Car. nunc cap. 3. in pursuance of which he distrained the said Nails for the Duty due by those Acts out of a Smiths Forge c. The Plaintiff demurred So the sole question was whether a Smiths Forge were within the Acts it being once argued the last Term the Court now gave their Opinion Moreton I think a Smiths Forge ought to pay 't is a great part of the Kings Revenue almost in every Village there is one we should explain the Act liberally for the King Rainsford of the same Opinion 't is within the words scilicet an Hearth whereon Fire is used and within the meaning for there is an exception of things not so properly Fire hearths as this viz. Private Ovens Where the Act excepts Blowing Houses I take it is meant Glass houses and the Houses at Ironworks by Stamps I think is meant Presses Calenders for Cloaths by the very words Houses that are not Dwelling Houses are charged The objection that it is his Trade is answered by the instance of Cooks Chandlers Common Ovens Hearths of Tripewomen who boil Neats Feet Twisden of the same Opinion the words are general yet I would not extend it to every Hearth that has a Fire upon it as Stils and Alembicks for so we might extend it to a Chaffing dish of Coals but we must take it for a Rule to extend it to those things which are most general A Smiths Forge is of such use that 't is found almost in every Village therefore 't was reckoned a great piece of hardship and slavery upon the Children of Israel that they were not permitted a thing so useful amongst them The exceptions enumerate particulars therefore it excludes whatever is not expressed Hale I would fain know how the fact is Do Silver Smiths c. pay It were too narrow to extend it only to Common Chimneys and too great a latitude to extend it to every place where Fire is where a Man can but warm his Hands I suppose Boylers in Cooks Chimneys and the Fireplaces of Worstead Combers do not pay Common Ovens should have paid tho' there were no exception of Private Ovens for they never are or can be without a Chimney This is matter of fact I have not enquired into and I would be loath to deliver an Opinion without much inquiry but 't is very probable that they are Firehearths and not excepted but it appears plainly upon the Record that 't is a Firehearth and by the general Demurrer 't is admitted Note There was a Special Rule that no advantage should be taken of the Pleading by either side But Hale said he did not know how they were bound by that Rule Termino Paschae Anno 24 Car. II. In Banco Regis Monk versus Morris and Clayton THe Plaintiff after he had obtained Iudgment in Debt became Bankrupt and the Defendants brought a Writ of Error The Judgment was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber and the Record sent back Then a Commission of Bankrupts is sued out and the Commissioners Assign this Judgment The Plaintiff Sues out Execution and the Money is levied by the Sheriff and brought into Court The Assignee moves that it may not be delivered to the Plaintiff surmising that the Judgment was assigned to him ut Ante. The Court said they might have brought a Special Sicre facias which they having delayed and that it would be hard to stay the Money in Court upon a bare surmise and for ought appeared it was the Plaintiff's due But however because it might be hazardous to deliver it to him they consented to detain it so that the Assignee forthwith took out a Scire facias against the Defendant in order to try the Bankrupcy or otherwise that it should be delivered to the Plaintiff Sir Ralph Bovyes Case IN an Ejectment upon a Tryal at Bar the Case appeared to be this Sir William Drake was seized in Fee of the Lands in question and 19 Car. 1. infeoffed Sir William Spring and five others to such uses as he should declare by his Will in Writing or by his Deed subscribed by three Witnesses In August 20 Car. 1. by his Deed ut supra he limits the use of the said Lands to his Brother Francis Drake for 90 years and declares That the Feoffees should be seized to their own use in Trust for the said Francis Drake and his Heirs with a power to Francis Drake to alter and limit the Trust as he should think fit In the same Month there is a Treaty of Marriage between F.D. and the Daughter of Sir William Spring and it was agreed by certain Articles between F.D. and Sir W. S. c. reciting that he should receive 2500 l with his intended Wife which Money was proved to be paid that F. D. should convey the Lands in question to himself and his Wife and the Heirs Males of their two Bodies c. for the Joynture of the Wife The Marriage afterwards in 20 Car. takes effect and soon after the same year F.D. by Indenture between him Sir W.S. and another reciting the Articles of Marriage Assigns his Term of 90 years to Sir W. S. and the other in Trust to himself for Life the remainder to his Wife for Life and after to the Heirs Males of their two Bodies and by the same Deed limits the Trust of the Inheritance of the Lands in the same manner Afterwards in 23 Car. 1. he in consideration of 6000 l proved to be paid Grants out of the said Lands a Rent of 400 l per annum to Sir Ralph Bovy and his Heirs with power to enter into the Land in case the Rent was not paid and to retain it until satisfaction Afterwards F. D. and his Wife dye the Rent was Arrear Sir R. Bovy enters Sir Will. Spring and the other Trustees Assign the term of 90 years to Sir Will. Drake Heir Male of F.D. and his Wife the Lessor of the Plaintiff In this case these Points were agreed by the Court. First That when Sir W. D. enfeoffed divers to such Uses as he should declare by his Will or Writing that if he had in pursuance of that Feoffment limited the Uses by his Will that the Will had been but Declaratory tho' if he had made a Feoffment to the Use of his Will it had been otherwise according to Sir Ed. Cleeres Case 6 Co. And Hale said my Lord Co. made a Feoffment provided that he might dispose by his Will to the use of the Feoffee and his Heirs and resolved in that case he might declare the Use by his Will which should arise out of the Feoffment Secondly That this Settlement being in pursuance of Articles made precedent to the Marriage had not the least colour of fraud whereby a Purchaser might avoid it and if there had been but a Verbal Agreement for such a Settlement it would have served the turn And the Court said if there had been no precedent Agreement so that it had been a voluntary Conveyance tho' every such
only shewn upon the Declaration to enable the Plaintiff to bring his Action Note This is aided by a late Act of Parliament Jay versus Bond. IN Trespass the Defendant pleads that Ante Quinden ' Sancti Martini usque ad hunc diem praed ' Jay Excommunicatus fuit adhuc existit protulit hic in Cur ' literas Testamentarias Episcopi Sarum quae notum faciunt universis quod scrutatis Registeriis invenitur contineri quod Excommunicat ' fuit c. pro contumacia in non comparendo to a Suit for Tythes c. in cujus rei Testimonium praed ' Episcopus Sigillum apposuit It was objected that such a kind of Certificate of Excommunication as this is was not allowable for it ought to be positive and under the Seal of the Ordinary whereas this is only a relation of what is found in their Register Sed non allocatur for tho' such a form of pleading would be altogether insufficient in our Law yet their course is sometimes to certifie Excommunication sub sigillo Ordinarij and sometimes per literas Testamentarias as here Hale said to plead Letters Patents without saying sub magno sigillo is naught and that because the King has divers Seals Note The entry was here quod Defendens venit dicit c. Hale doubted whether he ought not to have made some kind of defence tho' no full defence is to be made when Excommengment in the Plaintiff is pleaded Owen versus Lewyn THe Plaintiff declared in Action upon the Case upon the Custom of the Realm against a Common Carrier and also sur Trover and Conversion Hale said so he might for Not guilty answers both but if a Carrier loseth Goods committed to him a General Action of Trover doth not lye against him Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 24 Car. II. In Banco Regis Davenant against the Bishop of Salisbury IN Covenant The Plaintiff declared that the Bishop of Salisbury the Defendants Predecessor being seized in Fee demised unto him certain Lands for 21 years reserving the antient Rent c. and Covenanted for him and his Successors to discharge all publick Taxes assessed upon the Land and that since the Defendant was made Bishop a certain Tax was assessed upon the Land by vertue of an Act of Parliament and that the Plaintiff was forced to pay it the Defendant refusing to discharge it unde Actio accrevit c. The Defendant demurred first to the form for that 't is said that the Predecessor Bishop was seized and doth not say in jure Episcopatus But Hale said the Old Books were that where it was pleaded that J. S. Episcopus was seized that it implies seizin in the right of the Bishoprick which is true if he were a Corporation capable only in his politick capacity or as an Abbot c. but in regard he might also be seized in his natural capacity the Declaration was for this Cause held to be ill The matter in Law was whether this were such a Covenant as should bind the Successor as incident to a Lease which the Bishop is empowred to make by the 32 H. 8. For 't is clear if a Bishop had made a Covenant or Warranty this had not bound the Successor at the Common Law without the consent of the Dean and Chapter and if it should be now taken that every Covenant would bind the Successor then the Statute of 1 Eliz. would be of no effect But Hale said admitting this were an antient Covenant and if so it should have been averred to have been used in former Leases to discharge ordinary payments as Pentions or Tenths granted by the Clergy then it might bind the Successor by the 32 H. 8. But it were hard to extend it to new charges And we all know how lately this way of Taxes came in But the Court said that the Declaration being insufficent for the other matter they would not determine this But they held that however this Covenant should prove it would not avoid the Lease Vid. Gee Bishop of Chicester and Freedlands Case 3 Cro. 47. Note Hale said that antiently when the Sheriff returned a Rescous upon a Man he was admitted to plead to it as to an Indictment But the course of the Court of latter times has been not to admit any Plea to it but to drive the party to his Action upon the Case as upon the return of a Devastavit c. Cole versus Levingston IN Ejectment upon a long and intricate Special Verdict the Chief Justice said never was the like in Westminster Hall these following Points were resolved by the Court and declared by Hale as the Opinion of himself and the rest of the Judges First That where one Covenants to stand seized to the use of A. and B. and the Heirs of their Bodies of part of his Land and if they die without Issue of their Bodies then that it shall remain c. and of another part of his Land to the use of C.D. and E. and the Heirs of their Bodies and if they die without Issue of their Bodies then to remain c. that here there are no cross Remainders created by Implication for there shall never be such Remainders upon construction of a Deed tho' sometimes there are in case of a Will 1 Rolls 837. Secondly As this Case is there would be no cross Remainders if it were in a Will for cross Remainders shall not rise between three unless the words do very plainly express the intent of the Devisor to be so as where black Acre is devised to A. white Acre to B. and green Acre to C. and if they die without Issue of their Bodies vel alterius eor ' then to remain there by reason of the words alterius eor ' cross Remainders shall be Dier 303. But otherwise there would not Gilbert v. Witty and others 2 Cro. 655. And in this case tho' some of the Limitations are between two there shall be no cross Remainders in them because there are others between three and the intent shall be taken to the same in all The Dean and Chapter of Durham against the Lord Archbishop of York IN a Prohibition the Archbishop pleaded a Prescription that he and his Predecessors have time out of mind been Guardians of the Spiritualties of the Bishoprick of Durham Sede vacante and Issue joyned thereupon and tried at the Bar this Term. Hale said De jure communi the Dean and Chapter were Guardians of the Spiritualties during the vacancy as to matters of Jurisdiction but for Ordination they are to call in the aid of a Neighbouring Bishop and so is Linwood But the Usage here in England is that the Archbishop is Guardian of the Spiritualties in the Suffragan Diocess and therefore it was proper here to joyn the Issue upon the Usage There was much Evidence given that antiently during the vacancy of Durham the Archbishop had exercised Jurisdiction both Sententious and other as Guardian of the Spiritualties
But since H. 8. time it had béen for the most part administred by the Dean and Chapter and the Verdict was here for the Dean and Chapter King versus Melling IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the case was this R. Melling seized in Fee having Issue four Sons William Robert Bernard and John devised the Land in question in this manner I give my Land to my Son Bernard for his natural Life and after his decease I give the same to the Issue of his Body lawfully begotten on a second Wife and for want of such Issue to John Melling and his Heirs for ever Provided that Bernard may make a Joynture of all the Premisses to such second Wife which she may enjoy during her Life R.M. dies Bernard in the life of his first Wife suffered a Recovery to the use of himself in Fee and after her decease Marries a second Wife and then by Indenture covenants to stand seized to the use of himself for Life and after to the use of his Wife for her Life for her Joynture and dies J.M. Enters and makes a Lease to the Plaintiff And this Term after Arguments at the Bar the Court gave their Opinions Rainsford for the Plaintiff First I hold in this Case that B. M. takes but an Estate for Life with a Contingent Remainder to the Issue by his second Wife for the Devise is by express words for Life as in Archers Case 1 Co. a Devise to R. A. for Life and after to the next Heir Male of R. and the Heirs Males of that Heir Male Resolved to create but an Estate for Life to R. A. I rely mainly upon Wilds Case 6 Co. which was brought before all the Judges of England where the Devise was to a Man and his Wife and after their decease to the Children and resolved to be but an Estate for Life 't is true there were Children at the time of the Devise but in the end of the Case 't is said that in such Case if there were no Children the Children born after might take by remainder and the first Estate to be but for Life Clerk v. Day 1 Cro. 313. the Devise was to Rose his Daughter for Life and that if she married after his Death and had Heir of her Body then that the Heir after his Daughter's Death should have the Land and to the Heirs of their Body begotten and if his Daughter died without Issue then to a Stranger It was held by Gawdy and Fenner that Rose had but an Estate for Life in this Case 1 Rolls 837. Devise to his eldest Son for Life and after his decease to the Sons of his Body lawfully begotten the Son resolved to have but an Estate for Life The Second point Whether the power to make a Joynture be destroyed by the Common Recovery these powers to make Estates are of two sorts either Collateral as when Executors have power by a Will to sell Land and such a power cannot be destroyed as appears in Diggs's Case 1 Co. or powers appendant to Estates as to make Leases which shall continue after the Estates to which the power is annexed determins and the power in the Case at Bar to make a Joynture are of this second sort and are destroyed by the alteration of the Estate to which it is annexed in privity as 1 Co. Albany's Case is so that the Common Recovery being a Forfeiture of the Estate for Life by consequence 't is an extinguishment of the power Thirdly But admitting the power continues whether it be well executed and I hold that it is not for being seized in Fee at the time of the Covenant to stand seized to the use of his Wife for her Joynture and this without any reference to his power the use shall arise out of his Interest and not be executed by vertue of his power according to the resolution in Sir Ed. Cleeres Case 6 Co. Twisden of the same Opinion As to the first Point it must be agreed that these words Issue of the Body ex vi termini make not an Entail if they were in a Conveyance by Act executed no more than Children as the words were in Wilds Case 'T is true in a VVill a Devise of Land to a Man and his Issue creates an Entail if the Devisee had no Issue at that time for otherwise those words would be void for in regard they are limited to take presently the Issue born after cannot take as by Remainder there being none to take in praesenti they must be intended to be words of Limitation as a Devise to a Man and his Heirs Males makes an Entail or otherwise the word Males must be rejected then seeing the words in themselves are not proper to make an Entail the next thing to be considered is the intention which is to be known by the expressions in the VVill and not any averment dehors the words are J will give my Land to my Son for Life and after his decease I will give the same to the Issue c. so that the Land is given to him expresly for Life Devise of Land in perpetuum makes Fee but if Land be given by Deèd in perpetuum there an Estate only for Life will pass 15 H. 7. A Devise to one paying 10 l this is a Fee 6 Co. Coliers Case But a Devise to one for Life paying 10 l makes but an Estate for Life the Case of Furse and VVinter was Mich. or Trin. 13 Regis Caroli Rot. 1339. A Devise to his two Daughters equally to be divided between them and to the Survivor of them and to the Heirs of the Body of the Survivor This was so expresly to the Surviror that it was resolved to be a Joynt Estate and not in Common The words here are after the decease of Bernard I give the same to the Issue of the Body c. implying that the Issue should take by Purchase as a Gift and not by Descent Again The power given to Bernard to make a Joynture shews that he could not do it by Virtue of his Estate and therefore needed a power to be annexed And tho' such powers are usually affixed to Estates Tail yet when the construction is doubtful what Estate shall pass the giving such a power is an argument that 't is such an Estate that cannot make a Joynture or the like by any other means The words go further and for want of such Issue then to J.M. 'T is true if Land be devised to a Man and if he dies without Issue then to remain over the Devisee shall have an Entail Owen 29. But it shall not be so in this Case because that Clause is crowded in with other Clauses directly to the contrary I rely mainly upon VVilds Case 6 Co. and the Case quoted out of Bendlowes in the end of that Case A Devise to Baron and Feme and to the Men Children of their Bodies begotten because it did not appear that there were any more Children at
