which the most general Terms are affirmed by Terms which are so less as when we affirm the Genera of Species or of the Individuals 2. When two abstract Ideas are affirmed by one another the Proposition includeth no real truth but only regards the signification of Words If all these ridiculous Propositions were banished from discourse the way to come at some knowledge would be much less entangled with disputes than it is 9. Universal Propositions which include a truth or a certain falshood concern the Essences only The knowledge of Existence extendeth not it self beyond particular Beings It is visible we have a knowledg of simple view of our Existence and that nothing can be more evident 10. There is a Demonstration of the Existence of God that we may find without being obliged to go out of our selves to seek proofs 1. Although God hath given us no Idea of himself which is innate tho he hath not imprinted in our Souls any original Characters that may make us read his Existence having given to our Minds the faculties they have yet he hath not left himself without Testimony seeing we have Senses Intellect and Reason which cannot want Proofs of his Existence whilst we subsist We cannot justly complain of our ignorance in this regard seeing he hath furnished us so abundantly with means whereby to know him as much as it is necessary for the end for which we exist and for our Felicity which is the greatest of all our interests But tho the Existence of God be a truth the most easie to be discovered by Reason yet his own evidence is equal if I am not mistaken to that of Mathematical Demonstration nevertheless it requireth attention and the Mind must apply it self to draw it from some uncontestable part of our knowledge by a regular deduction Otherwise we should be in as great an uncertainty and in as great an ignorance in respect to this truth as in respect to the other Propositions which may evidently be Demonstrated To shew that we are capable to know and to know with certainty that there is God and to shew how we come to this knowledg I believe we only need to reflect upon our selves and upon the undoubted knowledg we have of our own Existence 2. I believe it is Uncontestable that Man knoweth certainly that he Existeth and that he is something If there be any that can doubt thereof I declare it 's not to him that I speak no more than I should be willing to dispute against pure Nought and to undertake to convince a Non-Being to be something 3. Besides Man knoweth by a knowledge of simple view that pure Nought can no more produce a real Being than the same Nought can be equal to two strait Angles If there by any that know that Non-Being or absence of every Being cannot be equal to two strait Angles its impossible he should conceive any of Euclides Demonstrations If we know that some real Being Existeth and that Non-Being can produce nothing it s by a Mathematical evidence that there is something from all Eternity seeing that which is not of all Eternity hath a beginning and that every thing that has a beginning hath been produced by some other thing 4. It is by the same evidence that every Being which draweth its Existence and its beginning from another deriveth also from another all that it hath and all that belongeth to it We ought to know that all these Faculties draw their Origine from some place Therefore the Eternal Source of all the Beings must also be the Source and Principle of all their Powers or Faculties so that this Being must be Almighty 5. Besides this Man findeth in himself some perception and knowledg We may therefore yet advance from one degree and assure our selves not only that some Being exists but that there is in the World some intelligent Being 6. There hath then been a time in which there was no intelligent Being and in which Knowledg hath begun to exist or there also hath been an intelligent being from all Eternity If 't is said there hath been a time in which No Being had knowledg and in which the eternal Being was destitute of intelligence I reply that it is then impossible that any knowledg should ever have existed For it s as impossible that a thing absolutely destitute of knowledg and which blindly acteth without any perception should produce an intelligent Being as its impossible that a Triangle should make for it self three Angles that should be bigger than two strait ones It is so contrary to the Idea of a matter without sense that it should produce to it self sense perception and knowledg as it is contrary to the Idea of a Triangle that it should make to it self Angles which should be bigger than two strait ones 7. Therefore by the consideration of our selves and of what we infallibly find in our Nature Reason leadeth us to the knowledg of this certain and evident Truth that there is an Eternal Being most powerful and most intelligent what name soever we give it whether we call God or otherwise there is nothing more evident and in considering well this Idea 't will be easy thence to draw all the Attributes that we ought to acknowledg in this Eternal Being It seemeth clear to me by what I have said that we have a knowledg more certain of the Existence of a God than of any thing else whatever that our Senses have not immediately discovered to us I believe I may say even that we know more certainly that there is a God than that we know there is something else without us When I say that we know I mean that we have in our power this knowledg which cannot fail us if we apply our selves to it as we do in other disquisitions 11. We cannot know the Existence of other things but by the Testimony of the Senses In this our knowledg extends it self not beyond that which we perceive by their means The Existence of any other thing whatever having no necessary connection with any of the Ideas which are in our Memory we cannot infer thence the Existence of any particular Idea and we can have no knowledg thereof but by an actual perception of our Senses 12. To augment our knowledg we must regulate our Ideas in the same method whereof we make use in a search of truth As to the substances where our Ideas are but imperfect Copies we can have but a very little general knowledg of 'em because few of our Abstract Ideas have an Agreement or Disagreement of a Coexistence that may be discovered and therefore upon this consideration we must endeavour to augment our knowledges by particular Experiences and Observations But when we speak of Moods and Relations our Ideas being Architypes and being the Real as well as the Nominal Essences of Kinds we may acquire a general knowledg by the only consideration of our Abstract Ideas And as to these Ideas our Searches regarding
Physitian to gather from the use of some parts of the Body of Animals some of the particular ends to which they were destined We may even in some occasions upon the Knowledg which we have of Nature and of the Disposition of certain Parts establish probable Conjectures about the use of these Parts Mr. Boyle speaks here only of such ends which regard the good and preservation of Animals in particular Those who have any Knowledg in Anatomy cannot doubt of it if they consider the whole Machine of Human Bodies and the regular Functions which an infinite number of Parts perform therein without the one hindring the other tho' their Offices are very different It evidently appears that several Parts are destined to certain Effects and that they are justly disposed as they ought to be to that intent because if there happens any change this Effect either ceases entirely or is not produced without much difficulty The Epicureans object That Men make use of their Members in many things not that they had them given 'em for that Design but because we have found out by Experience that they were proper for them Nil Ideo quoniam Natum est in Corpore ut uti Possemus sed quod Natum est id procreat usum Lucret. lib. 4. But chiefly there are several Parts of our Body which perform their Functions without our being sensible of it and without our knowing how Such are our inward Parts the Heart the Liver the Spleen c. and as to the Members which we move as we please altho' we cannot imploy them before they are formed it followeth not in any respect from thence that a blind Power hath presided over their Formation without knowing what they should be good for That is only a Supposition as little reasonable as that of a Man wou'd be who should maintain that a Book was not made to be read but that we read it because Chance has formed it and writ it after such a manner as we have Power to read it Suppose we knew well the Structure of one part we might often affirm or deny certain Uses which are attributed to it Those who writ formerly of Anatomy and Opticks believed as well as the Philosophers of the Schools That Vision is made in the Cristalline Humour but the Jesuit Scheiner hath shewn the first Thing in his Treatise of the Eyes That this part of the Eye not being proper for that purpose another should be sought for which might be only the Coat or Membrane of the Eye My. Boyle affirms that having demanded of the famous Harvey a little before his Death what it was that might have given him occasion to find the Circulation of the Blood He answered him That it was the Disposition of the Valvulae or Folds which permit the Veins to bring back the Blood to the Heart but suffer it not to go to the Extremities of the Body only by the Arteries 3. There are Things so proper and so well disposed for certain Vses either in the Vniverse considered in its utmost Extent or in the Bodies of Animals so that we may justly conclude that Bodies were made by an Intelligent Being which hath thus designedly disposed them Mr. Boyle demonstrates this Thesis by a great number of Examples drawn from divers Animals of Europe America and Asia where he examins only the exterior Actions without engaging himself into any refined Disquisition because what we see is sufficient to convince a rational Man that an Intelligent Being formed the World We shall not stop at it because every Person can present to himself an infinite number of convincing Examples and like unto those which our Author relates There is no Body this day in Europe who hath any Learning that believes pure Chance was able to produce Animals but there are Men who believe that they are formed by the known Rules of Motion or at least by Rules which we know not Yet they must grant that an Intelligent Being established these Rules as Descartes does or say that they are from all Eternity in Matter as well as in Motion whence it would follow that there have been Animals on Earth from all Eternity which is contrary to History and good Sense moreover the supposing that Matter moveth of it self is to suppose as incomprehensible a thing as the greatest Absurdities of the most ridiculous Religion So that the Proofs of Mr. Boyle may serve to destroy this Sentiment tho' it does not directly aim at it 4. We ought not precipitately to conclude nor assert too affirmatively that a Thing is or ought to be the particular end for which any Body hath been formed or the Motive which induced the Author of Nature to produce it It is true there are some Ends that were designed in the Creation of Bodies which are so clear and remarkable that it cannot be doubted but these Bodies were effectively formed for these Uses as the Eye to see but there are several Effects either necessary or profitable for the conservation of Animals to which Effects one part is not sensibly more proper than the other It is very difficult likewise to observe the chief and the most considerable Use of each Part as appears by these Reasons 1. The whole Animal whose Members are examined is itself but a part of the Universe and consequently it cannot be affirmed that his Members have no Relation but to himself only and not with the whole Creation whereof it makes a Part. 2. There is Danger in affirming That a Member was not designed to such an Use because it seems as if it could better perform this Function if it was otherwise disposed without considering whether this Structure which is judged the best for this particular Effect would not be more disadvantagious to the Animal in some other regard or if it would not be contrary to some other End that the Author of Nature might have proposed to himself in the Production of this Animal 3. It is hard to determine what the principal Use of a Member is because it may be equally destined to several 4. Nature can accomplish the same End by divers ways equally sufficient for that Intent though they are not all equally commodious Mr. Boyle believes That these two Considerations ought to be joyned together because they are often found to be united We imagine sometimes without Reason That Nature employeth but a Part in some one Function whereas the Effect which she proposeth to herself is oft produced by a Series of Operations which succeed one another and to which different Members do diversly concontribute Besides that an Animal cannot subsist only by the means either of the Solid or Liquid Parts which are seen in it when it is opened It is a Machine that may be called Hydraulico-pneumatick whose Functions and perhaps the principal ones are not simply performed by means of the Blood or other sensible Liquors because they are Liquors but partly by their Motion partly by an
