one as if the party had appeared for if he had appeared the Case would have béen otherwise So Iudgement was given for the Plaintif nisi c. Pasch 1652. Banc. sup MEmorandum One brought by Habeas Corpus from the Fleet remaâ—â—ed One was brought into the Court by the Mareschall of the Fléet by vertue of a habeas Corpus directed to him out of this Court and because it did appear upon Record that the party was charged with divers debts when he was turned over to the Fleet he was not suffered to put in Bail here but was remanded Gossage against Tayler Pasch 1652. Banc. sup Hill 1650. rot 117. IN an Ejectione firmae upon a Lease for years of a Messuage Special verdict in Trespass and Ejectrueâ—â— and certain lands in Hatfield Broad-Oak in the County of Essex upon a special verdict found the case fell out to be this Rich. Frank seised amongst other lands and Tenements of the Messuage and lands in question upon the mariage of his Son Leventhorp Frank with Susan Cotele levies a fine of the lands to the use of himself during his own life and the life of Leventhorp his Son and after during the life of Susanna Cotele the wife of Leventhorp the remainder to the use of the heirs to be begotten upon the body of Susanna by Leventhorp her Husband The question here was whether the word heirs shall be intended the heirs of Leventhorp and Susanna his wife or whether the estate shall be intended to be limited to the heirs of Susanna only and that Leventhorp shall have barely an estate for life in the lands Serjeant Glyn of Councel with the Plaintif held That Susanna Cotele hath an estate tayl executed in the lands and that the word heirs shall relate only to the heirs of Susanna and not to the heirs of Leventhorp 1. Because that here is an estate limited for life unto Susanna by an express limitation and her heirs shall take immediately after the estate for life ended and they shall not come in as purchasors By express Terms the word heirs is not limited to any person but it is left to the construction of the Law and that doth apply it to Susanna as to a person to whom Richard that setled the lands hath expressed most affection as appears by the Deed Lit. f. 6. Sect. 28. There is an expression of the party to whom the word heirs shall relate but so is not here and therefore the cases differ In 3 Ed. 3. f. 31 32. It is ruled that both parties have an estate tayl because the estate is limited to both but so it is not in our case so those books are not against me In our case it doth not appear that Richard did intend to advance the Husband of Susanna and therefore it is not reason that the word heirs should relate to him but to Susanna his wife only for in case of limitation of estates the intention of the party is to be considered and doth direct the matter and the preceding limiting of the estate to Susanna and not to Leventhorp doth shew that the party did mean to promote the heirs of Susanna Lit. Sect. 27. Dyer 27. A second reason is drawn from the penning of the déed which in the limitation of it doth encline more that the word heirs should be applyed to Susanna than to Leventhorp for the words upon her is as much as to say of her and then it is the same case with Littletons case 3ly The Intention of the Donor appears to be such by the circumstances of the entire limitations which do shew that he did intend that Leventhorp should not have such an estate whereby it should be in his power to deprive his issue and therefore the word heirs are to be applyed to Susanna and not to Leventhorp for if it should be applyed to both then Leventhorp might destroy the estate of the issue contrary to the Donors intent And whereas Dyer 99 is objected against me I answer that case is not against me for there the word heirs is expresly limited to a certain person viz. to the heirs of the body of both of them but so it is not in our case and whereas Hill 13 Iac. Lane and Panels case in this Court is also objected against me I answer that that case is in effect the same case with Dyer and the question in our case came not in dispute And the will of the Donor in deeds is to be ohserved Lit. 22. C. Tayl. 1. rep Shelleys case 103. 〈◊〉 Notwithstanding in gifts in tayl this rule holds not so that a gift in tayl may be limsted contrary to the rule of the Common Law And I know not of any authority in print or writing against me but in 13 Ed. 3. Fitz. tit variance 81 there is an expresse authority for me and 4 H. 4. Fitz. br 448. in my experience I have known many estates limited as this is in the Southern parts held good estates tayl if it should be otherwise many estates would be shaken Roll chief Iustice We have delivered our opinions before against you viz. that it was not the meaning of the donour to apply the word Heirs to the body of Susanna only for this construction would offer violence unto the words as appears by Littleton who interprets that they are to be applyed to the Heirs of both the partyes and your reason is founded upon a wrong ground and expresly against Litletons case and for your second reason it is of no waight for the words are all one as if he had said to the Heirs of the Husband and wife begotten upon the wife 3ly We are not to frame a meaning against plain words which shew the Donors intent to be against you And the Baron cannot Bar the Estate tayl as you suppose Tayl. for the Feme hath an Estate for life and if she survive she may revive the remaining Estate and we must not consider of inconveniences which possibly may happen against the expresse words of the deed and the multitude of conveyances made in this manner are of no force to alter the Law Ierman Iustice as Roll. That the word Heirs shall be applyed to the Heirs of both partyes because voluntas donatoris secundum formam chartae expressa est observanda Nicholas and Ask Iustices of the same opinion Garland against Yarrow Pasc 1652. Banc. sup THis case being in arrest of Iudgement formerly spoken unto in an Action upon the case for these words Arrest of Iudgement in an Act on for words you are a knave and keep a Bawdy house was again moved by Christ Turner who held that the words are not actionable 1. Because they are of spiritual cognisance 2ly It is not said that he kept a common Bawdy house 3ly here is no special damage laid 10 Car. These words he is a pimp adjudged not actionable in Lewis and Whittons case 4ly It is not alleged that he
words of a will which were these I give all my free lands wheresoever to my Brother Iohn Sanders and his heirs upon condition that he suffer my wife to enjoy all my Freelands in Holford for life the Testator having only a portion of tithes of inheritance in Holford and no lands The question here was whether this portion of tithes shall be accompted free lands within the intent of the will and so the wife be to have them during her life Twisden held the tithes were not devised by the will to the Feme for if I devise my fee-simple lands to Iohn a Stile and his heirs tithes do not pass by this devise for tithes are a collateral thing arising out of land and not part of the land it self 42 Ed. 3. f. 13. 10 Iac. Moyle and Ewers case 31 Eliz. Perkins and Hyndes case In the will here they pass not for there are no words in the will to devise them nor can the words he so expounded and here are other lands devised to satisfie the words of the will A term for years hath more relation to land than tithes and a term could not have passed by the words of the will Next the second Clause doth not pass the tithes for there is no such thing as is expressed in it but if it should pass to the wise by implication yet it cannot pass to Iohn Sanders the Brother for there are neither expresse words nor any implication to devise this portion of tithes to him but the contrary rather is to be collected from the Will Wadham Windham on the other side answered that the Testator calls the tithes in Holford his free lands It is true generally that by the devise of lands tithes do not pass but in a will by the intent of the Devisor they may pass and the word land includes all real things in common intention and legal construction as Lutrels Case is 1 Mar. Bro. Tit. Elegit An Elegit may be of a rent and tithes have a nearer relation to land than rent have 2ly Here is an apparent intention to devise the tithes for he explains his meaning in his second clause of the Will that he intends tithes by the word lands 44 Eliz. Com. Banc. Gery against Gery the question there was what passed by the word rents whether lands passed The words were as to all my lands in Dale I devise my rents c. and here the matter comes in by a Proviso which enlarges the matter Trin. 3 Iac. Fitz. Williams case One devised all his goods Iewels and Plate excepting his lease in C There it was adjudged that all his other Leases passed 4 Ed. â— Br. grants 51. Another circumstance in the Will enforceth this construction viz. the word wheresoever which word expresseth the intent of the Devisor to be so otherwise that word will be idle and to no purpose Hob. rep Stukely and Butlers case It may also appear out of the body of the Will for it appears thereby that his Daughter was provided for in his will by his personal estateâ— and that the intention was to dispose of his lands to the Heir and his Copyhold lands which he had in Holford were surrendred at the time of the making of the Will and so the devise cannot refer to them and besides this is called free lands which distinguisheth them from Copyhold lands and so he prayed judgement for the Plaintif Roll chief Iustice There is a Condition annexed to the Devise Condition that his wife shall enjoy this land though the words in the Will are not very proper to erpress it but we must consider them as used in a Will not in a conveyance Nicholas Iustice said the Devisor himself calls them free-holds and this distinguisheth them from Copyhold lands Adjourned till Saturday following to be argued again Dowse against Masters Pasc 1651. Banc. sup DOwse brought an Action of Debt upon an Indebitatus Assumpsit against Masters for five pound Demurrer to a plea in Debt upon Indebitatus assumpsit in which the Defendant pleaded that he did deliver bils to the Plaintif to the value of 6 l. in which the Plaintif was indebted to him which bills the Plaintif did accept in full satisfaction the Plaintif replyed protestando that he was not indebted to the Defendant that he did not receive