wee should make Reason and Faith the Same that there is to make the Faculty and the Habit the Same Reason is a Faculty Faith a Habit Now a Faculty and a Habit I have before sayd not to be res res but res modus Their Physicall Difference therefore I mean if you consider Faith and Reason in the same man is but Modall But it doth not follow from hence That they differ not in Nature For though an Habit have not Entitatem Rei distinct from the Faculty yet it hath Entitatem Modi so that the Habit is not a Faculty neither is the Faculty an Habit. To enquire of a Physicall Identity and of a Metaphysicall or Formall Identity are quaere's farre distinct The Faith of Peter is Really and Physically distinct from the Faith of Paul and yet their Metaphysicall Formall nature is exactly the Same Again all the Modall Beings in the same subject though their Essence and Nature be never so distinct v. g. Duration Augmentation Situation c in the same man be Really the same for neither of them being Modi have any Entitatem Rei beside the Entity of their common Subject and so cannot make a Reall distinction because there is not res res Yet each Modus hath a distinct Formall nature of its own The nature of a Figure is not the nature of a Habit though both in the same Subject But yet though it doe not follow from that Reall Identity between Res Modus that the Nature of Reason and the Nature of Faith be the same Yet if he change but the terms and say in stead of Reason that Knowledge and Faith are the same in nature I will not contend So that he mean Faith as it is an Act or Habit of the Vnderstanding and not of the Will For so Faith is an Assent to a Truth reveiled the same individuall Assent to the same Truth may be both Cognitio Scientiae and Cognitio Fidei I will instance in the Creation of the world By Faith we know that the worlds were made and Assent to it And by naturall Demonstrations it may be proved that the world was made and these also are sufficient to perswade assent Now we from both grounds joyntly assent to this Proposition That the world was made The which Assent in respect of the one Ground propter evidentiam rei is an assent of Science or Naturall Knowledge in regard of the other Ground Propter authoritatem dicentis is an assent of Faith or Supernaturall and reveiled Knowledge The assent of Science and of Faith differ not in their Form but in their Efficient But if he speak of Saving Faith quatenus Salvifica as it doth Save so it is an act of the Will and not of the Understanding and therefore differs from Knowledge But to conclude this If we speak of a Physicall difference or distinction Then all the Modi that belong to the same Thing can admit of no more then a Modall distinction because having no other Entitatem Rei but that of the common Subiect their Entitas Rei must be Common there cannot be Res Res the difference must be either tanquam Res Modus or tanquam Modus Modus And here is no consideration of the Nature of these Modi In distinct Things The Modi are Really distinct and not Modally though these Modi be exactly of the same nature as the Roundnesse of severall Circles For they not having Entitatem Rei besides the Entity of their Subjects their Subjects being really distinct they must be really distinct also Thus in the present case The Faith of Peter is really distinct from the Faith of Paul But Faith in Peter from Reason in Peter is only Modally distinct tanquam Res Modus viz. If you make Reason to be Res or a Faculty Really distinct from the soule and the Habit of Faith in Peter will be distinct from all other Habits in Peter v. g. from the Habit of Knowledge tanquam Modus Modus But if wee speak not of a Physicall but of a Metaphysicall Difference Here it little avails to enquire of their Physicall Difference or Identity For those things that are really distinct as two Souls may yet agree in the same Specificall Nature and those which are not really distinct as severall Modi of the same Thing may have their Formall Specificall differences Again though it be granted that Naturall Knowledge attained by by the use of Reason without a supernaturall Revelation be of the same Nature with Faith Yet doth it not presently follow That their difference is Graduall and the one but a greater Degree of the same Light For Skill in Musick and Skill in Metalls or Mineralls are both Naturall Habits yet the Skill of a Musician and the Skill of a Chymist are not the Same though of the same nature neither yet is their difference Graduall For the one is not the way to attain the other and the other a Perfection of that former And moreover a man may be skilfull in either of them without a knowledge of the other whereas a Greater Degree of Knowledge in the same Kind cannot be without the Lesser That which follows concerning Falling from Grace and the Freedome of the Will as also what proceeds How farre we do acti agere that is How farre and In what manner the First cause doth concurre with the Second in its Operations require a larger discourse for the deciding of them then to be toucht at in transitu and by the way I shall therefore say onely this and so passe them over Liberty and Servitude are opposit and both are Relative terms He that is Free from the