Civility and to know the Dictates of Reason from that of fancy and the ungovern'd Sense Appetite without respect to Justice being the onely rule of Men till Orpheus if we believe the Mythologists by the Harmony of his Verse redeemed them from that slavery The Judicious Mr. Rimer is of opinion with a great deal of Reason that Tragedy was at first the Liturgy of the Athenians So that in the first Ages of the World Verse was so far esteemed as not to be consecrated even to the Honour of the Gods themselves and it was with no little reluctance the Priests suffered the Poets to direct it to a meaner use But whatever was the Origin of it we are sure it was always in Esteem with the greatest and most flourishing Nations as Greece and Rome ' Twou'd be to repeat that which is known to every one to tell the value the Athenians had for it since Mr. Rimer tells us that Government laid out more in the Representations of their Plays than in their most Expensive VVars Alexander was so great an Admirer of it that he envy'd the happiness of dead Achilles for being prais'd by the Pen of Homer And Augustus in whose time Rome was most Flourishing made Virgil his Companion though born of mean Parents and no Nation that has flourished in Poetry ever held up its head after the decay of that But to pass from the Praise to the Practice of Poetry we advise the Candidates for the Lawrel that they first consider the difficulty of being a good Poet since unless they rise to a Perfection in their kind they reap but Infamy by exposing themselves as ambitious of a thing they cou'd not attain Mediocrity as we have said being intolerable in Poetry however excusable in other affairs They must also consider that to arrive to an Excellence they must take the right method supposing they have by Nature a good Fund first they must think and weigh with themselves and their Friends of Judgment what their Talent is for one may be able to Write a VVitty and Extraordinary Song who wou'd be dull in a VVork of a greater Fatigue Mr. VValer got a reputation not by VVriting Much but VVell and his little short Copies of Verses are preferrable in our opinion to the Voluminous Poems of some others who wou'd have their Performances swell into a Bulk and deserve the Name of VVorks for their Bigness not Intrinsick Value We are pretty confident it wou'd not have been for the disreputation of Sir VVilliam Davenant it wou'd not have for the Disreputation of William Davenant if the World had never seen any thing of his but his Gondibert and the much more Excellent Shakespear wou'd not have been less admir'd if an abundance of these things which are Printed for his were omitted Mr. Cowly is of this Opinion we are sure therefore our Advice is to a young Poet that he never be ambitious of writing much a little Gold is worth a great heap of Lead let him often make tryal of what his Shoulders are able to bear before he launches into the Ocean of the Criticks let him often Correct and Consult his Judicious Friend 't is Horace his Advice to the Pisoes To be a perfect Poet a Man must be a general Schollar skilld both in the Tongues and Sciences must be perfect in History and Moral Philosophy the latter of which is absolutely necessary to give him an insight into the Nature of the Passions to move which is his chief Aim and Business nor can he draw a virtuous Character unless he know what is the just Composition of it A Poet is to represent Mankind at least the nobler Part which he can never do if he be not throughly skill'd in knowledge of it Being thus qualifi'd Diligence and Exercise will furnish you with Facility in your Compositions and Reading the best Authors and Criticks as Casaubon Scaliger c. and for our English way of Writing Plays we mean Mr. Rimers Translations of Rapine and Examination of the Plays of the last Age Mr. Drydens Essay on Dramatick Poesie and most of his Prefaces L' Abbe Hedelius whole Art of the Stage My Lord Roscommons Translation of Horace his Art of Poetry c. 't will be absolutely necessary for your perusal Any farther particular Directions here wou'd be too long a Task for his place since 't is the business of these several Treatises we mention to perfect an Artist in this Kind We shall only therefore here place the Chief of the Latin and English Poets which are to be perus'd with great Care and Regard LATINS VIrgil Horace Ovid. Catullus Tibullus Lucan Statius Seneca Terence Plautus Silius Italicus Iuvenal Persius Martial Valerius Flaccus Claudian Ausonius Propertius Casimir Buchannan c. ENGLISH CHancer Spencer Sheakspear Iohnson Beaumont and Fletcher Draiton Daniel Sr. Iohn Suckling Sr. Iohn Denham Chasshaw Cowley Sr. William Davenant Dr. Donn Mr. Dryden Mr. Otway Mr. Lee. Mrs. Behn Mrs. Phillips Several Collections of Poems Painting PAinting is in that Esteem with the Ingenious of this Age that it may seem superfluous to trouble the Reader with Arguments to encrease it by setting before them the Value the Antients put upon Performances of this Nature we will not therefore Transcribe from Pliny the vast Sums of Mony which were given by the Kings and Princes of Greece and Rome for Picture of the Prime Masters and indeed the Relations we find in Pliny wou'd seem almost incredible if it were not that we ev'ry day see those of our Modern Masters in that Art sold for 1000 or 1500 Pounds apiece Nor is it necessary to repeat what we have formerly advanc'd concerning the first Invention of it that being so very Obscure that the most that can be said or gathered from Authors amounts only to a Probability Nor will it be much to our purpose to enumerate the several Excellent Pieces this Art produc'd when it Flourish'd in Greece tho' we confess it is not altogether unfit to be known to such as have any desire to apply themselves to this Noble Study which may be said to surpass the Judgment of the Sence it self by which we judge of it for it perswades the Eyes against the Evidence of themselves that there is a Substance more than really there is raising a Flat to a bulky Round or other Figure Nay presents the Eye with a Prospect of Miles in the Compass of a Hand and that so lively that with a great deal of satisfaction we dwell upon the View as if we were satish'd there was more than a flat thin Superficies that entertain'd us a great Master disputing in a Treatise of Painting and Statuary which was to be prefer'd gives it to Painting because a Statue has the Dimensions and Bulk of a Man but a Picture deceives the Eye and makes that appear round which is plain and flat Stone at most can give but the Features and Proportion but Picture gives also the Colour There are
innate or natural Idea to suppose the Mind occupied by Ideas before it hath received them from without is to suppose a thing contradictory For the better understanding of what I would say when I affirm that we have not nor can have any Idea but from the Sensations or from the Operations of the Mind upon its Ideas we must consider that they are of two kinds Simple and Complex It is of the Simple that I now speak such as are the whiteness of this Paper the sweetness of this Sugar c. where the Mind perceiveth no variety nor any composition but a perception only or a uniform Idea I say that we have none of these Ideas but by Sensation or by Reflection The Mind in this regard is absolutely passive and cannot produce to it self any new Idea though of those that it already hath it may compose others and so make thereof Complex Ideas with a very great variety as shall be seen in the following Discourse Therefore though we cannot deny but it was as possible to God to give us a sixth Sense as it was to give us the five we have nevertheless we cannot form to our selves any Idea that might come to us by the sixth Sense and that for the same Reason that one born Blind hath no Idea of Colours because it cannot be had but by means of one of those five Senses whereof he hath always been destitute I do not see that it is necessary to make here an Enumeration of all the Ideas that are the particular Objects of each of the Senses because it would not be of any great use for my Design to give a list of Ideas whereof the most part present themselves of their own accord and because the greatest part have no Names for Colours excepted and some few Qualities that are perceived by the Touch to which Men have given particular Names although a great deal less than their great variety would require Taste Odours and Sounds whereof the diversity is not less have but seldom Names except in general Terms Though the taste of Milk and the taste of Cherries are as far distant as white is from red notwithstanding we do not see that they have particular Names Sweet Sour Salt Rough and Bitter are almost all the Names we have for an infinite number of different Sapors that are found in Nature Therefore without applying my self to make an Enumeration of the simple Ideas that belong to each Sense I shall only mark that some of these Ideas are carried to the Mind by one only Sense as the Colours by that of the Sight the Sounds by the Ear the Hot and the Cold by the Touch. Besides these are others that come to the Mind by more than one Sense as Motion Rest Space and Figures which are apprehended by the Sight and the Touch. There are also Ideas of Reflection alone as those of Thinking of Willing and of all their different manners In fine There are others that we receive by all the Methods of Sensation and Reflection as Numbers Existence Power Pleasure c. These in general are all the simple Ideas or at least the most part whereof we are capable and which are the Subject of all our Notions of which all the other Ideas are composed and beyond which we have neither Thought nor Knowledge Chapters 3 4 5 and 6. 7. I shall yet remark something about simple Ideas after which I shall shew how the Complex ones are composed viz. That herein we are easily mistaken and that we often judge that they are Resemblances of some things which is in those Objects that perform them in us but for the most part they are nothing like although they lead us to the consideration of the manner whereby Bodies operate upon us by means of the Senses I only pretend to expound Historically the Nature of the Understanding and to mark the way and manner by which our Mind receiveth the subject of its Notions and by what degrees it comes at them I should be unwilling to engage my self here into a Physical Speculation It 's notwithstanding necessary to expound briefly this subject to avoid Confusion and Obscurity For the better discovering the Nature of sensible Ideas and making 'em more intelligible 't is necessary to distinguish 'em as they are Perceptions and Ideas of our Mind and as they form in Bodies the Causes of those Perceptions that are in us I call an Idea every immediate Object every Perception that is in our Mind when it thinketh I call quality of the Subject the power or the faculty it hath of producing a certain Idea in the Mind Thus I call Ideas Whiteness Coldness Roundness c. as they are Perceptions or Sensations in the Soul and when they are in a Ball of Snow that can produce these Ideas in us I call them qualities The original qualities that may be remarked in Bodies are Solidity Extent Figure Number Motion or Rest. In whatever quality the Bodies may be these qualities cannot be separated from them and therefore I call them original or first qualities What we ought to consider after that is the manner whereby Bodies act upon one another For my part I conceive nothing in it but an Impulse When therefore they produce in us the Ideas of some of their original qualities which are really in them as those of the Extension and the Figure that Senses perceive when the Object we look upon is at a certain distance they must needs press our Organs by means of some insensible Particles which come from the Object to our Eyes and which by a continuation of Motion that they have caused therein shake our Brains and produce in us these Ideas Thus we cannot find any thing but the Impulse and the Motion of some insensible Bodies which produce in our Mind the Ideas of these original qualities Thus we may conceive after what manner the Idea of the Colour and Odour of a Violet can be produced in us as well as that of the Figure 'T is by a particular Motion produced in the Organ by the Impulse of Particles of a certain bigness Figure Number and Motion and continued even unto the Brain For it is not more difficult to conceive that God can stick the Idea of a Colour or of an Odour to Motions to which they have no resemblance than it is to conceive that he hath applied the Idea of pains to the Motion of a bit of Iron which divideth our Flesh to which Motion the pain bears no resemblance What I have said of Colours and Odours may be applied to the Sounds and Tastes and to some tangible qualities as the Heat and Cold for the Ideas of these qualities and some others like them being perfectly distinguished from every perception of Bigness Figure Motion c. cannot be resemblances of any thing that may be really in the Object which produces in us these Ideas Therefore I call second qualities the power that Bodies have of producing
