informs his Understanding then assists and inclines his will by his Grace and so applys himself to his inferiour Appetites in a way suitable to their Natures in bringing them under the Power and Government of Reason and Religion I shall here rather enquire how far God made use of the Fancy and Imagination in the Communications of himself to his Servants under the Law by way of Prophecy and this I shall rather do because of the dangerous Opinions that some Men have of late vented on this Subject thereby endeavouring to undermine the very Foundation of all Divine Revelation truly so call'd For they think if they can but once sufficiently disparage the manner of God's revealing himself to the Prophets under the Old Testament they will be hereby better enabled to reject all Divine Revelation under the New I shall here therefore make some short reflections upon the Author of Tractatus-Theol Polit in his two first Chapters of Prophets and Prophecy In Order thereunto I shall premise 1st God in the Communications of himself to Mankind is not ty'd to any either Natural or Moral qualifications of the Persons he pleases to make use of For what ever is wanting either as to the vigorousness of the Fancy or strength of understanding God can supply the defects hereof some other way or act more immediately by himself in absence of them all 2dly Yet notwithstanding God commonly makes use of Second Causes and of Instruments duly qualified in order to the effecting his Designs in the World particularly in Prophecy According to the constant Opinion of the Iewish Doctors there were certain previous preparatory dispositions in order to it and these were of three Sorts Natural Acquir'd and Moral 1. A good Natural Complexion and Temper of Body a due mixture of the Humours without any predominancy of Melancholy a Mind naturally Calm and Chearful a Fancy Active and Vigorous an Understanding Clear and Strong without any Crazedness or Inconsistency 2. All these improv'd to the highest Degrees of perfection by Study and Industry 3. To these must also be added a vertuous and well-disposed Temper of Soul free from all vicious habits and inclinations Thus the Iews had their Schools of the Prophets for the fitting and preparing Young Scholars which they call'd the Sons of the Prophets for that imployment Now this sufficiently shews that something more than mere Fancy was required to the Nature of Prophecy Yet this is not so to be understood as if Prophecy was the Natural result of any of these singly or of all joyntly unless God was pleas'd to Communicate himself to some as he saw fit For all these who were brought up in the Schools of the Prophets did not presently prophesie Thus neither the absence of the usual qualifications do incapacitate a Man for Prophecy nor doth the concurrence of 'em all make one actually a Prophet Prophecy in the formal Notion and Nature of it being no ways in the power of Man but wholly depends upon the will of God Hence we see what little reason the soresaid Author had to say that tho' God did make use of the Fancy sometimes in the conveyance of his Will to the Prophets yet that Prophecy Non nisi ope imaginationis persicitur à solâ imaginatione pendet and this he proves no other ways than because they prophesied But this is not to prove but to beg the Question He first makes an injust Comparison betwixt Natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation 1. In respect of the Name and tells us that the one may be called Divine as well as the other because they are both deriv'd from the same Fountain viz. God But thus by the same way of arguing he must and indeed doth assert That either there are no Miracles at all or else that all the effects of Nature are such because the power of Nature is the Divine Power as well as that of Miracles But in order to either of these he should first make good one or both of these Positions either that God hath not an immediate Power of Acting by himself distinct from the ordinary course of Nature or else that since the constitution of the Natural Frame of the Universe he hath not reserv'd to himself a liberty of Acting according to that Original Power neither of which will he be ever able to prove 2. Suppose Natural Knowledge may also be call'd Prophecy or Divine Revelation in respect of it's Original yet how can it be call'd aequali jure as he says Divine because in other respects both as to the manner of their conveyance and largeness of extent there is a great deal of difference betwixt 'em however why should Natural Knowledge be call'd Divine Revelation since Custom and good Reason have justly affix'd them to several things for he that goes about to unhinge the signification of Words which Use and Custom has truly appropriated to 'em in Divinity has probably no better design than he that removes the ancient Land-Marks in a common Field viz. Injury Disorder and Confusion Tho' this must be also granted that Natural Knowledge doth bring us under an Obligation to those respective Duties which it dictates even antecedent to that of Divine Revelation For we are first Men and then Christians and by both these ways God hath made known his Will and claims our Obedience He grants indeed that Humanae Naturae Leges in se consideratae non possunt ejus i. e. Divinae Revelationis esse causa Why he should thus mince the matter as to insert these Words in se consideratae I know not whereas 't is certain That the Laws of Humane Nature can be no ways the cause of Divine Revelation I know his meaning here is suspected by some to be this that the Laws of Nature consider'd in themselves that is without the supposal of a God which is one integral part of the Universe so indeed they cannot be the cause of Divine Revelation but then supposing a God so interwoven with the Laws of Nature as that he shall be either really the same with or very little different from the Universe and the Laws thereof under this consideration how far the Laws of Nature may be the cause of Divine Revelation that is of that which he calls such is the grand mysterious Question The other thing wherein he compares Natural Knowledge with Prophecy is in respect of certainty wherein Natural Knowledge he says comes no ways short of Prophetical If we consider the certainty the Prophet himself had of those things which were reveal'd to him we are now at a loss how certainly to determine this Question for he only could fully assure us of the truth of these things they relating to himself Yet it seems very reasonable to believe that the certainty of their Knowledge did not any way fall short of but rather exceed that of Natural Knowledge seeing we may casily suppose that God may by the secret influences of his Spirit by the
more immediate applications of himself to the minds of Men as fully assure 'em of the truth of his Revelations as they can be of any thing by any Natural Principles and that it really and actually was so may appear from hence that those to whom God convey'd these Revelations have by vertue hereof undertaken the performance of such things which arguments drawn from mere Sense and Reason in all probability could not have perswaded 'em to Cum it aque mens nostra ex hoc solo quod Dei naturam objectivè in se continet de eadem participat potestatem habeat ad formandas notiones c. Merito mentis naturam quatenus talis concipitur primam Divinae Revelationis causam statuere possumus This seems very strange mystical Divinity if by Divine Revelation he mean Revelation truly so call'd then it is altogether unconceiveable how any impressions of Natural and Moral Truths and that is all that he ought to understand by those expressions quod Dei Naturam objective in se continet de eâdem participat How these can any ways be the cause of Divine Revelation if by Divine Revelation he mean nothing but Natural Knowledge besides the impropriety of the Expression I do not see how the Soul can so truly be call'd the first cause even of that neither but rather the first and immediate subject of it Upon the whole matter one might almost be perswaded from hence to think That by our Souls containing in it the Nature of God objectively and partaking of the very same that hereby he design'd as it were to melt down God and the Soul of Man into an equal constitution and both into parts of a material Universe Then he tells us that Quicquid dici potest ex