that time this made an Estate Tail But if it had béen and after their decease to their Children then the Children should take by Purchase tho' born after 'T is true that case is variously reported in the Books but I adhere to my Lord Coke presuming that being brought before all the Judges in the Argument of VVilds Case it was a true Report As for the second Point 't is plain that the power is extinguished for by the Recovery the Estate for Life to which it was annexed in privity is gone and forfeited so that 't is not necessary to dispute the third Point whether well executed or no But upon the whole I agree with my Brother Rainsford that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgment Hale I differ from my two Brothers and tho' I was of their Opinion at the finding of the Special Verdict yet upon very great Consideration of the Case I am of Opinion for the Defendant I shall proceed in a different method from my Brothers and begin with that Point which they made last and I agree with them admitting that Bernard had but an Estate for Life that the power was destroyed also here the Recovery does not only bar the Estate but all powers annexed to it for the recompence in value is of such strong Consideration that it serves as well for Rents Possibilities c. going out of and depending upon the Land as for the Land it self So Fines and Feoffments do ransack the whole Estate and pass or extinguish c. all Rights Conditions Powers c. belonging to the Land as well as the Land it self Secondly I agree with my Brother Rainsford that if Bernard had but an Estate for Life by the Devise the power was not well executed Where Tenant for Life has a power to make Leases 't is not always necessary to recite his power when he makes a Lease but if he makes a Lease which will not have an effectual continuance if it be directed out of his interest there it shall be as made by virtue of his power and so it was resolved in one Roger's Case in which I was Counsel Again Tho' it be here by Covenant to stand seized an improper way to execute his power yet it might be construed an Execution of it Mich. 51. In this Court Stapleton's Case where a Devise was to A. for Life Remainder to B. for Life Remainder to C. in Fee with power to B. to make his Wife a Joynture B. covenanted to stand seized for the Joynture of his Wife reciting his power tho' this could not make a legal Joynture yet it was resolved to enure by virtue of his power quando non valet quod ago ut ago valeat quantum valere potest But in this Case Bernard has got a new Fee which tho' it be defeasible by him in Remainder yet the Covenant to stand seized shall enure thereupon and the use shall arise out of the Fee Thirdly I was at the first opening of the Case of Opinion that Bernard had but an Estate for Life but upon deep Examination of the Will and of the Authority and Considerations of the Consequences of the Case I hold it to be an Estate Tail And first to ease that Point of all difficulties if cannot be denied but a Devise to a Man and the Heirs of his Body by a second Wife makes an Estate Tail executed tho' the Devisee had a Wife at the time As the Case often cited Land given to a Married Man and a Married Woman and the Heirs of their Bodies We are here in case of the Creation of an estate-Estate-Tail where intention has some influence voluntas Donatoris c. and may help words which are not exactly according to legal form 39 Ass 20. Land given to a Man and his Wife haeredi de corpore uni haeredi tantum this judged an Entail Again we are in case of an Estate Tail to be created by a Will and the intention of the Testator is the Law to expound the Testament therefore a Devise to a Man and his Heirs Males or a Devise to a Man and if he dies without Issue c. are always construed to make an Entail It must be admitted that if the Devise were to B. and the Issue of his Body having no Issue at that time it would be an Estate Tail for the Law will carry over the word Issue not only to his immediate Issue but to all that shall descend from him I agree it would be otherwise if there were Issue at the time Tayler and Sayer 41 Eliz. rot 541. a Devise to his Wife for Life 1 Cro. 742. Remainder to his Issue having two Children it was held the Remainder was void being to the Issue in the singular number for incertainy which should take But that was a little too rank for Issue is nomen collectivum Again I agree if a Devise be made to a man and after his death to his Issue or Children having Issue at that time they take by way of Remainder And that was the only Point adjudged in Wild's Case and there also against the Opinion of Popham and Gawdy This way being made I come to the Case it self and shall briefly give my Reasons why I hold Bernard has an Estate Tail First Because the word Issue is nomen collectivum and takes in the whole Generation ex vi termini and so the Case is stronger than if it were Children And where 't is said to the Issue that he shall have of the Body of the second Wife that is all that shall come of the second Wife For so 't is understood in common Parlance Secondly In all Acts of Parliament Exitus is as comprehensive as Heirs of the Body In Westm 2. de donis Issue is made a term of equivalence to Heirs of the Body for where it speaks of the Alienation of the Donee 't is said quo minus ad exitum discenderet So in 34 H. 8. of Entails setled by the Crown 'T is true in Conveyances c. the wisdom of the Law has appropriated the word Heirs as a Term of Art In Clerke's Case A Lease was made to commence after the death of his Son without Issue the Son had a Son and died and then that Son died without Issue It was Resolved both in the Kings Bench and the Exchequer that the Lease should commence for Issue being nomen collectivum whenever the Issue of the Son failed the term of Commencement did happen But now to see the difference Tyler's Case Mich. 34 Eliz. B.R. He had Issue A. B. C. and D. and Devised to his Wife for Life and after her death to B. his Son in Tail and if he dies without Issue then to his Children A. had Issue a Son and died and B. died without Issue Resolved that the Son of A. should not take as one of the Children of the Testator Which Case I cite to shew the odds between the word Issue and the
word Children My second Reason is from the manner of the Limitation which is to his Issue and of his Body lawfully begotten upon the second Wife Phrases agreeable to an Estate Tail and the meaning of a Testator is to be spelled out by little Hints It is admitted in Wild's Case in the 6 Co. 17. that if the Devise had been to the Children of their Bodies it would have been an Entail Thirdly It appears by the Devise that the Testator knew there could be no Children at that time and shall not be supposed to intend a contingent Remainder Fourthly It appears that the Testator did not intend to prefer the Children of the first Wife of Bernard but did the Children of the second and therefore cannot be thought to mean that John the younger Brother of Bernard should take before failure of the Issue which Bernard should have by his second Wife And to this purpose is Spalding's Case 3 Cro. 185. A Devise to his eldest Son and the Heirs of his Body after the death of his Wife and if he died living the Wife then to his Son N. And devised other Lands to another Son and the Heirs of his Body and if he died without Issue then to remain c. The first Son died living the Wife It was strongly urged that his Estate should cease for being said If he died living the Wife this was a Corrective of what went before But 't was Ruled by all the Court that it was an absolute Estate Tail in the first Son as if the words had been If he died without Issue living the Wife for he could not be thought to intend to prefer a younger Son before the Issue of his eldest Fifthly The words are further and for want of such Issue then to John which words in a Will do often make an Estate Tail by Implication As 4 Jac. Robinson's Case A Devise to A. for Life and if he died without Issue then to remain A. took an Entail So Burley's Case 43 Eliz. A Devise to A. for Life Remainder to the next Heir Male and for default of such Heir Male then to remain Adjudged an Estate Tail 'T is true Dyer 171. is where Lands were Devised to a man and the Heirs Males of his Body and if he died without Issue c. these last words did not make a Tail General to the Devisee For an Implication of an Estate of Inheritance shall never ride over an express limitation of an Inheritance before being 't is said here for want of such Issue the Land should remain 't is plainly meant that it should not before the Issue failed and then the Issue must have it so long for none else can and so 't is an Estate Tail I come now to Authorities 6 Eliz. Anderson num 86. Moor pl. 397. A Devise to his Son for Life and after his decease to the Men Children of his Body said to be an Estate Tail and so cited by Coke in that Book and so contrary to his Report of it in Wild's Case Bendloes num 124. But that Case is not so strong as this for Children is not so operative a word as Issue Rolls 839. A Devise to his eldest Son for Life non aliter for so were the words tho' not printed in the Book and after his decease to the Sons of his Body it was but an Estate for Life by reason of the words Non aliter Hill 13 Car. 2. Rot. 121. Wedgward's Case A Devise to his Son Thomas for Life and after his decease if he died without Issue living at his death then to the Daughter c. it was held to be an Estate for Life But were it an Estate Tail or no it was not necessary to be Resolved the Case depending upon the destruction or continuance of a Contingent Remainder which would have been gone had the Devise made an Estate Tail again there being an express Devise for Life they would not raise a larger Estate by Implication Again Wild's Case where Lands were Devised to A. for Life Remainder to B. and the Heirs of his Body Remainder to Wild and his Wife and after their decease to their Children And the Court of Kings-Bench were at first divided Indeed it was afterwards adjudged an Estate for Life to Wild and his Wife First Because having limited a Remainder in Tail to B. by express and the usual words if he had meant the same Estate in the second Remainder 't is like he would have used the same words Secondly It was not after their decease to the Children of their Bodies for then there would be an Eye of an Estate Tail Thirdly The main Reason was because there were Children at the time of the Devise and that was the only Reason the Resolution went upon in the Exchequer Chamber And tho' it be said in the latter end of the Case That if there were no Children at that time every Child born after might take by Remainder 't is not said positively that they should take And it seems to be in opposition to their taking presently but however that be it comes not to this Case For tho' the word Children may be made nomen collectivum the word Issue is nomen collectivum of it self Hill 42. and 43 Eliz. Bifield's Case A Devise to A. and if he dies not having a Son then to remain to the Heirs of the Testator Son was there taken to be used as nomen collectivum and held an Entail I come now to answer Objections First 'T is objected that in this Case the Limitation is expresly for Life and in that respect stronger than Wild's Case And this is the great difficulty But I Answer That tho' these words do weigh the Intention that way yet they are ballanced by an apparent Intention that weighs as much on the other side which is That as long as Bernard should have Children that the Land should never go over to John for there was as much reason to provide for the Issue of the Issue as the first Issue Again A Tenant in Tail has to many purposes but an Estate for Life Again 'T is possible that he did intend him but an Estate for Life and 't is by consequence and operation of Law only that it becomes an Estate Tail 1651. Hansy and Lowther The Case was A Copyholder surrendred to the use of his Will and Devised to his first Son for Life and after his decease to the Heir Male of his Body c. This was Ruled to be an Estate Tail and this differs from Archer's Case in the 1st of Co. for that the Devise there was for Life and after to the Heir Male and the Heirs of the Body of that Heir Male There the words of Limitation being grafted upon the word Heir it shews that the word Heir was used as Designatio personae and not for Limitation of the Estate So is the Case of Clerk and Day 1 Cro. 313. Another Objection was That there being a Power appointed
Estate Tail in Michael First Because in this Case the Use returns by operation of Law and executes an Estate in Michael for Life which being conjoined to the Estate limited to the Heirs Male of his Body makes an Estate Tail This Estate for Life rising by operation of Law is as strong as if it had been limitted to him for his Life and after his decease to the Heirs Male of his Body Secondly Because that a Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body is in Construction of Law a Limitation to himself and the Heirs Male of his Body There is a great difference when he who has the Use limits it to A. for Life the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of B. here no Estate can rise to B. because nothing moved from him but where he who has the Estate limits it to the Heirs Male of his own Body ut res valeat he shall have it for his Life Thirdly It is plainly according to the intent of the Parties the intent perfectly appears that the Issue by the second Wife should take and that Robert the eldest Son should not take till so much Money be paid therefore if we can by any means serve the intent of the parties we ought to do it as good Expositors For as my Lord Hobart says Judges in Construction of Deeds do no harm if they are astuti in serving the intent of the Parties without violating any Law Obj. Here the Use being never out of Michael he hath the ancient Use which is the Fee simple and consequently being the ancient Use and this being a new Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body the ancient use and the new one cannot be piec'd to make an Estate Tail executed in Michael but it shall be a Contingent Use if any which ought to rise to the Heir Male of his Body and so remains the ancient Fee simple And it hath been compared to these Cases If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J.S. or of his Son after his Marriage or after the Death of J. D. these are Contingent Limitations and there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor to serve the future Uses Resp 'T is true if a Man Covenants to stand seized to such Uses as that he leaves a discendible Estate in himself As if a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of his Son from and after his Marriage this is purely a Contingent Use because t is possible the Marriage may never take effect and nothing is fetch'd out of the Covenantor so if he Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J. S. after 40 years there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor and therefore those Cases are not to be resembled to our Case where the Estate of Michael cannot continue longer than his Life And this without any wrong done to any Rule of Law may be turned to a Use for Life and therefore such construction shall be Object 2. Here is an Estate to rise by way of Use by a Deed and not by a Will which shall not be by Implication by a Deed. Resp It s a certain truth But we are not here upon raising an Estate by Implication but qualifying an Estate that is now in the Father which by this new Deed is to be qualified to be an Estate for Life to preserve the Estate Tail so that the Cases of Implication are not to the purpose Object 3. In this Case Michael shall be in of his ancient Estate in Fee simple which is in him and not of a new Estate created by Implication of Law and it hath been compared to the Devise of Land to a Mans Heir he shall not be in by the Devise but of his ancient Estate that would have descended to him Resp True But in this Case a Man may qualifie his Estate as in Gilpins Case Cro. Ca. 161. Devise to his Heir upon Condition that he shall pay his Debts in a year the Heir is a Purchasor so here is a qualification to turn the Estate of Michael into an Estate for Life ut res valeat Object 4. Michael had not an Intention to have an Estate for Life for in the Limitation of the other Lands he has limited them expressly to himself for Life and if he had intended to have had an Estate for Life in the Lands in question he would also have so expressed it Resp The intention will not controul the operation of Law his main intent was to settle the Lands upon his younger Children this the Law serves but not his secondary intentions If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of himself for Life without impeachment of Wast and afterwards to the Use of the Heirs Male of his Body the Law supervenes his intention and makes him to be Tenant in Tail And in our Case there was a necessity to limit the other Lands to himself for Life because there was another Estate to intervene the Estate for Life and the Estate Tail The Reason given by my Lord Coke in Fenwick and Mitfords Case is plain enough and it appears that he was of that Opinion afterwards by the Report of Pannel and Lanes Case 13 Jac. in Rolls Rep. 1 part 238. The Case upon which I shall rely which has not been answered is my Lord Pagets Case adjudged by all the Judges of England Tho. Lord Paget Covenants in consideration of the discharge of his Funerals Payment of his Debts and Legacies out of the profits of his Land and for the advancement of his Son Brother and others of his Blood that he and his Heirs would stand seized of divers Mannors to the Use of T.F. one of the Covenantees for the Life of my Lord Paget and after his Death to the Use of C. Paget for the term of 24 years and then to the Use of W. Paget his Son in Tail with Remainders in over and afterwards the Lord Paget was aâ—â—â—nted of Treason And it was adjudged that the Lord Paget himself had an Estate for his Life for the Remainder being limited after his Death the Estate cannot pass out of him during his Life and there in Case of a Covenant to stand seized he himself hath an Estate for Life And this is not because the Estate returns as my Brother Twisden has said but because the Estate was never out of him and cannot return either from the Heir or the Covenantee otherwise where should it be during the Life of the Lord Paget who was attainted the Book is that it was never out of him but was turn'd into an Estate for Life So that now it is all one as if he had Covenanted to stand seized to the Use of his eldest Son after his Death And the question is What Estate he has during his Life It is adjudged that he has an Estate for Life for if there had been a Contingent Fee simple in the Lord Paget his Heir could never have had an Amoveas manus
