sides they shall recover costs and dammages LEe versus Edwards Trin. 19 Jacobi rotulo 470. The Case was in Replevin a Copy-holder claims Common in another mans Land the Lord infeofleth the Copy-holder of his Copy-hold Land whether he hath now lost his Common and held that he had but if a Copy-holder hath Common in the Lords waste and the Lord inseofeth him of the Copy hold with all Commons the Common is not gone Oabel versus Perrot Hill 9 Jacobi rotulo 2734. Tenant in Tail hath power to make a Lease for 89 years if three persons live so long and reserving the old Rent due and payable yearly and he maketh a grant in Reversion for years and whether that be good or no was the Question there being a Lease for life in possession the second Lease was for 89 years if three live so long for the matter in Law the Court held the Lease good but for want of an averment of the life of c. the Plea was not good ROberts versus Young Hill 9 Jacobi routlo 1835. the Defendant in a Replevin pleads that he offered amends and doth not shew that he offered it before the impounding of the Cattle and adjudged an ill Plea and the offer of amends cannot be made to him that maketh cognisance BAcon versus Palmer Trin. 12 Jacobi rotulo 3947. A Copy-holder in Replevin prescribes to have Common of pasture appurte nant to the Copy-hold the other party pleads an Extinguishment of Common because the Lord had inclosed Land lying in another field in which field and in the other field the Lord had Common by cause of vicinage and note that in Common for cause of vicinage if one inclose part it is an extinguishment of all the Common SHarp versus Emerson Mich. 12. Jacobi The Defendant makes avowry for Homage Fealty and Rent the Plaintiff prayes in aid and hath a Summmons in aid and at the return of the Summons the Prayee in aid was Essoined and after the Ession the Defendant moved the Court that the Homage might be put out of the Avowry which was entred with by consent of parties was raised out of the Will ARundell versus Blanchard and Jackson Pasch 13 Jacobi rotulo 2037. The taking in Replevin was supposed to be at Southwark and one of the Defendant pleads non cepit and the other Bailiff of the Governors of the possessions revenues and good of the Free-Grammar-School of c. for the Parishoners for the Parish of Saint Olaves in Southwark in the County of Surrey and the Advowry was made for damage fesant the Plaintiff prescribed for a way belonging to his house in the Parish of Saint Olaves in Southwark and the Venire facias was of Southwark in the Parish of Saint Olaves in Southwark and exception taken to that and held good because one Defendant had pleaded non cepit and another exception was because he had not shewed when the Corporation begun and held an idle exception for one need not shew when they were incorporated another exception was because the name of one of the Jury was mistaken because in the Return of the Venire it was to Lisney of Croydon and in the Pannell of the Habeas Corpus it was written to John Lisney of Croydon and because in sound it is all one and the Sheriff made oath that he was the man that was returned in the Venire facias the Return was amended in Court and Judgement given by the whole Court for the Plaintiff PAin versus Mascall Hill 12 Jacobi rotulo 3400. The Lord avows the taking of one Mare as for Rent behind so for the fourth part of a Releif and doth not expresse the same due for the releif and for the Rent the Plaintiff pleads tender and demurres for the Releif because he had not expressed the same and because he had distrained one thing for the Rent and Releif pretending that if one cause passe against him and another for the Avowant that he could not have a Return habend but the Court were of a contrary opinion but if two men shall distrain one and the same Mare for two severall causes and one hath Judgment for himselfe and the other for himselfe In this case no return habend can be made of the Mare BRown versus Goldsmith Trin. 13. Jacobi rotulo 607. A Court of Pipowders is incident to a Fine and a Court Baron to a Mannor And a Court Baron cannot be separated from a Mannor for it is a wealth to a Mannor the like of a Court of Pipowder to a Fair by the grant of a Mannor with cum pertinencijs the Court passes for it is an incident inseparable to the Mannor and a man cannot grant his Court but he may grant the profits of his Court. MAgistri socij Collegij Emanuel is in Cambridg The writ was adjudged naught in replevin because they had distrayned in their proper names for a Corporation as Maior and Comonalty cannot distrain in their own persons but by their Bayliff The Court held that the Sheriff could not take a Bond in replevin but must take pledges according to the old custome JVid versus Bungory Trin. 8. Jac. rotulo 3059. The Defendant shews that one was seised of Land in fee and held it by Knights service of a Mannor and for the rent of two Cocks and two Hens and the Lord grants the third part of the Mannor to another who avows for the seruice and the Cocks and Hens and held he could not alone avow for that joynt service but the other should joyn with him WEnden versus Snigg Trin. 11. Jac. rotulo 1137. In replevin the question was upon a Lease for life made to three to have and to hold to them the said A. B. and C. and every of them for the term of their lives and the longest liver of them successively one after another as they are writ in order And the question was whether this was a remainder or no and it was held to be a remainder upon the reading of the Record but if the grant had been only successively not saying as they are named in the writing it had been naught because he could not tell who should begin THorold versus Hadden Trin. 11. Jac rotulc 451. In replevin a Juror was returned by the name of Payly and in the distress the name was T. P. and in the Pannell he was written Baily and tryed by that name of Baily and moved in arrest of Judgment for the mistaking of the name And the Court held that if the right name was sworn yet notwithstanding the mistake it was good for if the name in venire was not mistaken all was good and the Sheriff ought to amend his misprision and the Court demanded if any one could swear that Paly was sworn and one then present in Court made oath that Paly was sworn and the Court ordered that it should be amended
Exchequer where the Record was would not award the Venire Facias of all the three Villages named in the Record if it did not appear judicially to them that the Close did extend in all the Villages and it doth not appear for parcell if the premises doth not necessarily extend to all the Villages but may well be and so presumed in one Village onely and therefore it is matter of substance And the Judges had not power after their Commission determined to amend the Plea DAvis versus Pardy Mich. 8. Jacobi The Plaintiffe declared of a Lease made by one Cristmas the sixth of May Anno 7. of one Messuage c. In D. by reason whereof the Plaintiffe entered and was possessed untill the Defendant afterwards to wit 18. of the same month Anno sexto supradicto did eject him And not guilty being pleaded a verdict was found against the Plaintiffe And Yelverton moved in Arrest of Judgement to save Costs that the Declaration was insufficient For that Action was grounded upon two things first upon the Lease secondly upon the Ejectment and both those ought to concur one after the other And in this case the Ejectment is supposed to be one year before the Lease made for the Lease is made Anno 7. and the Ejectment supposed to be done Anno 7. 6. And therefore the Declaration naught And Yelverton vouched the case between Powre and Hawkins Anno septimo Termino Pasch Where the Plaintiffe declared upon the Lease of Edw. Ewer 27. April Anno sexto and laid the Ejectment to be 26. April Anno 6. And the Court held then that the Declaration was naught yet in the case in question the Declaration was adjudged good And the word sexto to be void for the day of the Ejectment being the 18. of the same month of May it cannot be intended but to be the same year in which the Lease is supposed to be made by the opinion of the whole Court AYlet versus Chippin Mich. 8. Jacobi The Plaintiffe declares upon a Lease made by John Aylet for one year of certain Land in C. in the County of E. by vertue whereof he entred and was possessed untill the Defendant did eject him The Defendant pleads that the Copihold Land is parcell of the Mannor of D. c. of which one Jo Aylet the Lessors Father was seised in Fee according to the Custome and that he made a surrendor thereof to the use of his Will and by his will devised the Land in question to John the lessor and H. Aylet his sons and to their Heirs Males of their Bodies and willed that they should not enter untill their severall ages of 21 years And further willed that W. B. and H. B. his Executors should have the Lands to perform his Will untill his said Sons Jo and H. came to their severall Ages of one and twenty years c. To which Plea the Plaintiffe replies and confesses the Will but shews further how that such a day and year before the Lease Jo his Lessor attained to his full Age of one and twenty years and entred and made a Lease thereof to him c. To which Plea the Defendant demurred and adjudged for the Plaintiffe For although the Estate to Jo and H. precede in words and the devise to the Executors insues in construction yet the estate to Io Executors precedes in possession And is as if he should have demised the Land untill his Sons Io and H. should attain to their severall Ages of one and twenty years And afterwards to them and their Heirs Males c. to be enjoyed in possession at ther severall Ages so that the Executors have onely a limited estate determinable in time when either Son severally should attain to his full age for his part For so it appears the Devisors intent was that either Son might enter when he attained to the age of one and twenty years And although it was objected by Justice Williams that the two Brothers are joyntenants by the Will and if one should enter when he comes to his full Age the other Brother being under age that would destroy the intent of the devise for then they should not take joyntly but the Court as to that said that the entry of him that attained to his full age doth not destroy the juncture but that they are joyntenants notwithstanding For that entry in the intent of the Devisor was only as to thâ— taking of the the profits and the possession and not as to the estate in joyntenancy and this is proved by 30 H. 6. Devise 12. where a devise was to foure in Fee and that one of them should have all during his life and this was adjudged good and it was as to the taking of the profits onely which observe by the whole Court but Williams RIce versus Haruiston Pasch 10. Jacobi The Plaintiffe declares of a Lease made by Jo. Bull c. The Defendant pleads that the Land is Copihold Land parcel of the Mannor of c. Whereof the King was seised and is seised and that the King by his Steward such a day granted the Land in question to him in Fee to hold at will according to the custome of the Mannor by vertue whereof he was admitted and entred and was seised untill the lessor entred upon him and outed him and made a Lease to the Plaintiffe and then he entred and did eject him c. The Plaintiffe replies that long before the King had any thing in the Mannor Queen Eliz. was thereof seised in Fee in right of her Crown and before the Ejectment supposed by the Defendant by her Steward at such a Court did grant the Land in question by Copy to him in Fee to hold at Will according to the custome of the Mannor who was admitted and entred and further shewed the descent of the Mannor to the King and how the Lesser entred and made a Lease to the Plaintiffe who entred and was thereof possessed untill the Defendant did eject him Upon which Plea the Defendant did demurr because he supposed that the Plaintiffe ought to traverse the grant alledged by the copy of the Defendant in his Barr. But the Court held the replication good for the Plaintiffe had confessed and avoided the Defendant by a former Copy granted by Queen Eliz under whom the King that now is claimed and so the Plaintiffe need not traverse the grant to the Defendant but such a traverse would make the Plea vitious for which see Hilliais Case 6. Rep. And 14 H. 8. Dotknis Case 2 E. 6. Dyer And Brooks title confesse and avoid for as no man can have a Lease for years without assignment no more can a man have a Copy without grant made in Court Which observe SHecomb versus Hawkins Pasc 10 Jacobi The case was in an especial verdict in Ejectment that one Mrs. Luttrel Tenant in fee of the Mannor of L. leavied a Fine to the use of her self for life and after death to
cannot a Copy-holder which hath so base an estate And if this shall be so these mischeifes will insue That is that this base estate should be of better security then any estate at the Common Law for Fine shall not be a Barr of that for it cannot be levied of that also Recovery cannot be suffered of that for there cannot be a Recovery in value neither of Lands at the Common Law neither of Customary Lands for they cannot be transferred but by the hands of the Lord. And to Littleton he agreed and also 4 Ed. 2. which agrees with this where it is said that at Stebenâ—eath a Surrender was of Copy-hold Lands to one and the Heires of his Body but he said that that shall not be an Estate taile for then the Estate hath such operation that this setles a Reversion and Tenure betwixt the Giver and him to whom it is given but this cannot be of Copy-hold Land for this cannot be held of any but only of the Lord and to the others this Estate doth not lye in Tenure and yet he agreed that of some things which did not lye in Tenure Estate Tail may be but Land may be intailed but Copy-hold Estate is so base that an Estate tail cannot be derived out of it so that though that custome may make an Estate to one and the Heires of his Body yet this cannot be an Estate taile but Fee-simple conditionall and also he agreed that they might have Formedon in Discender but it is the same Formedon which was before the Statute as if Tenant in Fee-simple conditionall before the Statute would alien before issue but it was no Estate taile with the priviledges of an Estate taile before the Statute and to the other matter of Surrender that is the admittance of the parties which is an Estate taile that doth not conclude the Court as it appears by the Lord Barkleys Case in the Commentaries where the Estate pleaded severally by the parties is not traversed by any of them and so concludes and prayes Judgment c. And this case was argued again in Trinity Tearme next ensuing by Montague the Kings Serjeant for the Defendant and he said that there are three questions in the case First If Copy-hold land may be intailed Secondly Admitting that it may be intailed if Surrender makes discontinuance Thirdly If it shall be Remitter and to the first he seemed that it might be intailed and that it shall be within the Statute of Westminster 2. And first for the Antiquity of that he said that Littleton placed that amongst his Estates of Free-hold and hath been time out of minde and is a primitive Estate and not derived out of the Estate of the Lord and the Lord is not the Creator of that but the means to convey that after that it is cerated and what is created then shall have all the priviledges and Benefits which are incident to it and shall be nursed by the custome and is time out of minde and the Law alwaies takes notice of it and he cited 24 H. 4. 323. by Hankf Bracton Fitz. Na. Bre. 12 C. and Brownes Case 4. Coke which is not simply an Estate at the will of the Lord but at the VVill of the Lord according to the custome of the Mannor and when it hath gained the reputation of Free-hold then it shall be dircted according to the rules of the Common Law and 2. and 3. P. and Ma. Dier 114. 60. allow Copy-hold Estate to be intailed and he saith That no Statute hath more liberall exposition then the Statute of Westminster 2. 