and that all the simple Ideas whereof it is composed if it is complex should be fixt and constant This is necessary in the Names of all complex Ideas but we ought to take a particular care in Words that express the Ideas of Morality which being composed of divers simple Ideas are not as they should be till we have fixed in our Mind the complex Idea which we would denote by every Word We ought to endeavour to be in a capacity of an easie Enumeration of all that entreth into this Idea and to resolve it into all the simple Ideas which compose it For want of this it happeneth that our Words become so obscure and equivocal that neither others nor our selves can tell what we would say 3. One ought to accommodate his Ideas as much as possible to the common signification that the words have in the ordinary usage The usage is that which determineth the signification of the Words and every particular Person ought not to make such change as he pleaseth therein But because the common usage hath left a great part of Words not to say the most part in a very extravagant signification and Men often are constrained to make use of a common word in a sense somewhat particular it 's often necessary to mark in what sense we make use of Words especially when they belong to the principal Subject of the Discourse or of the Question This Interpretation of our Terms if we would be correct ought to be conformable to the different kinds of the Ideas that they signifie The best and even in several occasions the only way of making known the signification of the name of a simple Idea is to present it to the Senses The only means to mark the sense of the most part of the names of mix'd Moods at least of the Words that belong to Morality is Definition and the best means to understand the names of the most part of Bodies is to shew the Bodies we discourse on and in the mean while to define the names whereof we make use because on the one side several of the Qualities which distinguish them from other Bodies are not easie to be expressed by words and on the other since many other things among them cannot without much pain and preparations be discovered by the Senses 10. I have shewn what the signification is of Words and what care we ought to take that we may not suffer our selves to be thereby deceived that being necessary before we enter into the consideration of our Notions which maketh the subject of the following Book Before I finish this I shall say only one word of the common distinction of Terms because I believe it may serve for the clearing our Ideas It is the distinction of the Terms Abstract and Concrete upon which we may mark 1. That two abstract Ideas are never affirmed at once 2. That simple Ideas and Moods have concrete Names as well as abstract but that Substances have but concretes saving some few abstract Words affected by Scholasticks which they never could bring into common use as Corporeity Animality c. The first of these two Remarks teacheth us as it seemeth to me that two distinct Ideas are two distinct Essences which cannot be affirmed both at once The second includeth a clear Assertion that Men have no Idea of the real Essences of the kinds of Substances seeing they have in their Tongues no Terms to express them BOOK IV. We have treated in the two preceeding Books of the Ideas and Words in this we treat of Knowledge 1. It 's shewn in the first Chapter That Knowledge is nothing else but the perception of Agreement or of Dis-agreement which is between two Ideas This convenience or dis-convenience may be reduced for a greater clearness to these four 1. Identity 2. Coexistence 3. Real Existence 4. Relation The first and principal act of our Intellect is to perceive the Ideas it hath to see what each of them is and in what they differ from others Without that the Mind could not either have variety of Thoughts nor Discourse nor judge nor reason upon what it thinketh It 's by this faculty that the Mind perceiveth what Idea it hath when it seeth a Violet and by which it knoweth that Blew is not Yellow Secondly our Idea of Substances consists as I have shewn in a certain mass of simple Ideas which is noted by a Specifick Name The most part of our disquisitions touching Substances tends to know what other Qualities they have which refer to this to wit what other Ideas do coexist and are found united with other our complex Ideas Thus to seek if Gold is fixed is to seek if being able to be in the fire without being consumed is an Idea that coexisteth in the same subject with the Ideas of yellow Colour of Weight of Malleability and Fusibility whereof our Idea of Gold is composed The third sort of Agreement is to know if a real existence agreeth or not to some thing whereof we have an Idea in our Mind The last sort of Agreement or Dis-agreement of the Ideas consisteth in some other Relation which may be between two Ideas Thus this Enunciation Sweetness is not Bitterness marketh a dis-convenience of Idendity Thus Iron is susceptible of the Impressions of the Loadstone signifies an agreeing of coexistence These words God existeth inlcude an agreeing of real Existence This Proposition Two Triangles whereof the Base is equal and which are betwixt two parallel Lines are equal marketh a convenience of Relation 2. According to the different manner wherewith we perceive the convenience or the dis-convenience of our Ideas the evidence wherewith we know them is different Sometimes the Mind perceiveth the convenience or dis-convenience of two Ideas immediately Thus it seeth that Red is not Yellow that a Circle is not a Triangle that three is more than two and is equal to two and one That is what may be called intuitive Knowledge or of a simple view It is upon this simple view that is founded all the certitude and all the evidences of our Notions and indeed every one findeth that this evidence is so great that he cannot imagin nor consequently require a greater one For no Body can believe himself capable of a greater certitude than to know that an Idea which he hath in his Mind is such as he perceiveth it and that two Ideas among which he seeth a difference are different and are not really the same Therefore in the following degree of our Knowledge which I call Demonstration this intuition or simple view is necessary in all the connections of middle Ideas without which we cannot come at any general Knowledge nor to any certainty 2. When the Agreement or Dis-agreement of two Ideas cannot immediately be perceived but the Mind maketh some other Idea to intervene to shew it this is that which is called Demonstration Therefore the Mind not being able to joyn three Angles of a Triangle with
two strait ones so that it may perceive immediately their Equality it maketh use of some other Angles to measure them For to produce a Knowledge of this Nature we must know with a simple view the Agreement or Dis-agreement of two middle Ideas whereof we make use in each degree of Deduction for without that there can be no Demonstration and one cannot shew the Agreement or Dis-agreement of two Ideas that he considereth For either the Agreement or Dis-agreement of two Ideas is not evident by it self that is to say cannot be perceived immediately we still need Proofs to shew it This kind of Knowledge may be called a reasoned or demonstrative Knowledge and how certain soever it may be it 's never so clear nor so evident as the Knowledge of a simple view The reason of it is this The Memory must intervene to retain the connection of all the parts of a Demonstration together and we must be sure we omit none thereof which in a long Deduction demandeth an extraordinary Attention if we design to avoid Error I will not speak in this little Abridgment of what is commonly believed That Demonstration belongs but to Ideas which regard Quantity These are the two sorts of Knowledge that we have of general Truths As for the Existence of some particular finite Beings we perceive 'em by our Senses and we can call this Knowledge sensible Knowledge Though it hath not all the certitude of the two first degrees of Knowledge notwithstanding it must be granted that it hath something more than simple probability 3. From what hath now been said it followeth 1. That we can have no Knowledge where we have no Idea 2. That our Knowledge of a simple view extendeth not it self so far as our Ideas because we cannot compare the greatest part of them after a manner so immediate that we may discover the Agreement that we look for 3. That our reasoned Knowledge cannot make us to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of all the Ideas where the knowledg of a simple view faileth us because we cannot find middle Ideas that may unite them after an intuitive manner 4. That the sensible knowledge not extending it self further than the actual presence of the particular objects that strike our Senses it has a great deal less extention than the two preceding ones What I pretend to conclude from all this is that our Knowledg is not only infinitely below the Extent of Beings but that it also faileth us in the greatest part of the disquisitions that we can make upon the Ideas we have First of all as to what regards the whole Extent of Beings if we compare this small Corner of Earth upon which we are confined with this part of the Universe whereof we have some knowledge we shall find that the Earth is but as a Point but if we carry our thoughts yet further we shall find that 't is more than probable that this part of the Universe whereof we have some knowledge is in it self how immense soever it seems but as a Point in regard to that which is altogether beyond our discoveries And if we consider the vegetable the reasonable and corporal Animals not to speak of the different orders of Minds and the other things with their different qualities more proportionable perhaps to others Senses than ours and whereof we have no Notion if we make I say a little Reflection upon the number the variety and excellency of Beings that may exist and which without doubt do exist in an Extent as immense as is that of the Universe we shall with reason conclude that the things whereof we have some Idea are in a very small number in comparison to those that we do not at all know In the second place if we consider in what a small number how imperfect and superficial are the Ideas that we have of the things which are near us that we can know them better and which in effect are the best known to us In fine if we mark by how little we can discover by those Ideas we have of Agreement or Disagreement we have cause enough to infer from thence that our Minds are extreamly limited that they are no way proportionable to the whole extent of Beings and that Men are not capable of knowing all things It s true that in regard of Identity and of diversity our Knowledge of a simple view is as much extended as our very Ideas But on the other side we scarcely have any general knowledge of the coexistence of Ideas because not being able to discover the causes whereof the second qualities of the substances do depend nor to see any connection between these causes and our Ideas there are very few cases in the which we can know the coexistence of any other Idea with the complex Idea that we have of some sort of substances and thereby the knowledge we have of Substances is reduced almost to nothing As for what concerneth other Relations of our Ideas it does not yet appear how far our Knowledge can reach I believe nevertheless that if we studied well Morality which consists in the Relations of Moods it would be as capable of Demonstration as the Mathematicks as to the Existence we have our own a knowledge of simple view a demonstrative knowledge of the Existence of God and a sensible knowledge of the Existence of some few other things I shall not put in this little Abridgment the particular Examples that I gave to shew the small extent of our Knowledges What I have said here sufficeth I think for to convince us that there is no proportion betweâ—â— what we know and those things of whiâ—â— we are in an irreparable ignorance Bâ—â—â—des the Extent of our Knowledge in the Species of things we may therein consider another sort of Extent in regard of its Vniversality When our Ideas are abstract the knowledge we have of 'em is general The abstract Ideas are the Essences of Kinds what names soever are given them and are the foundations of the general and eternal Truths 4. It will perhaps be said that this Knowledge which we make to consist in the consideration of Ideas may be Chimerical and leave us in an entire ignorance of what things really are in themselves seeing we see that Men can and even often have Ideas altogether extravagant To that I answer that our Knowledge is as real as our Ideas are conformable to things and no more To be able to know what Ideas are conformable to the reality of things we must consider the different sorts of Ideas whereof I have spoken above 1. We can not doubt but simple Ideas are conformable to the things I do not mean a conformity of Resemblance but the conformity that is between a constant effect and its cause because the Mind being not able to form any simple Idea those it hath must be conformable to the Powers of producing them which are in things and this conformity is sufficient to
