitely quod nunquam implacitabit and therefore the Iudgement was affirmed for otherwise the Plaintiff shall both take advantage of this promise and of the bond also and here he hath in a manner forsaken the benefit of his bond and hath betaken himselfe to the benefit of this Assumpsit By Jones and Whitlock Iustices if A. be bound to me and I enter into bond to him that I will not sue this Obligation I cannot sue him upon the first Obligation without forfeiture of my bond and by Doderidge if an Obligation be forfeited and I say to the Obliger do not sue the Obligor or do not implead him an Action upon the case lies against me The same Term in the same Court. Arnold versus Dichton IN an Action upon the Case and Non-Assumpsit pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and Noy mooved in arrest of Iudgement that there was no consideration to maintain this Action the Case being thus Arnold having married the Daughter of the Defendents Testator the Testator promised to give him 40 l. and meat â—nd drink for a year and a Featherbed and Bolster and afterwards the Testator in consideration that the Plaintiff would Assumpsit forbear to sue him all his life for it promised that he should have as good a portion at his death as any of his children and the Plaintiff declares that he gave to one Tho. P. one of his Sons 200 l. and that he left him at the time of his death but 30 l. but when he gave to Tho. P. the 200 l. appeares not peradventure it might be in his life time and this promise doth not extend to that which he had given before as if a man be bound to keep a Goale and that no prisoner shall escape this only extends to a future keeping and future escapes and not to other escapes which were before True it is that sometimes the Law will alter the sense as in the Case of 32. H. 6. where a man is bound that his Feoffees c. And at another day Doderidge said that the first promise was but an inducement to the second and the Defendant hath pleaded Non Assumpsit to the last promise and then comes the Plaintiff and shews that he gave to such a one 200 l. and doth not shew when this was given and this may be before the promise and therefore I conceive the Declaration is not good Jones agreed that the Declaration is not good for admit that in this case he had given to all his children but one great portions before the said promise and had given a small portion to one after the promise the Plaintiff now shall have but according to the said promise and it is alledged here that he gave to such a one 200 l. which may be before the promise and therefore the breach not well laid Whitlock contra and that the Plaintiff shall have according to the best gift in this case whether it were before or after the promise and that upon the intention of the promise for the intention is that the Plaintiff should have as good a marriage or portion with his Daughter as any other of his children should have But by Doderidge this construction cannot be made without offering violence to the words for then daret should be for dedisset and for any thing which appeareth he had a portion before and this was but a superaddition Jones put this case I am bound to enfeoff J. S. of so much Land as I will enfeoff J. D. this extends not to a Feoffment which I have made to J. D. before but only to a Feoffment which I shall make to him afterwards which was not denied by Whitlock and it was adjourned The same Term in the same Court. Barker versus Ringrose BArker brought an Action upon the Case against Ringrose and declared that whereas he was of good fame and exercised the Trade of a Wool-winder the Defendant spake these scandalous words of him that he was a Words Thou art a bankrupt Rogue Bankrupt Rogue and it was moved in arrest of Iudgement that those words were not actionable for the words themselves are not actionable but as they concern an Office or Trade c. and it appeareth by the Statute of 27. E. 3 that a Wool-winder is not any Trade but is but in the nature of a Porter so that the Plaintiff is not defamed in his function because he hath not any also it is not averred that he was a Wool-winder at the time of the words speaking Jones Justice If one saith of a Wool-winder that he is a false Wool-winder action upon the Case lieth and it was demanded by the Court A Wool-winder wâ—at he is what a Wool-winder was and it was answered that in the Countrey he is taken to be a Wool-winder that makes up the fleece and takes the dirt out of it and a Wool-winder in London opens the fleeces and makes them more curiously up and in London they belong to the Mayn of the staple Doderidge If one saith of a Sher-man that he is a Bankrupt Action lyes and so it hath been adjudged of a Shoo-maker and note that if one saith of any man who by his Trade may become a Bankrupt within the In what case to call a man Bankrupt is actionable Statutes that he is a Bankrupt an Action lies as of a Taylor Fuller c. And the Court seemed to incline that in this case being spoken of a Wool-winder in London the Action lies But Mich. 3. Car. the Case being moved again the Court was of opinion that the Action could not lye and would not give