45. Ed. 3. Incumbrance shall not charge the Issue intaile also a Copy-holder shall have a Cui in vita also a Copy-hold is within the Statute of Limitation and so upon the Statute of buying of pretenced rights And it is alway intended when a Statute speakes of Lands and Tenements that Copy-hold Lands shall be within that And he saith That all the Objections which have been made of the contrary part are answered in Heydons Case but he relyed upon that that every reall Inheritance is within the Statute of Westminster 2. 4 Ed. 2. Formedon lyeth of Copy-hold Land 25 Ed. 3. 46. Estate tayle is of a Corrody and office which proves that Copy-hold is a reall Inheritance and for that shall be within the Statute 46 Ed. 3. 21. Gavelkinde Land may be intailed 6 Rich. 2. Avowry 2. 8. Rich. 2. 26. Copy-holder shall be charged with Fees of a Knight at Parliament 22 and 23. Eliz. Dier 373. 13. Lands in ancient Demesne were intayled and he said that the reason is that for that it is Inheritance and time hath applyed them to an Estate and so concluded and prayed Judgment for the Defendant Hutton Serjeant argued for the Plaintiff that Copy-hold Lands cannot be intailed for that is but a customary Estate and the Law doth not take any notice of it but onely according to Custome for there were no Estates tayle before the Statute for then all were Fee simple absolute or conditionall that is either implyed or by limitation which cannot be of an Estate tayle which is not within the Statute of Westminster 2. for no Actions are maintainable by that but those which are by the Custome and a Writ of false Judgment See Fitzherberts Natura brevium 12. 13 Ed. 3. F. Prescription 29. that it hath no Incidents which are incident to Estates at the Common Law without Custome as Dower See Revetts Case and so is Tenancy by the Curtesie and there shall be no discent of that to take away Entry and so of other derivatives And he seemed that it is not within the Statute for three reasons apparent within the Statute First That it is hard that Givers shall be barred of their reversions but in case of Copy-holds the Giver hath no remedy to compell the Lord to admit him after the Estate tayle spent but onely Subpena and in this Case the Lord may releive himselfe for the losse of his services for that the Statute provides no remedy for him Secondly That the Statute doth not intend any Lands but those of which there is actuall reversion or remainder and those which passe by Deed so that the will of the Giver expressed in the Charter may be observed and of which there may be a subdivision as Lord Mesne and Tenant for there shall be alwayes a reversion of the Estate tayle and the Donee shall hold of the Donor and not of the Lord. Also it seems that the Statute doth not intend to provide for any but those for whom the VVrit in the Formedon ordained by the Statute lyes and agreed that for Offices and such like Formedon lyeth if the party will admit Estate tayle to be discontinued Also the Statute intends those things of which a Fine may be levyed for the Statute provides that the Fine in his owne right should be nothing but by Copy-holder Fine cannot be levied and for that he shall not be within the
Mannor held in cheife and of other Mannors and Lands held of a Common person in socage and had Issue foure Sonns Thomas William Humphrey Richard And by his Deed 12 Eliz. covenants to convey these Mannors and Lands to the use of himself for his life without impeachment of wast and after his desease to the use of such Farmors and Tenants and for such Estates as shall be contained in such Grants as he shall make them and after that to the use of his last will and after that to the use of VVilliam his second sonn in tayle the Remainder to Humphrey his third Son in tayle the Remainder to Richard the fourth Sonn in tayle the Remainder to his own right Heires with power of Revocation and after makes a Feoflment according to the covenant and after that purchases eight other acres held of another common person in socage and after makes revocation of the said Estates of some of the Mannors and Lands which were not held by Knights service and after that makes his Will and devises the Land that he had purchased as before and all the other Land whereof he had made the Revocation to Thomas his eldest son the Heirs Males of his body for 500. years provided that if he alien and dye without Issue that then it shall remaine to William his second sonne in tayle with the like proviso as before and after dyed and the Jury found that the Lands whereof no revocation is made exceeds two parts of all his Lands Thomas the eldest sonne enters the 8. Acres purchased as before and dyes without Issue male having Issue a Daughter of whom this Defendant claimes these eight Acres and the Plaintiff claims them by William the second Son And Dodridge the Kings Serjeant argued for the Plaintiff intending that the sole question is for the 8. acres purchased and if the devise of that be good or not by the Statute of 34. H. 8. And to that the point is only a man which hath Lands held in cheife by Knights service and other Lands held of a common person in Socage conveys by act executed in his life time more then two parts and after purchases other Lands and devises those if the devise be good or not And it seems to him that the devise is good and he saith that it hath been adjudged in the selfe same case and between the same parties And this Judgment hath been affirmed by writ of Error and the devise to Thomas and the Heirs males of his body for 500. years was a good estate tayle and for that he would not dispute it against these two Judgments But to the other question hee intended that the devise was good and that the Devisor was not well able to doe it by the Statute of 34. H. 8. And hee intended that the statute authoriseth two things 1. To execute estates in the life time of the party for advancement of his Wife or Children or payment of his debts and for that see 14. Eliz. Dyer and that may be done also by the common Law before the making of this statute But this statute restrains to two parts and for the third part makes the Conveyance voyd as touching the Lord But the statute enables to dispose by Will a parts where he cannot dispose any part by the Common Law if it be not by special Custome but the use only was deviseable by the common Law this was altered into possession by the statute of 27 H. 8. and then cometh the statute of 32. and 34. H. 8. and enables to devise the Land which he had at the time of the devise or which he purchased afterwards for a third part of this Land should remain which hee had at the time of the devise made and if a third part of the Land did not remain at the time of the devise made sufficient should be taken out of that but if the Devisor purchase other Lands after hee may those wholly dispose And for that it was adjudged Trin. 26. Eliz. between Ive and Stacye That a man cannot convey two parts of his Lands by act executed in his life time and devise the third part or any part so held by Knights service and also he relyed upon the words of the statute that is having Lands held by Knights service that this shall be intended at the time of the devise as it was resolved in Butler Bakers Case That is that the statute implies two things that is property and time of property which ought to be at the time of the devise But here at the time of the devise the Devisor was not having of Lands held by Knights service for of those he was only Tenant for life and the having intended by the statute ought to be reall enjoying and perfect having by taking and not by retaining though that in Carrs Case cited in Butler and Bakers Case rent extinct be sufficient to make Wardship yet this is no sufficient having to make a devise void for any part Also if the Statute extend to all Lands to be after purchased the party shall never be in quiet and for that the Statute doth not intend Lands which shall be purchased afterwards for the Statute is having which is in the Present tence and not which he shall have which is in the Future tence and 4. and 5 P. and M. 158. Dyer 35. A man seised of Socage Lands assures that to his Wife in joynture and 8. years after purchases Lands held in cheife by Knights service and devises two parts of that and agreed that the Queen shall not have any part of the land conveyed for Joynture for this was conveyed before the purchase of the other which agrees with the principall case and though to the Question what had the Devisor It was having of Lands held in Capite insomuch that he had Fee-simple expectant upon all the estates tayl he intended that this is no having within the Statute but that the Statute intend such having of which profit ariseth and out of which the K. or other Lord may be answered by the receipt of the profits which cannot be by him which hath fee-simple expectant upon an estate tayle of which no Rent is reserved and also the estate tayle by intendment shall have continuance till the end of the world and 40. Edw 3. 37. b. in rationabili parte bonorum it was pleaded that the Plaintiff had reversion discended from his Father and so hath received advancement And it seems that was no plea in so much that the reversion depends upon an estate tayle and upon which no Rent was reserved and so no advancement So of a conveyance within this Statute ought such advancement to the youngest sonne which continues as it is agreed in Binghams Case 2 Coke that if a man convey lands to his youngest sonne and he convey that over to a stranger in the life time of his father for good consideration and after the Father dies this
adjudged insufficient and a new Writ awarded but many held that in the case of a Cognisor it was well enough but not in the case of a Purchasor If one knowledge a Statute and after a Judgement is had against the Cognisor now against the Cognisor the Statute shall be preferred but not against an Executor If a man plead a Bond knowledged to the King in the Exchequer it must be averred to be a true Debt If a Debt be assigned to the King in this case no priority of Execution If one staul a Debt by 20. s. a year this shall not stay my Execution the Court were of opinion that an Extent would not be good at Barwick for the Writ runs not there If a Judgement be given in a Court of Record it shall be preferred in case of an Executor before a Statute But if a man acknowledge a Statute and afterwards confess a Judgement and if the Land be extended upon the Judgement the Cognisee shall have a Scire facias to avoid the Extent upon the Judgement otherwise in case of Goods for therein first come first served for if I have a Judgement against one and afterwards he acknowledgeth a Statute and by vertue of the Statute the Goods of him being dead were taken in the Executors hands then upon the Judgement a Scire facias was sued and afterwards a Fieri facias of the Testators Goods it was held that the Goods first extended were lawfully extended and shall be good A Judgement was had against Sir Fr. Freeman and an Extent came to the Sheriff and afterwards and before any thing was thereupon done one Fieri facias against the Executor upon a Judgement given before the acknowledging the Statute was delivered to the Sheriff and the Question was whether the Extent or Fieri facias shall be first executed And note if the Land be first extended upon the Statute and afterwards an Elegit upon a Judgement obtained before the acknowledging the Statute come also to the Sheriff the moity of the Land extended shall be delivered to the Plaintiff upon the Judgement HIll 15. Jac. The case of Villainage is within the Statute of Limitation and in the case of M. Corbet it was held that the Prescription of the Seisin of the Plaintiff and his Ancestors as Villain was more then needeth and the Issue thereupon taken was good by the whole Court after Exception taken thereupon and Judgement was given for the Plaintiff In every Elegit the Sheriff must return and set out the moity distinctly unless they be Tenants in common and in that case he must return the special matter An Extent issued out against one Greisley by the name of Greisley Esquire who was at the time of suing out the Writ made Knight and Baronet and it was naught and the Plaintiff prosecuted a new Writ MIch 10. Jacobi A Tenant by Statute Staple or Elegit that hath extended an Abbots Lease or a Lease made out of an Abbots Lease is not bound to shew it because he cometh in by Act of Law but any other that cometh in under the Lease must shew it by the opinion of the whole Court And note that in Hillary 10. Jac. two Inquisitions taken at several Dayes by several Juries upon one Statute Merchant were adjudged naught one was taken of the Land and the other for Land and Goods and Extent of the whole fourth part was naught for it should be of the moity of the fourth part and mark it was of a Lease which was but a Chattell and the Sheriff might have sold it as Goods but seeing he had extended it in this case he should receive benefit but as in a common Extent COmyrrs versus Brandling A Lessee that had a Lease of the value of 100. l. and after the Teste of the Elegit and before the Sheriff had executed the Elegit assignes his terme to one who assignes it over to the Plaintiff in the Scire facias and afterwards and before the last Assignement the Sheriff executes the Elegit and delivers the Lease to the Plaintiff tenend c. for satisfaction of the Debt which came to but 43. l. 6. s. 8. d. it was held by all the Judges that the Sheriff could not deliver the Lease at another value then what the Jury had found it at and the Sale made by the Sheriff is as strong as if it had been made in open Market and that all the Goods and Chattels are bound after the Teste of the Elegit and cannot be sold by the Owner after the Teste of the Writ If a later Extent be avoided by an ancient Extent after the ancient Extent is satisfied the later Extent shall have the Land according to his first Extent without any re-extent by the opinion of Serjeant Hutton if the Husband charge the Lease of the Wife and dieth the Wife shall hold the Land discharged HIll 12. Jac. The Earl of Lincoln against Wood the Earl of Lincoln did arrest Wood upon a Capias upon a Statute Merchant Wood being in Execution obtained in the Chancery an Audita Quaerela and did put in Bail there and had a Supersedeas and was discharged of his Imprisonment and the Audita Quaerela and Bail sent into the Common Pleas to be proceeded on The cause of the Audita Quaerela was grounded upon the performance of the Defeasons of a Statute and after this case was debated for the Bailment of Wood and held by the Court to be good it was allowed of If the Act for Dissolution of Monasteries had not given the Land to the King the Founders ought to have had them And if an Hospital or religious House is impeached upon the Statute of Superstitious uses it must be proved to be regular for they must be religious that are dissolved by E. 6. JOules versus Joules Alderman purchased Land of one against whom a Judgement was given long before the Purchase and the Vendor afterwards became unable to pay the Judgement and long after the Plaintiff in the Judgement purchased a Scire facias against the Defendant and had Judgement against the Defendant by Default and afterwards had an Elegit and by vertue of that the Sheriff extends the Land of Joules the Purchasor who prayes the aid of the Court because the whole Land was not extended but he was forced to bring his Audita Quaerela If I make a Lease for years reserving a Rent during my Life and my Wives Life if I die the Rent is gone because she is a stranger she shall never have the Rent because she hath no Interest in the Land if one of them die nothing can survive to the other and a Limitation must be taken strictly otherwise it is by way of Grant that shall be taken strongly against the Grantor If 2. Tenants in common joyn in a Lease for years to bring an Ejectment and count Quod cum dimisissent c.