give a real knowledge 2. Nevertheless our Complex Ideas excepting those of Substances are conformable to the reality of things and we can assure our selves because they are Architypes which the Mind hath formed and not Copies by which it pretends to represent something existent out of it self We have a design in our discourses and in our reasonings touching this sort of Ideas to mark any thing that existeth but only as it is conformable to these Ideas 3. But our complex Ideas of substances being formed upon design to represeâ—t the Architypes existent without us we cannot be assured that our knowledge touching these Ideas is real but in as much as it appereth by the real Existence of things themselves which the simple Ideas included in a combination such as is that whereof our complex Ideas are formed it may coexist together The reason of this is that not knowing the real constitution whereof these qualities depend we cannot know but by experience what qualities can or cannot exist together in one same subject If we gather in a complex Idea other qualities than those that can exist together the knowledge of the substance which this Idea shall represent shall be only the knowledg of a Chimera which we shall have formed our selves and not of any real Being 5. According to this Description of Knowledge we may come to discover what Truth is which is nothing else but the conjunction or the separation of Signs according as things themselves agree or disagree By conjunction or separation of the Siâ—â—s I mean that which is made in affirmâ—â—g or in denying and that which is called position As the Signs whereof we 〈◊〉 use are of two sorts Ideas and words the Propositions are likewise of two sorts Mental and Verbal Truth is likewise of two kinds real or purely verbal A real Truth is found in a Proposition when it is Affirmative or Negative according as the Ideas themselves are conformable to their Architypes A Verbal Truth is included in a Proposition when it is Affirmative or Negative according to the agreement or disagreement of our Ideas tho these Ideas have no agreement with their Architypes 6. Truth represents it self commonly to our Mind or in being considered as included in certain Propositions It s of importance to examin what Propositions are capable to bring into our Mind a certain knowledge of general Truths 1. In general Propositions where we suppose that the Terms signifie Kinds which consist in real Existences and distinct from nominals we are capable of no certain Knowledge because not knowing this real Essence we cannot know what qualities have an agreement or disagreement with this unknown Essence nor even ever discover that the Beings belong to this kind And this is it which happeneth often in the Propositions which regard Substances and not in those that concern the other things because we do not suppose that the other things have a real Essence distinct from the Nominal 2. In all the general Propositions where are substituted Terms in place only of the Nominal Essence or from the abstract Idea so that the kind is determined by that only we are capable of Certainty as far as we perceive the agreement or disagreement of these abstract Ideas But this very little regards Substances because we cannot discover but in very few re-incounters the necessary coexistence or the incompatibility of the other Ideas with those that compose the complex Idea which we have of some kind of Substances 7. There are certain Propositions which are called Maxims which some do look upon as born with us and which the most part look upon as the foundation of all Knowledge But if we consider well what we have said touching the knowledge of simple view or self-evidence we shall find that these Axioms so much boasted of are not innate and have no more evidence by themselves than a thousand other Propositions whereof some are known before 〈◊〉 Axioms and whereof others are known as readily and as clearly whence it followeth that they are not innate and that they are not the foundation of all our Knowledg and reasonings as some believe It is allowed that these Maxims are evident in themselves All that is is and 't is impossible a thing should be and should not be at the same time But if we consider the nature of the Intellect and of the Ideas it hath and if we think that the Intellect cannot but know its proper Ideas and not know that the Ideas that are distinct in it are so we shall of necessity remark that these Axioms that are believed to be the fundamental Principles of Knowledge and Reasoning are no more evident in themselves than these Propositions One is one Red is Red and it 's impossible that one should be two and that Red should be Blew We also know evidently and even sooner these Propositions and a thousand such others that those that are commonly called Maxims Is there any one that could imagin that a Child knoweth not that a Seed of Herbs against Worms is not Sugar but by vertue of this Axiom It is impossible that the same thing should be and not be at the same time Our knowledge of simple view extends to all our Ideas in regard of the Agreement or disagreement of identity and consequently all the Propositions which regard this sort of agreement or disagreement whether they be conceived in more or less general Terms if the Ideas that they signifie are known these Propositions I say are equally evident by themselves As we know very few things with a knowledge of a simple view in respect to the Agreement or Disagreement of Coexistence so we cannot form thereupon but very few general Propositions evident by themselves and a very small number of Axioms In the third sort of agreement to wit in the agreement of Relation Mathematicians have formed divers general Propositions touching the equality to which they have given the names of Axioms tho these Propositions have no other certainty than that which is found in all the other general Propositions evident by themselves Although when one hath rendred to himself these Axioms familiar Men often make use thereof to shew the absurdity of false reasonings and of erroneous opinions in the less general Ideas notwithstanding the manner wherewith our Mind has acquired Knowledge is not by beginning with these general Propositions and thence drawing Consequences but on the contrary by beginning by particular observations and thence extending by degrees its knowledge to more general Views 8. Besides these Propositions there are others whereof several are certain but it teacheth us no real Truth because they regard only the signification of Words 1. When we affirm some part of a complex Idea of the name of this same Idea or which is the same thing when we affirm a part of a Definition of the name of the thing defined this Proposition only regardeth the signification of Terms and such are all the Propositions in
not the Agreement or Disagreement of Coexistance but respecting other Relations more easy to be discovered than that of Coexistence we are capable of making further Progresses To augment this knowledg we must establish in our Mind clear and constant Ideas with their Names or Signs and after that exactly consider their Connections their Agreements and their Dependencies As to know if we could not find some Method as profitable in regard to the other Moods as Algebra in regard to the Ideas of quantity to discover their Relations 'T is they that cannot be determined aforehand yet we ought never to despair of it Notwithstanding I doubt not but Morality may be brought to a much greater degree of Certainty than it hath been hitherto if after having applied the Term of Morality to clear and constant Ideas we examin them freely and without prejudice 13. Knowledg is not innate nor presents not it self always to our Intellect We must often bring in our Searches both Application and Study and 't is that which depends upon our Will but when we have examined some Ideas with their Agreements and Disagreements by all Means that we have and with all the exactness whereof we are capable it depends not upon our Will to know or not to know the Truths that concern these Ideas 14. Our knowledg extending not it self to every thing that belongs to us we supply it by what we call judgment by which our Mind concludes that Ideas agree or disagree to wit that a Proposition is true or false without having an evidence that may produce a certain knowledg 15. The foundation upon which we receive these Propositions as true is what we call probability and the manner wherewith the Mind receives these Propositions is that which is called Consent Belief or Opinion that which consisteth to receive an Opinion as true without having a certain knowledg that it is so effectively Here are the foundations of probability 1. The conformity of something with that which we know or with our Experience 2. The Testimony of others founded upon what they know or what they have experienced 16. In this Chapter we treat of the different degrees of Assurance or of Doubt which depend upon these two things diversified by Circumstances that concur with others or that counterbalance them but they are in too great a number for to be noted in particulars in this Extract 17. Errour is not the failure of knowledg but a fault of judgment which causeth Men to give their consent to things that are not true The causes ares 1. Want of proofs such as may or may not be had 2. The little ability Men have to make use thereof 3. The want of Will to make use thereof 4. The false rules of probability which may be reduced to these 4. Doubtless Opinions supposed as Principles Hypotheses received unruly Passions and Authority 18. Reasoning by which we know Demonstrations and probabilities hath as it seems to me four parts The first consists in discovery of proofs The second in ranging them in such order as is necessary to find the truth The third in clear perception or an evident connection of Ideas in each part of the Consequence The fourth in carrying strait Judgment and drawing a just conclusion from the whole It appeareth by this that Syllogism is not the great instrument of Reason that is serveth but in the third part and only to shew to others that the connection of two Ideas or rather of two Words by the interposition of a third one is good or bad But it is not at all subservient to Reason when it seeks for some new knowledg or would discover some unknow Truth and the proofs upon which it is grounded which is the principal use which we ought to make of Reason and not to Triumph in Dispute or to reduce to silence those that would be Litigious 19. Some Men oppose so often Faith to Reason that if we knew not distinctly their limits we should run a hazard to entangle our selves in our Searches about matters of Religion The Subject of reasoning is Propositions which we may know by the natural use of our Faculties and which are drawn from Ideas that we have by Sensation by Reflection The matters of Faith are those which are discovered to us by a Supernatural Revelation If we carefully consider the distinct Principles of these two things we shall know in what Faith excludeth Reason or imposeth Silence to it and in what we ought to hearken to Reason as a lawful Judge of a matter 1. A Proposition which we pretend to have received by an original and immediate Revelation cannot be admitted as an undoubted matter of Faith if it be contrary to the clear and evident Principles of our natural Knowledges because that though God cannot lie notwithstanding it 's impossible that a Man to whom the Revelation is made should know it comes from God with more certainty than he knows the truth of these Principles of Reason 2. But an original Revelation can impose Silence upon Reason in a Proposition wherein Reason giveth but a probable assurance because the assurance that we have that this Revelation comes from God is clearer than the thing that is most probable 3. If it cannot be granted that original Revelation may contradict our clear and evident natural Knowledg it can yet be less granted to what we know by Tradition only because that although that which God reveals cannot be called in Question nevertheless he to whom the Revelation hath not been immediately made but who holds it from the Relation of other Men can never know that God hath made this Revelation nor that he understands well the Words in which they are proposed to him nor even that he ever had read or heard this Proposition which we suppose to be revealed to another with as much certainty as he knoweth the truths of Reason which are evident by themselves It hath been revealed That the Trumpet shall sound and the Dead shall rise but I see not how those that hold that Revelation only is the object of Faith can say that it is a matter of Faith and not of Reason to believe that this Proposition is a Revelation if it be not revealed that such a Proposition advanced by such a Man is a Revelation The Question recurs to wit Whether I understand this Proposition in its true Sense 20. In fine conformable to these Principles I conclude in dividing the Sciences into three kinds The first which I call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the knowledg of Things whether Spiritual or Corporal or some of their Proprieties in their true Nature We propose in this no other end than simple Speculation The second which I name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contains the Rules of all our Operations comprehends the things that are in our power and chiefly that which belongs to the conduct of our Manners This second Science proposeth the action for its end The third to which