bills to the value of 6 l. in satisfaction Vpon this a Demurrer was joyned Roll chief Iustice said Plea the Plea of the Defendant is ill for he doth not say that he delivered the Bills in full satisfaction but that the Plaintif received them in full satisfaction which is not good for the Plaintifs receiving of the Bills must be as they were delivered and not other ways and that is not expressed Therefore let the Plaintif take his judgement nisi c. Ross against Lawrence Pasch 1651. Banc. sup ROss brought an Action of the Case against Lawrence for speaking these Welch words of him viz. Dedingues Will Rols in mudon Arrest of Iudgement in an Action upon the case for Welch words Englished which are in English William Ross hath forsworn himself upon Issue joyned and a verdict for the Plaintif the Defendant moved in Arrest of Iudgement that the words are not actionable as they are rendred in English and so the Action lies not Roll chief Iustice If the words sound in Welch that the Plaintif was perjured yet if the Plaintif do English them in English which doth not amount to perjury it is ill Case and an action will not lie for them Therefore let judgement be stayed Peck against Ingram Pasch 1651. Banc. sup PEck brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit and declares Arrest of Judgement in an action upon the case upon an Assumpsit that the Defendant in consideration that she the Plaintif would leave her Fathers house and come to the House of the Defendant in such a place did assume and promise unto her that he would mary her and that thereupon she did leave her Fathers House and did come to the Defendants House et obtulit se in maritagium conjungi and because he had not performed his promise Actio accrevit Vpon issue joyned and a verdict found for the Plaintif the Defendant moved in Arrest of Iudgement and took Exceptions that the Plaintif did not shew in her Declaration when she left her Fathers House and came to the Defendants house nor that she gave him any notice thereof Wild moved for judgement notwithstanding the Exceptions for he said though it be not expresly said that she gave the Defendant notice when she came to his House yet it is said quod obtulit se in maritagium conjungi which implies the Defendant had notice and besides here is no need of notice for the Assumpsit is that if she will come to the Defendants house he will marry her and it is not said that when she comes he will marry her so that he is bound by
determined and Hanbury and Cookrells case is not adjudged but if it be it is on my side and Mich. 37 38. C. B. rot 1149. It was adjudged upon solemn argument at the Bar and on the Bench contrary to the Iudgement in Pell and Browns case if lands be devised to one and his Heirs and if he dye without issue that the land shall be to another and his Heirs this is no Estate tail for it cannot stand with the rules of Law to devise â—uth an Estate for it is but a possibility and if it should be more it must be a Fee upon a Fee and so a perpetuity and it cannot be known within what bounds it shall end either in case of years or life or other contingencies and the comparison of Lampets case is not like to this case for that was or a Term but this is of a freehold and a contingent devise of a freehold is not good since the Statute of 32 H. 8. and Brook tit devise 2 Dyer 28 H. 8. f. 3â— is not an opinion against this And though there could be such a devise of other lands yet Copyhold lands cannot be so devised as the case is here for there cannot be so much as a possibility of reverter for there is no custom to warrant it Hill 5. Car. King and Leyden in this Court and Dyer 264. and though there might be a reverter yet he cannot devise it by will and if he could yet here the conbeyance is made up by surrender admittance and devise and the party is here in by the surrender and not by the devise and so is a Copyholder in by Act executed and not upon the contingency and the will is but to direct and though all this be otherwise yet the Plaintiff cannot have Iudgement for it appears not that the surrender is presented at any Court at all and here is nothing but a recitall found Ierman Iustice said by the Common Law there ought to be a presentment at the next Court Roll chief Iustice and Nicholas Iustice There is no certain time for the presentment but it is according to the Custom of the Manor so that it be within the life of the Tenant Roll chief Iustice said it is an inconvenience to devise such a contingent Estate Nicholas doubted for he said it would shake many wills if it might not be and so said Hales The Court would advise Hales confessed the verdict was imperfect but prayed it might be amended But Latch answered it is good enough for us the Defendants for we have primer possession The Court answered it would be good to have it amended and not to have a venire de novo Venire for that will be chargeable but if the verdict be imperfect to bring the matter in Law into question we can grant a new venire although it hath been heretofore doubted Therefore be advised so that it may be argued Antea Heal against Green Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Hill 1649. rot 370. THe case between Heal and Green upon a special verdict formerly argued by Latch was again spoken to and argued by Twisden Argument upon a special verdict upon construction of words of a Will and he held that the Feme had power by the Will to make the lease notwithstanding that she hath but an Estate for life and cited 11 Car. B. R. Hill rot 810. Iob and Whites case and 21 Iac. Danyel and Vgnel and he said that the remainder limited to the daughter doth not hurt for it may very well stand with the will and the intent of the Testator appears upon the whole to be to give such a power to his wife to make this lease and cited 8 Car. Perd and Bensams case And there is a clause in the will that shews that the Testator did intend to advance his wife by this devise And the Feme shall be in by the power which shall make the estate of the lease good and it is not necessary to recite the power as it is held in Rogers case Maynard on the other side said he would not dispute the power but here is no such power given to the wife as it appears by the expresse words of the Will which doth only describe that she shall only make Estates but for her life otherwise she might make Estates in Tail or in Fee and if this should be the last part of the Will which doth limit the remainder would be destroyed and generals in a Will shall not revoke an express devise but they ought so to be construed that all the Will may stand together as Bonhams case is 8. rep Roll chief Iustice It is a difficult thing to shew the meaning of the Testator here but the general must not destroy the particular devise to which Nicholas Iustice assented and Roll enclyned that the Feme had power by the Will to make this Estate otherwise the words of the Will must be idle and void and it may be the Baron intended to give his wife such a power that she might destroy the remainders and otherwise there cannot be any construction made of the Will Ask Iustice differed in opinion and said it was unreasonable the remainder should be destroyed which is expresly limited by the Will and a Will doth differ from a conveyance Nicholas Iustice said that the words shall be expounded to shew his bounty to his wife but not to give her power to destroy the remainder Ierman Iustice There are expresse words for the Feme and the daughter and the Feme hath a power but not to destroy the Estate of the daughter Curia advisare vult Antea Booth against Lambert Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Hill 1649. rot 201. VPon a speciall verdict upon these words Argument and judgement upon special verdict the question whether dower well assiâ—gâ—ed or not viz. I do endow you of a third part of all the lands my Cosen I. S. your husband dyed seised of The question was whether the feme were well endowed by these words because he doth not say that he endows her by metes and bounds Chase held she was not well endowed and cited 8 Ed. 2.15 and said that here is incertainty which begets dissention which ought not to be and the thing is not here entire but may be devided And this is an assignment of dower which differs from a demand of dower for a demand may be general as in the cases of Thyn and Thyn in this Court and of Fairefax and Fairefax and so the book of 8 E. 2. entry congeable S 5. which seems to prove the contrary that is not to our case for it differs from it Merifield of Councell on the other side held the feme was well endowed and agreed the cases put by Chase That of Common right a feme ought to be endowed by metes and bounds yet sometimes it is otherwise as 3 Eliz. Dyer 27. a feme endowed in Common And the feme that is to be endowed and the
264 Sale and Wray Pag. 373 Seaman and Edwards Pag. 63 Segar and Dyer Pag. 31 Siocnhams case Pag. 341 Scoble and Tolye Pag. 102 103 Shertliff and Timberly Pag. 219 Shurley and Semaign Pag. 255 Shann and Shann Pag. 256 257 280 Shayler and Bigg Pag. 171 Shann and Bilby Pag. 280 Sherecroft and Weeks Pag. 379 Shepheard and Gray Pag. 445 Sherlocks case Pag. 456 457 Skerlock and La pere Pag. 265 Skete and Clay Pag. 125 Slades case Pag. 138 Smith and Hobson Pag. 112 113 Smith and Stone Pag. 65 Smith and Hancock Pag. 137 138 Smithson and Wells Pag. 141 Smith and Hale Pag. 139 Smith and Dunch Pag. 139 146 Smith and Andrews Pag. 183 184 Smith and the Earl of Dorset Pag. 277 Smith and Ward Pag. 351 Smith and Holyman Pag. 361 Snelgrave and Bosvile Pag. 327 Somes and Sir John Lenthall Pag. 465 Sowthcott and Sowthcott Pag. 103 108 Spitlehouse and Farmery Pag. 290 Spry and Mill Pag. 182 183 203 204 Stoughton and Day Pag. 18 Stents case Pag. 127 Sir John Stowels case Pag. 104 Stradling and Boreman Pag. 129 130 Stubs and Manklin Pag. 165 Staples case Pag. 359 360 Sir Humphry Style and Tullye Pag. 286 287 Starky and Mill Pag. 296 Stroad and Homes Pag. 338 Staples case Pag. 248 Stevenson and Steward Pag. 404 Stavely and Ulithorp Pag. 411 422 Stephens and Ask Pag. 424 425 Wolverly Strachyes case Pag. 118 Captain Streeters case Pag. 415 Strowd and Beckwith Pag. 454 455 Swan and Fenham Pag. 409 410 Simons and Leir Pag. 72 Syms and Wilson Pag. 214 215 T TAnner and Lawrence Pag. 53 Tayler and Webb Pag. 301 302 307 308 309 319 383 Terry and Baxter Pag. 39 Tench and Cletheroe Pag. 59 