will for the Election is in bringing the Action and the words vel and are but Synonimaes and Champions Case Plowden 286. is taken for vel and the 21 E. 3. 29. in Mallories Case u is taken for and therefore they gave Judgement that the Defendant should answer over FReeman versus Shield Trin. 11 Jacobi and adjudged Pasch 12 Jacobi Freeman brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation against Shield and proved Oyer of the Condition which was that if the Defendant should stand to the Award and Arbitrement of J. S. that then c. the Defendant pleads that the Arbitrators awarded that whereas there was no suit in the Chancery depending against the Plaintiff for divers matters that the Plaintiff should be acquitted of that suit and of all the matters contained in the same Bill and the Defendant further alledges that he did not make any prosecution of the said Bill but that the Plaintiff stands acquitted thereof the Plaintiff replies that the Defendant after the said Award such a year and day did exhibit a new Bill which did contain the same matter which the first Bill had and set forth at large both the Bills by which it appeared to the Court that it was so to which Plea the Defendant Demurres and the cause of the Demurrer onely was because the Plaintiff had pleaded that the Defendant had exhibited a new Bill but had not alledged any Processe taken forth upon the same Bill and if this be a breach of the award is the question Govin was for the Plaintiff and he was of opinion that it was a breach for the words were quod staret acquietatus and to be acquitted is not onely to be intended of an actuall disturbance or molestation but if the party be put in fright or is liable to any Processe it is a breach 8 Ed. 4. 27. a Condition to save one harmlesse if a Capias be awarded against him although it be not executed yet it is a forfeiture of the Bond nay though it was never delivered to the Sheriff for otherwise the Plaintiff should be in continuall care trouble for fear lest the Defendant should do it and so the Defendant may dally with him a long time which shal be mischievous therefore it may be resembled to 9 H. 7. where if a man sell a thing with warranty to pay for it at a day to come if the thing sold be corrupt the party may have his Action of deceit before the day of payment because it is in the others power to bring his Action and so it is in the Defendants power to serve the Plaintiff with Processe when he pleases and therefore it is a breach Coventry for the Defendant first because it is no such Process as can prejudice for neither goods nor Body shall be taken and therefore is not like the Cases before cited And secondly it is not such a process as our law respects or regards for a Bill is but as a Petition Haughton Justice was of the same opinion with the rest of the Judges but adjourned untill Hill 11. Jac. and an Exception taken because the Defendant had not answered the Declaration for the Condition is that he should be acquitted the Defendant pleaded that he hath been acquitted and Cook was of opinion that it was good and Pasch 12. Jac. Judgement was given for the Defendant by the whole Court KIpping versus Swain Trin. 11. Jacobi The Plaintiff brought an Action of Debt against Swain upon the Statute of 2 E. 6. for not setting forth of Tithes and declares whereas the Plaintiff being Proprietor of the Rectory of B. in the County of c. for the term of seven years and that the Defendant was Occupier of Lands within the same Parish for six moneths by a Devise made the tenth of March Anno decimo Jacobi And that the Defendant 27. Aug. the year aforesaid did cut his Corn there growing and that the tenth of September then next following the Defendant being Subdit dicti Domini Regis carried away the said Corn not setting out the Tenth according to the Statute and upon a Nil debet pleaded it was found for the Plaintiff and it was moved in Arrest of Judgement first because of the Plaintiffs own shewing he had no cause of Action against the Defendant for the interest of the Defendant in the Land was determined before the Tithes were carried away but the Court were of opinion that it was no Exception for although his interest in the Land was gone yet he remained Owner of the Corn for if Corn is cut although a stranger take them away before severance yet an Action will lie against him upon this Statute for otherwise the intent of the Statute may easily be defeated Another Exception was taken because the Plaintiff said he was Subdit dicti Domini Regis which is a Fault incurable for the Statute referrs Subdit to his politick capacity but Dicti goes to his natural and sole capacity and so the force of the Statute shall be determined by his Death and for this cause an Indictment upon the 8 H. 6. Contra pacem dicti Domini had been severall times reversed and of this opinion were three Judges but Haughton doubted of it and so it was adjourned PEnniworth versus Blawe Trin. 11. Jacobi The Plaintiff brought an Action of Debt upon an Obligation and prayed Oyer of the Condition which was that he should stand to the Arbitrement of J. S. of all Suites Quarrels Controversies and Debates from the beginning of the World untill the making the Obligation so that the Award be made in writing under the hand and seal of N. S. and should be delivered to the parties before such a Day c. and observe that the Sealing and Delivery of the Obligation was at twelve a clock the first of May the Defendant pleads in Barr that the Arbitrators made an Award and did deliver that to the parties above-said but said further that in the morning and before twelve a clock the first of May aforesaid one Debate and Controversie did arise between the parties concerning a Trespasse committed by the Plaintiff the same morning of which the Defendant gave notice to the Arbitrator before twelve a clock of the said first of May concerning which Trespasse the Arbitrator made no Award and therefore pretends the Award to be void and demands Judgement to which the Plaintiff demurrs and Yelverton being for the Plaintiff that the Plea was not any Answer to the Plaintiff and therefore Judgement ought to be given for the Plaintiffs Action is grounded upon an Obligation as single and the thing which helps the Defendant is the Condition indorsed to stand to the Award of S. the which is restrained so that it be delivered under the hand and seal and if the Defendant will plead the Condition against the Plaintiff he must plead it to be performed and executed according to the Submission by the
Arbitrator for else the Bond remaines as single and so in this Case the Defendant pleads that the Arbitrator made an Award and that it was delivered by the Arbitrator but whether it was delivered in writing or under his hand according to the Submission is not pleaded and therefore it is no Answer to the Plaintiff for he hath not pleaded an Award made according to the Condition and therefore the Bond is single Yea Cook argued for the Defendant and said that the Plaintiff by the Demurrer had confessed that the Arbitrator had made no Award as the Defendant had pleaded and then he shal never have Judgement for if it may judicially appear to the Court that the Plaintiff had no Cause of Action he shall never have Judgement and that the Plaintiff ought to have averred and joyned with a Traverse of that the Defendant pleaded to wit that the Arbitrator had made an Award and delivered it in writing under his hand and seal without that c. and as to the other matter of the Trespasse the same Day and so he might have demanded Judgement for his Plea doth but amount to the general Issue that the Arbitrators made no Award but Yelverton answered that it could not be pleaded in any other manner then he had pleaded it because he could not traverse it because the Defendant himself had pleaded that he made an Award and although the Demurrer confesse all matters in Deed yet they are such onely as are well pleaded as Burtons Case 5. Rep. 69. And also although the Award pleaded cannot be intended the same Award specified in the Condition yet the Plaintiff had good cause of Action and all the Court Fleming being absent were of opinion that the Plaintiff ought to recover for the Reasons before alleadged but as for that point whether the Controversie that grew in the morning should be arbitrated because there cannot be a fraction of Dayes it was not argued nor any opinion of the Court delivered onely Cook cited 5 E. 4. 208. that the Arbitrator ought to arbitrate of that because the Condition was of all matters untill the making the Obligation WHeeler versus Hayden Trin. 11. Jacobi W. Parson of the Church of A. brought an Action of Debt against the Defendant for Arrerages of Rent and declared upon a Lease made to the Defendant for four years if the Plaintiff did so long live and continue Parson c. and upon a Non demisit pleaded the Jury found an especial Verdict to wit that the Plaintiff had leased it to the Defendant for four years if the Plaintiff shall so long live onely and whether this Verdict was found for the Plaintiff or Defendant was the Question and Cook Serj. seemed that it was found for the Plaintiff for the main matter was that he should lease it if he so long lived and the subsequent words are of no effect because they contained no more then by the Law was before spoke of for the Law sayes that if he be non-resident or if he resign or be deprived that the Lease shall be determined like to the 30. Ass 8. A Lease to two and the longest Liver of them and the 17 E. 3. 7. A. A Lease to one of Land and a House for years and that the Lessee may make good profit of it this last Clause in both is idle and Dallidge was of the same opinion but Yelverton against them for the Plaintiff had intituled himself to the Action by such a Cause and if he fail in that it is his folly and shall not recover for the Lease upon which he declared had two Determinations the first by Death the second by removing and the Jury had found the Lease onely upon the first Determination and therefore various in substance and therefore the Jury have found against the Plaintiff as if a Lease be made by Baron and Feme if they shall so long live continue married both of them ought to be found Haughton to the same purpose for when a Parson makes a Lease if he shall so long live he doth take upon himself that he will do no Act by which the Lease shall be determined but onely by his Death for otherwise an Action of Covenant will lie against him but if the other Clause be added to wit and shall so long continue Parson then he may resign or be non-resident without danger and so there is great difference between the Verdict and Declaration and it was adjourned the Court being divided in opinion Dower MIch 6. Jacobi Dower may be brought as well against the Heir himself as against the Committee of the Ward but if an Infant be in Ward to a Lord in Chivalry the Dower shall be brought against the Guardian in Chivalry If Dower be brought against one who is not Tenant of the Free-hold the Tenant before Judgement shall be received and upon Default of the Tenant and after Judgement he may falsifie MIch 9. Jac. Dower demanded of the third part of Tithes of Wooll and Lamb in three several Townes and it was demanded of the Court how the Sheriff should deliver Seisin and the Court held it the best way for the Sheriff to deliver the third part of the tenth part and the third tenth Lamb Videlicet the thirtieth Lamb. In Dower against the Lord Morley the Tenant at the Day of taking of the Inquest after the Jury had appeared and before the Jury were sworn made Default and a Pety Cape was awarded and the Tenant at the Day in Banck informed the Court that the Tenant is but Tenant for Tenant for Life and that the Reversion is in one P. who at the Return in Banck ought to be received to save his Title and the Court appointed him at the Return of the Pety Cape to plead his Plea HIH. 13. Jacobi Allen and his Wife Demandants versus Walter in Dower of a Free-hold in Munden Magna Munden Parva B. the Sheriff returned Pleg de prosequend J. D. R. R. And the Names of the Summoners J. D. R. F. And after the Summons made and by the space of fourteen Dayes and more before the Return of the said Writ at the most usual Church Door of Munden Magna where part of the Tenements lay upon the 27. of October being the Lords Day immediately after Sermon ended in that Church he publikely proclaimed all and singular things contained in that Writ to be proclaimed according to the Form of the Statute in that behalf made and provided L. P. Ar. Vic. And Exception was taken to the Return because Proclamation was not made at the Doors of the Churches where the Lands lay and the Court held it not necessary but it was sufficient to make Proclamation at any of the Churches but the Return was insufficient because he said that he had caused to be proclaimed all and singular in that Writ contained and sayes not what and the Demandant released his Default upon the grand Cape CLefold versus
for the intent of a Will must be certain and agreeable to Law and there must not an intent out of the words of the will be sought out and the whole Court held that the Plaintiff was barred YOung versus Radford Pasch 10 Jacobi Rotulo 1515. Action upon an Ejectment brought and the Jury found a speciall Verdict and the Case was that Elizabeth Rudford was possessed of a house full thirty years and she took a Husband the Husband and Wife morgage the Term the Wife dies and the Husband redeems the Land and marries another wife and then dies and makes his Wife Executrix and she maries the Lessor The Defendant takes Administration of the Goods of the first Woman and it was held void and Judgement for the Plaintiff PEttison versus Reel Pasch 12 Jacobi Rotulo 2350. An ejectment brought and Triall and Verdict for the Plaintiff and exception taken in arrest of Judgement to the Venire Facias because this word Juratum was omitted for the Writ was posuerunt se in illam and omitted the word Juratum and this was amended by the Court. When a Title is to be tryed upon an Ejectment and a Lease to be executed by Letter of Attorney the course is this that the Lessor do seal the Lease onely and the Letter of Attorney and deliver the Letter of Attorney but not the Lease for the Attorney must deliver that upon the Land and upon an Ejectruent brought of Lands in two villages of a house and forty Acres of Land in A. and B. and a speciall Entry in the Land adjoyning to the house to wit the putting in of a Horse which was drove out of the Land by the Defendant and this was adjudged a good Entry for the Land in both the Villages by the opinion of the whole Court ARden versus Mich. 12 Jacobi The Plaintiff delivers that whereas such a day and year at Curdworth in the said County did demise to the Plaintiff two Acres of Land with the Appurtenances in the Parish of C. and the Venire facias was of the Parish of C. and after a verdict exception was taken because it was not of Curdworth but it was adjudged good by the Court and to prove the Lease made Lanheston an Attorney swear that the Lessor sealed the Lease and subscribed it but did not deliver it and by word gave authority to one W. to enter into the Land and to deliver the Lease upon the Land to the Plaintiff as his Deed and by that authority he entred and delivered the Lease as his Deed to the Plaintiff and it was adjudged good MArsh versus Sparry Hill 14 Jacobi Rotulo 1859. An Ejectment brought ex dimissione G. W. and the Originall was made ex divisione and after a Triall Serjeant Hitchaw moved the Court that the Originall might be amended and make ex dimissione and the Court granted it and the Cursitor was ordered to amend it and also in the end of the Originall it was written Barnabiam and it should have been Barnabas and that also was ordered to be amended by the Court. CRadock versus Jones Trin. 14 Jacobi Rotulo 2284. An Ejectment brought upon a Demise made by Cotton Knight the Defendant pleads not guilty and a Challenge to the Sheriff and prayes a Venire facias to the Coroners because the Sheriff is cozen to the Plaintiff and shews how and because the Defendant did not deny it a Venire facias was awarded to the Coroners and after a verdict it was alledged in arrest of Judgement because it was not a principall Challenge and a Venire facias de novo awarded to the Sheriff PArkin versus Parkin 13 Hill Jacobi Rotulo 979. And Ejectment brought and verdict and after a Triall Exception taken to pleading of a Deed inrolled the Action was brought in the County of York and pleaded thus ut infra sex menses tunc proximos sequent coram milite uno Justic c. in West-Riding Com. Eborum ad pacem c. conservand Assign W. C. Clerico pacis ibidem debito modo de Recor. irrotulat and Exception was because the inrollment was not made according to the Form of the Statute because it did not appear that the Justice before whom the Deed was inrolled was a Justice of the Peace of the County of York but of the West-Riding and it was not alledged that the Land did ly in the West-Riding and note that the Defendants Plea in Barr was insufficient because the Defendant did not confesse nor avoid the Count and the Plaintif by his Replication doth not shew any Title to the Land because it did not passe by the inrollment and so he hath lost his Suit and although the Barr be insufficient yet notwitstanding the Plaintif shall not recover GReenely versus Passy Hill 5 Iacobi Rotulo 808. An Ejectment brought the Defendant pleads not guilty and the Jury found it Specially that one Woodhouse was seised of Land in Fee and did infeof the Husband and Wife to have and to hold to the said Husband and Wife and the Heirs of their bodies between them to be begotten by vertue of which Feofment the Husband and Wife were seised of the whole Land in Fee Tail to wit c. the Husband infeofs the youngest Sonne of the land in Fee and afterwards the Husband dies and the woman survives and afterwards she dies before any Entry by her made into the Land and further find the lessor to be the eldest son of their bodies and that the younger Son infeoffed the Defendant and afterwards the eldest Sonne entred into the Land and made the lease in the Declaration and whether the Entry of the eldest Son was lawfull or no was the question upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. that Fines or Feoffements made by the Husband c. during coverture be or make any discontinuance c. or be hurtfull to the said wife or her Heirs and Sir Edward Cook held that the Heir is not barred of his Entry by the Statute PAcy versus Knollis Trin. 6. Iacobi Rotulo 291. An Ejectment brought the Defendant pleaded not guilty and the Jury found it Specially and the question is upon the words of the Will to wit And I give to Katharine my Wife all the Profits of my Houses and Lands lying and being in the Parish of Billing and L. at a certain street there called Broke-street and the Jury found that there was not any Village or Hamlet in the said County called Billing and that the Land supposed to be devised lieth in Byrling-street no mans verbal Averment shall be taken or admitted to be contrary to the Will which is expresly set out in the Will If I have two Thomas to my Sonnes and I give it to Thomas it shall be intended my youngest Son because my eldest Son should have it by Discent the Will was held by all the Court to be good HEllam versus Ley Trin. 7. Jacobi rotulo 2718.
