consists in the clearness or obscurity of that Perception and not in the clearness or obscurity of the Ideas themselves A Man for instance that has a clear Idea of the Angles of a Triangle and of Equality to two Right ones may yet have but an obscure Perception of their Agreement and so have but a very obscure Knowledge of it But obscure and confused Ideas can never produce any clear or distinct Knowledge because as far as any Ideas are obscure or confused so far the Mind can never perceive clearly whether they Agree or Disagree CHAP. III. Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge FRom what has been said concerning Knowledge it follows that First We can have no Knowledge farther than we have Ideas Secondly That we have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas either by Intuition Demonstration or Sensation Thirdly We cannot have an Intuitive Knowledge that shall extend it self to all our Ideas and all that we would know about them because we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to another by Juxta-position or an immediate Comparison one with another Thus we cannot intuitively perceive the equality of two Extensions the difference of whose Figures makes their parts uncapable of an exact and immediate application Fourthly our rational Knowledge can not reach to the whole extent of our Ideas because between two different Ideas we would examine we cannot always find such proofs as we can connect one to another with an Intuitive Knowledge in all the parts of the Deduction Fifthly Sensitive Knowledge reaching no farther than the Existence of Things actually present to our Senses is yet much narrower than either of the former Sixthly From all which it is evident that the extent of our Knowledge comes not only short of the Reality of Things but even of the extent of our own Ideas We have the Ideas of a Square a Circle and Equality and yet perhaps shall never be able to find a Circle equal to a Square The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the Ideas we have being reduced to the four Sorts above-mentioned viz. Identity Co-existence Relation and Real Existence I shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these First As to Identity and Diversity our Intuitive Knowledge is as far extended as our Ideas themselves and there can be no Idea in the Mind which it does not presently by an Intuitive Knowledge perceive to be what it is and to be different from any other Secondly As to the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas in Co-existence in this our Knowledge is very short thô in this consists the greatest and most material part of our Knowledge concerning Substances for our Ideas of Substances being as I have shewed nothing but certain Collections of Simple Ideas co-existing in one Subject Our Idea of Flame for Instance is a Body hot Luminous and moving upward When we would know any thing farther concerning this or any other sort of Substance What do we but enquire what other Qualities or Powers these Substances have or have not which is nothing else but to know what other Simple Ideas do or do not Co-exist with those that make up that Complex Idea The reason of this is because the Simple Ideas which make up our Complex Ideas of Substances have no visible necessary Connexion or Inconsistence with other Simple Ideas whose co-existence with them we would inform our selves about These Ideas being likewise for the most part Secundary Qualities which depend upon the Primary Qualities of their minute or insensible Parts or on something yet more remote from our Comprehension it is impossible we should know which have a necessary Union or Inconsistency one with another since we know not the root from whence they spring or the Size Figure and Texture of Parts on which they depend and from which they result Besides this there is no discoverable Connexion between any Secundary Qualitie and those Primary Qualities that it depends on We are so far from knowing what Figure Size or Motion produces for Instance A Yellow Colour or Sweet Taste or a Sharp Sound that we can by no means conceive how any Size Figure or Motion can possibly produce in us the Idea of any Colour Taste or Sound whatsoever and there is no conceivable Connexion between the One and the Other Our Knowledge therefore of Co-existence reaches little farther than Experience Some few indeed of the Primary Qualities have a necessary Dependance and visible Connexion one with another As Figure necessarily supposes Extension receiving or communicating Motion by Impulse supposes Solidity But Qualities Co-existent in any Subject without this Dependance and Connexion cannot certainly be known to Co-exist any farther than Experience by our Senses informs us Thus thô upon trial we find Gold Yellow Weighty Malleable Fusible and Fixed yet because none of these have any evident Dependance or necessary Connexion with the other we cannot certainly know that where any Four of these are the Fifth will be there also how highly probable soever it may be But the highest degree of Probability amounts not to Certainty without which there can be no true Knowledge For this Co-existence can be no farther known then it is perceived and it cannot be perceived but either in particular Subjects by the observation of our Senses or in general by the necessary Connexion of the Ideas themselves As to Incompatibility or Repugnancy to Co-existence we may know that any Subject can have of each sort of Primary Qualities but One particular at once One Extension One Figure and so of sensible Ideas peculiar to each Sense For whatever of each kind is present in any Subject excludes all other of that Sort for Instance One Subject cannot have Two Smells or Two Colours at the same time As to Powers of Substances which makes a great part of our Enquiries about them and is no inconsiderable branch of our Knowledge Our Knowledge as to these reaches little farther than Experience because they consist in a Texture and Motion of Parts which we cannot by any means come to discover and I doubt whether with those Faculties we have we shall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this part Experience is that which in this part we must depend on and it were to be wished that it were improved we find the Advantages some Mens generous pains have this way brought to the stock of Natural Knowledge And if others especially the Philosophers by Fire who pretend to it had been so wary in their Observations and sincere in their Reports as those who call themselves Philosophers ought to have been our acquaintance with the Bodies here about us and our insight into their Powers and Operations had been yet much greater As to the Third Sort the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas in any other Relation This is the largest field of Knowledge and it is hard to determine how
another as those that convey the most real Truths and all this without any knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things existing without us Thus he that has learnt the following words with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them viz. Substance Man Animal Form Soul Vegetative Sensitive Rational may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is And of this sort a Man may find an infinite number of Propositions Reasonings and Conclusions in Books of Metaphysicks School-Divinity and some part of Natural Philosophy and after all know as little of God Spirits or Bodies as he did before he set out Thirdly The worst sort of Trifling is To use words loosely and uncertainly which sets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them or find in them That which occasions this is That Men may find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance or Obstinacy under the Obscurity or Perplexedness of their Terms to which perhaps Inadvertency and ill Custom does in many Men much contribute To conclude barely Verbal Propositions may be known by these following marks First All Propositions wherein two Abstract Terms are affirmed one of another are barely about the signification of Sounds For since no Abstract Idea can be the same with any other but it self when its Abstract Name is affirmed of any other Term it can signifie no more but this that it may or ought to be called by that name or that these two Names signify the same Idea Secondly All Propositions wherein a part of the Complex Idea which any Term stands for is predicated of that Term are only Verbal and thus all Propositions wherein more comprehensive Terms called Genera are affirmed of Subordinate or less Comprehensive called Species or Individuals are barely Verbal When by these two Rules we examine the Propositions that make up the Discourses we ordnarily meet with both in and out of Books we shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of Words and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these Signs CHAP. IX Of our Knowledge of Existence HItherto we have only considered the Essences of Things which being only Abstract Ideas and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Existence give us no Knowledge of Existence at all We proceed now to enquire concerning our Knowledge of the Existence of Things and how we come by it I say then that we have the Knowledge of our own Existence by Intuition of the Existence of God by Demonstration and of other Things by Sensation As for our own Existence we perceive it so plainly that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof I think I reason I feel Pleasure and Pain Can any of these be more evident to me than my own Existence If I doubt of all other Things that very Doubt makes me perceive my own Existence and will not suffer me to doubt of that If I know I doubt I have as certain a Perception of the Thing Doubting as of that Thought which I call Doubt Experience then convinces us that we have an Intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence and an Internal Infallible Perception that we are In every act of Sensation Reasoning or Thinking we are conscious to our selves of our own Being and in this matter come not short of the highest Degree of Certainty CHAP X. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God THO' God has given us no innate Ideas of himself yet having furnished us with those Faculties our Minds are endowed with he hath not left himself without a Witness since we have Sense Perception and Reason and cannot want a clear proof of him as long as we carry our selves about us nor can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great point since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover and know him so far as is necessary to the end of our Being and the great concernment of our Happiness But thô this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers yet it requires Thought and Attention and the Mind must apply it self to a Regular deduction of it from some part of our Intuitiv Knowledge or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other Propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration To shew therefore that we are capable of Knowing that is being certain that there is a God and how we may come by this Certainty I think we need go no farther than our selves and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Existence I think it is beyond question that Man has a clear Perception of his own Being he knows certainly that he Exists and that he is Something In the next place Man knows by an Intuitive Certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any real Being than it can be equal to two Right Angles If therefore we know there is some Real Being it is an evident Demonstration that from Eternity there has been Something since what was not from Eternity had a Beginning and what had a Beginning must be produced by something else Next it is evident that what has its Being from another must also have all that which is in and belongs to its Being from another too All the Powers it has must be owing to and received from the same Source This Eternal Source then of all Being must he also the Source and Original of all Power and so this Eternal Being must be also the most powerful Again Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge we are certain then that there is not only some Being but some Knowing Intelligent Being in the World There was a time then when there was no knowing Being or else there has been a knowing Being from Eternity If it be said there was a time when that Eternal Being had no Knowledge I reply that then it is impossible there should have ever been any Knowledge It being as impossible that Things wholly void of Knowledge and operating blindly and without any Perception should produce a knowing Being as it is impossible that a Triangle should make it self Three Angles bigger than Two Right ones Thus from the Consideration of our selves and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions our Reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth that there is an Eternal most Powerful and Knowing Being which whether any one will call God it matters not The thing is evident and from this Idea duly consider'd will easily be deduced all those other Attributes we ought to ascribe to this Eternal Being From what has been said it is plain to me we have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a God than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us Nay I presume I may say that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing else without