Dominion of one Master may be a Servant a Slave to another Thus the Will though it be Free from any Naturall Necessity either from within or without so that it be neither determined by an inward Principle as meer Naturall Agents are neither can have either Compulsion or Necessity imposed upon it by the command of another Creature Yet is it not Free from the Command and Power of God by whose Absolute Decree it is determined We must not so farre affect to be Liberi that we become Sacrilegi we must not vindicate our Liberty by committing Sacriledge exempting our selves from being under the Power of a Deity If I were now to examine the nature of Freedome wherein it consists I might perhaps place it in a Spontaneity that it acts without reluctancy Sponte agit Were it not that even Naturall Agents as a Stone falling have such a free action without Constraint without Reluctancie Or it might be placed perhaps in a Reflection upon its own Act whereby it doth not onely Agere yea and Sponte or volens agere without a Nolition a Renitentia But also Vult agere Whereas a Naturall agent though perhaps Sponte or Volens agit yet you cannot say Vult agere because there is not a Reflection whereby it Willeth its Action That which
hinders me from placing it in this is Because I allow not any reflex act of Willing in God besides that direct act of Working who is yet a most Free Agent For beside other reasons that if need were might be produced it stands not with Gods Simplicity to admit distinct acts in God whereof one should be the Object of another Now what strength there is in this to hinder the placing of Freedome in this Reflex act I propose to be considered rather then Affirm But I rather place the nature of the Wills Liberty in a Freedome from Servitude that it is not under the command of any Creature or a Naturall Determination of its own And therfore though it be free from such servitude as a Naturall agent or such as may be Forced is subject to yet it is not free from Gods Command Nor perhaps from the dictate of Reason neither Or if it be yet is not this its Freedome but its Weaknesse And this is not far distant from the received opinion which makes it consist in Indifferentiâ For the Will can agere vel non agere notwithstanding anything to the contrary from the Creature but it cannot agere vel non agere notwithstanding the Decree of God and therfore is not Free from that Determination And whereas other things are from God determined mediante causa secundâ the Will is Immediately determined a causa primâ And therefore what he cites out of Rutterfort That granting all things to be under an absolute Decree it is fond to aske Whether the Free Creature remain indifferent to doe or not to doe I willingly assent unto But you must consider withall that This Freedome neither the Angels have nor had Adam in his Innocencie And therefore when Divines tell us that by the Fall we have lost our Liberty or Freedome of Will in Spirituall things which yet we retain in Morall and Civill Actions I desire that they would more punctually set down What the Liberty is which we retain in Naturall things but want in Spirituall What Liberty that is which the Angels have and Man once had but hath now lost And not speak of such a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had nor is it possible for any Creature to have Nay not for God himselfe For God having once decreed cannot with his Truth revoke it nor is indifferent to execute it or not But as They say of Jupiter which make Him to be the Author of their Stoicall unavoidable Fate understanding it cum grano salis He once Commanded and ever after Obeyed There follows in the next place an Objection How it comes to passe if Faith and Knowledge be One that some who have more Knowledge have lesse Faith I need not recite his Lordships Answer I will only propose my own If there be meant a Physicall Identity whereby two Modi of the same Thing doe subsist by the subsistence of their common Subject it is not hard to determine For two Modifications of the same Thing may yet be independent of each other And therefore it is not requisite they should be both in the same measure or degree 2. If by Knowledge be meant an assent to Naturall truths and by Faith an assent to Supernaturall truths neither is here any difficulty For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconsistent with the Ignorance of another thing 3. â—f Knowledge and Faith be considered in relation to the same Object Spirituall truths or Saving truth and Faith be taken for an Intellectuall assent to them Then is it not true that there is in any if you speak adidâ—m more Knowledge and lesse Faith what any Knows to be Thus he cannot Beleeve to be Otherwise For the Understanding is not a Free faculty that it can either Accept or Reject a reveiled Truth 4. If by Faith be meant not an Assent in the Vnderstanding to the Truth Known but a Consent in the Will an imbracing of it which is the Iustifying act of Faith Neither is this difficulty much greater then the former For the too too frequent sinnes even in Gods children against light makes it over manifest That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Understanding And yet if this too cleare experience