Tench and Hubrison Pag. 340 Theoballs and Newton Pag. 307 Thomas's case Pag. 461 Thyn and Thyn Pag. 67 68 69 77 78 91 92 98 99 101 143 Thurle and Madison Pag. 462 Theoball and Conquest Pag. 343 Tisons case Pag. 153 Timbrell and Bullock Pag. 15 Tories case Pag. 15 Toby and Angell Pag. 110 Tompkins and Jourden Pag. 131 Toplady and Staly Pag. 165 166 Townsend and Barker Pag. 388 389 394 Tompkins and Clark Pag. 422 Tost and Day Pag. 431 474 Torret and Frampton Pag. 434 435 Tracy and Poole Pag. 143 144 Treton and Squire Pag. 230 Sir Humphry Tracy and Bloom Pag. 356 Trundall and Trowell Pag. 273 Trorman and Standart Pag. 284 285 Doctor Trig and the College of Physicians Pag. 329 330 Trevilian and Welman Pag. 400 401 Trevanian and Penhollow Pag. 452 Turner and his Wises case Pag. 47 Tucker and Cosh Pag. 288 289 Turner and Trapes Pag. 412 Twig and Roberts Pag. 145 Tyler and Johnson Pag. 41 Tyndall and Harington Pag. 162 F VAndicoots case Pag. 52 Vaux and Vaux versus Steward and Draper Pag. 157 203 Vincent and Fursey Pag. 43 44 Vincent and Wallis Pag. 197 Viccary and Barns Pag. 213 Vidian and Fletcher Pag. 472 W VVAtson and Norbury Pag. 3 201 202 Ward and Coggin Pag. 6 Wagstaff and Tempest Pag. 464 Watson and Watson Pag. 28 56 Waineright and Whitley Pag. 115 Walker and Alder Pag. 117 Waldron and Ward Pag. 449 Watson and Scotson Pag. 121 Ware and Chappel Pag. 186 187 Watts and Dix Pag. 188 189 204 205 Watts and Lord Pag. 230 Warry and Bond Pag. 256 Wallis and Bucknall Pag. 291 292 311 312 VVatts and Lowth Pag. 341 Wall and Bye Pag. 352 Walkenden and Heycock Pag. 425 Weeks and Weeks Pag. 90 Weston and Plowden Pag. 173 178 188 Wentworth and Wentworth Pag. 242 Webb and Wilmer Pag. 260 Weld and Rumney Pag. 418 Webb and Washborn Pag. 352 353 360 361 Weeks his case Pag. 371 Welden and Strudder Pag. 379 Webberly and Sir John Lenthall Pag. 454 Whitchurch and Paget Pag. 208 Whitwell and Short Pag. 5 6 Whitley and Fawset Pag. 12 13 Whites case Pag. 17 White and Thomas Pag. 38 39 White and Harwood Pag. 138 Whiteacre and Hillwell Pag. 27 White and Holford Pag. 170 White and Pinder Pag. 22 Whitwely and Pinsent Pag. 300 Whitehead and Buckland Pag. 373 379 380 401 402 403 Wingfield and Sherwood Pag. 5 Williamson and Henly Pag. 11 Willison and Crow Pag. 75 Pawl Williams and the Custodes c. Pag. 244 Williams and Tyrer Pag. 80 Willis and Bond Pag. 260 261 Winn and Stebbins Pag. 405 Williamson and Coleman Pag. 47 Wiatt and Harby Pag. 200 Williamson and Mead Pag. 207 208 Winter and Bernard Pag. 221 Withring and Bishopsgate Parish Pag. 260 VVillis and Bond. Williamson and Norwitch Pag. 337 338 VVingfield and Valence Pag. 414 415 Wise and Jeoffryes Pag. 429 Williams and Poole Pag. 460 Wood and Salter Pag. 53 Worsely and Worsely Pag. 123 Wood and Clemence Pag. 133 126 152 VVood and Holland Wood and Topham Pag. 216 227 234 235 303 Wood and Mountney Pag. 360 Wood and Markeham Pag. 408 Wood and Gunston Pag. 461 464 466 Wroath and Elsy Pag. 16 Wright and Pinder Pag. 34 Wright and Martyn Pag. 107 Wrights case Pag. 139 140 Wrights case Y YAte and Batisford Pag. 195 Yates and Lynden Pag. 47 Yongue and Petit Pag. 356 Yokehurst and Skot Pag. 439 440 HILARY TERM 21 Car. Banc. Reg. A Prohibition was prayed to the Admiralty Prohibition to stop procéedings there upon a Contract betwéen the parties suggested to be made upon the land within the body of a County and not upon the high Sea And the surmise was penned thus If there was any Contract made betwéen the parties as the libel supposeth it was made upon the land within the body of a County and not upon the high Sea The Court held this suggestion ill Suggestion for the uncertainty of it and ordered that it should be amended and made absolute viz. That the Contract was made upon the land c. And that the words if there was any Contract made should be put out because they made it uncertain whether there was any Contract or no and so by consequence did destroy the very ground of the surmise Barnaby against Goodale 21 Car. Banc. reg Trin. 21 Car. rot 201. A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a judgement given in an Action upon the Case in the Court at Owse bridge in York Error upon a Judgement in an action upon the Caie and the first Error assigned was in the Process because it was by summons whereas the action being an action upon the Case which is in the nature of a Trespass the Process should be by Attachment and Distress infinite and not by summons But to this it was answered by Roll Iustice that since 10 Iacobi this manner of procéeding is no Error Error Capias and that that Court hath no power to award a Capias in an action upon the case by the Statute of 1◠H. 7. two other light exceptions were taken to the venire but not insisted upon But the main exception was to Iudgement which was entred thus Ideo consideratum est per curiam dicti Domini
enough 2ly It doth not appear that there are divers Churches in New-Sarum where the Proclamation was made To the third exception the Proclamation is said to he made prout breve postulaâ— and that shall be supposed duly done and implies all requisite circumstances and he cannot make another return and it is impossible to be otherwaies To the fourth it is not necessary to retorn the place of the Summons and it is said that it was made secundum formam Statuti which supplies the rest And to this the Court said that the words secundum formam Statuti extend far And Roll Iustice said that Proclamaiton in one place was good in all Holhead of Councel with the Plaintiff in the Writ of Error proceeded and took these exceptions in the demand of the Dower 1. The demand is generally de rectoria which is not good Demand Rector for the incertainty of it for there may be a Rector of a College of a Province of a Bishoprick as well as of a Parish-Church and therefore it ought to have been de Rectoria Ecclesiae parochialis de c. 12 H. 4. f. â—9 pl. 1. 2ly The demand decimarum is too general and not good and it ought to have been decimarum granorum soeni c. for the demand de omnimodis decimis quibuscunque is too general 11 Rep. Herberts case 1. To these exceptions Hales answered that a demand in a Writ of Dower need not to be so exact as in other original Writs for original Writs are not alterable but ought to answer the forms in the Register To the second he said that rectoria shall be intended the Rectory of a Church and the Statute extends not to this besides the place of the Rectory is described which makes it certain enough To the third it is not necessary to express the Tithes particularly and the demand being of the Rectory it compriseth all the Tithes also the demand is de omnimodis decimis which is a general demand and compriseth all and is not de decimis only for that might be incertain Holhead The demand is de rectoria de omnimodis decimis which is a demand of one thing twice and that is not convenient for by this means the party may recover dammages twice and the Court will be also inveagled by this means and it matters not though we have not pleaded to this for the Court ought to take notice of it Notice because it is in the original Writ Next there is no form in the Count for cum pertinentiis is informal for it refers to the Parish and not to the Mannour 27 E. 3. f. 86. Pl. 3. Haleâ— This is but a variance in form and is not material and also it shall be intended to refer to the Mannour and not to the Parish Holhead The demand is not warranted by the Writ for the Vill and Parish are not named in the Writ but are named in the demand 11 Rep. Arondels case Hales The demand is not de rectoria in Tymsbury but de Tymsbury and is the denomination of the thing demanded Tithes Parissi and not of the Vill where it lyes Holhead It is not said where the Tithes extend and they may extend to divers Vills as a Parish may 19 E. 3. f. 9. Hales Here is one demand and it includes all the Tithes Roll Iustice You have demanded the Rectory in Tymber and not the Rectory of Tymber and by the grant of ones Mannour in Dale no more of it passeth than what doth lye in Dale and here it shall be intended so much of the Tithes as are in Tymber Holhead Here is a demand of Dower of such things whereof Dower lyes not viz. of a quarry of Stones and it appears not that the Quarry was open in the life of her Husband and if it were yet it is improper to demand it by the name of a Quarry Hales the word Quarry is a good word well-known what it means for Quarrera is an old wel-known Latine word for it Dower and she is as well dowable of it as of a Mine of Coles and it shall be intended to be open because she demands it by that name of a Quarry Holhead The demand of the Dower is also of a Hundred of which a Woman is not dowable because it is an entire thing and cannot be divided and the demand should have been de tertia parte proficuorum hundredi To this Roll Iustice answered then by your reason she shall never keep a Court. Hales It is well enough demanded for a demand shall be of the thing it self and not of the profits of it for the profits were not in the Husband but he was seised of the Hundred and the profits are a thing incertain Holhead The execution of the Habere facias fesinam is not well executed for by it two third parts are assigned for Dower and that is more than the demand Hales That is but a repetition of the thing demanded Holhead A thing not demanded at all is assigned for Dower viz. view of Frank pledge Hales That is but an incident to another thing that is demanded viz. the Hundred and by the demand of the Hundred the view of Frank-pledge is demanded and all other incidents to the Hundred Holhead Here is an assignment also of all tenures and she cannot have Homage because she is a Woman Hales She shall have all tenures which she is capable of and so all shall be understood in this place and no other she shall have Holhead The Iudgement is also if 15 Copiholds Tenements which lately were Copiholds Roll Iustice This is good enough and what loss have you by it Holhead The Assignment is also of the 3d. part de Copicia de Structuris and other words there are which are also incertain And there is error in the assignment of dammages for the dammages are assigned ultra valorem terrae which is against the Statute Roll Iustice Dammages Iudgement the Statute is an addition of the value and dammages for the Iudgement is perfect without returning the Writ of the dammages and so hath been adjudged in the Common pleas Holhead Here is an ill suggestion of the Feme for the suggesteth that her Husband dyed seised in fee of all the Lands out of which she demands her Dower and that is not true for he dyed seised of part of them in tayl To this the Court said that is not material if he dyed so seised that she ought to have Dower Holhead Dammages are given ultra valorem which I conceive is not good Roll Iustice It is well enough for dammages are given and the value by the Statute Holhead The retorn of the Elegit is not good Hales That is another Record and appears not now in the Court Roll Iustice The Elegit hath no reference to the former Record Holhead There is one error in fact and that is confessed by your joyning in demurrer Doubleness Roll