As to the first words Base Gentleman they are but words of choller 2. The next words He hath four Children by his servant Agnes cannot be actionable for although she were once his servant yet she might be afterwards his Wife 3. The Plaintiff hath averred in his Declaration that he hath lived continently and then he cannot have children by his servant Agnes and then the words are not actionable And 4. For saying he hath killed them is not actionable and upon this he cited one Snags Case Co. lib. 4. who brought an Action for these words Thou hast killed thy Wife and it appeared by the Declaration that his Wife was alive and therefore it was resolved that the words were not actionable And as to the last exception it was said by Ashley Serjeant on the other side that albeit the Plaintiff hath averred in his Declaration that he lived continently and so in a manner confessed that he had no children this is but for the aggravation of the offence of the Defendant as when an Action is brought for calling one Thiefe he avers that he lived honestly and yet the Action will lye But I confesse if the Plaintiff had averred that he never had any child then it would be like to Snags Case Co. lib. 4. 16. a. and that the Action would not lye But in Anne Davyes Case there she averred that she was a Virgin of good fame and frée from all suspition of incontinency and the Defendant sayd that a Grocer had got her with child Owen Wards Case in Cook Book of Entries hath the same Declaration as this and it was the President thereof But Jermy moved another exception upon these words he hath killed them and doth not say Felony which is not good for he migt kill them in execution of Iustice which is justifiable Trin. 2. Jac. Willers Case in the Court it was adjudged that for these words Thou hast stollen a peece and I will charge thee with Felony an Action lies not because a péece is a word of doubtfull signification And Trin. 20. Jac. It was resolved that these words Agnes Knight is a Witch were not Actinable but it was answered of the other side that upon the whole frame of these words they cannot be intended but to be spoken malitiously and there can be no pretencâ— of lawfull killing of children Doderidge all the words joyned together are actionable but these words only considered he hath four children by his servant Agnes are not Actionable and albeit he doth not alledge it felony yet this is a scandall and good cause of Action Jones agreed and yet he conceived that for saying singly that one hath a Bastard an Action lies not albeit the having of a Bastard be punishable by the Statute of 18. Eliz. cap. 1. But by him he hath killed the King shall be taken in pejori sensu otherwise it is if the words of themselves be indifferent as Pope and this word shall not be the rather taken in pejori sensu having relation to all the sentence for the contrariety of the Declaration it seems to me that the Declaration is good enough but if one saith Thou hast killed J. S. where in truth there never was such a man it is not actionable But here the Averment of the Plaintiff is more generall Ubi re vera he is not guilâ—y or incontinent which is a general allegation but if he had averred ubi re vera he never had any child there peradventure the Action would not lye but here it will Whitlock Justice agreed and he sayd that the first words hath had four children by his Maid Agnes are actionable and for the other matters they agreed whereby Iudgement was given for the Plaintiff The same Term in the same Court THis Term in the Common-place Sargeant Hendon cited this Case to be adjudged 4. Jac. A Copy-holder made a Lease for yeares by License and the Lessee dyed that this Lease shall not be accounted assets in the hands of the Excecutors neither shall it be extended But the Case was denyed by Iustice Hutton and others and that an Ejectione firmae lies of such a Lease But he said that if a Copy-holder makes a Lease for yeares by License of the Lord and dyes without Heire the years not expired the Lord notwithstanding this may enter for the Estate out of which this Lease was derived is determined But Yelverton Iustice was contra because this License shall be taken as a confirmation of the Lord and therefore the Lease shall be good against him and there as I heard it was argued by all that if a Copy-holder makes a Lease for a yeare this is a Lease by the Common-Law and not customary and shall be counted assets in the hands of the Executors of the Lessée The same Term in the Kings Bench. NOta upon evidence to a Iury between Buffield and Byburo the Case appeared to be this upon a Devise with these words I will and devise that A. and B. my Feoffees shall stand seised and be seised to and of Iohn Callis for life the remainder c. And the truth was that he had no Feoffees and the opinion of the whole Court nullo contradicente was that this is a good Devise to John Callis by reason of the intention 38. H. 8. Bro. Devis 48. 