be not able to prove it but that you still lay all the blame upon the Understanding as not being cleare enough in its Apprehensions or not sufficiently Peremptory in its Dictates and so excuse the Will of all Remissenesse I demand then what disability there is in the Will of Man since the fall more then in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven I cannot think but that the Image of God by the Fall is defaced in the Will as well as in the Understanding and yet if the Will doe never disobey the Light of Reason which is its sole immediate Guide I see not wherein this disability doth appear I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Understanding that is it never goes before it or without it it goes never but where the Understanding hath led the way in discovering some Good more or lesse something Desirable For the Will is Caeca potentia and Knows of nothing desirable but what the Understanding discovers And Knowing nothing can Desire nothing Ignoti nulla Cupido But yet I grant not that Proposition in this sense The will Allwayes follows the Understanding that is It never stays behind For to Omit what the Understanding commands requires not a discovery of some other Good but only an Impotency a Backwardnesse or Remisnesse to doe its Duty To goe without direction requires a Positive Cause because it is a Positive Act But Not to goe when it is directed may proceed from a Negative Cause Negatio Causae because it is a Negative Act or a Not-doing A lame man doth not runne when he knows that he ought to runne yet here is no need of a Positive Cause to stay him but his Impotency a Negative cause sufficeth And thus farre do I admit that distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis and Libertas Contradictionis though in that way in which it is ordinarily made use of I doe wholly reject it There is not in the Will an Indifferency to choose Good or to choose Evill neither yet to Choose good or Reject good velle nolle both which they call Libertas Contrietatis For the Understanding doth not shew any Amiablenesse or Lovelynesse in Evill nor any Odiousnesse in Good quatenus sic and therefore the Will cannot Desire Evill nor Reject Good Nolle or Velle non For Bonitas is Objectum formale Appetitûs and Malum is the formall Object of Nolition Now the Soule cannot velle quatenus bonum that in which no Good is apprehended nor nolle quatenus malum that is velle ut non sit that wherein it apprehends no Evill But for the other kinde of Indifferency which they call Libertas Contradictionis to Will good or Not Will it to Nill Evill or Not to Nill it
all this hinders not but that Vnity and all other Negations may have a kind of Reality as it is opposed to a Fiction And therfore the Ayr â—â— really Dark God is really Vnicus and not onely supposed so to be And yet Darknesse and Unity are not in themselves Reall but Negative term I purposely passe over severall particulars as well in this Chapter as in others which his Lordship lights upon by the way to avoid tediousnesse and look principally at those things to which his Lordships aim doth especially tend CHAP. VIII The Nature of Habits Whether they be one with Truth or the Soules Essence IN the eighth Chapter he speaks somewhat concerning the nature of Habits And this is to be adjoyned to the end of the 5. Chapter the 6. and 7. Chapters wherein he inferres a Corollary concerning the Essence of All things That it is One That it is Vnity being inserted as a Parenthesis He had in the fifth Chapter affirmed That the Soul is nothing but Truth Yet saith he while I affirm that the Soule is nothing but this Truth I doe not refuse the doctrine of Habits either Infused or Acquisite But before I proceed It is not amisse to give notice of a different acceptation of Truth here from that before He spake before of the Truth or Light of Reason which he contended to be One with the Soul and not a distinct Faculty This Light was an Innate or Connate Light which hath its Originall and its Period with the Soule For when the Soule begins the Light of Reason begins and this Light of Reason is no sooner extinct then when the Soule shall cease to be But the Light of Habituall Knowledge whether Infused or Acquisite is not an Innate Light but an Advenient Light subsequent to the Soules first Existence and really separable from it Yet may it be Antecedent to another degree of Advenient Light viz. Actuall Knowledge which may proceed from Habituall This Advenient Light of Habituall knowledge differs from Innate Light of Reason as a Habit in the first species of Quality from Naturalis potentia or a Faculty in the second species And so howsoever it may be true That a Faculty or Naturall Power may be so farre the Same with the Soule as that it differ only ratione ratiocinatâ Yet in a Habit we must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei For where there may be a Reall Separation and not onely Mentall there must needs be granted a Distinction in re Now that in all Habits there may be a reall Separation is apparent For though it may be some Habits acquired or infused cannot be lost when they are once had as Grace c. yet before the acquisition or infusion of such Habits the Soule was actually without