Selected quad for the lemma: land_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
land_n	body_n	heir_n	remainder_n	3,791	5	10.8619	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A65445	The office and dutie of execvtors, or, A treatise of wils and executors, directed to testators in the choise of their executors and contrivance of their wills with direction for executors in the execution of their office, according to the law, and for creditors in the recovery of their debts : expressing the duty, right, interest, power and authority of executors, and how they may behave themselves in the office of executorship : with divers other particulars very usefull, profitable, and behovefull for all persons, be they either executors, creditors or debtors : compiled out of the body of the common-law, with mention of such statutes as are incident hereunto.	Wentworth, Thomas, 1568?-1628.; Doddridge, John, Sir, 1555-1628.	1641 (1641)	Wing W1358; ESTC R15205	180,173	328

nothing it was resolved that A. should not have i● for their lives but for his owne onely This Case was said to come very close in reason to the Case in question for as heere the intent of the Lease was that B. and C. should bee estated for their lives and since that could not bee therefore the naming of them should bee utterly voyd and as if they had not at all beene named and their lives shall not stand as a measure for the estate of A. So in thother Case the intent of the will being that the Lease or Land leased should goe to the heires Males of the body first of Alexander and after of Raulphe since this cannot bee therefore the words and name of heires males should stand for a meere blancke and cipher and not to measure out any state to the said Alex. and Ra. and their Executors and assignes Also it was said on the defendants part that an estate for life in the judgement of Law is of so short and uncertaine continuance that if A. make a Lease to B. for his life and after makes a Lease of the same Land to C. for yeeres now shall not this latter Lease bee voyd absolutely for any part of the terme but shall stand in expectance of the death of B. and as soone as hee dyeth shall take effect immediately whereas if the Lease to B. had been for ten yeeres or any like terme then the Lease to C. should have beene voyd for so many yeeres of his terme thus it appeares that a State for life is very momentary in the judgement of Law and not reputed of any certaine continuance so much as for a day but it is otherwise of an estate tayle so as if A. having given Land to B. in tayle doth after without indenture which makes an Estoppell make a Lease to C. for xxj yeeres and then B. dyeth without issue during the terme yet shall not the Lease take effect because it was utterly voyd at the first making For an estate tayle being a state of inheritance may in the intendment and judgement of Law have continuance for ever as appeares both by the Case of Adams and Lambert where it is held within the Statute of Chaunteries which speaks of gifts to have continuance for ever Therefore a reversion upon an estate tayle is no assets nor giveth cause of receipt otherwise in all these Cases it is touching a reversion expectant upon a state for life Againe it was said by the defendants councell that an estate may bee limitted to A. and his heires during the life of B. with remainder to C. as in Chudlies Case was resolved but if Land bee given to A. and his heires so long as B. shall have heires of his body or heires males with remainder over to C. this remainder is utterly voyd So as there is in the judgement of Law a great difference betweene the largenes and continuance of an estate tayle and of an estate for life And if which is worth the observing a fe● simple cannot afford a remainder to bee drawne out of it after such a gift to one and his heires during the continuance of an estate tayle or of the measure thereof much lesse can a terme yield such large thongs to bee cut out of it as a remainder after an estate to one so long as hee shall have heires of his body or heires Males which is all one And in this case the remainder was held voyd by Baldwin and Shelley though Engl field were of contrary opinion as the Lord Dyer sheweth Further it was said that if such a conveyance by will should stand good it would raise a perpetuity not to bee cut off by any recovery But whereas the case of Hammon hath beene related before so by way of admittance it was argued as a gift and bequest to Al. Ham. and the heires Males of his body with remainder in like manner to Ralfe The truth of the case was that the words of the will were onely to Alexander and his heires Males not speaking of his body and so to Ralfe which as was urged by the defendants counsell made the Case stronger against the plantifes for admit that the former way Alexander should have had but a state determinable upon the continuance of his issue Males yet here not so Since the reason why in Willes such a devise being made the Law should supply the words of the body is onely to make an estate tayle to the issues Male according to the Testators intent Now in this case of a terme for yeares so bequeathed no estate tayle could possibly bee though these words had beene in the will and therefore the motive to the Law fayling no such supply will bee made by the Law since it would bee to no purpose consequently here was neither state tayle nor issues or heires Males of the body on whose continuance this state of Alex. should bee determinable Therefore it was an absolute and totall