do it because the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once and be compared with any other one or two Angles And so of this the Mind has no immediate or Intuitive Knowledge In this case the Mind is fain to find out some other Angles to which the three Angles of a Triangle have equality and finding those equal to two Right ones comes to know the equality of these three Angles to two Right ones Those intervening Ideas which serve to shew the Agreement of any two others are called Proofs And where the Agreement or Disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived it is called Demonstration A quickness in the Mind to find those Proofs and to apply them right is I suppose that which is called Sagacity This Knowledge thô it be certain is not so clear and evident as Intuitive Knowledge It requires pains and attention and steady application of Mind to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas it considers and there must be a Progression by Steps and Degrees before the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty Before Demonstration there was a Doubt which in Intuitive Knowledge cannot happen to the Mind that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of distinct Ideas no more than it can be a Doubt to the Eye that can distinctly see White and Black whether this Ink and Paper be all of a Colour Now in every step that Reason makes in Demonstrative Knowledge there is an Intuitive Knowledge of that Agreement or Disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate Idea which it uses as a proof for if it were not so that yet would need a proof since without the Perception of such Agreement or Disagreement there is no Knowledge produced By which it is evident that every step in reasoning that produces Knowledge has Intuitive Certainty which when the Mind perceives there is no more required but to remember it to make the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas concerning which we enquire Visible and Certain This Intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Intermediate Ideas in each step and progression of the Demonstration must also be exactly carried in the Mind and a Man must be sure that no part is left out which because in long Deductions the Memory cannot easily retain this Knowledge becomes more imperfect than Intuitive and Men often embrace Falshoods for Demonstrations It has been generally taken for granted that Mathematicks alone are capable of Demonstrative Certainty But to have such an Agreement or Disagreement as may be Intuitively perceived being as I imagine not the priviledge of the Ideas of Number Extension and Figure alone it may possibly be the want of due Method and Application in us and not of sufficient Evidence in Things that Demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of Knowledge For in whatever Ideas the Mind can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement immediately there it is capable of Intuitive Knowledge and where it can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas by an Intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement they have with any intermediate Ideas there the Mind is capable of Demonstration which is not limited to the Ideas of Figure Number Extension or their Modes The reason why it has been generally supposed to belong to them only is because in comparing their Equality or Excess the Modes of Numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable And in Extension thô every the least excess is not so perceptible yet the Mind has found out ways to discover the just Equality of two Angels Extensions or Figures and both that is Numbers and Figures can be set down by visible and lasting Marks But in other Simple Ideas whose Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees and not Quantity we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their Differences as to perceive or find ways to measure their just Equality or the least Differences For those other Simple Ideas being Appearances or Sensations produced in us by the Size Figure Motion c. of minute Corpuseles singly insensible their different Degrees also depend on the variation of some or all of those Causes which since it cannot be observed by us in Particles of Matter whereof each is too subtile to be perceived it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different Degrees of these Simple Ideas Thus for Instance not knowing what number of Particles nor what motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of Whiteness we cannot demonstrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of Whiteness because we have no certain Standard to measure them by nor means to distinguish every the least difference the only help we have being from our Senses which in this point fail us But where the difference is so great as to produce in the Mind Ideas clearly distinct there Ideas of Colours as we see in different kinds Blue and Red for instance are as capable of Demonstration as Ideas of Number and Extension What is here said of Colours I think holds true in all Secondary Qualities These two then Intuition and Demonstration are the degrees of our Knowledge whatever comes short of one of these is but Faith or Opinion not Knowledge at least in all General Truths There is indeed another Perception of the Mind employed about the particular Existence of finite Beings without us which going beyond probability but not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of Certainty passes under the name of Knowledge Nothing can be more certain than that the Idea we receive from an External Object is in our Minds this is Intuitive Knowledge but whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any Thing without us corresponding to that Idea is that whereof some Men think there may be a question made because Men may have such an Idea in their Minds when no such Thing Exists no such Object affects their Senses But 't is evident that we are invincibly Conscious to our selves of a different Perception when we look upon the Sun in the Day and think on it by Night when we actually taste Wormwood or smell a Rose or only think on that Savour or Odour so that I think we may add to the two former sorts of Knowledge this also of the Existence of particular external Objects by that Perception and Consciousness we have of the actual entrance of Ideas from them and allow these three degrees of Knowledge viz. Intuitive Demonstrative and Sensitive But since our Knowledge is founded on and employed about our Ideas only Will it follow thence that it must be conâ—ormable to our Ideas and that where our Ideas are clear and distinct obscure and confused there our Knowledge will be so too I answer No For our Knowledge consisting in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas its clearness or obscurity
far it may extend This part depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate Ideas that may shew the Habitudes and Relations of Ideas It is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such Discoveries They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it and what farther Improvements and Helps advantageous to other parts of Knowledge the Sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out it is not easy to determine This at least I believe that the Ideas of Quantity are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge and that other and perhaps more useful parts of Contemplation would afford us Certainty if Vices Passions and domineering Interests did not oppose or menace Endeavours of this kind The Idea of a Supream Being Infinite in Power Goodness and Wisdom whose Workmanship we are and on whom we depend and the Idea of our Selves as understanding rational Creatures would I suppose if duly considered afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action as might place Morality among the Sciences capable of Demonstration wherein I doubt not but from Principles as Incontestable as those of the Mathematicks by necessary Consequences the measure of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the One as he does to the Other of these Sciences The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as those of Number and Extension Where there is no Property there is no Injustice is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid for the Idea of Property being a right to any thing and the Idea of Injustice being the invasion or violation of that Right it is evident that these Ideas being thus established and these Names annexed to them I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true as that a Triangle has three Angles equal to Two right ones Again No Government allows absolute Liberty The Idea of Government being the establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws which require Conformity to them and the Idea of Absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition as of any in Mathematicks What has given the advantage to the Ideas of Quantity and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonstration is First That they can be represented by sensible Marks which have a nearer Correspondence with them than any Words or Sounds Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the Ideas and not liable to the uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification But we have no sensible Marks that resemble our Moral Ideas and nothing but Words to express them by which thô when written they remain the same yet the Ideas they stand for may change in the same Man and it is very seldom that they are not different in different Persons Secondly Moral Ideas are commonly more Complex than Figures whence these two Inconveniencies follow First That their Names are of more uncertain Signification the precise collection of Simple Ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on and so the sign that is used for them in Communication always and in Thinking often does not steadily carry with it the same Idea Secondly The Mind cannot easily retain those precise Combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination of the Habitudes and Correspondencies Agreements or Disagreements of several of them one with another especially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions and the intervention of several other Complex Ideas to shew the Agreement ' or Disagreement of two remote ones One part of these Disadvantages in Moral Ideas which has made them be thought not capable of Demonstration may in a good measure be remedied by Definitions setting down that collection of Simple Ideas which every Term shall stand for and then using the Terms steadily and constantly for that precise Collection As to the Fourth sort of Knowledge viz. of the real actual existence of Things we have an Intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence a Demonstrative Knowledge of the Existence of God and a Sensitive Knowledge of the Objects that present themselves to our Senses From what has been said we may discover the Causes of our Ignorance which are chiefly these Three First want of Ideas Secondly Want of a discoverable Connexion between the Ideas we have Thirdly Want of tracing and examining our Ideas First There are some things we are ignorant of for want of Ideas All the Simple Ideas we have are confined to the observation of our Senses and the operations of our own Minds that we are conscious of in our Selves What other Ideas it is possible other Creatures may have by the assistance of other Senses and Faculties more or perfecter than we have or different from ours it is not for us to determine but to say or think there are no such because we conceive nothing of them is no better an Argument than if a blind Man should be positive in it that there was no such thing as Sight and Colours because he had no manner of Idea of any such thing What Faculties therefore other species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmost constitutions of Things we know not This we know and certainly find that we want other views of them besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect The Intellectual and Sensible World are in this perfectly alike that the parts which we see of either of them hold no proportion with that we see not and whatsoever we can reach with our Eyes or our Thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest Another great cause of Ignorance is the want of Ideas that we are capable of This keeps us in ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known Bulk Figure and Motion we have Ideas of yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk Motion and Figure of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe we are ignorant of the several Powers Efficacies and ways of Operation whereby the effects we daily see are produced These are hid from us in some things by being too Remote in others by being too Minute When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our Ken is but a small part of the immense Universe we shall then discover an huge abyss of Ignorance What are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal Beings how far they are extended and what is their motion and how continued and what influence they have upon one another are contemplations that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in If we confine our Thoughts to this little Canton I mean this System of
made by Nature Our Complex Ideas of Substances being all referr'd to patterns in Things themselves may be False They are so First When looked upon as representations of the unknown Essences of Things Secondly When they put together Simple Ideas which in the real Existence of Things have no Union as in Centaur Thirdly When from any collection of Simple Ideas that do always Exist together there is separated by a direct Negation any one Simple Idea which is constantly joyned with them Thus if from Extension Solidity Fixedness Malleableness Fusibility c. we remove the Colour observed in Gold If this Idea be only left out of the Complex one of Gold it is to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect rather than a False one since thô it contains not all the Simple Ideas that are united in Nature yet it puts none together but what do really Exist together Upon the whole I think that our Ideas as they are considered by the Mind either in reference to the proper signification of their Names or in reference to the reality of Things may more proproperly be called Right or Wrong Ideas according as they agree or disagree to those Patterns to which they are referred The Ideas that are in Mens Minds simply considered cannot be wrong unless Complex Ideas wherein inconsistent Parts are jumbled together All other Ideas are in themselves Right and the Knowledge about them right and true Knowledge But when we come to refer them to any Patterns or Archetypes then they are capable of being wrong as far as they disagree with such Archetypes Having thus given an account of the Original Sorts and Extent of our Ideas which are the materials of our Knowledge before I proceed to shew what use the Understanding makes of them and what Knowledge we have by them I find it necessary because of that close connexion between Ideas and Words and that constant Relation which our Abstract Ideas and General Words have one with another to consider First The Nature Use and Signification of Language which therefore must be the business of the next Book BOOK III. CHAP. I. Of Words or Language in General GOD having design'd Man for a sociable Creature made him not only with an Inclination and under a Necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind But furnished him also with Language which was to be the great Instrument and common Tye of Society Man therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashioned as to be fit to frame Articulate Sounds which we call Words But besides Articulate Sounds which Birds may be taught to imitate it was further necessary that he should be able to use these Sounds as Signs of Internal Conceptions and make them stand as marks of the Ideas of his Mind whereby they might be made known to others But neither is it enough for the perfection of Language that Sounds can be made signs of Ideas unless these can be made use of so as to comprehend several particular things for the multiplication of Words would have perplexed their use had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by To remedy this inconvenience Language had yet a farther improvement in the use of General Terms whereby one Word was made to mark a multitude of particular Existences which advantageous use of Sounds was obtained only by the difference of the Ideas they were made Signs of Those Names becoming general which are made to stand for general Ideas and those remaining particular where the Ideas they are used for are particular There are other Words which signify the Want or Absence of Ideas as Ignorance Barrenness c. which relate to positive Ideas and signify their Absence It is observable that the Words which stand for Actions and Notions quite removed from Sense are borrowed from sensible Ideas v. g. to Imagine Apprehend Comprehend Understand Adhere Conceive Instill Disgust Disturbance Tranquillity c. which are all taken from the Operations of Things sensible and applied to Modes of Thinking Spirit in its primary signification is no more than Breath Angel a Messenger By which we may guess what kind of Notions they were and whence derived which filled the Minds of the first Beginners of Languages and how Nature even in the naming of things unawares suggested to Men the Originals of all their Knowledge whilst to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves or any other Ideas that came not under their Senses they were fain to borrow Words from the ordinary and known Ideas of Sensation The better to understand the Use and Force of Language as subservient to Knowledge it will be convenient to consider First To what it is that Names in the use of Language are immediately applyed Secondly Since all except proper Names are General and so stand not for this or that single thing but for Sorts and Ranks it will be necessary to consider what those sorts and kinds of Things are wherein they consist and how they come to be made This shall be considered in the following Chapters CHAP II. Of the Signification of Words MAN thô he have great variety of Thoughts yet are they all within his own Breast invisible and hidden from others nor can of themselves be made to appear It was necessary therefore for the comfort and advantage of Society that Man should find out some External Signs whereby those invisible Ideas might be made known to others For which purpose nothing was so fit either for Plenty or Quickness as those Articulate Sounds he found himself able to make Hence Words came to be made use of by Men as Signs of their Ideas not upon the account of any Natural connexion between Articulate Sounds and certain Ideas for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men but by a voluntary Imposition whereby such a Word is made Arbitrarily the mark of such an Idea The use then of Words is to be sensible marks of our Ideas and the Ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate Signification In which they stand for nothing more but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them For when a Man speaks to another it is that he may be understood that is That his Sounds may make known his Ideas to the Hearer Words being voluntary Signs cannot be imposed on Things we know not this would be to make them Signs of nothing Sounds without Significations A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of Qualities in Things or of Conceptions in the Mind of another whereof he has none in his own Words in all Mens Mouths that speak with any meaning stand for the Ideas which those that use them have and which they would express by them Thus a Child that takes notice of nothing more in the Mettal he hears called Gold than the Yellow Colour calls the same Colour in a Peacock's Tail Gold Another that hath better observed adds to shining Yellow
of the sorts or species of Things are nothing but these Abstract Ideas It is not denyed here that Nature makes Things alike and so lays the foundation of this Sorting and Cleansing But the sorts of Species themselves are the workmanship of Human Understanding so that every distinct Abstract Idea is a distinct Essence and the names that stand for such distinct Ideas are the names of Things Essentially different Thus Oval Circle Rain and Snow are Essentially different To make this clearer it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word Essence First It may be taken for the very Being of any Thing whereby it is what it is Thus the real Internal but unknown Constitution in Substances may be called their Essence This is the proper signification of the word Secondly In the Schools the word Essence has been almost wholly applyed to the artificial Constitution of Genus and Species it is true there is ordinarily supposed a real Constitution of the sorts of Things and it is past doubt there must be some real Constitution on which any collection of Simple Ideas co-existing must depend But it being evident that Things are ranked into sorts under names only as they agree to certain Abstract Ideas to which we have annexed those names the Essence of each Genus or Species is nothing but the Abstract Idea which the name stands for this the word Essence imports in its most familiar use These two sorts of Essence may not unfitly be termed the one Real the other Nominal Between the Nominal Essence and the Name there is so near a Connexion that the name of any sort of Things cannot be attributed to any particular Being but what has the Essence whereby it answers that Abstract Idea whereof that Name is the sign Concerning the Real Essences of Corporeal Substances there are Two Opinions First Some using the word Essence for they know not what suppose a certain number of those Essences according to which all natural Things are made and of which they equally partake and do become of this or of that Species Secondly Others look on all natural Things to have a Real but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts from whence flow their sensible Qualities which serve us to distinguish them one from another and according to which we rank them into Sorts under common Denominations The former Supposition seems irreconcilable with the frequent production of Monsters in all the Species of Animals Since it is impossible that Two Things partaking of the same Real Essence should have different Properties But were there no other reason against it yet the Supposition of Essences which cannot be known and yet the making them to be that which distinguisheth the Species of Things is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of Knowledge that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by We may farther observe that the Nominal and Real Essences of Simple Ideas and Modes are always the same but in Substances always quite different Thus a Figure including a Space between three Lines is the Real as well as Nominal Essence of a Triangle it being that foundation from which all its Properties flow and to which they are inseparably annexed But it is far otherwise in Gold or any other sort of Substance it is the real Constitution of its insensible Parts on which depend all those Properties that are to be found in it which Constitution since we know not nor have any particular Idea of we can have no name that is the sign of it But yet it is its Colour Weight Fusibility and Fixedness c. which makes it to be Gold or gives it a right to that name which is therefore its Nominal Essence since nothing can be called Gold but what has a conformity to that Abstract Complex Idea to which that name is annexed That Essences are but Abstract Ideas may farther appear by their being held Ingenerable and Incorruptible This cannot be true of the real Constitution of Things All Things in Nature save the Author of it are liable to Change their Real Essences and Constitutions are destroyed and perish but as they are Ideas established in the Mind they remain immutable For whatever becomes of Alexander or Bucephalus the Ideas of Man and Horse remain the same By these means the Essence of a Species rests safe and entire without the Existence of one Individual of that kind It is evident then that this Doctrine of the Immutability of Essences is founded only on the relation established between Abstract Ideas and certain Sounds and will always be true as long as the same Name can have the same Signification CHAP. IV. Of the Names of Simple Ideas WOrds thô they signifie nothing immediately but the Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker yet we shall find that the Names of Simple Ideas mixed Modes and natural Substances have each of them something peculiar And First The Names of Simple Ideas and Substances with the Abstract Ideas in the Mind intimate some Real Existence from which was derived their original Pattern but the Names of Mixed Modes terminate in the Idea that is in the Mind Secondly The Names of Simple Ideas and Modes signifie the Real as well as Nominal Essences of their Species the Names of Substances signifie rarely if ever any thing but barely the Nominal Essences of those Species Thirdly The Names of Simple Ideas are not capable of Definitions those of Complex Ideas are the reason of which I shall shew from the Nature of our Ideas and the signification of Words It is agreed that a Definition is nothing else but the shewing the meaning of one Word by several other not Synonymous Terms The meaning of Words being only the Ideas they are made to stand for the meaning of any Term is then shewed or the Word defined when by other words the Idea it is made the sign of is as it were represented or set before the view of another and thus its signification ascertained The Names then of Simple Ideas are incapable of being defined because the several Terms of a Definition signifying several Ideas they can altogether by no means represent an Idea which has no composition at all and therefore a Definition which is but the shewing of the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing can in the names of Simple Ideas have no place The not observing this difference in our Ideas has occasioned those trisling Definitions which are given us of those Simple Ideas such as is that of Motion viz. The Act of a Being in Power as far forth as in Power The Atomists who define Motion to be a passage from one place to another What do they more than put one Synonymous word for another For what is Passage other than a Motion Nor will the successive application of the parts of the Superficies of one Body to those of another which the Cartesians give us prove a much
narrow compass and many of the Philosophers to mention no other as well as Poets Works might be contained in a Nutshell BOOK IV. CHAP. I. Of Knowledge in General SInce the Mind in all its Thoughts and Reasonings has no other immediate Object but its own Ideas which alone it does or can contemplate it is evident that our Knowledge is only conversant about them Knowledge then seems to be nothing but the Perception of the Connexion and Agreement or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas Where this Perception is there is Knowledge and where it is not there thô we fancy guess or believe yet we always come short of Knowledge When we know that White is not Black what do we but perceive that these two Ideas do not agree Or that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Rightones what do we more but perceive that Equality to two Right ones does necessarily agree to and is inseparable from the three Angles of a Triangle But to understand a little more distinctly wherein this Agreement or Disagreement consists we may reduce it all to these Four sorts First Identity or Diversity Secondly Relation Thirdly Co-existence Fourthly Real Existence 1. Identity or Diversity 'T is the first Act of the Mind to perceive its Ideas and so far as it perceives them to know each what it is and thereby to perceive their difference that is the One not to be the Other by this the Mind clearly perceives each Idea to agree with it self and to be what it is and all distinct Ideas to disagree This it does without any pains or deduction by its natural Power of Perception and Distinction This is what Men of Art have reduced to those General Rules viz. What is is And It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be But no Maxime can make a Man know it clearer that Round is not Square than the bare perception of those two Ideas which the Mind at first sight perceives to disagree 2. The next sort of Agreement or Disagreement the Mind perceives in any of its Ideas may be called Relative and is nothing but the Perception of the Relation between any two Ideas of what kind soever that is their Agreement or Disagreement one with another in several ways the Mind takes of comparing them 3. The Third sort of Agreement or Disagreement to be found in our Ideas is Co-existence or Non-coexistence in the same Subject and this belongs particularly to Substances Thus when we pronounce concerning Gold that it is fixed it amounts to no more but this that Fixedness or a power to remain in the Fire unconsumed is an Idea that always accompanies that particular sort of Yellowness Weight Fusibility c. which make our Complex Idea signified by the word Gold 4. The Fourth sort is that of actual and real Existence agreeing to any Idea Within these Four sorts of Agreement or Disagreement I suppose is contained all the Knowledge we have or are capable of For all that we know or can affirm concerning any Idea is that it is or is not the same with some other As that Blue is not Yellow That it does or does not co-exist with another in the same subject As that Iron is susceptible of Magnetical Impressions That it has that or this Relation to some other Ideas As that Two Triangles upon equal Bases between two parallels are equal or that it has a real Existence without the Mind As That God is There are several ways wherein the Mind is possess'd of Truth each of which is called Knowledge First There is Actual Knowledge when the Mind has a present view of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its Ideas or of the Relation they have one with another Secondly A Man is said to know any Proposition when having once evidently perceived the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas whereof it consists and so lodged it in his Memory that whenever it comes to be reflected on again the Mind assents to it without Doubt or Hesitation and is certain of the Truth of it And this may be called Habitual Knowledge And thus a Man may be said to know all those Truths which are lodged in his Memory by a foregoing clear and full Perception Of this there are vulgarly speaking Two Degrees The one is of such Truths laid up in the Memory as whenever they occur to the Mind it actually perceives the Relation that is between those Ideas And this is in all those Truths where the Ideas themselves by an immediate view discover their Agreement or Disagreement one with another The other is of such Truths whereof the Mind having been convinced it retains the Memory of the Conviction without the proofs Thus a Man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the Demonstration that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones is commonly allowed to know it because he cannot doubt of the Truth of it But yet having forgot the Demonstration he rather believes his Memory than knows the thing or rather it is something between Opinion and Knowledge A Sort of Assurance that exceeds bare belief which relies on the Testimony of another and yet comes short of perfect Knowledge CHAP. II. