desire to know whether a Thing has such or such Properties or if we know it has we desire only to discover what is the Cause of them To solve the Questions of the first sort we must consider Things in their Birth and Original and conceive that they are always produc'd by the most simple and natural Ways But the Solution of the others requires a very different Method for they must be resolv'd by Suppositions and then we must examine whether those Suppositions induce into any Absurdity or whether they lead to any Truth plainly and clearly known For instance We desire to discover the Properties of the Roulet or some one of the Conick Sections We must consider those Lines in their Generation and form them by the most simple and least perplexing Ways for that is the best and shortest Means to discover their Nature and Properties We easily see that the Subâ—endent of the Roulet is equal to the Circle whence it is form'd And if we discover not many of its Properties that way 't is because the Circular Line that produces it is not sufficiently known But as to Lines merely Mathematical the Relations of which may be more clearly known such as are Conick Sections 't is sufficient for the discovering a vast Number of their Properties to consider them in their Generation Only we must observe that as they may be produc'd by a Regular Motion several Ways so all sorts of Generation are not equally proper to enlighten the Mind that the most simple are the best and that it often happens notwithstanding that some particular Methods are fitter than others to demonstrate some particular Properties But when it is not requir'd to discover in general the Properties of a Thing but to know whether such a Thing has such a Property then we must suppose that it actually enjoys it and carefully examine the Consequences of that Supposition whether it induces into a manifest Absurdity or leads to an undeniable Truth that may serve as a Means to find out what is sought for That is the Method which Geometricians use to solve their Problems They suppose what they seek and examine what will follow of it they attentively consider the Relations that result from the Supposition they represent all those Relations that contain the Conditions of the Problem by Equations and then reduce those Equations according to the usual Rules so that what is unknown is found equal to one or several Things perfectly known I say therefore that when 't is requir'd to discover in general the Nature of Fire and of the different Fermentations which are the most universal Causes of natural Effects the shortest and surest Way is to examine them in their Principle We must consider the Formation of the most agitated Bodies the Motion of which is diffus'd into those that ferment We must by clear Ideas and by the most simple Ways examine what Motion may produce in Matter And because Fire and the various Fermentations are very general Things and consequently depending upon few Causes there will be no need of considering very long what Matter is able to perform when animated by Motion to find out the Nature of Fermentation in its very Principle and we shall learn withall several other Things altogether requisite to the Knowledge of Physicks Whereas he that would in such a Question argue from Suppositions so as to ascend to the first Causes even to the Laws of Nature by which all things are form'd would make a great many of them that should prove false and unprofitable He might perhaps discover that the Cause of the Fermentation is the Motion of an invisible Matter communicated to the agitated Parts of Matter For 't is sufficiently known that Fire and the various Fermentations of Bodies consist in their Agitation and that by the Laws of Nature Bodies receive their immediate Motion only from their meeting with others that are more agitated So that he might discover that there is an invisible Matter the Motion of which is communicated to visible Bodies by Fermentation But 't is morally impossible that he should ever by his Suppositions find out how all that is perform'd which however is not so hard to do when we examine the Formation of Elements or of Bodies of which there is a greater Number of the same Nature as is to be seen in Monsieur des Cartes's System The Third Part of the Question concerning Convulsive Motions will not be very difficult to solve if we suppose that there are in our Bodies Animal Spirits susceptible of Fermentation and withall Humours so piercing as to insinuate themselves into the Pores of the Nerves through which the Spirits are diâ—â—us'd into the Muscles provided always that we pretend not to determine the true Texture and Disposition of those invisible Parts that contribute to these Convulsions When we have separated a Muscle from the rest of the Body and hold it by the two Ends we sensibly perceive that it endeavours to contract it self when prick'd in the Middle 'T is likely that this depends on the Construction of the imperceptible Parts of which it is made which are as so many Springs determin'd to some certain Motions by that of Compunction But who can be sure he has found out the true Disposition of the Parts employ'd in the Production of that Motion and who can give an uncontroverted Demonstration of it Certainly that appears altogether impossible though perhaps by long thinking we might imagine such a Construction of Muscles as would be fit to perform all the Motions we know them to be capable of we must not therefore pretend to determine the true Construction of the Muscles However because it cannot be reasonably doubted but that there are Spirits susceptible of some Fermentation by the Mixture of a very subtile heterogeneous Matter and that acriminious and pungent Humours may creep into the Nerves that Hypothesis may be suppos'd Now to proceed to the Solution of the Question propos'd We must first examine how many sorts of Convulsive Motions there are and because their Number is indefinite we must insist on the Principal the Causes of which seem to be different We must consider in what Parts they are made what Diseases precede and follow them whether they are attended with Pain or free from it and above all what are the Degrees of their Swiftness and Violence for some are very swift and violent others are very swift but not violent a third sort are violent and not swift and others again are free from both these Symptoms Some finish and begin afresh perpetually others keep the Parts rigid and unmoveable for some time and others deprive us of their Use and altogether deform them All this being well weigh'd it will be no hard matter to explain in general after what has been said concerning Natural and Voluntary Motions how the Convulsive are perform'd For if we conceive that some Matter capable of fermenting the Spirits mixes with those contain'd in
they may not overcome and so will quickly feed themselves with a borrowed Taste of the Good they hope to enjoy and will pass such Judgments as are fit to justifie their Hope and Joy But those that want agitated Spirits as Old Men and those that are of a Phlegmatick and Melancholy Temper being inclined to Fear and Sorrow because their Soul is conscious of her own Weakness and destitute of Spirits to perform her Orders will make quite contrary Judgments imagine insuperable Difficulties to justifie their Fear and give up themselves to Envy Sorrow Despair and other sorts of Aversion of which weak Persons are most susceptible CHAP. XII That such Passions as have Evil for their Object are the most Dangerous and Vnjust And that those that have the least Mixture of Knowledge are the most lively and sensible OF all the Passions the several sorts of Aversions make their Judgments the most remote from Reason and the most dangerous there being no Passion which corrupts and bribes Reason so much in its behalf as Hatred and Fear Hatred chiefly in the Cholerick or in those whose Spirits are in a perpetual agitation and Fear in the Melancholy or those whose gross and heavy Spirits are neither easily moved nor soon quieted But when â—atred and Fear conspire together to bribe Reason which is very frequently done then there are no Judgments so unjust and capricious but they will pass and defend them with an insuperable Obstinacy The Reason of this is That as in this Life Evil strikes the Soul more to the quick than Good so the Sense of Pain is livelier than that of Pleasure Injuries and Scandals more sensibly affect us than Commendations and Applause and though there are Men indifferent as to the enjoying some Pleasures and receiving certain Honours yet there is scarce one that can bear Pain and Contempt without Uneasiness And therefore Hatred Fear and other sorts of Aversion that have Evil for their Object are most violent Passions which shake the Mind with such unexpected Commotions as discompose and stupifie it and quickly pierce into the bottom of the Heart dethrone Reason and pass upon all sorts of Subjects erroneous and unjust Sentences to favour their tyrannical Madness Of all Passions they are the most cruel and distrustful contrary to Charity and Civil Society and at the same time the most ridiculous and extravagant since they give such impertinent and frantick Judgments as excite the Laughter and Indignation of all other Men. Those Passions inspired the Pharisees with these absurd Discourses What are we doing This Man works many Miracles If we let him alone all Men will believe in him and the Romans will come and destroy both our City and Nation They agreed that our Saviour had wrought many Miracles for the Resurrection of Lazarus was undeniable But what were the Judgments of their Passions To murther both JESUS and Lazarus whom he had raised from the Dead Why JESUS Because say they if we let him alone all Men will believe in him and the Romans shall come and extirpate our Nation And why Lazarus Because that by reason of him many of the Jews went away and believed on Jesus Oh Judgments equally Cruel and Irrational Cruel