for if a Man Covenants to stand seized to a Contingent Use and afterwards is attainted of Treason before the Contingency happen the Contingency shall never rise for the King has the Estate discharged and the Use is to rise out of the Estate of the Covenantor so is Moor Sir Tho Palmers Case 815 In Moors Rep. of my Lord Pagets Case 194. It s said that W. Paget had an Amoveas manus for the Estate of the Queen leased by the Death of my Lord Paget In Sir Francis Englefeilds Case Popham 18. n. 7. It s resolved that no Use rises because t is that it shall Discend Remain or Come which is uncertain but if he had Covenanted that after his Death he and his Heirs would have stood seized to the Use of John an Use would have resulted to Sir Francis Second Point I conceive if it be impossible for Ralph to take by Discent this would be a Contingent Use in him by Purchase The great Objection against this is that the Limitation is to an Heir and an Heir which ought to take by Purchase ought not to be only Heir of the Body c. but Heir general Of this I am not well satisfied I conceive the Remainder being limited to the Heirs of the Body of Jane begotten by Michael such a Limitation will make a special Heir to serve the turn and t is not to be resembled to Shelley's Case My Reasons are First Because at the Common Law before the Statute de Donis notice was taken that this was a special Heir and therefore 't is no wrong done to make him here a qualified Heir In the Statute de Donis 't is said When Lands are given to Man and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten Secondly Vpon the special penning of the Deed it is apparent that Michael took notice that he had an Heir at Common Law therefore it can't be intended that he meant here such an Heir that should be Heir general to him this would be Contradictio in Adjecto Litt. Sect. 352. puts this Case If a Feoffment be made upon Condition that the Feoffee shall give the Land to the Feoffor and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten In this Case if the Husband dye living his Wife before the Estate Tail is granted to them the Feoffee ought to make the Estate as near the Condition and as near the intent of the Condition as may be viz. To let the Land to the Wife for her Life without impeachment of Wast the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of the Husband on her begotten If the Husband and Wife dye before the Gift made then the Feoffee ought to make it to the Issue and to the Heirs of the Body of his Father and Mother begotten Suppose that this had been to a second Wife and there had been Issue by a former the Book of 12 H. 4. 3. says that there it shall be in another manner but Litt. says it shall be as near vid. Litt. Sect. 22. Morevils Case Fitzh Tail 23. 2 Ed. 3. 1. 4. Ed. 3. 50. by all these Cases it appears that no regard is had whether the Son be Heir of the Husband if he be Heir of their two Bodies Therefore it seems that by this Limitation Ralph shall take by way of Contingent Remainder For Heirs of the Body of the second Wife is a good name of Purchase I have not read any Case against this Hill 16. or 26 Eliz. there was this Case A Man taking notice in his Will that his Brother who was dead had a Son and that he himself had three Daughters who were his right and immediate Heirs he gave them 2000 l and gave his Land to the Son of his Brother by the name of his Heir Male. Provided If his Daughters troubled his Heir then the Devise of the 2000 l to them should be void And it was resolved that the Devisor taking notice that others were his Heirs the Limitation to his Brothers Son by the name of Heir Male was a good name of Purchase and this agrees with Cownden and Clarks Case in Hob. Wild Justice said he was of the same Opinion with Hale in this last Point And Iudgment was given for the Defendant Three Learned ARGUMENTS One in the Court of Kings-Bench BY Sir FRANCIS NORTH Attorny General And Two in the Court of Exchequer BY Sir MATTHEW HALE Chief Baron there The Argument of Sir Francis North. In Banco Regis Potter and Sir Henry North. IN a Replevin for taking of an Horse in a certain place called the Fenn at Milden-Hall in the County of Suffolk the Defendant makes Cognizance as Bayliff to Sir Henry North and saith That the place Where c. containeth Ten thousand Acres of Pasture in Milden-Hall whereof a certain place called Delfe is parcel and that it is Sir Henry North's Freehold and the Horse was Damage feasant there c. The Plaintiff Replies Confessing the Soyl to be the Freehold of Sir Henry Norths but says That time whereof c. the place Where hath been parcel of the Fenn and parcel of the Mannor of Milden-Hall of which Sir Henry North is seised in Fee and that the Plaintiff was at the time c. seised of an Ancient Messuage one of the Freeholds holden of the Mannor by Rents and Services and parcel of the said Mannor and that Time out of Mind there were divers ancient Freehold Messuages holden of the said Mannor by Rents and Services and divers Copyhold Messuages parcel of the said Mannor by Custom of the said Mannor demised and demisable by Copy of Court Rolls of the said Mannor And the several Tenants of the said Freehold Tenements being seised in their Demesn as of Fee and they whose Estate they have in the same Time out of mind have had together with the Customary Tenants of the said Customary Tenements the sole and several Feeding of 100 Acres of Pasture for all Beasts except Hogs Sheep and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Freeholds every year at all times of the year as to their several Freeholds belonging And that within the said Mannor there is and Temps d'ont c. hath been such a Custom that the several Tenants of the Customary Messuages together with the Freeholders aforesaid have used and accustomed to have the sole and several Feeding of the said 100 Acres of Pasture for all their Beasts except Sheep Hogs and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Copy-holds every year at all times in the year tanquam ad seperal ' Tenementa customar ' spectant ' pertinent ' and the Plaintiff being seised put in his Horse c. and so Iustifies Vpon this the Defendant demurs generally This Prescription is naught in substance and Judgment ought to be given for the Defendant upon these Four Exceptions First That several Freeholders cannot joyn or be joyned in a Prescription to claim an entire Interest in another mans Soyl as
his Bill to have the Land Conveyed according to the Agreement above But for the Defendants it was much insisted upon that this being to settle the Lands in case Thomas should dye without Issue it should not be regarded in this Court for the Execution of a Trust of a Remainder or Reversion in Fee upon an Estate Tail shall not be compelled because it is subject to be destroyed by the Tenant in Tail as here Thomas might have done in case he had made a Settlement according to the import of that Writing who therefore could not have been compelled himself to have executed this Agreement But the Lord Chancellor Fynch Decreed the Land for the Plaintiff because it was proved that the Marriage with the Plaintiffs Wife was in expectation of the performance of this Agreement and he was obliged to have left the Land to the Plaintiff if he had had no Issue Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria Collet versus Collet WIlliam Fox having three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha the two latter being Married and the first a Widow by his Will devised in these Words Viz. I give unto Martha my Daughter the Sum of 400 l to be paid unto her by my Executors within one year next after my decease But I will and my desire is that Cornelius Collet the Husband of Martha upon the payment of the said 400 l shall give such Security as my Executors shall approve of that the said 400 l shall be laid out within 18 Months next after my decease and purchase an Estate of that value to be setled and assured upon her the said Martha and the Heirs of her Body lawfully begotten And in the Close of his Will were these words following Viz. I Will That after my Debts which I shall owe at the time of my Decease and my Funeral Expences and the Probat of this my Will be discharged then I do give all the rest of my Personal Estate Unbequeathed to purchase an Estate near of as good value as the same Personal Estate shall amount unto within one year next after my my decease Which said Estate so to be purchased I Will shall be setled and assured unto and upon my said three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha and the Heirs of their respective Bodies lawfully begotten for ever or otherwise my said Daughter Mary and the Husbands of my said two other Daughters Elizabeth and Martha shall for such Moneys as they shall receive of my said Executors for the Overplus of my Personal Estate enter into one or more Bonds in the double Sum of Money as each part shall amount unto the same being to be divided into three parts unto my said Executors within 18 Months next after my decease to settle and assure such part or Sum of Money as each of them shall receive and have by this my Will for the Overplus of my Personal Estate unto and upon the Child and Children of my said Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha part and part alike Martha the Wife of Cornelius Collet died within six Months after the Testator leaving Issue only a Daughter who died within four Months after the Mother the other two Sisters surviving Cornelius Collet took out Letters of Administration both to Martha his Wife and likewise to his Daughter the Four hundred Pounds and likewise the Overplus of the Personal Estate being unpaid or disposed of Cornelius Collet preferred his Bill against the Executors and the surviving Sisters and thereby demanded the 400 l and likewise a third part of the Overplus which amounted unto 700 l And the Cause came to be heard before the Lord Chancellor upon Bill and Answer who Decreed the 400 l to the Plaintiff but as to the Surplus of the Estate the Bill was dismissed altho ' it was much insisted upon for the Plaintiff that he might have given Bond to secure the Surplus for his Child and so from the Child it would have come to him as Administrator But seeing that no Interest could vest in the Child till the Election were determined it not being material as to this Point whether the Executors or the Husband aâ— the Election the Father could not claim it as Administrator to the Child And then if the Money had been laid out in Land and the Settlement according to the direction of the Will the Husband would have had no benefit for there would have been a Ioynt Estate for Life in the Daughters with several Inheritances and no severance of the Ioynture by the Marriage and having Issue Co. Inst and so no Tenant by the Courtesie Therefore as to the Surplusage the Bill was Decreed to be dismissed Note As to the 400 l the Order of my Lord Chancellor was That Interest should be paid for it from the time of bringing the Bill Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria West versus The Lord Delaware WEST Heir apparent of the Lord Delaware Exhibited his Bill against the said Lord setting forth That upon a Marriage agreed to be had between him and the Daughter of one Mr. Huddleston with whom he was to have 10000 l Portion The Lord his Father Articled to settle Lands of such yearly value for the Wives Ioynture for their maintenance and the Heirs of their Bodies c. That the Wife being now dead and without Issue and no Settlement made the Bill prayed an Execution of the Articles and a discovery of what Incumbrances there were upon the Lands to be setled To this the Lord Delaware Answered That he never intended to settle Lands but for the Wives Ioynture only and that the Plaintiff her Husband was not named in the Articles and so was Advised He need make no Settlement and upon that Reason the Plaintiff could not require him to discover Incumbrances An Exception being taken to the Answer for that it did not discover any thing touching Incumbrances it was Argued before my Lord and for the Defendant it was alledged That by the Course of the Court the time of the Discovery should be when the other Point was determined for if that be for the Defendant then no Discovery can be required but if otherwise that then the Defendant shall be put to answer Interrogatories as is usual in Cases of like nature And it cannot be Objected That the Estate may be charged with Incumbrances since the Bill because they will be of no avail On the other side it was said That this would create great delay for upon the discovery of Incumbrances other parties must be made to the Bill and therefore this Case differed from the Case of Account which concerns the Defendant himself only but the Question now is only for the making proper Parties The Court Ordered That a further Answer should be made Nota If a man deviseth that such a Sum of Money shall be paid out of the Profits of his Lands and the Profits will not amount to the Sum in such case the Land
Car. nunc cap. 3. in pursuance of which he distrained the said Nails for the Duty due by those Acts out of a Smiths Forge c. The Plaintiff demurred So the sole question was whether a Smiths Forge were within the Acts it being once argued the last Term the Court now gave their Opinion Moreton I think a Smiths Forge ought to pay 't is a great part of the Kings Revenue almost in every Village there is one we should explain the Act liberally for the King Rainsford of the same Opinion 't is within the words scilicet an Hearth whereon Fire is used and within the meaning for there is an exception of things not so properly Fire hearths as this viz. Private Ovens Where the Act excepts Blowing Houses I take it is meant Glass houses and the Houses at Ironworks by Stamps I think is meant Presses Calenders for Cloaths by the very words Houses that are not Dwelling Houses are charged The objection that it is his Trade is answered by the instance of Cooks Chandlers Common Ovens Hearths of Tripewomen who boil Neats Feet Twisden of the same Opinion the words are general yet I would not extend it to every Hearth that has a Fire upon it as Stils and Alembicks for so we might extend it to a Chaffing dish of Coals but we must take it for a Rule to extend it to those things which are most general A Smiths Forge is of such use that 't is found almost in every Village therefore 't was reckoned a great piece of hardship and slavery upon the Children of Israel that they were not permitted a thing so useful amongst them The exceptions enumerate particulars therefore it excludes whatever is not expressed Hale I would fain know how the fact is Do Silver Smiths c. pay It were too narrow to extend it only to Common Chimneys and too great a latitude to extend it to every place where Fire is where a Man can but warm his Hands I suppose Boylers in Cooks Chimneys and the Fireplaces of Worstead Combers do not pay Common Ovens should have paid tho' there were no exception of Private Ovens for they never are or can be without a Chimney This is matter of fact I have not enquired into and I would be loath to deliver an Opinion without much inquiry but 't is very probable that they are Firehearths and not excepted but it appears plainly upon the Record that 't is a Firehearth and by the general Demurrer 't is admitted Note There was a Special Rule that no advantage should be taken of the Pleading by either side But Hale said he did not know how they were bound by that Rule Termino Paschae Anno 24 Car. II. In Banco Regis Monk versus Morris and Clayton THe Plaintiff after he had obtained Iudgment in Debt became Bankrupt and the Defendants brought a Writ of Error The Judgment was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber and the Record sent back Then a Commission of Bankrupts is sued out and the Commissioners Assign this Judgment The Plaintiff Sues out Execution and the Money is levied by the Sheriff and brought into Court The Assignee moves that it may not be delivered to the Plaintiff surmising that the Judgment was assigned to him ut Ante. The Court said they might have brought a Special Sicre facias which they having delayed and that it would be hard to stay the Money in Court upon a bare surmise and for ought appeared it was the Plaintiff's due But however because it might be hazardous to deliver it to him they consented to detain it so that the Assignee forthwith took out a Scire facias against the Defendant in order to try the Bankrupcy or otherwise that it should be delivered to the Plaintiff Sir Ralph Bovyes Case IN an Ejectment upon a Tryal at Bar the Case appeared to be this Sir William Drake was seized in Fee of the Lands in question and 19 Car. 1. infeoffed Sir William Spring and five others to such uses as he should declare by his Will in Writing or by his Deed subscribed by three Witnesses In August 20 Car. 1. by his Deed ut supra he limits the use of the said Lands to his Brother Francis Drake for 90 years and declares That the Feoffees should be seized to their own use in Trust for the said Francis Drake and his Heirs with a power to Francis Drake to alter and limit the Trust as he should think fit In the same Month there is a Treaty of Marriage between F.D. and the Daughter of Sir William Spring and it was agreed by certain Articles between F.D. and Sir W. S. c. reciting that he should receive 2500 l with his intended Wife which Money was proved to be paid that F. D. should convey the Lands in question to himself and his Wife and the Heirs Males of their two Bodies c. for the Joynture of the Wife The Marriage afterwards in 20 Car. takes effect and soon after the same year F.D. by Indenture between him Sir W.S. and another reciting the Articles of Marriage Assigns his Term of 90 years to Sir W. S. and the other in Trust to himself for Life the remainder to his Wife for Life and after to the Heirs Males of their two Bodies and by the same Deed limits the Trust of the Inheritance of the Lands in the same manner Afterwards in 23 Car. 1. he in consideration of 6000 l proved to be paid Grants out of the said Lands a Rent of 400 l per annum to Sir Ralph Bovy and his Heirs with power to enter into the Land in case the Rent was not paid and to retain it until satisfaction Afterwards F. D. and his Wife dye the Rent was Arrear Sir R. Bovy enters Sir Will. Spring and the other Trustees Assign the term of 90 years to Sir Will. Drake Heir Male of F.D. and his Wife the Lessor of the Plaintiff In this case these Points were agreed by the Court. First That when Sir W. D. enfeoffed divers to such Uses as he should declare by his Will or Writing that if he had in pursuance of that Feoffment limited the Uses by his Will that the Will had been but Declaratory tho' if he had made a Feoffment to the Use of his Will it had been otherwise according to Sir Ed. Cleeres Case 6 Co. And Hale said my Lord Co. made a Feoffment provided that he might dispose by his Will to the use of the Feoffee and his Heirs and resolved in that case he might declare the Use by his Will which should arise out of the Feoffment Secondly That this Settlement being in pursuance of Articles made precedent to the Marriage had not the least colour of fraud whereby a Purchaser might avoid it and if there had been but a Verbal Agreement for such a Settlement it would have served the turn And the Court said if there had been no precedent Agreement so that it had been a voluntary Conveyance tho' every such