Scripturâ solâ peti debet What ever is said of things relating to Divine Revelation ought to be fetch'd from Scripture alone This in general is a very good Rule yet it is to be understood with some certain limitations as he himself acknowledges in the same Paragraph unless we had rather say that the latter part thereof contradicts the former for he tells us That the Iews never took any notice of Second Causes but did generally recur to God as the cause of all great and excellent things they had occasion to speak of And therefore we must only take that for Supernatural Revelation which Scripture expressly says is such or what may be gathered to be so from the circumstances of the Relation First I grant that God may declare that again which a Man either by Natural Principles or some other way knew before Secondly When God makes any Revelation to a Man it is necessary that he should make such a reduplicative Declaration as this That this which I now speak is Pure Simple unmixt Divine Revelation such as exceeds the Power of Natural Causes to make known if so then it may be questioned Whether God ever made any supernatural Revelation to Mankind or no because we no where meet with any such Declaration And as to the circumstances of the Narration we can never according to his Principles from thence gather any thing to be truly Divine because as I intimated before he makes the Power of God and the Power of Nature the same or however asserts that we are very much ignorant how far the Powers of Nature may extend However we may make use of this assertion against himself that if we may argue from the circumstances of the Relation then it is not necessary that whatever is said concerning these things should be fetch'd from Scripture only 'T is easily observable how this Author by unsetling the significations of Words and confounding the Notions of things designs to bring all into confusion he argues much what at a rate with Mr. Hobbs that is weakly and probably with the same design that is Wickedly But Providence hath so ordered affairs that a bad Cause should always be a weak one He founds all Prophecy meerly in the imagination hence he says it is that the Prophets conceiv'd all things parabolically and express'd spiritual things after a Corporeal manner because this agrees more with the Nature of Imagination Hence it was that those that were with Christ saw the Spirit descending like a Dove and the Apostles as it were Tongues of Fire and S. Paul when he was Converted saw a great light because all these things did suit with the nature of Imagination As if either there was no Foundation in Nature for any such belief but only the imagination of Men or as if these appearances reach'd no further than the Fancy without any Divine Influence making any further impressions upon the minds of those who were concern'd herein Si igitur sacra volumina percurramus videbimus quod omnia quae Deus Prophet is revelavit iis revelat a fuerunt vel verbis vel figuris vel utroque modo That all the Prophecies we meet withal in Scripture were convey'd to the Prophets by Words or Figures and sensible Representations or both I shall here show First That this assertion is false Secondly If it was true yet it would not prove what he thereby designs 1. It doth not appear that all the Divine Revelations in Scripture were convey'd one of these two ways There are some instances where there is no mention made of either of these two and to say that one of these was made use of tho' not express'd this is gratis dictum and contrary to his own Rule That whatever is said of these things must be drawn from Scripture The instances I mean are those of Ioseph's interpreting the Dreams of the Butler and the Baker and of Pharoah's Dream concerning the Seven Years of Dearth c. Gen. 40 and 41 chap. Now the Interpretation of Dreams is as much Prophecy or Divine Revelation as the Dreams themselves and yet here we do not find either any Voice or sensible Representation Nor are his Reasons any whit more cogent than his Instances for tho' he grants it possible for God immediately to communicate himself to Men Attamen ut homo aliquis solâ mente aliqua perciperet quae in primis nostrae cognitionis fundamentis non continentur nec ab iis deduci possant ejus mens praestantior necessariò atque humana longe excellentior esse deberet But I know no reason why the Soul of Man is not of capacity enough to perceive and apprehend the Objects of Divine Revelation when duly communicated to the perceptive Faculties without the assistance of Fancy or Imagination For this is certain and both Reason and Religion obliges us to believe That God doth convey his gracious Assistances by which he both enlightens the Understanding and reforms the Will without the mediation of the Phancy and it is also very reasonable to believe That God did many times under the Old Testament convey the Intimations of his Will to Men without either Voice or Vision however this is certainly done by the
Metaphor then it is meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant. 2. Those who assert these Natural Notions do not suppose them super-induc'd or imprinted upon the Soul In esse completo but suppose them to be native Properties and Qualifications of the Soul as it is such as God first design'd to make it that is Rational and Religious Now it can be no meer Iargon to ascribe to a Subject its own natural and essential Properties such as are the very essential parts of its Constitution They do also suppose with Mr. Norris the ideal World or Idea's in the Divine Intellect which are the Archetypal Forms or Patterns of all Truth these they say are communicated to the Soul in a way and proportion suitable to such a being that is they are made either the natural Properties of its being as such or the necessary and immediate result of its Faculties in the right use and free exercise of 'em But the Author in the forementioned place tells us That he accounts for the mode of Humane Understà nding after a very different way viz. by the presentialness of the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or ideal World to our Souls wherein we see and perceive all things So that denying all mental Impressions not only innate Notions but also those which according to Dr. Lock derive their Original from Sensation or Reslection he asserts all sensible moral and intellectual Objects are only seen and understood in the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thus in his Book of Reason and Religion p. 85. This ideal World this Essence of God consider'd as variously exhibitive and representative of things is no other than the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second Person in the ever blessed Trinity this I think says he is highly agreeable to Reason for I know no Hypothesis that would so intelligibly make out the Eternal Generation of the Son of God Against this Opinion I shall briefly suggest these few Prejudices which whether they be real or only imaginary I shall leave to the Reader to judge 1. I grant that every good Christian so far as in him lies ought to defend against the Socinians the Mysteries of the Trinity from all palpable and down-right Contradictions But then it is question'd by some whether it be either modest or indeed possible to invent Hypotheses which may as the Authour speaks Intelligibly make out these Mysteries or whether the Eternal Generation of the Son of God may not as well remain as indeed it is an Incomprehensible Mystery as thus explain'd by making the ideal World and the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be one and the same thing 2lv Though the natural parturiency of the Authors own Mind p. 185. of his Reason and Religion did early pitch upon this Notion of seeing and knowing all things in God as easy and obvious even before he had consulted any Authors herein yet other Mens Capacities may be so dull as not easily to apprehend the manner of it even now after such an exact Elaboration 3. According to his Hypothesis there seems not a sufficient difference and distinction betwixt natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation seeing God must immediately apply himself to the Souls of Men in both and there is no natural ground or foundation in Man for one more than for the other 4. It seems not so becoming that profound veneration we ought to have of the Majesty of God thus to make the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were the Glass of every trivial perception of sensible objects 5. May not his Hypothesis of seeing and perceiving all things in God seem to discourage or lessen the diligent use of our Faculties in the search of Truth or may it not encourage Enthusiasm by giving Men occasion to think that the only way to Knowledge is fantastically to give themselves up to the Impressions of the Ideal World These things I here propound to Consideration though withal I think that it is more easy to oppose the particular manner of any Mans explaining humane Understanding than it is to lay down a true one of his own But lastly That which seems of the greatest consequence is that the Author dangerously forces some places of Scripture only to make 'em favour the peculiarity of his notion Thus Io. 1. 