them Indeed it is true That these Habits cannot subsist without the Soule and therefore they may not be imagined to be Really distinct as res res yet because the Soule may exist without these therefore they must have a Modall distinction in re as res modus Thus the Roundnesse of a piece of Coyn though when it is it is the same Thing with the Silver not being a Thing added but only a Modification a moulding or fashioning of the Former thing yet must it be Distinct from the essence of the Silver though not a Thing distinct Otherwise when this Silver looseth its Roundnesse it should loose its Essence and become somwhat else whereas the Silver in this form is not really distinct from it selfe in another forme but the same Metall the same Silver There being then this difference between a Habite and a Faculty Though Reason should be One with the soule without so much as a Modall distinction yet follows it not that a Habit hath the same Reall Identity but that it may be distinguished ex parte rei Habits he distinguisheth into Infused and Acquisite When the soul saith he by vertue of its Being is cleare in such a Truth it is said to be an Infused habit when by frequent action such a Truth is Connaturall to the Soule it may be stiled an Habit Acquisite though c. Whether or no this be the genuine distinction between an Acquisite and Infused Habit it is not materiall strictly to examine If the soule by its Essence be cleare in such a Truth that is be ready to act according to such a Truth I should call this a Faculty or Naturall power rather then an Habit. Thus Gravity in a Stone whereby it is naturally prone to descend I should not call an Habit but a Faculty Though Heavinesse in another relation be neither a Faculty nor an Habit but qualitas Patibilis And so perhaps may Knowledge as it is an accidentall Form informing the soule be referred to the same species of Quality though it can hardly be called by that Name For a Habit quatenus sic is so called not with any relation to the Subject but in relation to Acts which slow from it or are produced by it This Pronenesse or Aptnesse for operation which is in any thing immediatly from its Essence is a naturall Power or Faculty And a Habit is a further Readinesse and Pliablenesse or Facility of working according to this Faculty A Habit therefore alwayes presupposeth a Faculty as being but a Facilitation of it And when as by Reason a man hath an Ability to understand by Habituall Knowledge he hath a Readinesse to understand Now this Readinesse or Facility if it proceed from Often Acting so that from the iterating of former Acts it becomes more prone either to continue or repeate those Acts It is an Acquisite Habit Somewhat of this may be seene in Naturall things A Wheele being once in motion it will by a smaller force be Continued then at first Begun yea for a while persist without help If this Facility proceed from some Accidentall Form produced in it by an Externall Agent it is an Infused Habit The difference between an Infused and an Acquisit being no other but only in respect of the Efficient Thus the Knowledge of divers Tongues and the Ability to speak them which was in some of the Apostles by immediate Infusion was an Infused Habit whereas in others as in Paul it was Acquisite differing from the other not in Form but in the Efficient A Habit therefore whether Infused or Acquisite being but a Facilitation of the Faculty cannot be a Thing distinct from that Faculty but only a Modus of it which hath not in it selfe a Positive Absolute Being of its own but is a Modification of another Being And its Physicall Being Existentia Rei must be the same with the Being of that which is thus Modificated For it is not ipsum Existens but Modus Existendi And this Manner of Existing hath not an Existence of its own distinct from the Existence of that which doth exist in this manner Yet its Formall and Metaphysicall Being is distinct Yea and its Physicall Existence such
or Vnicus as it is opposed to Multitude and so we now take it is Negative Else where is the fault in this Syllogisme Quod est in Angliâ est in Europâ Sed Rex Vnicus est in Angliâ Ergo Rex Vnicus veltantùm Vnus est in Europâ Propositio 3. Chap. 8. 9 He returns next to his former discourse And what he had said of the Light of Reason he saith also of the Light of Knowledge both Habituall and Actuall Hee allows not that Habits either Infused or Acquisite are any thing new brought into the Soule but only former principles enlightened And therefore rejecting Aristotle's rasatabula he imbraceth Plato's Reminiscentia Which may be thus expressed He supposeth the Soule to be as a Table wherein be many rare lineaments and lively colours described but hanging in the dark they appeare not till such time as they be illustrated by some advenient Light which Light doth not bring with it any new colours or more lineaments but only illustrateth those that were formerly there but appeared not Whereas Aristotle rightly supposeth it as a Table prepared void of any yet capable of all Or rather as a Glasse which having of it selfe none of those Colours is yet fit to receive and reflect all those Rays or visible Species which from the adjacent Objects fall upon it And indeed