to the estate casts the possession of his Ancestors upon him but a stranger to whom a Copy hold is surrendred hath nothing before admittance because he is a purchasor And a Copy made to him upon which he is admitted is his Evidence by the custome and before that he is not a customary Tenant and so he could not transfer any thing to another and adjudged so according to 24 Eliz Alderman Dixies Case BEdell versus Lull Pasch 7. Jacobi The Plaintiffe declares in Ejectment upon a Lease made by Eliz James of certain Lands The Defendant pleads that before Eliz had any thing one Martin James was seised in fee of it and had issue Henry James and dyed seised by reason whereof it discended to H. J. as Son and Heir and that Eliz entred and was seised by abatement and made the Lease to the Plaintiffe and that afterwards the Defendant as servant to H James and by his command c. The Plaintiffe by way of replication confesses the seisen of M. James And that he being so seised by his last Will in writing devised the said Land to Eliz in fee and afterwards dyed seised by reason whereof she entred by force of the devise and made the Lease to the Plaintiffe and traverse without that Eliz was seised by abatement in manner and form c. And the Defendant demurrs upon this replication and shewed for cause that the traverse was not good and adjudged for the Defendant for the Plaintiffe by his replication need not both confesse avoid and traverse the abatement too for the Plaintiffe made a title to his Lease by the Will of his Ancestor and that proved that he entred legally and not by abatement as the Defendant had supposed And then to take a traverse over makes the replication vitious For a traverse shall not be taken but where the thing traversed is issuable And here the devise is onely the title issuable And it was also held that the traverse was not good as to the manner of it for he should not have traversed without that that he was seised by abatement but it ought to have been without that that he did abate and also if the Plaintiffe had minded to have fully answered the Defendant he ought to have took his traverse in the very same words the Defendant had pleaded it against him to wit without that that he did enter and was seised by abatement which observe The Case concerned Sir H. James to whom the Defendant was Tenant SAunders versus Cottington Mich. 7. Jac. An Ejectment brought of two Houses but the Bill was onely for one and it was filed And the Defendant by his paper book pleaded to both Messuages And the Roll in Court and the Record of Nisi prius were two Houses And there was a verdict for the Plaintiffe and Judgement entred accordingly And a Writ of Error was brought by the Defendant and before the Record was removed the Plaintiffe moved the Court that the Bill upon the file might be amended and made two Messuages And because the Defendant had pleaded to Messuages in his Answer in paper and that the Roll and Record were according it was resolved by the whole Court that the Bill upon the File should be amended and made two Messuages for that Bill which made mention onely of one House could not be the ground of all the proceedings afterwards but it was as if no Bill had been filed and therefore it should be supplied and so had been severall times before the Record was renewed Which observe THe Plaintiffe declared in Ejectment upon a Lease of an House 10 Acres of Land 20 Acres of Meadow 20 Acres of Pasture by the name of one Messuage and ten Acres of Meadow be it more or lesse and upon not guilty pleaded the Plaintiffe had a Verdict but moved in Arrest of Judgement and Judgement was stayed For by the Plaintiffs own shewing in his Declaration he could not have Execution of the number of Acres found by the Verdict for in the Lease there is but ten Acres demised And these words more or lesse could not in judgment of Law be extended to thirty or fourty Acres for it is impossible by common intendment and the rather because the Land demanded by the Declaration is of another nature then that which is mentioned in the per nomen c. For that is only of Meadow and the Declaration is of arrable and Pasture MOore versus Hawkins Mich. 8. Jacobi In Ejectment after issue Joyned upon a not guilty pleaded the cause came to be tried before Brook and Yelverton Judges of Assize in the County of Oxford the Plaintiffe had declared of divers Messuages and divers Acres of Land lying in three Villages in the said County And at the tryall before the Jury was sworn Walter the Defendants Counsell put in a Plea that after the last continuance to wit such a day in Trinity Terme before the day of Assize to wit the 20. of July the Assizes being held at Oxford the 21 of July the Plaintiffe had entred into such a Close by name containing eight Acres parcell of the premises specified in the Declaration c. and this Plea was received by the Judges of Assize And afterward in Mich. Terme Yelverton and Walter being of Counsell with the Defendant desired that they might amend their Plea to wit to put in the very Village where the Land did lye into which the entry of the Plaintiffe was because it was but matter of form and not of substance and they were of opinion that the tryall of that new lssue ought to be of all the three Villages named in the Declaration And Yelverton Justice having asked the opinions of all the Judges in Serjeants Inne Fleetstreet related their opinions in the Court the Record of Nisi prius was returned into the Exchequer to wit that it was in the discretion of the Justices of Assize to accept such a Plea as is before and that it might be well allowed as the 10 H. 7. is and it shall stay the Verdict But otherwise it is of a protection for although they allow a protection yet the Judges may take the Verdict de bene esse yet he said that in the 7. E 3. in a Precipe quod reddat a Release was pleaded at the tryal and the Jury found the Verdict but that was the indiscretion of the Judges to allow it when it should not have been allowed And all the said Judges held as he related that the Plaintiffe could not have a replication to that Plea at the tryall for the Justices have no power either to accept a Replication upon that Plea or to try it but onely to return it as parcell of the Record of Nisi prius And they held also that the Plea being put in the Countrey could not be amended in adding the Town in certain in which the Close did lye for it was matter of substance And that the Court of
his house which he could not do for the entring is one act done and ended at the going out again And therefore if he re-enter it is a new Trespass and the continuando is only alledged for the aggravation of damages 2 R. 3. 15. 10. E. 3. 10. 16. E. 3. 24. That a continuando cannot be for breaking the House but Doddridge and Haughton Justices the rest being silent were of opinion that it might be alledged that a continuando for although it might be that if hee went forth and re-entred it should be a new Trespass but if upon his first Entry he continued divers dayes it might be alledged with a continuando And see for that Mich. 38. El. in the Common Pleas fol. 118. If a Disseisee re-enter he shall have an Action of Trespass against the Disseisor with a continuando And so is Fitzherberts Nabrevium 91. L. that a continuando may be laid as well for breaking a House as eating the Grass and so is 10. E. 3. 10. and 20. H. 7. 30. by the opinion of Gapley GEush against Mynne Pach. 11. Jacobi An Action of Trespass brought wherefore by Force and Armes the Close of the Plaintiff did break c. The Defendant justified by reason there was a report that a Vermine called a Badger was found there to the great damage of the Inhabitants by reason whereof he uncoupled his Beagles in the place where c. and hunted there and found the Badger and pursued him untill he Earthed in the place where c. by reason whereof he digged the ground and took the Badger and killed him and afterwards hee stopped up the Earth again which is the same Trespass and demands Judgment whereupon the Plaintiff demurs And upon reading the Record Scamber of the Inner Temple was for the Demurrer and that the Defendant could not justifie as this case was And first he was of opinion that the Common Law warrants hunting such noysome Beasts although it be in the Lands of another because it is good and profitable to the Common-wealth that such hurtfull Beasts should be extirpated according to the 8. E. 4. 15. And Fishermen may justifie their Nets upon anothers Land 13. H. 8. 16. 22. H. 6. 49. A man may justifie entring into a house to serve a Subpaena 3. H. 6. 336. A man may justifie the entring into anothers Land with the Sheriff to help him to distrain but otherwise it is for things of pleasure as 38. E. 3. 10. B. You cannot justifie the Entry when your Hawk hath killed a Pheasant in anothers Land and so for hunting of Hares or Conies in the Free-hold of another but although the Law allows and permits such Entries as aforesaid yet the Law requires that such things shall be done in an ordinary and usuall manner as 12. H. 8. 2. A Commoner cannot digge the Land to make Trenches although it be for the benefit of another and this is confirmed and explained by the Statute of 8. Eliz. cap. 15. For although that Statute gives reward for the killing of Vermins yet the Statute further saies that it must be with consent and with reasonable Engines and Devices 2. R. 2. Barr. 237. Grant of Fish in the Pond one cannot dig the Land and make a Sluce but must take with them Nets And so if a man grant to me all his Trees in such a place I I cannot grub up the roots out of the earth if there be any other way to take them but if there be no other way then it is otherwise as 9 Ed. 4. 35. a. A grant to put a Pipe in my Land and afterward it is stopped I may dig to mend it by the opinion of the Court and therefore there being an Ordinary course to wit hunting to kill the Badger the digging for that is unlawfull and the Action will well ly Mich. 36. and 37 Eliz. 60. Nicholas Case expressely for a Fox and Fenner held it was not lawfull to break a Hedge in the pursuit MIles against Jones Pasch 11 Jac. Miles brought an Action of Trespasse against Jones wherefore by force and Arms his goods c. The Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff 5 Jacobi acknowledged a Recognisance of 100. l. at Mich. at which day he did not pay it and that two years after the Recognisance was extended upon his goods because the monies were not satisfied at the day nor at any time after the Plaintiff replies that they were paid in the sixth year of James and desires this that it may be inquired onely by the Countrey and the Defendant likewise and upon the Triall it was found for the Plaintiff and it was new moved in arrest of Judgement by Goldsmith that there was no Issue joyned for an Issue ought to be joyned upon a thing alledged by the party DOyly against White and Webb Trin. 11 Jacobi Doyly brought an Action of Assault Battery and imprisonment of his wife against White and Webb The Defendant pleads a speciall Justification to wit that in November 2 Jacobi an Action of Trespass was brought in the Common pleas by one A. against Julian Goddard and upon the generall Issue it was found for J. G. and Judgement given for her and afterwards and before Execution J. G. takes to Husband the now plaintiff and afterwards brings a Writ of Error in the Kings Bench and upon a Scire Facias against the said Julian the Judgement in the Common pleas was reversed and costs given to A. the plaintif in the Writ of Error and aftewards a Capias ad satisfaciend was directed to the now Defendants to take the said I. G. by Force of which the said Defendants took the woman of the now plaintif with an averment that the said I. G. and the Wife of the now Plaintif were one and the same person and the plaintif demurres upon this plea and Yelverton moved that this justification was not good for divers causes first when the Sherif is to execute a process he is to do it duly and upon the right person at his perill and for that see 11 H. 4. 90. b. If the Sherif take the goods of another in Execution he is a trespassor 5 E. 4. 50. a. If a Capias be to take I. S. and there be two of the same name he ought to look to take the right man at his perill and as he ought to take notice so he must pursue his authority and for this see 10. E. 4. 12. b. if a Capias issue out against I. S. the Son of A. and he take I. S. the Son of B. false imprisonment lies against him and in a Case when his Warrant is against I. G. there is no such J. G. for by her marriage with the Plaintiff she had another name and he is therefore a Trespassor for the taking of J. Doyly and his averment cannot help him because it agrees not with his Warrant and so cannot be intended to be the same person but if the variance was
cheife Justice and Williams Justice thought fit that he should not have a Prohibition for as well the reparations of the Church as the ornaments of that are meerely spirituall with which this Court hath nothing to do and Flemming said that such Tax is not any charge issuing out of Land as a rent but every person is taxed according to the value of the land but Yelverton and Fenner to the contrary that a Prohibition did lye for the same diversity which hath been conceived at the Barr and also they said that he which dwells in another Parish doth not intend to have benefit by the ornaments of the Church or for the Sextons wages and for that it was agreed by all by the cheif Justice Williams and the others that if Tax be made for the reparation of Seates of the Church that a forrainer shall not be taxed for that because he hath no benefit by them in particuler and the Court would advise Michaelmas 8. Jacobi in banco Regis HEnry Yelverton moved the Court for a Prohibition to the Admiralty Court and the case was there was a bargain made between two Merchants in France and for not performance of this bargain one libelled against the other in the Admiralty Court And upon the Libell it appeared that the bargain was made in Marcellis in France and so not upon the deep Sea and by consequence the Court of Admiralty had nothing to do with it and Flemming cheife Justice would not grant Prohibition for though the Admiralty Court hath nothing to doe with this matter yet insomuch as this Court cannot hold plea of that the contract being made in France no Prohibition but Yelverton and Williams Justices to the contrary for the bargain may be supposed to be made at Marcellis in Kent or Norfolke or other County within England and so tryable before us and it was said that there were many presidents to that purpose and day given to search for them Note upon a motion for a Prohibition that if a Parson contract with me by word for keeping back my owne tithes for 3. or 4. years this is a good bargain by way of Retayner and if he sue me for my Tithes in the Ecclesiasticall Court I shall have a Prohibition upon this Composition But if he grant to me the Tithes of another though it be but for a yeare this is not good unlesse it be by Deed see afterwards Westons Case A Merchant hath a Ship taken by a Spaniard being Enemy and a moneth after an English Merchant with a Ship called little Richard retakes it from the Spanyard and the owner of the Ship sueth for that in the Admiralty Court And Prohibition was granted because the Ship was gained by Battaile of an Enemy and neither the King nor the Admirall nor the parties to whom the property was before shall have that according to 7 Ed. 4. 