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge ALL our Knowlede consisting in the view the Mind has of its own Ideas which is the utmost Light and greatest Certainty we are capable of The different clearness of our Knowledge seems to lye in the different way of Perception the Mind has of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its Ideas When the Mind perceives this Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves without the Intervention of any other we may call it Intuitive Knowledge in which cases the Mind perceives the Truth as the Eye does Light only by being directed towards it of this sort are that White is not Black that Three are more than Two and equal to One and Two This part of Knowledge is irresistible and like the bright Sun-shine forces it self immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way It is on this Intuition that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of our other Knowledge which Certainty every one finds to be so great that he cannot imagine and therefore not require a greater The next degree of Knowledge is where the Mind perceives not this Agreement or Disagreement immediately or by the Juxta-position as it were of the Ideas because those Ideas concerning whose Agreement or Disagreement the Enquiry is made cannot by the Mind be so put together as to shew it In this case the Mind is sain to discover the Agreement or Disagreement which it searches by the Intervention of other Ideas and this is that which we call Reasoning And thus if we would know the Agreement or Disagreement in bigness between the three Angles of a Triangle and two right Angles we cannot by an immediate view and comparing them
our Sun and the grosser Masses of Matter that visibly move about it What several sorts of Vegetables Animals and Intellectual corporeal Beings infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth may probably be in other Planets to the knowledge of which even of their outward Figures and Parts we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this Earth there being no natural means either by Sensation or Reflection to convey their certain Ideas into our Minds There are other Bodies in the Universe no less concealed from us by their Minuteness These insensible Corpuscles being the active parts of Matter and the great instruments of Nature on which depend all their Secundary Qualities and Operations our want of precise distinct Ideas and their Primary Qualities keeps us in incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them Did we know the Mechanical Affections of Rhubarb or Opium we might as easily account for their Operations of Purging and causing Sleep as a Watch-maker can for the Motions of his Watch. The dissolving of Silver in Aqua fortis or Gold in Aqua Regia and not Vice versâ would be then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a Smith to understand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock and not the turning of another But whilst we are destitute of Senses acute enough to discover the minute Particles of Bodies and to give us Ideas of their Mechanical Affections we must be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations nor can we be assured about them any farther than some few Trials we make are able to reach but whether they will succeed again another time we cannot be certain This hinders our certain Knowledge of Universal Truths concerning Natural Bodies and our Reason carries us herein very little beyond particular Matter of Fact And therefore I am apt to doubt that how far soever Humane Industry may advance useful and Experimental Philosophy in Physical Things yet Scientifical will still be out of our reach because we want perfect and adequate Ideas of those very Bodies which are nearest to us and most under our Command This at first sight shews us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent even of Material Beings to which if we add the Consideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be and probably are which are yet more remote from our Knowledge whereof we have no cognizance we shall find this cause of Ignorance conceal from us in an impenetrable Obscurity almost the whole Intellectual World a greater Certainly and more beautiful World than the material For bating some very few Ideas of Spirit we get from our own Mind by Reflection and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all Spirits the Author of them and us and all Things we have no certain Information so much as of the Existence of other Spirits but by Revelation much less have we distinct Ideas of their different Natures States Powers and several Constitutions wherein they agree or differ one from another and from us And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties we are under an absolute Ignorance The Second cause of Ignorance is the want of discoverable Connexion between those Ideas we have where we want that we are utterly incapable of Universal and Certain Knowledge and are as in the former case left only to Observation and Experiment Thus the Mechanical Affections of Bodies having no affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us we can have no distinct Knowledge of such operations beyond our Experience and can reason no otherwise about them than as the effects or appointment of an Infinitly Wise Agent which perfectly surpass our Comprehensions The operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable How any Thought should produce a Motion in Body is as remote from the nature of our Ideas as how any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind That it is so if Experience did not convince us the consideration of the Things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us In some of our Ideas there are certain Relations Habitudes and Connexions so visibly included in the nature of the Ideas themselves that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any Power whatsoever In these only we are capable of Certain and Universal Knowledge Thus the Ideas of a right lined Triangle necessarily carries with it an Equality of its Angles to two right ones But the coherence and continuity of the Parts of Matter the production of Sensation in us of Colours and Sounds c. by Impulse and Motion being such wherein we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the wise Architect The Things that we observe constantly to proceed regularly we may conclude do act by a Law set them but yet by a Law that we know not whereby thô Causes work steadily and effects constantly flow from them yet their Connexions and Dependencies being not discoverable in our Ideas we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them Several Effects come every day within the notice of our Senses of which we have so far Sensitive Knowledge But the Causes Manner and Certainty of their Production we must for the foregoing reasons be content to be ignorant of In these we can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of Fact and by Analogy guess what Effects the like Bodies are upon other Tryals like to produce But as to perfect Science of Natural Bodies not to mention Spiritual Beings we are I think so far from being capable of any such thing that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it The Third cause of Ignorance is our Want of tracing those Ideas we have or may have and finding out those intermediate Ideas which may shew us what Habitude of Agreement or Disagreement they may have one with another and thus many are ignorant of Mathematical Truths for want of application in enquiring examining and by due ways comparing those Ideas Hitherto we have examined the Extent of our Knowledge in respect of the several sorts of Beings that are There is another Extent of it in respect of Universality which will also deserve to be considered and in this regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our Ideas If the Ideas are Abstract whose Agreement or Disagreement we perceive our Knowledge is Universal For what is known of such general Ideas will be true of every particular thing in which that Essence that is that Abstract Idea is to be found And what is once known of such Ideas will be perpetually and for ever true So that as to all general Knowledge we must search and find it only in our own Minds and it is only the examining of our own Ideas that furnishes us with the Truths belonging to Essences of Things that
must be such and such only as are made up of such Simple ones as have been discovered to co-exist in Nature Wherever then we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas there is Certain Knowledge and wherever we are sure those Ideas agree with the reality of Things there is Certain real Knowledge CHAP V. Of Truth in General TRuth in the proper import of the Word signifies the joyning or separating of Signs as the Things signified by them do Agree or Disagree one with another The joyning or separating of Signs is what we call Propositions so that Truth properly belongs only to Propositions whereof there are Two sorts Mental and Verbal as there are Two sorts of Signs commonly made use of Ideas and Words 'T is difficult to treat of Mental Propositions without Verbal because in speaking of Mental we must make use of Words and then they become Verbal Again Men commonly in their Thoughts and Reasonings use Words instead of Ideas especially if the subject of their Meditation contains in it Complex Ideas If we have occasion to form Mental Propositions about White Black Circle c. we can and often do frame in our Minds the Ideas themselves without reflecting on the Names But when we would consider or make Propositions about the more Complex Ideas as of a Man Vitriol Fortitude Glory c. we usually put the Name for the Idea because the Idea these Names stand for being for the most part confused imperfect and undetermined we reflect on the Names themselves as being more Clear Certain and Distinct and readier to occur to our Thoughts than pure Ideas and so we make use of these Words instead of the Ideas themselves even when we would Meditate and Reason within our selves and make tacit Mental Propositions We must then observe Two sorts of Propositions that we are capable of making First Mental Propositions wherein the Ideas in our Understandings are put together or separated by the Mind perceiving or judging of their Agreement or Disagreement Secondly Verbal Propositions which are Words put together or separated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences So that Proposition consists in joyning or separating Signs and Truth consists in putting together or separating these Signs according as the Things they stand for Agree or Disagree Truth as well as Knowledge may well come under the Distinction of Verbal and Real That being only Verbal Truth wherein Terms are joyned according to the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for without regarding whether our Ideas are such as really have or are capable of having an Existence in Nature But then it is they contain Real Truth when these Signs are joyned as our Ideas agree and when our Ideas are such as we know are capable of having an Existence in Nature which in Substances we cannot know but by knowing that such have Existed Truth is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as it is Falshood is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas otherwise than it is and so far as these Ideas thus marked by Sounds agree to their Archetypes so far only is the Truth Real The knowledge of this Truth consists in knowing what Ideas the Words stand for and the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of those Ideas according as it is marked by those Words Besides Truth taken in the strict Sense before-mentioned there are other sorts of Truths As First Moral Truth which is speaking Things according to the perswasion of our own Minds Secondly Metaphysical Truth which is nothing but the Real Existence of Things conformable to the Ideas to which we have annexed their Names These Considerations of Truth either having been before taken notice of or not being much to our present purpose it may suffice here only to have mentioned them CHAP. VI. Of Universal Propositions their Truth and Certainty THE prevailing Custom of using Sounds for Ideas even when Men think and reason within their own Breasts makes the consideration of Words and Propositions so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one without explaining the other And since General Truths which with Reason are most sought after can never be well made known and are seldom apprehended but as conceived and expressed in Words it is not out of our way in the Examination of our own Knowledge to enquire into the Truth and Certainty of Universal Propositions But it must be observed that Certainty is Twofold Certainty of Truth and Certainty of Knowledge Certainty of Truth is when Words are so put together in Propositions as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for as really it is Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Propositions This we usually call Knowing or being Certain of the Truth of any Proposition Now because we cannot be Certain of the truth of any General Proposition unless we know the precise Bounds and Extent of the Species its Terms stand for it is necessary we should know the Essence of each Species which is that which constitutes and bounds it This in all Simple Ideas and Modes is not hard to do for in these the Real and Nominal Essence be-being the same there can be no doubt how far the Species extends or what Things are comprehended under each Term which it is evident are all that have an exact Conformity with the Idea it stands for and no other But in Substances wherein a Real Essence distinct from the Nominal is supposed to constitute and bound the Species the extent of the general Word is very uncertain because not knowing this Real Essence we cannot know what is or is not of that Species and consequently what may or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it Hence we may see that the Names of Substances when made to stand for Species supposed to be constituted by Real Essences which we know not are not capable of conveying Certainty to the Understanding Of the Truth of General Propositions made up of such Terms we cannot be sure For how can we besure that this or that Quality is in Gold for Instance when we know not what is or is not Gold that is what has or has not the Real Essence of Gold whereof we have no Idea at all On the other side the Names of Substances when made use of for the Complex Ideas Men have in their Minds thô they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them will not yet serve us to make many Universal Propositions of whose Truth we can be certain because the Simple Ideas out of which the Complex are combined carry not with them any discoverable Connexion or Repugnancy but with a very few other Ideas For Instance All Gold is fixed is a Proposition we cannot be certain of how Universally soever it be believed For if we take the Term