I give the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the knowledg of Signs to wit of Ideas and Words as also serving to other sorts of Sciences It may be if this last was well considered it would produce a Logick and Critick different from those we have seen till now That Beasts are meer Machines divided into two Dissertations At Amsterdam by J. Darmanson in his Philosophical Conferences in Twelves without the name of a Printer 1684. IF any thing can mortifie the Mind of Man it is certainly the Controversie which hath been raised not long since betwixt the Cartesians and other Philosophers touching the Soul of Beasts All Men believed without contestation until the time of Mr. Descartes That Beasts had Knowledg Philosophers in that had no different Thoughts from the People they believed as well as the Vulgar that there was the utmost evidence for it They only disputed among themselves whether the Knowledg of Animals extended it self to Reason or no and to universal Ideas Or if it was limited by the perception of sensible Objects Most of the ancient Philosophers have believed that Beasts reasoned but among Christian Philosophers the most common Opinion was the contrary They were contented almost all to attribute a Sentiment unto them I say almost all for there have been always some who have maintained that they were not deprived of the faculty of Reasoning Mr. De la Chambre one of the most illustrious Peripateticks of this Age hath openly declared for this Party in which undoubtedly he hath been incomparably more judicious than any other of Aristotle's Followers because perhaps never any Opinion was more unlikely to be maintained than this That the actions of Beasts issue from a knowing Principle and nevertheless that Beasts have not the Strength to conclude one thing from another However it is in this particular Dispute all Men were united in this fix'd point and in this Article of Belief That Beasts have a Sentiment The most Subtle would have engaged That there would never have been any Man so foolish as to dare to maintain the contrary There hath nevertheless been one in the last Age who durst assert this Paradox in a place wherein it would be the least suspected that so new a Doctrin should take Birth I shall be well understood if I add only That it was a Spanish Physitian that published this Doctrin a Medina del Campo in 1554. in a Book which had cost him 30 years Labour and which he Entituled Antoniana Margarita to honour his Fathers Mothers Name Who should ever guess that Spain where the liberty of Opinions is less suffered than that of the Body is in Turky should produce so rash a Philosopher as to maintain that Animals feel not It deserves to be spoken of here and every where for the Rarity of the Subject and it is just that we should not suppress the Name of this Gallant Man who hath been the first Author as we know of of this unheard Paradox He was called Gamesius Pereira and lived in the last Age and not in the twelfth as a Doctor of Divinity hath affirm'd who places the quality of Abbot Gerard at the head of his Discourse upon the Courtiers Philosophy This Gamesius Pereira was briskly attacked by a Divine of Salamanca named Michael de Palacios and answered him as sharply without losing any Argument that he had advanced For Beasts being Machines But he made no Sect his Opinion immediately fell He had not the Honour done him as to fear him so that he was not much more known to our Age than if he had never come into the World and there is a great Likelihood that Mr. Descartes who read but little never heard talk of him Yet Men will have that he hath drawn from this Spanish Physitian the Opinion which he had concerning Beasts for in saying so People think to take away from him the Glory of the Invention and that it is still so much gained upon him But what is most certain is That Gamesius Pereira having not drawn his Paradox from true Principles and not having penetrated into its Consequences could not hinder Mr. Descartes from finding it first by a Philosophical Method It is notwithstanding very probable that he found it without seeking for it very likely he begun and ended his Meditations without thinking upon the Soul of Beasts and without abandoning the Opinion which he had receiv'd thereof in his Infancy and it was only in considering the sequel of that Principle concerning the distinction of the Cogitive Substance from that of the extended Substance that he perceived the knowledg of Animals overturned all the oeconomy of his System It may perhaps be that he had then need that this Objection should be made him and that before it did not come into his Mind It is therefore thro' meer necessity that he maintained that Beasts cannot feel If he could have defended his Principles without it he had never concerned himself with an Opinion which not only had always appeared undoubtful to all the World but which was also cloathed with almost an invincible Evidence This Evidence made me say at first That there is nothing more likely to mortifie the Mind of Man than the Controversie concerning the Knowledg of Beasts For in fine what can be more mortifying than to see the State wherein this Controversie is now On the one side by Mr. Descartes an Opinion upheld which never appeared before in the World but once and which took Birth rather through Capriciousness than Reason for as I have already said Gamesius Pereira knew not very well himself why he maintained it which Opinion hath been adopted by Mr. Descartes only because he was constrained to throw himself into this Precipice to confirm what he had once advanced In fine what so readily contradicts the natural light of many Persons that it is said openly in a thousand Places it is a shame for France and for our Age to have produced a Philosopher who hath been able with Success to put off that monstrous Opinion that Beasts are Machines What do we see on the other side An Opinion generally approved of all Men who have been since Adam until these latter years and which so possesseth our Minds by I know not what Evidence that accompanies it that Men are not more persuaded that they enjoy a pleasure in eating than they are that Beasts do feel some likewise when they feed Yet in spight of all these great advantages of the Opinion which the Cartesians have been forced to strive against they boast of having after three or four years Dispute reduced it into so poor a condition that it can be no longer preserv'd but by an Appeal to the People and to what Hunters and Fisher-Men will say on 't As for Philosophical Reasons they say it cannot bring any either for its Defence or to oppose the contrary This is very humbling and what may make us trouble for Opinions which appear the most
that there being a great many Things made for our use and which notwithstanding we do not know and that the Things whereof we actually make use may have other uses which are besides unknown to us Libertines have long since objected That if other Animals had been made for Man they would not come into the World in a better State than he Whereas there are several produced in a condition of defending themselves from the Injury of the Air and of seeking their livelihood without the help of another To these slight Advantages is opposed that of Reason which hath enabled Men to form Societies and to become Masters of all other Animals by their Policy This Reason evinces That Man is more excellent than the whole Globe of the World or an Extent of much greater Matter without Intelligence So that do but look upon the outside of Things with regard only to the littleness of the Body of Man deny that the Earth and some of the Coelestial Bodies were made for him because they are infinitely greater and because an Intelligence such as the Soul of Man is much more excellent than all these Bodies Mr. Boyle moreover draweth from this Consideration an important Consequence which is That tho' Man receives no use from some distant parts of his Body he can nevertheless receive a very great one in regard of the Intelligence which animates it which raiseth it self by the consideration of the more distant Objects to the knowledg of their Author and acknowledgeth in a thousand ways his Power and his Wisdom and also renders him the Homage that is due unto him Why should we not believe that among the ends of God in producing these vast Bodies which their excessive distance hath not robbed from our Sight he hath proposed to make himself known to the innumerable Intelligences which he hath covered with Human Bodies This is the most probable Inference that Men have ever made thereof as Mr. Boyle sheweth But if we will yet consider Man as covered with a Body we must take heed of committing a gross Fault whereinto we fall by Imagining That nothing can go under the notion of having been made for Man but that which all Men have always made use of we ought to look upon Man from his Origin upon this Earth until his Dissolution he changes Habitation as does a Family which in divers times makes use of divers things altho' none of his Members do immediately participate of these Uses Thus an Infinity of Things whence much Profit is drawn of late have notwithstanding been made for Man tho' he made no use of them some Ages before us We may see particularly Examples thereof in the Original IV. The fourth Question is to know With what Precaution Physicians ought to make use of the Supposition of Final Causes Thence two sorts of Consequences may be drawn the one relates to the Author of Nature as when from the constant use of a thing it is concluded that it was made for that So after having acknowledg'd the use of Eyes we ascend to the Creator by saying that in creating the Eyes he had a Design to make a Machine as proper to produce that which we call Vision The other Consequences conclude from the Supposition of certain ends That Bodies ought to be disposed after a certain manner because otherwise they would not be proper to produce the Effect for which they are created Mr. Boyle reduces what he has to say upon this Question to five Propositions upon which he makes divers Remarks which are briefly there as also some of the most considerable Reflections which are made upon them 1. As for Coelestial Bodies in general it is Folly to conclude any thing about their Nature from the Supposition that God hath produced them for the use of Man Those who say That the Earth being the Place which Man Inhabits and the Sun having been created to light this Earth it follows from thence That the Sun turns round the Earth and not the Earth about the Sun against the Rules we have related They suppose that the only end which God proposed to himself in creating the Sun is to light the Earth and tho' that was so their Consequence may be denyed As to what regards the fixt Stars whereof some are so distant that there is no use of the Telescope to discern them it is yet more rash to suppose that they were only produced for our Earth tho' we do not deny but that we may draw from them both Moral and and Physical Uses It would be also a meer Presumption to conclude from thence that they are disposed after such a certain manner because that would seem more commodious for the use of the pretended King of the Universe It is much more reasonable to think that God might have proposed Ends which we see not in the Symmetry of the World Can it be said that the Angels which are more excellent Beings than we are take no share therein and that God in creating it had no regard to them On the contrary it 's well known that several Divines have conjectured with Mr. Boyle That the Angels were created before the Material World that they might render God the Praises due to him for the Creation of the Universe It may be these Intelligences perceive at first sight in this part of the Heaven what we discover only with difficulty by the Telescope and in other Bodies which we know not a profound Wisdom and as admirable Ends as those which we observe in Bodies which are nearest and most known to us To descend from Heaven upon Earth tho' it is very rationally believed that God made for the use of Man Metals and Minerals being such Things as he can procure there would be no Reason to believe that that which is round the Center of the Earth more than fifteen hundred Leagues below our Feet is made for us and even only for that end There could never yet a thousand Steps be dugg into a strait Line nor is there any appearance that the Industry of Men shou'd ever find the means to peirce the Earth Diametrically for a Mile and without that they can neither see nor apply to their use what it hides in its Centre We may notwithstanding judge by the knowledg we have of some other parts of the World that what the Earth includeth in its Bulk may contribute something to the Order and Symmetry of its Vortex wherein it is placed It might also be said that there are divers Things in the World which were produced not for themselves or upon a Design of immediately receiving some Benefit but because they were necessary Subjects of what God had directly designed to create So God it may be is the remote cause of Eclypses but yet they are a necessary Series of the Motion of the Planets and he did not think but that this Motion should be changed to avoid Eclypses 2. It is permitted to a