bequest of the terme to Alexander for ever viz. so long as the Terme should continue for as a bequest to one for ever is asmuch as a bequest to him and his heires so a bequest to one and his heires is as much as if it had beene to him for ever And this Case after sixe arguments on each side at the Barre if I much mistake not was upon argument by the Barons adjudged for the defendant by the Lord chiefe Baron Tanfeild and M r. Baron Bromley M r. Baron Denham who onely heard as I take it one argument on each side made of purpose in respect of his comming into his place after the former arguments being of the contrary opinion and the judgement proceeded upon the point formerly touched that as this case was the state of Alexander did not end by his death and remaine to the Executors of Ralfe Other points were stirred which will bee touched upon other divisions after in this Chapter It will be observed that I doe more fully expresse reasons and points inforced on the defendants part then on the plaintifes whereof let these two reasons bee accepted First That I better could relate that then the other being the first who argued for the defendant and hearing little of that which was by others said on either side after nor hearing the Courts Nec ad hoc conductus nec pedibus fortis Secondly the labour did lie on the defendants part to prove that this Case differed from the common case of devise to one for life with remainder to another Wee are now come to the sixt point viz. that where House or Land held by lease or the proffits thereof or the lease or terme it selfe which in a Will makes no difference is bequeathed to A. for life or for some part of the terme with the remainder to B. and the Executor assenteth that A. shall enjoy his bequest whether this shall enure to B. also since without the Executors assent no legacy can take

by a wrongfull person and in Suttons case it was expresly held that each Executor should answer for so much as he wasted Now for the fift and last point viz. how and in what manner reliefe shall bee had upon this point of wasting for him to whom it pertaines first this is to bee observed that in case where the verdit passeth directly against the plaintife no devastation can come in question for that no judgement being for the plaintife no writ of execution can issue and therefore if upon the issue of fully administred it shall appeare that there hath beene a devastation which causeth assets to faile then must the Iury finde that the defendant hath assets and not finde a devastation as was resolved in the Kings Bench in the late Queenes time betweene Hankeford and Metford for there the jury finding a devastation viz. a surrender of a lease for yeeres left by the Testator it was held voyd and nugatory and was not regarded by the Court which said that must come in by the Sherifes returne viz. upon the Fieri fac Thus assets being found in the Executors hands judgement is given for the plaintife to recover his debt and to have it levied of these assets nor is this finding of them by a jury against truth though they bee wasted and so not to bee had in kind for the Executor hath them in right since hee hath not rightfully parted from them according to the rule Propossessore habetur qui dolo or injuria desiit possidere As in the case first put this wasting cannot come in question for want of a judgement for the plaintife so also where the judgement it selfe extendeth to the Executors owne goods by reason of some false plea whereof wee shall after consider for since that the consequence and effect of a vastation is but to make the Executors owne proper goods liable to the debt of the Creditor this is altogether needlesse where the judgement it selfe hath layed hold on his goods But now in case where the judgement extends onely to the Testators goods in the Executors hands let us finde the way to releive the Creditor in case the Testators goods bee wasted by misadministring or otherwise for hereabout the right way hath often beene missed and againe easily may bee In the latter end of the late Queenes time this course was taken viz. the Sherife returning generally that the Executor had no goods a surmise was entred that the Executor had converted to his owne use the Testators goods whereupon a writ was awarded to the Sheriffe to enquire thereof by jury or enquest which he did and returned that it was found that the executor had wasted the goods and thereupon a Scire facias was awarded against the executor to shew cause why execution should not be of his owne goods and upon two nihils returned execution was so awarded but a writ of error was hereupon brought And although it were said for defence of that course that it was usuall in the Cōmon Pleas and more favourable than the other course where the Sheriffe only returneth the wasting or is sole judge thereof whereas here it was found by an inquest of Jurors and thereupon a Scire facias awarded yet did the Court resolve the contrary and reverse this execution as erroneous For it was said that upon the Sheriffes returne of nulla bona viz. that there were no goods of the testator to be found the plaintiffe should have a speciall writ of Fieri facias willing the Sheriffe to levie the summe recovered either of the goods of the testator or if it could appeare that the executor had wasted the testators then to levie it of his own goods and this way as was said the executor hath good remedy by action against the Sheriffe if without just cause hee levie it of his goods but the other way viz. when inquest is thereupon