through Hatred and Irrational through Fear The Romans shall come and destroy our City and Nation The same Passions moved a great Assembly consisting of Annas the High-Priest Caiaphas John Alexander and as many as were of the Kindred of the High-Priest to speak thus What shall we doe with these Men For that indeed a notable Miracle hath been done by them is manifest to all them that dwell in Jerusalem and we cannot deny it But lest it should spread farther let us threaten to punish them severely if they preach the Name of JESUS any more All those great Men agitated by their Passions and blinded by their false Zeal pass Judgment both impertinent and unjust They dare not punish the Apostles because of the People and that the Man who had been miraculously cured was above Forty Years of Age and present in the Assembly but threaten them lest they should â—each in the Name of Jesus supposing they ought to condemn the Doctrine because they put the Author to death You intend say they to bring this Man's Blood upon us When false Zeal unites it self to Hatred it shelters it from the Reproofs of Reason and justifies it so well that we scruple not to be led by its Motions When Ignorance and Weakness accompany Fear they extend it to innumerable Subjects and drive on its Commotions to that heighth that the least Suspicion disturbs and frightens Reason False Zealots imagine they serve God when they obey their Passions They blindly follow the secret Motions of their Hatred as Inspirations from internal Truth and insisting with great satisfaction on the Proofs of Sense that justifie that Excess their Errours become confirmed with an unconquerable Stubbornness As to ignorant and weak Persons they create to themselves Matter of ridiculous and fantastick Fears like Children that walk in the dark without a Guide and Light fansie frightful Bugbears are distur'd and cry out as though they were undone Knowledge retrieves them if they be ignorant but if they be weak their Imagination continues crazed and the least thing that relates to that frightful Object renews the Tracks and opens the Current of the Spirits which cause the Symptoms of their Fear So that it is altogether impossible to cure or pacifie them for ever But when false Zeal meets with Hatred and Fear in a weak Mind it incessantly produces such unjust and violent Judgments as cannot be thought upon without Horrour To change a Mind possest with those Passions requires a greater Miracle than that which converted St. Paul and his Cure would be absolutely impossible could we seâ— Bounds to the Power and Mercy of God Those that walk in the Dark rejoyce at the sight of Light but this Man cannot suffer it because it wounds him by opposing his Passion His Fear is in some sort voluntary as being produced by his Hatred and therefore he loves to feel its Commotions because we love to be agitated even with the Passions that have Evil for their Object when the Evil is only imaginary or rather when we know as in Tragedies that the Evil cannot hurt us The Phantasms which those that walk in the Dark frame in their Imaginations vanish at the Approach of Light but the idle Dreams of this sort of Men will not disappear at the Light of Truth which instead of dissipating the Darkness of their Mind incenses their Imagination so that the frustrated Light recoils because they are wholly taken up with the Objects of their Passion and it seems those Apparitions have a real Body since they reflect some weak Rays of the Light that falls upon them But though we should suppose in those Men a sufficient Teachableness and Attention to listen to and comprehend the Reasons that
is included in the Idea of a necessary Being as the Equality of Diameters is included in the Idea of a Circle And I except the Existence of our Soul because we are inwardly conscious that we Think Will and Feel and have no clear Idea of our Soul as I have sufficiently explained in the seventh Chapter of the second Part of the third Book and elsewhere These are some of the Reasons which we have to add to those already given to prove that all our Light is deriv'd to us from God and that the immediate and direct Object of our clear and evident notices is an immutable and necessary Nature Some Objections are usually made against this Opinion which I shall now endeavour to solve Against what has been said that none but God enlightens us and that we see all things in him OBJECTION I. OUR Soul thinks because it is her Nature God in creating her gave her the faculty of thinking and she needs nothing more But if any thing else is wanting let us stick to what Experience teaches us of our senses which is that they are the manifest causes of our Ideas 'T is an ill way of Philosophizing to argue against Experience ANSWER I cannot but admire that the Cartesian Gentlemen who with so much reason reject and scorn the general Terms of Nature and faculty should so willingly employ them on this occasion They cry out against a Man that shall say the Fire burns by its nature and converts certain Bodies into Glass by a natural Faculty And yet some of them fear not to say that the Humane Mind produces the Ideas of all things in it self by its nature and because it has a thinking faculty But be it spoken without offence these words are no more significative in their Mouths than in the Peripateticks I know very well that the Soul is capable of thinking But I know likewise that extension is capable of Figures The Soul is capable of Will as matter is of Motion But as it is false that matter though capable of figure and motion has in it self a force faculty or nature by which it can move it self and give it self now a round figure and anon a square one so though the Soul be naturally and essentially capable of Knowledge and Will it is false that she has Faculties whereby she can produce in her Ideas or motion towards good There is a great difference between being Moveable and self moving Matter is by its nature moveable and capable of Figures nor can it subsist without a figure But it neither moves it self nor shapes it self nor has it any faculty to do it The Mind is of its nature capable of motion and Ideas I acknowledge But it neither moves nor enlightens its self But 't is God that does all in Minds as well as in Bodies Can we say that God effects the changes that happen in matter and that he causes not those which occur in the Mind Is this to give to God the things that are his to leave these latter sort of Beings to their own management Is he not equally Lord of all things Is he not the Creator Preserver and true mover of Minds as well as Bodies Certainly he makes all both Substances Accidents Beings and Modes of Being For in short he knows all But he knows nothing but what he does We therefore streighten him in his Knowledge if we limit him in his Action But if it must be said that Creatures have such faculties as are commonly conceived and that natural Bodies have a Nature which is the Principle of their Motion and Rest as says Aristotle and his Followers This indeed overthrows all my Ideas but yet I will rather agree to it than say the Mind enlightens it self Men may say that the Soul has the force of moving diversly the Limbs of her Body and of communicating to them Sense and Life They may say if they please that it is she that gives heat to the Blood motion to the Spirits and to the rest of her Body its Bulk Situation and Figure Only let them not say that the Mind gives Light and Motion to it self If God works not all let us allow him at least to do what is Noblest and Perfectest in the World And if Creatures do any thing let them move Bodies and range and posture them as they think fit But let them never act upon Minds We will say if that will serve that Bodies move each other after they have been mov'd themselves or rather will sit down ignorant of the different Dispositions of matter as not concerning us But let not our Minds be ignorant whence proceeds the Light that enlightens them Let them know from what hand they receive all that can make them more happy or more perfect let them acknowledge their dependence in its whole extent and know that whatever they actually have God gives them every moment for as says a great Father upon another Subject 'T is a very criminal Pride to use the gifts of God as our own innate Perfections Above all let us take heed of imagining that the Senses instruct Reason that the Body enlightens the Mind that the Soul receive of the Body what it wants it self We had better believe our selves independent than to believe we truly depend on Bodies 'T is much better to be our own Masters than to seek for Masters among inferior Creatures But we had much better submit our selves to Eternal Truth which assures us in the Gospel that none else is our Instructor than to believe the Testimony of our Senses or of some Men who presume to talk to us as our Teachers Experience whatever may be said does not countenance prejudices For our Senses no less than our Teachers after the Flesh are only occasional causes of the Instruction which Eternal Wisdom infuses into our most inward Reason But because this Wisdom enlightens us by an insensible Operation we imagine it is our Eyes or the words of those that verberate the Air against our Ears who produce this Light or pronounce that intelligible Voice which instructs us And for this Reason as I have said in another place our LORD thought it not enough to instruct us in an intellible manner by his Divinity unless he condescended also to inform us in a sensible way by his Humanity thereby teaching us that he is every way our Master And because we cannot easily retire into our selves to consult him in Quality of eternal Truth immutable Order intelligible Light he has rendred Truth sensible by his Words Order Amiable by his Example Light Visible by a Body which breaks the force of its Lustre and after all we are still so ungrateful unjust stupid and insensible as to respect as our Masters and that against his express prohibition not only other Men but it may be the most insensible and vilest Bodies OBJECTION II. Since the Soul is more perfect than Bodies how comes it that she cannot include