Gold to stand for a Real Essence it is evident we know not what particular Substances are of that Species and so cannot with certainty affirm any Thing Universally of Gold But if we make the Term Gold stand for a Species determined by its Nominal Essence be its Complex Idea what it will for Instance A Body Yellow Fusible Malleable and very heavy no Quality can with Certainty be Denyed or Affirmed Universally of it but what has a discoverable Connexion or Inconsistency with that Nominal Essence Fixedness for Instance having no necessary Connexion that we can discover with any Simple Idea that makes the Complex one or with the whole Combination together it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this Proposition All Gold is fixed But is not this an Universal certain Proposition All Gold is Malleable I answer it is so if Malleableness be a part of the Complex Idea the word Gold stands for But then here is nothing affirmed of Gold but that that Sound stands for an Idea in which Malleableness is contained And such a sort of Truth and Certainty it is to say a Centaur is Four-footed I imagine amongst all the Secundary Qualities of Substances and the Powers relating to them there cannot any two be named whose necessary Co-existence or Repugnance to Co-exist can be certainly known unless in those of the same Sense which necessarily exclude one another Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly know what Smell Tast c. any Body is of 'T is no wonder then that Certainty is to be found but in very few general Propositions concerning Substances Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties goes very seldom farther than our Senses reach or inform us Inquisitive and Observing Men may by strength of Judgment penetrate farther and on Probabilities taken from wary Observations and Hints well laid together often guess right at what Experience has not yet discovered to them But this is but guessing still it amounts only to Opinion and has not that certainty which is requisite to Knowledge To conclude general Propositions of what kind soever are then only capable of Certainty when the Terms used in them stand for such Ideas whose Agreement or Disagreement as there expressed is capable to be discovered by us And we are then certain of their Truth or Falshood when we perceive the Ideas they stand for to Agree or not Agree according as they are affirmed or denyed one of another whence we may take notice that general Certainty is never to be found but in our Ideas CHAP. VII Of Maxims THERE are a sort of Propositions which under the Name of Maxims and Axioms have passed for Principles of Science and because they are Self-evident have been supposed Innate It may be worth while to enquire into the reason of their Evidence and examine how far they influence our other Knowledge Knowledge being but the perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas where that Agreement or Disagreement is perceived immediately by it self without the intervention or help of any other there our Knowledge is Self-evident which being so not only Maxims but an infinite number of other Propositions partake equally with them in this Self-evidence For In respect of Identity and Diversity we may have as many Self-evident Propositions as we have distinct Ideas T is the First Act of the Mind to know every one of its Ideas by it self and distinguish it from others Every one finds in himself that he knows the Ideas he has that he knows also when any one is in his Understanding and what it is and that when more than one are there he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another so that all Affirmations or Negations concerning them are made without any possibility of doubt or uncertainty and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood that is as soon as we have in our Minds the Ideas clear and distinct which the Terms in the Proposition stand for Thus a Circle is a Circle Blue is not Red are as Self-evident Propositions as those general ones What is is and 'T is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be nor can the consideration of these Axioms add any thing to the Evidence or Certainty of our Knowledge of them As to the Agreement or Disagreement of Co-existence the Mind has an immediate perception of this but in very few And therefore in this sort we have very little Intuitive Knowledge thô in some few Propositions we have Two Bodies cannot be in the same place I think is a self-evident Proposition The Idea of fitting a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies being annexed to our Idea of Body As to the Relations of Modes Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality as Equals taken from Equals the remainder will be Equal c. which however received for Axioms yet I think have not a clearer Self-Evidence than these that One and One are equal to Two that if from the Five Fingers of one Hand you take Two and from the Five Fingers of the other Hand Two the remaining Numbers will be equal These and a thousand other such Propositions may be found in Numbers which carry with them an equal if not greater clearness than those Mathematical Axioms As to Real Existence since that has no Connexion with any other of our Ideas but that of our Selves and of a First Being we have not so much as a Demonstrative much less a Self-Evident Knowledge concerning the Real Existence of other Beings In the next place let us consider what influence these Maxims have upon the other parts of our Knowledge The Rules established in the Schools That all Reasonings are Ex praecognitis praeconceptis seem to lay the foundation of all other Knowledge in these Maxims and to suppose them to be Praecognita whereby I think is meant Two Things First That these Axioms are those Truths that are first known to the Mind Secondly That upon them the other parts of our Knowledge depend First That these Axioms are not the Truths first known to the Mind is evident from Experience For who knows not that a Child perceives that a Stranger is not its Mother long before he knows that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be And how many Truths are there about Numbers which the Mind is perfectly acquainted with and fully convinced of before it ever thought on these general Maxims Of this the reason is plain for that which makes the Mind assent to such Propositions being nothing but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Disagreement of its Ideas according as it finds them affirmed or denied in Words one of another and every Idea being known to be what it is and every two distinct Ideas not to be the same it must necessarily follow that such Self-evident Truths must be first known which consist of Ideas that are first in the
Mind and the Ideas first in the Mind it is evident are those of particular Things from whence by slow degrees the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense are settled in the Mind with general Names to them Thus particular Ideas are first received and distinguished and so Knowledge got about them and next to them the less general or specifick which are next to particular ones Secondly From what has been said it plainly follows that these magnified Maxims are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge for if there be a great many other Truths as Self-evident as they and a great many that we know before them it is impossible that they should be the Principles from which we deduce all other Truths Thus that One and Two are equal to Three is as evident and easier known then that the Whole is equal to all its parts Nor after the knowledge of this Maxim do we know that One and Two are equal to Three better or more certainly than we did before For if there be any odds in these Ideas the Ideas of Whole and Parts are more obscure or at least more difficult to be setled in the Mind than those of One Two and Three Either therefore all Knowledge does not depend on certain Praecognita or general Maxims called Principles or else such as these That One and One are Two that Two and Two are Four c. and a great part of Numeration will be so To which if we add all the Self-evident Propositions that may be made about all our distinct Ideas Principles will be almost infinite at least innumerable which Men arrive to the knowledge of at different Ages and a great many of those innate Principles they never come to know all their Lives But whether they come in view earlier or later they are all known by their Native Evidence and receive no Light nor are capable of any Proof one from another much less the more particular from the more general or the more simple from the more compounded the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar and the easier and earlier apprehended These general Maxims then are only of use in disputes to stop the Mouths of Wranglers but not of much use to the discovery of unknown Truths or to help the Mind forwards in its search after Knowledge Several general Maxims are no more than bare verbal Propositions and teach us nothing but the respect and import of Names one to another as The whole is equal to all its Parts What real Truth does it teach us more than what the signification of the word Totum or whole does of it self import But yet Mathematicians do not without reason place this and some other such amongst their Maxims that their Scholars having in the Entrance perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with these Propositions made in such general Terms may have them ready to apply to all particular Cases not that if they be equally weighed they are more clear and evident than the particular Instances they are brought to confirm but that being more familiar to the Mind the very naming them is enough to satisfy the Understanding But this I say is more from our Custom of using them than the different Evidence of the Things So that if rightly consider'd I think we may say that where our Ideas are clear and distinct there is little or no use at all of these Maxims to prove the Agreement or Disagreement of any of them He that cannot discern the Truth or falshood of such Propositions without the help of these and the like Maxims will not be helped by these Maxims to do it He that needs any proof to make him certain and give his assent to this Proposition that Two are equal to Two or that White is not Black will also have need of a proof to make him admit that What is is or That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be And as these Maxims are of little use where we have clear and distinct Ideas so they are of dangerous use where our Ideas are confused and where we use words that are not annexed to clear and distinct Ideas but to such as are of a loose and wandring signification sometimes standing for one and sometimes for another Idea from which follows Mistake and Error which these Maxims brought as proofs to establish Propositions wherein the Terms stand for confused and uncertain Ideas do by their Authority confirm and rivet CHAP. VIII Of Trifling Propositions THere are Universal Propositions which thô they be certainly true yet add no Light to our Understandings bring no increase to our Knowledge such are First All Purely Identical Propositions These at first blush appear to contain no Instruction in them for when we affirm the same Term of it self it shews us nothing but what we must certainly know before whether such a Proposition be either made by or proposed to us Secondly Another sort of trifling Propositions is when a part of the Complex Idea is praedicated of the name of the whole a part of the definition of the word defined as Lead is a Metal Man an Animal These carry no Information at all to those who know the Complex Ideas the Names Lead and Man stand for Indeed to a Man that knows the signification of the word Metal and not of the word Lead it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word Lead by saying it is a Metal than by enumerating the Simple Ideas one by one which make up the Complex Idea of Metal Alike trifling it is to predicate any one of the Simple Ideas of a Complex one of the name of the whole Complex Idea as All Gold is fusible for fusibility being one of the Simple Ideas that goes to the making up the Complex one the Sound Gold stands for what can it be but playing with Sounds to affirm that of the name Gold which is comprehended in its received signification What instruction can it carry to tell one that which he is supposed to know before For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me or else he is to tell me The general Propositions that are made about Substances if they are certain are for the most part but Trifling And if they are Instructive are Uncertain and such as we have no knowledge of their real Truth how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in Guessing Hence it comes to pass that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Discourses that amount yet to nothing For names of Substantial Beings as well as others having setled Significations affixed to them may with great Truth be joyned Negatively and Affirmatively in Propositions as their Definitions make them fit to be so joyned and Propositions consisting of such Terms may with the same clearness be deduced one from