only shewn upon the Declaration to enable the Plaintiff to bring his Action Note This is aided by a late Act of Parliament Jay versus Bond. IN Trespass the Defendant pleads that Ante Quinden ' Sancti Martini usque ad hunc diem praed ' Jay Excommunicatus fuit adhuc existit protulit hic in Cur ' literas Testamentarias Episcopi Sarum quae notum faciunt universis quod scrutatis Registeriis invenitur contineri quod Excommunicat ' fuit c. pro contumacia in non comparendo to a Suit for Tythes c. in cujus rei Testimonium praed ' Episcopus Sigillum apposuit It was objected that such a kind of Certificate of Excommunication as this is was not allowable for it ought to be positive and under the Seal of the Ordinary whereas this is only a relation of what is found in their Register Sed non allocatur for tho' such a form of pleading would be altogether insufficient in our Law yet their course is sometimes to certifie Excommunication sub sigillo Ordinarij and sometimes per literas Testamentarias as here Hale said to plead Letters Patents without saying sub magno sigillo is naught and that because the King has divers Seals Note The entry was here quod Defendens venit dicit c. Hale doubted whether he ought not to have made some kind of defence tho' no full defence is to be made when Excommengment in the Plaintiff is pleaded Owen versus Lewyn THe Plaintiff declared in Action upon the Case upon the Custom of the Realm against a Common Carrier and also sur Trover and Conversion Hale said so he might for Not guilty answers both but if a Carrier loseth Goods committed to him a General Action of Trover doth not lye against him Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 24 Car. II. In Banco Regis Davenant against the Bishop of Salisbury IN Covenant The Plaintiff declared that the Bishop of Salisbury the Defendants Predecessor being seized in Fee demised unto him certain Lands for 21 years reserving the antient Rent c. and Covenanted for him and his Successors to discharge all publick Taxes assessed upon the Land and that since the Defendant was made Bishop a certain Tax was assessed upon the Land by vertue of an Act of Parliament and that the Plaintiff was forced to pay it the Defendant refusing to discharge it unde Actio accrevit c. The Defendant demurred first to the form for that 't is said that the Predecessor Bishop was seized and doth not say in jure Episcopatus But Hale said the Old Books were that where it was pleaded that J. S. Episcopus was seized that it implies seizin in the right of the Bishoprick which is true if he were a Corporation capable only in his politick capacity or as an Abbot c. but in regard he might also be seized in his natural capacity the Declaration was for this Cause held to be ill The matter in Law was whether this were such a Covenant as should bind the Successor as incident to a Lease which the Bishop is empowred to make by the 32 H. 8. For 't is clear if a Bishop had made a Covenant or Warranty this had not bound the Successor at the Common Law without the consent of the Dean and Chapter and if it should be now taken that every Covenant would bind the Successor then the Statute of 1 Eliz. would be of no effect But Hale said admitting this were an antient Covenant and if so it should have been averred to have been used in former Leases to discharge ordinary payments as Pentions or Tenths granted by the Clergy then it might bind the Successor by the 32 H. 8. But it were hard to extend it to new charges And we all know how lately this way of Taxes came in But the Court said that the Declaration being insufficent for the other matter they would not determine this But they held that however this Covenant should prove it would not avoid the Lease Vid. Gee Bishop of Chicester and Freedlands Case 3 Cro. 47. Note Hale said that antiently when the Sheriff returned a Rescous upon a Man he was admitted to plead to it as to an Indictment But the course of the Court of latter times has been not to admit any Plea to it but to drive the party to his Action upon the Case as upon the return of a Devastavit c. Cole versus Levingston IN Ejectment upon a long and intricate Special Verdict the Chief Justice said never was the like in Westminster Hall these following Points were resolved by the Court and declared by Hale as the Opinion of himself and the rest of the Judges First That where one Covenants to stand seized to the use of A. and B. and the Heirs of their Bodies of part of his Land and if they die without Issue of their Bodies then that it shall remain c. and of another part of his Land to the use of C.D. and E. and the Heirs of their Bodies and if they die without Issue of their Bodies then to remain c. that here there are no cross Remainders created by Implication for there shall never be such Remainders upon construction of a Deed tho' sometimes there are in case of a Will 1 Rolls 837. Secondly As this Case is there would be no cross Remainders if it were in a Will for cross Remainders shall not rise between three unless the words do very plainly express the intent of the Devisor to be so as where black Acre is devised to A. white Acre to B. and green Acre to C. and if they die without Issue of their Bodies vel alterius eor ' then to remain there by reason of the words alterius eor ' cross Remainders shall be Dier 303. But otherwise there would not Gilbert v. Witty and others 2 Cro. 655. And in this case tho' some of the Limitations are between two there shall be no cross Remainders in them because there are others between three and the intent shall be taken to the same in all The Dean and Chapter of Durham against the Lord Archbishop of York IN a Prohibition the Archbishop pleaded a Prescription that he and his Predecessors have time out of mind been Guardians of the Spiritualties of the Bishoprick of Durham Sede vacante and Issue joyned thereupon and tried at the Bar this Term. Hale said De jure communi the Dean and Chapter were Guardians of the Spiritualties during the vacancy as to matters of Jurisdiction but for Ordination they are to call in the aid of a Neighbouring Bishop and so is Linwood But the Usage here in England is that the Archbishop is Guardian of the Spiritualties in the Suffragan Diocess and therefore it was proper here to joyn the Issue upon the Usage There was much Evidence given that antiently during the vacancy of Durham the Archbishop had exercised Jurisdiction both Sententious and other as Guardian of the Spiritualties
But since H. 8. time it had béen for the most part administred by the Dean and Chapter and the Verdict was here for the Dean and Chapter King versus Melling IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the case was this R. Melling seized in Fee having Issue four Sons William Robert Bernard and John devised the Land in question in this manner I give my Land to my Son Bernard for his natural Life and after his decease I give the same to the Issue of his Body lawfully begotten on a second Wife and for want of such Issue to John Melling and his Heirs for ever Provided that Bernard may make a Joynture of all the Premisses to such second Wife which she may enjoy during her Life R.M. dies Bernard in the life of his first Wife suffered a Recovery to the use of himself in Fee and after her decease Marries a second Wife and then by Indenture covenants to stand seized to the use of himself for Life and after to the use of his Wife for her Life for her Joynture and dies J.M. Enters and makes a Lease to the Plaintiff And this Term after Arguments at the Bar the Court gave their Opinions Rainsford for the Plaintiff First I hold in this Case that B. M. takes but an Estate for Life with a Contingent Remainder to the Issue by his second Wife for the Devise is by express words for Life as in Archers Case 1 Co. a Devise to R. A. for Life and after to the next Heir Male of R. and the Heirs Males of that Heir Male Resolved to create but an Estate for Life to R. A. I rely mainly upon Wilds Case 6 Co. which was brought before all the Judges of England where the Devise was to a Man and his Wife and after their decease to the Children and resolved to be but an Estate for Life 't is true there were Children at the time of the Devise but in the end of the Case 't is said that in such Case if there were no Children the Children born after might take by remainder and the first Estate to be but for Life Clerk v. Day 1 Cro. 313. the Devise was to Rose his Daughter for Life and that if she married after his Death and had Heir of her Body then that the Heir after his Daughter's Death should have the Land and to the Heirs of their Body begotten and if his Daughter died without Issue then to a Stranger It was held by Gawdy and Fenner that Rose had but an Estate for Life in this Case 1 Rolls 837. Devise to his eldest Son for Life and after his decease to the Sons of his Body lawfully begotten the Son resolved to have but an Estate for Life The Second point Whether the power to make a Joynture be destroyed by the Common Recovery these powers to make Estates are of two sorts either Collateral as when Executors have power by a Will to sell Land and such a power cannot be destroyed as appears in Diggs's Case 1 Co. or powers appendant to Estates as to make Leases which shall continue after the Estates to which the power is annexed determins and the power in the Case at Bar to make a Joynture are of this second sort and are destroyed by the alteration of the Estate to which it is annexed in privity as 1 Co. Albany's Case is so that the Common Recovery being a Forfeiture of the Estate for Life by consequence 't is an extinguishment of the power Thirdly But admitting the power continues whether it be well executed and I hold that it is not for being seized in Fee at the time of the Covenant to stand seized to the use of his Wife for her Joynture and this without any reference to his power the use shall arise out of his Interest and not be executed by vertue of his power according to the resolution in Sir Ed. Cleeres Case 6 Co. Twisden of the same Opinion As to the first Point it must be agreed that these words Issue of the Body ex vi termini make not an Entail if they were in a Conveyance by Act executed no more than Children as the words were in Wilds Case 'T is true in a VVill a Devise of Land to a Man and his Issue creates an Entail if the Devisee had no Issue at that time for otherwise those words would be void for in regard they are limited to take presently the Issue born after cannot take as by Remainder there being none to take in praesenti they must be intended to be words of Limitation as a Devise to a Man and his Heirs Males makes an Entail or otherwise the word Males must be rejected then seeing the words in themselves are not proper to make an Entail the next thing to be considered is the intention which is to be known by the expressions in the VVill and not any averment dehors the words are J will give my Land to my Son for Life and after his decease I will give the same to the Issue c. so that the Land is given to him expresly for Life Devise of Land in perpetuum makes Fee but if Land be given by Deèd in perpetuum there an Estate only for Life will pass 15 H. 7. A Devise to one paying 10 l this is a Fee 6 Co. Coliers Case But a Devise to one for Life paying 10 l makes but an Estate for Life the Case of Furse and VVinter was Mich. or Trin. 13 Regis Caroli Rot. 1339. A Devise to his two Daughters equally to be divided between them and to the Survivor of them and to the Heirs of the Body of the Survivor This was so expresly to the Surviror that it was resolved to be a Joynt Estate and not in Common The words here are after the decease of Bernard I give the same to the Issue of the Body c. implying that the Issue should take by Purchase as a Gift and not by Descent Again The power given to Bernard to make a Joynture shews that he could not do it by Virtue of his Estate and therefore needed a power to be annexed And tho' such powers are usually affixed to Estates Tail yet when the construction is doubtful what Estate shall pass the giving such a power is an argument that 't is such an Estate that cannot make a Joynture or the like by any other means The words go further and for want of such Issue then to J.M. 'T is true if Land be devised to a Man and if he dies without Issue then to remain over the Devisee shall have an Entail Owen 29. But it shall not be so in this Case because that Clause is crowded in with other Clauses directly to the contrary I rely mainly upon VVilds Case 6 Co. and the Case quoted out of Bendlowes in the end of that Case A Devise to Baron and Feme and to the Men Children of their Bodies begotten because it did not appear that there were any more Children at
cannot tender an Oath to the party sued nisi in causis Matrimonialibus Testamentariis But the Court after hearing divers Arguments denied the Prohibition for they said It was no more than the Chancery did to make Defendants answer upon Oath in such like Cases Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 31 Car. II. In Banco Regis How versus Whitfield ante in ult ' Term. IN Repl the Plaintiff declares of the taking of his Cattle in a Close containing five Acres The Defendant avows and sets forth a Fine to the use of A. in Tail which discended to him Virtute cujus he was seised in Dominico ut de feodo talliato c. The Plaintiff Replies that the Fine was first to the use of J. S. for Life the Remainder to his Executors Administrators and Assigns for 80 years with Power to him and his Assigns to lett the five Acres in Possession or Reversion for 21 years determinable upon three Lives reserving the ancient Rent and that J. S. Devised this Term to J. N. and died his Executors assented and after it came to the Executors of J. N. who assigned it and that the Assignee made a Lease of the said five Acres inter alia reserving proinde the Rent of 6 s per annum and avers that the ancient Rent was 6 s per annum The Avowant Rejoyns setting forth his former Title And the Plaintiff Demurrs It was Objected First That the Plaintiff ought to have traversed the Seisin in Tail alledged by the Avowant seeing in his Replication he sets forth and intitles himself under an Estate inconsistent with it To this it was Answered and the Court agreed that there ought to be no Traverse for the Avowant doth not say it was his Freehold or that he was Seised in Tail but only under a Virtute cujus c. And the Plaintiff in his Replication sets forth a Title consistent with all that the Avowant alledges and so confesses and avoids and all depends upon the execution of the Power And for that Secondly It was Objected That he which made this Lease was not Assignee of J. S. for Executors were not within the Power and consequently not their Assignee This is a Power collateral to the Estate and shall not run with the Land for then Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupcy the Vendee of the Term by the Sheriff upon an Execution c. should execute this Power It is like Covenants annexed to Leases which the Assignee could not take advantage of till 32 H. 8. Again Here appears to be no good Reservation for the Lease is of the five Acres inter al' reserving proinde so that the Rent issues out of other Lands as well as the five Acres and therefore cannot be said to be the ancient Rent reserved upon that The Court were all of Opinion that the Assignee in this case might execute the Power and conceived that Assignees might include Assignees in Law Vid. Mo. 855. as well as Fact but however the Tenant for Life devising this Term the Devisee was an Assignee and the Power in the greatest strictness of acceptation was in him and consequently must go to his Executors and by the same Reason to their Assignee As to the Reserving the Rent proinde the Court said it might be intended that the inter al' might comprehend nothing but such things out of which a Rent could not be reserved and then the six Shillings was reserved only for the five Acres However the proinde might reasonably be referred only to the five Acres and not to the inter al and that a distinct Reservation of Six shillings might be for five Acres And so Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Ante. Steed versus Berrier ERror upon a Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect J.S. made his Will in Writing and devised Lands to his Son J.S. and his Heirs and in the same Will gave a Legacy of 100 l to his Grandson The Son died afterwards in his Life time after whose decease J. S. the Grandfather made a Codicil wherein he gave away part of the Lands devised as aforesaid to a Stranger and afterwards declared by Parol that his Intention was that his Grandson J. S. should have the Lands which his Son J. S. should have had The Question upon this Special Verdict was Whether this were sufficient to carry the Lands to the Grandson And Judgment was given in the Common Pleas by three Judges against one that it was Whereupon a Writ of Error was brought in this Court Finch Solicitor Argued that this Will was sufficient to carry it to the Grandson He agreed Brett and Ridgen's Case in Pl. Com. that a Devise to a man and his Heirs who dies in the Life of the Devisor a new Publication will not be enough to make the Heir take by the Will because named in the Will by way of Limitation of the Estate and not Designation of the Person that should take But in Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. 423. and in Mo. 2. where the Devise was to his Son Richard and the Heirs of his Body which Richard afterwards died in his Life time and then the Devisor said My Will is That the Sons of Richard my Son deceased shall have the Land devised to their Father as they should have had if their Father had lived and died after me There Popham and Fenner held that this new Publication would carry the Land to Richard's Son Gawdy and Clench contra But our Case is much stronger for there Heirs of the Body were used only for Limitation but in the Will here where the words are I Devise to my Son J. with this new Publication the Grandson J. may take because a Grandson is a Son and when a Will is new Published it is all one as if it were wrote at the time of such Publication Beckford and Parncot's Case in the 1 Cro. 493. Mo. 404. Devise of all his Lands and after the Will the Devisor purchaseth other Lands and then publishes it again it will carry the new purchased Lands Dyer 149. Trevanian's Case Cestuy que use before the 27th of H. 8. Devised the Lands a new Publication will pass the Lands executed in him by the Statute The Opinion of the Court inclined to Reverse the Judgment they held it to be the same with Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. that no Parol averment can carry Lands to one person when the words of the Will plainly intended them to another They agreed If a man having no Son but a Grandson deviseth his Lands to his Son the Grandson may take But here is an opposition contained in the new Publication viz. Those Lands which my Son J. should have had my meaning is my Grandson J. shall have And in the Will it self there is a Legacy devised to the Grandson by that Name so where they are so distinguished 't is impossible to take the Grandson to be