taken the remedy failes since neither sheriffe doing according to the inquest can be punished nor the jurors finding falsely are subject to any attaint it being no verdict upon issue joyned but an inquest of office which excludeth also all challenge of jurors And whereas that booke mentions the Sheriffes subjection to action onely in case of his mis-feasance or doing wrong I conceive that hee is likewise suable for omission or nonfeasance in this case viz. for not levying the debt upon the executors owne goods where proofe is made of his wasting And where the booke mentions this Fieri facias to bee in this manner upon the Sheriffes returne in a Scire facias doubtlesse the booke therein is misprinted and should be a Fieri facias for in a Sciri facias the Sheriffe can returne nothing but that he hath warned the party or that he hath nothing where by he may be warned This then is the course there prescribed that first a generall Fieri facias go out and that thereupon the Sheriffe returne generally that the defendant hath no goods of the testators and that thereupon the said speciall writ is to issue yet in the beginning of the late Queens time the verdict passing for the plaintiffe upon the issue of fully administred the Sheriffe was not permitted to make such a generall return of no goods to be found of the testators but was inforced by the Court upon good advisement either to leavy the debt or to returne a Devastavit and so was done at last by the Sheriffes of London much against their minds and therupon went out a writ to leavy the debt of the executors owne goods first into London and after into Devonshire upon a Testatum that the executor had goods there And it was there said that if no goods could bee there found then the plaintiffe might have a Capias to take the executors body in execution or an Elegit for the moiety of his lands But certainly I cannot find except with a difference how this course of inforcing the Sheriffe to doe one of these two can be just as neither could Justice Fulthorp in the time of King Henry the sixth approve it For a Jury of one County may finde assets in another County as was resolved in the time of King Henry the eight which yet was understood of goods moveable and not of lands This then thus being if a Jury of Kent find assets which be in London or Essex how can the Sheriffe of Kent where the action was laid leavy the debt recovered by or out of these goods or since he cannot why should he be compelled to make a false returne of a wasting when the goods remain unspent and unwasted in another County Why rather should hee not bee suffered to returne according to truth that there is nothing within his Countie or Bayliwicke whereof the debt may be levied since even his oath tieth him to make a true returne nor is this contrary to the verdict finding assets generally and this so returned upon

might it be yeelded at another so as it were at any time before the day But yet there it was held that if no time of assent were limitted then one expresse deniall or refusall would be peremptory so as the refusall were expressed to the party to whom the assent was to be given otherwise if it were but in speech to or among strangers This and the former case 19. Eliz. give the best light to this point that I remember Now for disablement to assent it was held in the fore-mentioned case of Low and Carter that where a terme is bequeathed to A and after the testators death the executor takes a new lease of the same land for more yeares in possession or to begin presently now by this was the terme left by the testator surrendred and drowned so as it could not passe to A by the executors assent after As to the fifth point viz. in what manner a lease for yeares or other chattell reall may be bequeathed to one for a time with remainder to another it hath been heretofore much doubted when a lease for yeares was bequeathed to one for life or for so many yeares as he should live whether the limitting of a remainder thereof after his decease were of any validity in law or not and this doubt had this ground any state for life in the judgement of law is greater than any terme for yeares therefore when a termer hath by his will given his terme or his house or land which hee so holdeth for yeares to one for life or for so many yeares as he shall live this testator and devisor hath not in the judgment of the law any estate remaining in him and therefore it was thought very hard for him to give or limit a remainder to another But after many arguings and debatings it was in the late Queenes time resolved that such a remainder was good and that if the first devisee died before the terme expired that then he to whom the remainder was limitted might enter and enjoy the residue of the terme As for the giving of part of the years to one and the residue to the other viz. If the terme being twenty yeares the Lessee bequeatheth ten thereof to his wife and the remainder to his daughter Of this no doubt ever was but that it was good for that after the first state limitted there remained a further terme viz. ten yeares more in the Devisor whereof he had power to dispose whereas in the other case after the terme limitted to one for life there remained but a possibility that this life should not take up the whole terme But now put we the case a third way viz. that the termor deviseth or bequeatheth the thing in lease to one child intaile with remainder to another and dieth and the first entreth and dyeth without issue now whether shall the next in remainder or the executor of