we shall find that the great Advancement and Certainty of Real Knowledge Men arrived to in these Sciences was not owing to the influence of these Principles but to the clear distinct and compleat Ideas their Thoughts were employed about and the relation of Equality and Excess so clear between some of them that they had a Intuitive Knowledge and by that a way to discover it in others and this without the help of those Maxims For I ask Is it not possible for a Lad to know that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger but by virtue of this Axiom The Whole is bigger than the Part nor be assured of it till he has learned that Maxim Let any one consider from what has been elsewhere said which is known first and clearest by most People the particular Instance or the general Rule and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other These general Rules are but the comparing our more general and Abstract Ideas which Ideas are made by the Mind and have Names given them for the easier dispatch in its reasonings But Knowledge began in the Mind and was founded on Particulars thô afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof It being natural for the Mind to lay up those general Notions and make the proper use of them which is to disburthen the Memory of the cumbersome load of Particulars The way to improve in Knowledge is not to swallow Principles with an implicite Faith and without examination which would be apt to mislead Men instead of guiding them into Truth but to get and fix in our Minds clear and complete Ideas as far as they are to be had and annex to them proper and constant Names and thus barely by considering our Ideas and comparing them together observing their Agreement or Disagreement their Habitudes and Relations we shall get more true and clear Knowledge by the conduct of this one Rule than by taking up Principles and thereby putting our Minds into the Disposal of others We must therefore if we will proceed as Reason advises adapt our methods of Enquiry to the nature of the Ideas we examine and the truth we search after General and Certain Truths are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of Abstract Ideas Therefore a Sagacious Methodical Application of our Thoughts for the finding out these Relations is the only way to discover all that can with Truth and Certainty be put into general Propositions By what steps we are to proceed in these is to be Learned in the Schools of the Mathematicians who from every plain and easie beginnings by gentle Degrees and a continued chain of Reasonings proceed to the Discovery and Demonstration of Truths that appear at first sight beyond Humane Capacity This I think I may say that if other Ideas that are Real as well as Nominal Essences of their Species were pursued in the way familiar to Mathematicians they would carry our Thoughts farther and with greater Evidence and Clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture which I suggest Chapter the Third viz. that Morality is capable of Demonstration as well as Mathematicks for Moral Ideas being real Essences that have a discoverable Connexion and Agreement one with another so far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations so far we shall be possessed of Real and General Truths In our knowledge of Substances we are to proceed after a quite different Method the bare Contemplation of their Abstract Ideas which are but Nominal Essences will carry us but a very little way in the search of Truth and Certainty Here Experience must teach us what Reason cannot and it is by trying alone that we can certainly know what other Qualities co-exist with those of our Complex Idea for Instance Whether that Yellow heavy fusible Body I call Gold be Malleable or no which Experience however it prove in that particular Body we examine makes us not certain that it is so in all or any other Yellow Heavy Fusible Bodies but that which we have tried because it is no consequence one way or the other from our Complex Idea The necessity or inconsistence of Malleability hath no visible Connexion with the combination of that Colour Weight and Fusibility in any Body What I have here said of the Nominal Essence of Gold supposed to consist of a Body of such a determinate Colour Weight and Fusibility will hold true if other Qualities be added to it Our Reasonings from those Ideas will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other Properties in those masses of Matter wherein all those are to be found As far as our Experience reaches we may have certain Knowledge and no farther I deny not but a Man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments shall be able to see farther into the nature of Bodies and their unknown Properties than one that is a stranger to them But this is but Judgment and Opinion not Knowledge and Certainty This makes me suspect that Natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science From Experiments and Historical Observations we may draw advantages of Ease and Health and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life but beyond this I fear our Talents reach not nor are our Faculties as I guess able to advance From whence it is obvious to conclude That since our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate the Real Essences of Bodies but yet plainly to discover to us the Being of a God and the Knowledge of our Selves enough to give us a clear discovery of our Duty and great Concernment it will become us as Rational Creatures to employ our Faculties about what they are most adapted to and follow the direction of Nature where it seems to point us out the way For it is rational to conclude that our proper Employment lies in those Enquiries and that sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities and carries in it our greatest Interest that is the condition of our Eternal State And therefore it is I think that Morality is the proper Science and Business of Mankind in general who are both concerned and fitted to search out their Summum Bonum as several Arts conversant about the several parts of Nature are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men for the common use of Humane Life and their own particular Subsistance in this World The ways to enlarge our Knowledge as far as we are capable seem to me to be these Two The First is to get and settle in our Minds as far as we can clear distinct and constant Ideas of those Things we would consider and know For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas where they are either imperfect confused or obscure we cannot expect to have certain perfect or clear Knowledge The other is the Art of finding out the intermediate Ideas which may shew us the Agreement or
Repugnancy of other Ideas which cannot be immediately compared That these Two and not the relying on Maxims and drawing Consequences from some general Propositions are the right method of improving our Knowledge in the Ideas of other Modes besides those of Quantity the consideration of Mathematical Knowledge will easily inform us Where First We shall find that he that has not clear and perfect Ideas of those Angles or Figures of which he desires to know any thing is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them Suppose a Man not to have an exact Idea of a Right Angle Scalenum or Trapezium and it is clear that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them And farther it is evident that it was not the influence of Maxims or Principles that hath led the Masters of this Science into those wonderful Discoveries they have made Let a Man of good Parts know all the Maxims of Mathematicks never so well and contemplate their Extent and Consequences as much as he pleases he will by their assistance I suppose scarce ever come to know that the Square of the Hypotenuse in a Right Angl'd Triangle is equal to the Squares of the Two other sides This and other Mathematical Truths have been discovered by the Thoughts otherwise applied The Mind had other Objects other views before it far different from those Maxims which Men well enough acquainted with those received Axioms but ignorant of their method who first made these Demonstrations can never sufficiently admire CHAP. XIII Some farther Considerations concerning Knowledge OUR Knowledge as in other things so in this has a great conformity with our Sight that it is neither wholly Necessary nor wholly Voluntary Men that have Senses cannot chuse but receive some Ideas by them and if they have Memory they cannot but retain some of them and if they have any distinguishing Faculty cannot but perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of some of them one with another As he that has Eyes if he will open them by day cannot but see some Objects and perceive a difference in them yet he may chuse whether he will turn his Eyes towards an Object curiously survey it and observe accurately all that is visible in it But what he does see he cannot see otherwise than he does it depends not on his Will to see that Black which appears Yellow Just thus it is with our Understanding All that is voluntary in our Knowledge is the employing or with-holding any of our Faculties from this or that sort of Objects and a more or less accurate Survey of them But they being employed our Will hath no power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind one way or other That is done only by the Objects themselves as far as they are clearly discovered Thus he that has got the Ideas of Numbers and hath taken the pains to compare One Two and Three to Six cannot chuse but know that they are equal He also that hath the Idea of an Intelligent but weak and frail Being made by and depending on another who is Eternal Omnipotent perfectly Wise and Good will as certainly know that Man is to Honour Fear and Obey God as that the Sun shines when he sees it But yet these Truths being never so certain never so clear he may be ignorant of either or both of them who will not take the pains to employ his Faculties as he should to inform himself about them CHAP. XIV Of Judgment THE Understanding Faculties being given to Man not barely for Speculation but also for the conduct of his Life A Man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true Knowledge he that will not Eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him nor Stir till he is infallibly assured of Success in his Business will have little else to do but Sit still and perish Therefore as God has set some things in broad Day-light as he has given us some certain Knowledge thô limited to a few Things in comparison probably as a Taste of what Intellectual Creatures are capable of to excite in us a Desire and Endeavour after a better State so in the greatest part of our concernment he has afforded us only the Twilight as I may so say of Probability suitable to that state of Mediocrity and Probationership he has been pleased to place us in here The Faculty which God has given Man to enlighten him next to certain Knowledge is Judgment whereby the Mind takes its Ideas to Agree or Disagree without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs The Mind exercises this Judgment sometimes out of necessity where demonstrative Proofs and certain Knowledge are not to be had and sometimes out of Laziness Unskilfulness or Haste even where they are to be had This Faculty of the Mind when it is exercised immediately about Things is called Judgment when about Truths delivered in Words is most commonly called Assent or Dissent Thus the Mind has Two Faculties conversant about Truth and Falshood First Knowledge whereby it certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas Secondly Judgment which is the putting Ideas together or separating them from one another in the Mind when their certain Agreement or Disagreement is not perceived but presumed to be so And if it so unites or separates them as in Reality Things are it is right Judgment CHAP. XV. Of Probability PRobability is nothing but the appearance of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas by the intervention of Proofs whose connexion is not constant and immutable or is not perceived to be so but is or appears for the most part to be so and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to be true or false rather than the contrary Of Probability there are Degrees from the neighborhood of Certainty and Demonstration quite down to Improbability and Unlikeliness even to the confines of Impossibility And also degrees of Assent from certain Knowledge and what is next it full Assurance and Confidence quite down to conjecture Doubt Distrust and Disbelief That Proposition then is Probable for which there are Arguments or Proofs to make it pass or be received for True The Entertainment the Mind gives to this sort of Propositions is called Belief Assent or Opinion Probability then being to supply the defect of our Knowledge is always conversant about a Thing whereof we have no Certainty but only some Inducements to receive it for true The Grounds of it are in short these Two following First The Conformity of any thing with our own Knowledge Experience or Observation Secondly The Testimony of others vouching their Observation and Experience In the Testimony of others is to be considered First The Number Secondly The Integrity Thirdly The Skill of the Witnesses Fourthly The Design of the Author if it be a Testimony cited out of a Book Fifthly The consistency of the Parts and Circumstances