3. all things were made by him or according to him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 89. Reason and Religion and p. 90. Heb. 1. By him God is said to make the Worlds that is says he according to the eternal exemplars or platforms in this ideal World Now if the Arrians were justly blam'd for putting that interpretation upon those words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thereby to signify an Instrumental Cause as if the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was only an Instrument in the hand of God in creating the World how much more then ought this interpretation to be rejected which makes the second Person in the Trinity only an Exemplar or Platform according to which God made the World but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with a Genitive Case in Scripture generally signifies the efficient Cause And however I believe he will no where in Scripture find it in that sense which he there puts upon it So that this ingenious Author seems not so successful in assigning his own particular way of humane Understanding as he was in confuting that of Dr. Lock 's And here I would further appeal to the considerate Reader whether this way of seeing and perceiving all things in the ideal World if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor whether it be not as meer Iargon and unintelligible Cant as the other Anima est abrasa tabula nihil est in intellectu quod non priùs erat in sensu These and such like Opinions seem to owe that general reception they meet withal rather to the Authority of their first Founder than to any strength of reason that would be found in 'em did they once undergo a severer Examination this Opinion seems to tye the Soul to its particular Seat or at most gives it leave only to go a begging to the Cinque-Ports of the Senses not only for all the Notices it receives from abroad but also for all the knowledge it enjoys at home That the Soul by the very Laws of Creation was at first dependant upon the Body and by the first transgression of the Divine Law is now more deeply immers'd in matter and a greater Slave thereto than it was by nature is certainly true but then the Image of God wherein Man was at first Created did first more especially respect the Soul 2. It consisted in the respective Endowments and Perfections of the Understanding and Will viz. in Knowledge and Righteousness And therefore 3. Not in a mere capacity or bare possibility of having this Pourtraicture drawn afterwards upon the Soul by the assistance of the outward Senses but in something at first actually existent in it self And supposing this to be the true state
so much as any Law of Nature but then he says that it is false that the Gentiles not believing in Christ either did or could perfectly observe the Law and who ever said they could The Text only says That the Gentiles not having the Law that is not any reveal'd Law did by nature the things of the Law Now he will needs make doing the things of the Law to be perfectly to observe the Law and further if by Gentiles be understood those that believed in Christ how can it be said that these are a Law unto themselves seeing they had both the Law of Moses and the Law of Christ to direct ' em But from hence it will be obvious to observe what hard shifts Men are commonly forc'd to make when once they engage in the defence of a false Opinion Some Reflections upon the Tenth Chapter of the Second Book of Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi THE Position he there endeavours to defend is this That by the mere light of Nature without Divine Revelation it cannot be made appear that there is any difference betwixt Vice and Vertue although we were already assur'd that there was a God etiamsi nobis jam innotuisset esse Deum Vertue therefore and Vice in respect of God can be nothing else quà m religiosus numinis cultus Vertue indeed may but how Vice can be a religious worship of the Deity is hard to understand Some would think such a stumble as this in the very Threshold was very ominous Others perhaps more agreeably to his Principles tell us that Vice and Vertue in respect of God are the same as to this particular and that God if he had so pleas'd might as well have been worship'd by the one as by the other Now worship he says necessarily requires the certain knowledge of these three things 1. That he to whom we pay it requires any such thing at our hands 2. What it is that he does require 3. Upon what conditions viz. What Rewards he will give in case of observance and what punishments he will inflict in case of neglect Now he would seem to infer that we have no natural knowledge of any of these three I shall here once for all remind the Reader that in the stating of the question he supposes not only that there is a God but also that we certainly know it Now as to the first requisite he grants that there is a worship due to God when it doth appear that we are his Creatures p. 250. So that by his own confession it doth appear that God requires this worship at our hands unless we may know that there is a God and yet at the same time not know that we are his Creatures which would be a strange position for a Christian Philosopher to assert And secondly if we know that there is a God then we know in general how and with what actions he will be worship'd If God be a Spirit then he is to be worship'd with a pure mind was a natural and easy consequence made by an honest Heathen This I say will follow unless we suppose an Immoral God But this though it be both absurd and impious to do yet I am afraid it will not be counted either by him As to his third Requisite we grant that we owe it only to Divine Revelation that God will reward our imperfect obedience with such degrees of eternal happiness yet this even Nature teaches us that holiness doth either entitle us to happiness or at least to a freedom from misery And as for what he says That it cannot be known among Men whether or how they will be served unless they first openly declare it the Argument is no ways conclusive if it be apply'd to this case because Men have no other way to make known their Will but by outward Declarations butGod has viz. those natural Notions which he inwardly inserted into the Minds of Men. But to this he answers That since Men draw these things from natural reason they must also by the same reason prove the existence of a God but since that cannot be done neither can there be any natural knowledge of good and evil of Vice and Vertue But here though I do not grant That the Being of God cannot be prov'd by the light of Nature yet I must remind him that he flies here from the Question as it was by himself first stated where he supposes the Bing of God to be now known to us But then as if he was himself conscious of his Evasion herein he immediately adds Vel st aliqua inde petenda esset scilicet vitii vel virtutis cognitio c. if there was any knowledge of Vice and Vertue to be drawn from Nature then it could be no other than that that should be counted vicious from which any Man's Nature doth abhor and that honest to which Men are carryed by a natural Propension But this is a strange account of Morality to make every Man 's exorbitant Lusts and Passions the rule and measure of good and evil nay according to these Principles there can searce be any thing evil for p. 254. he tells us Nihil fere est nec ullum flagitium ad quod natura multorum c. that there is scarce any wickedness to which the Nature of many Men is not naturally inclin'd I shall not here particularly examine his Opinion concerning Original Sin only herein he shows himself neither a sound Divine nor good Philosopher seeing many of the Heathens themselves did acknowledge the Substance that is the general depravation of humane Nature tho' they were unacquainted with the Name and Nature of it But he again resumes his former Argument That if the way how God is to be Worshipped may be known by the light of Nature then the reward of eternal Life might be known also by the same light But this is no good consequence as I before show'd 'T is true neither the way and method of Divine Worship nor eternal Life are so clearly known by the Light of Nature as they are now made manifest to us by Divine Revelation yet it doth not thence follow but that Nature hath in some measure discover'd Both unto us 2 Tim. 1. 