to his heir in the singular number And he argued that the word heir includes heirs because it is Nomen Collectivum Next Whether the devising the land to Richard for his natural life and after to his heir for ever makes any difference in the Case and he held it did not and said that Archers case that is objected by the other side differs much from this for there the words are restrained for it is Proximo Haeredi and not Haeredi generally as it is in our Case and there the words next heir are not words of limitation but of purchase and to decipher the person but not to limit the estate and in our case if there should not be a limitation Richard should only take for life which is not the intent of the Will as may appear by the passages and clauses of it And Thomas and Kemishes case in 5 Car. in this Court makes an end of our Case Neither doth the adding of the word in perpetuum make a difference in the Case for if the words had béen omitted the same estate had passed to the Tenant Richard and his Estate is not enlarged by them 2ly The words in perpetuum relate to all the Estate and not to any particular Estate and so the surrender made by R. Hunt is good Next of all supposing that it be a limited Estate and a contingent remainder the question will then be whether this contingent remainder be destroyed or no and I conceive it is because the particular Copyhold estate which must support this contingent remainder is destroyed and the Law is the same in that point in Copyhold cases as it is in other cases at the Common Law for Copyholds are directed by the rules of the Common Law 13 Iac. Banc. Reg. It is also held that there is the same rule to support a contingent remainder of a Copyhold as there is of Land at the Common Law Next it is to be considered whether the particular Copyhold estate be extinguished or not And it is cléer that it is for the customary Estate is in the Lord who hath the Fée simple which cannot both stand together and so there is no estate to support the contingent remainder Copyhold and consequently all objections are by this answered 1. That the surrender shall not do wrong 2ly That the surrender destroys not the Custom Turner on the other side argued that only an estate passeth to Richard for life and that the word Heir is not a word of limitation to make the Ancestor take a Fée simple neither shall the word Heir be taken Collective here but singulariter and so according to the common sence number and matter ought it to be construed And Nowns Collective in the singular number do not signifie the same thing that they do in the plurall number as may be proved by other examples and there is no proper name to signifie one particular Heir in Law if the word Heir in the singular number shall not do it Shellyes case 1. Rep. f. 101. â—ooks institut f. 8.1 Rep. Archers case And there are two Iudgements in the Common pleas in the very point as I am informed by the Attorney on our side In a Will the word Heir shall not be taken Coliective out in the natural grammaticall sence and not as a word of art but it is otherwise taken perchance in conveyances which are made by men of Art and learned in the Laws whereas wills are made commonly by lay gents and unskilfull in the Law And the rule is that words shall be interpreted to make all the parts of a déed in which they are to stand together and to bear sence and to be in esse and effectual which cannot be here if the word heir shall be taken Collective but may be if it be taken singulariter Hob. rep Stukely and Butlers case Next if the word heir should be taken Collective then the Estate for life would merge 30 El. C. B. Hill 3 Iac. C. B. Hiller and Lewis his case 3ly Rich. hath only an Estate for life if it were otherwise the Testator would have otherwise expressed it and he hath well expressed an estate for life and no other Estate in him If one grant 4. parts of his mannor it shall passe 4. parts of 5. and not all For the other poynt the contingent remainder is not here destroyed by the destruction of the Copyhold Estate for Copyhold Estates do not depend one upon another as Estates of the Common Law do and here is one in esse to take the Estate Another question he spoke to viz. whether a Lessee at will being ousted by a stranger can reenter and he held he cannot for he hath but a meer right 38 H. 6. f. 27. Fortescue and Yelverton 3. Iac. Banc. Reg. rot 501. Carpenter and Collins But to this Roll chief Iustice Entry and Nicholas Iustice answered that he may enter notwithstanding it hath been heretofore controverted and the reason is because he hath the primer posseâ—sion Roll chief Iustice enclined that the contingent remainder is not destroyed because it doth not here depend upon the particular Estate but it ought to expect till the remainder happen and he conceived that the word heir and heirs were all one here by the intent of the partyes and the frame of the conveyance Ask Iustice said that it is a good Estate of Fee simple conditionall executed in Richard Ierman Iustice The intent in a Will if it be not contrary to Law ought to be taken and there must be words to make the intent appear and these words must stand together and shall not be made void and he conceived the contingent remainder not destroyed Adjourned till the next Term. Postea Port against Midleton Hill 1650. Banc. sup A Writ of Error was brought to reverse a Iudgement given in an Action of debt upon an obligation Error to reverse a judgment in debt and the Error insisted upon was in the entring of the Iudgement which was quod recuperet Debitum suum and doth not say praedictum Roll chief Iustice answered Delivery Escrow that the debt is confessed by the party and the question is whether the deed was delivered as an escrow or not but it was delivered to the party himself and therefore could not be delivered as an escrow Ierman Iustice said that debitum suum without praedictum is not good for the word praedictum is verbum operativum Ask Iustice as Roll and there is but one debt Implication and the word ideo in the record implyes it to be the same debt Nicholas to the same effect The rule was affirmetur nisi causa die Iunae sequenti Hill 1650. Banc. sup AN administrator had a Iudgement against one to recover a debt due to the Intestate and then the Administrator dyed Intestate For a scire facias to revive a judgement denyed Scire facias and another took out new letters of administration de bonis non
a Legacie and it may be there are debts owing which are to be paid before Legacies and here doth not appear to be any assets in the Executors hands besides this debt and if the Testator would have released it he ought to have done it by a deed Roll chief Iustice What shall the Executor do in this case I conceive it is a strong case for the Executor and that it is very unreasonable that the Testator should make such a devise and here is no consent of Mary the Executor expressed to this release besides a will cannot release a thing created by deed and so discharge Creditors Nicholas and Ask Iustices concurred But Ierman Iustice doubted For a fault in the writ of Error and imperfection in the record certifyed the Iudgment was not then affirmed Afterward Sir Humphrey Style preferred his bill in Chancery to be releived herein and obteyned an injunction till hearing but upon a hearing at the Rolls could get no relief but was ordered to pay 100 l. or else the injunction to be dissolved Q. Nota. Hamond against Ward Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Pasc 1650. rot 58. AN Action of debt was brought against the Defendant Error to reverse a judgment in debt upon an insimul computaverunt upon an insimul Computaverunt and a verdict and a Iudgement given against him whereupon he brought his writ of Error and assigns for Error that the Action was brought against him for rent as a Tenant of land and not as a receiver and that therefore an accompt did not lye Roll chief Iustice cited 20 H. 6. that rent alone lyes not in accompt because rent is a certain thing and it is also in the realty but if rent be mixed with other things an accompt will lye Accompt but here it appears the Action is brought against the Defendant as a receiver and if one receive mony due to me upon an obligation I shall have either an Action of accompt Debt or an Action of debt against him so if he receive my rents without my consent Therefore let the Iudgement be affirmed Alleyn against Holden Trin. 1651. Banc. sup Entred Pasc 1650. AN Action of debt was brought against an Heir who pleads riens per discent Error to reverse a judgment in debt against an Heir Iudgment was given against him upon a nihil dicit a writ of enquiry was awarded without the prayer of the party and a special Iudgement thereupon given against the Defendant Vpon a writ of Error brought to reverse this Iudgement it was alleaged for Error that the Iudgement ought to have been a general Iudgement and there ought not to have been a writ of enquiry except the party had prayed it and to this the Court enclined and Roll chief Iustice said that it is otherwise in an Action against an Executor for there assets may be found At another day Roll chief Iustice said Writ of inquiry if the Heir plead riens per discent and if it be a false plea a general Iudgement ought to be against him and there shall be no writ to enquire what lands he hath and it is not necessary as here it is to have a special Iudgement Iudgement that the Plaintiff shall recover of the lands discended for the Iudgement ought to be that the Defendants body and goods be lyable and half his lands and not as it is here a writ to enquire and find what lands he hath by discent Reverset nisi Barcock against Tompson Trin. 1651. Banc. sup THis case was again spoken unto Error brought by the Bail to verse a judgment given against the principal which was this A Iudgement was given in the Comon pleas against the principal without an original upon this Iudgment there issued out a scire facias against the Bail two nichils returned and thereupon Iudgment was given against the Bail a writ of Error was brought by the Bail to reverse this Iudgment And it was now argued by Hales of Councel for the writ of Error that the Iudgment was erroneous because it being given upon a scire facias which is a judicial writ it ought to be grounded upon an original and it not being so here it is Error in fact although it be not Error in Law To this it was answered that two nichils returned upon a scire facias amount to a scire seci and a judgment given thereupon is good and therefore it is too late now to say that the scire facias was not well executed Brook Sc. fac 96. 