word Children My second Reason is from the manner of the Limitation which is to his Issue and of his Body lawfully begotten upon the second Wife Phrases agreeable to an Estate Tail and the meaning of a Testator is to be spelled out by little Hints It is admitted in Wild's Case in the 6 Co. 17. that if the Devise had been to the Children of their Bodies it would have been an Entail Thirdly It appears by the Devise that the Testator knew there could be no Children at that time and shall not be supposed to intend a contingent Remainder Fourthly It appears that the Testator did not intend to prefer the Children of the first Wife of Bernard but did the Children of the second and therefore cannot be thought to mean that John the younger Brother of Bernard should take before failure of the Issue which Bernard should have by his second Wife And to this purpose is Spalding's Case 3 Cro. 185. A Devise to his eldest Son and the Heirs of his Body after the death of his Wife and if he died living the Wife then to his Son N. And devised other Lands to another Son and the Heirs of his Body and if he died without Issue then to remain c. The first Son died living the Wife It was strongly urged that his Estate should cease for being said If he died living the Wife this was a Corrective of what went before But 't was Ruled by all the Court that it was an absolute Estate Tail in the first Son as if the words had been If he died without Issue living the Wife for he could not be thought to intend to prefer a younger Son before the Issue of his eldest Fifthly The words are further and for want of such Issue then to John which words in a Will do often make an Estate Tail by Implication As 4 Jac. Robinson's Case A Devise to A. for Life and if he died without Issue then to remain A. took an Entail So Burley's Case 43 Eliz. A Devise to A. for Life Remainder to the next Heir Male and for default of such Heir Male then to remain Adjudged an Estate Tail 'T is true Dyer 171. is where Lands were Devised to a man and the Heirs Males of his Body and if he died without Issue c. these last words did not make a Tail General to the Devisee For an Implication of an Estate of Inheritance shall never ride over an express limitation of an Inheritance before being 't is said here for want of such Issue the Land should remain 't is plainly meant that it should not before the Issue failed and then the Issue must have it so long for none else can and so 't is an Estate Tail I come now to Authorities 6 Eliz. Anderson num 86. Moor pl. 397. A Devise to his Son for Life and after his decease to the Men Children of his Body said to be an Estate Tail and so cited by Coke in that Book and so contrary to his Report of it in Wild's Case Bendloes num 124. But that Case is not so strong as this for Children is not so operative a word as Issue Rolls 839. A Devise to his eldest Son for Life non aliter for so were the words tho' not printed in the Book and after his decease to the Sons of his Body it was but an Estate for Life by reason of the words Non aliter Hill 13 Car. 2. Rot. 121. Wedgward's Case A Devise to his Son Thomas for Life and after his decease if he died without Issue living at his death then to the Daughter c. it was held to be an Estate for Life But were it an Estate Tail or no it was not necessary to be Resolved the Case depending upon the destruction or continuance of a Contingent Remainder which would have been gone had the Devise made an Estate Tail again there being an express Devise for Life they would not raise a larger Estate by Implication Again Wild's Case where Lands were Devised to A. for Life Remainder to B. and the Heirs of his Body Remainder to Wild and his Wife and after their decease to their Children And the Court of Kings-Bench were at first divided Indeed it was afterwards adjudged an Estate for Life to Wild and his Wife First Because having limited a Remainder in Tail to B. by express and the usual words if he had meant the same Estate in the second Remainder 't is like he would have used the same words Secondly It was not after their decease to the Children of their Bodies for then there would be an Eye of an Estate Tail Thirdly The main Reason was because there were Children at the time of the Devise and that was the only Reason the Resolution went upon in the Exchequer Chamber And tho' it be said in the latter end of the Case That if there were no Children at that time every Child born after might take by Remainder 't is not said positively that they should take And it seems to be in opposition to their taking presently but however that be it comes not to this Case For tho' the word Children may be made nomen collectivum the word Issue is nomen collectivum of it self Hill 42. and 43 Eliz. Bifield's Case A Devise to A. and if he dies not having a Son then to remain to the Heirs of the Testator Son was there taken to be used as nomen collectivum and held an Entail I come now to answer Objections First 'T is objected that in this Case the Limitation is expresly for Life and in that respect stronger than Wild's Case And this is the great difficulty But I Answer That tho' these words do weigh the Intention that way yet they are ballanced by an apparent Intention that weighs as much on the other side which is That as long as Bernard should have Children that the Land should never go over to John for there was as much reason to provide for the Issue of the Issue as the first Issue Again A Tenant in Tail has to many purposes but an Estate for Life Again 'T is possible that he did intend him but an Estate for Life and 't is by consequence and operation of Law only that it becomes an Estate Tail 1651. Hansy and Lowther The Case was A Copyholder surrendred to the use of his Will and Devised to his first Son for Life and after his decease to the Heir Male of his Body c. This was Ruled to be an Estate Tail and this differs from Archer's Case in the 1st of Co. for that the Devise there was for Life and after to the Heir Male and the Heirs of the Body of that Heir Male There the words of Limitation being grafted upon the word Heir it shews that the word Heir was used as Designatio personae and not for Limitation of the Estate So is the Case of Clerk and Day 1 Cro. 313. Another Objection was That there being a Power appointed
Trover inter al' de uno Instrumento ferreo Anglicè an Iron Range After Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that Instrumentum ferreum was too uncertain and that a Range was the same with a Grate for which Crates was a proper Latin word Sed non allocatur For Crates is such a Grate as is before a Prison But a Fire Range was not in use in the Romans time and therefore Instrumentum ferreum is well enough with the Anglicè Twisden said Trover de septem libris has been held good without saying what they were Blackman's Case IT was assigned for Error that the Venire was to Summon probos legales homines instead of liberos and so a material Variance and alledged that many Judgments had been Reversed for it But the Court here being informed that the Presidents were generally probos instead of liberos would not allow the Exception The King versus Armstrong Harrison al' c. THey and others were Indicted for Conspiring to Charge one with the Keeping of a Bastard Child and thereby also to bring him to Disgrace After Verdict for the King it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the bare Conspiring without Executing of it by some Overt act was not subject to Indictment according to the Poulterers Case in the 9 Co. And it doth not appear that he was actually Charged with the Keeping of a Child nay 't is alledged 't was but a pretended Child neither was he by Warrant brought before a Justice of Peace upon such an account but only that they went and affirmed it to the party himself intending to obtain Money from him that it might be no further disclosed Sed non allocatur For there was as much Overt act as the nature and design of this Conspiracy did admit in regard there was no Child really but only a Contrivance to Defame the Person and Cheat him of his Money which was a Crime of a very heinous nature Then it was alledged That this was tryed at the Old-Baily commonly called Justice-Hall in London and the Jury came de Warda de Faringdon extra London which appeared to be out of the Iurisdiction Sed non allocatur For the Name of the Ward is Faringdon extra to distinguish it from Faringdon infra but both are known to be in London Whereupon Judgment was Entred up against them and Armstrong which appeared to be the principal Offender was Fined 50 l and the other 30 l Burrough's Case HE and others were Indicted for that they being Church-wardens Overseers of the Poor and a Constable did contemptuously and voluntarily neglect to Execute diversa Praecepta Watranta directed to them by the Bayliffs of Ipswich being Justices of the Peace under their Hands and Seals c. It was moved to quash it for that the nature and tenour of the Warrants were not expressed in the Indictment For unless the parties know particularly what they are charged with they cannot tell how to make their Defence And for that Reason it was quashed by the Court. Note The Court never gives Costs for not Executing of a Writ of Enquiry of Damages tho' Notice be given Anonymus AN Indictment of Forcible Entry into certain Lands in the possession of J.S. was quashed for not shewing what Estate J.S. had and tho' the word Disseisivit were in the Court held that tho' that might be taken to imply a Freehold yet it was not sufficient Vid. Mo. 481. And another was quashed because it was said possessed pro termino But the Court held that if it had been pro termino annorum tho' not said for how many years it had been well Note A Bayliff caught one by the Hand whom he had a Warrant to Arrest as he held it out of a Window And the Court said that this was such a Taking of him that the Bayliff might justifie the breaking open of the House to Carry him away Kent versus Harpool AN Ejectment The Case came hither by a Writ of Error out of the Kings-Bench in Ireland and divers Points were in it which concerned the Act for Settlement of Lands in Ireland But the Case was as to the great Point at Common Law to this effect Father Tenant for Life Remainder to the Son for Life Remainder to first Son of that Son who was not born Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of the Father the Father died before the first Son was born and Whether the Descent of the Entail to the Son did prevent the Contingent Remainder was the Question It was Argued that it did not because the Inheritance came to the Son by Act in Law And the Opinion in Cordal's Case in the 1 Cro. 315. was cited the great Reason in Chudley's Case and other Cases wherein Contingent Remainders have been held to be destroyed was for the preventing of Perpetuities which would have been let in if Contingent Remainders had been preserved whatever Act had been done by those which had the Actual Estate But there is no such necessity of making the life Construction upon Acts in Law If Lessee for years makes the Lessor Executor the Term is not drowned But if the Executor that hath a Lease purchases the Inheritance the Term is gone because it is his own act but in the other Case the Law shall not work that which must be construed a Devastavit In Lewis Bowles's Case in the 11 Co. and Co. Litt. where there is an Estate for Life Remainder to the first Son Remainder in Fee to the Tenant for Life the Estates at first close and open again upon the Birth of the first Son which should take the Remainder And so it may be here But the Court seemed to be of Opinion that the Contingent Remainder was destroyed by the Descent of the Estate Tail And Rainsford Chief Justice relyed upon Wood and Ingersol's Case in the 2 Cro. 260. where a Devise was to the first Son for Life Remainder to the Son which should survive and there three Judges against one held that the descent of the Fee upon the first Son prevented the Contingent Remainder to the Survivor Et Adjornatur Note In Lewis Bowle's Case the Estates were united at the first upon making of the Conveyance Smith versus Tracy IN a Prohibition the Case was One died Intestate and whether his Brother of the Half-blood should come in for Distribution upon the new Statute of 22 23 Car. 2. cap. 10. was the Question It was Argued that the Half blood should have no share for the Words are The next of Kindred to the Dead person in equal Degree which the Half-blood is not The Words likewise are Those which legally represent their Stocks and that must be intended in an Act of Parliament such as the Common Law makes to be Representatives and not the Civil Law For then it would be that the Bastard eigne should come in for Distribution For their Rule is that subsequens matrimonium facit
Indicted of Perjury in a voluntary and Extra judicial Oath and cited a late Case where one had stole away a mans Daughter and went before a Justice of the Peace and Swore that he had the Fathers Consent and this in order to get a Licence to marry her and he was Indicted and Convicted thereupon And all the Court said that it was not the course to quash Indictments of Perjury Nusance or the like but to put the party to plead to them Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. In Banco Regis Duncomb versus Walter IN an Indebitat ' Assumpsit by an Assignee of Commissioners upon the Statute of Bankrupts upon Non assumpsit a Special Verdict was found upon which the Case appeared to be thus One Staly was Arrested by an Executor of his Creditor 6 Sept which was before Probat of the Will and within two or three days after he paid 1000 l to the Defendant to whom he stood Indebted in such Sum and after the 18th of September he yielded himself to Prison upon the said Arrest The Question was Whether the Defendant should be obliged to Refund this Money which was paid unto him as aforesaid First Whether the Arrest before the Probat was a good Arrest It was said If an Executor hath a Reversion in a Term upon which a Rent is reserved and Distrains c. he may avow for the Rent before the Probat Vid. 1 Roll. 917. tit Executors where an Executor brings an Action before Probat yet if he shews the Probat upon the Declaration 't is well enough Secondly Whether when he yields himself to Prison it shall not relate to the first Arrest to make him a Bankrupt from that time This depends upon the Statute of 21 Jac. cap. 19. where it is said that in the Cases of Arrest and lying in Prison he shall be adjudged a Bankrupt from the time of his first Arrest Object This Relation doth not prejudice Strangers Answ Dame Hales's Case Pl. Com. 293. If one giveth another a mortal Wound and then sells his Land and the person dies there shall be such Relation as to make the Land forfeit from the first Stroke Note This Case came by Writ of Error out of the Common Pleas where Judgment was given for Walter and the said Judgment was affirmed in this Court principally upon the point of Relation For the Court said that it would be a great mischief if it should relate to the first Arrest as to the payment of Money to Strangers Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 1 2 Jac. II. In Banco Regis Herring versus Brown Quod vid. ante Michaelmas 35 Car. 2. THe Case upon a Special Verdict was to this effect That J. S. being Seised in Fee had made a Conveyance of his Estate to the use of himself for Life with divers Remainders over to other persons with a power of Revocation by Writing under his Hand and Seal c. Afterwards the said J. S. having a purpose to Revoke the said Uses and make a new Settlement of his Estate he levied a Fine and after the Fine he made a Deed wherein he expressed that he Revoked the former Uses and so proceeded to a new Limitation by that Deed and declared that the Fine by him limited should be to the Vses of the said Deed. The sole Question was Whether the Fine had extinguished his Power and by consequence forfeited his Estate or Whether the Fine and Deed should be taken as one Conveyance and so be a good execution of his Power and new limitation of the Uses And after many solemn Arguments it was Resolved by the Chief Justice Herbert Holloway and Wright that the Fine was an extinguishment of his Power and that the Deed came too late contrary to the Opinion of Justice Withens Vido ante ADDENDA Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 26 Car. II. In Banco Regis Pibus versus Mitford Intratur Trin. 20 Car. 2. Rot. 703. IN an Ejectment the Jury find a Special Verdict to this effect viz. That Michael Mitford was seiz'd of the Lands in question and of divers other Lands in Fee and having Issue Robert by one Venter and Ralph by Jane his second Wife did 23 Jan. 21 Jac. by Indenture Covenant to stand seized of some of the Lands to the use of himself for Life Remainder to Trustees for years for several purposes Remainder to Jane his second Wife for Life Remainder to Ralph and the Heirs Male of his Body And as to the Lands in question he Covenants to stand seiz'd To the use of his Heirs Male begotten or to be begotten on the Body of his second Wife and died And then the Jury made this Special Conclusion If any Use did arise by the Deed to Ralph then they find for the Defendant and if not they find for the Plaintiff This Case was Argued several times at the Bar and now the Judges delivered their Opinions seriatim Wild Justice for the Defendant We are to give our Opinions upon a Deed of Uses made for the Provision of younger Children not otherwise provided for But if the Case were not so It is a safe way when the Words are ambiguous to follow the Intention of the party appearing in the Deed. I shall not maintain that Ralph is a Purchaser and so make this an Executory Use I agree a man cannot either by Conveyance at Common Law by Limitation of Uses or Devise make his right Heir a Purchaser I agree also Griswold's Case in Dyer 156. and if this Case had operated by Transmutation of Possession this Limitation to the Heirs of the Body of the Covenantor had been void and no Use should have risen But here in the Case of a Covenant to stand seiz'd nothing moves out of the Covenantor he retains the Land and directs the Use and keeps sufficient in him to maintain this Use There 's a great difference between a Conveyance at the Common Law and a Conveyance to Uses At the Common Law the Heir cannot take where the Ancestor could not but otherwise it is in case of Uses 2 Rolls 794. and so is Wood's Case 1 Co. 99. a. cited in Shelly's Case This I say to shew that the Intent of the Parties shall be the Guide and that there is a difference between Conveyances at the Common Law and Conveyances to Uses Horwood's Opinion in Hussey's Case 37 H. 8. comes to our Case There 's no great difference between a Covenant to stand seiz'd and a Feoffment to Uses I will not Argue to prove that this Deed shall enure as an Executory Use because 't is against a Rule in Law taken by my Lord Hobart and so Agreed before his time But here Ralph is Tenant in Tail Michael his Father being Tenant for Life Remainder to his Heirs Male begotten on the Body of Jane his second Wife For the Law to preserve this Limitation to the use of his Heirs Male c. will by Implication create an Estate for Life in Michael