15. Eliz. Dyer 323. were urged for the proofe of it and by Doderidge the Case of 15. Eliz. is more strong then our Case is Linyen made a Feoffment to his own use and afterwards devised that his Feoffees should be seised to the use of his Daughter A. who in truth was a Bastard and yet this is a good Devise of the Land by intention for by no possibility they can be seised to his use Mich. 2. Car. Lemasons and Dicksons Case in the Kings Bench. Trin. 2. Car. Roll. 1365. THe Case was this One Parcevall Sherwood was indebted to Susan Clarke who brought an Action of debt by a Bill of Middlesex which is in nature of a Writ of Trespas against him and Sherwood upon a mean Proces was arrested by the Defendant being Bayliff of the Liberty of White-Chappel and being in his custody he suffered him to escape Afterwards Susan Clarke made the Plaintiff her Executor and dyed and then the Plaintiff brought an Action upon the Case against the Defendant upon the said escape and upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiff And Calthrop of Councel with the Plaintiff moved that the Action will well lye for the Testator himselfe might have had either an Action of Debt or upon the case upon the sayd Escape and therefore the Executor may have the same remedy and that by the equity of the Statute of 4. E. 3. cap. 7. which gives an Action to Executors pro bonis asportatis in vita Testatoris And by 14. H. 7. 17. this Statute shall be taken by equity and Administrators who are in the same mischiefe shall have the same remedy albeit they
will is wrong to him and the performance of Wills is much favoured because it is the last desire of the Partie who is dead and it is for the publick-weale because by this means debts shall be payd And many cases are within the equity of the Statute that are not within the letter as those Cases which have been put all which he agreed Jones Iustice on the sudden was against it and that this Case is not within the equity of the Statute of 4. E. 3. There are divers Actions which are not helped by this Statute as Trespasse for cutting of Trees Battery and the like for the Statute is de bonis Catallis asportat in vita testator An Executor shall have a Replevin of Goods taken in vita testator for by this he recovers the thing it selfe and shall have Detinue but shall not have treâ—passe for he cannot punish the wrong done in the life of the Testator The Statute of 4. E. 3. is much inlarged by equity as the cases which have been put and extend also to usurpation in the life time of the Testator as appears in Russels Case Co. lib 5. 32. 33. Eliz. in C. B. in the Bishop of Chichesters case that if the Testator dyes within 6 months after the usurpation the Executor shall have a Quare impedit And the Case of Trover and Conversion in vita Testator was maintained by Executors and it was so resolved 41. and 42. Eliz. in the Countesse of Rutlands Case in both the Benches because this is in nature of a Writ of Detinue Now for the Case in question I conceive that it is not within the Statute of 4. E. 3. because it is neither bona nor catalla Whitlock Iustice contra and that this Statute is very much taken by equity praeter literam though not contra literam But Nota that all agreed if it were upon an escape after Iudgement that the Action would lie by the Executors according to the Case of F. N. B. 121. a. But the principall Case was adjourned And afterwards Trin. 3. Car. It was argued again by Jermy for the Plaintiff and the sole point was A man taken by latitat and being in the custody of the Sheriff escape the Party at whose suit he was arrested dies whether his Executor shall have an Action upon the Case upon the Escape and he conceived that he might It hath been objected that it is a personall wrong and as an Action doth not lye against Executors upon an Escape in vita Testator so not by Execucutors To which I answer that it is not meerly personall but mixed with an interest At the Common-Law an Executor could not have trespas for Goods taken in vita Testator but yet he should have a Replevin 34. E. 3. Fitz. Avoury 257. and Executors 106. So at Common-Law a Successor should not have Trespas for Goods carried away in the life time of his Predecessor but he shall have a Replevin 9. H. 6. 25 but this was remedied by the Statute of Marlebridge cap. 28. and so upon the Statute of 4. E. 3. de bonis asportat c. Trover and Conversion hath beene adjudged within the said Statute for the Statute hath alwayes been liberally expounded 7. H. 4. 2. Fitz Executor 52. An Executor shall have ravishment of Gard taken away in vita Testator and also other Statutes which do not name Executors have beene eâ—pounded to extend to them as the Statute of 23. H. 8. which gives attaint 3. Eliz. Dyer 201. Co. lib. 6. 8. Executors shall take benefit of the pardon of Trin. 14 Jac. Pâ—obe and Maynes Case if the party escape being a rested upon mean Proces the Sheriffe is not liable for the Escape otherwise if upâ—n an Execution 43. Eliz. and 6. E. 6. Bendloes Reports which is cited there Executors shall have restitution upon the Statute of 21. H. 8. and Co. lib. 5. 