10. Christ hath indeed brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel that is made clearer manifestations of it but then this hinders not but that both Iews and Gentiles might have some more obscure and imperfect Notions of it before But he goes on and tells us p. 252. Virtutis vitii Christiani notitia c. That the knowledge of Vice and Vertue both among Iews and Christians is no otherwise convey'd to either of 'em but by Divine Revelation And here he urges Rom. 7. 7. I had not known Sin but by the Law and I had not known Lust if the Law had not said Thou shalt not covet But here first I would ask him Whether those People who have no outward Law given 'em either do or
of this Ratiocination or the Ratiocination the Cause of the Idea Some think that these two Reasoning and the Idea ought not to be separated or contradistinguish'd in this dispute For the Idea is not such an Engine as of it self will prove the Being of God without the Use and Exercise of reasoning thereupon So that the Idea doth not exclude but include the use of our Faculties nor is it any receding from the Argument so to do Yet it seems more probable that there is something in Man Co-eval with and connatural to his very Being that dictates such a thing and directs our thoughts and reasonings that way for it is not probable that Men should as it were accidentally and yet so generally agree in one and the same thing without some inward suggestions and intimations at least to employ their Faculties upon such an object viz. a Supreme Being So that though this Idea be not so full and perfect but that it may receive further Additions of strength and clearness from Ratiocination yet this is no more a disparagement to the Works of Nature that they are sometimes further perfected by Study and Industry than it is to a Man that he was not born with all those accomplishments which he hath afterwards acquired Secondly Next to a Sceptick who grants no Principles at all it is the greatest difficulty to convince an Atheist who asserts such absurd and unreasonable ones that he can scarce be urged with any greater so that he will more easily evade the force of any Argument if what we urge upon him as an absurdity if he make it as it were the very Foundation of his Discourse Only 't is observable that such Men are more usually prevail'd upon by the Convictions of Conscience which is done I conceive by awakening those natural impressions of God and their obligations to him in their minds than merely by convincing their Understandings Thirdly In the managing our thoughts upon this subject we ought to consider not only what is in it self possible and perhaps may imply no contradiction but what upon a full consideration of things and all their circumstances may be counted most reasonable what is worthy of our rational Faculties to assert and a prudent Person to believe So that after these inward impressions made upon the minds of Men and those outward manifestations of himself by the Works of Creation and Providence it perhaps would be difficult even for the most Sceptical Person to assign what further Rational Evidence he could desire for the Belief of a Deity Nor does that variety of Opinions concerning the Nature of God in different Nations and among different Persons any whit lessen the credibility of his Being but rather confirms and strengthens it For this shows that it was not the Invention or Contrivance of any single Nation at first nor of more jointly afterwards for if they had thus combin'd together or borrow'd one from another in all probability they would have agreed better in their Notions and Opinions concerning him Nor was Religion any humane Invention to restrain the Exorbitances of Mankind because there was Religion before any such Offences as a Learned Prelate of our own has well observed That Oppression though by Accident grew rather from Religion than Religion from Oppression for before the two Brothers Cain and Abel had offer'd up their Sacrifice there was no such thing as Oppression There are some who tell us that the Being of God cannot be proved by any Internal Arguments from any natural impressions made upon the minds of Men dictating any such thing others that it cannot be proved by any external ones drawn from the nature of the Universe or any thing else without us Now the Atheists make this advantage of these our unseasonable differences herein That they bid us first Answer our own Arguments which we bring against our selves and if the Being of God cannot be proved either way which some among our selves do with too much eagerness severally assert then they think they have gain'd their point For as for Divine Revelation they do not much value that as thinking it not so proper to be urged against them because they believe nothing of the whole matter What Cuperus in his Arcana Atheismi sayes of Divine Revelation that we are first convinc'd by it That there is a God and afterwards thereby enabled to prove it by reason I think may be better apply'd in some proportion to these two ways of probation here made use of thus That from these natural impressions made upon the minds of Men we have the first grounds of our belief of a God and then this is further confirmed by those External Arguments drawn from Nature Quae non prosunt singula juncta juvant I shall here make some short remarks upon Cuperus his Opinion in this particular In the beginning of his Proem he tells us with some kind of Formality and Ostentation That the only prejudice that can be done to a good cause is to endeavour to defend it by weak Arguments That he had frequent opportunities of hearing Atheists being bred up amongst 'em discovering the weakness of those Arguments which the Theists brought against ' em Hereupon he was forced to think upon some more effectual way of proving the Being of a God than hitherto had been made use of which is this to deny all natural knowledge of God and utterly to reject at least at first all those Arguments drawn from the light of nature and to prove his Being by Divine Revelation This indeed is a very firm and sure way of doing it but I am afraid it will not be altogether so cogent as to convince an Atheist for such an one will not believe Moses his History neither the Creation nor any Tradition relating to it Now the whole force of his Argument will depend upon this slender hinge viz. The faithful and uninterrupted conveyance of this Tradition to all succeeding Ages But the present Learned Archbishop of Canterbury in that excellent Sermon of his against Atheism Page 51. tells us That it is much more likely that the Belief of God is a Notion which was bred in the mind of Man and born with him than a Tradition transmitted from hand to hand through all Generations especially if we consider how many rude and barbarous Nations there are which consent in the Opinion of a God and yet have scarce any certain Tradition of any thing that was done amongst 'em but two or three Ages before If the Knowledge of God says Cuperus Proem p. penult was drawn from the Light of Nature then it needed not to be proved That there was a God because thus we suppose it and already believe it But may not his own way of arguing be retorted more justly upon himself When he tells us p. 246. That Postquam per Dei Revelationem edocti sumus esse Deum tum intelligi posse c. When by Divine Revelation we are taught there is