of the Relation Sixthly Contrary Testimonies The Mind before it rationally Assents or Dissents to any probable Proposition ought to examine all the Grounds of Probality and see how they make more or less for or against it and upon a due balancing of the whole reject or receive it with a more or less firm Assent according to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability on one side or the other CHAP. XVI Of the Degrees of Assent THE Grounds of Probability laid down in the foregoing Chapter as they are the foundations on which our Assent is built so are they also the measure whereby its several Degrees are or ought to be regulated Only we are to take notice that no grounds of Probability operate any farther on the Mind which searches after Truth and endeavours to judge right than they appear at least in the first Judgment or Search that the Mind makes It is indeed in many cases impossible and in most very hard even for those who have admirable Memories to retain all the proofs which upon a due Examination made them embrace that side of the Question It suffices that they have once with Care and Fairness sifted the matter as far as they could and having once found on which side the Probability appeared to them they lay up the Conclusion in their Memories as a Truth they have discovered and for the future remain satisfied with the testimony of their Memories that this is the Opinion that by the proofs they have once seen of it deserves such a Degree of their Assent as they assord it It is unavoidable then that the Memory be relied on in this case and that Men be perswaded of several Opinions whereof the proofs are not actually in their Thoughts nay which perhaps they are not able actually to recall without this the greatest part of Men must be either Scepticks or change every Moment when any one offers them Arguments which for want of Memory they are not presently able to Answer It must be owned that Men's sticking to past Judgments is often the cause of a great Obstinacy in error and mistake But the fault is not that they relye on their Memories for what they have before well judged but because they judged before they had well examined Who almost is there that hath the Leisure Patience and Means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the Opinions he has so as safely to conclude that he has a clear and full view and that there is no more to be alledged for his better information and yet we are forced to determine our selves on one fide or other The conduct of our Lives and the management of our great Concerns will not bear delay For those depend for the most part on the determination of our Judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain Knowledge and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace one side or the other The Propositions we receive upon Inducements of Probability are of Two sorts First Concerning some particular Existence or matter of Fact which falling under Observation is capable of Humane Testimony Secondly Concerning Things which being beyond the discovery of our Senses are not capable of Humane Testimony Concerning the First of these viz. Particular matter of Faâ—t First Where any particular Thing consonant to the constant Observation of our selves and others in the like case comes attested with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it we receive it as easily and build as firmly upon it as if it were certain Knowledge Thus if all Englishmen who have occasion to mention it should report that it Froze in England last Winter or the like I think a Man would as little doubt of it as that Seven and four are eleven The First and highest Degree of Probability then is when the general consent of all Men in all Ages as far as can be known concurs with a Man 's own constant Experience in the like cases to confirm the Truth of any particular matter of Fact attested by fair Witnesses Such are the stated Constitutions and Properties of Bodies and the regular proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary course of Nature this we call an Argument from the nature of Things themselves For what we and others always observe to be after the same manner we conclude with Reason to be the Effects of steddy and regular Causes thô they come not within the reach of our Knowledge As that Fire warmed a Man or made Lead fluid that Iron sunk in Water swam in Quick-silver A Relation affirming any such thing to have been or a Predication that it will happen again in the same manner is received without doubt or hesitation and our Belief thus grounded rises to Assurance Secondly The next degree of Probability is when by my own Experience and the Agreement of all others that mention it a Thing is found to be for the most part so and that the particular Instance of it is attested by many and undoubted Witnesses Thus History giving us such an account of Men in all Ages and my own Experience confirming it that most Men prefer their own private Advantage to the Publick If all Historians that write of Tiberius say that he did so it is extreamly probable And in this case our Assent rises to a Degree which we may call Confidence Thirdly In matters happening indifferently as that a Bird should fly this or that way when any particular matter of Fact comes attested by the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses there our Assent is also unavoidable Thus that there is in Italy such a City as Rome that about One thousand and seven hundred Years ago there lived such a Man in it as Julius Caesar c. A Man can as little doubt of this and the like as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance whereof he himself is a witness Probability on these grounds carries so much Evidence with it that it leaves us as little liberty to Believe or Disbelieve as Demonstration does whether we will know or be ignorant But the difficulty is when Testimonies contradict common Experience and the Reports of Witnesses clash with the ordinary course of Nature or with one another Here Diligence Attention and Exactness is required to form a Right Judgment and to proportion the Assent to the Evidence and Probability of the Thing which rises and falls according as the two Foundations of Credibility Favour or contradict it These are liable to such variety of contrary Observations Circumstances Reports Tempers Designs Over sights c. of Reporters that it is impossible to reduce to precise Rules the various Degrees wherein Men give their Assent This in general may be said That as the Proofs upon due Examination shall to any one appear in a greater or less Degree to Preponderate on either side so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such different Entertainments as are called Belief Conjecture Guess
Doubt Wavering Distrust Disbelief c. It is a Rule generally approved that any Testimony the farther off it is removed from the Original Truth the less Force it has and in Traditional Truths each Remove weakens the force of the Proof There is a Rule quite contrary to this advanced by some Men who look Opinions to gain Force by growing Older Upon this ground Propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning come by an inverted Rule of Probability to pass for Authentick Truths and those which deserved little Credit from the Mouths of their first Relators are thought to grow venerable by Age and are urged as undeniable But certain it is that no Probability can rise above its First Original What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of one Witness must stand or fall by his only Testimony thô afterwards cited by Hundreds of others and is so far from receiving any Strength thereby that it becomes the weaker Because Passion Interest Inadvertency Mistake of his Meaning and a thousand odd Reasons or Caprichois Mens Minds are acted by may make one Man quote another's Words or Meaning wrong This is certain that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight grounds can never after come to be more valid in future Ages by being often repeated The Second sort of Probability is concerning Things not falling under the reach of our Senses and therefore not capable of Testimony And such are First The Existence Nature and Operations of Finite Immaterial Beings without us as Spirits Angels c. or the Existence of material Beings such as for their smallness or remoteness our Senses cannot take notice of As whether there be any Plants Animals c. in the Planets and other Mansions of the vast Universe Secondly Concerning the manner of Operation in most parts of the works of Nature wherein thô we see the sensible Effects yet their Causes are unknown and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced We see Animals are generated nourished and move the Loadstone draws Iron c. but the Causes that operate and the manner they are produced in we can only guess and probably conjecture In these matters Analogy is the only help we have and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of Probability Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon one another produces Heat and very often Fire we have reason to think that what we call Heat and Fire consists in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter This sort of Probability which is the best conduct of rational Experiments and the rise of Hypotheses has also its use and influence And a wary reasoning from Analogy leads us often into the discovery of Truths and useful Deductions which would otherwise lie concealed Thô the common Experience and the ordinary course of Things have a mighty influence on the Minds of Men to make them give or refuse Credit to any thing proposed to their Belief yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the Fact lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it For where such supernatural Events are suitable to Ends aimed at by him who has the power to change the course of Nature there under such Circumstances they may be the fitter to procure Belief by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary Observation This is the proper case of Miracles which well attested do not only find Credit themselves but give it also to other Truths There are Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our Assent upon bare Testimony whether the Thing proposed Agree or Disagree with common Experience and the ordinary course of Things or no The reason whereof is because the Testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived and that is God himself This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt Evidence beyond Exception This is called by a peculiar Name Revelation and our Assent to it Faith which has as much Certainty in it as our Knowledge it self and we may as well doubt of our own Being as we can whether any Revelation from God be True So that Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation only we must be sure that it be a Divine Revelation and that we understand it right else we shall expose our selves to all the extravagancy of Enthusiasm and all the error of wrong Principles if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not Divine Revelation CHAP. XVII Of Reason THE word Reason in English has different Significations Sometimes it is taken for True and Clear Principles Sometimes for Clear and Fair Deductions from those Principles Sometimes for the Cause and particularly for the Final Cause but the Consideration I shall have of it here is as it stands for a Faculty whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from Beasts and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them Reason is necessary both for the enlargement of our Knowledge and regulating our Assent for it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion and is necessary and assisting to all our other Intellectual Faculties and indeed contains Two of them viz. First Sagacity whereby it finds intermediate Ideas Secondly Illation whereby it so orders and disposes of them as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the Chain whereby the Extremes are held together and thereby as it were to draw into view the Truth sought for which is that we call Illation or Inference and consists in nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the Ideas in each step of the Deduction whereby the Mind comes to see either the Certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas as in Demonstration in which it arrives at Knowledge or their probable Connexion on which it gives or with-holds its Assent as in Opinion Sense and Intuition reach but a little way the greatest part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate Ideas In those Cases where we must take Propositions for true without being certain of their being so we have need to find out examine and compare the grounds of their Probability In both Cases the Faculty which finds out the Means and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one and Probability in the other is that which we call Reason So that in reason we may consider these Four Degrees First The discovering and finding out of Proofs Secondly The regular and methodical Disposition of them and laying them in such order as their Connexion may be plainly perceived Thirdly The perceiving their Connexion Fourthly The making a right Conclusion There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning Reason and that is whether Syllogism as is generally thought be the proper instrument of it ant the usefullest way of exercising this Faculty The Causes I have to doubt of