it the best I could in the Night to my great Microscope and then to another that was less but I could not find any Light by the means of these Instruments neither in this Bit nor in any of the Drops of Water which shined before and which I had put into Glasses The tenth of May I examined a little Bit of this Fish with my great Telescope at the brightest Beams of the Sun which shined most of the preceeding Night but we remarked nothing considerable It s Surface seemed whitish and dry with deep Inequalities and the rest as well as I thought they saw a Vapor rather obscure than luminous which raised from this Fish after the manner of small Dust and small Sparkles which were almost imperceptible notwithstanding we are very certain of having seen them for we reckoned them and we all agreed in their Number their Order and their Place yet I am not so assured of this Vapour whereof I have spoken but that I am afraid the Light of the Sun deceived us and that this Vapour was the Dust of the Air. Having made Trial in the Day with a great Microscope upon this Bit we examined it at Night but it gave no more Light whether it was looked upon with Glasses or otherwise Seeing it was dry I thought that by wetting it with Spittle and handling it I could make it shine a little which also happened but this Lustre lasted not long and besides there were seen some small Sparkles which disappeared immediately We perceived them with our Eyes without making Use of Spectacles The Fishes as yet had no ill Smell and had not lost their Savour according to the Judgment even of the most delicate Palates therefore I caused two to be kept to make other Experiments two or three Days afterwards when they should begin to be corrupted hoping to find more Light therein but I found nothing of what I expected neither in stirring the Water nor in drawing out the Fishes An Extract of an English Iournal containing divers Experiments about Petrification THough there hath been already much written of the manner how Stones are formed notwithstanding we have not as yet a perfect History therefore the Curious ought to apply themselves to this matter to perfect it and to discover the Cause of this Transmutation for besides other Advantages which might be drawn from this Knowledg it would be of great Use to hinder a Stone from generating in Human Body or to dissolve it when it is formed To this End there has already been given in divers Places of the English Journal several Relations touching this Matter as the History of a Monstrous Calf which was found in the Belly of its Dam laid upon a great Stone which weighed more than twenty Pounds As also that a certain sandy Earth in England converts into a Stone such Wood as is put therein although there is no petrifying Spring in it There is also mention made of two Stones which were found in the left Ventricle of the Earl of Belcarras one of which was of the bigness of an Almond and the other was one Inch broad and two in length Mr. Boyle relates in his Essay of Firmness several such Histories upon which he makes very curious Reflections There are also several other Examples in the Micrography of Mr. Hook and in the Book of Helmont entituled De Lithiasi where among other things he relates what Pareus saith of a Child petrified that was to be seen formerly at Paris and which served for a Whetting Stone to him that kept it There might several other Histories be added still more surprizing if they were suspected as that of an entire Company of Men and of a Company of Beasts which according to the Relation of Aventius and Purchas were converted into a Stone and what Acosta speaks of a Company of Spanish Cavaliers to whom a like Accident happened Dr. Beale tells us upon this Subject That there was an Inspection about the Time of Easter into the Matrix of a Woman whence a Stone was drawn which she carried for eight or nine Years with unsufferable Torments of which she was since entirely well cured He assures That he hath seen the Stone and that having then weighed it in excellent Ballances he found it weighed near four Ounces but that its Weight is since a great deal diminished and is become very Light for a Stone of the Bigness He adds That it is of a whitish Colour a little clearer than that of Ashes He believes it is not much different from that which Scaliger speaketh of and after him Mr. Boyle in his Essay of Firmness which being exposed to the Air became like Plaister as much in Consistence as Colour It hath no considerable unevennesses and its Figure is almost Oval but one of the Ends is not so much like a Hen's Egg as the other which is bigger and more obtuse than that of a Goose-Egg This Stone is now given to the Royal Society with the Certificate of the Chirurgeon who made the Operation and of several credible Persons who were present thereat Micrographia or some Philosophical Descriptions of minute Bodies made by Magnifying Glasses with Observations and Enquiries thereupon by R. Hook Fellow of the Royal Society in Fol. Lond. ONE of the greatest Obstacles which is in the Progress of Natural Science is that the Ancients being entirely taken up to perfect Reason have neglected the Knowledg of the Senses having rather chosen to guess the most part of things than to see them Notwithstanding as the Soul knoweth nothing but by the Interposition of the Organs of the Body the Operations of the Senses serve not less to acquire a perfect Knowledg of Nature than those of the Mind and they are even more necessary that the Wisdom of God being infinitly above the Reach of our Imagination it is more easie to know what it hath done than to imagine what he hath been willing to make To remedy this Defect the Moderns having endeavoured to perfect the Operation of the Senses particularly that of Sight which is the most necessary of all as it is the noblest have invented two kinds of Glasses the Telescope to draw near the Objects which are invisible because of their Distance and the Microscope to magnifie those which are imperceptible because of their Smalness And with these two Instruments they have discovered more things in a few Years than the Ancients had done with all their Reasons for the Course of many Ages By this means all Nature has appeared New unto us For the Telescope hath shewed us in the Firmament new Motions new Stars and new Meteors And the Microscope hath discovered unto us upon the Earth a little World altogether new and hath made us perceive in each thing an infinity of small Creatures which are not less admirable than all those which have been known hitherto The Ingenious Mr. Hook having made several curious Observations with both the one and the other of these
between them are only about little Accents as Metheg and Makkaph and Munach and Pashta single and double And the divisions about the Points are only about Holem and Kamets Katuph and Kamets Gadol and Pathak and Sheva and Kateph Pathak and so of Dagesh and Raphah and Milhill and Milrah c. But doth Elias suppose these in whole or in part to be the Authors of the Punctation Nay he saith the quite contrary is evident in the words immediately before these of Maimonides And thus saith Elias But as to the Divisions that are between Ben Asher and Ben Naphthali being only about Points and Accents there is no doubt but that they were written after the Points and the Accents were founded And this saith he is easie to understand Masoret Hamasoret Pref. 3. pag. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 3. as indeed it is for the differences being about the several Parts of the Punctation both Points Vowels and Accents all those Parts must needs have been before in being or they could not have been the matter of division or difference between them Obj. What made Ben Asher so long about it if he only Corrected it Sol. The Nature and Weight of the thing to make it a Standard by which to try all Copies of their only Rule of Faith wherein it was needful to observe exactly and compare faithfully by the best Copies every Letter Point and Accent of the Scripture and after that to write it over until that there neither wanted nor yet abounded one Letter Point or Accent of all the Bible was a work wherein many Years might be taken up without supposing him to be the Author of any part of the Punctation because he was long in exact Correcting of it So that here as Elias leaveth Capellus so also the Testimony doth not help him at all and others he hath none 2. As Capellus leaves Elias about the Sence of Maimonides so they differ greatly in the Method and Order wherein they suppose the several parts of the Punctation were invented Capellus conceiteth they were 500 years in compiling after this manner 1. They distinguished the Verses by two thick strokes for Soph pasuk 2. Next to that they placed the five long Vowels a e i o u. 3. Then the Pauses or great Stops by the Accents 4. Then the lesser Stops c. But he brings no Testimony to prove it and 't is no more than his own single Conjecture Now Elias saith they were all made at one time A. D. 500. and that in another manner For Elias saith that next unto the placing of the Period they placed the Colon or Athnack and then the Sakeph And it was necessary saith Elias that they should do all this before they placed the Points because that many of the Points are changed by reason of Athnack and Soph pasuk as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. And indeed on this Account Capellus his Opinion is absurd for the Vowels could not be placed before Athnack and the other Accents which change the Vowels one into another were fixed And that the Points cannot be 500 years in composing viz. from A. D. 500. until A. D. 1040. as Capellus thinks they were the Nature of the Masoretick Notes and the Time unavoidably to be allotted for the same do evince For the Masorites have made their Notes on the Anomalies of all the parts of the Punctation So that the whole of the Punctation must needs have been finished long before their time who yet must needs have been before the time of Ben Asher because the Grammarians succeeded him and take no notice of any Masorites of their time which they could not have omitted if there had been any such Criticks in Grammar-learning among them as the Masorites were And yet 't is as absurd to suppose these Masorites to be before Ben Asher as it was to suppose them since his time Because 1. They had then been Contemporary with the Authors of some part of the Punctation and before the Authors of the last part of the Punctation Which is most absurd as shall be made to appear from the Nature of the Masoretick Notes which do manifestly shew that the whole of the Punctation was long before those Observations For else we must suppose there were several sets of Masorites that did successively arise after every Set of Authors of each part of the Punctation as it was gradually invented and placed But this we cannot imagine Because 1. The First Set of Masorites must then have been so near the Authors of that part of the Punctation which was invented before their time as to have been able to know the Reasons of the Anomalies which if they had known no doubt but they would have mention'd them there being no way like it to restrain Posterity from altering of them Which was the main End of all their Observations so to keep them even as they found them And the same may be said of every Set of Masorites successively 2. Then the First Set of Masorites must have been Authors of the Punctation it self rather than bare Annnotators on it being much more fit than after Ages so to be For if they durst only observe the Anomalies of that part of the Punctation which was before them how then durst any who came after their time become Authors who had no more nor yet so much skill and ability for the same For the succeeding Authors must place the parts of the Punctation of which they were the Authors of the Shapes thereof according as they had received the knowledge of the Force Sound or Pronunciation thereof from these Masotites who were their Predecessors who yet durst not attempt any such things themselves 3. If the Masorites were of such distant and divers Ages there would then be a proportionable difference in their Style and Dialect and those who made Notes on the First Part of the Punctation would have been known by their Style Dialect or Authority from those who made their Notes on the Last Part of it But there is no Mark or Means left whereby we can disâ—ern who were first or who were last by any difference of Style Dialect or Authority in any one part of the Masoretick Notes from another part of it So that these Masorites could not be before the whole of the Punctation was finished nor yet since Ben Asher's time and therefore the Punctation must needs have been finished before Ben Asher's time Which holds good against the Third Opinion which is That they were begun and ended by Ben Asher As also doth what Elias hath said before about it And therefore no Testimony being brought by any for this Opinion and few or none at this time contending for it we need not enlarge upon it But seeing Capellus would be accounted to be for the main of Elias his Opinion though he differs from him in these Particulars as to the time taken up in Composing the Punctation and the