of Jane the second Wife is void and it cannot be returning where the Use is not setled in any Person I agree my Lord Pagets Case because there the Estate was vested in William Paget and the other Use returned by operation of Law and the Estate setled could not be divested but here the Limitation to the Heirs Males being void the ancient Use remained yet in Michael for nothing was out of him he having limited a thing which cannot be And as to a returning Use tho' all be done in an instant yet there is a priority of time in the Eye of the Law for it ought to vest first in him in Remainder and then Return but here nothing vests in the Remainder Secondly It hath béen urged That it shall be made good by Implication of Law and so shall amount to a Covenant to stand seized to the Used of the Covenantor for Life c. and the rather as it has béen said by Wild because Uses are guided by Equity But I answer we are here in case of a Deed where an Estate shall not be raised by Implication as it shall by a Will Cro. Car. Seagood ad Hone 366. A Deed differs greatly from a Will for if a Man Surrenders Copyhold Land to two equally to be divided they are Joynt-tenants but such a Devise would have made them Tenants in Common Admit in some Case an Estate shall be raised by Implication in a Deed yet it shall not be so here for it would be to the disinheriting the Heir As to the case of 13 H. 7. I agree that a Devise to the Eldest Son after the Death of the Wife gives an Estate for Life to the Wife but otherwise it would be upon such a Devise to the Younger Son for there the Eldest Son and not the Wife should have the Estate in the mean time Cro. Jac. Horton and Horton 57. We are not herein Favorabili materiâ and therefore no construction shall be made which does not appear by the words It hath béen strongly urged that this being by way of Use which is a matter of Equity shall be favoured Admit it yet it shall be guided by the Common Law for aequitas sequitur legem There never shall be a Settlement by way of Use to make one capable who is not capable by the Common Law I do not see any difference between a Feoffment to Uses and a Covenant to stand seized for if a Feoffment be made to the use of one for Life the Use shall return which is not disposed of as well as upon a Covenant to stand seized Thirdly It has been urged if these severally cannot support this Limitation yet the intention operating with the Deed will both together make an Estate for Life in Michael But I do not see his intent here to have it for Life the intention even in a Will which is much stronger ought to be collected out of the words of the Will. Cro. Car. Spirt and Bence 368. agreed by the whole Court that words in a Will ought to have an apparent intent to disinherit an Heir and here there is not any apparent intent but rather to the contrary for of some Lands Michael Covenants to stand seised to the Use of himself for Life Remainder c. but of the Lands in question he makes a difference in the Limitation And the words of the Deed are to be considered He Covenants to stand seized to the Uses mentioned declared and limited in the Deed and if Michael shall have an Estate for Life he must have it by operation of Law There was a like case between Flavil and Ventroise in the Common Pleas in which the Court was divided but the same Point came afterwards in question in the Case of Mr. Tape of Norfolk and it was adjudged to be the ancient Use And no Case can be shewn that the Law will create an Estate in the Covenantor where the Use is not vested in any Person but the ancient Use remains in him As to the Cases cited on the other side I have answered my Lord Pagets's Case already And as to my Lord Cokes Case 1 Inst 22. b. I agree the Use returns and the Son is in by discent and so it was adjudged in Fenwick and Mitfords Case there cited But the Paraphrase he makes there I do not understand It is said there when the Limitation is made to his right Heirs and right Heirs he cannot have during his Life the Law doth create an Use in him during his Life Wherefore is this said to make the Heir in by discent No doubt without this he is in by discent and so was the Iudgment in that Case for what Reason then should there be an Estate for Life raised by the Law to be merg'd by the Fee as soon as raised And there 't is said Till the future use come in Esse I do not conceive then where it is so long as the Father lives and what he means by the Future Use I do not know for it always was in Esse and never was out of the Feoffor and this was so adjudg'd in that Case of Fenwick and Mitford and not the construction of my Lord Coke And t is strange that no other Reports should mention his construction Hale Chief Justice for the Defendant If Ralph takes either by Discent from Michael or by Purchase the one way or the other answers the Verdict and the Issue is for the Defendant I shall divide the Case into two Points 1. If he takes by Discent 2. Admitting he does not If he may take by Purchase as this Case is I shall Premise two or three things First It has been agreed if an Estate for Life be raised to Michael the Remainder being to his Heirs Male of the Body of Jane his second Wife the Estate Tail is executed in him be the Estate for Life raised by Implication or express Limitation Secondly It is plain quacunque via It be rais'd that the Estate was long'd in Michael till Ralph the Son be in a capacity to take it either by Discent or Purchase for be it part of the ancient Use or a new Use it ought to be in Michael during his Life for there is nothing to bring it out of him Thirdly In all Cases touching Uses there is a great difference between a Feoffment to Uses a Covenant to stand seized and a conveyance at the Common Law If a Man by Feoffment to uses conveys Land to the use of J.S. for Life he may remit the Use to himself and the Heirs Male of his Body by the same Deed and so alter that wich was before a Fee simple and turn it into another Estate but if A. gives Land to B. for Life Remainder to A. and the Heirs Male of his Body because a Man cannot give to himself the Remainder is void for a Man cannot convey to himself by a Conveyance at the Common Law These things being premised I conceive here is an
for if a Man Covenants to stand seized to a Contingent Use and afterwards is attainted of Treason before the Contingency happen the Contingency shall never rise for the King has the Estate discharged and the Use is to rise out of the Estate of the Covenantor so is Moor Sir Tho Palmers Case 815 In Moors Rep. of my Lord Pagets Case 194. It s said that W. Paget had an Amoveas manus for the Estate of the Queen leased by the Death of my Lord Paget In Sir Francis Englefeilds Case Popham 18. n. 7. It s resolved that no Use rises because t is that it shall Discend Remain or Come which is uncertain but if he had Covenanted that after his Death he and his Heirs would have stood seized to the Use of John an Use would have resulted to Sir Francis Second Point I conceive if it be impossible for Ralph to take by Discent this would be a Contingent Use in him by Purchase The great Objection against this is that the Limitation is to an Heir and an Heir which ought to take by Purchase ought not to be only Heir of the Body c. but Heir general Of this I am not well satisfied I conceive the Remainder being limited to the Heirs of the Body of Jane begotten by Michael such a Limitation will make a special Heir to serve the turn and t is not to be resembled to Shelley's Case My Reasons are First Because at the Common Law before the Statute de Donis notice was taken that this was a special Heir and therefore 't is no wrong done to make him here a qualified Heir In the Statute de Donis 't is said When Lands are given to Man and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten Secondly Vpon the special penning of the Deed it is apparent that Michael took notice that he had an Heir at Common Law therefore it can't be intended that he meant here such an Heir that should be Heir general to him this would be Contradictio in Adjecto Litt. Sect. 352. puts this Case If a Feoffment be made upon Condition that the Feoffee shall give the Land to the Feoffor and his Wife and the Heirs of their two Bodies begotten In this Case if the Husband dye living his Wife before the Estate Tail is granted to them the Feoffee ought to make the Estate as near the Condition and as near the intent of the Condition as may be viz. To let the Land to the Wife for her Life without impeachment of Wast the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of the Husband on her begotten If the Husband and Wife dye before the Gift made then the Feoffee ought to make it to the Issue and to the Heirs of the Body of his Father and Mother begotten Suppose that this had been to a second Wife and there had been Issue by a former the Book of 12 H. 4. 3. says that there it shall be in another manner but Litt. says it shall be as near vid. Litt. Sect. 22. Morevils Case Fitzh Tail 23. 2 Ed. 3. 1. 4. Ed. 3. 50. by all these Cases it appears that no regard is had whether the Son be Heir of the Husband if he be Heir of their two Bodies Therefore it seems that by this Limitation Ralph shall take by way of Contingent Remainder For Heirs of the Body of the second Wife is a good name of Purchase I have not read any Case against this Hill 16. or 26 Eliz. there was this Case A Man taking notice in his Will that his Brother who was dead had a Son and that he himself had three Daughters who were his right and immediate Heirs he gave them 2000 l and gave his Land to the Son of his Brother by the name of his Heir Male. Provided If his Daughters troubled his Heir then the Devise of the 2000 l to them should be void And it was resolved that the Devisor taking notice that others were his Heirs the Limitation to his Brothers Son by the name of Heir Male was a good name of Purchase and this agrees with Cownden and Clarks Case in Hob. Wild Justice said he was of the same Opinion with Hale in this last Point And Iudgment was given for the Defendant Three Learned ARGUMENTS One in the Court of Kings-Bench BY Sir FRANCIS NORTH Attorny General And Two in the Court of Exchequer BY Sir MATTHEW HALE Chief Baron there The Argument of Sir Francis North. In Banco Regis Potter and Sir Henry North. IN a Replevin for taking of an Horse in a certain place called the Fenn at Milden-Hall in the County of Suffolk the Defendant makes Cognizance as Bayliff to Sir Henry North and saith That the place Where c. containeth Ten thousand Acres of Pasture in Milden-Hall whereof a certain place called Delfe is parcel and that it is Sir Henry North's Freehold and the Horse was Damage feasant there c. The Plaintiff Replies Confessing the Soyl to be the Freehold of Sir Henry Norths but says That time whereof c. the place Where hath been parcel of the Fenn and parcel of the Mannor of Milden-Hall of which Sir Henry North is seised in Fee and that the Plaintiff was at the time c. seised of an Ancient Messuage one of the Freeholds holden of the Mannor by Rents and Services and parcel of the said Mannor and that Time out of Mind there were divers ancient Freehold Messuages holden of the said Mannor by Rents and Services and divers Copyhold Messuages parcel of the said Mannor by Custom of the said Mannor demised and demisable by Copy of Court Rolls of the said Mannor And the several Tenants of the said Freehold Tenements being seised in their Demesn as of Fee and they whose Estate they have in the same Time out of mind have had together with the Customary Tenants of the said Customary Tenements the sole and several Feeding of 100 Acres of Pasture for all Beasts except Hogs Sheep and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Freeholds every year at all times of the year as to their several Freeholds belonging And that within the said Mannor there is and Temps d'ont c. hath been such a Custom that the several Tenants of the Customary Messuages together with the Freeholders aforesaid have used and accustomed to have the sole and several Feeding of the said 100 Acres of Pasture for all their Beasts except Sheep Hogs and Northern Steers levant and couchant upon their several Copy-holds every year at all times in the year tanquam ad seperal ' Tenementa customar ' spectant ' pertinent ' and the Plaintiff being seised put in his Horse c. and so Iustifies Vpon this the Defendant demurs generally This Prescription is naught in substance and Judgment ought to be given for the Defendant upon these Four Exceptions First That several Freeholders cannot joyn or be joyned in a Prescription to claim an entire Interest in another mans Soyl as
Mesuages Lands and Premisses And to the intent that the Contingent Remainder by the said Will limited to the Heirs Males and Females of the Body of the said Robert Durdant might be extinguished and destroyed he the said John Higden by the appointment of the said Robert Durdant did surrender his Estate in the Premisses to the said Gideon Durdant and by the said Deed it was Covenanted That the said Robert Durdant John Higden and Gideon Durdant should levy a Fine of the Premisses which should be to the use of the said John Higden and his Heirs They find that a Fine was levied accordingly in Easter Term 15 Car. 2. They find That Robert Durdant died on the 19th of August 20 Car. 2. and that John Higden after in 20 Car. 2. upon a valuable Consideration in money enfeoffed John Burchet of the Premisses and that the said Burchet died the 1st day of October in the same year and that the Premisses from him came to the Defendant Burchet who entred into the Premisses and became seised prout lex postulat And they find That Robert Durdant as well at the time of the said Will making as at the death of the said Henry Wicks had an only Son called George Durdant who was also Godson to the Testator and that the said George Durdant died and that William Durdant Lessor of the Plaintiff was his Son and Heir and entred and made the Demise prout c. si super totam materiam c. Vpon his Special Verdict Iudgment was given in the Kings-Bench for the Plaintiff And the Court here afterwards having heard the Case thrice Argued did affirm the Iudgment And the first Point spoken to was Whether the Estate did not execute in Robert Durdant by the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses For if so he would be seised of an Estate tail and then Burchet would have a good Title It is clear Lands may be Devised to the use of another as in Popham 4. 'T is true a Devise implies a Consideration and will lodge the Estate in the Devisee if no Vse be limited upon it Here it is Devised to John Higden and his Heirs upon trust and confidence that he should permit and suffer c. The word Trust is proper for the Limitation of an Use and the Estate shall Execute unless it be first limited to the use of a man and his Heirs in Trust for another there the Intention is that it should be only a Trust and here Robert Durdant is restrained only from doing waste which shews that he intended he should take an Estate or else he could not commit waste But Lands may be Devised to an Use tho' the Statute of Wills is since the Statute of Uses Mo. 107. 1 Cro. 343. The Court over-ruled this Point and Resolved it to be only a Trust in Robert Durdant for the words are That Higden should permit him to take the profits which shews that the Estate was to remain in Higden And for the restraint of waste it was proper for Higden was to permit Robert Durdant to have the possession but the Testator would not have him to commit waste or spoil The second and principal Point was Whether the Remainder to the Heirs of Robert Durdant now living did vest in George Durdant or was a Contingent Remainder It was much urged That one could not take in the Life of his Ancestor by the name of Heir for nemo est haeres viventis in the 1 Co. Archer's Case A Devise to Robert Remainder to the next heir Male of Robert and to the heirs Males of the Body of that heir Male this is Resolved to be a Contingent Remainder during the Life of Robert and it was said in that Case that the next heir Male is as much a designation of a person as an Heir now living He that will take by purchase by the name of Heir must be a compleat Heir to all intents Co. Littl. 24. b. 2 Leon 70. Chaloner and Bowyer 's Case upon a Devise But it was Resolved that this was a Remainder vested in George Durdant for the Remainder being limited to the Heirs of the Body of Robert Durdant now living and George being found to be then the only Son it was a sufficient designation of the person and as much as if it had been said to his Heir apparent and such an one is called Heir sometimes in proceedings in Law where the greatest strictness of phrase is used as in Writs of Ravishment of Ward Quare filium haeredem rapuit 2 Inst 439. Westm 2. cap. 35. 25 Ed. 3. the Statute of Treasons Treason to kill the Heir of the King The third Point was Whether George Durdant took an Estate Tail or only an Estate for Life for it was Objected that if the words Heirs of the Body were taken for the description only of the person who should take then he must take only for Life But the Court held that they would make an Estate Tail for Heirs is nomen collectivum and is sometimes so taken when 't is only Heir in the Singular Number A Devise to one for life Remainder to the heir Males of his Body for ever this is an Estate Tail in the Devisee Pawsey and Lowther in Rol. Abr. 2. Part 253. But in case the first words viz. Heirs of the Body now living would carry but an Estate for Life to George Durdant yet the subsequent words would make an Entail in him viz. and to such other Heirs Male and Female as he should hereafter happen to have of his Body this would clearly vest an Entail in George he being Heir of the Body of Robert and surviving Robert So the Judgment was affirmed Sed Nota as to the second Point the Lord Chief Baron Atkyns and Justice Powell seemed to be an Opinion that the Remainder was Contingent But in regard the Point had been upon a Writ of Error brought in the House of Lords upon a Judgment given in the Kings-Bench in another Case upon the same Will adjudged to be a Remainder vested they conceived themselves bound by that Judgment in the House of Lords Paschae Anno 2 Willielmi Mariae Memorandum BY an Order of the King and Council 1 Willielmi Mariae the Judges were Ordered to meet and all of them except Gregory Eyre and Turton were assembled at the Lord Chief Justice's Chamber to give their Opinion concerning Colonel Lundy who was appointed Governour of London Derry in Ireland by the King and Queen and had endeavoured to betray it and afterwards he escaped into Scotland where he was taken and brought Prisoner into England and Committed to the Tower Whether admitting he were guilty of a Capital Crime by Martial Law committed in Ireland he might be sent thither from hence to be Tryed there in regard of the Act of Habeas Corpus made Anno 31 Car. 2. which Enacts That no Subject of this Realm shall be sent over Prisoner to any Foreign parts But