upon the Warranty as well as the other tho' the Declaration saith knowing them to be naught yet the knowledge need not to be proved in Evidence Debt upon a Bond and a mutuatus may be joyned in one Action yet there must be several Pleas for Nil debet which is proper to the one will not serve in the Action upon the Bond. Sed Adjornatur Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 34 35 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus A Quo Warranto was brought against divers persons of the City of Worcester why they claimed to be Aldermen c. of the said Corporation The Cause came to be tried at the Bar and a Challenge was made to the Jury in behalf of the Defendants for that the Jury men were not Freeholders The Court said that for Juries within Corporate Towns it hath hath been held that the Statutes that have been made requiring that Jurymen should have so much Freehold do not extend to such places for if so there might be a failer of Justice for want of such Jurymen so qualified but then to maintain the Challenge it was said by the Common Law Jurymen were to be Freeholders But the Court overruled the Challenge but at the importunity of the Counsel they allowed a Bill of Exceptions and so a Verdict passed against the Defendants and afterwards it was moved in Arrest of Judgment upon the Point But the Court would not admit the Matter to be Debated before them tho' divers Presidents of like nature were offered because they said they had declared their Opinions before and the Redress might be upon a Writ of Error Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 35 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus A Motion for a Prohibition to a Suit in the Ecclesiastical Court for a Churchwarden's Rate suggesting that they had pleaded That it was not made with the Consent of the Parishioners and that the Plea was refused The Court said That the Churchwardens if the Parish were Summoned and refused to meet or make a Rate might make one alone for the Repairs of the Church if needful because that if the Repairs were neglected the Churchwardens were to be Cited and not the Parishioners and a Day was given to shew Cause why there should not go to a Prohibition Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 35 Car. II. In Banco Regis Gamage's Case ERror out of the Court of the Grand Sessions where in an Ejectment the Case was upon Special Verdict upon the Will of one Gamage who devised his Lands in A. to his Wife for Life Item his Lands in B. to his Wife for Life and also his Lands which he purchased of C. to his Wife for Life and after the decease of his Wife he gave the said Lands to one of his Sons and his Heirs And the Question was Whether the Son should have all the Lands devised to the Wife or only those last mentioned And it was Adjudged in the Grand Sessions that all should pass And upon Error brought it was Argued that they were Devises to the Wife in distinct and separate Sentences and therefore his said Lands should be referred only to the last On the other side it was said that the word Said should not be referred to the last Antecedent but to all If a man conveys Land to A. for Life Remainder to B. in Tail Remainder to C. in forma praedict ' the Gift to C. is void 1 Inst 20. b. It is agreed if he said All the said Lands to his Son and his heirs it would have extended to the whole This is the same because Indefinitum equipollet universali Et Adjornatur Herring versus Brown IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the Case was Tenant for Life with several Remainders over with a Power of Revocation Levied a Fine and then by a Deed found to be Sealed ten Days after declared the Vses of the Fine which Deed had the Circumstances required by the Power The Question in the Case was Whether the Fine had extinguished the Power It was Argued that it had not because the Deed and Fine shall be but one Conveyance and the use of a Fine or Recovery may be declared by a subsequent Deed in the 9 Co. Downam's Case And a Case was Cited which was in this Court in my Lord Hale's time between Garrett and Wilson where Tenant for Life with Remainders over had a Power of Revocation and by a Deed under his Hand and Seal Covenanted to levy a Fine and declared it should be to certain Vses and afterwards the Fine was Levied accordingly This was held to be a good execution of the Power and limitation of the new Vses and the Deed and Fine taken as one On the other side it was Argued That the Deed was but an Evidence to what Vses the Fine was intended and the Power was absolutely revoked by the Fine Suppose he in Remainder had Entred for the Forfeiture before this Deed should the Defendant have defeated his Right Et Adjornatur Postea Hodson versus Cooke IN an Action upon the Case for commencing of an Action against him in an Inferiour Court where the Cause of Action did arise out of the Jurisdiction After a Verdict for the Plaintiff upon Not Guilty it was moved in Arrest of Judgment That it was not set forth that the Defendant did know that the Place where the Action arose was out of the Jurisdiction which it would be hard to put the Plaintiff to take notice of On the other side it was said that the party ought to have a Recompence for the Inconvenience he is put to by being put to Bail perhaps in a Case where Bail is not required above and such like Disadvantages which are not in a Suit brought here and the Plaintiff ought at his peril to take notice However to help by the Verdict And of that Opinion were Jeffreys Lord Chief Justice Holloway and Walcot but Withens contra The Court said that it could not be assigned for Error in Fact that the Cause arose out of the Jurisdiction because that is contrary to the Allegation of the Record neither is the Officer punishable that executes Process in such Action but an Action lies against the party And so it was said to be resolved in a Case between Cowper and Cowper Pasch 18 Car. 2. in Scac. when my Lord Chief Baron Hale sate there Anonymus AN Indictment of Perjury for Swearing before a Justice of the Peace that J. S. was present at a Conventicle or Meeting for Religious Worship c. It was moved to quash it because it did not appear to be a Conventicle viz. That there was above the number of Five and so the Justice of the Peace had no power to take an Oath concerning it and then it could be no Perjury To which the Lord Chief Justice said That Conventicles were unlawful by the Common Law and the Justices may punish Unlawful Assemblies And he seemed to be of Opinion that a man might be
Indicted of Perjury in a voluntary and Extra judicial Oath and cited a late Case where one had stole away a mans Daughter and went before a Justice of the Peace and Swore that he had the Fathers Consent and this in order to get a Licence to marry her and he was Indicted and Convicted thereupon And all the Court said that it was not the course to quash Indictments of Perjury Nusance or the like but to put the party to plead to them Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. In Banco Regis Duncomb versus Walter IN an Indebitat ' Assumpsit by an Assignee of Commissioners upon the Statute of Bankrupts upon Non assumpsit a Special Verdict was found upon which the Case appeared to be thus One Staly was Arrested by an Executor of his Creditor 6 Sept which was before Probat of the Will and within two or three days after he paid 1000 l to the Defendant to whom he stood Indebted in such Sum and after the 18th of September he yielded himself to Prison upon the said Arrest The Question was Whether the Defendant should be obliged to Refund this Money which was paid unto him as aforesaid First Whether the Arrest before the Probat was a good Arrest It was said If an Executor hath a Reversion in a Term upon which a Rent is reserved and Distrains c. he may avow for the Rent before the Probat Vid. 1 Roll. 917. tit Executors where an Executor brings an Action before Probat yet if he shews the Probat upon the Declaration 't is well enough Secondly Whether when he yields himself to Prison it shall not relate to the first Arrest to make him a Bankrupt from that time This depends upon the Statute of 21 Jac. cap. 19. where it is said that in the Cases of Arrest and lying in Prison he shall be adjudged a Bankrupt from the time of his first Arrest Object This Relation doth not prejudice Strangers Answ Dame Hales's Case Pl. Com. 293. If one giveth another a mortal Wound and then sells his Land and the person dies there shall be such Relation as to make the Land forfeit from the first Stroke Note This Case came by Writ of Error out of the Common Pleas where Judgment was given for Walter and the said Judgment was affirmed in this Court principally upon the point of Relation For the Court said that it would be a great mischief if it should relate to the first Arrest as to the payment of Money to Strangers Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 1 2 Jac. II. In Banco Regis Herring versus Brown Quod vid. ante Michaelmas 35 Car. 2. THe Case upon a Special Verdict was to this effect That J. S. being Seised in Fee had made a Conveyance of his Estate to the use of himself for Life with divers Remainders over to other persons with a power of Revocation by Writing under his Hand and Seal c. Afterwards the said J. S. having a purpose to Revoke the said Uses and make a new Settlement of his Estate he levied a Fine and after the Fine he made a Deed wherein he expressed that he Revoked the former Uses and so proceeded to a new Limitation by that Deed and declared that the Fine by him limited should be to the Vses of the said Deed. The sole Question was Whether the Fine had extinguished his Power and by consequence forfeited his Estate or Whether the Fine and Deed should be taken as one Conveyance and so be a good execution of his Power and new limitation of the Uses And after many solemn Arguments it was Resolved by the Chief Justice Herbert Holloway and Wright that the Fine was an extinguishment of his Power and that the Deed came too late contrary to the Opinion of Justice Withens Vido ante ADDENDA Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 26 Car. II. In Banco Regis Pibus versus Mitford Intratur Trin. 20 Car. 2. Rot. 703. IN an Ejectment the Jury find a Special Verdict to this effect viz. That Michael Mitford was seiz'd of the Lands in question and of divers other Lands in Fee and having Issue Robert by one Venter and Ralph by Jane his second Wife did 23 Jan. 21 Jac. by Indenture Covenant to stand seized of some of the Lands to the use of himself for Life Remainder to Trustees for years for several purposes Remainder to Jane his second Wife for Life Remainder to Ralph and the Heirs Male of his Body And as to the Lands in question he Covenants to stand seiz'd To the use of his Heirs Male begotten or to be begotten on the Body of his second Wife and died And then the Jury made this Special Conclusion If any Use did arise by the Deed to Ralph then they find for the Defendant and if not they find for the Plaintiff This Case was Argued several times at the Bar and now the Judges delivered their Opinions seriatim Wild Justice for the Defendant We are to give our Opinions upon a Deed of Uses made for the Provision of younger Children not otherwise provided for But if the Case were not so It is a safe way when the Words are ambiguous to follow the Intention of the party appearing in the Deed. I shall not maintain that Ralph is a Purchaser and so make this an Executory Use I agree a man cannot either by Conveyance at Common Law by Limitation of Uses or Devise make his right Heir a Purchaser I agree also Griswold's Case in Dyer 156. and if this Case had operated by Transmutation of Possession this Limitation to the Heirs of the Body of the Covenantor had been void and no Use should have risen But here in the Case of a Covenant to stand seiz'd nothing moves out of the Covenantor he retains the Land and directs the Use and keeps sufficient in him to maintain this Use There 's a great difference between a Conveyance at the Common Law and a Conveyance to Uses At the Common Law the Heir cannot take where the Ancestor could not but otherwise it is in case of Uses 2 Rolls 794. and so is Wood's Case 1 Co. 99. a. cited in Shelly's Case This I say to shew that the Intent of the Parties shall be the Guide and that there is a difference between Conveyances at the Common Law and Conveyances to Uses Horwood's Opinion in Hussey's Case 37 H. 8. comes to our Case There 's no great difference between a Covenant to stand seiz'd and a Feoffment to Uses I will not Argue to prove that this Deed shall enure as an Executory Use because 't is against a Rule in Law taken by my Lord Hobart and so Agreed before his time But here Ralph is Tenant in Tail Michael his Father being Tenant for Life Remainder to his Heirs Male begotten on the Body of Jane his second Wife For the Law to preserve this Limitation to the use of his Heirs Male c. will by Implication create an Estate for Life in Michael
because the Intent of the parties appears that it should be so There 's no great difference between the Construction of a Deed of Uses and a Will 13 H. 7. The Wife takes an Estate for Life by Implication where the Land is devised to the eldest Son after her decease Manning and Andrew's Case in 1 Leon. 259. The Reason of these Cases is the fulfilling of the Intention of the Parties and here this Limitation cannot be made good by way of a Future Use nor by any other way but only by creating of an Estate for Life in Michael the Father by Implication and this is according to the nature of a Covenant to stand seiz'd For the Use is not to pass out of the Covenantor till the proper time for the subsequent Estate to commence As to my Lord Paget's Case 't was his Intention to have the Use during his Life And my Lord Coke was certainly very well satisfied with the Resolution in Fenwick and Mitford's Case when he wrote his Institutes for he Argued before to the contrary as appears by the Report of that Case in Moor. Rainsford Justice to the same Intent If no Use rises immediately to Ralph yet if a Use rises by the Deed so that he has the Land any way be it by discent from his Father 't is within the Conclusion of the Verdict By the scope of the Conveyance it appears that it was intended that Robert should never have his Land till Twelve hundred Pound was paid for the provision of younger Children so that if Robert should have it it would be against the Intention of Michael There are two Reasons and Grounds in Law by which we may make this Deed agree with the Intention of the Parties First Because it is in the Case of an Estate Tail ubi voluntas donatoris observari debet Secondly It is in a Conveyance setled by way of Use and in Cases of Uses the Intention of the parties ought to be pursued And this is in Case of a Use that rises by Covenant to stand seiz'd which makes the Case the stronger And I conceive this is not a void Limitation but such an one as gives an Estate to Ralph In speaking to which I shall observe what my Lord Coke in the 1 Inst 23. says viz. That so much of the Use as the Owner of the Land does not dispose of remains in him c. and so in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. 30. And this is the Reason of Bingham's Case 1 Co. 91. Now here when Michael Covenanted to stand seiz'd to the Vse of his Heirs Male on the Body of his second Wife begotten I conceive he shall retain the Land as parcel of his ancient Vse during his Life for non est Haeres viventis according to Archer's Case 1 Co. And that Michael shall retain an Estate for Life is prov'd by my Lord Paget's Case 1 Co. 154. Dyer 310. N. 79. 1 Co. Chudleigh's Case 129. 2 Rolls 788. 21 H. 7. 