him so dying have the terme residue and this case came in question and was adjudged about the middle of K. Iohn his reigne in the Exchequer for there Master Hamond holding by lease for yeares from the Crowne the manner of Akers in Kent devised the same by his will to Alexander Hamond his eldest son and the heires males of his body with remainder to Ralfe Hamond another son in like manner and the like remainder to Thomas Hamond and made the said Alexander executor who after his fathers decease elected to take as legatory and after Ralfe Hamond died leaving issue male and making his wife executrix Alexander not having issue male granted the whole terme by deed to B and C. for the behoofe of himselfe and his wife during their lives and after to the use of his yongest daughter whom Sir Robert Lewkenor married then Alexander dying without issue male the wife and Executrix of Ralfe Hammond entred claiming the terme and being kept out sealed a Lease whereupon an Eject firmae was brought and a Jury appearing at the Barre in the Exchequer found a speciall verdict in effect Vt supra And in argument of this Case first the maine question was whether this case were all one in Law with the former where a terme was devised to one for life which remainder over so as by the death of Alexander Hammond without issue male the terme should goe to the next in remainder as in the other Case by the death of the devisee for life dying within the terme it should doe And on the plaintifes part it was urged to bee all one so that by vertue of the Bequeasts supra Alexander had an estate to him and his Executors onely so long as there should bee heires males of his body and hee dying without such issue the terme remained to the Executors of Ralfe who had the remainder in like manner and left issue male which still lived and so that seate of Ralfe yet had continuance For it was admitted by the counsell on that side that the terme could not goe to the issue male of Ralfe according to the words and intent of the will since it was impossible to make a terme to descend without an act of Parlament This therefore they said the Law should worke which was neerest to the intent viz. that after Alexanders death it should goe first to his Executors and assignees so long as issue male of his body doth continue and for want of such issue then to Ralfe his Executors and assignees so long as his issue male should last and therefore in this case the issue male of Alex. failing the executor of Ralfe whose issue male fayleth not should injoy the terme and so judgement ought to be given for the plaintife being lessee of that Executor on the other side it was said by the defenda●ts counsell that this Case differeth much from the other Case where the terme or Land held by Lease is given but for life to the first with remainder to another which Case as having beene often resolved was clearely admitted to bee good law for in that case the intent of the Testator might and did take effect But in this case if the land should goe to the Executors and assignees of Ralfe Hammon it must goe against the intent of the Testator whose mind and wil was as it appeares by his word that it should goe onely to the issue male of one sonne after another and not to any Executors Now then since this intent was so contrary to the rules of Law that it could not take effect therefore it must be voyd and so all the words of heires Male standing voyd the Will is to be construed as a sole and absolute gift and bequeast to the said Alex. consequently the terme must goe to his Executors and assignees And for this point resemblance was made to a Case resolved in the Kings-Bench where a Lease was made by indent to A. Habend to A. B. and C. for their lives now because B. and C. could take

effect And it hath beene resolved that this assent shall bee effectuall as well to all the remainders as to the first estate and so according to former resolutions it was admitted in Hamons Case that Alexander his assent to take as legatee sufficed if the bequest had beene good for the remainders to Ralfe and others And the reason of this doubtles is because heere the particular estate and the remainder are all but one estate in Law they make but one degree in a Writ of Entre nor shall have but one yeere and a day to enter for mortmaine And an atturnement to the grantee of a rent or reversion for life with remainder over doth enure also to the remainder which being an assent hath much affinity to that of the Executor each tending to perfect the grant of another man Now then whereas it was urged in Hammo●ds Case that the state limitted to Ral●e should take effect not as a remainder but as a new estate to commence futurely viz. when Alexander should bee dead without issue male if it should bee admitted to bee so then could not the assent of the first state to Alexander have enured to this since to A. remainder it worketh as being one estate with the first which reason must faile thother way This difference betweene a remainder and new estate future brings to my minde the case of a rent by way of new Creation granted by C. out of land to A. for life or in taile with remainder to B. in like manner where it hath probably beene held although this limitation to B. cannot bee good by way of remainder because C. had no estate in the rent remaining with him when hee made the grant to A. yet should it be good by way of new grant and creation to commence futurely But this doubtles cannot so be but with a difference for if the grant were by indenture betweene C. on th one