these Terms ought to be explain'd If you 'll say that the Union of my Mind and Body consists in God's willing That upon my Desire to move my Arm the Animal Spirits should betake themselves to the Muscles it is compos'd of to move it in the manner desir'd I clearly understand this Explication and receive it But this is exactly my own Assertion For if my Will determine that of God 't is evident that my Arm is mov'd not by my Will which is impotent of it self but by the Will of God which never fails of its Effect But if it be said The Union of my Mind and Body consists in God's giving me a Force to move my Arm as he has given my Body likewise a Force of making me feel Pleasure and Pain to the end I may be sollicitous for this Body and be concern'd for its Preservation certainly this is to suppose the thing in dispute and to make a Circle No Man has a clear Idea of that Force which the Soul has over the Body or the Body over the Soul nor knows very well what he says when he positively asserts it That Opinion has been embrac'd through Prejudice has been learn'd in Infancy and in the Age of Sense But Understanding Reason and Reflexion have no part in it which is manifest enough from what I have said in the foregoing Treatise But you 'll say I know by my inward Conscience of my Action that I really have this Force and therefore am not mistaken in believing it I answer That when I move my Arm I am conscious to my self of the Actual Volition by which I move it and I err not in believing I have that Volition I have moreover an inward Sense of a certain Effort or Endeavour which accompanies this Volition and it is to believ'd that I make this Endeavour Last of all I grant that I have an inward feeling of the Motion of my Arm at the instant of this Effort which suppos'd I agree to what is said That the Motion of the Arm is perform'd at the instant a Man feels this Effort or has a practical Volition of moving his Arm. But I deny that this Effort which is no more than a Modification or Sensation of the Soul which is given us to make us understand our Weakness and to afford us a confus'd and obscure Sensation of our Strength can be capable of moving and determining the Spirits I deny there is any Analogy or Proportion between our Thoughts and the Motions of Matter I deny that the Soul has the least Knowledge of the Animal Spirits which she imploys to move the Body Animated by her Last of all Though the Soul exactly knew the Animal Spirits and were capable of moving them or determining their Motions yet I deny that with all this she could make choice of these Ductus of the Nerves of which she has no Knowledge so as to drive the Spirits into them and thereby move the Body with that Readiness Exactness and Force as is observable even in those who are the least acquainted with the Structure of their Body For supposing that our Volitions are truly the moving Force of Bodies howbeit that seems inconceivable how can we conceive the Soul moves her Body The Arm for Example is mov'd by means of an inflation or contraction caus'd by the Spirits in some of the Muscles that compose it But to the end the Motion imprinted by the Soul on the Spirits in the Brain may be Communicated to those in the Nerves and from thence to others in the Muscles of the Arm the Volitions of the Soul must needs multiply or change in proportion to those almost infinite shocks or Collisions that are made by the little Bodies that constitute the Spirits But this is inconceivable without admitting in the Soul an infinite number of Volitions upon the least Motion of the Body since the moving it would necessarily demand an innumerable multitude of Communications of Motions For in short the Soul being but a particular Cause and not able to know exactly the degrees of agitation and the dimensions of infinite little Corpuscles which encounter upon the dispersion of the Spirits into the Muscles she could not settle a General Law for the Communication of these Spirits Motion nor follow it exactly if she had establish't it Thus it is evident the Soul could not move her Arm although she had the Power of determining the Motion of the Animal Spirits These things are too clear to be longer insisted on The case is the same with our Thinking Faculty We are inwardly conscious that we Will the Thinking on something that we make an effort to that purpose and that in the Moment of our desire and effort the Idea of the thing presents it self to our Mind but our inward Sensation does not tell us that our Will or Effort produces our Idea Reason does not assure us that it 's possible and only prejudice makes us believe that our desires are the causes of our Ideas whilst we experiment an hundred times a Day that the latter accompany or pursue the former As God and his Operations have nothing sensible in them and as we are not conscious of any thing but our desires that precede the presence of our Ideas so we do not think our Ideas can have any other cause than these desires But view the thing closely and we shall see no force in us to produce them neither Reason nor Conscience giving us any information thereupon I don't think my self oblig'd to transcribe all the other proofs employ'd by the patrons for the Efficacy of Second Causes Because they seem so trifling that I might be thoughts to design to render them Ridiculous And I should make my self so if I gave them a Serious Answer An Author for Example very gravely asserts in behalf of his Opinion Created Beings are true Material Formal Final Causes why must not they likewise be Efficient or Efficacious I fancy I should give the World little satisfaction if to answer this Gentlemans Question I should stand to explain so gross an Ambiguity and show the difference between an Efficacious cause and that which the Philosophers are pleas'd to call material Therefore I leave such arguments as these to come to those which are drawn from Holy-Writ ARGUMENT VII The Defenders of the Efficacay of Second Causes commonly alledge the following Passages to support their Opinion Let the Earth bring forth Grass Let the Waters bring forth the moving Creature that hath Life and Fowl that may fly c. Therefore the Earth and Water by the Word of God receiv'd the Power of producing Plants and Animals Afterwards God Commanded the Fowls and Fishes to multiply Be fruitful and multiply and fill the Waters in the Seas and let Fowl multiply in the Earth Therefore he gave them a Power of begetting their like Our Saviour in the fourth Chapter of St. Mark says the Seed which falls on good Ground brings forth
Religion against Hereticks give frequent occasion to the same Hereticks of adhering obstinately to their Errors and treating the mysteries of Faith as Humane Opinions The Working and Agitation of the Mind and the Subtilties of the School are no fit means to make Men sensible of their own Weakness and to inspire them with that Spirit of Submission requisite to make them humbly resign to the Decisions of the Church On the contrary these Subtil and Humane Reasonings may kindle a secret Pride in their Heart and dispose them to imploy their Mind to evil purpose by framing a Religion suitable to its Capacity And so far are we from seeing Hereticks convinc'd by Philosophic Arguments and the Reading of Books purely Scholastical so as to acknowledge and condemn their Errors that on the contrary we find them daily taking constant occasion from the Weakness of some School-men's Arguings to turn the most Sacred mysteries of our Religion into Jest and Raillery which indeed are not establish'd on any Reason and Explications of Humane Derivation but only on Authority of the Word of GOD written or unwritten that is transmitted down to us by way of Tradition And indeed 't is impossible for Humane Reason to make us comprehend how one GOD is in Three Persons How the Body of our LORD can be really present in the Eucharist and how 't is consistent for Man to be free whilst GOD knows from all Eternity all that Man shall do The Reasons that are brought to prove and explain these things are such for the generality as convince none but those who are willing to admit them without Examination but look ridiculous and extravagant to Men minded to oppugn them and that are not settled in the Belief of the Foundation of these mysteries Nay it may be said that the Objections that are form'd against the Principal Articles of our Faith and especially against the mysteries of the TRINITY are so strong as cannot possiby admit of any clear evident and satisfactory Solution such I mean as one way or other does not shock our weak and staggering Reason These mysteries being in truth incomprehensible The best way of converting Hereticks is not then to accustom them to the Exercise of Reason by urging to them only uncertain Arguments deduc'd from Philosophy because the Truths we would instruct them in come not under the Scrutinity of Reason Nor is it always convenient to use Argument in Truths that can be made out by Reason as well as Tradition as the Immortality of the Soul Original Sin the necessity of Grace the corruption of Nature and some others for fear least the Mind having once tasted the Evidence of Argument upon these Questions will not acquiesce in those which are only prov'd by Tradition On the other hand they should be taught to quit their own Reason by making them sensible of its Weakness its Limitation and its Disproportion to our mysteries and when the Pride of their mind shall be humbled and brought down it will be easie to introduce them into the Sentiments of the Church by representing to them her Authority or explaining to them the Tradition of all Ages if they are capable of understanding it But whilst men are continually calling of their Sight from the Weakness and Limitation of their Mind their Courage will be puffed up