so that they were half naked Besides which they suffered both their Beard and Hair to grow This Dress with their particular manner of Carriage drew many Children after them and exposed them to their Ridicule Yet for all the apparent Severity they were very debauched as they walked the Streets this Aspersion was often cast upon them especially when out of Greece 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Grec imposteur Their Garments were generally black and dirty and if any one was seen to affect the same Slovenliness he was certain to have the same Reproaches rendred him as St. Ierome makes appear in his Epistle to Marcellus upon the Infirmity of Blasill The Christian Monks with their habits inheriting the Vanity of the Philosophers also it is believed by some Authors that the Heathens called them through Contempt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Black Casacks and said they were no mark of Virtue so that it was but wearing a Mourning Dress and that it imported not what they appeared outwardly since there was nothing but excessive Vanity within Now to return to Iustin Antiquity assures us he lived very conformably to the habit he wore He went to Rome in the beginning of the Reign of Antonine the Pious and fixt his Abode there applying himself to the defence of the Christian Religion against the Heathens Marcionites and other Hereticks in pursuit of which he writ several Books that have been lost About the hundred and fortieth Year of the Blessed Jesus he Presented to Antonine his Apology for the Christian Religion Which seemed to be the Cause that the Emperor publish'd an Edict and sent into all Asia commanding that the Christians should be proceeded against according to the ordinary Forms of Justice whereas before they took away their Goods banished them and sometimes put them to death without any Formalities at all In Dr. Cave there are some critical Observations on the date of this Edict by which he plainly proves that it was Antonine's and not Marcus Aurelius's as some Learned Men have supposed After having Publish'd this Apology Iustin makes a Voyage into Asia where he came acquainted with Trypho the Iew which Dr. Cave believes to be R. Tarpho who was Friend to R. Akiba that is so often spoke of in the Thalmud Trypho had retired from Iudea after the War of Barchocheas and Iustin finding him at Ephesus disputed with him for two days of which he gives an account to the Publick in a Book Entituled A Dialogue with Trypho From thence returning to Rome he composed that Apology which is called the First tho it was really the Second and Presented it to Marcus Aurelius Lucius Verus for a certainty not being at that time at Rome Iustin had great Contests also with one Crescens a Cynic Philosopher who under the pretended Austerities of a Philosophical Life concealed many shameful Disorders Wherefore Iustin calls him a Philosopher and no Philosopher 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This Man enraged against Iustin resolved to do his utmost to ruin him he found it not difficult to make use of the excessive Superstition of Marcus Aurelius to that end who had also a very ill Opinion of the Christians as is evident by these words of his Book 11. § 3. Such is the Disposition of the Soul that it must be separated from the Body whether it be extinguish'd and dissipated like a Vapour or whether it Subsists This Disposition must proceed from its own Iudgment not from a Passion purely which troubles it as is often seen in the Christians but from a calm and solid Reasoning such as may be inspired to another without making use of Discourses full of Figures and Exaggerations The Circumstances of Iustin's Death may be seen in the Account of his Martyrdom which Dr. Cave believes to be true Their shortness he says being no little sign that they have been taken from ancient Memoirs without being corrected and added to in latter Ages as many things of the like nature have been It is true that some have doubted whether those Acts contained the Martyrdom of Iustin according to matter of Fact but their Suspicion seems not to be well grounded because there is nothing but what agrees very well with it especially the Time and Death of this Martyr which was when Rusticus was Praefect of Rome as St. Epiphanius confirms Rusticus was a great Man both in the Wars and State very much enclined to Philosophy and particularly that of the Stoicks He had been Governor to Marcus Aurelius as may be seen in the First Book of this Emperor where are the chief Lessons that he learnt of him Before this Rusticus Iustin and Six other Christians were brought after they had been first put in Prison He asked them if they were Christians they all freely confessing it publickly and refusing to Sacrifice to the Roman Deities were Beheaded Baronius concludes it to be in the 165th Year after Christ as agrees very well with the Alexandrian Chronology that saith a little after Iustin had presented his second Apology to the Emperor he received the Crown of Martyrdom Dr. Cave after the Relation of Iustin's Death gives a Character of his Virtues and Learning in the manner of a Panegyric as he does to all the Lives he has Written where all along he mingles Eloquence with the Critical part of his History He tells us that although Ancients have extremely praised the Learning of Iustin this Holy Man had no knowledge of the Hebrew as appears by the Etymology he gives of the word Satanas which he saith comes from Sata and from Nas that in Hebrew and Syriac signifie an Apostat Whereas 't is known that the Termination in AS is from the Greek and is added to the word Satan which signifies in Hebrew an Enemy The Etymology that Iustin gave to this word without doubt made Trypho Laugh this shews that some Moderns have not been very well acquainted with the Writings of our Martyr because that a false Etymology of the word Osanna being found in his Book entituled Questions and Answers to the Orthodox They have concluded it to be none of Iustin's who according to them understood Hebrew very well because he was born in Palestine Mr. Rivet also gives this Reason in his Book Entituled Criticus Sacer from whence Sundius hath taken it and added to this Treatise de Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis which consists almost of nothing else but what others that have treated of the same matter have said before him Dr. Cave informs us that this Author who pretended to have read the Writings of the Ancients his Citations of which savour infinitely more of Ostentation than Judgment or Fidelity hath sufficiently declared his Ignorance in what relates to the Fathers with whom he has pretended to be so well acquainted when he made that Remark on Iustin. Though Dr. Cave does not look upon this Work as his but rejects it for other Reasons as well as many other that have been
division without excepting even the Spaniards altho' he has been pretty bountiful to them What he says of the Manners and Wit of the Chinese is admirable they keep no Memoirs of their Warlike Princes and reserve their Elogies for the Peace Makers and Righteous They never delighted in Conquests unless the desire of living under so wise a Government invited by their Neighbours to submit but they constrained none being only concerned if men who wanted this happiness refused to participate with them They acknowledge none as Gentlemen but Men of Learning t is derogatory amongst them and reduces them into a Plebean state to forsake this profession The Counsellors and Favorites of the Prince are all Philosophers and when he commits a fault they reprehend him with so much Liberty and Freedom that the Prophets took not more in respect to the Kings of Iudah If they don't make use of this Priviledge the People censure them and look upon 'em as weak Men and degenerate from the Courage of Confutius and other Philosophers who have retired from the Court in a time of Tyranny They reproach them to their face with Cowardise and say that they are neither Philosophers nor Men of honour since for their own private Interests they abandon the good of the Publick As for their Wit Mr. Vossius believes they surpass all the World and that after having learnt from 'em the Compass Printing and many other admirable things he doubts not but there remains much finer Inventions amongst 'em than we have borrowed of 'em He tells us wonderful things of their skill in Physick and above all their Art in knowing the Diseases by the differences of the Pulse They are so admirable in that respect that they look not upon a Man to be a good Physitian if after having felt divers places of the sick persons Arm he does not without asking Questions discover from what part of the Body the Distemper proceeds as well as the nature of it 'T is very pleasant to read all the curious things that Mr. Vossius has related upon this subject and upon the Ability of this Nation in all the noble Arts. He pretends that they made use of Powder and Cannons many Ages before the Europeans were acquainted with them and adds to it the Original and Progress of Powder amongst the people of Europe The other Pieces which compose Mr. Vossius's Works are not less worthy of particular observation but having been long upon this there 's a necessity of being brief upon what follows 1. He treats upon the Constructions of Galleys very learnedly 2. On the Reformation of Longitudes The Author maintains that the observations of Eclipses have more confounded this matter than any thing whatsoever because they have not sufficiently regarded either Refractions or Shadows He corrects many errors that concern the extent of the Mediterranean Sea which has been render'd much less than really it is he shews also that the like faults have been committed upon many Eastern parts of Asia and says that the dispute betwixt the Portuguese and Spaniards touching the Division of the New World has produced strange Alterations both in Longitudes and Geography 3. He speaks of Navigation into the Indies and Iapan by the North this Treatise contains many curious and useful observations 4. He examines the cause of the Circles which appear sometimes about the Moon Upon which he has some thoughts perfectly new for he believes these Circles proceed from the Mountains in the Moon because they produce their Images reverst in the Air that is under them which he maintains by some experiments Amongst others he relates this that some English Merchants being on the Pick of Tenariff observed that as soon as the Sun arose the shadow of this high Mountain convered not only all the Isle of Teneriff but also the great Canarie and all the Sea even unto the Horizon where the top of the Pick seem'd to appear reverst which sent back its shadow into the Air. He tells us a very surprizing thing viz. that the shadow of this Mountain extended as far as the Levant to the place even from whence the Light came since the great Canarie which is at the East of this Pick is covered with the shadow What he adds concerning the Sea between this Mountain and the grand Canaries is very remarkable for he says it appears not larger than the Thames although there is fourteen Leagues between these two Isles 5. He treats of the fall of heavy Bodies and explains it according to the Cartesians by the Diurnal Motion of the Earth upon its Center but establishes a Principle unknown to Mr. Des Cartes viz. That a Body which is moved Circularly approaches nearer to the Center than is possible when its Axis is perpendicular to the Horizon But if its Axis is parallel to the Horizon then it is removed from the Center as far as 't is possible He relates an Experiment that he says was made some times agoe and which is quite contrary to Mr. Hugens's given us by Mr. Rohault for whereas Mr. Hugens says that the Particles of Spanish Wax dipp'd in a Vessel full of Water which is turn'd upon a Pirot are removed farther from the Center and soon arrive to the extremities of the Vessel Mr. Vossius has found out that Balls of Leed and Iron thrown into a Vessel of Water which is moved circularly tend towards the Center of the Vessel whereas Bowls of Wood which float upon the Surface of the Water make towards the sides of it The rest of the Book is a Treatise upon the Oracles of the Sybils which Mr. Vossius published in the Year 1672. There 's also the Answer that he made sometime after to the Objections of Mr. Simon scatter'd throughout his Critical History of the Old Testament and a Reply to that part of the Discourse which concerns him in Father Simons's Disquisitiones Criticae de varâ—s Bibliorum Editionibus Historia Plantarum c. Or Ray's History of Plants Tom. 1st London 1686. SInce Baubin published his History of Plants and Parkinson his Botanick Theater a great Number of Plants have been discoved that appeared not in their Collection Several Authors have described many that were unknown to the Botanists that liv'd before them But no one yet has ever gathered them together in one Piece like our present Author who has also used much more Method than has yet been observed on the same Subject He divides Plants into Genders and Kinds and gives an account of those that resemble them in their principal parts as in their Flower Seed and Films which cover them He thinks this Method is the most Natural and easie to attain in a little time to the knowledg of Botanicks and doubts not but any one that will apply himself to this study may without the help of a Master by following these Rules to accomplish it and be well acquainted with Plants If any Plant shou'd be found which comes not under these