of the Crown so 11. and so it was held in the Case of the Earl of Essex in Queen Elizabeths Time and in the Lord Cobham's Case in the Reign of King James the First And the Chief Justice cited the Statute made 29 H. 6. cap. 1. upon the Rebellion of Jack Cade which Act sets forth that John Cade naming himself John Mortimer falsly and traiterously imagined the Death of the King and the destruction and subversion of this Realm in gathering together and levying of a great Number of the King's People and exciting them to Rise against the King c. against the Royal Crown and Dignity of the King was an Overt act of imagining the Death of the King and made and levied War falsly and trayterously against the King and his Highness c. So that it appears by that Act that it was the Iudgment of the Parliament That gathering Men together and exciting them to Rise against the King was an Overt Act of Imagining the Death of the King Vide Stamford's Pleas of the Crown fo 180. And according to this Opinion Judgment was given against Harding in the following Sessions and he was Executed thereupon NOta At an Adjourned Sessions held the 19th of May 2 Willielmi Mariae it appeared that one of the Kings Witnesses which was to be produced in an Indictment for Treason had been the day before Challenged to Fight by a Gentleman that it was said was a Member of the House of Commons he was by the Court bound in a Recognizance of 500 l to keep the Peace And because it appeared the Witness had accepted the Challenge he was bound in the like Sum. NOta Vpon an Appeal to the House of Lords Anno 2 Willielmi Mariae the sole Question was Whether upon the Statute of Distributions 22 23 Car. 2. the half Blood should have an equal share with the whole Blood of the Personal Estate And by the Advice of the two Chief Justices and some other of the Judges the Decree of the Lords was That the Half Blood should have an Equal share Samon versus Jones IN an Ejectment brought in the Court of Exchequer in the year of the Reign of the late King James the Second The Case upon a Special Verdict was to this effect William Lewis seised of a Reversion in Fee expectant upon an Estate for Life did by Deed Poll in Consideration of Natural love and affection which he had to his Wife and Robert Lewis his Son and Heir apparent begotten on the Body of his said Wife and to Ellen his Daughter give grant and confirm unto the said Robert Lewis the Son all those Lands c. the Reversion and Reversions Remainder and Remainders thereof To have and to hold to his Son and his Heirs to the Vses following viz. to the use of himself for Life and then mentioned several other Vses not necessary to be here mentioned as not material to the Point in question and then to the use of the Wife for Life and after to the use of Robert and the Heirs of his Body and for want of such Issue to the use of Ellen the Daughter and the Heirs of her Body c. William Lewis and his Wife died Robert the Son devised the Estate to the Lessor of the Plaintiff and died without Issue Ellen was in possession and claimed the Lands by this Deed in which thâ—re was a Warranty but no Execution of the said Deed further than the Sealing and Delivery was had either by Enrolment Attornment or otherwise So that the sole Question was Whether this Deed should operate as a Covenant to stand seised or be void And it was Adjudged to amount to a Covenant to stand seised in the Court of the Exchequer And upon a Writ of Error brought upon the Statute of Ed. 3. before the Commissioners of the Great Seal and others empowered by that Act to sit upon Writs of Error of Judgments given in the Court of Exchequer the said Judgment was Reversed by the Opinion of Holt Chief Justice of the Kings Bench and Pollexfen Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas And upon a Writ of Error before the Lords in Parliament brought upon the said last Judgment it was Argued for the Plaintiff in the VVrit of Error That this should enure as a Covenant to stand seised to the use of the Wife Son c. It appears by Bedell's Case in the 7 Co. and Foxe's Case in the 8 Co. that the words proper to a Conveyance are not necessary but ut res magis valeat a Conveyance may work as a Bargain and Sale tho' the words be not used so as a Covenant to stand seised tho' the word Covenant is not in the Deed and and Poplewell's Case were cited in 2 Roll. Abr. 786 787. A Feme in Consideration of a Marriage intended to be had between her and J. S. did give grant and confirm Lands to J.S. and his Heirs with a Clause of VVarranty in the Deed which was also Enrolled but no Livery was made It was Resolved to operate as a Covenant to stand seised Vide Osborn and Churchman's Case in the 2 Cro. 127. which seems contrary to that Case but the chiefest Case relied upon was that of Crossing and Scudamore Mod. Rep. 175. where a man by Indenture bargained sold enfeoffed and confirmed certain Lands to his Daughter and her Heirs and no Consideration of Natural Love or Money exprest This was Resolved 22 Car. 2. in B.R. to operate as a Covenant to stand seised and upon a Writ of Error in the Exchequer Chamber the Judgment was affirmed It was said on the other side for the Defendant That the Case at Bar differed from the Cases cited for here the Intention of the Deed is to transfer the Estate to the Son and that the Vses should arise out of such Estate so transferred In the Cases cited no Vses are limited upon the Estate purported or intended to be Conveyed but only an Intention appearing to convey an Estate to the Daughter in Crossing's Case and to the intended Husband in Poplewell's Case and seeing for want of due Execution in those Cases the Estate could not pass at Law it shall pass by raising of an Vse But the Case at Bar is much the same with the Case of Hore and Dix in Siderfin the 1st Part. 25. where one by Indenture between him and his Son of the one part and two Strangers of the other part in Consideration of Natural love did give grant and enfeoff the two Strangers to the use of himself for Life Remainder to the Son in Tail c. and no other Execution was three than the Sealing and Delivery of the Deed this was Resolved not to raise an Vse for the Vse was limited to rise out of the Seisin of the Strangers who took no Estate Vide Pitfield and Pierce's Case 15 Car. 1. Marche's Rep. 50. One gave granted and confirmed Lands to his Son after his Death this Deed had been
his Bill to have the Land Conveyed according to the Agreement above But for the Defendants it was much insisted upon that this being to settle the Lands in case Thomas should dye without Issue it should not be regarded in this Court for the Execution of a Trust of a Remainder or Reversion in Fee upon an Estate Tail shall not be compelled because it is subject to be destroyed by the Tenant in Tail as here Thomas might have done in case he had made a Settlement according to the import of that Writing who therefore could not have been compelled himself to have executed this Agreement But the Lord Chancellor Fynch Decreed the Land for the Plaintiff because it was proved that the Marriage with the Plaintiffs Wife was in expectation of the performance of this Agreement and he was obliged to have left the Land to the Plaintiff if he had had no Issue Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria Collet versus Collet WIlliam Fox having three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha the two latter being Married and the first a Widow by his Will devised in these Words Viz. I give unto Martha my Daughter the Sum of 400 l to be paid unto her by my Executors within one year next after my decease But I will and my desire is that Cornelius Collet the Husband of Martha upon the payment of the said 400 l shall give such Security as my Executors shall approve of that the said 400 l shall be laid out within 18 Months next after my decease and purchase an Estate of that value to be setled and assured upon her the said Martha and the Heirs of her Body lawfully begotten And in the Close of his Will were these words following Viz. I Will That after my Debts which I shall owe at the time of my Decease and my Funeral Expences and the Probat of this my Will be discharged then I do give all the rest of my Personal Estate Unbequeathed to purchase an Estate near of as good value as the same Personal Estate shall amount unto within one year next after my my decease Which said Estate so to be purchased I Will shall be setled and assured unto and upon my said three Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha and the Heirs of their respective Bodies lawfully begotten for ever or otherwise my said Daughter Mary and the Husbands of my said two other Daughters Elizabeth and Martha shall for such Moneys as they shall receive of my said Executors for the Overplus of my Personal Estate enter into one or more Bonds in the double Sum of Money as each part shall amount unto the same being to be divided into three parts unto my said Executors within 18 Months next after my decease to settle and assure such part or Sum of Money as each of them shall receive and have by this my Will for the Overplus of my Personal Estate unto and upon the Child and Children of my said Daughters Mary Elizabeth and Martha part and part alike Martha the Wife of Cornelius Collet died within six Months after the Testator leaving Issue only a Daughter who died within four Months after the Mother the other two Sisters surviving Cornelius Collet took out Letters of Administration both to Martha his Wife and likewise to his Daughter the Four hundred Pounds and likewise the Overplus of the Personal Estate being unpaid or disposed of Cornelius Collet preferred his Bill against the Executors and the surviving Sisters and thereby demanded the 400 l and likewise a third part of the Overplus which amounted unto 700 l And the Cause came to be heard before the Lord Chancellor upon Bill and Answer who Decreed the 400 l to the Plaintiff but as to the Surplus of the Estate the Bill was dismissed altho ' it was much insisted upon for the Plaintiff that he might have given Bond to secure the Surplus for his Child and so from the Child it would have come to him as Administrator But seeing that no Interest could vest in the Child till the Election were determined it not being material as to this Point whether the Executors or the Husband aâ— the Election the Father could not claim it as Administrator to the Child And then if the Money had been laid out in Land and the Settlement according to the direction of the Will the Husband would have had no benefit for there would have been a Ioynt Estate for Life in the Daughters with several Inheritances and no severance of the Ioynture by the Marriage and having Issue Co. Inst and so no Tenant by the Courtesie Therefore as to the Surplusage the Bill was Decreed to be dismissed Note As to the 400 l the Order of my Lord Chancellor was That Interest should be paid for it from the time of bringing the Bill Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 34 Car. II. In Cancellaria West versus The Lord Delaware WEST Heir apparent of the Lord Delaware Exhibited his Bill against the said Lord setting forth That upon a Marriage agreed to be had between him and the Daughter of one Mr. Huddleston with whom he was to have 10000 l Portion The Lord his Father Articled to settle Lands of such yearly value for the Wives Ioynture for their maintenance and the Heirs of their Bodies c. That the Wife being now dead and without Issue and no Settlement made the Bill prayed an Execution of the Articles and a discovery of what Incumbrances there were upon the Lands to be setled To this the Lord Delaware Answered That he never intended to settle Lands but for the Wives Ioynture only and that the Plaintiff her Husband was not named in the Articles and so was Advised He need make no Settlement and upon that Reason the Plaintiff could not require him to discover Incumbrances An Exception being taken to the Answer for that it did not discover any thing touching Incumbrances it was Argued before my Lord and for the Defendant it was alledged That by the Course of the Court the time of the Discovery should be when the other Point was determined for if that be for the Defendant then no Discovery can be required but if otherwise that then the Defendant shall be put to answer Interrogatories as is usual in Cases of like nature And it cannot be Objected That the Estate may be charged with Incumbrances since the Bill because they will be of no avail On the other side it was said That this would create great delay for upon the discovery of Incumbrances other parties must be made to the Bill and therefore this Case differed from the Case of Account which concerns the Defendant himself only but the Question now is only for the making proper Parties The Court Ordered That a further Answer should be made Nota If a man deviseth that such a Sum of Money shall be paid out of the Profits of his Lands and the Profits will not amount to the Sum in such case the Land
that time this made an Estate Tail But if it had béen and after their decease to their Children then the Children should take by Purchase tho' born after 'T is true that case is variously reported in the Books but I adhere to my Lord Coke presuming that being brought before all the Judges in the Argument of VVilds Case it was a true Report As for the second Point 't is plain that the power is extinguished for by the Recovery the Estate for Life to which it was annexed in privity is gone and forfeited so that 't is not necessary to dispute the third Point whether well executed or no But upon the whole I agree with my Brother Rainsford that the Plaintiff ought to have Judgment Hale I differ from my two Brothers and tho' I was of their Opinion at the finding of the Special Verdict yet upon very great Consideration of the Case I am of Opinion for the Defendant I shall proceed in a different method from my Brothers and begin with that Point which they made last and I agree with them admitting that Bernard had but an Estate for Life that the power was destroyed also here the Recovery does not only bar the Estate but all powers annexed to it for the recompence in value is of such strong Consideration that it serves as well for Rents Possibilities c. going out of and depending upon the Land as for the Land it self So Fines and Feoffments do ransack the whole Estate and pass or extinguish c. all Rights Conditions Powers c. belonging to the Land as well as the Land it self Secondly I agree with my Brother Rainsford that if Bernard had but an Estate for Life by the Devise the power was not well executed Where Tenant for Life has a power to make Leases 't is not always necessary to recite his power when he makes a Lease but if he makes a Lease which will not have an effectual continuance if it be directed out of his interest there it shall be as made by virtue of his power and so it was resolved in one Roger's Case in which I was Counsel Again Tho' it be here by Covenant to stand seized an improper way to execute his power yet it might be construed an Execution of it Mich. 51. In this Court Stapleton's Case where a Devise was to A. for Life Remainder to B. for Life Remainder to C. in Fee with power to B. to make his Wife a Joynture B. covenanted to stand seized for the Joynture of his Wife reciting his power tho' this could not make a legal Joynture yet it was resolved to enure by virtue of his power quando non valet quod ago ut ago valeat quantum valere potest But in this Case Bernard has got a new Fee which tho' it be defeasible by him in Remainder yet the Covenant to stand seized shall enure thereupon and the use shall arise out of the Fee Thirdly I was at the first opening of the Case of Opinion that Bernard had but an Estate for Life but upon deep Examination of the Will and of the Authority and Considerations of the Consequences of the Case I hold it to be an Estate Tail And first to ease that Point of all difficulties if cannot be denied but a Devise to a Man and the Heirs of his Body by a second Wife makes an Estate Tail executed tho' the Devisee had a Wife at the time As the Case often cited Land given to a Married Man and a Married Woman and the Heirs of their Bodies We are here in case of the Creation of an Estate-Tail where intention has some influence voluntas Donatoris c. and may help words which are not exactly according to legal form 39 Ass 20. Land given to a Man and his Wife haeredi de corpore uni haeredi tantum this judged an Entail Again we are in case of an Estate Tail to be created by a Will and the intention of the Testator is the Law to expound the Testament therefore a Devise to a Man and his Heirs Males or a Devise to a Man and if he dies without Issue c. are always construed to make an Entail It must be admitted that if the Devise were to B. and the Issue of his Body having no Issue at that time it would be an Estate Tail for the Law will carry over the word Issue not only to his immediate Issue but to all that shall descend from him I agree it would be otherwise if there were Issue at the time Tayler and Sayer 41 Eliz. rot 541. a Devise to his Wife for Life 1 Cro. 742. Remainder to his Issue having two Children it was held the Remainder was void being to the Issue in the singular number for incertainy which should take But that was a little too rank for Issue is nomen collectivum Again I agree if a Devise be made to a man and after his death to his Issue or Children having Issue at that time they take by way of Remainder And that was the only Point adjudged in Wild's Case and there also against the Opinion of Popham and Gawdy This way being made I come to the Case it self and shall briefly give my Reasons why I hold Bernard has an Estate Tail First Because the word Issue is nomen collectivum and takes in the whole Generation ex vi termini and so the Case is stronger than if it were Children And where 't is said to the Issue that he shall have of the Body of the second Wife that is all that shall come of the second Wife For so 't is understood in common Parlance Secondly In all Acts of Parliament Exitus is as comprehensive as Heirs of the Body In Westm 2. de donis Issue is made a term of equivalence to Heirs of the Body for where it speaks of the Alienation of the Donee 't is said quo minus ad exitum discenderet So in 34 H. 8. of Entails setled by the Crown 'T is true in Conveyances c. the wisdom of the Law has appropriated the word Heirs as a Term of Art In Clerke's Case A Lease was made to commence after the death of his Son without Issue the Son had a Son and died and then that Son died without Issue It was Resolved both in the Kings Bench and the Exchequer that the Lease should commence for Issue being nomen collectivum whenever the Issue of the Son failed the term of Commencement did happen But now to see the difference Tyler's Case Mich. 34 Eliz. B.R. He had Issue A. B. C. and D. and Devised to his Wife for Life and after her death to B. his Son in Tail and if he dies without Issue then to his Children A. had Issue a Son and died and B. died without Issue Resolved that the Son of A. should not take as one of the Children of the Testator Which Case I cite to shew the odds between the word Issue and the