with an indiscreet Presumption they will be dazled by an abusive Light and blinded with the love of Glory and so Hereticks will be continually Hereticks Philosophers obstinate and opinionated And Men will never leave disputing on all things they can dispute on as long as Disputation pleases them CHAP. III. I. The Philosophers dissipate or dissolve the force of their Mind by applying it to Subjects including too many Relations and depending on too many things and by observing no Method in their Studies II. An Instance taken from Aristotle III. That Geometricians on the contrary take a good Method in the Search of Truth Especially those who make use of Algebra and Analyticks IV. That their Method increases the strength of the Mind and that Aristotle's Logick lessens it V. Another Fault of Learned Men. MEN not only involve themselves in a multitude of Errors by being busied with Questions partaking of Infinity whilst their Mind is Finite but by over-matching their Mind which is but of a narrow Reach with those of a vast Comprehension It has been already said That as a piece of Wax was incapable of receiving many perfect and very distinct Figures so the Mind was incapable of receiving many distinct Idea's that is of perceiving many things distinctly at the same time Whence 't is easie to conclude that we should not apply our selves at first to the finding out occult Truths the Knowledge whereof depends on too many things some of which are unknown to us or not so familiar as they should be For we ought to study with order and make what we know distinctly serviceable to the Learning we know not or what we know but confusedly And yet the most part of those who take to any Study trouble not themselves so much They never make trial of their forces nor enter into themselves to try how far the reach of their Mind will go 'T is a secret Vanity and a disorderly Desire of Knowledge and not Reason which regulates their Studies For without consulting their Reason they undertake the fathoming the most hidden and inscrutable Truths and the resolving Questions which depend on such a multitude Relations that the most quick and piercing Mind would to the discovering their Truth with an absolute Certainty require several Ages and infinite Experiments to build upon In Medicine and Morality there are a vast many Questions of this nature all the Sciences of Bodies and their Qualities as of Animals Plants Mettals and their Properties are such Sciences as can never be made sufficiently evident or certain especially unless they are cultivated in in another manner than has been done and the most simple and least compos'd are began with on which those other depend But Men of study care not to be at the pains of a methodical Philosophy They are not agreed about the certainty of the Principles of Physics They frankly confess they know not the Nature of Bodies in general nor their Qualities And yet they fancy themselves able for instance to account for Old Men's Hairs growing White and their Teeth becoming Black and such like Questions which depend on so many Causes as 't is impossible to give any infallible Reason of them For to this 't is necessary to know wherein truly consists the Whiteness of Hairs in particular the Humours they are fed with the Strainers which are in the Body to let these Humours through the Conformation of the Root of the Hairs or of the Skin they pass through and the difference of all these things in a Young Man and an Old which is absolutely impossible or at least extreamly difficult to be known Aristotle for instance
the knowledge we have of them is most perfect I mean that the Idea that we have of Extension is sufficient for the displaying to us all the Properties Extension is capable of and we cannot desire a more distinct and fertil Idea of Extension of Figures and Motions than that which GOD furnishes us withal As the Idea's of things which are in GOD include all their Properties in seeing their Idea's we can see successively all the Properties of them for in seeing things as they are in GOD we constantly see them in the most perfect manner and the knowledge of them would be infinitely Perfect if the Mind that perceives them in him were infinite What is wanting to our knowledge of Extension its Figures and Motions is not the defectiveness of the Idea that represents it but of our Mind that considers it But 't is not so in point of the Soul we know her not by her Idea we see her not in GOD we know her only by Conscience and for that reason the knowledge we have of her is imperfect We know nothing of our Soul but what we feel pass within us If we never had had the sensation of Pain Pleasure Light c. it were impossible for us to know whether the Soul was capable of them because we know her not by her Idea But if we saw in GOD the Idea that answers to our Soul we should at the same time know or at least might know all the Properties she is capable of as we know all the Properties Extension is capable of because we know Extension by its Idea It is true we know well enough by our Conscience or by the internal sentiment we have of our selves that our Soul is something great and excellent But 't is possible that what we know of her is the least part of what she is in her self If all we knew of Matter were only Twenty or Thirty Figures wherewith it had been modify'd certainly our knowledge of it had been very inconsiderable in comparison of what we know by the Idea that represents it To understand then the Soul perfectly it is not sufficient to know that only which we receive by internal Sentiment since our Self-Consciousness discovers to us it may be but the least part of our Being It may be concluded from what has been said that though we know the existence of our Soul better than the existence of our Body or than of the things about us yet we have not so perfect knowledge of the Nature of our Soul as of the Nature of our Body which may serve to reconcile the different Sentiments of those who say there is nothing better known than the Soul and of others that affirm we understand nothing less This too may be of Use to prove that the Idea's which represent something to us that 's External are not Modifications of our Soul For if the Soul saw all things by considering her own Modifications she ought to have a more clear and perspicuous knowledge of her own Essence or Nature than of that of Bodies and of the Sensations or Modifications she is capable of than of all the Figures or Modifications incident to Bodies Mean while she knows not that she is capable of this or that Sensation by any View she takes of her self but by Experience whereas she knows Extension to be capable of an infinite number of Figures by the Idea which represents Extension There are morover certain Sensations as Colours and sounds which the generality of Men cannot discover to be Modifications of the Soul but there are no Figures which every one does not know by the Idea he has of Extension to be the Modifications of Bodies What I have been saying shews likewise the reason why we cannot give a Definition explanatory of the Modifications of the Soul For since we know neither the Soul nor its Modifications by Idea's but only by Sensations and such Sensations of Pleasure for instance Pain Heat or the like have no Connexion with Words It is plain that had a Man never seen Colour nor felt Heat he could not be made to understand these Sensations by all the Definitions in the World Now Men having their Sensations occasionally from the Body and all Men's Bodies being not dispos'd alike it often happens that these words are Equivocal and that those which are employ'd to express the Modifications of our Soul signify quite contrary to what they design so that thay often for instance make a Man think of Bitter when 't is suppos'd they make him think of Sweet But though we have not an entire knowledge of our Soul we are sufficiently instructed by Conscience for demonstrating her Immortality Spirituality Liberty and some other Attributes which it is necessary for us to know and for that reason GOD manifests her not to us by her Idea in the way that he gives us to know Bodies True the knowledge we have of our Soul by Conscience is imperfect but it is not false the knowledge on the contrary we have of Bodies by Sensation or Conscience if we may term Conscience that Sensation we have of what occurrs in our Bodies is not only imperfect but also false Wherefore the Idea of Bodies was necessary to correct the Sensations we had of them But we have no need of the Idea of the Soul since the Consciousness we have of her engages us not in Error and there is no fear of mistaking in the Knowledge of her if we be carefull not to confound her with the Body which may be done by Reason Lastly if we had had a clear Idea of the Soul as we have of the Body that Idea had made us consider her as too separate from it and so it had weakned the union of our Soul with our Body by hindring us from regarding our Soul as expanded through all our Members which I explain not more at large There remains now no other Objects of our Knowledge to be spoke to than the Souls of other Men and pure Intelligences and 't is manifest we know them only by Conjecture We know them not at present either in themselves or by their Idea's and whereas they are different from us it is not possible to know them by Conscience We conjecture that the Souls of other men are of the same Species with our own What we feel in our selves we presume that they feel too and when these Sentiments have no Relation to our Body we are sure we are not deceiv'd because we see certain Idea's and immutable Laws in GOD according to which we are certainly assur'd that GOD acts equally on all Spirits I know that twice two are four that it is better to be Righteous than Rich and I am not deceiv'd in believing others know these Truths as well as I. I love Good and Pleasure I hate Evil and Pain I am willing to be happy and I am not deceiv'd in thinking all Men and Angels and even Devils have