18. From my Lord Paget's Case upon which I shall rely and the other Cases it appears that were there 's a Limitation to one after the death of another the Covenantor shall retain the Land during the Life of the other and here in our Case this Estate not taking effect till after the Death of Michael he shall retain the Estate and shall be Tenant for Life of the old Vse Now the Question is Whether Ralph shall take by Discent or Purchase And I conceive this Estate for Life with the Remainder in Tail makes but one Estate Tail in Michael and that he becomes Tenant in Tail and so Ralph shall take as Heir in Tail I shall not trouble my self whether Ralph may take here as a Purchaser because in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. it is Resolved that he cannot take as Heir Male of the Body by Purchase because all the words are not verified in him for he is not Heir I shall rely upon the First Point That here is an Estate Tail executed in Michael For when an Estate for Life is in the Auncestor by way of Retainer and an Estate is afterwards limited to his Heirs this is within the Rule put in Shelley's Case in 1 Co. where the Auncestor takes an Estate of Freehold and by the same Conveyance an Estate is limited to his Heirs Mediately or Immediately they are Words of Limitation and not of Purchase because the Heir is part of his Father Our Case is stronger that Fenwick and Mitfords Case It s true the same Reason for that Case is not given by Anderson and More which is given by my Lord Coke More 437. There the Reason is because the Limitation to the right Heirs is merely void here Michael hath an Estate in Tail of the ancient Use therefore 't is not necessary for the Law to create an Estate for Life Obj. That this cannot be an Estate Tail executed in Michael because the Estate for Life is not by the same Limitation but by Construction of Law But my Lord Coke says in Fenwick and Mitfords Case 1 Inst 22. b. that there is no difference where the Estate is created by Law and where by the Deed. 1 Anderson 259. and the Law retaining an Estate in Michael for Life our Case is the same as if the Estate had been limited to him with the Remainder to his Heirs Male begotten on his second Wife which would be an Estate Tail executed in Michael and would have discended to Ralph Twisden Justice for the Plaintiff I hold there 's no Use raised to Ralph by this Deed. We are here in the construction of a Deed and not of a Will It may be an Estate should be raised in such a case by a Will altho' my Lord Hobart is of a contrary Opinion I agree the Case of Hodgkinson and Wood Cro. Car. 23. but it cannot be argued from thence that it shall be so in a Deed for a Devise is not to take effect till after the Death of the Devisor and then 't is apparent that he is Heir Male of his Body It hath been agreed that Heirs Male of the Body are words of purchase It is plain that Ralph cannot take as Special Heir unless by Purchase and that he cannot do because he who shall take by virtue of such a Limitation ought to be Heir as well as Issue Male and Ralph here cannot take by vertue of the Statute de Donis Conditionalibis because none can take as Special Heir but where his Ancestor took before and therefore this Limitation is utterly void To make this Limitation good divers ways have been urged First That this Deed has an operation by way of returning of the Use and it has been compared to my Lord Pagets Case which differs from it here cannot be any part of the old Use in Michael for if he hath an Estate for Life it ought to be a new Use It cannot be a returning Use for the Limitation to the Heirs Male of the Body
of Jane the second Wife is void and it cannot be returning where the Use is not setled in any Person I agree my Lord Pagets Case because there the Estate was vested in William Paget and the other Use returned by operation of Law and the Estate setled could not be divested but here the Limitation to the Heirs Males being void the ancient Use remained yet in Michael for nothing was out of him he having limited a thing which cannot be And as to a returning Use tho' all be done in an instant yet there is a priority of time in the Eye of the Law for it ought to vest first in him in Remainder and then Return but here nothing vests in the Remainder Secondly It hath béen urged That it shall be made good by Implication of Law and so shall amount to a Covenant to stand seized to the Used of the Covenantor for Life c. and the rather as it has béen said by Wild because Uses are guided by Equity But I answer we are here in case of a Deed where an Estate shall not be raised by Implication as it shall by a Will Cro. Car. Seagood ad Hone 366. A Deed differs greatly from a Will for if a Man Surrenders Copyhold Land to two equally to be divided they are Joynt-tenants but such a Devise would have made them Tenants in Common Admit in some Case an Estate shall be raised by Implication in a Deed yet it shall not be so here for it would be to the disinheriting the Heir As to the case of 13 H. 7. I agree that a Devise to the Eldest Son after the Death of the Wife gives an Estate for Life to the Wife but otherwise it would be upon such a Devise to the Younger Son for there the Eldest Son and not the Wife should have the Estate in the mean time Cro. Jac. Horton and Horton 57. We are not herein Favorabili materiâ and therefore no construction shall be made which does not appear by the words It hath béen strongly urged that this being by way of Use which is a matter of Equity shall be favoured Admit it yet it shall be guided by the Common Law for aequitas sequitur legem There never shall be a Settlement by way of Use to make one capable who is not capable by the Common Law I do not see any difference between a Feoffment to Uses and a Covenant to stand seized for if a Feoffment be made to the use of one for Life the Use shall return which is not disposed of as well as upon a Covenant to stand seized Thirdly It has been urged if these severally cannot support this Limitation yet the intention operating with the Deed will both together make an Estate for Life in Michael But I do not see his intent here to have it for Life the intention even in a Will which is much stronger ought to be collected out of the words of the Will. Cro. Car. Spirt and Bence 368. agreed by the whole Court that words in a Will ought to have an apparent intent to disinherit an Heir and here there is not any apparent intent but rather to the contrary for of some Lands Michael Covenants to stand seised to the Use of himself for Life Remainder c. but of the Lands in question he makes a difference in the Limitation And the words of the Deed are to be considered He Covenants to stand seized to the Uses mentioned declared and limited in the Deed and if Michael shall have an Estate for Life he must have it by operation of Law There was a like case between Flavil and Ventroise in the Common Pleas in which the Court was divided but the same Point came afterwards in question in the Case of Mr. Tape of Norfolk and it was adjudged to be the ancient Use And no Case can be shewn that the Law will create an Estate in the Covenantor where the Use is not vested in any Person but the ancient Use remains in him As to the Cases cited on the other side I have answered my Lord Pagets's Case already And as to my Lord Cokes Case 1 Inst 22. b. I agree the Use returns and the Son is in by discent and so it was adjudged in Fenwick and Mitfords Case there cited But the Paraphrase he makes there I do not understand It is said there when the Limitation is made to his right Heirs and right Heirs he cannot have during his Life the Law doth create an Use in him during his Life Wherefore is this said to make the Heir in by discent No doubt without this he is in by discent and so was the Iudgment in that Case for what Reason then should there be an Estate for Life raised by the Law to be merg'd by the Fee as soon as raised And there 't is said Till the future use come in Esse I do not conceive then where it is so long as the Father lives and what he means by the Future Use I do not know for it always was in Esse and never was out of the Feoffor and this was so adjudg'd in that Case of Fenwick and Mitford and not the construction of my Lord Coke And t is strange that no other Reports should mention his construction Hale Chief Justice for the Defendant If Ralph takes either by Discent from Michael or by Purchase the one way or the other answers the Verdict and the Issue is for the Defendant I shall divide the Case into two Points 1. If he takes by Discent 2. Admitting he does not If he may take by Purchase as this Case is I shall Premise two or three things First It has been agreed if an Estate for Life be raised to Michael the Remainder being to his Heirs Male of the Body of Jane his second Wife the Estate Tail is executed in him be the Estate for Life raised by Implication or express Limitation Secondly It is plain quacunque via It be rais'd that the Estate was long'd in Michael till Ralph the Son be in a capacity to take it either by Discent or Purchase for be it part of the ancient Use or a new Use it ought to be in Michael during his Life for there is nothing to bring it out of him Thirdly In all Cases touching Uses there is a great difference between a Feoffment to Uses a Covenant to stand seized and a conveyance at the Common Law If a Man by Feoffment to uses conveys Land to the use of J.S. for Life he may remit the Use to himself and the Heirs Male of his Body by the same Deed and so alter that wich was before a Fee simple and turn it into another Estate but if A. gives Land to B. for Life Remainder to A. and the Heirs Male of his Body because a Man cannot give to himself the Remainder is void for a Man cannot convey to himself by a Conveyance at the Common Law These things being premised I conceive here is an
of the Crown so 11. and so it was held in the Case of the Earl of Essex in Queen Elizabeths Time and in the Lord Cobham's Case in the Reign of King James the First And the Chief Justice cited the Statute made 29 H. 6. cap. 1. upon the Rebellion of Jack Cade which Act sets forth that John Cade naming himself John Mortimer falsly and traiterously imagined the Death of the King and the destruction and subversion of this Realm in gathering together and levying of a great Number of the King's People and exciting them to Rise against the King c. against the Royal Crown and Dignity of the King was an Overt act of imagining the Death of the King and made and levied War falsly and trayterously against the King and his Highness c. So that it appears by that Act that it was the Iudgment of the Parliament That gathering Men together and exciting them to Rise against the King was an Overt Act of Imagining the Death of the King Vide Stamford's Pleas of the Crown fo 180. And according to this Opinion Judgment was given against Harding in the following Sessions and he was Executed thereupon NOta At an Adjourned Sessions held the 19th of May 2 Willielmi Mariae it appeared that one of the Kings Witnesses which was to be produced in an Indictment for Treason had been the day before Challenged to Fight by a Gentleman that it was said was a Member of the House of Commons he was by the Court bound in a Recognizance of 500 l to keep the Peace And because it appeared the Witness had accepted the Challenge he was bound in the like Sum. NOta Vpon an Appeal to the House of Lords Anno 2 Willielmi Mariae the sole Question was Whether upon the Statute of Distributions 22 23 Car. 2. the half Blood should have an equal share with the whole Blood of the Personal Estate And by the Advice of the two Chief Justices and some other of the Judges the Decree of the Lords was That the Half Blood should have an Equal share Samon versus Jones IN an Ejectment brought in the Court of Exchequer in the year of the Reign of the late King James the Second The Case upon a Special Verdict was to this effect William Lewis seised of a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate for Life did by Deed Poll in Consideration of Natural love and affection which he had to his Wife and Robert Lewis his Son and Heir apparent begotten on the Body of his said Wife and to Ellen his Daughter give grant and confirm unto the said Robert Lewis the Son all those Lands c. the Reversion and Reversions Remainder and Remainders thereof To have and to hold to his Son and his Heirs to the Vses following viz. to the use of himself for Life and then mentioned several other Vses not necessary to be here mentioned as not material to the Point in question and then to the use of the Wife for Life and after to the use of Robert and the Heirs of his Body and for want of such Issue to the use of Ellen the Daughter and the Heirs of her Body c. William Lewis and his Wife died Robert the Son devised the Estate to the Lessor of the Plaintiff and died without Issue Ellen was in possession and claimed the Lands by this Deed in which thâ—re was a Warranty but no Execution of the said Deed further than the Sealing and Delivery was had either by Enrolment Attornment or otherwise So that the sole Question was Whether this Deed should operate as a Covenant to stand seised or be void And it was Adjudged to amount to a Covenant to stand seised in the Court of the Exchequer And upon a Writ of Error brought upon the Statute of Ed. 3. before the Commissioners of the Great Seal and others empowered by that Act to sit upon Writs of Error of Judgments given in the Court of Exchequer the said Judgment was Reversed by the Opinion of Holt Chief Justice of the Kings Bench and Pollexfen Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas And upon a Writ of Error before the Lords in Parliament brought upon the said last Judgment it was Argued for the Plaintiff in the VVrit of Error That this should enure as a Covenant to stand seised to the use of the Wife Son c. It appears by Bedell's Case in the 7 Co. and Foxe's Case in the 8 Co. that the words proper to a Conveyance are not necessary but ut res magis valeat a Conveyance may work as a Bargain and Sale tho' the words be not used so as a Covenant to stand seised tho' the word Covenant is not in the Deed and and Poplewell's Case were cited in 2 Roll. Abr. 786 787. A Feme in Consideration of a Marriage intended to be had between her and J. S. did give grant and confirm Lands to J.S. and his Heirs with a Clause of VVarranty in the Deed which was also Enrolled but no Livery was made It was Resolved to operate as a Covenant to stand seised Vide Osborn and Churchman's Case in the 2 Cro. 127. which seems contrary to that Case but the chiefest Case relied upon was that of Crossing and Scudamore Mod. Rep. 175. where a man by Indenture bargained sold enfeoffed and confirmed certain Lands to his Daughter and her Heirs and no Consideration of Natural Love or Money exprest This was Resolved 22 Car. 2. in B.R. to operate as a Covenant to stand seised and upon a Writ of Error in the Exchequer Chamber the Judgment was affirmed It was said on the other side for the Defendant That the Case at Bar differed from the Cases cited for here the Intention of the Deed is to transfer the Estate to the Son and that the Vses should arise out of such Estate so transferred In the Cases cited no Vses are limited upon the Estate purported or intended to be Conveyed but only an Intention appearing to convey an Estate to the Daughter in Crossing's Case and to the intended Husband in Poplewell's Case and seeing for want of due Execution in those Cases the Estate could not pass at Law it shall pass by raising of an Vse But the Case at Bar is much the same with the Case of Hore and Dix in Siderfin the 1st Part. 25. where one by Indenture between him and his Son of the one part and two Strangers of the other part in Consideration of Natural love did give grant and enfeoff the two Strangers to the use of himself for Life Remainder to the Son in Tail c. and no other Execution was three than the Sealing and Delivery of the Deed this was Resolved not to raise an Vse for the Vse was limited to rise out of the Seisin of the Strangers who took no Estate Vide Pitfield and Pierce's Case 15 Car. 1. Marche's Rep. 50. One gave granted and confirmed Lands to his Son after his Death this Deed had been
his Assent to the Marriage of his Daughter with J.S. and that he would give her 1500 l And afterwards by another Letter upon a further Treaty concerning the Marriage he went back from the Proposals of his Letter And at some time after declared That he would agrèe to what was propounded in his first Letter This Letter was held a sufficient Promise in Writing within the Statute of 29 Car. 2. called the Statute against Frauds and Perjuries and that the last Declaration had set the Terms in the first Letter up again Anonymus WHere a man buys Land in anothers name and pays Mony it will be in Trust for him that pays the Mony tho' no Deed declaring the Trust for the Statute of 29 Car. 2. called the Statute of Frauds doth not extend to Trusts raised by Operation of the Law Anonymus AN Administrator de bonis non of the Conusee of a Statute had agreed with the Conusor to assign it in Consideration of a Sum of Mony which upon the said Agreement the Conusors had Covenanted to pay to him his Executors or Administrators and then the Administrator died The Court Decreed the Mony to be paid to the Executor of the Administrator and not to the New Administrator de bonis non altho' before the Extent it could not be assigned at Law Sed nota That there were not Debts of the first Intestate appearing Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 35 36 Car. II. In Cancellaria NOte Suits in Chancery admitted for Distribution of Intestates Estates upon the Act of 22 Car. 2. Sir Thomas Draper Mil ' versus Dr. Crowther THe Bill sets forth a Contract under Seal with the Defendant for making of a Lease of certain Lands in Middlesex and to have an Execution of the Agreement The Defendant pleaded That he has Head of a Colledge in Oxford and sets forth the Charters of 14 R. 2. and 14 H. 8. Impowering the University to enquire and proceed in all Pleas and Quarrels in Law and Equity except concerning Freehold where a Scholar their Servants and Ministers sunt una partium c. ita quod Justiciarij de Banco Regis sive de Communi Banco vel Justiciarij ad Assisas non se intromittant c. And the Confirmation by an Act of Parliament of the 13th of Elizabeth and Concluded his Plea to the Iurisdiction of the Court. And it came to be Argued before the Lord Keeper Guildford 22 Febr. 1683. and the Plea was Over-ruled because the Charter ought properly to be extended to Matters at Common Law only or to Proceedings in Equity that might arise in such Cases and not to meer Matters of Equity which are Originally such as to Execute Agreements in specie Again Conuzance of Pleas is never to be allowed unless the Inferior Jurisdiction can give Remedy Here they can only Excommunicate or Imprison but cannot proceed to Sequestration of Lands in Middlesex If the Matter lay only in Damages it might be allowed to them because the Jurisdiction is given over all England but this is not to be intended where the Suit is for the thing it self and when 't is out of their reach A President was cited in the year 1663. before my Lord Clarendon Chancellor