28. 17 Car. C. B. To this Hales said there was a Iudgement against us in the Common pleas so that we could urge nothing against the scire facias there but here we may Roll chief Iustice answered it is to some purpose to make up the record upon the two nichils otherwise there would be no end of things and the Iudgement is well given by the Iudges and how can you now make Error in it Iudgement and if you be inconvenienced by the Iudgement you are not without remedy Error for you may bring an Audita querela and you might have pleaded to the scire facias nul tief record for it is not matter of fact And therefore shew better matter why the Iudgement shall not be affirmed Audita querela and take liberty to bring an Audita querela Antea Tucker against Cosh Trin. 1651 Banc. sup Entred Trin. 1650. rot 388. TVcker brought a replevin against Cosh Special verdict in a replevin for distreining his Cattel The Defendant makes conusance as Baily to I. S. and upon the Avowry the case fell out to be this A tradesman in consideration of mariage made a conveyance of his lands to the use of himself and of his wife and afterwards becomes a Banckrupt and a commission of Bankrupt is taken out against him and the lands of the Bankrupt are sold by the Commissioners to the avowant that took the distress The question here was whether this conveyance made by the Bankrupt of his lands was within the Statute of fraudulent conveyances or not and the sale made by the Commissioners of this land were good Maynard for the Plaintif argued that it is not within any of the Statutes of Bankrupts The Déed here is without fraud and so it is not within the Statute for a valuable consideration is only expressed in the Statute and not a conveyance upon consideration of mariage as it was in our case 2ly The Feme is but one person with her Husband 3ly By comparing the Statutes together it appears that the wife is not comprised within the Statute of 1 Iacobi which looks back to other Statutes touching Bankrupts for the wife is not named in the Statute of 1 Iacobi but only children and other persons otherwise the words of the Act which do enumerate children and other persons would be frivolous and idle Roll chief Iustice said the Case is of great consequence and
the Arbitrators have all of it to agree in and till it is ended the Vmpire hath no power at all otherwise the submission would be repugnant in it self The rest of the Iudges concurred in all and so ruled That the Plaintif all capiat per billam nisi Theoballs against Newton Mich. 1651. Banc. sup ONe was sued upon the Statute of Inmates and the distringas jurata bare date on a Sunday and out of Term and so is erronious The question here was whether it be not helped by the Statutes of Ieofails of 18 Eliz. and 21 Iac. Roll chief Iustice held Ieofails that the Statutes extend not to penal Laws although it be ambiguously penned nor to any processes grounded upon them for the Proviso exempts the Original action and by consequence all processes depending upon it are excepted Venire de novo so that here is no good tryal but there shall be a venire de novo nisi Tayler and Webb Mich. 1651. Banc. sup THe Case of Tayler and Webb which arose upon a special verdict upon these words of Will Special Verdict upon the words of a Will viz. I make my Cosen Giles Bridges my soll ayere and yexecutor was again moved and argued by Hales and he made three questions 1. Whether any estate passeth by the words of the will 2ly If any what estate passeth 3ly Whether the false Orthography doth hurt the Will For the first he said that by making one his sole heir his land passeth to him The word heir is to be considered either in relation to an Ancestor and so one cannot make one his heir or it may be considered in relation to a thing to be inherited to wit lands or tenements and so one may make another his heir and thus a Custom may make one a mans heir as it is in Borough English and an accident may thus also make one a mans heir as it is in the Case of possessio fratris Coundens case Hob. Rep. Case 947. And here it is all one to make one his heir and to make hint heir of hislands and the reasons are First the word heir here cannot have any other relation than to the Testators lands for he cannot make him his heir otherwise and the words may be more reasonably intended so 2ly The words carry in them the plain intention of the Devisor that the party should have his lands although the words are not very proper â— H. 7. A devise of lands to his son after the death of his wife passed an Estate for life to the wife although no such Estate was expressed in the Will so here although no expresse Estate of land be devised yet the Devisee shall have the lands by the intent of the Devisor 3ly In ordinary speech if one make such an one his Heir it is intended that he gives him his lands 8 Car. in the C. B. in Spurt and Bents case A devise of his inheritance was held a devise of his lands and Trin. 3. Iac. in Terryes case A devise of all his rents in tayl passed his lands because in vulgar acceptance it is the rents of lands and in Pits and Sands case in this Court A devise of all his free lands in Holford did passe a portion of Tithes and in the case of one Iohnson a devise of all his estate passed all his lands And the words cannot bear the fence to make him Executor according to the Civill Law as hath been objected for the Will shall be intended as it is to be an English mans Will and so the word Heir in it shall he interpreted according to out Law and not the Civill Law and even in the Civill law to make one his Heir doth convey unto him all his lands for he is haeres testamentarius although not haeres legitimus And in this Will here are two expressions for the party is made Heir and Executor which two words cannot signifie one thing for that would be an idle expression 4ly There are some clauses in the Will which shew the intent of the Testator was to convey his lands if it were needful to make use of them 1. There are several annuities for the Devisee to pay 2ly He directs him where the conveyances and assurances of his lands were laid up which plainly shew he meant he should have his land 3ly The words Heir and Executor are joyned together to shew that he gives him all his lands and goods else one of the words must be imperfect and ineffectual which shall not be intended For Authority 7 E. 6. Br. devise 38. by devising that one Son shall be Heir to the other it shall be intended of lands so in construction of law it shall be here intended that the Devisor made him Heir of his lands Hob. Reports in Sparkes and Burnells case William and Anthony shall be each others Heir and it is not said of land yet adjudged that it shall be so meant and so is it in our case and if I have lands in see simple and make one my heir it shall be intended that he shall have my lands in see simple although I say not that I make him Heir of my lands For the second question the reasons before expressed do also shew that the lands are passed in Fee as it is in Purnells and Hambletons case for the word Heir shall relate to the same Estate that the party had in the land who makes the other his Heir 8 Iac. Inkersals case For the 3d point whether here shall be any good devise at all by reason of the false English he said it was all one and to as good effect as if the words were all true English and neither the incongruity nor the insufficiency of the words shall hurt the Will as it is pretended For 1. This is not in case of pleading or of writs but in conveyance of lands It is true that in the former it doth hurt because writs and pleadings may be amended if they be naught but it is fatal in conveyances for they cannot be amended as in Trotman and Standards case Trin. 1651. in this Court it was held that impropriety of words shall not hurt it they can admit of a good construction Desinet in piscem mulier formosa superne 2ly This is in a Will which is such an instrument that is much favoured in Law and therefore to be favourably construed 3ly This is an English Will and admits of much variety of dialects and therefore is not to be critically interpreted Neither are there here any insignificant or missignificant words as hath been objected but significant for the sound of the word as it is written is the same as if it had been rightly spelled for Ayer and Heir sound both alike As in 3 H. 4. f. 4 Baxter and Baxster sounded alike 2ly If the word Heir might receive any other sence yet it cannot do so here because there are other words joyned to it to declare and signifie that the