excused yet 't is merely void as to the Party Et Ad jornatur Norton versus Harvey THe Case was an Executor being possessed of a Term let part of it reserving a Rent and died And the Question was whether his Executor should have the Rent or the Administrator de bonis non It was argued for the Executor that this Rent is meerly due by the Contract and not incident to the Reversion and the Administrator is in Paramount it being now as if the Testator had died Intestate and therefore before the Statute of this King such Administrators could not have had a Scire facias upon a Judgment obtained by the Executor tho' in the Case of Cleve and Vere 3 Cro. 450 457. 't is held that he may have a Liberate where the Executor had proceeded in the Execution of a Statute so far as an Extent for there the thing is executed and not meerly Executory as a Judgment If a Man that hath a Term in the right of his Wife le ts part of it reserving a Rent the Wife surviving shall not not have the Rent On the other side it was said that this case differed from that because the Reservation here is by him that had the whole Right executed in him Another objection against the Action was that here in the Declaration being in Covenant for Non payment of Rent there is not any demand alledged But that was answered because the Covenant was to pay such a Sum for the Rent expresly but if the Condition of a Bond be for performance of Covenants expressed in such a Lease one of which is for payment of Rent in that case the Bond will not be forfeit without a demand and of that Opinion were the Court and that the Executor should have the Rent but when recovered Hale said it should be Assets in his Hands And accordingly Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 26 Car. II. In Banco Regis Silly versus Silly DOwer of 300 Acres of Land 200 Acres of Pasture 100 Acres Meadow The Tenant pleaded Non Tenure The Jury found him Tenant as to 320 Acres of Land and as to the rest that he was not Tenant And the Iudgment was that the Demandant should recover the 320 Acres Error was assigned in this Court that the Verdict and Judgment were for more Acres of Land than were demanded But on the other side it was said Land was a general word and might include Meadow and Pasture Curia In a Grant Land will extend to Meadow Pasture c. but in Pleading it signifies Arable only and here in regard they are distinguished in the Count the Verdict and Judgment must be reversed for the whole Tho' Hale said antiently such Iudgment would have been reversed but for the surplusage Vid Post Batmore Vxor versus Graves TRover for a 100 Loads of Wood upon a Special Verdict the Case was this Copyhold Land was surrendred to the use of J. S. for years Remainder to the Brother of the Plaintiff's Wife who died before the Term expired and so was not admitted any otherwise than by the admission of the Tenant for years And it was resolved First That the admittance of him that had the Estate for years was an admittance for him in the Remainder 4 Co. 23. a. 3 Cro. 504. Fine sur Grant and render to A. for Life Remainder to B. Execution sued by A. serves for B. So an Attornment to Tenant for Life serves for him in Remainder and this brings no prejuduce to the Lord for a Fine is not due until after admittance and the Lord may Assess one Fine for the particular Estate and another Fine for the Remainder But Wild said he need not pay it until his Estate comes in Possession after a Surrender the Estate remains in the Surrender before admittance of the Cestuy que use yet where Borough English Land was Surrendred to the use of J. S. and his Heirs and he died before admittance It was held that the younger Son should have it Secondly It was resolved that the Possession of the Tenant for years was so the Possession of him in Remainder as to make a Possessio Fratris But then it was moved that the Conversion was laid after the Marriage and so the Feme ought not to have joyned with her Husband in the Action But the Court held that in regard the Trover was laid to be before the Marriage which was the inception of the cause of Action the Wife might be joyned as if one has the Custody of a Womans Goods and afterward Marries her she may joyn in Detinue with her Husband for in case of Bailment the Proprietor is to some purposes in Possession and to some out of Possession Hale said in this case the Husband might bring the Action alone or joyntly with his Wife And so Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus IN Debt upon a Bond the Condition was to save the Obligee harmless from another Bond. The Defendant pleaded Non damnificatus The Plaintiff replies that the Money was not paid at the day and he devenit onerabilis and could not attend his business for fear of an Arrest The Defendant rejoyns that he tendred the Money at the day absque hoc that the Plaintiff devenit onerabilis to which it was Demurred and the Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff for the Money not being paid at the day the Counter Bond is forfeited Vid. 1 Cro. 672. 5 Co. and the Traverse in this case is naught The Mayor and Commonalty of London versus Dupester IN Debt for a Duty accruing to the City for Timber imported called Scavage The Declaration was that they were and had been a Corporation time out of mind and their Customs were confirmed by Act of Parliament Temps R. 2. c. The Defendant tendred his Law and Co. Entries 118. was cited where in Debt for an Amerciament in a Court Baron tho' the imposing of it was grounded upon a Prescription yet Wager of Law was admitted But notwithstanding in this case the Court overruled the Wager of Law for here the Duty it self is by Prescription and that confirmed by Act of Parlimant Debt for a Duty growing by a By-Law if the By-Law be Authorised by Letters Patents no Wager of Law lies So in Debt for Toll granted by Letters Patents 20 H. 7. Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 26 Car. II. In Banco Regis Silly versus Silly THe Case was moved again And the Court said that the Demandant might have taken Judgment for the 300 Acres only habito nullo respectu to the rest and released all the Damages But this was not proper for an Amendment the Mistake being in the Verdict but if it could have been amended in the Common Bench the Court might here have made such Amendment Ante. Burfoot versus Peal A Scire facias was brought against the Bail who pleaded that the Principal paid the Debt ante diem impetrationis Brevis
cannot tender an Oath to the party sued nisi in causis Matrimonialibus Testamentariis But the Court after hearing divers Arguments denied the Prohibition for they said It was no more than the Chancery did to make Defendants answer upon Oath in such like Cases Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 31 Car. II. In Banco Regis How versus Whitfield ante in ult ' Term. IN Repl the Plaintiff declares of the taking of his Cattle in a Close containing five Acres The Defendant avows and sets forth a Fine to the use of A. in Tail which discended to him Virtute cujus he was seised in Dominico ut de feodo talliato c. The Plaintiff Replies that the Fine was first to the use of J. S. for Life the Remainder to his Executors Administrators and Assigns for 80 years with Power to him and his Assigns to lett the five Acres in Possession or Reversion for 21 years determinable upon three Lives reserving the ancient Rent and that J. S. Devised this Term to J. N. and died his Executors assented and after it came to the Executors of J. N. who assigned it and that the Assignee made a Lease of the said five Acres inter alia reserving proinde the Rent of 6 s per annum and avers that the ancient Rent was 6 s per annum The Avowant Rejoyns setting forth his former Title And the Plaintiff Demurrs It was Objected First That the Plaintiff ought to have traversed the Seisin in Tail alledged by the Avowant seeing in his Replication he sets forth and intitles himself under an Estate inconsistent with it To this it was Answered and the Court agreed that there ought to be no Traverse for the Avowant doth not say it was his Freehold or that he was Seised in Tail but only under a Virtute cujus c. And the Plaintiff in his Replication sets forth a Title consistent with all that the Avowant alledges and so confesses and avoids and all depends upon the execution of the Power And for that Secondly It was Objected That he which made this Lease was not Assignee of J. S. for Executors were not within the Power and consequently not their Assignee This is a Power collateral to the Estate and shall not run with the Land for then Assignees of Commissioners of Bankrupcy the Vendee of the Term by the Sheriff upon an Execution c. should execute this Power It is like Covenants annexed to Leases which the Assignee could not take advantage of till 32 H. 8. Again Here appears to be no good Reservation for the Lease is of the five Acres inter al' reserving proinde so that the Rent issues out of other Lands as well as the five Acres and therefore cannot be said to be the ancient Rent reserved upon that The Court were all of Opinion that the Assignee in this case might execute the Power and conceived that Assignees might include Assignees in Law Vid. Mo. 855. as well as Fact but however the Tenant for Life devising this Term the Devisee was an Assignee and the Power in the greatest strictness of acceptation was in him and consequently must go to his Executors and by the same Reason to their Assignee As to the Reserving the Rent proinde the Court said it might be intended that the inter al' might comprehend nothing but such things out of which a Rent could not be reserved and then the six Shillings was reserved only for the five Acres However the proinde might reasonably be referred only to the five Acres and not to the inter al and that a distinct Reservation of Six shillings might be for five Acres And so Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Ante. Steed versus Berrier ERror upon a Judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas upon a Special Verdict the Case was to this effect J.S. made his Will in Writing and devised Lands to his Son J.S. and his Heirs and in the same Will gave a Legacy of 100 l to his Grandson The Son died afterwards in his Life time after whose decease J. S. the Grandfather made a Codicil wherein he gave away part of the Lands devised as aforesaid to a Stranger and afterwards declared by Parol that his Intention was that his Grandson J. S. should have the Lands which his Son J. S. should have had The Question upon this Special Verdict was Whether this were sufficient to carry the Lands to the Grandson And Judgment was given in the Common Pleas by three Judges against one that it was Whereupon a Writ of Error was brought in this Court Finch Solicitor Argued that this Will was sufficient to carry it to the Grandson He agreed Brett and Ridgen's Case in Pl. Com. that a Devise to a man and his Heirs who dies in the Life of the Devisor a new Publication will not be enough to make the Heir take by the Will because named in the Will by way of Limitation of the Estate and not Designation of the Person that should take But in Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. 423. and in Mo. 2. where the Devise was to his Son Richard and the Heirs of his Body which Richard afterwards died in his Life time and then the Devisor said My Will is That the Sons of Richard my Son deceased shall have the Land devised to their Father as they should have had if their Father had lived and died after me There Popham and Fenner held that this new Publication would carry the Land to Richard's Son Gawdy and Clench contra But our Case is much stronger for there Heirs of the Body were used only for Limitation but in the Will here where the words are I Devise to my Son J. with this new Publication the Grandson J. may take because a Grandson is a Son and when a Will is new Published it is all one as if it were wrote at the time of such Publication Beckford and Parncot's Case in the 1 Cro. 493. Mo. 404. Devise of all his Lands and after the Will the Devisor purchaseth other Lands and then publishes it again it will carry the new purchased Lands Dyer 149. Trevanian's Case Cestuy que use before the 27th of H. 8. Devised the Lands a new Publication will pass the Lands executed in him by the Statute The Opinion of the Court inclined to Reverse the Judgment they held it to be the same with Fuller's Case in the 1 Cro. that no Parol averment can carry Lands to one person when the words of the Will plainly intended them to another They agreed If a man having no Son but a Grandson deviseth his Lands to his Son the Grandson may take But here is an opposition contained in the new Publication viz. Those Lands which my Son J. should have had my meaning is my Grandson J. shall have And in the Will it self there is a Legacy devised to the Grandson by that Name so where they are so distinguished 't is impossible to take the Grandson to be
upon the Warranty as well as the other tho' the Declaration saith knowing them to be naught yet the knowledge need not to be proved in Evidence Debt upon a Bond and a mutuatus may be joyned in one Action yet there must be several Pleas for Nil debet which is proper to the one will not serve in the Action upon the Bond. Sed Adjornatur Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 34 35 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus A Quo Warranto was brought against divers persons of the City of Worcester why they claimed to be Aldermen c. of the said Corporation The Cause came to be tried at the Bar and a Challenge was made to the Jury in behalf of the Defendants for that the Jury men were not Freeholders The Court said that for Juries within Corporate Towns it hath hath been held that the Statutes that have been made requiring that Jurymen should have so much Freehold do not extend to such places for if so there might be a failer of Justice for want of such Jurymen so qualified but then to maintain the Challenge it was said by the Common Law Jurymen were to be Freeholders But the Court overruled the Challenge but at the importunity of the Counsel they allowed a Bill of Exceptions and so a Verdict passed against the Defendants and afterwards it was moved in Arrest of Judgment upon the Point But the Court would not admit the Matter to be Debated before them tho' divers Presidents of like nature were offered because they said they had declared their Opinions before and the Redress might be upon a Writ of Error Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 35 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus A Motion for a Prohibition to a Suit in the Ecclesiastical Court for a Churchwarden's Rate suggesting that they had pleaded That it was not made with the Consent of the Parishioners and that the Plea was refused The Court said That the Churchwardens if the Parish were Summoned and refused to meet or make a Rate might make one alone for the Repairs of the Church if needful because that if the Repairs were neglected the Churchwardens were to be Cited and not the Parishioners and a Day was given to shew Cause why there should not go to a Prohibition Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 35 Car. II. In Banco Regis Gamage's Case ERror out of the Court of the Grand Sessions where in an Ejectment the Case was upon Special Verdict upon the Will of one Gamage who devised his Lands in A. to his Wife for Life Item his Lands in B. to his Wife for Life and also his Lands which he purchased of C. to his Wife for Life and after the decease of his Wife he gave the said Lands to one of his Sons and his Heirs And the Question was Whether the Son should have all the Lands devised to the Wife or only those last mentioned And it was Adjudged in the Grand Sessions that all should pass And upon Error brought it was Argued that they were Devises to the Wife in distinct and separate Sentences and therefore his said Lands should be referred only to the last On the other side it was said that the word Said should not be referred to the last Antecedent but to all If a man conveys Land to A. for Life Remainder to B. in Tail Remainder to C. in forma praedict ' the Gift to C. is void 1 Inst 20. b. It is agreed if he said All the said Lands to his Son and his heirs it would have extended to the whole This is the same because Indefinitum equipollet universali Et Adjornatur Herring versus Brown IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the Case was Tenant for Life with several Remainders over with a Power of Revocation Levied a Fine and then by a Deed found to be Sealed ten Days after declared the Vses of the Fine which Deed had the Circumstances required by the Power The Question in the Case was Whether the Fine had extinguished the Power It was Argued that it had not because the Deed and Fine shall be but one Conveyance and the use of a Fine or Recovery may be declared by a subsequent Deed in the 9 Co. Downam's Case And a Case was Cited which was in this Court in my Lord Hale's time between Garrett and Wilson where Tenant for Life with Remainders over had a Power of Revocation and by a Deed under his Hand and Seal Covenanted to levy a Fine and declared it should be to certain Vses and afterwards the Fine was Levied accordingly This was held to be a good execution of the Power and limitation of the new Vses and the Deed and Fine taken as one On the other side it was Argued That the Deed was but an Evidence to what Vses the Fine was intended and the Power was absolutely revoked by the Fine Suppose he in Remainder had Entred for the Forfeiture before this Deed should the Defendant have defeated his Right Et Adjornatur Postea Hodson versus Cooke IN an Action upon the Case for commencing of an Action against him in an Inferiour Court where the Cause of Action did arise out of the Jurisdiction After a Verdict for the Plaintiff upon Not Guilty it was moved in Arrest of Judgment That it was not set forth that the Defendant did know that the Place where the Action arose was out of the Jurisdiction which it would be hard to put the Plaintiff to take notice of On the other side it was said that the party ought to have a Recompence for the Inconvenience he is put to by being put to Bail perhaps in a Case where Bail is not required above and such like Disadvantages which are not in a Suit brought here and the Plaintiff ought at his peril to take notice However to help by the Verdict And of that Opinion were Jeffreys Lord Chief Justice Holloway and Walcot but Withens contra The Court said that it could not be assigned for Error in Fact that the Cause arose out of the Jurisdiction because that is contrary to the Allegation of the Record neither is the Officer punishable that executes Process in such Action but an Action lies against the party And so it was said to be resolved in a Case between Cowper and Cowper Pasch 18 Car. 2. in Scac. when my Lord Chief Baron Hale sate there Anonymus AN Indictment of Perjury for Swearing before a Justice of the Peace that J. S. was present at a Conventicle or Meeting for Religious Worship c. It was moved to quash it because it did not appear to be a Conventicle viz. That there was above the number of Five and so the Justice of the Peace had no power to take an Oath concerning it and then it could be no Perjury To which the Lord Chief Justice said That Conventicles were unlawful by the Common Law and the Justices may punish Unlawful Assemblies And he seemed to be of Opinion that a man might be