assisted with Hale then Chief Baron and Justice Wyndam where the Plea was Over-ruled Vide in the 3 Cro. 63. Wilcocks and Bradell's Case and Hallie's Case 87. Sir Robert Reeve's Case SIr George Reeve upon his Marriage with his Second Wife setled a Ioynture of divers of his Lands in Suffolk which he had before charged with his Daughters Portion viz. 3000 l which Daughter he had by a former Wife and by his last Will he mentioned that the said Joynture Lands were so incumbred and therefore he Devised certain Lands he had in Bickerton in Yorkshire to his Wife in lieu of such part of the Suffolk Lands as were charged with the Portion in case she would accept thereof But after his Decease it appeared that the Lands in Bickerton were not equivalent in Value to the Suffolk Lands and therefore she held to the latter and was not prejudiced by the Charge of the Portion because it appeared to be a Voluntary Settlement Nota In this Case the Lord Keeper Decreed that the Portion should be charged upon the Bickerton Lands for so much as it was defeated by the Settlement in Ioynture of the Suffolk Lands Anonymus ONe Devised his Lands to J.S. in Fee in Trust for Katharine and the Heirs of her Body and if Katharine died without Issue to Jane for life And in another Clause in the Will he devised That if Katharine died without Issue and Jane be then deceased then and not otherwise he gave the Land to J. N. and his Heirs Katharine died without Issue and Jane survived her and died A Bill was brought by J. N. against J. S. and the Heir at Law of the Testator to have this Trust executed My Lord Keeper Decreed it for J. N. altho' Jane survived Katharine because the words if Jane be then deceased seemed to be put in to express his meaning that Jane should be sure to have it for her life and that J. N. should not have it till she were dead and also to shew when J.N. should have it in possession Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. In Cancellaria Wiliam Ragget and his Wife versus William Clarke THe Case was thus Nicholas Wheeler was seised of a parcel of Land for his own life and the lives of two others and prevailed with the Defendant to be bound with him for a Sum of Mony And that the Defendant might raise Mony for the discharge of the said Debt he permitted the Defendant to enter into the said Lands and to take the Profits for two years the said Lands being about 12 l yearly value and the said Land being so in the possession of the Defendant the said Wheeler died and made Isabel Wife of the now Plaintiff his Executrix And this Bill was brought by the said Husband and Wife to have an account of the Profits and that the possession of the Land should be delivered up to them The Defendant by Plea sets forth his Title as Occupant and it was allowed And the Bill was dismissed Bonham versus Newcomb ONe being seised in Fee in Consideration of 1000 l paid to him by a Person that married his Kinswoman Conveys to him and his Heirs and takes a Re-demise for 99 years if he should live so long And a Covenant therein That if he should pay 1000 l with the Interest that should be due for the same at any time during his life that the Grantee should Re-convey to him and his Heirs and that if he did not pay the Mony then that his Heirs c. should have no power to Redeem He died the Mony not being paid and his Heir preferred a Bill to Redeem it And it was urged for him That in a Conveyance which was a Security for Mony whatever
the Defendant shew Cause why he should not accept of a Declaration upon payment of Costs Termino Paschae Anno 22 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IF there be several Contracts between A. and B. at several times for several sums Prohibition each sum under 40 s and they do all amount to a sum sufficient to Entitle the Superiour Court they shall be there put in Suit and not in a Court which is not of Record And so it was resolved in the Case of the Savoy Court and Stanford 24. C. 2. Also it was said That if a Man at divers times Steals things all which amount to above 12d 't is Felony Capital In an Account after a Quod computet the Court Assigns Auditors and they sit upon and return the Account when they will for day is not given them and they give the Parties in the interim what time they please but if the Defendant delays they return it to the Court and Process goes out against him Nota Memorandum On Tuesday April the 26th Steven Mosdel to whom Mr. Lenthal had granted the Office of Marshal of the Kings-Bench for life was sworn Marshal The Oath was this Viz. You shall swear that during the time of your being Marshal you shall well and truly use exercise and behave your self in the said Office you shall encrease no Fees and in all things shall do your Duty in the said Office c. It was resolved That the said Stephen Mosdel could not afterwards practise as an Attorney of this Court and that Mr. Lenthall Marshall in Reversion had no Priviledge Anonymus A Promise was made to give 1000 l to one for curing of his Eyes and an Assumpsit is brought Vpon this the Jury may give less than 1000 l Damages if they think fit Sir W. Mewes versus Mewes A Title of Land was tryed out of the proper County upon a feigned Wager Whether well conveyed or no this is the Course of Issues directed out of Chancery Note In this Case a Bill in Chancery was given in Evidence against the Complainant though held to be but of slight moment Smiths Case SMith and other Commissioners of Sewers which sate at White-Chappel were brought in upon an Attachment awarded against them for a Contempt of this Court. And the Case was thus A Certiorari was lately sent and delivered to them out of this Court upon Special direction and recommendation by the King and Council before whom the Business had been agitated to remove hither Certain Orders and Proceedings of theirs in order to a Tryal of the Right of the Matter in Question At first they did not allow the Certiorari but afterwards having allowed it they proceeded de novo upon the same Matter and made an Order again which certain persons being the same persons who procured the Certiorari refusing to obey the Commissioners fined them 10 l apiece Then a second Certiorari was taken out and delivered to them after which they imprisoned persons for not executing and obeying of a Warrant made upon their second Order and for speaking Contemptuous words of the Commissioners and fined them 5 l apiece Being now questioned by the Court concerning these Contempts and Misdemeanours They said they did this wholly by the advice of their Counsel Mr. Ofley who being in Court received a severe Reprimand therefore and the Commissioners were committed to Prison About the Fortnight afterwards having made and Filed their Return they were brought into Court to receive the Sentence of the Court. And then it was said by them and Coleman their Counsel that they would not urge any thing in justification of their not returning their Proceedings they only offered that what they did was by the advice of their Counsel and that the Clause in 13 Eliz. cap. 9. was so penned as to give a great occasion of doubt in this particular which Clause upon their desire was read And is this And be it further Enacted c. That from henceforth the said Commissioners of Sewers nor any of them shall not be compelled or compellable to make any Certificate or Return of the said Commissioners or any of them or of any of the Ordinances Laws or doings by the Authority of any of the said Commissions nor shall not have any Fine Pain or Amerciament set upon them or any of them or any ways to be molested in Body Lands or Goods for that Cause and after the reading thereof the Court delivered themselves seriatim as followeth Moreton This is a great Offence and Contempt The Commissioners of Sewers and their Proceedings are subject to the Jurisdiction of this Court Sir Henry Mildmayes Case 2 Cro. 336. and Sir H. Hungates in our Memory If Commissioners of Sewers or any other inferiour Jurisdiction excéed their Commission we may reform and restrain them and it nay we prohibit them in Cases where They have no Jurisdiction of the matter Many presidents are with us in the present Case And we cannot answer our Duty to the King without taking notice of and punishing this Offence Therefore my Opinion is That for their not obeying of the first Writ they be fined 40 Marks apiece and for their not obeying of the second Writ 20 Marks apiece Rainsford This is indisputably an Offence and Contempt and the greater for that it was seconded It is aggravated too in that the Commissioners proceeded after they had allowed the Certiorari and that they fell upon and shewed their Indignation against those persons who only pursued the Kings Authority and that this was in a Case which was recommended by the King and Council to which Recommendation the Commissioners were Privy they had contrary advice from other Counsel then there but they would hearken to that advice which pleased them best Obedience is that Ligament of the Government without which all will be turned into Anarchy and Confusion Without betraying the Trust reposed in us by the King and violating of our Oaths we cannot omit to punish this therefore I agree the Fines The Reason of the Fines is the disobeying of the Writs the Reason of their disproportion is to resemble the Measures the Commissioners observed towards those persons whom they unduly fined Twisden It was resolved in 23 Car. That this Statute hath no reference to this Court and that this Clause extends only to Certificates and Returns into Chancery the Statute speaks of Supersedeas c. which issue out of the Court of Chancery only for this Court does not nor ever did send out Supersedeas's but this Court sends out Certiorari's which are to bring the business before the King here and the words of them are quia coram nobis terminari volumus non alibi What should move that Gentleman to give such advice as he did I cannot imagin I suppose there is more in the matter than we know and 't is a strange thing that these Commissioners should ask Counsel whether they should obey the Kings Writ or no Especially when it
c. be indicted for not repairing of a Way within their Precinct they cannot plead Not guilty and give in Evidence that another by Prescription or Tenure ought to repair it for they are chargeable de communi Jure and if they would discharge themselves by laying it elsewhere it must be pleaded Error ERror to Reverse a Judgment in Debt upon a Bond given in Norwich Court where by the Custom the plea of the Defendant was quod non dedicit factum sed petit quod inquiratur de debito First It was moved to be Error for that the Venire was XII Men c. in figures Sed non allocatur for being in these letters XII and not in the figures 12. it was well enough Secondly It was ad triandum exi tum whereas there was no Issue joyned wherefore it ought to have been ad inquirend ' de debito c. Sed non allocatur for the Presidents are as the Case is here Thirdly The Condition of the Bond was to pay at Alborough and that ought to have been shewn to be within the Jurisdiction of the Court Sed non allocatur for the Plea here is not payment secund ' formam Conditionis but the Jury is to inquire by the custom of all manner of payments and discharges Fourthly In the Record it was continued over to several Courts and in the Court where the Judgment is given 't is said in Curia praedicta and so incertain which but notwithstanding these matters the Iudgment was affirmed Anonymus THe Case upon Evidence at a Tryal in Ejectment was this a Dean and Chapter having a right to certain Land but being out of Possession Sealed a Lease with a Letter of Attorney to deliver it upon the Land which was done accordingly and held to be a good Lease for tho' the putting the Seal of a Corporation aggregate to a Deed carries with it a delivery yet the Letter of Attorney to deliver it upon the Land shall suspend the operation of it while then Tenant for Life being in Debt to defraud his Creditors commits a Forfeiture to the end that he in Reversion may enter who is made privy to the contrivance The Opinion of Hale was that the Creditors should avoid this as well as any fraudulent Conveyance Anonymus IN an Ejectment upon a Tryal at Bar for Lands in antient Demesne there was shewn a Recovery in the Court of antient Demesne to cut off an Entail which had been suffered a long time since and the Possession had gone accordingly But there was now objected against it First That no sufficient Evidence of it appeared because the Recovery it self nor a Copy of it was shewn for in truth it was lost But the Court did admit other proof of it to be sufficient and said if a Record be lost it may be proved to a Jury by Testimony as the Decree in H. 8. time for Tythe in London is lost yet it hath been often allowed that there was one Secondly It appeared that a part of the Land was leased for Life and the Recovery with a single Voucher was suffered by him in Reversion and so no Tenant to the Praecipe for those Lands But in regard the Possession had followed it for so long time the Court said they would presume a Surrender as in an Appropriation of great Antiquity there has been presumed a Licence tho' none appeared Thirdly It was objected That the Tenant in Tail which suffered the Recovery having first accepted of a Fine sur Conusans de droit come ceo his Estate Tail was changed for he was estopped during his Life to say that he had any other Estate than Fee then he being made Tenant to the Praecipe the Recovery was not of the Estate Tail and so should not bind But the Court held clearly that the acceptance of this Fine made no alteration of his Estate If Tenant for Life accepts such a Fine 't is a Forfeiture because he admits the Reversion to be in a Stranger but it does not change his Estate so where two Joynt-tenants in Fee accept a Fine which is to the Heirs of one of them yet they continue Joynt-tenants in Fee as they were before Fourthly The Writ of Right Close did express the Land to lie in such a Mannor and a Praecipe that demands Land ought to mention the Vill in which they lie for a Praecipe of Land in Parochia or in Manerio is not good But this exception was disallowed by the Court for Hale said the Writ of Right Close is directed Ballivis Manerij c. quod plenum rectum teneant of the Land within the Precinct of the Mannor and it is not to be resembled to another Praecipe But if a Praecipe be faulty in that Point unless exception be taken to it in Abatement it cannot be assigned for Error but if it were Erroneous the Recovery would bind until reversed Note After Judgment quod computet tho' it be not the final Judgment yet no motion is to be admitted in Arrest of Judgment and after such Judgment a Scire facias lies against the Executor of the Defendant Note In an Action of Debt against the Lessee he may plead nil debet and give the expulsion in Evidence Anonymus IN an Assumpsit the consideration appeared to be that the Defendant promised to pay a Sum of Money which he owed this is no good consideration tho' after a Verdict unless it appeared that the Debt was become remediless by the Statute of Limitations but payment of a Debt without Suit is a good consideration Anonymus A Justice of the Peace brought an Action of Slander for that the Defendant said He was not worth a Groat and that he was gone to the Dogs and upon motion in Arrest of Judgment notwithstanding that it was urged to maintain it that the Statute of H. 6. requires that a Justice of Peace should have 40 l a year And therefore in regard an Estate was necessary to his Office that the Action would lie yet the Judgment was stayed for such words will not bear an Action unless the person of whom they are spoken lives by buying and selling Anonymus IT was returned upon Elegit that the Sheriff had delivered medietatem Terrar ' Tenementorum in extent and after the Filing and Entry of it upon the Record the Plaintiff moved to quash it because it was insufficient for the Sheriff ought upon such Execution to deliver the Possession by Metes and Bounds Wild held that it being entred upon the Record there was no avoiding of it but by Writ of Error But Hale held that in regard it appeared by the Record to be void it might be quashed as if upon an Ejectment to recover Possession upon such a return it appears upon the Evidence that there was more than the half the Land delivered this shall be avoided So if a Fieri facias be not warranted by the Judgment upon which it is awarded tho' the Sheriff shall be