14. See 2. and 3. Phillip and Mary Dyer 128. b. Michael 8. Jacobi 1610. in the Kings Bench. A Man sues an Executor for a Legacy in the Spirituall Court where the Executor becommeth bound by his deed obligatory to the party to pay that at a certain day befoâ—e which this suit was begun in the Spirituall Court and the Executor moved for a Prohibition and it was granted for the Legacy is extinct but by Williams if the Bond had been made to a stranger the Legacy is not extinct Fenner seemed that it was so Hillary 1610. 8. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. Robotham and Trevor THe Bishop of Landaff granted the Office of his Chancellor-ship to Doctor Trevor and one Griffin to be exercised by them either joyntly or severally and it was informed by Serjeant Nicols that Dr. Trevor for 350. l. released all his right in the said Office to Griffin so that Griffin was the sole Officer after died and that after that the Bishop granted the same Office to one Robotham being a Practitioner in the Civil Law for his life And that Doctor Trevor surmising that he himselfe was the sole Officer by survivor-ship made Doctor Lloyd his Substitute to execute the said Office for him and for that that he was disturbed by Robotham the said Doctor Trevor being Substitute to the Judge of the-Arches granted an Inhibition to inhibite the said Robotham for the executing of the said Office and the Libell contains That one Robotham hindered and disturbed Doctor Lloyd so that he could not execute the said Office And against this proceeding in the Arches a Prohibition was prayed and day was given to Doctor Trevor to shew cause for why it should not be granted And they urged that the Office was spirituall and for that the discussing of the Right of that appertaineth to the Ecclesiasticall Courts But all the Judges agreed That though the Office was Spirituall to the exercising of that yet to the Right it was Temporall and shall be tryed at the Common Law for the Party bath a Free-hold in this see 4. and 5. of Phil. and Mary Dyer 152. 9. Hunts Case for the Office of the Register in the Admiralty and an Assize brought for that and so the cheife Justice saith which was adjudged in the Kings Bench for the Office of the Register to the Bishop of Norwich between Skinner and Mynga which ought to be tryed at the Common Law And so Blackleeches Case as Warberton saith in this Court for the Office of Chancellor to the Bishop of Gloucester which was all one with the Principall case And they said that the Office of Chancellor is within the statute of Edw. 6. for buying of Offices And Warberton also cited the case of 22. H. 6. where action upon the case was maintained for not maintaining of a Chaplain of the Chamber in the private Chappel of the Plaintiff very well though it was spirituall for the Plaintiff hath inheritance in that But if it had been a parochial Church otherwise it shall be for the infiniteness of the Suits for then every Parishoner may have his action And so in manner of Tything the prescription is temporall and this is the cause which shall be tryed at the Common Law and Prohibition was granted according to the first Rule Hillary 8. Jacobi in the Common Bench. AN Attorney of the Kings Bench was sued in the Arches for a Legacy being Executor as it seems and it was urged that hee inhabited in the Diocess of Peterborough And for that that he was here remaining in London in the Tearm time he was sued here and upon that a Prohibition was prayed and it was granted accordingly For as the Lord Coke said Though that he were remaining here yet he was resident and dwelling within the Jurisdiction of the Bishop of Peterborough and he said that if one Lawyer cometh and remaineth during the Tearm in an Inne of Court or one Attorney in an Inne of Chancery but dwelleth in the Country in another Diocesse he shal not be sued in the Arches Master Brothers
a Fee simple conditionall and not an Estate tayl and he said that the sole question was if the Statute of Westminster 2. conevrted and changed Fee simple conditionall of copy-hold into an Estate tayl for if it be not an Estate tayl within this Statute it shall not be an Estate tayl at all for Littleton saith before the making of the said Statute these Estates were Fee simple conditionall and for that cannot be by prescription also he said that copy-hold Estate was so base an Estate that at the Common Law a copy holder had no remedy but only in the Court of the Lord But as to Littleton who sayth that he may have a Formedon in discender to that he saith that the Heire which hath Fee simple conditionall may have it by the Common Law for this was at the Common Law before the making of that Statute of Westminster 2. As it appears by 4. Ed. 2. Formedon 50. 10. Ed. 2. Formedon 55. And by Bendlowes in the Lord Barkleys case in the Commentaries 239. b. by Benlose where it is said by him that a Formedon in discender was not at the Common Law but in a speciall case where an Assise of Mortdancester would not serve the Issue that is if a man had Issue a Sonn and his Wife died and after that he takes another Wife and Land was given to him and to his second Wife and to the Heires of their two Bodyes begoten and they have another Sonn and the Wife dies and after the Father dies and a stranger abates there he sayth that before the Statute the youngest Soon could not have an Assise of Mortdancester and for that he shall have a Formedon in discender which was no other but a writ founded upon his Case see 10 of Ed. 2. Formedon 55. And for that when Littleton speakes of an Estate tayl of copy-hold that ought to be understood of Fee taile which may be Fee simple conditionall and so Littleton may be reconciled 〈◊〉 will well agree with himself also it seems that Copy-hold is ouâ—â—f the intent and meaning of the Statute of Westminster 2. For at the common Law in ancient times this was base Estate and not more in reputation then villinage and also if such an Estate then might be created of that which shall be perpetuall and no means to barr it for surrender of that doth not make any discontinuance and Recovery was not known till 12. Ed. 4. and he saith that in ancient time the name of Copy-holder was not well known for in ancient time they were called Tenants in Villinage and Tenants by copy is but a new terme see Fitzherberts Natura Brevium 12. b. and the old Tenures fol. 2. and Bracton lib. 2. charter 8. In gifts made to servants calleth them Villaines and Sokemen and in the old Tenures it is said that the Lords may expell them and upon this he inferred that if it be so baseâ— Tenure though it be of Lands and Tenements yet they shall not be intended to be within the intent of the makers of the Statute of Westminster 2. and also by a second reason that is that it was not the intent of the makers of the Statute that this should extend to any Lands but only to those which are free Lands for the parties are called Donees and Feoffees and the will of the Giver should be observed according to the forme in the Charter of his gift manifestly expressed by which it appears that it ought to be of such Land of which a gift may be made and also the Statute provides that if the Donee levy a fine that in right it should be nothing by which also it appears as to him it seemed that it ought to be of such Land of which a fine may be levied And also for a third reason which was the great Inconvenience which would ensue upon it for then the Donees have no meanes to dispose of that nor give that for the advancement of his Wife nor her Issues and also the Lord shall loose his signiory for the Donee shall hold of him in Reversion and not of the Lord and it is resolved in Heydens Case 3 Coke 8. a. That when an act of Parliament alters the service Tenure Interest of the Land or other thing in prejudice of the Lord or of the custome of the Mannor or in prejudice of the Tenant there the generall words of such act shall not extend to Copy-holders see the opinion of Manwaod cheife Baron there and he agreed that admitting it shall be an Estate taile that then Surrender shall not make discontinuance and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Plaintiffe his Clyent see Hill and Vpchars Case which was adjudged in the Kings Bench and the principall case was adjourned untill the first Saturday of the next Tearme See Hillari 7. Jacobi in this Book in Replevin the Plaintiff was non-suited between the same parties See also Pasche 9. Jacobi 149. Hillary 1610. 8. Jacobi in the Common Bench. Wallop against the Bishop of Exeter and Murray Clark IN a Quare impedit the case was Doctor Playford being Chaplaine of the King accepted a Benefice of presentation of a common person and after he accepted another of presentation of the King without any dispension both being above the value of eight pound per annum if the first Benefice was void by the Statute of 21 H. 8. chapter 13. or not was the question for if that were void by the acceptance of the second Benefice without dispensation then this remaines a long time voide so that the King was intituled to present by Laps and presented the Plaintiff the Statute of 21 H. 8. provides that he which is Chaplain to an Earle Bishop c. may purchase license or dispensation to receive have and keep two Benefices with cure provided that it shall be lawfull to the Kings Chaplaines to whom it shall please the King to give any benefices or promotions spirituall to what number soever it be to accept and receive the same without incurring the danger penalty and forfeiture in this Statute comprised upon which the question was if by this last Proviso Chaplaine of the King having a Benefice with cure above the value of eight pound per annum of the presentation of a common person might accept another Benefice with cure over the value of eight pound also of the presentation of the King without dispensation the words of the Statute by which the first Church is made void are and be it enacted that if any parson or parsons having one Benefice withcure of Soules being of the yearly value of eight pound or above accept and take any other with cure of Soules and be instituted and inducted in possession of the same that then and immediately after such possession had thereof the first Benefice shall be adjudged in the law to be void See Hollands case 4. Cooke 75. a. This case was not argued but the point only opened by Dodridge Serjeant
But in this case before Attornement the Grantee hath nothing and after Attornement the particuler Estate being granted it shall be drownd in the reversion Harris Serjeant the words of the devise are that his Feoffees and all other Persons which after his Death shall be seised shall be seised to the same uses before declared and of one Acre he hath not any Feoffees for of that the Feoffment was voyd and yet it was agreed that the devise was good as Lyngies Case was in 35. H. 8 cited by Anderson in Welden and Elkintons Case Commentaries 523 b. And he argued that though that when a conveyance may enure in severall courses yet it cannot enure for part in one course and part in another course and for that this devise enures as a devise of Land for one Acre and declaration of the use of the Feoffment foâ—…her Acre for it is agreed in Sir Rowland Haywards Case 2. 〈…〉 a. 6. Coke 18. a. Sir Edward Cleeres Case and also in this 〈◊〉 the devisor hath made expresse declaration that the Land shall passe by the Feoffment and that the Will shall be but a declaration of the use of the Feoffment and for that nothing shall passe by the devise with which the Justices seemed to accord and cited a case to be adjudged in the Kings Bench 40. Eliz. where the Father gives and grants Lands to his Son his heires with warranty and makes a Letter of Attorney within the deed to make Livery and adjudged that that shall not enure as a Covenant to raise a use for that that it appeares by the Letter of Attorney that his intent was that that should enure as a Feoffment and not as any other manner of conveyance see 14 Eliz. Dyer 311. 83. Master Cromwells Case and so it was adjudged accordingly Hillary 8. Jacobi 1610. in the Common Bench Gargrave against Gargrave Katherine Gargrave was Plaintiff in a Replevin against Sir Richard Gargrave Knight and the case was this The Father of Sir Richard Gargrave was seised of divers Tenements called Lyngell Hall in Lyngell Hall and of a Moore called Kingstey Moore in another Town and the Tenants of the said Father of Sir Richard have used to have Common in the said Moore and the said Father so being of that seised demised the said Tenements to the said Katherine Gargrave for her Joynture by these words by the name of Hingell Hall and certaine Land Meadow and Pasture in certainty and with all â—ands Tenements and Hereditaments to that belonging or with that occupied and enjoyed now or late in the Tenure of one Nevill and Nevill was Tenant of the said premises and had Common in Kingsley Moore upon which the question was if the said Katherine by this demise shal have Common in the said Moore or not And Hutton Serjeant argued that the said Katherine shall have Common in the said Moore for he said that the said demise shall be expounded according to the intent of the partie 〈◊〉 as it is agreed in Hill and Granges Case Commentaries 270. b. Where a man makes a Lease for yeares of a house and all the Lands to that belonging and though it is there agreed that Land cannot be appurtenant to a house yet this word appurtenant shall be taken in the effect and sense of usually occupied with the Messuage or lying to the house by which it appeares that the words are transferred from the proper signification to another to satisfie the intent of the parties for it is the office of the Judges to take and expound the words which the common People use to expresse their intent according to their intent and for that shall be taken not according to the very definition insomuch that it doth not stand with the matter but in such manner as the party used them And for that this grant shall amount to a new grant of Common in the said Moor for as it seems common or feeding for Cattell may be granted and passe by the name of Tenements Hereditaments or at least shall be included and comprised within the words Tenements and Hereditaments and so shall be construed as a thing occupied and injoyed with the said Messuages see Hen. Finches Case 39. Coke And it was an expresse endorsment upon the demise that the said Katherine should not have Common in the said Moore but it was agreed by all that this was vaine and idle and nothing worth but he urged that this shall have a favorable construction for that it was for Joynture which shall have as favorable construction as Dower And so he prayed Judgement for the Plaintiff and of the other part Nicholls Serjeant argued that this shall not amount to a new grant for he said that they are not apt words to receive such construction for he said that this is no Tenement or Hereditament no Common but only a Feeding for the Cattell of the Lessee in the wast of the Lessor see 20. Edw. 2. Fitzherbert admeasurement and it cannot passe as a thing used with the said house for that was not in Esse at the time of the grant and there is not any apt word to make a new grant â—nd he cited 〈◊〉 Iudgement in Action of wast between Arden and Darcy where Ardon was seised of the Mannor of Curball and also of Parkhall and makes a conveyance of the Mannor of Curball to divers uses and at this time parcell of the Mannor of Curball was occupied with Parkhall as parcell of that and after made another conveyance of all his Lands in England except the Mannor of Curball And adjudged that the Parke which is used with Parkhall shall not be within the exception Coke saith that it was only feeding and not Hereditament for the Inheritance of both was in the Lessor but if it be granted of feeding it shall be intended the same like feeding that the Tenant hath as if the King grant such Liberties as the City of London hath and that shall be good and so it was adjourned Hillary 8. Jacobi 1610. In the Common Bench. Cannige against Doctor Newman IN an Information upon the Statute of 21 H. 8. chapter 13. Of non-residency it was found by speciall Verdict that Doctor Newman was Incumbent invested in the Rectory of Staplehurst in the County of Kent and that hee was also seised of a house in Staplehurst aforesaid scituate within twenty yards of the said Rectory and that the mansion house of the said Rectory was in good repaire and that Doctor Newman held that in his hands and occupation with his one proper goods and did not let it to any other and that he inhabited in the said Messuage and not in the Parsonage the Statute of 21 H. 8 chapter 13. Provides that every Parson promoted to any Parsonage shall be personally resident and abiding in at and upon his said Benefice and in case any such spirituall Parson keep not residence at his Benefice as aforesaid but absent himself willfully by the space