hence is a great presumption at least of the falseness of such Principles seeing Truth always lyes so plain and easie especially in things of this nature so consistent with our natural Apprehensions and with all other Truths both natural and revealed that it stands not in need of such perplexed ways and methods for its own defence Nor is Mr. Hobbs the only man that hath made false representations of Human Nature there are also some foreign Philosophers who have been very obnoxious in this Particular Cuperus in his Arcana Atheismi 9. 10. cb 2. lib. denies all Natural Knowledge of God and all Natural Difference betwixt Good and Evil And in his Proeme p. 2 3. he makes Natural Reason to be ratiocinatio ex innatis homini affectibus passionibus legitimè deducta And this farther account he gives of these Affections p. 3. Affectus passiones Iesu Christi mandatis contrarias sive quae nos ad ea quae ipse prohibuit sectanda stimulant per se suâ naturâ non esse malas nec expeccato originali maláve consuetudine ortas existimo These seem but bad Principles for Human Nature to proceed upon And as for right Reason Rectam sanam rationem appello ratiocinationes ex claris apud neminem controversis sacrae Scripturae sensibus vel ex expressis verbis in scripturâ contentis vel per legitimam consequentiam elicitas This indeed is true but right Reason in the just and full nature of it is of larger extent than arguing meerly from Scripture And P. Poiret in his Cogit ration de Deo lib. 3. cap. 10. makes all the Reasons of Truth and Goodness to depend wholly upon the Divine Decree and that nothing is in it self either good or evil but only as God has been pleased to make it so and might also if He had so pleased have made it quite otherwise These I shall make some short Reflections upon and leave the fuller examination thereof to some abler Pen. I have not had recourse to Scripture to prove my Assertions because my design here is to speak of Man as guided rather by Reason than Revelation and because those I have here to deal with do more especially appeal thereto Yet here I cannot but take notice of the strange Humour of some men who reject some things for those very Reasons for which they ought to receive 'em thus when they are urg'd with Scripture they look upon that only as something that would impose upon their Understanding and oblige 'em to a blind Obedience as if it designed only to erect an arbitrary government over the Minds of Men without giving any reason of its Commands But though they will not give these Writings the credit and authority justly due to 'em upon account of their divine Revelation yet it would be unreasonable to reject 'em and the things therein contained before they have enquir'd into the Reasons and credibility of 'em which if they vouchsase to do I doubt not but as our Saviour said in another case If ye believe not me yet believe my Works So here tho' they believe not the Scriptures for their authority yet they will at least be convinc'd by the Reason contain'd in ' em Thus a learned Prelate of our Church Tho' sacred Authors have little authority with Atheists speaking as meer Witnesses yet when their Testimony is attended also with the highest Reason those Reasons must be acknowledg'd and answer'd though the Author be rejected Nor do I here insist much upon the authorities even of Heathen Authors being willing so far to comply with the Humours of some of the present Age as only to appeal to mens unprejudic'd Reasons whether what is here humbly propos'd to consideration be true or no for if what is writ by any one be not in it self reasonable I know no authorities great enough to make it so Only if any think that the concurrent Testimonies of such Authors may add any strength to the things here handled I doubt not but they who have been but moderately conversant in those Writers may easily furnish themselves with such authorities from their own reading and observation I shall here advertise the Reader one thing further That whereas I have frequent occasion of making use of these words Vice and Virtue I there take 'em according to the acceptation of our old English Dictionaries and in the sense wherein the ancient moral Philosophers formerly took 'em that is to signifie much what the same thing with Good and Evil Sin and Duty as supposing 'em founded upon something more sixt and certain than the Custom of Countries or the Mode and Fashion of those with whom we do converse I should have counted this a needless Advertisement but that I find the ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding p. 158 159 c. telling us That the measure of what is every where called and esteemed Virtue and Vice is his Approbation or Dislike Praise or Blame which by a secret and tacite consent establishes it self in the several Societies Tribes and Clubs of Men in the World so that Virtue is every where that which is thought praise-worthy and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick esteem is Virtue And here he quotes Cicero Tusc. lib. 2. Nihil habet natura praestantius quà m honestatem quà m laudem quà m dignitatem quam decus Which he says are all Names for the same thing But here we may observe that he puts Honesty in the first place then Praise viz. such as is consequent hereupon quà m dignitatem that is that Dignity of Nature which is the greatest Ornament of a Man The same Author of that Essay hath much better explain'd the sense of the old Heathen Philosophers upon this Subject p. 17. If one of those had been asked here I suppose the Question should not have been propounded as before Why a Man must keep his word but rather thus why a Man should not break his word he would have answer'd because it was dishonest below the Dignity of a Man and opposite to Virtue the highest perfection of Human Nature By the Dignity of a Man I suppose was here meant the same that Tully meant by his that is the Dignity of Human Nature consider'd in it self not with respect to the accidentally good or bad Opinion that Men might entertain of it But he further tells us p. 159. That the Exhortations of inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common Repute Whatsoever things are lovely whatsoever things are of good report if there be any virtue if there be any praise c. Phil. 4. 8. But the Apostle doth not here appeal to common Repute absolutely but with a certain restriction and limitation that Men do not confound the notions of Good and Evil whatever things are of good report with this Proviso that there be any Virtue or any such Praise as is virtutis comes then we are to think on
' em But then he says That since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with Esteem and Reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage and to blame and discountenance the contrary 't is no wonder that Esteem and Discredit Virtue and Vice should in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong c. But then suppose Men should so far mistake themselves as to place their Commondation or Blame on that side that really deserves it not and such a thing may possibly sometimes happen would this alter the nature of things and make Vice Vertue and Virtue Vice Lastly Tho' thou dost not find in these Papers that profoundness of Thought that depth of Reasoning that may be elsewhere met withal yet I hope what is here offered is free and natural easie and obvious and therefore probably not less true but more useful for I never look'd upon Intricacy and Obscurity either as any certain sign of Truth or any ways to promote the Benefit and Advantage of the Reader Contents of the Chapters CHAP. I. THE Excellency of the Knowledge of a man's self briefly intimated Mr. Hobbs's Interpretation of Nosce Teipsum examin'd and confuted The Knowledge of our selves in six particulars the possibility of this Knowledge the certainty of it hereby we come to the knowledge 1. of the Being of God 2. of the Nature of God 3. of the Worship of God CHAP. II. Of Man as compounded of Soul and Body A Physical Account of Man not here intended The Question stated betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans Pride and Ignorance of the true state of Human Nature justly chargeable upon the Stoicks the Epicureans ascribe too much to the Body Epicurean Tranquility of Mind not true Peace of Conscience how far Epicurus chargeable with Atheism Virtue according to him founded upon very uncertain grounds Happiness according to him impossible Enthusiasts