Ejectment the Case upon a Special Verdict was to this effect Sir John Danvers being seized of the Lands c. in Tail with the Fee expectant Anno 1646 and in 1647 levied a Fine to the same uses as he was before seized save that a power was reserved to make Leases for any number of years and without reserving any Rent Sir John Danvers did after become Guilty of Treason in Murdring of King Charles the first in 1648 and died in 1655. In 13 Car. 2. cap. 15. the Statute commonly called the Statute of Pains and Penalties Enacts That sundry of the Offenders in that execrable Treason of which Sir J. D. was one should amongst other Penalties there inflicted forfeit all their Lands Tenements and Hereditaments Leases for years Chattels real and interest of what nature or quality soever See the Act of 14 of this King The Lands were by Patent granted to the Duke of York who let them to the Defendant And John Danvers Heir of Sir John Danvers entred and made the Lease to the Plaintiff It had been several times argued at the Bar and this Term Iudgment was given by the Court for the Defendant And Rainsford Chief Justice delivered the Opinion of the Court and the Reasons for himself Twisden Wild and Jones as followeth The question being Whether an Estate Tail were forfeited by the words of the Act of 13 Car. 2. It was observed that all Estates were Fee simple at the Common Law and forfeitable W. the 2. de donis was the first Statute that protected Estates Tail from Alienations and from all Forfeitures of all kinds and so continued until the 12 E. 4. Taltarums Case from which time common Recoveries have been held not to be restrained by the Statute de donis and by the way it must be considered that Perpetuities were never favoured Then came the Statute of 4. H. 7. of Fines which with the explanation of the 32 H. 8. have been always resolved to bar the Issues in Tail so as to Alienations Estates Tail were set free but were not forfeitable no not for Treason until the 26 H. 8. by which they became subjected to Forfeitures in case of Treason and so by 5 E. 6. But 't is true these Statutes extend only to Attainders and 33 H. 8. Vests the Lands c. in the Kings possession without Office Thus having considered the History and Progress of Estates Tail the reasons why such an Estate should be construed to be forfeited upon this Act of 13 Car. 2. are these First The Crime mentioned is of the same nature and with the same aggravations as in 12 Car. 2. by which the Offenders are attainted of Treason c. for they are called Perpetrators of that execrable Treason with many Expressions to the like effect which was looked upon as an offence of that hainous nature that the same Parliament Enacted An Anniversary Humiliation throughout the whole Kingdom to be perpetually observed upon the account of it as if not only they that acted it but the whole Kingdom and their Posterity like to another Original sin were involved in the Guilt of it Nati natorum qui nascuntur ab illis And therefore the Punishment shall not be mitigated in any other manner than is expresly provided by that Act. Secondly It is proved by the generally and comprehensions of the words which are made use of viz. Possessions Rights Hereditaments of what nature soever Interests which does as well signifie the Estate in the ting as that wherein the Estate is which can have no effect if not extended to Estates Tail We must observe also that at the making of this Act entailed Lands were not protected from Forfeitures and tho' 26 H. 8. extends only to Cases where the Offender is attainted yet 't is of good direction to the Judges in Cases of like nature and 't is plain that by this Act of 13 Car. 2. the Offenders were looked upon in pari gradu with these attainted for when the Proviso comes to save the Estates of Strangers c. in trust for whom the Offenders were seized It is said notwithstanding any of the Convictions or Attainders aforesaid Thirdly It is to be observed that the Act takes notice that divers of the Offenders included in this Act were dead now in regard most Lands are known to be entailed if the Act had not intended such Estates to be forfeited it would signifie nothing indeed if the Offenders had been alive it might have been somewhat satisfied with the Forfeiture during their Lives But as the case was it should be of no effect at all after making a great noise of Forfeitures and Confiscations the Act would have been but a Gun charged only with Powder or as in the Fable Parturiunt Montes c. Fourthly It is manifest that the Parliament did not intend that the Children or Heirs of the Persons within the Penalties of the Act should have any benefit of their Estates for in the saving which is made for Purchasers upon valuable Considerations the Wives Children and Heirs of the Offenders are excepted then surely if they would bar them of the benefit of their Purchases à fortiori from inheriting to an Estate Tail especially of a voluntary Entail that seems to be made with a prospect of this Treason which was perpetrated a year after and such an Entail as scarce the like was ever seen before that a power should be reserved to make Leases for any number of years and without Reservation of any Rent By which it is manifest that Sir John Danvers that committed the Treason was fully Master of the Estate Again all Conveyances are avoided by the Act unless such as were upon valuable Consideration which this Fine was not The great case which has been insisted upon by way of objection is Trudgeons Case Co. Litt. 130. Estates Tail were not forfeited upon the Statute of Praemunire but during the Offenders Life For answer to that it must be observed that that Forfeiture is upon the Statute of 16 R. 2. at which times Estates Tail were under thè protection of the Statute de donis but since that time the Judges have not been so strict in expounding Statutes concerning Estates Tail as appears by Adams and Lamberts Case 4 Co. That an Estate Tail given for a superstitious use was within the Statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 4. where the words are generally and not so large as in our case nor so much to demonstrate the intent as is in our Act to extend to Estates Tail wherefore Iudgment was given for the Defendant Note They that argued for the Defendant endeavoured to maintain that if it should be admitted that Entails were not forfeited by the Act yet the Estate of Sir John Danvers in those Lands would be forfeited in regard he levied a Fine in 1647 and the Act of 13 Car. 2. extends to all Lands c. whereof the Persons therein mentioned were seized c. since 1646 and he being
makes a Lease for the Life of the Lessee not warranted by the Statute and dies leaving B. in Remainder his Heir B. let ts for 99 years to commence after the death of the Tenant for Life reserving Rent and then the Tenant for Life surrenders to B. upon Condition and dies B. suffers a Recovery with single Voucher and dies the Lessee for years enters the Heir of B. distrains for the Rent and the Lessee brings a Replevin and upon an Avowry and Pleadings thereupon this Case was disclosed to the Court of Common Bench and Judgment given there for the Avowant and Error thereupon brought in this Court For the Plaintiff in the Error it was Argued That the Lease being derived out of a Reversion in Fee which was Created in A. upon the Discontinuance for Life and the New Fee vanishing by the Surrender of the Tenant for Life for it was urged he was in his Remitter altho' the taking of the Surrender was his own Act that the Lease for years by consequence was become void Again It was Objected against the Common Recovery that the Tenant in Tail and a Stranger which had nothing in the Estate were made Tenants to the Praecipe and therefore no good Recovery Again In case B. were not remitted after acceptance of the Surrender then he was Seised by force of the Tail and so no good Recovery being with single Voucher On the other side it was Argued to be no Remitter because the acceptance of the Surrender was his own Act and the Entry was taken away But admitting it were a Remitter because by the Surrender the Estate for Life which was the Discontinuance was gone and it was no more than a Discontinuance for Life For if Tenant in Tail letts for Life and after grants the Reversion in Fee if the Lessee for Life dies after the Death of the Tenant in Tail so that the Estate was not executed in the Grantee during the Life of the Tenant in Tail the Heir shall immediately Enter upon the Grantee of the Reversion Co. Litt. It seems also to be stronger against the Remitter in this case because 't is not Absolute but only Conditional However the Lease may be good by Estoppel for it appears to have been by Indenture and if the Lessor cannot avoid the Lease the Lessee shall without question be subject to the Rent But it was Objected against the Estoppel that here an Interest passes and the Lease was good for a time As if the Lessee for Ten years makes a Lease for Twenty years and afterwards purchaseth the Reversion it shall bind him for no more than Ten. To which Pemberton Chief Justice said The difference is where the party that makes the Estate has a legal Estate and where a Defeasible Estate only for in the latter a Lease may work by Estoppel tho' an Interest passed so long as the Estate out of which the Lease was derived remained undefeated As to the Recovery it was held clearly good altho' a Stranger that had nothing in the Land was made Tenant to the Praecipe with the Tenant in Tail for the Recompence in Value shall go to him that lost the Estate and being a Common Assurance 't is to be favourably Expounded Et Adjornatur Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 33 34 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IN Error upon a Judgment in Ejectione Firmae in the Common Pleas where the Case was That the Bishop of London was seized injure Episcopatus of a Mannor of which the Lands in question were held and time out of mind were demised and demisable by Copy of Court Roll for Life in Possession and Reversion and J.S. being Copyholder for Life in Reversion after an Estate for Life in Ann Pitt and J.N. being seized of the Mannor by Disseisin J.S. at a Court holden for the Mannor in the name of J. N. surrendred into the Hands of the said J.N. the Disseisor Lord to the used of the said Lord. Afterwards the Bishop of London entred and avoided the Disseisin Ann Pitt died and an Ejectment was brought by J. S. And it was adjudged in the Common Bench that he had a good Title and now upon a Writ of Error in this Court the Matter in Law was insisted upon by Pollexfen for the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error That this Surrender to the Disseisor Lord to the Lords own use was good for all the Books agree a Copyholder may Surrender to a Disseisor of the Mannor to the use of a Stranger and why not to the Lords own use As if Lessee for years be ousted and he in Reversion disseised and the Lessee Releases to the Disseisor this extinguishes his Term. Here is a compleat Disseisin of the Mannor by Attornment of the Freeholders without which the Services cannot be gained and the Copyholders comeing to the Disseisors Court and by making Surrenders c. owning him for their Lords tantamounts Serjeant Maynard contra And he insisted that this Surrender was not good for the Disseisor had no Estate in this Land capable of a Surrender for the Copyholder for Life continuing in Possession and never having been ousted there could be no Disssesin of that And he endeavoured to distinguish it from a Surrender to a Disseisor Lord to the use of another for in such Surrenders the Lord is only an Instrument and does but as it were assent and until admittance the Estate is in the Surrenderer And he resembled it to the Attornment of a Tenant when è converso a Seigniory is granted and he put Cases upon Surrenders of Leases that they must be to one that hath the immediate Reversion as an under Lessee for part of the Term cannot Surrender to the first Lessor and he cited a Case of Lessee for years Remainder for Life Remainder in Fee to a Stranger he that had the Fee enfeoffed the Tenant for years by Deed and made Livery and the Conveyance held void for it could not work by Livery to the Tenant for years who was in Possession before and a Surrender it could not be because of the intermediate Estate for Life and it could not work as a Grant for want of Attornment He said it had been commonly received that a Common Recovery cannot be suffered where the Tail is expectant upon an Estate for Life not made Tenant to the Praecipe which he said was true in a Writ of Entry in the Post which are commonly used And the true reason is because such Writ supposes a Disseisin which cannot be when there is a Tenant for Life in Possession But as he said a Common Recovery in such case in a Writ of Right would be good Pemberton Chief Justice said his reason of Desseisin would overthrow Surrenders to the use of a Stranger for if the Possession of the Copyholder would preserve it from a Disseisin then was it pro tempore lopped off or severed from the Mannor and then no Surrender could be at all Et Adjornatur Berry
that he should suffer a Recovery his Term is not drowned 195 Tenant for Life with power to make a Jointure suffers a Recovery the Power is extinguished 226 227 Good tho' a Stranger that hath nothing in the Land be made Tenant to the Praecipe for a Recovery being a Common Assurance is to be favourably expounded 358 Whether a Recovery can be suffered where the Tail is expectant upon an Estate for Life the Tenant for Life not being made Tenant to the Praecipe 360 Release See Obligation Of all Demands its effect 314 Remainder Contingent Remainder by what Act destroyed 188 306 334 345 No Cross Remanders upon Construction in a Deed tho' sometimes in a Will 224 Rent Difference between a Rent and a Sum in Gross 99 Lease by Tenant in Fee and Rent reserved to the Lessor Executors Administrators and Assigns the words Executors and Administrators void 162 A Rent may be reserved by Contract without Deed 242 Where Rent shall be suspended and where apportioned by the Lessors Entry 276 277 Reputation Lands repurted parcel of a Mannor shall pass in a Recovery under the Word Appurtenances 52 Retorn Sheriff amerced for retorning Non est inventus on the Writ brought against his Bayliff 12 24 Sheriff retorns that Goods came to the Executors hands elongavit vendidit disposuit ad proprium usum suum convertit this tantamounts to quod devastavit 20 221 Sheriff retorns upon a Fi. fa. that he had taken Goods and that they were rescued from him not good 21 Action against Sheriff for a false Retorn of Cepi Corpus 85 Revocation What shall be a good Revocation upon a Power reserved 278 infra S. Scandal See Action upon the Case for Slander Scandalum Magnatum I do not know but my Lord of P. sent G. to take my Purse Action lies 59 Difference between an Action on the Statute of Scandalum Magnatum and a Common Action of Slander the Words in one Case shall be taken in mitiori sensu and in the other in the worst sense against the Speaker that the Honour of Great Persons may be preserved 60 Sewers Commissioners of Sewers and their Proceedings subject to the Jurisdiction of the King's Bench notwithstanding the Clause in Statute 13 Eliz. cap. 9. 67 Sheriff Sheriff may bring Trover for Goods taken in Execution and after taken away by the Defendant in the first Action 52 Soldiers Every Officer and Soldier as liable to be arrested as a Tradesman or any other person whatsoever 251 A Captain and Serjeant committed to Newgate for a great Misdemeaner in rescuing a Soldier ibid. Statutes When a Statute makes an Offence the King may punish it by Indictment but an Information will not lie when a Statute doth barely prohibit a thing 63 31 Ed. 1. Statute of Winton in an Action upon this Statute what taking shall be sufficient to discharge the Hundred 118 235 4 Ed. 3. cap. 7. Action lies for Executors upon this Statute for cutting and carrying way Corn 187. This Statute hath been always expounded largely ibid. 3 H. 7. cap. 2. A Wife forcibly married contrary to this Statute shall be admitted to give Evidence against her Husband 244 5 Eliz. cap. 4. For using a Trade not being Apprentice thereto 8 51 142 326 346 364. This Statute in relation to Apprentices expounded 174 31 Eliz. cap. 7. Of Cottages no Offence against this Statute to erect a Cottage if no body inhabits therein 107 43 Eliz. cap. 2. Poor By this Statute that enables Justices of Peace to tax a Neighbouring Parish the Justices may tax any of the Inhabitants and not the whole Parish 350 21 Jac. cap. 26. Of Felony to Personate 301 12 Car. 2. Of Ministers A good Act being made by King Lords and Commons and any defects in the Circumstances of calling them together ought not to be pried into 15 This Act extends only to Benefices with Cure ibid. 14 Car. 2. cap. 10. 16 Car. 2. cap. 3. Harth-mony Smiths Forges shall pay 191 192. So empty Houses 312 14 Car. 2. cap. 33. Of Printing Seditious Books 316. 16 Car. 2. cap. 7. Of Gaming Articles for above 100 l at a Horse Race within this Statute 253 254 17 Car. 2 cap. 2. Of Non Con-Ministers explained 328 29 Car. 2. Of Frauds and Perjuries No Promise made before the 24th of June within this Act 330. What Contracts within ths Act 361 31 Car. 2. Habeas Corpus Prayer must be made by Council wiihin the first Week after the beginning of the Term 346 T. Tail THO' a Term in gross cannot be entail'd yet where man hath a Term in point of Interest and at the same time the Trust of the Inheritance here he may entail the Trust of the Term to wait upon the Inheritance 194 What Words create an Estate Tail and what in Remainder contingent or vested 215 230 231 Estates Tail how forfeitable for Treason 299 infra A Devise to a Man and the Heirs Males of his Body with a proviso if he attempts to alien the Estate to cease the Condition void 321 322 A Limitation in Tail how it operates 378 Tender Tender and refusal is as much as payment 167 Tender where not good 252 261 Teste Where the Teste of a Writ before it was taken out is notwithstanding good 362 Tythes May be paid of a Warren by Custom 5. So of Doves and Fish ibid. Whether an Executor may bring Debt upon the Statute 2 E. 6. for Tythes due to the Testator 30 31 Where and what Modus shall bar the Recovery of Tythes in specie 32 A Prescription cannot be suggested time out of mind to pay a Modus for Tythe Hops since they were not known in England till Queen Elizabeth's time 61 Tythes of VVood tho' not Fewel payable unless exprest to be burnt in a House for the maintenance of Husbandry 75 Treason In Coyning and Clipping the Judgment 254 For raising a Rebellion in Carolina 349 Trespass See Pleading Quare Clausum fregit and threw down his Fences what Plea in Justification good 221 Continuando in Trespass where good and where not 363 Trust See Tayl. A Use in former time the same with what a Trust is now 130 Where a Trust for Life Remainder over with Power of Revocation is forfeitable and where not 128 infra Whether a Trustee is compellable to produce Writings or the Key of the Box wherein they are against the Interest of the Party for whom he is Trustee 197 Tryal See Venue What shall be Cause for new Tryal what not 30 Justices of Assize may try Informations tho' commenced before the Justices of a former Assizes 85 181 V. Venue WHere a Deed is forged at S. and given in Evidence at D. from whence the Venue ought to come in an Information thereupon 17 A Breach of Covenant assigned in Barwick the Venue shall arise from the next place in Northumberland 58 Judgment by Nihil dicit reverst after a Writ of Enquiry executed because no