for another man he had unwillingly committed a Trespass against the Plaintif in taking away 2 or 3 wheele-barroughs of Earth of the Plaintifs soil and therefore it was prayed that the matter might be referred to the Secondary to tax the damages and Costs for the Trespass which he was ready to pay that the proceedings might be stayed But Roll chief Iustice answered It cannot be but you may confess the Action Reference He le against Green Hill 1651. Banc. sup IN an Ejectione firmae a special Verdict was found upon which the Case fell out to be this A man being Lessee of a Manor for 199 years Special Verdict in an Ejectione firmae deviseth the Term to his wife for life with power to make such estates in as ample manner as he himself might have done during her life and the remainder in Tall to his Daughter and dies the Feme proves the Will and accepts of the Legacy and after makes a Lease for 99 years and dies and the daughter brings an Ejectione firmae against the Lessee of the Feme The question was whether this Lease made by the Feme were a good Lease or not Merifield argued that the Lease was not good after the death of the Feme because she having but an estate for life Lease and the Lease for 99 years being derived out of it when the estate for life ends the estate derived out of it must end also And 2ly If the Feme had any power to dispose of any part of the Term longer than for her life by the same reason she might have disposed of all of it which cannot be intended for the Testator did not mean that she should have power to destroy the Entayl made upon his Daughter And as to the Objection that she hath dissposed of but part of the Term and therefore hath not destroyed the Entayl I answer It matters not what she hath done but what she might have done for by the same reason that she disposed of part she might have disposed of the whole The rest of the Argument I could not hear Henage Finch on the other side argued That the Lease made by the Feme continues after her death because the Feme had a power given her to make such a Lease and by vertue of that power the Lease continues for the power given unto her relates to the Estates to be made by her and not to the continuance of her life And here the intent of the Testator is to be considered which was that his wife should have the power to dispose of all the Term if she would for he trusted her with it because she was his Wife and Mother of his Daughter to whom the Entayl was made and the very subject matter shews his intent to be so and because there is no other power expressed against this in any other part of the Will and the words that give her this power would be idle and trifling if they should receive any other Construction 2 Car. Banc. Reg. Danyel and Ogleys case and Gibs and Whites case 1 Car. nor does the assent of the Feme to the Legacy to have the Term for life destroy her power to make estates 2ly She hath well executed this power for the Iury have found that it is the Lease of the Feme 9 Iac. Suckham and Hawkins case a power given to an Executor may be executed by parts Roll chief Iustice held Lease the Lease was good for a Will ought to be so interpreted that all the parts of it may stand together and if the Feme here have not power to make this Lease the Clause of giving her this Lease is idle and the meaning is so without doubt the Feme hath the sole estate in Law in her and the power given here is but a restoring to her of that which she had before by the Law and her consenting to the Legacy doth not take away her power to make Estates And this limited power and the remainder to his daughter may stand together for it might be that the wife would not make such a lease and then the daughter should have had the land in tayl but if she dispose of it the daughter shall not have it Ierman as Roll. Nicholas Iustice held that the Feme could only dispose of the land during her life and that the Testators intent by the words was that the Feme should not be tyed to occupy the lands her self during her life but might dispose of them Ask as Nicholas that she can dispose of the lands only during her life for the power is only given during her life and this interpetation will make all parts of the Will stand together better than the other interpretation Adjourned Antea Dekins against Latham Hill 1651. Banc. sup Entred Hill 22 Car. rot 946. IN an ejectione firmae a special verdict was found Special verdict in an ejectione firmae upon which the Case fell out to be this One seised of lands covenanted to levy a fine to the use of himself and his wife for life and after he leased the lands for 21 years for 3 l. rent per annum by equal portions and after the death of I.S. to pay a gross sum of 125 l. by way of fine payable by 5 l. a year quarterly with a proviso in the Indenture that for default of payment of the rent or fine or for want of reparations it should be lawfull for the Lessor to re-enter After the Lessor levyes a fine and assigneth over his interest in the reversion The question here was whether the condition of entry be transferred over to the Assignee by the transferring over of the reversion Hales of councell with the Plaintiff held that the lease proceeds from the Husband only and not from the Baron and Feme and the condition is transferred over for the condition runs joyntly as well to the fine reserved as to the rent and is as it were a several condition in Law although it be comprised but in one clause and not several clauses and the condition as to the rent is transferred though not as to the fine In 19 E 4. f. 7. The law makes a several distribution of one praecipe and so may it do here of one condition and Rawlins case in the â— rep cited against this comes not to this case for there the question was of the suspension of a condition but here it is of the transferring over of a condition 2ly If it be but one condition yet it is well transferred by the Statute of 32 H. 8. C. â—4 an extinguishment in part is not extinguishment of all although a suspension of part be a suspension of all and the Grantee of the reversion shall have advantage of the condition because 1. He is within the words of the condition as to the condition 2ly The clause of re-entry is within the words of the Statute and Knights case objected comes not to this case for there
mony and thereupon the Defendant moved to have the moniés out of Court Roll chief Iustice Peremptory The Plaintiff hath lost his mony â—y this verdict therefore let him shew cause why the Defendant should not have them for it is peremptory to the Plaintiff Franklin Mich. 1653. Banc. sup IN an Action of Accompt the Defendant was adjudged to accompt Motion for Merchants to be joyned to Auditors assigned to receive an accompt and Auditors were assigned The Court was moved that they would order to joyn some Merchants to the Attorneys on either side to help them to mannage the Accompt because the Attorneys were not skilfull in such businesses Roll chief Iustice We can make no rule for this but you may by consent advise with Merchants to assist you in drawing up the Accompts Mich. 1653. Banc. sup BY Roll chief Iustice One burned in the hand may be a Witness one that hath been burned in the hand for Felony may notwithstanding be a witness in a Cause for he is in a capacity to purchase Lands and his fault is purged by his punishment Townsend and Barker Mich. 1653. Banc. sup Trin. 1653. rot 743. TOwnsend brought an Action upon the Case against Barker Arrest of judgement in an action for words that had béen a Copartner with him in trade for speaking these words of him You are a cosening Knave and did cosen me of 1200 l. at one time and that was in making an accompt in the year 1648. Vpon a verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in arrest of Iudgement that the words are not actionable because though they he spoken of a Tradesman yet they are not spoken of him in reference to his Trade but in reference to an Accompt and although by way of reduction and consequence they may reflect upon his honesty yet they are not actionable and though his reputation be impaired by speaking them yet he cannot be endicted for cosening in his Trade by reason of them because they are spoken of a singular and particular abuse and not of a general cosening used in his Trade and an Action upon the Case lies not for words which are only scandalous by way of reduction and if the words should hinder the party to get a Partner hereafter to trade with him yet he may use his Trade and so cannot be prejudiced nor are the words that he cheated him but that he cosened him which are not of so violent a construction Wild on the other side said that here is a Partnership which is necessary to the driving of a Trade and without which it cannot be so well driven and the Accompt is incident to all Partnerships and prayed for Iudgement Roll chief Iustice If the Copartnership continued the words were actionable without doubt for then they must be spoken of him in the way of his Trade Case but here the Partnership being ended makes the matter more considerable but yet as it is the words are scandalous and may hinder him from getting a Partner for the time to come and it may be he cannot mannage his Trade without a Partner and although an Accompt be a private thing yet the Plaintiff is disgraced by the speaking of the words and none will deal with a man that will cosen his own Partner and we must countenance Trade and Traffique and mens credits and the Accompt is not so collateral a thing to trade as Hales objects as is the hiring of a shop to trade in or the like German Iustice ad idem and said that Copartnership is necessary to support Trade and the keeping of a true Accompt is the principal thing between Partners Nicholas and Ask Iustices ad idem Judicium nisi pro querente Bird and Christopher Mich. 1653. Banc. sup IN this Case upon giving of an evidence in a Trespass and Ejectment Extinguishment of a Proviso in a Deed. it was said by Roll chief Iustice that if I do enfeoff I. S. with a Proviso contained in the Deed that it shall be lawfull for me to revoke this Feoffment and afterwards I levy a fine to I. S. of the same Land this is an extinguishment of the Proviso of revocation Olive and Tong. Mich. 1653. Banc. sup Trin. 1651. rot 1426. Vpon a special Verdict in an Action of Trespass and Ejectment Special Verdict in a Trespass and Ejectment the Case in effect was this One whose Sirname was Mills seised of gavelkind-Gavelkind-lands in Kent in fee by his last Will and Testament devised these Lands to Elizabeth his Daughter in tayl with a Proviso in the Will that if his Daughter Elizabeth did mary one of his own Sirname that then she should have the Lands in fee-simple Elizabeth maried one whose Sirname was Mill but commonly called and known by the name Mills also The question was whether she had maried one of such a Sirname whereâ—â— according to the Proviso in the Will she had a fee-simple in the Lands â—evised unto her or whether his Sirname should be accompted a distinct name from the Testators so that Elizabeth by the Will could only have an Estate in tayl in the Lands devised unto her It was argued first that the name Mill and Mills shall not be said to be one and the same name no more than if she had maried one of a clear differing Sirname in sound yet commonly called also Mills could she have been said to have maried one of his own Sirname and the Proviso here is not a particular pointing out of the person whom his Daughter should mary but a general limitation directing her to mary one of his own Sirname and this ought to have been punctually followed because the name was used to induce the affection of the Devisor to enlarge the estate given by him If he had devised his Land to his Daughter E. if she shall mary a Protestant or an Earl she must mary one that is really so and not one called or only reputed so And as to the objection that this construction would make contrariety in the Will which is not to be admitted this will not be if the Will be taken compositive as it is penned or together and not abstractive and taken to pieces and if it should not be intended that she should mary one who in truth was of his name there would be a contradiction in the Will and here is an Emphasis in the word Own which must be meant his real name and not of a reputative name Roll chief Iustice If a Iuror be retorned by the name of Mills and is sworn by the name of Mill shall this be a mistryal quasi non and the words found alike as Baxter and Backster At an other day the Case was put again by Hales and argued for the Plaintiff and he made divers points in the Case but I could not well hear him but the only point insisted on was the point formerly spoken to and the sum of his Argument was that we are in