if a man devise his Lands to his Wife and after her death to his Son and the remainder to his sayd Wife in Fee-simple the Husband of the Wife having Issue shall not be Tenant by the Curtesie for alwayes the Judges have made such favourable construction of Wills that if Estates devised by Will might be created by act executed in the life of the party then it should be good by devise and to the objection that conclusion and agreement is uncertaine and so for that shall be voyd he saith that it is not so uncertaine as going about or resolve and determine an attempt or procure as in Corbets Case first of Coke 83. b. or as attempt or endeavour as in Germins and Arscotts Case there cyted fol. 285. a. See 6 Coke 40. a. Mildmayes Case and also the words subsequent are repugnant that the Estate tayle shall cease as if the Tenant in tayle were dead and not otherwise which is absurd and repugnant for the Estate tayle doth not determine by his death if he doe not dye without Issue And also he sayd that it is more reasonable that the perpetuity in Scholasticas Case for here the limitation depends upon agreement which is a thing certaine upon which the Issue may be joyned and also the condition doth stand with the nature of the Estate tayle and for the preservation of it and Recovery is against the nature of it for this destroyes the Estate tayle and is onely a consequent of it and not parcell of the nature of the Estate and this is the reason that Littleton saith That an Estate tayle upon condition that he should not alien is good for that preserves the Estate and also preserves Formedon for him in reversion if there be a discontinuance and with that agreed 13 H. 7. 23. 24. and he sayd that there was a Judgement in the point for his Clyent for another part of the Land and he cyted 31 Edw. 5. Fitz. Feoffment placito the last and Fitzherberts Natura brevium Ex gravi querela last Case and so concluded and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff and this Case was argued againe by Shirley Serjeant for the Defendant and he intended that the agreement is voyd to the Wife and shall be intended the agreement of the Husband onely for a marryed Wife cannot countermand Livery 21 Assis 25. and if a Woman makes a Feoffment upon condition to enfeoff upon request made by her and she takes a Husband she cannot make request after coverture 35 Assisarum So that he intended that this shall be intended the agreement of the Husband onely and not of the Wife and yet he argued that Declaration of a use by a marryed Wife shall be good according to Beckwiths Case But he sayd That the reason of that is for that that she is party to the Recovery which is a matter of Record and as long as the Record remaines in force so long the Declaration of the use shall be good and also he argued that if the condition being that if the Wife conclude or agree to any act to make discontinuance that then c. that that shall be intended unlawfull acts and Recovery is no unlawfull act and for that shall not be within the restraint of the Condition as the Earl of Arundels Case 17 Eliz. Dyer 343. and admitting that it is a limitation yet it shall be of the same nature as a condition and as well as a condition that Tenant in tayle shall not suffer Recovery is voyd So also is such Limitation void and so it was intended before the Statute of Donis Conditionalibus and it appeares by the pleading that the parties did not intend to take advantage of the agreement for it is pleaded that at the time of the Recovery suffered the youngest Daughter was seised of an estate tayl the which could not be if her estate were determined and destroyed by the agreement and conclusion so that the last words make the Forfeyture for the first are not unlawfull and before the execution of the Recovery the estate tayl is determined and so he concluded and praied Judgement for the Defendant Barker Serjeant argued for the Plaintiff It shall be intended a Limitation and not a condition for a Will shall have favorable construction according to the intent of the Devisor for a Joyntenant may devise to his Companion 49. Ed. 3. and Fitz. Na. Bre. Ex gravi querela last case A man devises Land to his Wife for life upon condition that if he marry that it should remain over to his Son in tayl and the Wife marries and the Son in remainder sues Ex Gravi querela by which it appeares that it was a Limitation and not a condition and 34 Ed. 3. devise was to one for life upon condition that if his Sonn disturbed him that then it should remaine over in taile upon disturbance he in Remainder in tail brings Formedon by which it appears it was a Limitation and with that agrees all the Justices in 29 Assisarum 17. And Wellock and Hamonds Case cited in Barastons Case before and 18. Eliz. Dyer If Land be limited to no third person by the Devise then the Heir shall enter for breaking the condition and also he said that it appears by Littleton and 13 H. 7 23. and 24 and 20 H. 7. and 17 Eliz. 343. the Earle of Arundells case which conditioneth that Tenant in taile shall not alien standeth with his Estate but not with Fee simple and so it is adjudged in Nowes and Scholasticas Case which is adjudged in the point which as he saith cannot be answered and the Words of the Condition are not that her Estate taile shall cease as if shee had been dead but as if she had not been named which is not so repugnant or absurd as the other and this compared to 34 Ed 3. Where the Estate was limited till it was disturbed And he also argued that the agreement of the Wife shall be a forfeiture notwithstanding the coverture for when the Estate is granted upon such condition he which hath the estate shall take it subject to the condition as if two Lessees are and one Seals the Counterpart onely yet the other shall be bound by the Covenants contained in it and 33 H. 6. 31. a Woman disavows to be Executor notwithstanding that shee was marryed and if Precipe had been brought against the Husband and Wife the default of the Husband shall binde the Wife and so she shall be punished for waste made during the coverture and so concluded and prayed judgement for the Plaintiff Foster Justice that an Estate of Free-hold shall not cease by agreement or conclusion without entry for it is a matter of Inheritance and Free-hold and it is not like to 33 H. 6. 31. which concerns Chattels and Goods and Walmesley Justice accorded with him Warburton Justice it hath been adjudged in Scholasticas Case that the condition was good and therefore he would not deliver his
condition to re-enfeoff and she with her Husband makes the re-enfeoffment it is good so a Woman being Lessee for Life and with her Husband attorn upon a Grant of Reversion is good and shall binde the Wife after the Death of the Husband 3 Ed. 3. 42. 4 Ed. 3. Attornment 12. 15 Ed. 3. Attornment also this Estate was made to the Wife when she was sole and for that it shall be accounted her folly that she would take such a Husband that would forfeit her Estate but with that agreed the reason of the Booke of 20 H. 6. 28. Where a woman Tenant was bound by the ceasing of her Husband and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Plaintiff and so it was adjourned see another argument of this case in Michaelmas Tearm 9. Jacobi 1611. by Haughton and Nicholls Serjeants Pasch 9. Jacobi 1611. In the Common Bench. Pitts against Dowse IN an Ejectione firme upon not guilty pleaded The Case was this A man makes his Will by these words I bequeath all my Lands to my Son Richard except my Chauntery Lands And I devise all my Chauntery Lands to be devided amongst all my Children men and women alike except my Son Richard And if Richard die without Issue the remainder to A. My second Son the remainder to B. My third Son the remainder to C. My fourth Son the remainder to my next of blood and so from Heire to Heire And so likewise I would to be done upon my Chauntery Lands and Tenements in case all my aforesaid Children die without Issue Then I would the one halfe of my Chauntery Lands to remaine to the next of kin and the other half to the Hospitall of M. And the question was what estate the Heire of the eldest Son shall have in the Chauntery Lands and it was argued by Dodridge the Kings Serjeant that the Heire of the eldest Son shall have estate tayl in the Chauntery Lands the Devisor devises no estate to Richard his eldest Son in the Chauntery Lands nor limitts any estate of that in certaine and for that he seemed that the youngest Sons and Daughters shall be Tenants in Common for life and by this manner of Interpretation every part of the Will shall be for first he excludes Richard himselfe so that he shall have nothing in that and then by the Limitation to the younger Children to be equally divided between them makes them Tenants in Common see 28. H. 8. 25. Dyer 155. And he cited Lewin and Coxes Case to be adjudged Michaelmasse 41. and 42. of Eliz. Pasche 42. Eliz. Rot. 207. Where a man devises Lands to his two Sons to be equally divided and adjudged that they are Tenants in Common so devise to two part and part like and equally divided and equally to be divided is all one and for that there is no other words to make an estate of Inheritance it shall be an estate for life and the remainder shall be directed according to the estates limited of the other Land And he seemed that the words in the last sentence all my aforesaid Children shall extend to Richard his eldest Son as well as to the others and so all the Will shall stand in his force which may be Objected that Richard the eldest Son shall be excluded out of the Possession and for that see 6. Eliz. Dyer 333. 29. Chapmans Case and also he cited one case to be adjudged Trinity 37. Eliz. Rot. 632. betweene Bedford and Vernam where a man deviseth all his lands in Alworth and afterwards purchaseth other Lands in the same Town and afterwards one comes to him to take a Lease of this Land newly purchased which the Testator refused to Let. And said that these Lands newly purchased should goe as his other Lands And upon his Death bed adds a Codycell to his Will but saith nothing of his purchased Lands and adjudged that the purchased Lands shall passe and so concluded and praied Judgement Harris Serjeant that it is a new Sentence and Richard is excluded and it shall be a good Estate tayl to the youngest Children and foresayd Children shall be intended them to which the Chauntery Lands are limited see Ratcliffes case 3. of Coke adjudged that they shall be Tenants in Common by the devise to he equally divided and thall not be surviving but every youngest Children shall have his part in tayl though that the first words do not containe words of Inheritance yet the last words in case all my Children die without Issue declares his intent that they should have an estate tayl see the 16. of Eliz. Dyer 339. 20. Claches Case that when he hath disposed of part devised to Richard then disposeth of the residue and the sentence begins with And so likewise and that shall be intended in the same manner as he had disposed of the Lands devised to Richard for he hath devised the remainder otherwise that is to an Hospitall and so concludes and praies Judgement accordingly Coke cheife Justice saith that it was adjudged between Coke and Petwiches 29. Eliz. that if a man devise a house to his eldest Son in tayl and another house to his second Son in tayl and the third house to the third Son in tayl and if any of them die without Issue the remainder to the other two equally this shall be but for life for this enures to the quantity of the Land and not to the quality of the Estate And he said that Richard is excepted without question for it is but a Will and every of the youngest Sons therein shall have the Chauntery Land one after another and Richard shall have no part and the Chauntery shall have nothing till they all are dead and he likened that to Frenchams Case where Lands were given to one and to his Heires Males and if he died without Issue the remainder over the Issues Females shall not take though that it be if they die without Issue for expresse it makes to cease only and so it was adjourned Petoes Case PEto suffers a common Recovery to the use of himselfe for life the remainder to his eldest Son in tayl with diverse remainders over to the intent that such Annuities should be paid as he by his last Will or by grant declares so that they did not exceed the summ of sixty pound and if any of the said Rents be behind then to the use of him to whom the Rent shall be behind till the Rent be satisfied with clause of distresse Rent of twenty pound was granted to his youngest Son for his life the grantee distraines for the Rent and in Replevin avowes the Plaintiffe replâ—es that by the non-paiment the use riseth to the youngest Son by which it was objected that the Rent shall be suspended Quere if without demand or if the distresse shall be demanded or that the use shall not rise till after the distresse and to the distresse well taken and agreed by all that the Plaintiff shall take nothing by