her But Object All these words together to make a Slander Answ No man can assign me such a ratiocination a male divisis ad bene conjuncta I never heard it but in my Lord Straffords Case viz. that many Trespasses should make a Treason 'T is said he stirred up a Vexatious Action so does a Counsell when he Advises an Unsuccessful Action for the party is amerced pro falso clamore He will milk your Purse taken enunciatively signifies no more than Milking a Bull the Phrase is not come to an Idiom So of Filling his Pockets these Words might have been spoken of the Law and indeed they are spoken of the Thing not the Man or his Practice Dunce Corrupt c. concern the Profession but these words are applicable to any If he had said he were not a Good Fidler would that be Actionable Termino Paschae Anno 28 Car. II. In Communi Banco Hockett Uxor versus Stegold Ux ' TRespass for Assault Battery and Wounding of the Baron and Feme Vpon Not Guilty pleaded the Verdict was as to the Wife Guilty and quoad residuum Not guilty It was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the Baron and Feme could not joyn in an Action of Trespass for Beating them both 2 Cro. 355 655. 2. That there is nothing found as to the Beating of the Husband and so an imperfect Verdict for the Quoad residuum shall extend only to the other Trespasses done to the Wife Yelv. 106. Vid. Lib. which goes to both Points But the Whole Court were of Opinion that the Verdict had Cured this Mistake in the Action 9 Ed. 4. 51. 6 Acc ' Vid. Styles 349. Termino Paschae Anno 29 Car. II. In Communi Banco Herbert Perrot's Case HE having married a Wife that had an Inheritance of a considerable Value prevails upon her while she was but of the Age of 20 years to levy a Fine upon which the Use was declared to him and her and the Heirs of their two Bodies This was taken in the Country upon a Dedimus potestatem by Sir Herbert Perrot his Father and Mother After which the Wife died without Issue but had Issue at the time of the Fine It was moved in Court that this Fine might be set aside and a Fine imposed upon the Commissioners for the undue Practice and taking of a Fine of one under Age. But all the Judges agreed they could not meddle with the Fine but if the Wife had been alive and still under Age they might bring her in by Habeas Corpus and inspect her and set aside the Fine upon a Motion for perhaps the Husband would not suffer the bringing or proceeding in a Writ of Error And Justice Atkyns said These Abuses which are so frequent in taking Fines were occasioned by the Alteration of the Common Law made by the Statute of Carlisle 15 Ed. 2. that Fines which before were always to be done in Court may now be taken by Dedimus But the Common Law â—alls much short of the Order the Statute prescribes which requires that two Judges of the Court or one at the least should taking with him an Abbot Prior or Knight of good Fame take such Fines whereas 't is now the Common Practice to name Attorneys and Inconsiderable persons The Court were of Opinion That if a Commissioner to take a Fine do execute it corruptly he may be Fined by the Court for in relation to the Fine which is the proper Business of this Court he is subject to the Censures of it as Attorneys c. But they held that they had no power to Fine the Parties for a Misdemeanour in them North Chief Justice and Wyndham would have Fined Sir Herbert Perrot for taking a Fine of one under Age But Atkyns and Scroggs dissented because it did not appear that Sir Herbert Perrot did know she was under Age and it could not be discerned by the View she being Twenty Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 29 30 Car. II. In Communi Banco Sir John Otwaie's Case IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect It was found that there was a Parish of Ribton and Vill of Ribton but not Coextensive with the Parish J.S. had Land in Tail in the Parish and out of the Vill and bargained and sold by Indenture with a Covenant to levy a Fine and suffer a Recovery to the Vses of the Deed of the said Land in the Parish of Ribton and the Fine and Recovery were only of Lands in Ribton and whether this would serve for the said Land in the Parish of Ribton was the Question Serjeant Maynard Argued that it would not and said that the Division by Parishes is wholly Ecclesiastical the Limits of which are equal to the Cure of the Parson But that of Towns and Vills is Civil and hath the same Limits with the Power of the Constable and Tythingman Where a Place is named in a Record of the Law and no more said 't is always intended a Vill tho' when a Vill and Parish are both mentioned and of the same Name they are intended Coextensive The later Authorities have admitted Fines to be levied of Land in a place known 1 Cro. 2 Ro. 20. But in a Recovery the Town must be mentioned But 't is Objected That here the Intention appears by the Deed that these Lands should pass But he Answered That cannot carry the Words further than they are contained in the Record Again it is Objected That the Deed Fine and Recovery do all make but one Assurance True but each hath its several effect the Deed serves to declare the Uses but it cannot make the Record larger than it is in the Subject Matter of it If a Formedon had been brought and the Fine and Recovery pleaded in Bar had it not been a good Reply to have said Nient comprise c. In 2 Cro. 120. Storke and Fox the Case was Walton and Street were two Vills in the Parish of Street and a Fine was of Lands in Street and Resolved that no Lands but in the Vill of Street tho' in the Parish did pass And so is Mo. 910. in case of a Grant 2 Ro. 54. If this were permitted it would introduce much Mischief for men would not know what passed by searching the Record but this should be known only by a Pocket Deed and so they in Reversion a Lord of Ancient Demesne c. would not know when to make their Claim and should be barred by reason of a Private Deed when the Record of the Fine or Recovery did not import that they were concerned Fines are to end Controversies and therefore must be certain and in that respect sometimes receive a stricter Construction than Grants A Fine of a Tenement is not good but ought to be reversed but a Grant of a Tenement will bind On the other side it was Argued that since Common Recoveries have been so much in practice and become the Common Assurances of mens Estates
there be several Extents upon Statutes acknowleged at different times that they are all present Rights because the Liberate delivers the Land to the Conisee to hold immediately ut liberum tenementum and therefore if a Fine be levied he that hath the Extent upon the puisne Statute must claim immediately as well as he that hath the first Extent whereas the Extent upon a latter Statute until there comes an Extent upon an elder Statute is either turned to a Reversion as I Argued before or in the nature of a future Interest And therefore till the first Extent be barred or some way determined he that hath the Extent upon the puisne Statute can have no present Right and consequently is not bound to claim but his Right is preserved by virtue of the second saving of the Statute of 4 H. 7. But it appears by the Verdict that above ten years passed after the Fine of Thomas Lewis without any claim by Edward Lewis so that I conceive he was barred as to both Extents So that which I have taken notice of to have already passed in the Case is enough to bar the two Extents of Knight and Gerrard and to let in the Right of the Extent of Elwaies and Burroughs so that I think they might have entred or made their claim without any thing more But it is found further in the Case that in the year 1670. Sir John Lewis devised the Premisses by his Will in writing to Edward Lewis and the Heirs of his Body and for want of such Issue to his two Daughters who are married to the Earls the Lessors of the Plaintiff and died in August 1671. and 't is found that at the time of the Will and also of the Death of the said Sir John Lewis the Lands were in the possession of Edward Lewis and in Michaelmass Term 1671. Edward Lewis levied a Fine of the Lands in question to Francis Lewis to the use of Edward the Conusor and his Heirs Now if we should admit that the Extents of Knights and Gerrard's Statute were not barred by the Fine of Thomas Lewis let us see what will become of them upon these things done since And here I will agree with those that have Argued for the Defendant that the Devise of the Inheritance to Edward will not drown the Extent upon Gerrard's Statute For as I have Argued before I take the Extent of Elwaies and Burrough's Statute after the eviction by the elder Statute to be turned to a Reversional Interest and then the interposing of the Reversion will hinder the drowning of Gerrard's Extent in the Fee devised to Edward Lewis as aforesaid Now therefore let us see what is found to have been done further in the Case and I conceive if we should grant as the Counsel for the Defendant have urged That the Fine by Thomas Lewis had no effect as to the barring of Gerrard's Extent nor that the Devise of the Inheritance of the Premisses to Edward Lewis will not drown the Extent as I agree it did not by reason of the Extent interposing that was in Elwaies and Burrough's Case being as I have Argued a Reversional Interest I say admitting all this yet when Edward Lewis who had the Extended Interests upon Knights and Gerard's Statute in him and the Estate of Inheritance also in Michalmass Term 1671. Levied the Fine to Francis Lewis to the use of himself and his Heirs that Fine must destroy and determine the Extended Interests that were in him For where a Fine is levied by him that hath the Fee and Freehold in him whatever Right Estate or Interest there is in him besides passeth inclusively in the Fine not by way of transferring the very Interest it self but as it were consolidating with the Fee So as to determine and extinguish such Interest none can pretend that after this Fine of Edward Lewis the Extended Interest did continue in him They could not pass to Francis Lewis as assigned or transferred by the Fine why then they must be destroyed And I think it cannot be denied but that Elwaies and Burroughs might have entred immediately the two former Extents being taken out of the way And 't is found that at the time of the Fine Edward Lewis was in possession so that Five years passing without Claim after the Fine for 't is found that Satisfaction was not acknowledged till Nine years after 't is plain that the Extent upon Burroughs and Elwaies Statute was barred as to the present Right For I think its clear that when a former Statute is determined whether it be by release of the Debt by purchase of part of the Lands by being barred by Non-claim upon the Fine Satisfaction acknowledged or any other means this sets in the puisne Statute And now we are come to the great Question in the Case Admitting the Extent upon Elwaies Statute was barred in respect of the present Right Whether a new Rightcame upon the satisfaction acknowledged upon Gerrard's Sta-tute so that there should be Five years more given by the second saving of the Statute of the 4 H. 7. to claim upon that new Right It has been much urged by those that Argued for the Defendant that wherever there is a Reversion or an Estate to commence after the end of another Estate that if a Fine be levied tho' the Case be so that he in Reversion may enter or bring his Action so that Five years Non-claim will bar him as to the present Right or Remedy yet he shall have Five years more to claim when the Time is incurred or the Limitation come That the first or particular Estate should end Now though the Extents upon the two first Statutes were so avoided that there might have been an entry upon Elwaies Extent yet the proper and natural determination of Gerrard's Extent was not till satisfaction acknowledged upon Record or by perception of Profits appearing upon Record and then there shall be Five years given to claim and that by virtue of the second saving of the Statute of the 4 H. 7. which is to this purpose Viz. Saving to all persons such Right as first shall grow remain descend or come to them after the Fine levied by reason of any matter before the Fine levied so that they take their Action or pursue their Right within Five years next after such Right shall come Now I do not see that the Condition of this saving was performed by those that had the Right of Elwaies and Burroughs Extent the Right indeed came after the Fine levied and upon a matter before for it came after that the Extents upon Knights and Gerrards Statutes were barred or otherwise avoided Whether upon the Non claim by the first Fine or their being destroyed by the second Fine which was levied by Edward Lewis but there was no claim within Five years after either of those Fines so the Right clearly was not pursued within Five years after the Right first came And this has been held necessary
Tenant in Tail and levying of a Fine there is an Instantaneous Fee in him out of which the new Estate Tail is supposed to be created and that cannot hold bring derived out of a Fee subject to the Forfeiture by Relation but this Point was not touched by the Judges for that they were fully agreed upon the other Point Beasly's Case HE was taken in Execution taken a Recognizance of Bail and he made it appear to the Court that he never acknowledged the Recognizance but was personated by another and thereupon it was moved that the Bail might be vacated and he discharged as was done in Cottons Case 2 Cro. 256. But the Court said since 21 Jac. cap. 26. by which this Offence is made Felony without Clergy it is not convenient to vacate it until the Offender is convicted and so it was done 22 Car. 2. in Spicers Case Wherefore it was ordered that Beasly should bring the Money into Court an be let at large to prosecute the Offender Twisden said it must be tried in Middlesex tho' the Bayl was taken at a Judges Chamber in London because filed here and the Entry is venit coram Domingo Rege c. So it differs from a Recognizance acknowledged before my Lord Hobart upon 23 H. 8. at his Chamber and Recorded in Middlesex there Scire facias may be either in London or Middlesex Hob. rep If a false Bayl be acknowledged it is not Felony unless it be Filed and so held in Timberly's Case The King versus Humphrey's al. AN Indictment upon the Statute of Maintenance and one only found Guilty and it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that seeing but one was found Guilty it did not maintain the Indictment 2 Rolls 81. several were indicted for using of a Trade and said uterque eor ' usus fuit and held not good Sed non allocatur for that in that case in Rolls the using of the Trade by one cannot be an using by the other But this is an Offence that two may joyn in or it may be several as in a Trespass But then it was alledged that the Maintenance was in quodam placito in Cur ' coram Domino Rege pendent ' and not said where the Kings Bench Sate and this was held fatal Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 28 29 Car. II. In Banco Regis Jay's Case A Mandamus to restore to his place of a Common Council Man in the Corporation of Eye in Suffolk The Return was that he was amoved for speaking of approbious words of one of the Aldermen viz. That he was a Knave and deserved to be posted for a Knave all over England And it was moved that the Return was insufficient for words are not good cause to remove a Man from his place in the Corporation To which it was said that this not a difranchising of him but only removing him from the Common Council as a person not fit to sit there To which Twisden said that his place there could no more be forfeited than his Freedom for he was chosen thereunto by the Custom of the place And Magna Charta is that a Man shall not be disseised de liberis consuetudinibus But he held that words might be a cause to turn out a Freeman as if they were that the Mayor or the like did burn the Charters of the Town or other words that related to the Duty of his place But in the Case at Bar the words do not appear to have any reference to the Corporation wherefore it was ordered that he should be restored The Court said that my Lord Hale held That Returns of this nature should be sworn tho' of late days it has not been used and that it was so done in Medlecot's Case in Cro. Abram versus Cunningham UPon a Special Verdict the Case appeared to be to this effect A. possessed of a Term makes B. Executor who makes three Executors and dies two of them dies and the Will of B. the Executor not being discovered Administration is granted cum Testamento annexo to D. who grants over the Term. The surviving Execcutor never intermeddles but so soon as he had Notice of the Will Refused before the Ordinary and the Point was Whether the grant of the Term in the mean time was good Saunders to maintain it Argued That to the making of an Executor besides the Will there was requisite that the Executor should assent and if the Executor refuses 't is as much as if there never had been any There is no Book which proves the Acts of an Administrator void where there is a Will and the Executor renounces Greysbrook and Foxe's Case in Plowden's Com. is that after Administration granted the Executor proved the Will And so in 7 E. 4. 14. in Dormer and Clerke's Case it was held that where there was an Executor who after refused and Administration committed the Administrator should have all the Rent belonging to the Term in Reversion which accrued after the death of the Testator If an Executor be a Debtor and refuses the Administrator may Sue him Which was denied by Twisden because a Personal Action once suspended is ever so Dyer 372. If one makes an Executor who dies and never proves the Will Administration shall be granted as upon a dying Intestate suppose an Executor de son tort had Judgment against him Shall not there be Execution upon a Term as Assets in his hands Twisden It hath been Doubted whether there could be an Executor de son tort of a Term or whether he were not a Disseisor And by the same Reason it may be granted in the present Case for at least the Administrator here is an Executor de son tort before the Refusal Levins contra Anciently Bona Intestati capi solebant in manus Regis as appears in Hensloe's Case in the 9 Co. And since the Power of the Ordinary hath been introduced it was only to grant Administration upon a dying Intestate 4 H. 7. Pl. 10. If the Ordinary cites the Executor to prove the Will and he Renounces 't is said he may grant Administration which implies that it cannot be before So 21 H. 8. cap. 5. is to grant Administration c. upon a dying Intestate or refusal of the Executor the Interest of the Executor commences before the Probat In 36 H. 6. 8. an Executor commanded one to take the Goods and after the Executor refused before the Ordinary who committed Administration and the Administrator Sued the person that took the Goods who Iustified by the Executor's Command and it was held good And a Relation shall never make an Act good which was void for defect of Power And the Court seemed strongly of that Opinion But Serjeant Pemberton desiring to Argue it the Court permitted him to speak to it the next Term. Et sic Adjornatur And afterwards it was Argued again and Judgment was given for the Defendant per totam Curiam Dunwell versus Bullocke IN an Action of