as for Historicall Knowledge I suppose his Lordship himselfe if he well consider of it will not affirm that to have any Idea's originally in the Soule It being utterly impossible by discourse to find out a by-past History without Historicall Relation And if there may be new Idea's of Historicall truths imprinted in the Soule which were not there before why not also of Discuâ—sive Knowledge But his Lordship stays not here dissenting from us in the Nature of Habits whether they be new Idea's or the illustration of former Idea's but in effect he takes away all Habits wholly Telling us that we Seem only by frequent acts to help the Soule and create new Habits but that indeed all actings are but new discoveries Now this is not to establish Plato's Reminiscentia but to take away all Memory whatsoever How can we be said to remember how is one said to be learned another ignorant what is the benefit of study and of experience if former acts doe not at all help future acts but only seem so to doe How comes it to passe that wee are able out of our own memories to furnish our selves with Historicall truths formerly heard or read without a second relation which at the first wee could not doe if our former acts doe not at all help latter acts but all things be new discoveries Proposition 4. Chap. 10. And what hath been said of Naturall and Habituall light of Reason and Habituall Knowledge he now affirms of Actuall Knowledge The severall Operations of the Soule in apprehensions affirmations negations c. the severall Actings of Truth are also the Souls Essence And why but because the Soule is Actus primus and therefore its Essence must be Action This Action likewise must Exist which what else can it be but Rationall workings and so the same with Actus Secundus But his Lordship is much mistaken to think that actus primus is Latine for Action Actus is of as large an extent as Potentia Now there is potentia ad Esse and potentia ad Formam as well as potentia ad Operari When Ens in potentiâ becoms Ens Actu when that which was possible is actually produced it s own Essence oâ— Being is that Actus which makes it Ens Actu which was before Ens in Potentiâ and this we call actus Entitativus and it is better translated Actuality then either Action or Activity Again the Matter is capable of this or that Form which we call potentia ad Formam substantialem whereby it is potentiâ tale in genere substantiâ— as materia putris is in potentiâ ad formam vermis Now when this Form whereof it is capable is actually introduced that which was before potentià tale becoms now actu tale in genere substantiae and this Form is called actus Substantialis but not Actio Substantialis or actus primus and thus the Soule is Actus Again a Substance of this or that Species constituted by this or that form is capable of this or that Accident and is therefore potentiâ talis accidentaliter or in potentiâ ad hanc formam acâ—identalem as Water is potentiâ calida when Heat is produced it becoms Actu calida and the Heat is this Actus whereby it is actu talis and it is actus primus accidentalis though perhaps some would call it actus secundus Yet none call it Actio This actus acciden alis or forma accidentalis if it be Operative stands in a double relation to its Subject and so it is actus informans and to its Operation and so it is actus operativus but not Operatio and belongs either to the first or the second species of Quality it is either a Habit or a Faculty this if you please you may call Activity though not Action Now a Subject indued with this actus operativus is in potentiâ ad operandum When this power is reduced into act it is actu operans and this actus whereby it doth actu operari is properly Actus secundus Actio or Operatio and belongs to the Praedicament of Action But such an Actus the Soule is not and therefore its Operations cannot be its Essence Objectio 1. Chap. 11. But now least by making the Soules Operations to be the Soules Essence he should make so many Soules as there be Acts which is indeed a good Consequence he is put upon another invention to make all these operations to be but One the second action is but the same with the former So that with him one sinfull Act is all one with a continued Course of sinning And therefore tells us that actions performed in distinct Times and Places are not therefore distinct actions because Time and Place are Nothing but meerly imaginary But this pâ—aister is not large enough to cover the sore For it is true indeed different actions may receive an externall denomination from difference in Time and Place but they receive not their difference from hence but from themselves Time and Place can neither make different things to be the same nor the same to be different A man is the same to day that he was yesterday the same at London that he was at York yet both Time and Place be different Againe two Angels being at the same time coexistent in the same place are not therefore the same Angel So that whether time and place be any thing or nothing yet this Man is not the other Man this Action is not the other Action But if difference of Time and Place be only imaginary then why do we deny to the Papists that Christs Body is corporeally present in the