among Christians resemble the Stoicks among the Heathens some short Reflections upon the first and second Chapt. of Tractatus Theol. Posit concerning Prophets and Prophecy CHAP. III. Of Natural Notions of Truth and Goodness Natural Inscription and Divine Revelation the two great means of preserving Truth among all the Disadvantages it labours under Dr. Parker the late Bishop of Oxford's Opinion concerning Experimental Observation examin'd and confuted Our Faculties not false Des Cartes's opinion concerning Eternal Truths examin'd Dr. Cumberland the present learned Bishop of Peterborough no direct Enemy to Natural Notions some Remarks upon his opinion herein Some short Reflections upon the Ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding Mr. Norris's opinion examin'd That opinion that distinguisheth betwixt the Idea's of the Understanding and the Phantasms of Sense and Imagination seems no ways to favour Enthusiasm Some Remarks upon P. Poiret's Cogitationes Rational de Dco and upon Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi the one asserting That there is nothing good or evil antecedent to the Divine Placitum the other that it doth not appear by the light of Nature that there is any difference betwixt Vice and Virtue CHAP. IV. Of the Being of GOD. How an Atheist ought in Prudence to demean himself seeing he cannot be positively certain that there is no God the belief of a God antecedent to all Atheism not first invented by Statesmen the two great Arguments to prove the Being of God the Constitution of the Universe and the general Consent of Nations The production of Mankind not the result of blind Chance No Reason why the Christian Philosopher should willingly give up that Argument drawn from the Consent of Nations Unseasonable Differences among our selves in the choice of our Arguments to prove the Divine Existence so preferring one as to invalidate the force of all the rest Cuperus's opinion herein examin'd CHAP. V. The state of Nature neither a state of Equality nor a state of War A fault in Mr. Hobbs in not first setling the significations of those words Nature Naturally and by Nature His Arguments to prove the equality of Men frivolous and insufficient those to prove the state of Nature a state of War the same Man a sociable Creature by Nature not only by Education Me. Hobbs's Principles of Politicks a meer Hypothesis and not a good one neither as wanting the necessary Qualifications of such a one Of Self-preservation CHAP. VI. Religion the best Foundation of Civil Government The nature of Religion in general in reference to Government Two Considerations to prove the consistency of the one with the other The divine original of Civil Power Grotius's Opinion examin'd Dr. Donn's Opinion of the original of Civil Power asserted Dominion not founded in Grace not the Honour or Interest of a Prince to be wicked against Machiavil some of his Arguments answer'd Christianity doth not depress or effeminate Mens Spirits CHAP. VII Of Moral Virtue Virtue in general natural and essential to Man in Innocence Moral Virtue distinguished from original Righteousness and Evangelical Holiness founded in Nature not by inspiration from God Plato's Opinion herein examin'd natural and original Excellencies of Human Nature in respect of the Soul the adventitious Dignities thereof such as are conferr'd upon it by Divine Benignity their Reasons briesly intimated who would willingly grant a possibility of some Heathens being saved CHAP. VIII Some short Observations upon Mr. Hobbs's First Chap. of his Kingdom of Darkness Mr. Hobbs inconsistent with himself in his Discourses concerning Phantasms the Church in a proper sense the Kingdom of Christ Mr. Hobbs's notion of a Covenant no ways applicable to God Almighty his Answers to those places of Scripture which are commonly brought to prove the Immortality of the Soul no ways sufficient Appendix to the 7th Chapter CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Excellency of the Knowledge of a Man's Self THE true Worth and Value of a Thing consists either in its Intrinsick Nature or in the Relation it bears to us either that it is in it self Excellent or to us Useful Now both these meet together in the Knowledge of a Man's Self this being that which so nearly concerns us that no one ought in Honour to be ignorant of it Thus those whose ancient Families or personal Merits have Entituled to a Coat of Arms do usually think themselves bound at least to attain to such a degree of Skill in Heraldry as to be able to Blazon them So would it be a Disparagement to a Man as such to be owner of so many and great Excellencies of Nature and not rightly to understand them not to be able to derive their Descent from their first and divine Original not fully to know and duly to consider that nobleness and generosity of Action which even his Order obliges him to Now since there is no more effectual Way or Method to recommend a Thing truly Excellent than only fully to explain it I shall therefore shew wherein the Nature of this Knowledge of a Man's Self consists Mr. Hobbs in his Introduction to his
Communications of Divine Grace to Christians now under the Gospel 2. Suppose that God always made use of these imaginary Representations in the Conveyance of his Will to the Prophets will it therefore follow ad prophetizandum non esse opus perfectiore mente sed vividiore imaginatione Will it therefore follow that they did tantùm per imaginationem percipere Will it therefore follow that they did non nisi ope imaginationis percipere Though God in the wise methods of his Providence did make use of second Causes will it therefore follow that the whole Causality must be ascribed to them Could the Fancy alone or the Fancy and Understanding together rightly judge of the sense and meaning of those Representations without the further assistance of Divine Illumination to assert either of these would argue him either a bad Philosopher or a worse Divine so that it would be hard to conceive how these imaginary Representations without a more immediate interpretation of their sense and meaning would be any thing better than idle shows and insignificant appearances CHAP. III. Of natural Notions of Truth and Goodness THere is nothing that affords us more noble or more useful matter whereon to exercise our Speculations than a serious Enquiry into the respective natures of Truth Goodness which are things of so great Excellency in themselves and of such near relation to us that it doth not become a Man a Philosopher or a Christian to be ignorant of either 'T is observ'd by some that Pilate immediately upon his propounding that Question to our Saviour What is Truth He went forth not staying sor an Answer yet Providence hath not left us in the dark in things of this nature we have the certain Guides of Reason and Revelation as much as God thought fit to impart to us sufficient to satisfy all sober though not over-curious Enquiries sufficient to all the ends and purposes of this humane State Truth indeed both natural and reveal'd hath ever since its first appearance in the World variously suffer'd by the Ignorance of some and the Malice of others by the contrary and eager pretences of opposite Parties by the weaknesses and follies of Men and by the power and subtlety of the Devil and especially by that universal deluge of Sin and Wickedness which both upon a natural and moral account is very prejudicial to the concerns of Truth both as Vice is naturally destructive of good Principles and also as wicked Men are ready to believe though never so false what they think would be their Interest to be true Thus if we consider the state of the Gentile World in the first Ages we shall there find a very bad face of things For not to speak of the grossness of popular Errours and the no less impious than false apprehensions of the generality of the common sort the most exact Enquiries of their Philosophers were often false but always mixt with a great deal of uncertainty in their Discourses having commonly a contrary Sect and Company of Men that whatever was asserted by one was many times with as much vigour and equal probability of reason contradicted by another So that a sober and serious Enquirer after Truth though he might have reason enough not to profess himself a Sceptick but to believe that there was such a thing as truth yet he