this Case upon the construction of a Will which must be favourably taken and the variation here betwixt Mills and Mill is small and inconsiderable to defeat an Estate for it is only in the termination of the word and is as little as the difference between Baxter and Backster or Hasting and Hastings 9 E. 4.42 44 Eliz. Molyn and Molyns or Pitt and Pitts which differ but in one letter and is not a material difference 2ly It appears by the Verdict that he was commonly called Mill and Mills and common reputation we know doth give names to things 3ly It is found that he was known by one name as well as the other and this will satisfie the Testators intent well enough to carry the Estate 4ly The party himself was known to the Testator at the time of the making of the Will by the name of Mills as appears in eight several places of the Will And if one devise Lands and Goods and excepts one Lease if there be other Leases they are devised 5ly It appears by the Will and the Verdict that the mariage was intended by the Father with this very person that is called Mills and a settlement of Lands made upon it and it shall not be intended that the Testator thought that this mariage would be dissolved and another mariage be had And the devise in the body of the Will doth not make the Proviso in the end of the Will repugnant but if it did the last repugnancy shall stand for here is no dependancy of the last Proviso upon the other part of the Will but it is a substantine clause which revokes not the other Doctor Buts Case 10 Rep. and this shall be counted his last Will and it is the more strong because it appears by the very words that it is a plain substantive clause made to declare the new intent of the Testator and it shall not be intended that this Proviso shall be applyed to another person although there be a particular title given to him by the Will and the Estate altered by the Proviso and the former devise is derogated by it Hob. 2d Case Harding Case and the strength of the Proviso to have one of the true name of Mills is not to be intended for it appears that the intent of the Testator was to have one of his name in reputation and this appears by the former limitation in the Will and the provision made in the last Proviso to preserve his name is no more than that he had done before and the former limitation is as well for the Testators advantage as the latter Proviso and more and his intent was not to sell the Lands but to preserve them and it is no more to say of my own Sirname than to say of my Sirname nor is the videlicet any thing to the purpose Roll chief Iustice if the question were only upon the Proviso there would be no difficulty but that Mill and Mills should be all one and it would be good in a Conveyance also as I suppose and if it were apparent that he intended one and the same person Proviso then the last Proviso would be good to revoke the former part of the Will but the doubt is whether he intend the same person or not because he makes such an alteration of the Estate by the Proviso and puts these words mine own name in it by which it séems he intended to advance his own name and he seems exact in it by the great alteration of the Estate made by the Proviso in the settlement of the Estate At another day the Case was again moved and argued by Wadham Windham that Mills Mill are both one name and differ but in sound as Abacock Habacock and the Verdict finds that both the names are his true Sirname though it could not be so in Christian names 6 Rep. 66. Sirnames are altered by time and Custom of places and being so altred do become true names as the name of Cromwell is now become a true name though antiently the name was Williams but I agree that Christian names cannot be altered by time no more than things can be altered from one thing to another 3ly By the construction of the Will and by the finding of the Verdict the names are made one name although by the Testator he was known by no other name than the name of Mills for he is so called and this answers the Proviso in the Will that he should be of his own Sirname with whom his Daughter was to mary 4ly Here is a particular devise made to her in the body of the Will of the Lands if they should not be devised here 8 Rep. Clausa generalia non extendunt ad ea quae sunt specialiter recitata and there is a difference between a Will and a Deed for all the words in a Deed are spoken together but it is not so in a Will which is ambulatory and may have several constructions and one clause may controll another Instit 11 2. and the Proviso here in the last part of the Will controlls the former part of the Will as a Codicil might have done if there had been any and the very words express the parties meaning 1 Rep. Porters Case Dyer 255. If in a Will a clause may receive a doubtfull construction then a verbis non est recedendum nor shall there be a particular supplyment of words added to expound it except to prevent an absurdity which must not be admitted though in a Will Maynard on the other side made two questions 1. Whether Mills and Mill should be intended to be one and the same Sirname and so to be the Testators Sirname 2ly Whether Elizabeth take the Lands by the first clause in the Will or by the Proviso or latter clause For the first he held that Mills and Mill is not one and the same Sirname because the Testator had a particular eye to his own true Sirname and the Cases put of names that differ yet sound alike do not come to our Case because there was no such special eye or regard as here is 2ly Suppose that his true name be Mills and that he is provided for particularly by the Testator in his Will then the Proviso cannot extend to him for this would be senselesse and it is as much as to make the Testator in one breath to speak contradictories and it would be hard to make such constructions of such words that would argue the party to be irrational that spake them and the words in the Proviso are in nature of an exception in construction of Law 12 Ed. 1. Fitzh Grants 87. and Carter and Ringsteeds Case is not yet answered by the other side Bolton and the Lady Staffords case 8 Iac. C. B. 1. rep Mildmayes Case The words in a Proviso in a Will or Deed may be supplyed with other words rather than to interpret it so that it shall contradict the former part of the Will or Deed
secrets of his Clyents cause Not to disclose a Clyents cause and thereupon he was forborn to be examined Pilkinton and Bagshaw Pasch 1655. Banc. sup VPon a tryal to be had at the Bar between Pilkington and Bagshaw Tryal at the Bar. the Plaintif would not put in his writ that the tryal might goe on Whereupon Roll chief Iustice bid the Cryer to call the Attorney of the Plaintif to appear and to bring in the writ upon pain of 20 l. and said Pain of 20 l. Attorney put out of the Roll. Non-sute upon the Record that if he brought it not in he should be put out of the Roll. Serjeant Maynard moved that if he brought not in the writ that the Plaintif might be called non-sute upon the Record which Roll chief Iustice answered might well be because the parties have day in Court by the Record or Roll afterwards the Sollicitor who had the writ brought it in yet Roll chief Iustice said There shall notwithstanding the writ be brought in be 20 l. fine set upon him for his trifling with the Court. The Protector and Sumner Pasch 165â— Banc. sup SErjeant Bernard moved that Sumner that appeared in Court upon his habeas corpus directed to the Kéeper of Northampton Gaol might be bailed To bail a prisoner denied for that having killed two men upon the Highway the Iury had found it Man-slaughter se defendendo Roll chief Iustice answered The Iuries conclusion is contrary to their premises Therefore let the prisoner be sent to Northampton Gaol whence he came yet that may not be for the fact was done in Peterborough Tryal Writ ad reâ—piendum and therefore he cannot be tryed at Northampton therefore let him be sent to Peterborough Gaol with a writ ad recipiendum to the Gaoler there to take charge of him Pilkington versus Bagshaw Pasch 1655. Banc. sup IN a Tryal at the Bar in a Trespass and Ejectment betwixt Pilkington and Bagshaw Trespass and Ejectment the question being whether Copyhold lands may be entailed by the custom of the Manor It was said that if Tenant in tail and the issue in tail of Copyhold lands in tail joyn in a surrender in a Court Baron of the Copyhold lands Estopel Copyhold lands in tail Customary entail Fine State enjoyed Seisure of Cepyhold lands that this is not an estopel for it ought to be by fine or deed indented And Roll chief Iustice said that Copyhold lands in tail are not within the Statute of Westm 2. but it is a Customary entail like in its nature to another entail and such an estate must be docked by fine or by some other customary way It was also said by him that if Copies of Court Rolls be shewed