more like a Divine than Philosopher For example among other things he concludes That u if the Will had not this Liberty but must have embrac'd every thing that came cloath'd with an appearance of Truth it would have almost ever been deceived whence probably it might be concluded that the Author of its Being was the Author of its Errours and Seducements And afterwards We have therefore a Liberty given us by God that we might avoid falling into Errour 'T is visible this reasoning is founded on the Author 's supposing God will not deceive us x But may it not be doubted whether God has not made us for the enjoyment of probability only and resolv'd to reserve the knowledge of Truth as his own peculiar or whether he designs not this as a pure accession to our Happiness y in Heaven wherefore we ought not to conclude that he would be a Deceiver if he should not afford us the means of discovering it z I leave it Sir to you to think what the Pyrronists would say if they should hear this arguing Many such there are in the process of this piece especially in the last part whereof most Chapters contain Arguments which include theological Questions a b Whether then he considers all these Suppositions as Articles of Faith or regards them as Truths demonstrable by Philosophy he ought still to distinguish them from the Fundamentals of his Work If he considers them as Articles of Faith he is very well pâ—rsuaded they are obscure If he looks on them as conclusions of Humane Science his Method ought to precede them and not imploy them as Principles to depend upon If I thought the World would be concern'd to know exactly that the Animadverter has not understood what he has pretended to encounter I would thus continue him on to the end of his Book and would make it undeniably appear that he has hardly ever taken my Sense and that he had no Idea of my Design but I believe that reasonable Men will be very indifferent in this particular and therefore not to weary them to no purpose and yet to discharge that Debt which some persons think I owe to Truth I will answer in few words all the Chapters of the Animadversions and I desire such as shall have leasure and curiosity enough to examine whether my Answers are just by confronting the Animadversions with the Search In the fourth Article or Chapter the Animadverter opposes my Opinions at large without knowing them He does not consider there are two sorts of Traces one which the Mind forms to represent things by as the Trace which accompanies the Idea of a Square the other which accompanies abstract Ideas but represents them not such are the Traces which the Sound of Words and the Sight of Characters produce in the Brain which naturally have no power to represent or raise Ideas This one Distinction overthrows the grand Reasonings of our Author In this fifth Chapter he puts upon me many Opinions which I never had 'T is not true That I acknowledge all our Ideas to be but Modes of our Soul 's existing On the contrary I have in the third Book which he reflects on given a Chapter on purpose to shew that Opinion indefensible When a Man will play the Critick 't is fit methinks he should read the Book he takes to task Nor is it true that I own that the Ideas we receive by the Senses represent only the Effects produc'd in us hy external Objects I have said the contrary in several places in the fifteenth Chapter of the first Book and elsewhere Why does he not cite or rather why does he not examine what he Criticises on For what remains I cannot distinctly conceive all the Argumentations he here makes I know not the Reason of them those who attentively read them may think of them what they please But I scruple not to affirm that he is so far from impugning my Opinion about the manner of the Minds perceiving external Objects that on the contrary what he says in this Article shews he knows nothing of it In his sixth Chapter he imposes on me what he calls my sixth Supposition or rather he has no knowledge of my Opinion upon that Subject To me he seems not so much as to have read what I have written on it he affirms in several places that I bottom upon Mr. des Cartes 's resolution upon that Question when yet my Opinion is intirely different from his But 't is evident to all that understand Mr. des Cartes and have read what I have said upon that Question that the Author neither understands mine nor Mr. des Cartes's Opinions Mean-while he argues vehemently without knowing what he opposes and even sometimes without discovering what he aims at The Author is very much in the wrong in his seventh Chapter to require me to prove the Existence of Extension when I mean only to assault the Errours of the Senses in point of sensible Qualities and I should have repented if I had follow'd that Method I prove what is serviceable to me in the sequel and I establish nothing upon the Supposition he attributes to me Moreover I cannot tell how it came into his Head after seven years to complain of an Answer of Monsieur Rohault he should have replied to it whilst he was alive but he wanted courage for every one knows with what accuracy and force that learned Man repell'd the Blows that were offer'd him and with two or three words pronounc'd without all manner of Heat and Passion humbled the Imagination of such as being full of themselves thought to cover him with confusion In answer to the eighth Chapter I desire the Author to take notice first that there is difference between an Evil and the Representation of it and therefore the Will may fly the former and yet aquiesce in the latter Secondly that though the Will be nothing but the natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general yet the Rest or Acquiescence of the Soul in evident Truths proceeds from the Will because Rest is produ'd by Motion God will still imprint on us this natural Motion of Love when we shall intirely repose our selves upon him For the Motion of Love doth not cease by the possession of Good and by the view of Truth as Motion of Bodies is interrupted by Rest. We might say farther that even Bodies rest not as capable of Figures but with respect to Motion The rest need no Answer if the Reader will carefully consider those places in the Search which he attacks for 't is needless to answer Objections which vanish upon a distinct Understanding of what I have written though they appear considerable in themselves In the ninth Chapter the Author opposes my own Objections and neglects the Answers I have given them and not knowing there are several sorts of Liberty he fancies with a great deal of Joy that I have fallen into a Contradiction I
is not strange that our Sensations should agitate us and quicken our love for sensible things whereas our Light dissipates and vanishes without producing any zeal and ardency for Truth 'T is true that several Men are persuaded that God is their real Good love him as their All and earnestly desire to strengthen and increase their Union with him But few evidently know that by meditating on the Truth we unite our selves to God as far as natural strength can attain that it is a sort of Enjoyment of him to contemplate the true Ideas of things and that that abstracted view of some general and immutable Truths on which all the particulars depend are flights of a Mind that sequesters it self from the Body to unite it self to God Metaphysicks speculative Mathematicks and all those universal Sciences which regulate and contain the particular as the Universal Being comprehends all particular Beings seem to be Chimerical to most Men as well to the pious as to those that do not love God So that I dare hardly make bold to say that the study of those Sciences is the most pure and perfect Application to God that the Mind may be naturally capable of and that it is by the sight of the Intellectual World which is their Object that God has produced and still knows this sensible World from which Bodies receive their Life as Spirits live from the other Those that purely follow the Impressions of their Senses and motions of their Passions are not capable of relishing the Truth because it flatters them not And even the Vertuous who constantly oppose their Passions when they proffer them false Goods do not always resist them when they conceal from them the Truth and make it despicable because one may be pious without being a Man of parts To please God we need not exactly know that our Senses Imagination and Passions always represent things otherwise than they are since it appears not that our Lord and his Apostles ever intended to undeceive us of several Errours upon this matter which Descartes has discover'd to us There is a great difference betwixt Faith and Understanding the Gospel and Philosophy the greatest Clowns are capable of Faith but few can attain to the pure Knowledge of Evident Truth Faith represents to vulgar Men God as the Creator of Heaven and Earth which is a sufficient motive of Love and Duty towards him whereas Reason knowing that God was God before he was Creator not only considers him in his Works but also endeavours to contemplate him in himself or in that immense Idea of the infinitely perfect Being which is included in him The Son of God who is the Wisdom of his Father or the Eternal Truth made himself Man and became sensible that he might be known by Men of Flesh and Blood by gross material Men that he might instruct them by that which was the Cause of their Blindness and draw them to the love of him and disengage them from sensible goods by the same things that had enslav'd them for having to doe with Fools he thought fit to take upon him a sort of Folly whereby to make them wise So that the most pious Men and truest Believers have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him by the help of his Grace without understanding that he is their All in the sense Philosophers understand him and without thinking that the abstracted Knowledge of Truth is a sort of a Union with him We