because the Intent of the parties appears that it should be so There 's no great difference between the Construction of a Deed of Uses and a Will 13 H. 7. The Wife takes an Estate for Life by Implication where the Land is devised to the eldest Son after her decease Manning and Andrew's Case in 1 Leon. 259. The Reason of these Cases is the fulfilling of the Intention of the Parties and here this Limitation cannot be made good by way of a Future Use nor by any other way but only by creating of an Estate for Life in Michael the Father by Implication and this is according to the nature of a Covenant to stand seiz'd For the Use is not to pass out of the Covenantor till the proper time for the subsequent Estate to commence As to my Lord Paget's Case 't was his Intention to have the Use during his Life And my Lord Coke was certainly very well satisfied with the Resolution in Fenwick and Mitford's Case when he wrote his Institutes for he Argued before to the contrary as appears by the Report of that Case in Moor. Rainsford Justice to the same Intent If no Use rises immediately to Ralph yet if a Use rises by the Deed so that he has the Land any way be it by discent from his Father 't is within the Conclusion of the Verdict By the scope of the Conveyance it appears that it was intended that Robert should never have his Land till Twelve hundred Pound was paid for the provision of younger Children so that if Robert should have it it would be against the Intention of Michael There are two Reasons and Grounds in Law by which we may make this Deed agree with the Intention of the Parties First Because it is in the Case of an Estate Tail ubi voluntas donatoris observari debet Secondly It is in a Conveyance setled by way of Use and in Cases of Uses the Intention of the parties ought to be pursued And this is in Case of a Use that rises by Covenant to stand seiz'd which makes the Case the stronger And I conceive this is not a void Limitation but such an one as gives an Estate to Ralph In speaking to which I shall observe what my Lord Coke in the 1 Inst 23. says viz. That so much of the Use as the Owner of the Land does not dispose of remains in him c. and so in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. 30. And this is the Reason of Bingham's Case 1 Co. 91. Now here when Michael Covenanted to stand seiz'd to the Vse of his Heirs Male on the Body of his second Wife begotten I conceive he shall retain the Land as parcel of his ancient Vse during his Life for non est Haeres viventis according to Archer's Case 1 Co. And that Michael shall retain an Estate for Life is prov'd by my Lord Paget's Case 1 Co. 154. Dyer 310. N. 79. 1 Co. Chudleigh's Case 129. 2 Rolls 788. 21 H. 7. 18. From my Lord Paget's Case upon which I shall rely and the other Cases it appears that were there 's a Limitation to one after the death of another the Covenantor shall retain the Land during the Life of the other and here in our Case this Estate not taking effect till after the Death of Michael he shall retain the Estate and shall be Tenant for Life of the old Vse Now the Question is Whether Ralph shall take by Discent or Purchase And I conceive this Estate for Life with the Remainder in Tail makes but one Estate Tail in Michael and that he becomes Tenant in Tail and so Ralph shall take as Heir in Tail I shall not trouble my self whether Ralph may take here as a Purchaser because in Cownden and Clark's Case in Hob. it is Resolved that he cannot take as Heir Male of the Body by Purchase because all the words are not verified in him for he is not Heir I shall rely upon the First Point That here is an Estate Tail executed in Michael For when an Estate for Life is in the Auncestor by way of Retainer and an Estate is afterwards limited to his Heirs this is within the Rule put in Shelley's Case in 1 Co. where the Auncestor takes an Estate of Freehold and by the same Conveyance an Estate is limited to his Heirs Mediately or Immediately they are Words of Limitation and not of Purchase because the Heir is part of his Father Our Case is stronger that Fenwick and Mitfords Case It s true the same Reason for that Case is not given by Anderson and More which is given by my Lord Coke More 437. There the Reason is because the Limitation to the right Heirs is merely void here Michael hath an Estate in Tail of the ancient Use therefore 't is not necessary for the Law to create an Estate for Life Obj. That this cannot be an Estate Tail executed in Michael because the Estate for Life is not by the same Limitation but by Construction of Law But my Lord Coke says in Fenwick and Mitfords Case 1 Inst 22. b. that there is no difference where the Estate is created by Law and where by the Deed. 1 Anderson 259. and the Law retaining an Estate in Michael for Life our Case is the same as if the Estate had been limited to him with the Remainder to his Heirs Male begotten on his second Wife which would be an Estate Tail executed in Michael and would have discended to Ralph Twisden Justice for the Plaintiff I hold there 's no Use raised to Ralph by this Deed. We are here in the construction of a Deed and not of a Will It may be an Estate should be raised in such a case by a Will altho' my Lord Hobart is of a contrary Opinion I agree the Case of Hodgkinson and Wood Cro. Car. 23. but it cannot be argued from thence that it shall be so in a Deed for a Devise is not to take effect till after the Death of the Devisor and then 't is apparent that he is Heir Male of his Body It hath been agreed that Heirs Male of the Body are words of purchase It is plain that Ralph cannot take as Special Heir unless by Purchase and that he cannot do because he who shall take by virtue of such a Limitation ought to be Heir as well as Issue Male and Ralph here cannot take by vertue of the Statute de Donis Conditionalibis because none can take as Special Heir but where his Ancestor took before and therefore this Limitation is utterly void To make this Limitation good divers ways have been urged First That this Deed has an operation by way of returning of the Use and it has been compared to my Lord Pagets Case which differs from it here cannot be any part of the old Use in Michael for if he hath an Estate for Life it ought to be a new Use It cannot be a returning Use for the Limitation to the Heirs Male of the Body
Estate Tail in Michael First Because in this Case the Use returns by operation of Law and executes an Estate in Michael for Life which being conjoined to the Estate limited to the Heirs Male of his Body makes an Estate Tail This Estate for Life rising by operation of Law is as strong as if it had been limitted to him for his Life and after his decease to the Heirs Male of his Body Secondly Because that a Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body is in Construction of Law a Limitation to himself and the Heirs Male of his Body There is a great difference when he who has the Use limits it to A. for Life the Remainder to the Heirs of the Body of B. here no Estate can rise to B. because nothing moved from him but where he who has the Estate limits it to the Heirs Male of his own Body ut res valeat he shall have it for his Life Thirdly It is plainly according to the intent of the Parties the intent perfectly appears that the Issue by the second Wife should take and that Robert the eldest Son should not take till so much Money be paid therefore if we can by any means serve the intent of the parties we ought to do it as good Expositors For as my Lord Hobart says Judges in Construction of Deeds do no harm if they are astuti in serving the intent of the Parties without violating any Law Obj. Here the Use being never out of Michael he hath the ancient Use which is the Fee simple and consequently being the ancient Use and this being a new Limitation to the Heirs Male of his Body the ancient use and the new one cannot be piec'd to make an Estate Tail executed in Michael but it shall be a Contingent Use if any which ought to rise to the Heir Male of his Body and so remains the ancient Fee simple And it hath been compared to these Cases If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J.S. or of his Son after his Marriage or after the Death of J. D. these are Contingent Limitations and there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor to serve the future Uses Resp 'T is true if a Man Covenants to stand seized to such Uses as that he leaves a discendible Estate in himself As if a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of his Son from and after his Marriage this is purely a Contingent Use because t is possible the Marriage may never take effect and nothing is fetch'd out of the Covenantor so if he Covenants to stand seized to the Use of J. S. after 40 years there is a Fee simple determinable in the Covenantor and therefore those Cases are not to be resembled to our Case where the Estate of Michael cannot continue longer than his Life And this without any wrong done to any Rule of Law may be turned to a Use for Life and therefore such construction shall be Object 2. Here is an Estate to rise by way of Use by a Deed and not by a Will which shall not be by Implication by a Deed. Resp It s a certain truth But we are not here upon raising an Estate by Implication but qualifying an Estate that is now in the Father which by this new Deed is to be qualified to be an Estate for Life to preserve the Estate Tail so that the Cases of Implication are not to the purpose Object 3. In this Case Michael shall be in of his ancient Estate in Fee simple which is in him and not of a new Estate created by Implication of Law and it hath been compared to the Devise of Land to a Mans Heir he shall not be in by the Devise but of his ancient Estate that would have descended to him Resp True But in this Case a Man may qualifie his Estate as in Gilpins Case Cro. Ca. 161. Devise to his Heir upon Condition that he shall pay his Debts in a year the Heir is a Purchasor so here is a qualification to turn the Estate of Michael into an Estate for Life ut res valeat Object 4. Michael had not an Intention to have an Estate for Life for in the Limitation of the other Lands he has limited them expressly to himself for Life and if he had intended to have had an Estate for Life in the Lands in question he would also have so expressed it Resp The intention will not controul the operation of Law his main intent was to settle the Lands upon his younger Children this the Law serves but not his secondary intentions If a Man Covenants to stand seized to the Use of himself for Life without impeachment of Wast and afterwards to the Use of the Heirs Male of his Body the Law supervenes his intention and makes him to be Tenant in Tail And in our Case there was a necessity to limit the other Lands to himself for Life because there was another Estate to intervene the Estate for Life and the Estate Tail The Reason given by my Lord Coke in Fenwick and Mitfords Case is plain enough and it appears that he was of that Opinion afterwards by the Report of Pannel and Lanes Case 13 Jac. in Rolls Rep. 1 part 238. The Case upon which I shall rely which has not been answered is my Lord Pagets Case adjudged by all the Judges of England Tho. Lord Paget Covenants in consideration of the discharge of his Funerals Payment of his Debts and Legacies out of the profits of his Land and for the advancement of his Son Brother and others of his Blood that he and his Heirs would stand seized of divers Mannors to the Use of T.F. one of the Covenantees for the Life of my Lord Paget and after his Death to the Use of C. Paget for the term of 24 years and then to the Use of W. Paget his Son in Tail with Remainders in over and afterwards the Lord Paget was aâ—â—â—nted of Treason And it was adjudged that the Lord Paget himself had an Estate for his Life for the Remainder being limited after his Death the Estate cannot pass out of him during his Life and there in Case of a Covenant to stand seized he himself hath an Estate for Life And this is not because the Estate returns as my Brother Twisden has said but because the Estate was never out of him and cannot return either from the Heir or the Covenantee otherwise where should it be during the Life of the Lord Paget who was attainted the Book is that it was never out of him but was turn'd into an Estate for Life So that now it is all one as if he had Covenanted to stand seized to the Use of his eldest Son after his Death And the question is What Estate he has during his Life It is adjudged that he has an Estate for Life for if there had been a Contingent Fee simple in the Lord Paget his Heir could never have had an Amoveas manus
the Estate had fully declared his Intention There is a difference where a man has power to make Leases c. which shall charge and incumber a third persons Estate such Powers are to have a rigid Construction but where the Power is to dispose of a mans own Estate it is to have all the favour imaginable It was offered by the Counsel That where Tenant in Tail did bargain and sell his Estate that seeing he had power over it notwithstanding there were no Fine and Recovery a Court of Equity should Decree against the Heir But my Lord Chancellor said that he would not supersede Fines and Recoveries but where a man was only Tenant in Tail in Equity there this Court should Decree such disposition good for a Trust and Equitable Interest is a Creature of their own and therefore disposable by their Rule Otherwise where the Entail was of an Estate in the Land Nota In the Case supra that the Court would not Decree the Infants to be foreclosed till they come of Age tho' sometimes 't is so done because this Mortgage depended upon a disputable Title and so no Money could be expected upon Assignment of it over Termino Paschae Anno 33 Car. II. In Cancellaria Sir Thomas Littleton's Case IN this Case my Lord Chancellor Declared 1. That it was a constant Rule That the Money to be paid upon Mortgages in Fee whether forfeit or not before the death of the Mortgagee that it should go to the Executor 2. If a man had Lands in Fee and other Lands mortgaged to him in Fee by a Devise of all his Lands the Mortgage would pass 3. If a man had but the Trust of a Mortgage of Lands in D. and had other Lands in D. by a Devise of all his Lands in D. the Trust would pass But here a Will devised Lands to J. S. in D. S. and T. and all his Lands elsewhere when he had a Mortgage of Lands that did not lye in D. S. or T. which were of more value than the Lands in D. S. and T. The Decree was that the Mortgage should not pass for he could not be thought to mean to comprehend Lands of so much value under the word elsewhere which is like an c. that comes in currente calamo and besides that there were some other Circumstances in the Will that did seem as if he intended not to pass the Mortgage Lands Anonymus A Bill was Exhibited setting forth That the Defendant in a Replevin had avowed for a Rent-charge and Issue was taken thereupon upon the Seisin of the Grantor and it was found for the Defendant Which Verdict the Plaintiff complained of alledging that the Rent pretended to be granted had not been paid in 50 years and other Circumstances to render the Grant suspicious c. The Lord Chancellor Decreed That there should be a New Trial the Complainant paying the Costs of the former Note This could not have been tryed again at Law because the Verdict in Replevin is conclusive Cage versus Russel A Feme Covert having Power by her Will to Devise certain Lands devised them to her Executors to pay 500 l out of them to her Son when he should attain the Age of One and twenty years provided that if the Father of the Son did not give a sufficient Release to the Executors of the Goods and Chattels remaining in such an House then the Devise of the 500 l should be void and to go to the Executors After her Decease a Release was tendred to the Father who refused it and then the Son exhibits a Bill against the Father and the Executors for the 500 l and to compell the Father to Release The Executors in their Answer insisted upon the Refusal as a Forfeiture of the 500 l And the Father said That tho' he had for some Reasons before refused he was now ready to Release The Lord Chancellor Decreed the Payment of the 500 l and said that it was the standing Rule of the Court That a Forfeiture should not bind where a thing may be done afterwards or any Compensation made for it As where the Condition was to pay Money or the like But in the Case of Fry and Porter in the 22th of Car. 2 which see at large in the Modern Reports where a Devise was of an House upon Condition that the Devisee should Marry with the Consent of three persons and she married without Consent it was an immediate Forfeiture for Marriage without Consent was a thing of that nature that no after Satisfaction could be made for it But if where there is a Devise over to a third Person after a Forfeiture by the first a Forfeiture in such a Case would be generally binding but here 't is said that it shall go the Executors c. which was not to be considered because it is no more than what the Law implied Termino Sancti Michaelis Anno 33 Car. II. In Cancellaria Anonymus ONe Deviseth 250 l to his Son and makes his Wife Executrix who marries another Husband In a Bill brought against them for the Legacy by the Son the Defendants would have discounted Maintenance and Education Which was not permitted by the Court so as to a diminish the principal Sum for it was said that the Mother ought to maintain the Child But a Sum of Money paid for the binding of him out an Apprentice was allowed to be discounted Note It is the Course here that where a man dies in Debt and under several Incumbrances viz. Judgments Statutes Mortgages c. and the Heir at Law buys in any of them that are of the first Date if those which have the latter Securities prefer their Bill the Incumbrances brought in shall not stand in their way for more than the Heir really paid for them Goylmer versus Paddiston THe Case was thus Thomas Goylmer in 1653. being seised of certain Lands in Fee of the value of 14 l per annum and there being a Marriage in Treaty between the Plaintiff the Brother of Thomas and Anne Wells the said Thomas did make a Writing sealed and delivered by him which was to this purpose Viz. That if the Marriage takes effect between my Brother and Ann Wells she being worth Eightscore Pounds I do promise that if I dye without Issue to give my Lands in c. to my Brother and his Heirs or to leave him 80 l in Money And for the true performance of this I bind my self my Heirs Executors and Administrators After which the Brother the now Plaintiff and the said Anne Wells did intermarry and she was worth Eightsocore pounds But Thomas Goylmer did afterwards marry and having no Issue he did settle the Lands upon his Wife for Life the Remainder to his own right Heirs this way a Joynture setled before Marriage and did afterwards devise the Land to her in Fee and died without Issue His Wife afterwards devised it to the Defendant's Wife in Fee and now the Plaintiff exhibited