is now out of the Statute for the advancement ought to be continuing until the death of the Father And so he saith also it was adjudged in Butler and Bakers Case that if a man devise Socage Lands and after sell to a stranger for good consideration his Lands held by Knights service this devise is now good for all for hee hath not any Land held by Knights service at the time of his death and so he concluded that the devise was good and prayed Judgement for the Plaintiff Houghton Serjeant for the Defendant he thought the contrary and hee argued that before the statutes of 32. and 34. of H. 8. men were disabled to devise any Land and for that they cannot provide for their Wives Children or for payment of their Debts and for remedy to that Feoffments to uses were invented and then to dispose the use by their Wills and then experience finds that to be inconvenient and then the statute of 27. H. 8. transfers the use into possession and then neither use nor land was deviseable without speciall Custome and then this was found to be mischeivous after five years experience and then was the statute of 32. H. 8. made and where by the statute of Marlebridg of those which did enfeoff their begotten sons a Feoffment by the Father to his son and Heir was void for all Now by this statute this is good for 2. parts and void only for the 3d part that for the good of the Lord but as to the party that is good for all as it is agreed in Mightes case 8 Coke Then to consider in the case here if all things concur that the statute requires and to that here is a person which was actually seised of Land held by Knights service in 12. Eliz. So that it is a person which then was having within the statute 2. If here be such conveyance for advancement of his children as is intended within the statute and to that he seemed that so notwithstanding that it may be objected that here is no execution to the youngest children insomuch that it is first limited to such Farmers and Tenants c. But he intended that this is no impediment Secondly also there is a limitation to the use of his last Will. Thirdly also there is a limitation to the use of such persons to whom he devises any estate by his Will But these are no impediments for the last is no other but a devise to himselfe and his heirs and there is not any other person knowne but meerely contingent and it is not like to a remainder limited to the right heirs of I. S. for there the remainder is in Abeiance but here it is only in contingency and nothing executed in Interest till the contingency happen and the not having of a son at the time shall not make difference as in 38. Edw. 3. 26. in formedon in Remainder where the gift was in one for life the remainder to another in tayle remainder in fee to another stranger and he in remainder in tayle dyes without Issue in the life time of the Tenant for life he in remainder in fee may have formedon in remainder without mentioning the remainder in tayle But here he intends that the devise shall be void in respect of the Lands first conveyed which were held in cheife by Knight service for the words of the statute are by act executed either by devise or by any of them and they are conjoyned and it is not of necessity that the time of the Conveyance shall be respected but the time of the value And notwithstanding that the Testator doth not mention any time But in so much as the provision of the statute is to save primor seisin and livery to the King as if the man had 20 l. by year in Socage and one acre in cheife and makes a conveyance of all that it shall be void first to the livery and priâ—or seisin to the third part So if he make conveyance of the 20 l. by yeare and leave the said acre held in cheife to discend and after that purchase other Lands to the value of the third part of all the conveyance of the 20 l. land notwithstanding which for the advancement of his Wife Children or payment of his Debts for he had a full third part at the time of his death which discended And he supposed that the having of a dry reversion depending upon the estate tall is sufficient having within the words and letter of the Statute and yet he agreed the ease put in Butler and Bakers case that if a man devise his Socage Lands and after alien his Lands held in cheife by Knight service to a stranger bonafide this is good So if he had made a reservation of his Lands held in chiefe to himselfe for his life in so much that his estate in that ended with his life and hee remembred the case cyted in Bret and case Comment That if a man devise a Mannor in which he hath nothing and after hee purchaseth it and dyes the devise is good if it be by expresse name But when a man hath disposed of two parts of his Land the Statute doth not inable him to devise the Residue but he hath done all and executed all the authority which the Statute hath given to him But he agreed also that the reversion is not such a thing of value which might make the third part discend to the Heir but it is uncertaine as a hundred and the other things of uncertain value contained in Butler and Bakers Case And also he intended that the remainder could not take effect insomuch that the condition is precedent and it is not found that the eldest Sonne hath aliened and then dead without Heir male and so he concluded and prayed Judgment for the Defendant In Replevin the Defendant avows for 9 s. Rent the Plaintiff pleads a Deed of feoffment of the same Land made before the Statute of quia emptores terrarum by which 6 s. 8 d. is only reserved and demands Judgment if he shall be received to demand more then is reserved by the Deed See 4 Ed. 2. Avowry 202. 10. H. 7. 20. Ed. 4. 7. Edw. 4. Lung 5 Ed. 4. 22 H. 6. 50. This Deed was without date and it was averred that it was made before the Statute of quia emptores terrarum which was made in the 18. of Edw. 1. And also it ought to be averred to be made after the beginning of the Reign of Richard 1. For a writing after the beginning of his Reign checks prescription But if a man hath a thing by grant before that he may claim by prescription for hee cannot plead the grant insomuch it is before time of memory and a Jury cannot take notice of that and for that the pleading before with the said averments was good If debt be due by Obligation and another debt be due by the same Debtor to the same Debtee of
Michaell then it is cleer that the Lessor hath no remedy by way of distress for the Tearm is ended before and by Action of Debt upon the Contract he hath no remedy as it seems as this case is for the Contract is that the Rent shall be paid yearly during the Tearm then when the Tearm is ended the contract is determined and for that the cheife Justice sayd That if a man makes a Lease at Michaelmas for a yeare rendring Rent yearely at our Lady day and the ninth of October which is after Michaelmas that the Lessor hath not any remedy for the Rent of the last halfe yeare for that is not reserved to be payd yearly according to the contract And Yelverton Justice agreed that the Lessee hath election as above but he saith when that is behinde the tenth day after Michaelmas then the Lessor shall bring his Action of Debt and declare that the Rent was behinde at the Feast of Saint Michaell and shall not make mention of the ten dayes after and Coke Justice sayd That it seems to him that the Lessee shall not have the benefit of these ten dayes after the last Feast for the words of the Lease are rendring Rent yearly during the tearme at the Feasts aforesayd or ten dayes after so that the Lessee shall have the benefit of these ten dayes during the tearme but not after then he shall not have these after the last Feast of Saint Michaell for then shall the tearme be ended And after in Trinity Terme 8 Jacobi The Case was moved againe and then Flemming cheife Justice conceived That the Lessee shall not have ten dayes after the last Feast and this upon construction to be made reasonably for otherwise the Tearm being ended the Contract should be determined with the Tearm and so the Lessor should be without remedy for his Rent and he sayd that reservations are not taken so strictly according to the letter And for that he cited the case of Hill and Granger in the Com. fol. 171. Where a man makes a Lease for a year And the Lease was made in August rendring Rent yearely at the Annunciation of our â—ady and Michaelmasse upon condition of Re-entry In this case the first payment shall be at the next Michaelmasse after the making of the Lease and not at the Annunciation of our Lady though this is first in words and this by reasonable construction for otherwise this word Yearely shall not be supplied and of this see the Action and so he said in this case Rent is reserved yearely during the Tearme at the Feasts of the Annunciation of our Lady or Michaelmasse or ten daies after he shall not have ten daies after the last Feast But Williams held his old opinion that the Lessor hath no remedy for the last halfe years Rent and it was adjourned Hillary 7. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. Grymes against Peacocke IN Terspasse for his Close broken The Defendant justifies that it was used within the Mannor of D. that every Farmer of such a house and averred that that had been allwaies let to Farme had Common in the Lords wast The house came into the hands of the Lord in Possession And he granted the house and the wast to J. S. in Fee J. S. Bargaines and Sells the house to J. N. with all Commons Profits and Commodities used occupied and pertaining to the same And after grants the wast to another If the Grantee of the house shall have Common in the wast was the question And Yelverton argued that the Common was gone for if he shall have Common this shall enure as a new Grant of a Common but this cannot so enure for two reasons First when a man will grant a Common he ought to shew the place in certaine where the Grantee shall have this Common or otherwise the Grant is void But here no place is shewed and for that it cannot enure as a new Grant of a Common Secondly If that be a new Grant yet this hath reference to the usage that is Quod Vsitatum est c. And this Vsitatum is void for it seemes to him that Lessee for yeares cannot alledge a usage for every Vsitatum ought to go in one selfe same currant not interrupted as in ths case of a Coppy-hold But here every new Lease is a new contract and so the usage is interrupted and then the Grant having the reference to the usage and that is void usage nothing shall passe by this Grant and for that in Long 5. Ed 4. 40. If a custome be against Law And that is confirmed by the Act of Parliament this is void confirmation for it hath reference to a void custome so here this Grant hath reference to the usage and for that it seemes to him that the Common is gone Hutton Serjeant to the contrary and that the Grantee of the Messuage shall have common for this usage is not a thing by strictnesse in Law appertaining to the Land but this hath gained his reputation that that shall passe very well in a conveiance by apt words And for that it will not be denied but if a man makes a Lease for years to one and grants him Common for all his Kine c. And after this Lease expires and he makes a new Lease and grants such Commons as the first Lessee had that this shall be a good grant of Common to the Lessee So he said in this case this grant of the house with all profits and commodities used occupied and appertaining to the said Messuage shall be said a grant of such Common which other Lessees of this Manner have used and this by reasonable construction in Law to make good the conveiances of Lay-men according to the common speaking for Benigne sunt Faciende Interpritationes Chartarum c. and for that he cited the case of Hill and Grange in the Comment Where the case was That a man made a Lease for yeares of a house and a hundred Acres of Land appertaining to that though the Land be not appurtenant to the house yet insomuch that this hath been usually occupied with the house this shall passe as appertaining to it and so 26. Assis 38. A man makes a Lease for life rendring Rent and after grants over the Rent to J. S. and dies The Heire grants and confirmes to the Grantee and his Heires the same Rent with clause of distresse and the Tenant for life dies now is the Rent reserved upon the Estate for life determined and yet this shall enure as a new grant of another Rent in quantity So in Sir Moyle Finches Case the case of uses and Durham in Ejectione Firme A Lease was pleaded of a Mannor whereof the feilds in which c. Were parcell And Issue was joyned Quod non Demiset Manerium And upon this Issue found it was that there were not any Free-holders but diverse Copy-holders and this was allwaies knowne by the name of a Mannor and it was adjudged that
but hath nothing in the Soyl according to the 14. H. 2. and 3. H. 6. 45. Ives case 5. Coke 11. So if a man make a feoffment of land except the Woods all woods are except by that and if Woods be cut and after grow againe in the same place this is also excepted But if woods after grow in another place this shall not be excepted for it was no wood in Esse at the time of the feoffment so if a man grants to another to dig Coles in his Soyl this is but to take profit and the Soyl doth not passe as it is agreed in 11. Eliz. Dyer 245. And it was said by Hutton Serjeant that he had seen an Ejectione Firme brought upon a Lease of Vsura terra But it was agreed by Coke cheife Justice and Foster that the Statute of 22. Ed. 4. chap. 7. was repealed by the Statute of 35. H. 8. for this is the negative and for that is repeal of a former Statute but if the last had been in the affirmative otherwise it should be and it was also agreed that this was not within the Statute of 35. H. 8. for that appoints of what age the wood shall be when it shall be inclosed and by this recompence is given to the Commoner but here it is not averred by pleading of what age this wood was which was inclosed and for that it was adjudged that the Action is not maintainable against the Commoner see Pasche 8. Jacobi for another argument at the Bar and also by the Judges Hillary 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. Vivion against Wilde A Man was bound in an Obligation to another with Condition to stand to abide and performe the award of two Arbitrators and before the award by his writing the Obligor revoked the authority of one of the Arbitrators And it was agreed by all that this Obligation is become single without Condiion and yet it was not pleaded that the Arbitrator had notice of the revocation before the award made And yet for that it was pleaded that Revocavit it was agreed that that implies notice for without notice it is no revocation But it was agreed that if a man submit himselfe to the award of another and after he revokes his authority But before the Arbitrator had notice of that he makes the award the award is good and shall be performed so if a man make a Feoffment and Letter of Attorney to make Livery And before Livery made he revokes the power of the Attorney But before notice the Attorney makes Livery this is good but if the Feoffor makes a Lease or feoffment to another before the Livery made by the other this is a Countermand in Law and shall be good without notice for Fortior est dispositio legis quam hominis But where a man makes actuall revocation of the authority and before notice the other executes his authority and in pleading the other pleades Quod revocavit the other party may reply Quod non revocavit and give in evidence that he hath no notice of that before the execution of his authority and this is good for without notice it is no revocation where revocation is the act of the party The case is entred Trinity 7. Jacobi Rotulo 2629. Vivion against Wild. Hillary 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. Smallman against Powys A Man made a Lease for life rendring Rent and after the Lessor by Indenture in consideration of fifty pound deviseth and granteth the Reversion to have from the day of the date for 99. yeares rendring a Rent also which was lesse then the first Rent and the Grantee of the reversion destraines for the rent reserved upon the Lease for life being behind and the sole question in this case was if the reversion shall passe without Attornment and it was said that in all cases where a use may be raised by the Common Law and that it shall be performed by order of Chancery that in these cases the use shall be executed by the Statute of 27. H. 8. of uses and one case was cyted by Harris Serjeant 14. and 15. Eliz. where the Brother was Tenant in tayl the remainder to his Sister in tayl the