ought not therefore to be surprized if so few Persons labour to strengthen their natural Union with God by the Knowledge of Truth since to this there is required a continual opposition of the Impressions of the Senses and Passions in a very different way from that which is usual with the Vertuous who are not always persuaded that the Senses and Passions abuse them in the manner that has been explain'd in the foregoing Books The Sensations and Thoughts in which the Body has a share are the sole and immediate Cause of the Passions as proceeding from the Concussion of the Fibres of the Brain raising some particular Commotion in the Animal Spirits And therefore Sensations are the only sensible proofs of our dependence on some things which they excite us to love but we feel not our Natural Union with God when we know the Truth and do not so much as think upon him because he is and operates in us so privately and insensibly as to be imperceptible to our selves And this is the Reason that our natural Union with God raises not our Love for him But it goes quite otherwise with our Union to sensible things All our Sensations prove it and Bodies appear before our Eyes when they act in us Their Action is visible and manifest Our Body is even more present to us than our Mind and we consider the former as the best part of our Selves So that our Union to our Body and by it to sensible Objects excites in us a violent Love which increases that Union and makes us depend on things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the more general Errours of the Passions with some particular Instances 'T IS the part of Moral Philosophy to discover the particular Errours concerning Good in which our Passions engage us to oppose irregular affections to restore the Integrity of the Heart and to rule the Course of our Life But here we chiefly aim at giving Rules to the Mind and finding out the Causes of our Errours in reference to Truth so that we shall not proceed farther in those Matters that relate to the Love of true Good We are tending to the Instruction of the Mind and only take the Heart in the way in as much as the Heart is its Master We search into Truth it self without a special Respect to our selves and we consider its Relation with us only because that Relation is the Spring of Self-love's disguising and concealing it from us for we judge of all things by our Passions whence it is that we mistake in all things the Judgments of Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of Truth 'T is what we learn in these excellent Words of St. Bernard Neither Love nor Hatred know how to make a Judgment according to Truth Will you hear a true Judgment As I hear I judge says our Lord he says not as I hate as I love or as I fear Here you have a Judgment of Hatred We have a Law say the Jews and by that Law he ought to die Here a Judgment of Fear If we let him alone say the Pharisees the Romans shall come and take away our Place and Nation Here another of Love as that of David speaking of his Parricide Son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only Nothing but the pure Light of Truth can illuminate our Mind nothing but the distinct Voice of our common Master can cause us to make
engages us to apply our selves to Subjects that are very disgusting First because that Passion is very dangerous to the Conscience Secondly because it insensibly draws us into ill Studies that have more Lustre than Use or Truth in them and Lastly because it is very difficult to moderate it and that we often become its Fool and Property and instead of enlightning the Mind we only strengthen the Concupiscence of Pride which both corrupts our Moral Powers and darkens our Understanding with an undissolvable Obscurity For it must be consider'd how That Passion insensibly increases settles and fortifies it self in the Heart of Man and when it is too violent instead of helping the Mind in the Search of Truth it strangely blinds it and even persuades it that Things are just as it desires they should be Sure it is there would not be so many false Inventions nor imaginary Discoveries were not Men's Heads giddy'd by the ardent Desire of appearing Inventors For the firm and obstinate Persuasion wherein several Persons have been to have found for Instance the Perpetual Motion the Quadrature of the Circle the Duplication of the Cube by ordinary Geometry in all likelihood proceeded from an extraordinary Desire of seeming to have perform'd what others have vainly attempted And therefore 't is fitter to excite in us such Passions as are so much more useful to our searching out of Truth as they are more strong and wherein the Excess is not to be fear'd Such are the Desires of making a good Use of our Mind of freeing our selves from Prejudices and Errours of getting a sufficient Light to behave our selves in our Condition and such others as neither engage us into fruitless Studies nor carry us on to rash and inconsiderate Judgments When we have begun to taste the pleasure of making use of our Mind to be sensible of the Profit that arises from it have freed our selves of violent Passions and have disrelish'd sensible Pleasures which always prove the Masters of or rather the Tyrants over Reason in those that indiscreetly give up themselves to them we need not other Passions but such as we have spoken of to become attentive upon the Subjects on which we desire to meditate But most Men are not in that Condition they have neither Taste nor Understanding nor Curiosity for any thing but what affects the Senses their Imagination is corrupted by an almost infinite Number of deep Traces which raise none but false Ideas and as they depend upon all the Objects that resort to the Senses and Imagination so they always judge by the Impression they receive from them that is with reference to themselves Pride Debauchery the various Engagements the restless Desires of Advancement which are so common amongst the Men of the World darken the Sight of Truth and stifle in them the Sense of Piety because they separate them from God who alone is able to enlighten as he alone is able to govern us For we cannot increase our Union with sensible Things without diminishing that which we have with intellectual Truth since we cannot be at the same time strictly united with Things so different and opposite Those whose Imagination is pure and chaste that is whose Brain is not fill'd up with deep Traces that fasten them to visible Things may easily unite themselves to God listen attentively to the Truth that speaks to them and even forbear the Use of the most just and rational Passions But as to those that live amongst the Great who depend upon too many things and whose Imagination is soil'd by the false and obscure Ideas of sensible Objects they cannot apply themselves to the Truth unless they be born up by some Passion strong enough to countervail the Weight of the Body that carries them down and to imprint Traces on their Brain that may make a Revulsion upon the Animal Spirits However as every Passion can only by it self perplex our Ideas they ought to use that Help but so far as Necessity requires and all Men ought to study themselves that they may proportionate their Passions to their Weakness It is no hard matter to find a Method of raising in us such Passions as we desire since the Knowledge we have given in the foregoing Books of the Union betwixt Soul and Body has sufficiently open'd the way to it In a word no more is requir'd than to think attentively upon those Objects that by the Institution of Nature are able to raise the Passions Thus we may almost at any time excite in our Hearts whatever Passion we have occasion for but because we can easier excite them at any time than suppress them or remedy the Disorders they cause in the Imagination we must be very sober and cautious in employing them Above all we must take care not to judge of Things by Passion but only by the clear Sight of the Truth which is almost impossible when the Passions are somewhat lively they ought only to raise our Attention but they never fail of stirring up their proper Ideas and violently driving the Will to judge of Things by those Ideas that affect it rather than by the pure and abstracted Ideas of Truth that make no Impression upon it So that we often make Judgments which last no longer than the Passion because they are not produced by the clear Sight of the immutable Truth but by the Circulation of the Blood True it is that Men are wonderfully obstinate in some Errours which they maintain as long as they live but then those Errours have other Causes than the Passions or at least depend on such as are permanent and lasting proceeding from the Constitution of the Body from Interest or from some other durable Cause For Instance Interest being a Motive of a continual standing produces a Passion that never dies and the Judgments that arise from it are very long liv'd But all the other Sentiments of Men which depend upon particular Passions are as inconstant as the Fermentation of their Humours They say one while this another while that and yet what they say is commonly conformable to what they think And as they run from one counterfeit Good to another by the Motion of their Passion and are disgusted at it when that Motion ceases so they run from one false System into another and ardently assert a false Opinion when Passion makes it probable which the Passion ebbing they afterwards forsake By their Passions they taste of every Good without finding any really so and by the same Passions see all Truths without discovering any thing absolutely true though in the time of their Passion what they taste seems to them the Sovereign God and what they see an undeniable Truth The Senses are the second Spring whence we can draw Succours to make the Mind attentive Sensations are the very Modifications of the Soul and differ from the pure Ideas of the Mind the former raising a much stronger Attention than the latter So that 't is plain that