31. and 27. Russels Case an Executor shall have Trover upon Goods lost in vita Testator and this is in manner and nature of a promise to have the party in Court at the day and it is cleer that upon an expresse Assumpsit to the Testator an Executor shal have an action upon the Case and it hath been in manner agreed by the Court that if it had been an escape of one in execution that the action would have lyen by the Executor and I see no difference between that and our case And it was adjourned The same Term in the same Court UPon an Information by Heath the Kings Attorney against two men of the County of Huntington in the name of all the County that they ought and used to repaire the Bridge of S. Eedes in the County of Huntington Issue was joyned by the County whether they ought and used to repaire this Bridge and the Attorney gave no evidence but put it upon the other side for he said by the Statute of 22. H. 8. cap. if it doth not appeare that any particular person or Towne ought to repaire a Bridge by reason of Tenure or otherwise that then the County where this is ought to repaire it But Nota that the issue was whether they ought to repaire the whole Bridge and yet upon the evidence it appeared that onely two Arches and a halfe of the Bridge was in the County of Huntington and two Aâ—â—hes and a halfe in the County of Bedford and the Iury found generally that onely two Arches and a halfe of the Bridge were in the County of Huntington and say nothing where the rest was for they could not find a thing in another County And also they found that the County of Huntington ought to repaire all but not that they used to repaire it And at another day Hedley Serjeant moved for the County that the Verdict was not good because the issue was whether they ought to repaire and a tempore cujus contrarium c. had repaired c. And the Iury hath found that they ought to repaire which is but the halfe of the issue and also they find that they ought to do it which is a Question in Law and therefore voyd 8. H. 6. 3. 4. Secondly the issue is whether they ought to repair the Bridge and the Iury hath found that they ought to repair two Arches and a halfe onely c. and the Bridge is an entire thing The Attorney answered that for the first exception the case of 27. Ass Pl. 8. is against it And for the last the very case of 43 Ass Pl. 37. is against it and therfore the Court conceived the Verdict good notwithstanding these exceptions Doderidge Iustice By the common Law before the Statute of 22. H. 8. if no man by reason of tenure or otherwise ought to repaire a Bridge the County ought to do it like to the case of 8. E. 4. Fishers by the Law of Nations may dry their Nets upon the Land of any man The same Term in the same Court DOctor
Cleland brought a Writ of error against Baldock upon a Iudgement given in where the Plaintiff declared that the Intr. Hill 22. Iac Rot. 59â— Defendant in consideration that he would do all his commands honestly and truly for the space of a yeare assumed to pay him 10 l. and further declared that he had done all his honest and lawfull commands and this promise being found by verdict Iudgement was given against Doctor Cleland and thereupon he brought this Writ of error and Greene assigned two errors 1. The Assumpsit is that he shall doe all his commands honestly and truly and he hath declared that he hath done all his lawfull and honest commands and he may honest commands and yet not honestly 2. It is said that Jurator Assident dampna and it is not said occasione transgression predict and it is against all Presidents But Nota that there were these words ex hac parte opposita and therefore the exceptions were disallowed by the Court and the first Iudgement affirmed The same Term in the same Court. Secheverel versus Dale THis Case was sent out of Chancery to this Court â—o know the Law therein and in Trespas the case was this Henry Secheverell the Father seised in Fée levied a Fine to A. and B. in Fee to the use of himselfe for life absque impetitione vasti with power to cut and carry away the trees and to make Leases for 21 yeares or three lives the remainder to the use of John Secheverell his eldest Son for life without impeachment of waste with the same powers Henry the Father made a Lease to one under whom the Plaintiff claims for three lives rendring the ancient Rent excepting all the trees unlesse those which shall be for cropping lopping and fewell Henry the Father dyes John the Son in the next remainder cut certain trees Victorin Secheverell who clayms by the lease made by the Father brings trespas and two Questions were moved 1. Whether Lessee for life without impeachment of waste may make a Lease excepting the trees and it was objected by the Councel of the Plaintiff that he could not because this second Lease ariseth out of the first fine and out of the estate of the Conusor But the Court prima facie was of opinion that he might well make such a Lease with such an exception See Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowls his Case and Doctor and Student lib. 1. cap. 1. and by Doderidge Iustice the Lease ariseth out of both the estates Jones Iustice suppose the Lessee absque impetitione vasti assigne over all his estate might he cut the trees and it was conceived that he might for by Doderidge he hath power to dispose of the trees as it was resolved in Lewys