might then see too much cause to despair of ever finding the certain way that led to it among so many By-paths of errour and uncertainty And even now in the Christian World the many errours in Opinions and the more fatal Heresies of wicked practices do sufficiently-testify that Truth doth not enjoy such an undisturb'd Empire as might have been hop'd and wish'd since Christ's appearance in the Flesh. Now among all these disadvantages under which Truth always labour'd and even still labours Providence hath more especially provided these two ways for the preservation of it 1. By natural inscription upon the minds of men 2. By after revelation for the further illustration and confirmation of it And these two are as it were the two Pillars that have preserved it both from the deluge of Sin and the violence of all other opposition 1. Natural Inscription I hope I shall not need to desire the Reader not to impose any such gross sense upon this word as is inconsistent with the nature of an Immaterial Soul I shall here therefore first briefly explain what I mean by truth of first Inscription or natural Notions For the Defendant has always leave to state his own Question and to declare in what sence he undertakes the defence of it this I the rather intimate because some Men will put such a Sense upon these words innate imprinted or impress'd frequently made use of in this Question as none that I know of go about to defend First I do not here assert the Opinion of the Platonists concerning innate Ideas in all its circumstances I do not here suppose the Soul to praexist nor do I make all the knowledge we have in this state to be nothing but reminiscence or recollection of what we knew in the other Secondly These natural Notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves even in Children and Ideots without any assistance from the outward Senses or without the help of some previous Cultivation For thus reason it self which yet we say is natural to a Man is not so born with him but that it requires some supervenient assistances before it arrive at the true exercise of it self and it is as much as I here contend for if these notions be in the same sense connatural to the Soul as reason it self is But Thirdly The use of our Understandings being first suppos'd that is our faculties labouring of no natural defect nor depriv'd of those other advantages that God and Nature have made necessary thereunto then our Souls have a native power of finding or framing such Principles or Propositions the Truth or Knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the evidence of sense or observation thus knowing what is meant by a whole and what by a part hence naturally results the truth of this Proposition totum est majus sui parte without being any ways oblig'd to sense for it Of this nature are those universal Propositions the truth whereof doth not depend upon the actual Existence of any thing as quicquid agit est c. Now I suppose we may easily discern a difference betwixt the Truth of such Propositions as these and those others which are brought by some to vie with those natural Notions viz. White is not black Fellowness is not sweetness c. I shall here 1. enquire into the grounds and reasons upon which Dr. Parker late Bishop of Oxford in his account of the Platonick Philosophy asserts Experimental Observation to be the great Rule and Measure of Truth And first he blames the Platonick Theology for resolving Knowledge into its first
and fundamental Principles But Knowledge is of a larger extent than that which relates strictly to natural Philosophy or what is the object of sensible Experiment There is also a Metaphysical Knowledge a truth of Propositions which no ways depends upon Observation so that I suppose when the Platonists spoke of resolving Science into its first Principles they only meant such Knowledge as was capable of such Resolutions They did not suppose us born with innate notions of such things the Knowledge whereof depends upon Experience and therefore we ought not to measure the Truth or Falshood of many late Inventions by searching for the respective Ideas of 'em in our Minds Indeed as to matters of natural Philosophy it is a much more certain way of resolving such Knowledge so far as can be done into the testimony of Sense and Experience than into any imaginary Principles of Speculation But he tells us That the Mind from particular Observations doth make general Rules which after an exact Scrutiny and comparing of every Individual are justly admitted for proleptick and fundamental Verities and that general Axioms are only the results and abridgments of a multitude of single Experiments and that from the plain experience of several Instances that we cannot look abroad but we see the parts always less than the whole Hence we gather this Maxime totum est majus suâ parte this indeed is plausible popular Discourse but not severely Philosophical For what if one should come and tell us that in a certain place in the East-Indies he found the contrary to his observation to be true viz. That the parts there were bigger than the whole I know not what we could Answer in this Case upon the former Principles for according to them this Proposition totum est c. is true only with this his Proviso so far as hath been yet observ'd But now we find in things of meer Observation some particulars to contradict what has been before generally receiv'd for true Besides I never heard of any general Council or Company of Men appointed to declare when particular observations had undergone a sufficient tryal and probation so that they then might be admitted into proleptick and fundamental verities and I conceive no Man's private authority is enough to do it It is very difficult if it all possible to convince a Sceptick yet are there more strong and probable ways of arguing with him than this which founds all truth upon experimental observation for thus the truth and certainty of any proposition can arrive no higher than this That so far as is yet observ'd 't is true Now this seems only a more ingenuous and well-natur'd piece of Scepticism for the more moderate of 'em will grant truth of appearance and tell you That Snow seems white but whether it be so or no they know not But to what purpose says he should God imprint such obvious and evident Notions upon Mens minds To this I answer 1. That it must be granted that it is at least possible for God to imprint truths upon the minds of Men and if so then it cannot be done any other way than by making 'em thus plain and self evident for we cannot suppose any other way than by making 'em such as do suâ luce patere So that supposing this possible and supposing God to reduce this possibility into act and really and actually imprint 'em yet the objection would lye still as strong against 'em as formerly So that this is only such an objection as would ly against an acknowledged truth which we commonly say upon that account is none at all 2. He must give us leave to suppose these natural Notions till such time as he has evinc'd the contrary Now in strictness of Argument we ought not to urge the needlessness of imprinting such obvious and evident Notions against those who say that these truths do in a great measure owe their clearness and evidence to their being thus imprinted they are indeed evident from the Nature of the Thing and to us evident from the Nature and Constitution of our Faculties that we cannot apprehend 'em otherwise And as for Observation that only claims in the Third place sic à Iove tertius haeres So that the needlessness of imprinting such evident Notions cannot be argued from their present clearness because it is their being thus imprinted or thus connatural to our minds that makes 'em so If it be here reply'd That however they would be sufficiently evident meerly by observation It is not certain that they would be thus sufficiently so as was before intimated However we have no reason to find fault if God has given us more and clearer evidences than perhaps were absolutely necessary But suppose says he that we were born with these innate Notions how shall we be assur'd but that errour may be the natural Result of our Faculties Here indeed is such a doubt raised as I see not how he either gives or can give a satisfactory Answer to according to his Principles For supposing that the seeds of