finite or infinite Time but what is only infinite in one sense is neither finite nor infinite and therefore nothing can subsist in that Manner This is the way of arguing with the Prince of Philosophers and the Genius of Nature who instead of discovering by clear and distinct Ideas the true Cause of natural Effects lays the Foundation of a Pagan Philosophy upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses or upon such Ideas as are too general to be useful to the Search after Truth I condemn not Aristotle for not knowing that God has created the World in Time to manifest his Power and the Dependency of Creatures and that he will never destroy it to shew that he is immutable and never repents of his Designs But I may find fault with him for proving by trifling Reasons that the World is of Eternal Duration For though he be sometimes excusable as to the Opinions he maintains yet he 's for the most part intollerable as to the Reasons he alledges when he treats of Subjects that are somewhat difficult What I have already said may perhaps be sufficient to evince it though I have not related all the Errours I have met with in the Book whence the former are extracted and that I have endeavour'd to make him speak plainer than is customary with him But for an entire and full Conviction that the Genius of Nature will never discover the secret Springs and Contrivances of it it will be convenient to shew that his Principles upon which he reasons for the Explication of natural Effects have no Solidity in them 'T is evident that nothing can be discover'd in Physicks without beginning with the most simple Bodies that is with the Elements into which all others are resolv'd because they are contain'd in them either actually or potentially to speak in a Peripatetick Stile But no distinct Explication of those simple Bodies can be found in the Works of Aristotle whence follows that his Elements being not clearly known 't is impossible to discover the Nature of Bodies which are compos'd of them He says indeed that there are four Elements Fire Air Water and Earth but he gives no clear Manifestation of their Nature by any distinct Idea He pretends not that those Elements are the Fire Air Water and Earth that we see for if it were so our Senses at least would afford us some Knowledge of them I grant that in several places of his Works he endeavours to explain them by the Qualities of Heat and Cold Moisture and Dryness Gravity and Levity But that Method is so impertinent and ridiculous that it cannot be conceiv'd how so many Learned Men could be satisfied with it which I proceed to demonstrate Aristotle pretends in his Book of the Heavens that the Earth is the Centre of the World and that all Bodies which he is pleas'd to call simple because he supposes that they are mov'd by their own Nature must move by simple Motions He asserts that besides the Circular Motion which he pretends to be simple and by which he proves that the Heavens which he supposes to move circularly are a simple Body there are two other simple Motions one downwards from the Circumference to the Centre and the other upwards from the Centre to the Circumference That those simple Motions are proper to simple Bodies and consequently that Earth and Fire are such Bodies one of which is altogether heavy and the other perfectly light But because Gravity and Levity may be proper to a Body either wholly or in part he concludes that there are two other Elements or simple Bodies one of which is partly light and the other partly ponderous viz. Water and Air. Thus he proves that there are four Elements and no more It is plain to all those who examine the Opinions of Men by their own Reason that all those Propositions are false or cannot at least be taken for clear and undeniable Principles which may afford very plain and distinct Ideas whereon to lay the Foundation of Natural Philosophy 'T is certain that nothing can be more absurd than to establish the Number of Elements upon the imaginary Qualities of Heaviness and Lightness saying without any farther Proof that some Bodies are ponderous and others light of their own Nature For if any thing may be asserted without Proof it may be said that all Bodies are naturally heavy and endeavour to approach the Centre of the World as the place of their Rest. And the contrary may be asserted too viz. That all Bodies are light of their own Nature and tend to rise to the Heavens as to the place of their greatest Perfection For if you object to him who maintains the Gravity of Bodies that Fire and Air are light he needs but answer that Fire and Air are not light but that being less ponderous than Earth and Water they seem to us to be light And that it goes with those Elements as with a piece of Wood that appears light upon the Water not by reason of any natural Levity since it falls down when in the Air but because Water being heavier seizes the lower Place and forces it to ascend On the contrary If you object to him that defends the natural Levity of Bodies that Earth and Water are ponderous he will likewise answer That those Bodies seem heavy because they are not so light as those that surround them That Wood for instance appears to be ponderous when in the Air not because of its natural Gravity since it ascends when in the Water but because it is not so light as Air. And therefore 't is ridiculous to suppose as an undeniable Principle that Bodies are either light or heavy of their own Nature it being on the contrary evident that none has the Force of moving it self and that 't is indifferent to be moved either upwards or downwards to the East or to the West to the South or to the North or in any other possible manner But let us grant to Aristotle That there are four Elements such as he pretends two of which are heavy viz. Earth and Water and the two other light of their own Nature viz. Fire and Air what Consequence may be drawn from thence for the Knowledge of the Universe Those four Elements are not the visible Fire Air Water and Earth but something quite different which we know neither by the Senses nor by Reason having no distinct Idea of them Let all natural Bodies be compos'd of them since Aristotle has said it But the Nature of those Compounds is still unknown and cannot be discovered but by knowing the four Elements or the simple Bodies of which they are made since the Composed is known only by the Simple Fire says Aristotle is light by its own Nature the ascending Motion is simple Fire is therefore a simple Body since Motion must be proportion'd to the Moveable Natural Bodies are compos'd of simple there is then Fire in all natural Bodies but a Fire
them together In a word as it does nothing it must needs congregate nothing Aristotle judging of things by his Senses imagin'd Cold to be as positive as Heat and because the Sensations of Heat and Cold are both real and positive he supposes them both likewise to be active Qualities and indeed if we follow the Impressions of the Senses we shall be apt to believe that Cold is a very active Quality since cold Water congeals accumulates and hardens in a moment melted Gold and Lead when they are pour'd upon it from a Crucible though the Heat of those Metals be yet strong enough to separate the Parts of the Bodies which they touch 'T is plain by what has been said in the First Book concerning the Errours of the Senses That if we relye upon the Judgment the Senses make of the Qualities of sensible Bodies 't is impossible to discover any certain and undeniable Truth that may serve as a Principle to proceed in the Knowledge of Nature For one cannot so much as discover that way what things are hot and what cold amongst several Persons who touch luke-warm Water it feels cold to those that are hot and hot to those that are cold And if we suppose Fishes susceptible of Sensation 't is very probable that they feel it warm when all or most Men feel it cold It is the same with Air that seems to be hot or cold according to the different Dispositions of the Bodies of those that are exposed to it Aristotle pretends that it is hot but I fansie that the Nothern Inhabitants are of another Opinion since several learned Men whose Climate is as hot as that of Greece have asserted it to be cold But that Question which has made so much noise in the Schools will never be resolv'd as long as no distinct Idea shall be affixed to the Word Heat The Definitions Aristotle lays down of Heat and Cold cannot settle that Idea For Instance Air and even Water though never so hot and scalding congregate the parts of melted Lead together with those of any other Metal whatsoever Air conglutinates all sorts of Fat joyn'd with Gums or any other solid Bodies And he shall be a very formal Peripatetick who should think of exposing Mastich to the Air to separate the pitchy from the Earthy part and other compound Bodies to uncompound them And therefore Air is not hot according to the Definition which Aristotle gives of Heat Air separates Liquors from the Bodies that are imbued with them hardens Clay dries spread Linen though Aristotle makes it moist and so is hot and drying according to the same Definition therefore it cannot be determined by that Definition whether or no Air is hot It may indeed be asserted that Air is hot in reference to Clay since it separates the Water from the Earthy Part. But must we try all the various Effects of Air upon all Bodies before we can be assured whether there is Heat in the Air we breath in If it be so we shall never be sure of it and 't is as good not to philosophize at all upon the Air we respire but upon some certain pure and elementary Air not to be found here below of which we can very dogmatically assert with Aristotle that it is hot without giving the least Proof of it nor even distinctly knowing what we understand either by that Air or by the Heat ascribed to it For thus we shall lay down Principles scarce to be destroyed not because of their Plainness and Certainty but by reason of their Darkness and