urged or assented to as a matter of Faith wherein Reason has nothing to do Whatsoever is Divine Revelation ought to over-rule all our Opinions Prejudices and Interests and hath a right to be received with a full Assent Such a submission as this of our Reason to Faith takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge this shakes not the foundations of Reason but leaves us that use of our Faculties for which they were given us CHAP. XIX Of wrong Assent or Error ERROR is a mistake of our Judgment giving Assent to that which is not true The Reasons whereof may be reduced to these Four First Want of Proofs Secondly Want of Ability to use them Thirdly Want of Will to use them Fourthly Wrong measures of Probability First Want of Proofs by which I do not mean only the want of those Proofs which are not to be had but also of those Proofs which are in being or might be procured The greatest part of Mankind want the Conveniencies and Opportunities of making Experiments and Observations themselves or of collecting the Testimonies of others being enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition whose Lives are worn out only in the provisions for living These Men are by the constitution of Humane Affairs unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs on which others build and which are necessary to establish those Opinions For having much to do to get the means of living they are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries It is true that God has furnished Men with Faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take if they will but seriously employ them that way when their ordinary Vocations allow them leisure No Man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living as to have no spare time at all to think on his Soul and inform himself in matters of Religion were Men as intent on this as they are on Things of lower concernment There are none so enslaved to the necessity of Life who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their Knowledge Secondly Want of Ability to use them There be many who cannot carry a Train of Consequences in their Heads nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Testimonies These cannot discern that side on which the strongest Proofs lie nor follow that which in it self is the most probable Opinion It is certain that there is a wide difference in Mens Understandings Apprehensions and Reasonings to a very great Latitude so that one may without doing injury to Mankind affirm that there is a greater distance between some Men and others in this respect than between some Men and some Beasts But how this comes about is a speculation thô of great consequence yet not necessary to our present purpose Thirdly For want of Will to use them Some thô they have opportunities and leisure enough and want neither Parts nor Learning nor other Helps are yet never the better for them and never come to the knowledge of several Truths that lie within their reach either upon the account of their hot pursuit of Pleasure constant Drudgery in Business Laziness and Oscitancy in general or a particular aversion for Books and Study and some out of Fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour those Opinions which best suit their Prejudices Lives Designs Interests c. as many Men forbear to cast up their Accounts who have reason to fear that their Affairs are in no very good posture How Men whose plentiful Fortunes allow them leisure to improve their Understandings can satisfie themselves with a lazy Ignorance I cannot tell But methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of Knowledge I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for Men that ever think of a future state and their concernment in it which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes nor shall I take notice what a shame it is to the greatest Contemâ—ers of Knowledge to be found ignorant in Things they are concerned to know But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call themselves Gentlemen that however they may think Credit Respect and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune yet they will find all these still carried away from them by Men of lower condition who surpass them in Knowledge They who are blind will always be led by those that see or else fall into the Ditch and he is certainly the most subjected the most enslaved who is so in his Understanding Fourthly Wrong measures of Probability which are First Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident but doubtful and false taken for Principles Propositions looked on as Principles have so great an influence upon our Opinions that it is usually by them we judge of Truth and what is inconsistent with them is so far from passing for Probable with us that it will not be allowed Possible The reverence born to these Principles is so great that the Testimony nor only of other Men but the Evidence of our own Senses are often rejected when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established Rules The great obstinacy that is to be found in Men firmly believing quite contrary Opinions thô many times equally absurd in the various Religions of Mankind are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional Principles so that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes renounce the Evidence of their Senses and give their own Experience the Lye rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these Sacred Tenents Secondly Received Hypotheses The difference between these and the former is that those who proceed by these will admit of matter of Fact and agree with Dissenters in that but differ in assigning of Reasons and explaining the manner of Operation These are not at that open defiance with their Senses as the former they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently but will by no means admit of their Reports in the explanation of Things nor be prevailed on by Probabilities which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are Thirdly Predominant Passions or Inclinations Let never so much Probability hang on one side of a Covetous Man's Reasoning and Monâ—y on the other it is easie to foresee which will prevail Thô Men cannot always openly gain-say or resist the force of manifest Probabilities that make against them yet yield they not to the Argument Not but that it is the nature of the Understanding constantly to close with the more probable side but yet a Man hath power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries and not permit a full and satisfactory
Examination Until that be done there will be always these Two ways left of evading the most apparent Probabilities First That the Arguments being brought in Words there may be a fallacy latent in them and the consequences being perhaps many in train may be some of them incoherent There are few Discourses so short and clear to which Men may not with satisfaction enough to themselves raise this Doubt and from whose Conviction they may not without reproach of Disingenuity or Unreasonableness set themselves free Secondly Manifest Probabilities may be evaded upon this Suggestion that I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side and therefore thô a Man be beaten it is not necessary he should yield not knowing what Forces there are in reserve behind Fourthly Authority or the giving up our Assent to the common received Opinions either of our Friends or Party Neighbourhood or Country How many Men have no other ground for their Tenents than the supposed Honesty or Learning or Number of those of the same Profession As if Honest or Bookish Men could not err or Truth were to be established by the Vote of the Multitude Yet this with most Men serves the turn All Men are liable to Error and most Men are in many points by Passion or Interest under temptation to it This is certain that there is not an Opinion so absurd which a Man may not receive upon this ground There is no Error to be named which has not had its Professors And a Man shall never want crooked paths to walk in if he thinks that he is in the right way wherever he has the Footsteps of others to follow But notwithstanding the great noise is made in the World about Errors and Opinions I must do Mankind that right as to say there are not so many Men in Errors and wrong Opinions as is commonly supposed not that I think they embrace the Truth but indeed because concerning those Doctrines they keep such a stirr about they have no Thought no Opinion at all For if any one should a little Catechize the greatest part of the Partisans of most of the Sects in the World he would not find concerning those matters they are so zealous for that they have any Opinions of their own Much less would he have reason to think that they took them upon the examination of Arguments and appearance of Probability They are resolved to stick to a Party that Education or Interest has engaged them in and there like the common Soldiers of an Army shew their Courage and Warmth as their Leaders direct without ever examining or so much as knowing the Cause they contend for CHAP. XX. Of the Division of the Sciences ALL that can fall within the compass of Humane Understanding being either First The Nature of Things their Relations and their manner of Operation Or Secondly That which Man himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary Agent for the attainment of any End especially Happiness Or Thirdly The ways and means whereby the Knowledge of both of these are attained and communicated I think Science may be properly divided into these Three Sorts First The Knowledge of Things Their Constitutions Properties and Operations whether Material or Immaterial This in a littâ—e more enlarged Sense of the Word I call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Natural Philosophy The end of this is bare Speculative Truth and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such falls under this branch whether it be God himself Angels Spirits Bodies or any of their Affections as Number Figure c. Secondly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The skill of Right applying our own Powers and Actions for the attainment of Things good and useful The most considerable under this head is Ethicks which is the seeking out those Rules and Measures of humane Actions which lead to Happiness and the means to practise them The end of this is not bare Speculation but Right and a Conduct suitable thereto Thirdly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Or the Doctrine of Signs the most usual being Words it is aptly enough termed Logick The Business whereof is to consider the nature of Signs which the Mind makes use of for the Understanding of Things or conveying its Knowledge to others Things are represented to the Mind by Ideas and Mens Ideas are communicated to one another by Articulate Sounds or Words The Consideration then of Ideas and Words as the great Instruments of Knowledge makes no despicable part of their Contemplation who would take a view of Humane Knowledge in the whole Extent of it This seems to me the First and most general as well as natural Division of the Objects of our Understanding For a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing but either the Contemplation of Things themselves for the discovery of Truth or about the Things in his own Power which are his Actions for the attainment of his own Ends or the Signs the Mind makes use of both in the one and the other and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information All which Three viz. Things as they are in themselves Knowable Actions as they depend on us in order to Happiness and the right use of Signs in order to Knowledge being Toto Coelo different they seemed to me to be the Three great Provinces of the Intellectual World wholly separate and distinct one from another FINIS THE CONTENTS OF THE Second BOOK THe Introduction Page 1 Chap. I. Of Ideas in General and their Original 7 Chap. II. Of Simple Ideas 13 Chap. III. Of Ideas of one Sense 14 Chap. IV. Of Solidity 15 Chap. 5. Of Simple Ideas of divers Senses 18 Chap. 6. Of Simple Ideas of Reflection 19 Chap. 7. Of Simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection 19 Chap. 8. Some farther Considerations concerning Simple Ideas 24 Chap. 9. Of Perception 31 Chap. 10. Of Retention 34 Chap. 11. Of Discerning and other Operations of the Mind 37 Chap. 12. Of Complex Ideas 41 Chap. 13. Of Simple Modes and first of the Simple Modes of Space 44 Chap. 14. Of Duration and its Simple Modes 47 Chap. 15. Of Duration and Expansion considered together 51 Chap. 16. Of Numbers 53 Chap. 17. Of Infinity 54 Chap. 18. Of other Simple Modes 58 Chap. 19. Of the Modes of Thinking 59 Chap. 20. The Modes of Pleasure and Pain 61 Chap. 21. Of Power 64 Chap. 22. Of Mixed Modes 71 Chap. 23. Of our Complex Ideas of Substances 77 Chap. 24. Of Collective Ideas of Substances 83 Chap. 25. Of Relation 84 Chap. 26. Of Cause and Effect and other Relations 86 Chap. 27. Of Identity and Diversity 89 Chap. 28. Of other Relations 97 Chap. 29. Of Clear Obscure Distinct and confused Ideas 104 Chap. 30. Of Real and Fantastical Ideas 108 Chap. 31. Of Ideas Adequate or Inadequate 110 Chap. 32. Of True and False Ideas 114 THE CONTENTS OF THE Third BOOK Chap. 1. OF Words or Language in General Page 121 Chap. 2. Of the Signification of Words 124 Chap. 3. Of General Terms 128 Chap. 4 Of the Names of Simple Ideas 137 Chap. 5. Of the Names of Mixed Modes and Relations 141 Chap. 6. Of the Names of Substances 145 Chap. 7. Of Particles 153 Chap. 8. Of Abstract and Concrete Terms 156 Chap. 9. Of the Imperfection of Words 158 Chap. 10. Of the Abuse of Words 163 Chap. 11. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses 174 THE CONTENTS OF THE Fourth BOOK Chap. 1. OF Knowledge in General Page 180 Chap. 2. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge 185 Chap. 3. Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge 194 Chap. 4. Of the Reality of our Knowledge 213 Chap. 5. Of Truth in General 220 Chap. 6. Of Universal Propositions their Truth and Certainty 223 Chap. 7. Of Maxims 229 Chap. 8. Of Trifling Propositions 237 Chap. 9. Of our Knowledge of Existence 241 Chap. 10. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God 243 Chap. 11. Of our Knowledge of the Existence other Things 250 Chap. 12. Of the Improvement of our Knowledge 258 Chap. 13. Some farther Considerations concerning Knowledge 267 Chap. 14. Of Judgment 269 Chap. 15. Of Probability 271 Chap. 16. Of the Degrees of Assent 273 Chap. 17. Of Reason 283 Chap. 18. Of Faith and Reason and their distinct Provinces 292 Chap. 19. Of wrong Assent or Error 299 Chap. 20. Of the Division of the Sciences 308 Books Printed for and Sold by A. and J. Churchill at the Black Swan in Pater-noster-Row A View of Universal History from the Creation to the Year of Christ 1695. By Francis Tallents sometime Fellow of Magdalen Colledge Cambridge The whole Graven in 16 Copper-Plates each 15 Inches deep and 12 broad bound up into Books the Sheets lined Price 16s The General Hist of the Air. By R. Boyl Esq 4to A Compleat Journal of the Votes Speeches and Debates both of the House of Lords and Commons throughout the whole Reign of Queen Elizabeth Collected by Sir Simonds Dewes Baronet and Published by Paul Bowes of the Middle Temple Esq The 2d Edit Fol. The Works of the Famous Nith Machiavel Citizen and Secretary of Florence Written Originally in Italian and from thence faithfully Translated into Eng. Fol. Mr. Lock 's Essay concerning Humane Understanding The 3d Edition with large Additions Fol. His Thoughts of Education Octav. Two Treatises of Government The First an Answer to Filmer's Patriarcha The Later an Essay concerning the true Original Extent and End of Civil Government Octav. The Resurrection of the same Body asserted from the Tradition of the Heathens the Ancient Jews and the Primitive Church With an Answer to the Objections brought against it By Humphry Hody D. D. Considerations about lowering the Interest and raising the Value of Money Oct. 3d Par. By Mr. Lock Two Treatises of Natural Religion Octav. Gentleman's Religion with the Grounds and Reasons of it Sermons Preached by Dr. R. Leighton late Arch-Bishop of Glasgow The Second Edi. Oct The Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures Octav. Prince Arthur an Heroick Poem In Ten Books By R. Blackmore M. D. Fellow of the Colledge of Physicians London Fol.