his Assent to the Marriage of his Daughter with J.S. and that he would give her 1500 l And afterwards by another Letter upon a further Treaty concerning the Marriage he went back from the Proposals of his Letter And at some time after declared That he would agrèe to what was propounded in his first Letter This Letter was held a sufficient Promise in Writing within the Statute of 29 Car. 2. called the Statute against Frauds and Perjuries and that the last Declaration had set the Terms in the first Letter up again Anonymus WHere a man buys Land in anothers name and pays Mony it will be in Trust for him that pays the Mony tho' no Deed declaring the Trust for the Statute of 29 Car. 2. called the Statute of Frauds doth not extend to Trusts raised by Operation of the Law Anonymus AN Administrator de bonis non of the Conusee of a Statute had agreed with the Conusor to assign it in Consideration of a Sum of Mony which upon the said Agreement the Conusors had Covenanted to pay to him his Executors or Administrators and then the Administrator died The Court Decreed the Mony to be paid to the Executor of the Administrator and not to the New Administrator de bonis non altho' before the Extent it could not be assigned at Law Sed nota That there were not Debts of the first Intestate appearing Termino Sancti Hillarij Anno 35 36 Car. II. In Cancellaria NOte Suits in Chancery admitted for Distribution of Intestates Estates upon the Act of 22 Car. 2. Sir Thomas Draper Mil ' versus Dr. Crowther THe Bill sets forth a Contract under Seal with the Defendant for making of a Lease of certain Lands in Middlesex and to have an Execution of the Agreement The Defendant pleaded That he has Head of a Colledge in Oxford and sets forth the Charters of 14 R. 2. and 14 H. 8. Impowering the University to enquire and proceed in all Pleas and Quarrels in Law and Equity except concerning Freehold where a Scholar their Servants and Ministers sunt una partium c. ita quod Justiciarij de Banco Regis sive de Communi Banco vel Justiciarij ad Assisas non se intromittant c. And the Confirmation by an Act of Parliament of the 13th of Elizabeth and Concluded his Plea to the Iurisdiction of the Court. And it came to be Argued before the Lord Keeper Guildford 22 Febr. 1683. and the Plea was Over-ruled because the Charter ought properly to be extended to Matters at Common Law only or to Proceedings in Equity that might arise in such Cases and not to meer Matters of Equity which are Originally such as to Execute Agreements in specie Again Conuzance of Pleas is never to be allowed unless the Inferior Jurisdiction can give Remedy Here they can only Excommunicate or Imprison but cannot proceed to Sequestration of Lands in Middlesex If the Matter lay only in Damages it might be allowed to them because the Jurisdiction is given over all England but this is not to be intended where the Suit is for the thing it self and when 't is out of their reach A President was cited in the year 1663. before my Lord Clarendon Chancellor assisted with Hale then Chief Baron and Justice Wyndam where the Plea was Over-ruled Vide in the 3 Cro. 63. Wilcocks and Bradell's Case and Hallie's Case 87. Sir Robert Reeve's Case SIr George Reeve upon his Marriage with his Second Wife setled a Ioynture of divers of his Lands in Suffolk which he had before charged with his Daughters Portion viz. 3000 l which Daughter he had by a former Wife and by his last Will he mentioned that the said Joynture Lands were so incumbred and therefore he Devised certain Lands he had in Bickerton in Yorkshire to his Wife in lieu of such part of the Suffolk Lands as were charged with the Portion in case she would accept thereof But after his Decease it appeared that the Lands in Bickerton were not equivalent in Value to the Suffolk Lands and therefore she held to the latter and was not prejudiced by the Charge of the Portion because it appeared to be a Voluntary Settlement Nota In this Case the Lord Keeper Decreed that the Portion should be charged upon the Bickerton Lands for so much as it was defeated by the Settlement in Ioynture of the Suffolk Lands Anonymus ONe Devised his Lands to J.S. in Fee in Trust for Katharine and the Heirs of her Body and if Katharine died without Issue to Jane for life And in another Clause in the Will he devised That if Katharine died without Issue and Jane be then deceased then and not otherwise he gave the Land to J. N. and his Heirs Katharine died without Issue and Jane survived her and died A Bill was brought by J. N. against J. S. and the Heir at Law of the Testator to have this Trust executed My Lord Keeper Decreed it for J. N. altho' Jane survived Katharine because the words if Jane be then deceased seemed to be put in to express his meaning that Jane should be sure to have it for her life and that J. N. should not have it till she were dead and also to shew when J.N. should have it in possession Termino Paschae Anno 36 Car. II. In Cancellaria Wiliam Ragget and his Wife versus William Clarke THe Case was thus Nicholas Wheeler was seised of a parcel of Land for his own life and the lives of two others and prevailed with the Defendant to be bound with him for a Sum of Mony And that the Defendant might raise Mony for the discharge of the said Debt he permitted the Defendant to enter into the said Lands and to take the Profits for two years the said Lands being about 12 l yearly value and the said Land being so in the possession of the Defendant the said Wheeler died and made Isabel Wife of the now Plaintiff his Executrix And this Bill was brought by the said Husband and Wife to have an account of the Profits and that the possession of the Land should be delivered up to them The Defendant by Plea sets forth his Title as Occupant and it was allowed And the Bill was dismissed Bonham versus Newcomb ONe being seised in Fee in Consideration of 1000 l paid to him by a Person that married his Kinswoman Conveys to him and his Heirs and takes a Re-demise for 99 years if he should live so long And a Covenant therein That if he should pay 1000 l with the Interest that should be due for the same at any time during his life that the Grantee should Re-convey to him and his Heirs and that if he did not pay the Mony then that his Heirs c. should have no power to Redeem He died the Mony not being paid and his Heir preferred a Bill to Redeem it And it was urged for him That in a Conveyance which was a Security for Mony whatever
the Defendant shew Cause why he should not accept of a Declaration upon payment of Costs Termino Paschae Anno 22 Car. II. In Banco Regis Anonymus IF there be several Contracts between A. and B. at several times for several sums Prohibition each sum under 40 s and they do all amount to a sum sufficient to Entitle the Superiour Court they shall be there put in Suit and not in a Court which is not of Record And so it was resolved in the Case of the Savoy Court and Stanford 24. C. 2. Also it was said That if a Man at divers times Steals things all which amount to above 12d 't is Felony Capital In an Account after a Quod computet the Court Assigns Auditors and they sit upon and return the Account when they will for day is not given them and they give the Parties in the interim what time they please but if the Defendant delays they return it to the Court and Process goes out against him Nota Memorandum On Tuesday April the 26th Steven Mosdel to whom Mr. Lenthal had granted the Office of Marshal of the Kings-Bench for life was sworn Marshal The Oath was this Viz. You shall swear that during the time of your being Marshal you shall well and truly use exercise and behave your self in the said Office you shall encrease no Fees and in all things shall do your Duty in the said Office c. It was resolved That the said Stephen Mosdel could not afterwards practise as an Attorney of this Court and that Mr. Lenthall Marshall in Reversion had no Priviledge Anonymus A Promise was made to give 1000 l to one for curing of his Eyes and an Assumpsit is brought Vpon this the Jury may give less than 1000 l Damages if they think fit Sir W. Mewes versus Mewes A Title of Land was tryed out of the proper County upon a feigned Wager Whether well conveyed or no this is the Course of Issues directed out of Chancery Note In this Case a Bill in Chancery was given in Evidence against the Complainant though held to be but of slight moment Smiths Case SMith and other Commissioners of Sewers which sate at White-Chappel were brought in upon an Attachment awarded against them for a Contempt of this Court. And the Case was thus A Certiorari was lately sent and delivered to them out of this Court upon Special direction and recommendation by the King and Council before whom the Business had been agitated to remove hither Certain Orders and Proceedings of theirs in order to a Tryal of the Right of the Matter in Question At first they did not allow the Certiorari but afterwards having allowed it they proceeded de novo upon the same Matter and made an Order again which certain persons being the same persons who procured the Certiorari refusing to obey the Commissioners fined them 10 l apiece Then a second Certiorari was taken out and delivered to them after which they imprisoned persons for not executing and obeying of a Warrant made upon their second Order and for speaking Contemptuous words of the Commissioners and fined them 5 l apiece Being now questioned by the Court concerning these Contempts and Misdemeanours They said they did this wholly by the advice of their Counsel Mr. Ofley who being in Court received a severe Reprimand therefore and the Commissioners were committed to Prison About the Fortnight afterwards having made and Filed their Return they were brought into Court to receive the Sentence of the Court. And then it was said by them and Coleman their Counsel that they would not urge any thing in justification of their not returning their Proceedings they only offered that what they did was by the advice of their Counsel and that the Clause in 13 Eliz. cap. 9. was so penned as to give a great occasion of doubt in this particular which Clause upon their desire was read And is this And be it further Enacted c. That from henceforth the said Commissioners of Sewers nor any of them shall not be compelled or compellable to make any Certificate or Return of the said Commissioners or any of them or of any of the Ordinances Laws or doings by the Authority of any of the said Commissions nor shall not have any Fine Pain or Amerciament set upon them or any of them or any ways to be molested in Body Lands or Goods for that Cause and after the reading thereof the Court delivered themselves seriatim as followeth Moreton This is a great Offence and Contempt The Commissioners of Sewers and their Proceedings are subject to the Jurisdiction of this Court Sir Henry Mildmayes Case 2 Cro. 336. and Sir H. Hungates in our Memory If Commissioners of Sewers or any other inferiour Jurisdiction excéed their Commission we may reform and restrain them and it nay we prohibit them in Cases where They have no Jurisdiction of the matter Many presidents are with us in the present Case And we cannot answer our Duty to the King without taking notice of and punishing this Offence Therefore my Opinion is That for their not obeying of the first Writ they be fined 40 Marks apiece and for their not obeying of the second Writ 20 Marks apiece Rainsford This is indisputably an Offence and Contempt and the greater for that it was seconded It is aggravated too in that the Commissioners proceeded after they had allowed the Certiorari and that they fell upon and shewed their Indignation against those persons who only pursued the Kings Authority and that this was in a Case which was recommended by the King and Council to which Recommendation the Commissioners were Privy they had contrary advice from other Counsel then there but they would hearken to that advice which pleased them best Obedience is that Ligament of the Government without which all will be turned into Anarchy and Confusion Without betraying the Trust reposed in us by the King and violating of our Oaths we cannot omit to punish this therefore I agree the Fines The Reason of the Fines is the disobeying of the Writs the Reason of their disproportion is to resemble the Measures the Commissioners observed towards those persons whom they unduly fined Twisden It was resolved in 23 Car. That this Statute hath no reference to this Court and that this Clause extends only to Certificates and Returns into Chancery the Statute speaks of Supersedeas c. which issue out of the Court of Chancery only for this Court does not nor ever did send out Supersedeas's but this Court sends out Certiorari's which are to bring the business before the King here and the words of them are quia coram nobis terminari volumus non alibi What should move that Gentleman to give such advice as he did I cannot imagin I suppose there is more in the matter than we know and 't is a strange thing that these Commissioners should ask Counsel whether they should obey the Kings Writ or no Especially when it
out of Repair Secondly The whole is Sequestred whereas it ought to have been but in proportion to the Charge of Repairing and should be certainly expressed what it required Thirdly The Sequestration is to remain by the Sentence until the Judge should take further Order Whereas it ought to have been but until the Repairs had been done These Exceptions the Court held fatal and therefore gave no Opinion as to the Matter in Law but did incline that there could be no Sequestration for being made Lay Fee the Impropriation was out of their Jurisdiction and it was now only against the Person as against a Layman for not Repairing the Church And they said in case of Dilapidations the whole ought not to be Sequestred but to leave a proportion to the Parson for his Livelyhood Anonymus IN an Ejectment upon a Special Verdict the sole Point was Whether a Lease for a year upon no other Consideration than reserving a Pepper Corn if it be demanded shall work as a Bargain and Sale and so to make the Lessee capable of a Release And it was Resolved that it should and that the Reservation made a sufficient Consideration to raise an Use as by Bargain and Sale Vid. 10 Co. in Sutton's Hospitals Case Rozer versus Rozer AN Indebitatus Assumpsit pro parcell ' Corii ad specialem instantiam requisitionem of the Defendant sold and delivered to J.S. Et sic inde Indebitat ' existens the Defendant promised to pay Vpon Non assumpsit pleaded and a Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that there is no Promise laid and no Reason to presume a Promise when 't is the very ground of the Action tho' after a Verdict And admitting there were a Promise yet it being Collateral it did not make a Debt but should have been brought as an Action upon the Case Mo. 702. and Dyer 230. And hereupon Judgment was stayed Tho' as I hear in the King Bench about two years since between Danbey and Kent they held such a Case well enough after a Verdict Quaere Termino Sanctae Trinitatis Anno 33 Car. II. In Communi Banco Page versus Kirke IN an Action of Trespass upon Not Guilty at the Assizes in Suffolk a Verdict was found for the Plaintiff and 10 s Damages and 40 s Costs and Judgment entred accordingly And an Action of Debt was brought upon the Judgment and the Defendant pleaded Specially the Statute 22 23 of Car. II. ca. 9. against Recovering more Costs than Damages where the Damages are under 40 s in Trespass unless certified by the Judge that the Title was chiefly in question the Words of the Statute being If any more Costs in such Action shall be awarded the Judgment shall be void To which the Plaintiff Demurred and the Plea was held Insufficient because the Verdict was for 40 s Costs and not Costs increased by an Award of the Court. 2. If the Judgment were Erroneous yet it was hard to make it avoidable by Plea notwithstanding that the Words of the Statute are Shall be void Termino Sanctae Michaelis Anno 33 Car. II. In Communi Banco Onslowes Case HE brought an Action against a Bayliff being the chief Magistrate of a Corporation for that although he were chosen one of the Burgesses to serve in Parliament for the Corporation by the greater Number c. yet the Bayliff to disappoint him of sitting and to bring trouble c. upon him did return another Person in the Indentures together with him to his Damage c. Vpon Not Guilty pleaded and a Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Action would not lie And of that Opinion were the whole Court viz. North Chief Iustice Wyndham Charlton and Levins for they said they had no Iurisdiction of this Matter the principal part thereof being a Retorn in Parliament No Action before the Statute H. 6. c. did lie against a Sheriff or chief Officer of a Corporation for a False-retorn and the Courts at Westminster must not enlarge their Iurisdiction in these matters further than those Acts give them That there were no Presidents of any Actions at the Common Law save Nevils Case in the late times and Sir Samuel Bernardistons Case both which miscarried In the Long Parliament there were a great many double Retorns but no Actions had been brought which is a great Argument that no such Action lies as Littleton argues upon the Statute of Merton of disparaging an Heir Termino Paschae Anno 35 Car. II. In Communi Banco The Lord Conwallis's Case THE Case was Isaac Pennington a Copyholder of the Mannor whereof my Lord Conwallis is now feised committed Treason in the matter of the Murder of King Charles the First and then about Anno 1655. surrendred into the hands of the Lord of the Mannor his Copyhold Lands to the use of some of his Children who were admitted In 1659. the Mannor was aliened to the Lord Conwallis then came the Act of Attainder 12 Car. 2. whereby Tychburn with other Regicides were attainted and thereby it was Enacted That all their Mannors Messuages Lands Tenements Rents Reversions Remainders Possessions Rights Conditions Interests Offices Annuities and all other Hereditaments Leases for Years Chattels Real and other things of that nature whatsoever they be shall stand forfeited to the King c. Provided that no Conveyance Assurance Grant Bargain Sale Charge Lease Assignment of Lease Grants and Surrenders by Copy of Court Roll c. made to any Person or Persons other than the Wife or Wives Child or Children Heir or Heirs of such Person or Persons c. After which Attainder c. the Lord of the Mannor caused the Lands to be seised and brought an Ejectment The First Point Was whether in Case of Treason or Felony the Lord can seise before Conviction or Attainder And the Court seemed to be of Opinion that no Seisure could be till Attainder without Special Custom but they agreed the presentment of the Homage was not necessary to precede a Seisure or to entitle the Lord to take the advantage of a Forfeiture but in case of a Capital Crime it would be unreasonable and inconvenient to permit the same to be tried or controverted in a Civil Action before the Conviction appeared upon Record Secondly Whether this were such a Forfeiture as the Lord was bound to take notice thereof for if no notice then the acceptance of the Surrender c. would not preclude him from taking advantage of the Forfeiture And the Court inclined that the Lord should be presumed to take notice in this Case as he shall in the Case of Failer of Suit of Court Non-paiment of Rent c. Vide 2 Cro. Matthews and Whetton 233. Thirdly Whether the Mannor being conveyed away before the Attainder shall purge the Forfeiture Iustice Levins said That although no advantage of this Forfeiture can be taken till Attainder yet after Attainder it has relation and