'T was thus I took a Vessel full of Water the depth of four Inches the Diameter whereof was seven inches 2 10 in which I placed a Thermometer Afterwards by the means of a Chaâ—ing-Dish full of hot Coals I brought the Water to the same degree of Heat as we feel in the hottest Summer as appeared by the Thermometer That being done I ty'd this Vessel without taking any thing out of it to one end of the Beam of a Ballance and put on the other side Weights exactly of the same heaviness It was easy to preserve the same Degree of Heat in the Water by the Chafing Dish of Coals either drawing it nearer or putting it at a farther distance I soon observed that the Weight of the Water sensibly diminished and in about 2 Hours space 233 Grains of Water was evaporated altho' no Fume was observ'd to ascend and the Water appear'd not hot to the touch This quantity of Water evaporating in so small a time seems very considerable for it follows from thence that in 24 Hours it wou'd evaporate six Ounces of Water from so small a Surface which was a Circle of 8 Inches Diameter To draw an exact Computation from this Experiment and to determine the greatness of the quantity of the Water that is thus evaporated I made use of the Experiment that Doctor Bernard affirmed to have been made at Oxford It is That the quantity of Water of the bigness of a Cubic Foot weighs 76 Pounds of Troy weight This number being divided by 1728. which is the Number of the Cubic Inches contain'd in this Foot gives 253 Grains and â…“ or one ½ Ounce 13 Grains â…“ for the weight of a Cubic Inch of Water The weight then of 233 Grains is 233 253 or 35 parts of a Cubic Inch divided into 38. Now the Area of a Circle the Diameter whereof is 7 Inches 2 10 contains 49 Inches square by which dividing the quantity of the evaporated Water viz. 35 38 of an Inch the Quotient is 38 1862 or 1 5.3 from whence it appears the quantity of this Water is the 53 part of an Inch but for the facility of the Calculation we will suppose it is but the 60 part If then the Water as hot as the Air is in Summer exhales the 60 part of an Inch in two Hours from the Surface described in twelve Hours it will exhale the 10 part a sufficient quantity to furnish all Rains Fountains and Dews This Calculation may even suppose the Sea without its diminishing or overflowing like the Caspian Sea which is always of an equal height and supposing also the Current which they say is always in the Streights of Gibralter altho' the Mediterranean Sea receives a great number of considerable Rivers To make an estimation of the quantity of Water which is exhaled by Vapours from the Sea I believe one need only consider it during the time the Sun is up for as for the Night as much Water falls in Dews or even more than it draws up in Vapours during that time It is true that the Summer days are above 12 Hours but this length of the day is counter-ballanced by the weakness of the action of the Sun when it is up and before the Water is hot Thus if I suppose that if it raises every day in Vapours 1 10 of an Inch the Extent already observed from the Sea this Supposition cannot be rejected According to this Hypothesis 10 Inches square from the Surface of the Water will furnish every day in Vapours a Cubic Inch of Water each Foot the square whereof produces half a Pint 4 Feet square Gallon a Mile square 6914 Tuns and a Degree square supposing it to be 60 English Miles will exhale in Vapours 33 Millions of Tuns If we give to the Mediterranean 40 Degrees in length and 4 Degrees in breadth in respect to those Places that are broader and those that are narrower the least without doubt that can be given will be a 160 Degrees square and by consequence all the Mediterranean Sea in a Summers day will emit in Vapours 5280 Millions of Tuns This quantity of Vapours altho' very great is however the least that can be supposed according to the Experiment that I have related It is true there is another thing that one cannot reduce to certain Rules it is the Winds which from the Surface of the Water take more Particles than the Heat of the Sun evaporates as may be easily conceived if we do but reflect on the Winds which sometimes blow It is very difficult to make a true estimation of the quantity of Water that the Mediterranean Sea receives from the Rivers that fall into it unless one had some way to measure the Mouths of the Rivers and their Rapidity All that can be done in this Affair is rather to give 'em a greater quantity of Water than indeed they have than to take from them that is to suppose 'em greater than they are according to all appearance and afterwards to compare the quantity of Water that the Thames carries into the Sea with that of those Rivers which we shall calculate The Mediterranean Sea receives these nine considerable Rivers the Eber the Rhone Tyber the Po the Danube the Nester the Boristhenus the Tanais and the Nile others being neither so celebrated nor so large Wee 'l suppose that each of these nine Rivers have ten times as much Water as the Thames not that there are any that have really ten times as much but to comprehend in our Calculation other Rivers that are less which discharge themselves into the Mediterranean the bigness of which we can no otherwise make any estimation of To measure the Water of the Thames I take it at Kingston Bridg where the Reflux never happens and where the Water always runs downwards The breadth of it is 100 Yards and its depth 3 supposing it every where equal in which computation I am certain I give it rather more Extent than it really has The Water is then in this place 300 Yards square that multiplied by 48 thousand is I believe the quantity of Water that is drawn up admitting 2000 each Hour or 84480 Yards give 25344000 Yards of Water which will be drain'd in a day that is 2030000 Tuns each day I am persuaded that by what I have added more to the Channel of this River than it really hath I have sufficiently compensated by comprehending therein the Rivers of Brent Lea Wandal and of Darwent which are of some Consideration and which discharge themselves into the Thames below Kingston Bridg. Now if every one of these nine Rivers had ten times more Water than the Thames it wou'd it follow that from each River wou'd every day run into the Sea 203 Millions of Tuns and that the whole will be but 1827 Millions of Tuns which is but a little more than the third part of what I have shewn is evaporated out of the Mediterranean Sea in 12 Hours time The
Knowledg is still wanting what becomes of these Vapours when they are rais'd in the Air and from whence comes that Current which always appears at the entrance of the Straits of Gibralter but Mr. Halley sends us back once more to examine it only advertises the Reader that to make the Experiment which he hath spoken of he must make use of Water which hath been Salted to the same Degree that the common Sea Water is dissolving therein one fortieth part of Salt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 SEU De Punctorum Origine Antiquitate Authoritate OR A DISCOURSE Concerning the ANTIQUITY DIVINE ORIGINAL AND AUTHORITY OF THE Points Uowels and Accents That are placed to the HEBREW BIBLE In TWO PARTS By a Member of the ATHENIAN SOCIETY Quod superest de Vocalium Accentuum Antiquitate eorum sententiae subscribo qui Linguam Hebraeam tamquam c. i. e. As for the Antiquity of the Vowels and Accents I am of their Opinion who maintain the Hebrew Language as the exact Pattern of all others to have been plainly written with them from the Beginning seeing that they who are otherwise minded do not only make Doubtful the Authority of the Scriptures but in my Iudgment wholly pluck it up by the Roots for without the Vowels and Notes of Distinction it hath nothing firm and certain Anton. Rodulph Cevallerius Rudimenta Hebraicae Linguae cap. 4. pag. 16. LONDON Printed for Iohn Dunton at the Raven in the Poultrey MDCXCII 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 OR A Discourse concerning the Antiquity and Original of the Points Vowels and Accents that are placed to the Hebrew Bible In Two Parts The FIRST PART WHEREIN The Opinions of Elias Levita Ludivicus Capellus Dr. Walton and Others for the Novelty of the Points are considered their Evidences for the same examined and the Improbability of their Conceit that the Masorites of Tiberias Pointed the Text is at large discovered from the Silence of the Iews about it their Testimonies against it the Unfitness of the Time Place and Persons of late assigned for the Invention of the Points from the Nature of the Masora and of the Masoretick Notes on the Verses Words Letters Points Vowels and Accents of the Old Testament Their Observations on all the Kinds of the Keri U Ketib the Words written Full or Defective the Ittur Sopherim the Tikkun Sopherim and the rest of the Parts of the Masora and from other Considerations The SECOND PART Containing the Principal Testimonies and Arguments of Iews and Christians for the Proof of the Antiquity Divine Original and Authority of the Points Vowels and Accents Wherein the chiefest Objections of Elias Capellus and Others are either Obviated or briefly Answered The Cause Occasion and Method of the ensuing Discourse is declared in the Prooemium or Introduction AMongst our Abstracts of Books that have a more particular Relation to Ecclesiasticks such as the various Editions of the Bible Iurieu's System of the Church c. we have thought fit to insert this our own following Collection which perhaps may more particularly treat of the Parts of the Masora than any Piece yet extant It will be of great Use to all Scholars that are design'd for the Study of the Original Tongues and will help to make good our Title-page The Young Students Library We have herein endeavoured to remove some Prejudices and reconcile the Differences of the Learned on this great and weighty Subject which is of no less Consequence than the receiving or rejecting the Bible it self We must not enlarge in Prefacing to any Work where the Works themselves are to be Absteacts but referr you to the Subject it self Advice to the Young Students of Divinity Recommending the Study of the Scriptures in their Original Languages together with the Writings and Commentaries of the Rabbins thereupon with Directions for the Knowledge thereof Men and Brethren YOur Work is the greatest as St. Paul saith Who is sufficient for these things Consider what Knowledge the Work you must account for at the last Tribunal doth most require and attend it Hoc age You are to have the Care of Souls and to your Trust are committed the Oracles of God Your great Concern therefore is to know the Mind of God as it is revealed in his Word that you may teach it others and defend it against all Opposers This is all you are entrusted with and shall be judged by to wit the Bible This Word or Mind of God is contained perfectly in the Hebrew Bible and Greek Testament only Translations are no further God's Word than they do express the sense thereof which in all places they cannot perfectly do without more words than are allowed to to be in a Translation These Sacred Originals are the Standard and Rule of our Life Worship and Doctrine and the Fate of all Translations depends on their Preservation If therefore the Teachers need not know nor be able to defend the Original none else need Then were the Translation of it needless and so the Scripture it self and thereby all Religion and Ministery to boot if any of these things are needful they are all so for they stand or fall together Now that we may know the Mind of God in his Word we must first know what the words themselves do signifie and properly and literally mean This we cannot do in many places without the help of the Rabbins or of those who have been taught by them which is much the same and that on several Accounts which renders their Work needful as Leusden in Philologus Hebraeo-mixtus pag. 115 c. and others do manifest As 1 st Because many words as to the Grammar and sense of them could not be known without the help of those Masters of the Hebrew Tongue as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ioel 2.5 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ioel 2.8 c. 2. There are many words but once used in Scripture especially in such a sence and are called the Apax legomena or ein lo chober bemikr◠which we cannot know the meaning of without their help and herein they are singular though they lament the loss they have been put to about them vid. Kimchi in his Preface on Miklol Also Kimchi in his Preface on Sepher Sherashim tells a Story how they knew not the meaning of that word a Besom in the Prophet's sweeping with the Beesom of Destruction till in Arabia a Rabbin heard a Woman say to her Daughter Take the Besom and sweep the House So Ioel 2.8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Sword To conclude There are very many such words but once used which as they cannot be known by the Bible alone so neither can the sence of the place be known wherein they are till they are first known and this is in many places 3. Many Phrases and divers ways of Speech are very dubious in the Old and New Testament which are well illustrated and explained by the Rabbins as Ioel 1.20 Ionah 1.5 Iudg. 12.7 Gen. 2.2 c. And