Bowls his case Jones he hath no propriety in the Trees untill they be cut Crew ch Justice Admit a Stranger cut the trees who shall have them By all the Court the Lessee without impeachment of waste shall have them 2. Point Tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut and carry away the trees and make Leases for 21. years or three lives the remainder for life to J. S. without impeachment of waste c. Tenant for life makes a Lease for thrée lives and dyes whether he in remainder for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trées may cut the trées and take them during the Lease for thrée lives and the Court séemed to be of opinion that he might And Leving of Councell with the Plaintiff argued that when tenant for life without impeachment of waste with power to cut the trees and to make Leases for 21. years or three lives makes a Lease for thrée lives excepting the trées that this is a voyd exception because he hath no interest but a bare Authority 27. H. 6. Fitz. Wast 8. Statham tit Wast 1. makes this a Quaere which Statham was once the owner of the Land in question A man makes a Lease for life without impeachment of waste a Stranger cuts trées the Lessée brings trespas he shall recover no Damages for the value of the trees because the propriety belongs to him in the reversion he may dispose of them Quaere Dyer 284. Daunsley and Southwels Case Co. lib. 11. Lewys Bowles case that such a Lessee may take trées which are blown down and 3. H. 6. 45. Mich 41. and 42. Eliz. C. B. Leechford against Sanders in an Action of waste upon a Lease made to Sanders for life with a proviso that the Plaintiff might dispose of the trées during the estate and resolved that the Action lies not for notwithstanding this power the trées are demised to the Lessée also so here when the trées are excepted he hath no interest but only an authority 2. The exception is voyd for another reason because when such a Lessée makes such a Lease this is not his Lease but it hath its operation out of the originall fine and he who makes this hath but the nomination and therefore cannot adde a condition or exception to it And if the second Lease shall have its being out of the estate of the Lessee for life then there shall be an use upon an use as appears Co. lib. 1. 134. and that the Law will not allow 15. H. 7. and Co. Lib. 1. Albanyes Case If a man devise that his Executors shall fell his Land they cannot adde a condition or exception to this sale as an attornment upon a condition subsequent is voyd Co. lib. 2. Tookers case 3. This case may be resembled to the case of Copy-holds which is in Co. lib. 8. 63. b. in Swaynes Case If a Lord takes a Wife and afterwards grants Lands by Copy according to the custome and dyes his Wife shall not be endowed of this Land for albeit her title of Dower was before the Grant yet the title of Copi-hold which is the custome is elder then the title of Dower so in our case the title of the second Lessee is derived out of the estate of the Conuzées and therefore shall not be clogg'd with the Exceptions of Lessee for life without impeachment of waste 4. This priviledge to cut the trées is annexed to the estates and goes along with the estate and therefore shall not begin before the Stranger be in possession 3. E. 3. 44. 45. Idles case 28. H. 8. Dyer 10. And it may be resembled to the cases of 16. E. 4. and 27. H. 8. Tenant in taile sold the trées if he dyes before the Party takes them he shall never have them because he hath stayd out his time But it may be objected that upon such a Lease he may reserve a rent as it is in Whitlocks case Co. lib. 8. to which I will offer this difference Lessée for life with power to make Leases for thrée lives reserving rent makes a Lease for thrée lives reserving rent this reservation is good because it is but a Declaration of the Lease and of the rent
Reversion shall stand hereafter seised and adjudged in lawfull Estate and Possessions of the Lands c. of such an Estate as he had in the Use The words then in the Statute being so precise as they stand to wit that in such case he who hath such an Vse shall have the possession executed of such an Estate as he had in the Vse excludes all other who are not in it to have it to be executed untill that they happen to be in the same case as of that which the Statute speaks And if they had intended to have the Possession to be executed and transferd from the Feoffees to these contingent Vses they would have made some mention therof as well as they did of Reversions and Remainders and they did not leave there but mention this again to wit that the Estate Right Title and Possessions which was in such person or persons which were seised to the use of any such person or persons shall be hereafter cleerly adjudged in him or those who had or have such Vse according to such quality manner form and condition as he had before the use which was in them by which it appeareth plainly that the Right and Possession of the Feoffee shall not be vested in or to any untill that he hath the use it self for it is said that it shall be in him therfore they ought to have somthing in the Vse by the