part and A. only on the other part now B. being no party to the deed can take nothing by it except by way of remainder but if hee were party to the indenture or if the grant were by deed poll to which all men are alike parties then it happily may enure as a future grant to B. This not impertinent Now as the executors assent to one cannot enure to another though of the same thing except by way of remainder so neither can it any way where the things are not the same except in very speciall cases as if a termor bequeath a rent to A and the land it selfe to B the executors assent that A should have the rent is no assent that B should have the land yet I think the assent that B should have the land doth imply the assent that A should have the rent 1. For that the restraint imposed by the law against the passing of a chattell by a will without the executors assent being out of respect to the payment of the testators debts now if the land shall passe to B it is no more availeable to the testators debts that it passe discharged of the rent then charged 2. Since the gift and bequest was of the land charged with the rent therefore if this bequest shall take effect it shall carry the land according to the testators intent viz. with this charge upon it for what else doth the executor in this but assent that the will of the testator herein do stand and take effect and consequently B must take the terme according to the will and not in any different or contrary manner Next we are to consider of the manner of assents by executors which hath some affinity with the fourth point But here we shall consider only of assents conditionall now to this purpose we will cast our eyes upon two sorts of conditions viz. precedent and subsequent As for ●he former an executor may to a legatee absolutely given assent upon a condition precedent as thus I am content that if you can get and bring in to me such a bond wherein the testator stood bound unto I. S. that then you enter upon the terme or take the corne or cattell to you bequeathed So of other like conditions which may precede the assent as if you can get the assent of my coexecutor or if you will pay the arrerages of rent to the lessor behind at the testators death or if you will pay the wages already due to the servants attending about the cattell or corne to you bequeathed In this case if the condition be not performed there is no assent and therefore the conditioning in this manner is good But if it be upon a condition subsequent as thus I do agree that you shall have the thing bequeathed to you provided that you shall pay so much yearly to me or to such a creditor of the testator now the legatee entring into or taking the thing bequeathed shall not lose it againe by failing to performe the condition afterwards for the executor by his assent cannot make that legacy conditionall which the testator gave absolutely no more then he can make that bequest to be absolute which the testator gave conditionally except by a release made of the condition As in other things so in this the executors assent is like to the atturnement of a lessee which cannot be upon a condition subsequent where the grant is absolute or without condition though yet he may to his atturnement prefix a condition precedent In the eighth place we are touching the bequest of leases or chattels reall to consider what manner of interest one to whom a remainder of a terme after the death of another is limited hath and whether he may grant the same or dispose thereof during the life of the first And as to that it is cleare that he hath but a possibility of remainder for that possibly the whole terme may be spent in the life of the first to whom during his or her life it is bequeathed now a meere possibility is not grantable Therefore was it resolved in the late Queenes time where hee in remainder granted or sould his state or interest to another during the time of the first that this grant was utterly void because a possibility cannot be granted but whereas some opinion in that case was delivered that this possibility could not be released no more then granted it hath since bin resolved that he in the remainder by his deed of grant or release to the devisee for life may make his estate which before was determinable by his death to be now absolute so as it shall continue to his executors administrators and assignes after his death during the whole terme It may be that what was conceived in the said case of Fulsey negatively of the validity of a release by him in the remainder might be meant or perhaps expressed of a release to him in the reversion but surely me thinks though he could not surrender yet his release or defeasance to him

in reversion or remainder having the freehold or inheritance should dissolve or destroy this terme residue after the death of the divisee for life so as there the freehold should be discharged thereof But Quae. for I have not knowne this in question As for the other point of Fulses case it was in the said later case of Lampett confirmed and admitted for good law viz. that this possibility of remainder could not be aliened nor conveyed to a stranger Now we are come to the ninth point viz. to examine whether any act of the devisee for life can frustrate or defeate him in the remainder of the terme and whether by the act of God viz. the death of him in the remainder before the first devisee for life shall defeat it As to the first it hath divers times been resolved that no grant made by the first man cut off or defeat the second though formerly it were