to prove a Customary estate the enjoynment of such estates must also be proved otherwise the proof is not good It was also said upon the evidence That a seisure by the Lord made of Copyhold entailed lands within the Manor of Wakefield in Yorkshire is in the nature of a recovery to deck the entail and that the manner of doing it is either for the Copyholder to let his Copyhold for more years than he ought or to refuse to do his service and then the Lord seifes the lands for a forfeiture and grants it to another by the consent of the Copyholder that made the forfeiture It was then also said by Roll chief Iustice Custom that a Custom cannot be urged for a thing that had its beginning since Rich. the 1. if a Record can be shewed to the contrary Common recovery Recompense in value Custom Copyhold destroyed It was also said by him that a common recovery suproseth a recompence in value to all persons who lost the estate by the recovery He said also that he conceived that there could be no such Custom to cut off entails of Copyhold lands by the forfeiture and seisure of the Lord for his seisure upon the forfeiture destroys the Copy-hold estate by the Common Law for it is in the Lords election after the seisure whether he will grant the estate again or no and you do not prove that the Custom binds him to it Nota. Harris and Pasch 1655. Banc. sup THe Court was moved in the Case of one Harris To amend an old judgement Denied that the entry of a judgement twelve years past might be amended upon the Roll. But Roll chief Iustice answered It cannot be after so long time past Pasch 1655. Banc. sup VPon a writ of Error brought to reverse a fine levied by an Infant being a Feme Covert Day to inspect an Infant The Court was moved for a day to bring in the party that levied the fine to be inspected by the Court which was granted and at the day she was brought into the Court and viewed and two witnesses deposed that she was within age at the time of the fine levied Entry upon the Roll. which was entred upon the Roll upon which the Issue was tryed Pasch 1655 Banc. sup IT was said by Roll chief Iustice Election That if there be two Kinsmen in equal degree of kindred to the Intestate it is in the election of the Ordinary to which of them he will grant Letters of Administration Pasch 1655. Banc. sup AN Outlawry was reversed Outlawry reversed because the place where the County Court was held is not shewed in the secundo exactus Pasch 1655. Banc. sup IT was moved that there was a judgement given in the Common Pleas To affirm a judgement a writ of Error depending and thereupon the Defendant brought his writ of Error to reverse the judgement in this Court and since pending the writ of Error the partses were agréed and therefore they desired the judgement might be affirmed because that otherwise satisfaction of the judgement cannot be acknowledged upon the Roll because the Court of Common Pleas were forclosed to do any thing further upon the judgement given there by reason of the writ of Error But Roll chief Iustice answered It cannot be Denied for you shew no cause why we should affirm the judgement and therefore we will make no rule in it but enter satisfaction upon the Roll if you will at your own peril Pasch 1655. Banc. sup IT was said by Roll chief Iustice that an Action upon the case will lie against one that brings vexatious actions against another Action upon the Case for vexation or for entring of Actions of a great value to force his adversary to put in great bail where he hath but small cause of Action Nota. Trevanian and Penhollow Trin. 1655. TRevanian brought an Action upon the case against Penhollow for speaking of these words of him Plea to an Action on the Case Thou hast taken a false Oath at the Assizes and art false forsworn The Defendant pleads that the Plaintif had agréed to accept of 3 Iuggs of Beer from him in satisfaction The Plaintif
he was taken and imprisoned The Defendant pleaded an award made by Sir John Rivers and Sir Nicholas Miller two Iustices of Peace between the parties in Bar. Twisden of Councel with the Plaintif said that the award doth not bind the Plaintif for the award concerns only the speaking of the words and speaks nothing of the imprisoment And 2ly the Award is not good for there is not satisfaction made by it on both parties Wild of Councel with the Defendant held that the Declaration was not good and that therefore he needs not to justifie the plea for though it should be ill yet the Plaintif can have no judgement and he said the Declaration was naught because it alleged no day when nor place where the Defendant charged the Plaintif with the felony and made him to be imprisoned Twisden answered that there is a place alleged and that though there were none yet it is well enough for part and judgement may be given for that To which Roll chief Iustice agréed Wild replyed then the plea is good But the Court answered it is not and what say you to the Arbitrement Wild answered it was good to which Ierman and Ask Iustices assented Roll chief Iustice answered It is a benefit to the Parish and so to the Overseers of the poor Nicholas Iustice to the same purpose Roll chief Iustice said that the Declaration is ill and the Plea also for the Plea is entire Declaration Plea and yet goes not to all the matter alleged in the Declaration but the plea is only to part of them and therefore if any part of the Declaration be good judgement ought to be given against the Defendant for that part and the plea in Bar is naught so judgement ought to be entirely for the Plaintif But it is to be considered concerning the damages Rosyer against Langdale Hill 1650. Banc. sup Pasch 1650. rot 100. ROsyer an Executor brought an Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit against Langdale a Feme Administratrix Error to reverse a judgement in an Assumpsit by an Executor against an Administratrix and declares that the Defendant in consideration that he would forbear sute until she had taken out Letters of Administration did assume and promise to pay unto him the Plaintif a certain sum of money owing unto him by the Intestate Vpon Issue joyned and a Verdict and a Iudgement for the Plaintif The Defendant brought a writ of Error to reverse the Iudgement And Baldwin of his Councel took these Exceptions 1. That the Plaintif had set forth no consideration in his Declaration for the Assumpsit for all that is alleged is that the Plaintif should forbear sute till the Defendant had taken out Letters of Administration which is no consideration at all for the Defendant was not lyable to be sued as Administratrix until she had taken out Letters of Administration except there were a cause depending as here is not And he cited Hob. rep Bidwell and Cottons case That if there be a sute commenced though there be no cause for it yet forbearance to sue is a good cause to ground an Assumpsit upon Assumpsit A second Exception was that the Venire facias is not awarded per Curiam nec in Curia Roll chief Iustice held the 1. a good Exception for the Defendant was not chargeable before Letters of Administration taken forth if she do not intermedle with the goods of the Intestate and it doth not appear here that she did neither is the Defendant compellable to take forth Letters of Administration for they may be granted to the next of Kin if the Ordinary pleaseth according as the Statute ordains Ierman Nicholas and Ask Iustices to the same intent thereupon the rule was reversetur nisi c. But because Day being of Councel on the other side took some Exceptions to the writ of Error and the retorn thereof It was adjourned Staples Hill 1650. Banc. sup THe Court was moved to supersede a scire sacias brought by a prisoner of the Marshalsea For a Supersedeas to a Scire sacias upon the late Act for discharging of poor prisoners because the Certificate of the cause for which he was a prisoner was false and so the procéedings erronious for the party was in execution for Trespass which is not within the Statute made for the prisoners 2ly Because there was no due notice given to the party at whose sute he lay in execution as the Statute doth direct there should The Court ordered to view the Certificate 〈◊〉 Den uneâ— and to file it otherwise there should be no proceedings upon the scire facias and directed the party to demur upon the scire facias if it be not good because the matter alleged cannot be pleaded to it Custodes against Arskot Hill 1650. Banc. sup MAynard moved the Court for one Arskot that was outlawed for murther For time to bring a Writ of Error and had leave to bring his writ of Error that he may have longer time to bring it because the King uses to sign the writ and the Parliament had not ordered who shall do it now and therefore the Attorney General must advise with the Parliament about it which cannot spéedily be done Thereupon time was granted till the Attorney could conveniently do it Newcomin against Leigh Hill 1650. Banc. sup Pasch 16â—0 rot 52. LEigh did assume and promise unto Newcomin Whether a good Assumpsit that if Newcomin would take one Loe for his Debtor in the room of one Cooper and would spare Loe until such a time for the money that then he would pay the money to Newcomin if he did not and upon this Assumpsit Newcomin brought his Action against Leigh The question was whether this were a good Assumpsit And the Court held it was not because it is a collateral thing and he doth not say that he will discharge Cooper and so Newcomin may sue Cooper notwithstanding the Assumpsit For though it may be it was the intention of the parties to discharge Cooper yet it appears not so by the words of the Assumpsit set forth And it was then said by Roll. That if I promise to pay to Iohn a Down a Debt which Iohn a Stile oweth to Iohn a Down Nudum pactum this is nudum pactum Bawsy and Lowdall Hill 1650. Banc. sup Pasch 1650. rot 275. VPon a special verdict in an Action of Trespasse and Ejectment Special Verdict upon the devise of a Copyhold in Fee the case in effect was this A man seised of Copyhold lands in fée devisable by Custom deviseth them in this manner I give and bequeath my lands c. to my son Richard during his natural life and after to the heir of his body for ever Hales of Councel with the Plaintif made these questions 1. whether by the words of the Will a Fee-simple at the Common Law passeth because there is an estate to Richard for life and after