Brother by Deed which was Indented in parchment but made in the first person and no mention of Indenting in the Deed and the Deed was Inrolled withâ—… three moneths and after Livery and Seisin was made and it wâ—… adjudged that the Deed enures as a Bargaine and Sale and that nothing passes by the feoffment so that it was no discontinuance but that the Sister might enter after the death of her Brother without Issue Coke cheife Justice said that it was a good Bargain and Sale though that the words Bargain and Sell were not in the Deed but he conceived if a Letter of Attorney be incerted in the Deed so that it may appear that the intent of the parties is that it should not enure as a Bargain and Sale but as a feoffment there it is otherwise so if a man covenants to stand seised to a use if it be in consideration of money and the Deed is inrolled there this shall enure well as Bargain and Sale as it was adjudged in Bedels case 7. Coke 40. a. but the Statute of 27. H. 8. of inrollments doth not extend to a Tearme for the words of the Statute are that no freehold shall passe c. But it seemes in the principall case that the Statute of uses executes the use which is raised by this Grant and that the Grantor shall stand seised c. And all the Justices insisted strongly upon the Limitation of the Estate from the day of the date of the Grant and the Reservation of the Rent immediatly and upon this concluded that it was the intent of the parties that the Grantee should have the Rent reserved upon the first Lease and should pay the Rent reserved upon his estate and that when words of diverse natures are incerted in one conveiance the Grantee hath election to use which of them that he will as it appeares by Sir Rowland Haywards case and by Danyel if a man makes a Bargain and Sale in english and makes Livery Secundum forma Chartae this shall not be good But if it be in Latine otherwise it is for this word Vendo is compounded of Do and it is an apt word for Sur. that Livery might be made And agreed all that the reversion passes well without Attornment and that these words Demise and Grant shall be taken and enure to a Bargain and Sale and Judgement was given accordingly A man made a Lease for yeares to two if they lived so long and it was resolved by the Court that this determines by the death of one of them according to the resolution in Bradwells Case 5. Coke 9. a. and Judgement was given accordingly and there the case of Trupenny was recited which was this Lands was let to one for one and
to viewers and searchers this doth not abridge the power of the Alneger for this is but an addition of greater care and diligence and by the statute of 39. and 43. Eliz. If upon a search they find any forfeyture they shall have it but if they do not find the Alneger may find it and then the King shall have it And to the Second he answered that true it is for every 64. of clothes the Alneger ought to have foure pence for his Fee and though that some peeces of cloth are more broade then others yet the lobour of the Alneger to measure them is all one So he concluded and demanded Judgement for the plaintiff Hillary 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. Rutlage against Clarke IN Account the Plaintiff declares that the Defendant hath received of his money by the hands of a stranger to give an account The Defendant pleades in Bar that he received to deliver over to a stranger the which he hath done accordingly without that that he received it to make any of account otherwise then in this manner and it was resolved that the Plea in Bar was good without traverse for when he received the money he is to deliver it over or to give an account of it to the Plaintiff so that he is accountable Conditionally but the traverse is repungnant to the Plea though it be otherwise or another way against the Book of 9. Ed. 4. 15 See 41. Ed. 3. 7. 1. Ed. 5. 22. H. 6. 49 21 Ed. 4. 4. 66 1. Ed. 5. 2. that it is a good Bar without traverse But Brooke in abridging the case of 21. Ed. 4. 66 in Title of account saith that it seemes that the traverse ought to be without that that he was his receiver in other manner and there and in the Book at large are that Justices that is Coke Nele and Vavasor against Bryan that it ought to be traversed But here in the principall case it was adjudged that the traverse made the Plea ill Hillary 7. Jacobi 1609. In the Common Bench. Dunmole against Glyles THE case was this Grand-Father Father and Son the Grand-Father was possessed of a Tearme for two and twenty yeares to come devised to the Son the Land for one and twenty yeares and that the Father should have it during the Mynority of the Son and makes the Son his Executor and dies the Son being within the age of one and twenty yeares the Father enters into the Land and makes a Lease for seven yeares by Indenture untill the Son came to full age the Father makes his Son his Executor and dies The Son enters by force of the devise made by the Grand-Father And the question was if the Son shall avoid the Lease made by his Father and it was agreed that he might in proofe of which a Judgement was cyted which was in the Kings Bench Mich. 5. of Eliz. Rot. 459. or 499. In the Prioresse of Ankoresse Case where a Tearme was devised to one and if he died within the Tearme then to such of the Daughters of the Devisor which then should not be preferred the Devisor dieth the Tearme was extended for the Debt of the first Devisee and then he died the extent was avoided by the Daughters not preferred and they grounded their Judgement upon the former Judgements in Weltden and Eltingtons case and Paramores and Yardleys case in the Comment and for that the Law intends that a Devisor is Inops consillij and for that his devise shall have favourable construction according to his intent appearing within the devise and it was said by Coke that in many cases a man may make such an Estate by devise that he cannot make by an Act executed in his life time as it was adjudged in Graveners case where a man devises his Lands to his Executors for payment of his Debts that there the Executors have Interest that there the Executor of Executors shal have that and such Estate cannot be executed by Act in the life of the Devisor and so it was concluded by them all that the Son shall avoid the Lease made by the Father for the Devise was Executory and doth not vest till the full age of the Son and then Executor and shall avoid all Acts made by the Father by which Judgement was given accordingly Freeman against Baspoule See 9. Coke 97. b. THE case was this A. was indebted to B. and they both died the Heire of A. for good consideration assumed to the Administrator of B. that he would pay to the said Administrator the said Debt and for the not payment of that according to the Assumption the Administrator after brought an Action and then the said Heire and the Administrator submitted themselves to the award and arbitrement of C. and became bound one to the other to stand to the award accordingly so that the said Arbitrator makes his award of all the matters and controversies between them before such a day C. the Arbitrator before the day recyted the Assumpsit and the debt as aforesaid and agreed that the Heire should pay the Administrator so much money and that published according to their submission And in Action upon the case Nullum fecit Arbitrium was pleaded and upon demurrer it was objected that the award was void First For that it was for one party only and nothing was arbitrated of the other and to prove this the Book of 7. H. 6. 6. was cited and 39. H. 6. 9. see 2 R. 3. 18. b. And this also appeares by the pleading of an award for he which pleades it that he hath performed all things which are to be performed of his part And that the other pleades performance of all thing which are to be performed of his part by which it appeares that there ought to be performance of both parts and by consequence one award to both parties according to 22. H. 6. 52. Secondly that the award was void for that that the submission was of all controversies so that the Arbitrator delivered his award of all controversies c. And there was no award of the said Suit between the parties and for that he hath not made an Arbitrement of all controversies and by that the award was void and to prove that the Bookes in 4 Eliz. Dyer 216. Pumfreies award and 19. Eliz. Dyer 356. 39. and 39. H. 6. 9. Where it is said that if the submission were of all things and the Arbitrement of one only that is a void Arbitrement Thirdly For that it was not limited within the award at what day nor at what place the money should be paid by the Heire to the Administrator and for this cause also it shall be void for it ought to be payd immediatly and if the Heire cannot find the Administrator he forthwith hath forfeyted his Obligation and for that in this point it is uncertain and for that shall be void as it is in Samons case 5. Coke 77. b. Where
22 Assise 24. 48 Ed. 3. 8. Register 47. And in case that one common person hath any Office which he cannot exercise by a Deputy yet if he be imployed in the Kings service as if he be made Ambassador out of the Realm or other such imployment he may during his absence make a Deputy and this shal not be forfeiture of his Office and an Earl in ancient time was not only a Councellour of the King but by his Degree was Prefectus sive prepositus commitatus as it appears by Cambden 106 107. Comes prefectus Satrapas which is Prepositus comitatus and was in place of the Sherif at this day and when that he was Sherif though that he had the custody of the county committed unto him which was a great trust yet then by the Common Law he might make an under Sherif which was but a Deputy the like Holinsheads Chronicle 463. Amongst the customes of the Exchequer he called the under Sheriff Senescallus which agreed with the Definition before for he held the place of Sherif himself and by the statute of Westminster 8. chapt 39. It is sayd that Vice comes est viccarius commitatus and if a Barony discend upon the Sheriff yet he shall continue Sheriff 13. Eliz Dyer and Britton 43. If a Rybaud strike a Baron or a Knight he shall loose his Land And Tenant by Knights service may execute it by Deputy 7. Ed. 3. Littleton And if it be so in the case of a Sheriff which hath the County committed to him that he may make a Deputy by the Common Law upon that he inferred that the Steward which hath but the Mannors of the King committed to him that he may make a Deputy And also he said that the words in the last clause that is Volentes precipentes that the Officers and the Subjects should be attendant expoundes and declares the intent of the Queen for the words are Omnibus premisses and the Grant of the Office of the Stewardship is one of the premisses and so he concluded upon these reasons that Judgement shall be given for the Plaintiff and that the Grant was good and the Action wel maintainable And oâ— this opinion were Warburton and Foster Justices And Judgement was given accordingly this Trinity Tearm 8. Jacobi And Coke cheife Justice remembred a Report made by him and Popham cheife Justice of England upon reference made to them that this Patent was good and that the Earle of Rutland might exercise this Office by Deputation and he conceived that there were other words in the Patent which were found by the Jury that the said Earle should have the said Office Cum omnibus Juribus Jurisdictionibus c. as full c. as any other Patent hath been had and withall the Appurtenances and it seemed that a former Patentee had power by expresse words to execute that by a Deputy and he conceived though these words Adeo plene c do not inlarge the Estate yet this inlargeth the Jurisdiction of the Officer as in 43. Ed. 3. 22. Grant is made by the King of a Mannor to which an advowson is appendant Adeo plene tam amplis modo forma c. And these words past the advowson without naming that and he said it was adjudged Hillary 40. Eliz. in Ameridithes case where the case was the Queen granted a Mannor Adeo plene intigre in tam amplis modo forma as the Countesse of Shrewshury or any other had the same Manno r and Queen Kathrin had the same Mannor and diverse liberties with it of great value during her life and adjudged that these liberties should passe also by this Patent by these words and so in the principall case if the former Patent had been found also by the Jury and so was the opinion of Popham and him and was certified accordingly FINIS A Table of the Second Part. ARch-Bishops Jurisdiction 1 2. 28. Admiralties Jurisdiction 10 11. 13 16 17. 26. 29. 31. 37. Arbitrement satisfaction what 31. 131. Assumpsit 40 41. 273. Arrianisme one committed for it 41. Assets 47. Almony 36. Apurtenant what shall be said 53 Action sur Case by a Commoner for words 55. 84. 100. 119. 122. Avowry the whole plea 62 63. 102 Agreement what 72 Account 76 Audita Querela 81. 83. 168 Atturnment good by one under age where and why 84 Award void 100 Age not allowed in Dower 118 Administration repealable 119 Accord with satisfaction good plea where where not 131 Attorney ought to finde Baile in an Originall not Bill 134 Action sur Assumpsit 137 Assuâ—psit against an Executor where maintainable 138 Assets in Formedon what 138 Attachment 144. 168 Assent to a Legatee 173 Ayd prayer 191 Attachment for contempt of the Court 216 Accessary null unlesse there is Principall 220 Assignment of an estate suspended 225 Assise of novel Disseisin 229 Abatment of brief per entry 231 232 Abatement de facto and by plea differ in what 235 Agreement and Arbitrement good pleas where 132 Agreement by word to keepe backe tythes 17 Admiralls Commission for measuring of Corne 29 Administration during minority of c. 83 Atturney brings Debt for Trees 99. Arbitrement 130. 131. Arrest of Judgment 167. Acts what to make an Executor de seu tort 184. Attachment of Priviledge for an Estate against the Marshall c. 266. Assise where it may lye sans view 268. Assise the Recognitors challenged ibid Ajournment of the Tearm 278. Annuity or Writ of Covenant where 273. Arbitrement submission and revocation 290. Approvement of Common 297. Account 308. Award submission 309. Arbitrement 310 Arbitrement who it binds 323. Assise del Office 328. B BIshop not displaceable 7. Baron alone cannot sue for not setting forth Tithes without the feme proprietory 9 Ballast granted to Trinity House a Monopoly 13. Baron and Feme joyn where 66. Baron Judgment against an Executor 83 Baron how chargeable pur sa feme 92. 93. 95. Bar in trespass 121. By-Laws whom they bind 180. To what extended 258. Baron and feme take by intirity where 226. Barwick whether part of England or Scotland 270. Bayle 293 Banckrupt actionable 299. C CHase an action not to be divided 56 Cui in vita of Copy-hold 79. Custome for pound breach 90. Common Recovery 16. Copiholder shall hold charged where 208. Confirmation to a copiholder destroys common 209 210. Consultation after it no Prohibition grantable upon the same Libell 247. Cape grand Petit 253 Cause of a commitment traversable 266. Count in trespass after the teste del Breife 273. Covenant to pay Rent 273 Continuance Ibidem Chellenge 275 Customes of London argued by the Justices 284. 285. 286. Certiorari 312. Capias ad satisfaciendum no satisfactory execution 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. Copy-hold at common Law 44. Creditor may sue both heireand Executor 97. Court of Equity not proper after Judgment 97. Copyhold intayled 121. Covenants direct and collaterall how they differ 136.