held otherwise but according to the later resolution was it also held or admitted by all in the said case of Hamo●d where was such a grant And as this cannot be done by direct grant or alienation no more can it by an indirect or implyed as by taking of a new lease which is a surrender in law of the old lease no more then by an expresse surrender Nor doubtlesse by outlawry whereby the terme of the first divisee is setled in the Crowne But if we put the case further of waste committed by the tenant for life or breach of condition by not paiment of the rent or otherwise these for the whole in the later case and for the part wasted in the former doe so destroy the lease and put the reversioner in Statu quo prius as that all remainders must needs faile so of a feoffement or other like forfeiture by fine As for the death of him in remainder it was urged in the case of Hamond that since it was but a meere possibility if it could not take effect and become an estate in the life of him to whom it was limitted it could not settle in his executor and to that purpose were cited the case of the Rector of Chedington and more expresly as resolved in the point the case of Price and Atmore But the Court resolved and found former resolutions in other Courts that way that the death of him in remainder did not hinder but that it may settle as well in his executors upon the death of the devisee as it should have done in himselfe if he had overlived the first divisee for life If the lessor enter and levie a fine and the divisee for life enters not nor claimes in five years he in the remainder may enter as having a right futurely accrued In the last place wee intermedled only with Leases bequeathed wherein yet is to be understood that what thereof is spoken is to be extended to and understood of all other chattels reall as wardship of body and lands estates by extent upon statutes or judgements termes otherwise than by lease in faires markets rents annuities commons advowsons and other profits yea one single next avoidance of a Church Now we come to consider of bequests personall principally if not only viz. how such may be forfeited lost or revoked First then we will consider of the acts of the legatee secondly of the acts of God thirdly of the acts of the testator The legatee as from the Civilians I learne may forfeit his legacie by his mis-cariage towards the will as if hee use meanes to have it concealed and kept from being knowne and consequently proved So if he accuse it of falsity So againe if he deface or destroy the will Also if being by the will appointed to be tutor or educator of a child he refuseth so to be so saith Master Swinborne but Silvester Prierius seemes to me opposite in that where he saith Si legatum fuerit aliquid ea conditione ut facias aliquid tale legatum non est conditionale sed modale so as he takes away the force of a condition from words conditionall whereas the other without words conditionall raiseth a condition implied Lastly if the legatee presume too farre upon the strength of of the bequest to him so as he taketh the thing bequeathed without the consent of the executor thus also doth he forfait his legacie saith Master Swinborne unlesse the testator did will and appoint he should so doe The falling into enmity with the testator will be considered of more fitly as I take it among the acts of the testator In the next place let us see what acts of shall God cause a legacy not to take effect first thus If the legatee die before the testator this legacie is lost and his executor shall not have it So also saith Master Swinborne if it be appointed to bee paid after the death of the executor and the legatee dieth before the executor it is lost and so also if he dye before the condition performed saith he Let us come now to time of payment and death before it If there bee a day certaine limitted for payment and the legatee die before that day his executor shall have the legacie contrariwise if the paiment were limitted to be made when the legatee should be married but if it were only expressed to be towards the marriage of the legatee and shee die before marriage her executors shall have it saith Swinborne Now put the case that a legacie is bequeathed to B to be payed when he shall be five and twenty yeares old and B dyeth before that age it shall now be paid to the executor and that presently without staying till B should have been of that age saith Prier Nay saith Swinborne if the words of the will be so viz. when he shall come to such an age then if he die before his executors shall not have it at all but if the bequest be generall and further it is added in the will that the testator would have that legacie paid the legatee at such an age there though he die before such age yet his executors shall have the summe bequeathed The difference may seeme very nice yet happily it wants not some probable colour of reason Now lastly let us come to the testators own act who clearly hath power to revoke or countermand any legacie though he revoke not the rest of the will and here first of revocation presumed If there fall out Graves inimicitiae inter legantem legatarium legatum caducum efficitur saith the Summist Sed non propter leves saith he si graves si tamen redeant ad amicitiam reintegratur legatum that is by grievous enmity after arising and never reconciled between the testator and legatee the legacie is dissolved otherwise of a light breach or falling out though it continue untill the death of the testator This I conceived to be rather fit for this place as