errour may be the natural results of our Faculties that is Supposing our Faculties may be false I do not see how their truth can be evinc'd by the most wary and discreet experience and this he says is the only way by which to do it For if errour may be the natural result of my Faculties that is If my superiour Faculties be false I may then justly suspect my lower If I may be deceiv'd in what by the most clear and distinct methods of reasoning I conceive to be true I have then little reason to trust my Senses Here I shall further do these two things 1. Show that the Seeds of Errour are not the natural results of our Faculties 2. If they were the most wary and discreet experience would not at all help us in our searches after truth and certainty 1. It is not possible that the seeds of errour should c. in those things that we clearly and distinctly perceive to be true and this will appear First From the nature of Man as he is a rational Creature now rationality includes in it one or both of these two things 1. Some certain and undoubted Principles which are to be the Foundations of Truth and Goodness 2. However a natural power or faculty of making right consequences and drawing necessary Conclusions from true premises which way soever we come by ' em Now the possibility of our Faculties being false is not consistent with either of these Secondly This further appears from the nature of the divine Attributes for considering the excellency and goodness of the Divine Nature he could not give us such faculties as should deceive us in clarè distinctè perceptis as D. Cartes has well observ'd for this would argue either weakness or malice in God either that he stood in need of such fallacious methods to bring about his designs or that he did purposely impose upon his Creatures All
essentialiter proprietatem for these truths are only things of an intellectual nature such as terminate the act of Divine Wisdom and Understanding but no body says that they have any radical or essential propriety univocally equal or like to God But further What inconsistency or what unbecomingness would there be in the Notion if we thus conceiv'd of God that he is an insinitely wise and Omnipotent Being comprehending Himself and the extent of his own Power that is the Idea's of all the possibilities of things together with all their several either necessary or accidental relations one towards another So that according to this Scheme of things these truths are but the necessary objects of Omniscience or infinite Wisdom so that it is impossible that these necessary and immutable truths should any ways derogate from the Divine Perfections seeing we cannot suppose God to be Omniscient that is infinitely perfect without 'em neither would these truths be so absolutely Independent of themselves for we can scarce suppose any moral good or evil unless we first suppose a God in Conformity or Non-Conformity to whose pure and holy nature and to his Will acting always according thereunto consists the nature of both The second thing I shall observe from his management of this Question is this that as to things which relate to moral goodness such is the awful power of truth such is the natural modesty of Mankind that inward sense they have of and profound veneration for these things that many times they are asham'd openly to assert that which yet may be the natural consequence of some false Principles they have entertain'd And this seems the Case of this Author in this particular for it is observable through his whole Discourse he no where plainly and expresly asserts which yet according to his Principles will necessarily follow that God might if he had so pleas'd have appointed a quite contrary Scheme of Morality or a Set or Systeme of moral truths just contrary to what they now are Indeed he does say p. 126. that this Divine Placitum was of its own nature indifferent vel ad haec statuenda vel plane omittenda vel diversa decernenda and that God might have represented himself to the minds of Men per alia nescio quae quam per naturas rerum quales jam sunt p. 136. Yet these seem to come short of asserting the quite contrary way and method But some perhaps will say that this is too favourable an interpretation put upon his words but suppose it be yet I would rather err on this side than on the other yet if it be but thus far true it will be notwithstanding a sufficient confutation of his Opinion But give me leave only to suggest the reason of that my charitable interpretation viz. because he osten mentions a certain decency which he seems to make the Rule of Divine Actions even antecedent to the Divine Will Thus p. 131. he says that the justice of God did appoint things modo ipsum decenti in a way becoming him which would seem an impertinent expression if all the decency that things have arise only from God's appointing 'em to be so and immediately after speaking of God's liberty and freedom in making things thus or thus he says that he was indifferent vel ad nulla statuenda vel ad alia stabilienda quae aequè Deum decuissent which words seem to imply that there was something truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 worthy of God antecedent to his positive appointment But then let us see how he answers that Objection that according to his Principles the hatred of God might have been good and the love of him evil if he had so appointed Now this might either have been so or not if it might then why did he not plainly say so if it could not then his Principles are false viz. that there is something good or evil antecedent to the divine positive appointment But when Men either cannot or will not return plain Answers to a plain Question it is a certain Argument that they ly under either some natural or some moral defect that their notions either do not ly smooth and clear in their Heads or else upon some worse design they thus purposely wrap themselves in Clouds But he tells us p. 136. amor praesupponit mentis naturam haec voluntatem sive placitum Dei sese hoc modo adumbrandi But we must abstract he says from all these but now to comply with him in his own way I am willing to abstract as far as is possible for us to abstract only he must not abstract us into nothing he must suffer us to remain subjects capable of abstracting and yet I believe after all these he is not that hardy Man as in plain words to say That God might have made the lovc of himself a Sin and the hatred of him a vertue However it doth not seem any good Argument of the truth or any great commendation of the goodness of an Opinion that we must abstract from every thing that is at least at present either rational or religious before we can possibly frame any conception of it And yet this is the opinion which he is so fond of and seems to value himself so much upon that in his Appendix p. 304. where he makes some reflections upon his former work he particularly commends this 10th Ch. de Dei dominio cujus excellentiam sine jactantiâ ob ipsam rei veritatem utilitatem non satis possum commendare And yet this seems a truer Character of it that it is in it self false unworthy of God and of dangerous consequence to Men. I shall only here clear one place of Scripture relating hereunto from a forc'd and false interpretation which Cuperus p. 246. Arcana Atheismi has put upon it Rom. 2. 14. the Gentiles having not the Law do by Nature the things contain'd in the Law these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves The Apostle here designs to assert that natural knowledge which the Gentiles had of good and evil But says he before this can be made appear we must prove these two things 1. That by the Gentiles are here to be understood the Pagan Gentiles those who had neither heard of the Law of Christ nor the Law of Moses 2. That the words by Nature are not to be join'd with those going before thus the Gentiles having not the Law by Nature do the things contain'd in the Law But first he has no warrant from any Copy or good Authority thus to place the Comma and so to read it now if Men may take that liberty to place Comma's where they please they may soon make the Scripture quite another thing But then further it would not be worthy of the Apostles way of discoursing to tell us that the Gentiles had not the Law of Moses by Nature for who ever imagin'd they had Now he does not grant here any other Law not