very expresse letter of the Statute before any thing of the Possession shall be executed or transferred by this Statute from the Feoffee to Cestay que use And how can this be said to be within the letter of the Statute which hath so many and so precise words and branches against it And therfore it is cleer that if the Feoffee to use were seised at the time of making of this Statute that the use shall not be executed by this Statute untill there be a regresse made by the Feoffee or in his right to revive the former use and it had been out of the letter of the Statute But to this I say that how precise soever the letter is against the execution of these contingent uses the intent therof is yet more strong precise against them which I will prove cleerly by the Statute it self which is of greater authority then the particular opinion or conceit of any Iudge whomsoever for it is the Iudgment of all the Iudges and all the Realm also which ought to bind all and to which all ought to give credit And to take the intent the Statute was full that it was made as is rehersed for the Disinherison which before was to true Heirs for the defect which before was in the assurance of Purchases for the mischiefs in regard before men did not know by reason of these Vses against whom to bring their Actions to recover their Rights To avoid perjury that it should not be so common as it was by reason of the maintenance and support of these secret Vses for the releif of the King other Lords as to their Escheats Forfeitures Wardships Releases and the like for the mischief which before hapned to Tenants by the Curtesie and in Dower by reason of these Estates in Vse and finally for the great Incoveniencies which hapned by reason of them to the great trouble and unquiet of the People These were the great mischiefs that were before the making of the Statute and these were the things for which the Statute intended to provide remedy and if the exposition shall be as hath been on the other side these mischiefs shall be on every part more mischievous by much then it was before the making of the Statute and that in such a a manner that it shall be impossible to help any of them but by Parliament wheras alwaies the good and true construction of a Statute is to constrain it so that it shall give remedy to the mischief which was before and not to make it more mischievous and therfore examine it by parts And as to the disinherison of two Heirs it appears now that by such exposition more incoveniences will arise and that in a more dangerous degree then before the Statute for before for the Vse the Heir had his remedy in conscience according to the trust and he might have made a disposition of the Land it self by the Statute of Rich. 3. as an Owner for the advancement of his Wife and his Children and for payment of his debts and the like But as the case is now used by means of these perpetuities as they are called if the exposition of the other side shall hold place the true Heir shall not only be continually in danger to loose his Inheritance but by them the very bowels of nature it self shall come to be divided and as rent in peeces for by reason of these the Inheritants themselves cannot make any competent provision for the advancement of their Wives Daughters or youngest Sons as every one according to the course of nature ought to do nor by reason of this can he redeem himself if he were taken Prisoner And this will make disobedience in Children to their Parents when they see that they shall have their Patrimony against their will wherby such Children oftentimes become unnaturall and dissoluts of which I in my time have seen many unnaturall dangerous and fearfull consequences not convenient to be spoken of And it staies not there but it causeth mortall debate as to blood between Cosin and Cosin Brother and Brother and not so only but between the Father himself and his Children of which every one of us have seen the experience for the one ought to be as a watch upon the other to see when any thing happen to be done to give him advantage to disinherit the very true Owner And I say that it is impossible that any can keep his Possessions which hath them tyed with these perpetuities if the exposition of the Statute should hold place which the other side hath made And I affirm precisely that there is not any one in England who hath had such Possessions so bound by descent of Inheritance by five years of any value but that he hath lost all or part of his said Land at this time let him be never so precise in making his Assurances and yet he is not sure to have one skilfull in the Law alwaies at his elbow when he is to meddle with his Land And therfore I put but this Case One who hath such a perpetuity with power to make Leases rendring the ancient Rent or more hath two Farms either of them of the ancient Rent of 20 s. a year but the one is worth 60 l. a year and the other but 20 l. these are in hand to be better together rendring 53 s. 4 d. for both together therfore he hath lost all or part of his Land according to that of which the perpetuity is so it is evident that it will happen to be more mischievous in