these Defendants were entitled to these Costs and he that did not appear might release them to the Plaintiff but they said that if there should appear to the Covin between the Lessor of the Plaintiff and the Defendant who did not appear to release the Costs the Court supposed that they might correct such Practice when it should be made appear Bright versus Addy AN Action of Trespass Quare clausum fregit was brought by Baron and Feme Pollexfen Chief Justice was of Opinion that the Feme could not be joyned tho' it was her Land Ventris contra For this Action will survive and they have election either to joyn or to bring it alone 1 Brown l. 21. 1 Ro. Abr. 348. Hob. 189. 1 Cro. 96. 3 Cro. Tregniel and Reeve Mo. 5. In an Action of Forcible Entry upon the Wives Land after the Coverture she was joyned with the Husband Adjornatur Anonymus IN an Assumpsit against the Administratrix the Defendant pleaded quod ipsa non assumpsit instead of the Intestate After Verdict a Repleader was awarded and no Costs to either party upon a Repleader Marks versus Nottingham THe Defendant pleaded in Abatement that the Plaintiff was dead at such a place before the Action brought The Court doubted whether such Plea could be received but upon view of Rastall's Entries 161. pl. 6. where the like Plea was Powell and Ventris conceived it to be a good Plea Pollexfen Ch. Justice and Rokeby said that that in Rastall differed because there were two Plaintiffs so that Issue might be joyned with the other Plaintiff Sed vide librum where the Replication to that Plea is that W.H. praedict ' R.B. Attornat ' praed ' J. which J. was pleaded to be dead nomine pro ipso J. Magistro suo dicit quod breve praed ' ratione praeallegat ' cassari non debet quia dicit quod praed ' J. superstes in plena vita existit viz. apud L. in Com. N. non mortuus prout praed ' W. superius allegavit hoc petit quod inquiratur per Patriam praed ' W. similiter c. Adjornatur Haselwood versus Mansfield IN Debt for 150 l the Plaintiff declared upon a Charter-party which contained divers mutual Agreements and in performatione conventionum praed ' ex parte dicti Magistri ipse obligasser se dicto Mercatori in penali summa 150 l ad performationem convention ' praed ' ex parte dicti Mercator ' obligasset se dicto Magistro c. in simili penali summa 150 l c. And this Action was brought by the Master of the Ship against the Merchant The Defendant pleaded an Insufficient Plea to which there was a Demurrer But it was moved that the Declaration was Insufficient for when it comes to the Penalty on the Merchants part it is only obligasset se omitting ipse or ipse praed ' Mercator obligasset se so 't is not expresly declared that the Defendant was bound And of that Opinion were Pollexfen Chief Justice Powell and Rokeby Ventris contra For it is obligasset se dicto Magistro so none but the Merchant can be understood to be bound and if it were ipse obligasset it had been good and that is understood But Judgment was given for the Defendant Snode versus Ward IN an Indebitat ' assumpsit for Goods sold The Defendant pleaded quod ipse infra sex annos proxime ante diem impetrationis Brevis Originalis ipsius Quer ' non assumpsit To which the Plaintiff demurred 1. Because the late Statute of 1 Willielmi Mariae for reviving of Process doth Enact That the Time from the 11th of December 1688 to the 13th of February then next following should not be accounted as any part of the Time upon the Statute of Limitations And therefore the Defendant should have pleaded that he did not assume within six years and so many days as were between the 11th of December and the 13th of February And it was said so had the Pleading been ever since the said Statute But the Court Resolved that the Pleading might be still in such manner as before the Statute For the Statute is that those Days shall be no part of the time and therefore pleading non assumpsit infra sex annos is to be understood of Six years exclusive of those Days between the 11th of December and the 13th of February 2. Another Exception was taken to the Plea for that it is ante impetrationem Brevis Original ' ipsius Quer ' and doth not say praed ' brevis and so it may be referred to some other Writ the Plaintiff might have Pollexfen Chief Justice inclined that it was naught for this Cause Adjornatur Vid. 8 Co. 57. The Earl of Rutland's Case He pleads that he was seised of the Park of Clipsham and granted officium Parci sui and not said praed ' Parci and held it good Vid. 2. Cro. 288. Burton and Eyre Humphreys versus Bethily IN an Action of Debt upon a Penal Bill where the Defendant was to pay 10 s upon the 11th of June and 10 s more upon the 10th of July next following and so 10 s every three Weeks after till a certain Sum were satisfied by such several payments And for the true payment thereof the Defendant obliged himself in the Penal Sum of 7 l The Plaintiff in facto dicit pleaded that the Defendant did not pay the said Sum or any part thereof upon the several days aforesaid unde actio accrevit for the 7 l The Defendant pleaded that he paid 10 s upon the 11th of June hoc paratus estve rificare c. The Plaintiff Replyed that he did not pay it hoc petit quod inquiratur per Patriam To which the Defendant demurred The Plea was held altogether Insufficient But then Pollexfen Chief Justice observed that the Declaration was naught for he should have declared that the Defendant failed in payment of one of the Sums which would have been enough to have entitled him to the Penalty but he says The said several Sums of Money or any of them and this is double and he inclined that it was not aided by Answering over or by the General Demurrer Adjornatur Vide Saunders and Crowley 1 Ro. 112. Thompson versus Leach IN an Ejectment by Thomas Thompson against Sir Simon Leach and divers other Defendants upon the Demise of Charles Leach of the Mannor of Bulkworthy and divers Messuages Lands and Tenements Vpon Not Guilty pleaded a Special Verdict was found to this effect Viz. That Nicholas Leach was seised in Fee of the said Mannors Lands and Tenements in the Declaration and by his last Will in Writing bearing date the 9th day of December in the 19th year of the Reign of the late King Charles the Second devised the Premisses to his Brother Simon Leach for Life remainder to the first Son of the Body of the said Simon and the Heirs Males of the
Pollexfen Chief Justice was of Opinion that it ought to have been shewn in the Declaration that the Racks were set up and fixed But the other Justices conceived that it should be intended that they were Racks fixed for use in the Stable and it would be very remote to give it any other Construction And so Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus IN an Ejectment it was moved in Arrest of Judgment that the Plaintiff had declared of two Demises viz. That J. S. demised 10 Acres of Land to him an that J. N. had demised 10 other Acres of Land to him habend ' for the Term of Five years c. and that he entred into the Premisses demised to him by J. S. and J. N. in forma praedict ' After Verdict upon Not guilty for the Plaintiff it was Objected That in one of the Demises there is no certain Term or Estate for the habend ' can be referred only to the Demise of J.S. for that begins a New sentence But the Court held that the Habend ' should be a good Limitation of both Demises for Five years and when 't is shewn that the Plaintiff entred into the Premisses demised to him in forma praedict ' that is an Averment that all was demised for Five years for that is the forma paed ' As Lands lett to A. for his life Remainder to B. in forma praed ' this is an Estate to B. for Life And so Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Anonymus IN an Action upon the Statute of Hue and Cry it was after Verdict moved in Arrest of Judgment that in the Recital of the Statute there were Variances from the Statute and Omissions First There was no mention of Burning of Houses in the Recital but that is in the Statute Non allocatur For 't is not necessary to set forth more in the Declaration than is pertinent to the Action Secondly The Statute is That the Country should answer for the Bodies of the Malefactors and the Recital is Quod patria respondeat ê“ Malefactoribus the sense of which is That the Country should stand in their stead whereas the meaning of the Statute is That they should produce their Persons Sed non allocatur For as it is in the Recital of the Declaration it well answers the sense of the Statute Anonymus IN an Action of Trespass quare Clausum fregit and digging up and carrying away of his Trees It appeared upon the Evidence That the Defendant had entred into the Plaintiffs Close and digged up several Roots of his Trees and removed them to a place on the same Ground about two yards distance off And the Question was Whether this were such a Carrying away as that the Plaintiff should have full Costs or only Costs according to the late Statute where the Damages are under 40 s as was in this Case Pollexfen Chief Justice and Rokeby Powell absente were of Opinion that the Plaintiff was to have full Costs because the Roots were carried from the place where they were digged tho' not removed off from the Ground and they said that it had been adjudged Felony to take and removed things with an intent to steal them tho' laid at a small distance from the place and not carried out of the House or the like Ventris conceived That the taking of the Roots and laying them a little way off in the same man's Ground could not be taken as an asportavit and it differed from the Case of Stealing for taking Goods as a Thief is the Felony and it doth not lye in the carrying them off but in the Felonious intent in the taking But by the Opinion of the other two of the Plaintiff had his full Costs Anonymus IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Ecclesiastical Court to stay a Suit for Dilapidations by the Successor against the Executor of the former Incumbent upon the late General Act of Pardon for that all Suits for Offences of Incest Simony or Dilapidations are excepted in the Act unless commenced and depending before such a Day viz. the 20th day of March last and this Suit was commenced since The whole Court upon Hearing of Counsel at the Bar and Consideration of the Matter conceived that the Parliament never intended to take away the Successors Remedy for Dilapidations for that would be to ease the Executor of the last Incumbent who was the Wrong-doer and translate the Charge to the Successor But they would intend this Exception of such Suits as might be in the Ecclesiastical Court ex Officio against the Dilapidator himself to punish it as a Crime against the Ecclesiastical Law and to pardon it unless there were Prosecution before the Day aforesaid And so the Prohibition was denied Nota If a Sheriff of a County in a City be in Contempt the Attachment is to go to the Coroner and not to the Mayor or Chief Officer of the Corporation in such City or Town And if the Offender be out of his Office the Attachment shall be directed to the New Sheriff Gawden versus Draper IN an Action of Covenant the Plaintiff declared upon a Deed of Covenant by Indenture made between the Defendant and him whereby the Defendant Covenanted with the Plaintiff That Sarah Wife of the Defendant should be permitted to live separate from the Defendant until the Defendant and the said Sarah by Writing under their several Hands attested by two Witnesses should give notice to each other that they would again Cohabit And further Covenanted That he the Defendant during the Coverture and until such Notice should be given of their desires to Cohahit as aforesaid would pay to the Plaintiff for the Maintenance of the said Sarah 300 l per Annum at four Quarterly payments and sets forth That the said Sarah form the Date of the said Indenture to the time of the said Suit did live separate from the Defendant and no notice of Cohabitation as aforesaid had been given during that time of either side And for 75 l for one Quarters payment of the said 300 l which was to be paid at our Lady-day last the Action is brought The Defendant pleads in Bar That after the Indenture aforesaid and before the Action brought another Indenture was made between the Defendant and the said Sarah his Wife of the one part and the Plaintiff of the other part which the Defendant ê“fert hic in Cur ' reciting the said first Indenture and further reciting That the Defendant and the said Sarah did then intend to Cohabit and did at that time Cohabit and expressing that it was the true intent and meaning of all the said parties to the said Indenture produced ut supra by the Defendant That so long as the Defendant and the said Sarah should agree to Cohabit the said Annual payment should cease And the Plaintiff did by the said last mentioned Indenture by the appointment of the said Sarah as appointed by her being party thereunto and her Signing Sealing and
there be several Extents upon Statutes acknowleged at different times that they are all present Rights because the Liberate delivers the Land to the Conisee to hold immediately ut liberum tenementum and therefore if a Fine be levied he that hath the Extent upon the puisne Statute must claim immediately as well as he that hath the first Extent whereas the Extent upon a latter Statute until there comes an Extent upon an elder Statute is either turned to a Reversion as I Argued before or in the nature of a future Interest And therefore till the first Extent be barred or some way determined he that hath the Extent upon the puisne Statute can have no present Right and consequently is not bound to claim but his Right is preserved by virtue of the second saving of the Statute of 4 H. 7. But it appears by the Verdict that above ten years passed after the Fine of Thomas Lewis without any claim by Edward Lewis so that I conceive he was barred as to both Extents So that which I have taken notice of to have already passed in the Case is enough to bar the two Extents of Knight and Gerrard and to let in the Right of the Extent of Elwaies and Burroughs so that I think they might have entred or made their claim without any thing more But it is found further in the Case that in the year 1670. Sir John Lewis devised the Premisses by his Will in writing to Edward Lewis and the Heirs of his Body and for want of such Issue to his two Daughters who are married to the Earls the Lessors of the Plaintiff and died in August 1671. and 't is found that at the time of the Will and also of the Death of the said Sir John Lewis the Lands were in the possession of Edward Lewis and in Michaelmass Term 1671. Edward Lewis levied a Fine of the Lands in question to Francis Lewis to the use of Edward the Conusor and his Heirs Now if we should admit that the Extents of Knights and Gerrard's Statute were not barred by the Fine of Thomas Lewis let us see what will become of them upon these things done since And here I will agree with those that have Argued for the Defendant that the Devise of the Inheritance to Edward will not drown the Extent upon Gerrard's Statute For as I have Argued before I take the Extent of Elwaies and Burrough's Statute after the eviction by the elder Statute to be turned to a Reversional Interest and then the interposing of the Reversion will hinder the drowning of Gerrard's Extent in the Fee devised to Edward Lewis as aforesaid Now therefore let us see what is found to have been done further in the Case and I conceive if we should grant as the Counsel for the Defendant have urged That the Fine by Thomas Lewis had no effect as to the barring of Gerrard's Extent nor that the Devise of the Inheritance of the Premisses to Edward Lewis will not drown the Extent as I agree it did not by reason of the Extent interposing that was in Elwaies and Burrough's Case being as I have Argued a Reversional Interest I say admitting all this yet when Edward Lewis who had the Extended Interests upon Knights and Gerard's Statute in him and the Estate of Inheritance also in Michalmass Term 1671. Levied the Fine to Francis Lewis to the use of himself and his Heirs that Fine must destroy and determine the Extended Interests that were in him For where a Fine is levied by him that hath the Fee and Freehold in him whatever Right Estate or Interest there is in him besides passeth inclusively in the Fine not by way of transferring the very Interest it self but as it were consolidating with the Fee So as to determine and extinguish such Interest none can pretend that after this Fine of Edward Lewis the Extended Interest did continue in him They could not pass to Francis Lewis as assigned or transferred by the Fine why then they must be destroyed And I think it cannot be denied but that Elwaies and Burroughs might have entred immediately the two former Extents being taken out of the way And 't is found that at the time of the Fine Edward Lewis was in possession so that Five years passing without Claim after the Fine for 't is found that Satisfaction was not acknowledged till Nine years after 't is plain that the Extent upon Burroughs and Elwaies Statute was barred as to the present Right For I think its clear that when a former Statute is determined whether it be by release of the Debt by purchase of part of the Lands by being barred by Non-claim upon the Fine Satisfaction acknowledged or any other means this sets in the puisne Statute And now we are come to the great Question in the Case Admitting the Extent upon Elwaies Statute was barred in respect of the present Right Whether a new Rightcame upon the satisfaction acknowledged upon Gerrard's Sta-tute so that there should be Five years more given by the second saving of the Statute of the 4 H. 7. to claim upon that new Right It has been much urged by those that Argued for the Defendant that wherever there is a Reversion or an Estate to commence after the end of another Estate that if a Fine be levied tho' the Case be so that he in Reversion may enter or bring his Action so that Five years Non-claim will bar him as to the present Right or Remedy yet he shall have Five years more to claim when the Time is incurred or the Limitation come That the first or particular Estate should end Now though the Extents upon the two first Statutes were so avoided that there might have been an entry upon Elwaies Extent yet the proper and natural determination of Gerrard's Extent was not till satisfaction acknowledged upon Record or by perception of Profits appearing upon Record and then there shall be Five years given to claim and that by virtue of the second saving of the Statute of the 4 H. 7. which is to this purpose Viz. Saving to all persons such Right as first shall grow remain descend or come to them after the Fine levied by reason of any matter before the Fine levied so that they take their Action or pursue their Right within Five years next after such Right shall come Now I do not see that the Condition of this saving was performed by those that had the Right of Elwaies and Burroughs Extent the Right indeed came after the Fine levied and upon a matter before for it came after that the Extents upon Knights and Gerrards Statutes were barred or otherwise avoided Whether upon the Non claim by the first Fine or their being destroyed by the second Fine which was levied by Edward Lewis but there was no claim within Five years after either of those Fines so the Right clearly was not pursued within Five years after the Right first came And this has been held necessary