their being like to Apparitions which cannot be wounded because they have not a Body I shall not insist upon Aristotle's Definitions of Moisture and Dryness it being evident that they explain not their Nature For according to those Definitions Fire is not dry since it is not easily contained within its own limits and Ice is not moist since it keeps within its proper Bounds and can difficultly be adapted to external Bounds But if fluid be understood by the Word humid or moist it may again be said that Ice is not moist and that Flame melted Gold and Lead are very humid If by humid or moist be understood what easily cleaves to any thing Ice is not humid and Pitch Fat and Oil are moister than Water since they cleave to Bodies more strongly than it does Quick-silver is moist in that sense for it cleaves to Metals whereas Water is not perfectly moist since it cleaves not to most of them So that 't is unserviceable to have recourse to the Testimony of the Senses to defend the Opinions of Aristotle But without farther examining his wonderful Definitions of the four Elementary Qualities let us suppose that whatever the Senses teach us of those Qualities is incontestable let us muster up all our Faith and believe all those Definitions very accurate Only let it be allowed us to enquire whether all the Qualities of sensible Bodies are made of these Elementary Qualities Aristotle pretends it and he must do so indeed since he looks upon those Four primitive Qualities as the Principles of all the things which he intends to explain in his Books of Physicks He teaches us that Colours are produced from the Mixture of those Four Elementary Qualities White is produced when Moisture exceeds Heat as in old Men when they grow gray Black when Moisture is exhausted as in the Walls of Cisterns and all other Colours by the like Mixtures that Odours and Savours arise from different Degrees of Dryness and Moisture mix'd together by Heat and Cold and that even Gravity and Levity do depend thereon In short All sensible Qualities must needs be produced according to Aristotle by Two active Principles viz. Heat and Cold and composed of Two passive namely Dryness and Moisture that there may be some probable Connexion betwixt his Principles and the Consequences he draws from them However 't is yet a harder Task to persuade us of such things than any of those that have been hitherto related from Aristotle We can scarce believe that the Earth and other Elements would not be colour'd or visible if they were in their natural Purity without Mixture of those Elementary Principles though some learned Commentators on that Philosopher assert it We understand not what Aristotle means when he assures us that gray Hair is produced by Moisture because in old Men Moisture exceeds Heat though to illustrate his thought we put the definition instead of the thing defined For it looks like an incomprehensible piece of Nonsence to say that the Hair of old Men becomes gray because what is not easily contained within its own Limits but may be within others exceeds what congregates homogeneous things And we are as hard put it to believe that Savour is well explain'd by saying it consists in a mixture of Dryness Moisture and of Heat especially when we put instead of those words the Definitions given by that Philosopher as it would prove useful
deduce them from their natural Principles that they may know evidently by Reason what Faith has already taught them with an absolute Certainty Thus they will convince themselves that the Gospel is the most solid Book in the World that Christ perfectly knew the Disorders and Distempers of Nature that he has rectified and cured them in a manner the most useful to us and most worthy of himself that can be conceived But that the Light of Philosophers is nothing but a dark Night and their most splendid Vertues an intolerable Pride In short that Aristotle Seneca and all the rest are but Men to say nothing worse CHAP. VII Of the Vse of the First Rule concerning particular Questions WE have sufficiently insisted upon the general Rule of Method more especially regarding the Subject of our Studies and shewn that Des Cartes has exactly followed it in his System of the World whereas Aristotle and his Disciples have not observed it We proceed now to the particular Rules that are necessary to resolve all sorts of Questions The Questions that may be formed upon all sorts of Subjects are of so many Kinds as that it is not easie to enumerate them However I shall set down the principal Sometimes we search after the unknown Causes of some Effects that are known and sometimes after unknown Effects by known Causes Fire burns and dissipates Wood we enquire after the Cause of it Fire consists in a violent Motion of the fiery Particles we desire to know what Effects that Motion is able to produce whether it may harden Clay melt Iron c. Sometimes we seek the Nature of a thing by its Properties and sometimes its Properties by its Nature that is known to us We know or suppose that Light is transmitted in a moment and however that it is reflected and collected by a concave Mirrour so as to consume and melt the most solid Bodies and we design to make use of those Properties to discover its Nature On the contrary we know that all the space that reaches from the Earth to the Heavens is full of little Spherical and most movable Bodies which continually endeavour their removal from the Sun We desire to discover whether the endeavour of those small Bodies may be transmitted in an instant whether being reflected by a concave Glass they must unite themselves and dissipate or melt the solidest Bodies Sometimes we enquire after all the Parts of the Whole and sometimes after the Whole by its Parts We search after all the unknown Parts of a Whole that is known when we seek all the Aliquot Parts of a Number all the Roots of an Equation all the Right Angles of a Figure c. And we enquire after an unknown Whole all the Parts of which are known when we seek the Summ of several Numbers the Area of many Figures the Dimensions of different Vessels Or we seek a Whole one Part of which is known and whose other Parts though unknown include some known Relation with that which is unknown as when we seek what is that Number one Part of which as 15 being known makes with the other part the half or the third of an unknown Number or when we seek an unknown Number equal to 15 and to the double of the Root of that unknown Number Lastly We often enquire whether some things are equal or like to others and how much they are unequal or different As when we desire to know whether Saturn is greater than Jupiter and how much the former surpasses the latter Whether the Air of Rome is hotter than that of London and how many degrees What is general in all Questions is that they are formed for the Knowledge of some Truths and because all Truths are Relations it may generally be said that in all Questions we search but after the Knowledge of some Relations either betwixt things or betwixt Ideas or betwixt things and their Ideas There are Relations of several sorts as betwixt the Nature of things betwixt their Magnitudes their Parts their Attributes their Qualities Effects Causes c. but they may all be reduced to two viz. to Relations of Magnitude and of Quality comprehending under the former all those in which things are consider'd as suceptible of more and less and all the others under the latter So that it may be said that all Questions tend to discover some Relation either of Magnitude or of Quality The first and chief Rule is That we must very distinctly know the state of the Question to be resolv'd and have such distinct Ideas of its Terms that we may compare them together and discover their unknown Relations We must then first very clearly perceive the unknown Relation enquired after for 't is plain that if we have no certain Mark to distinguish it when 't is sought for or when 't is found our labour will be fruitless Secondly We must as far as possible make the Ideas which answer to the Terms of the Question distinct by taking off their Equivocation and make them clear by considering them with all the possible Attention for if those Ideas are so confused and obscure as that we cannot make the necessary Comparisons to discover the Relations we look for we are not yet in a state of resolving the Question Thirdly We must consider with all possible Attention the Conditions expressed in the Question if any there be since without that we can but confusedly understand the state of that Question besides that the Conditions commonly trace out the way to resolve it So that when the state of a Question and its Conditions are rightly understood we not only know what we enquire after but also sometimes by what means it may be discovered I grant that Conditions are not express'd in all Questions but then those Questions are undeterminate and may resolved several ways as when 't is required to find out a Square Number a Triangle c. without specifying any other particulars Or it may be that the Querist knows not how to resolve or that he conceals them in order to puzzle the Resolver as when 't is required to find out Two mean Proportionals betwixt Two Lines without adding by the Intersection of the Circle and Parabola or of the Circle and Ellipsis c. And therefore 't is altogether necessary that the distinguishing Character of what is searched after be very distinct and not equivocal or that it be only proper to the thing enquired otherwise we could not be certain whether the Question proposed is resolved We must likewise carefully separate from the Question all the Conditons that make it intricate and without which it subsists entire because they fruitlessly divide the capacity of the Mind Besides that we have not a distinct perception of the state of the Question as long as the Conditions that attend it are useless Suppose for instance a Question were proposed in these Words to cause that a Man besprinkled with some Liquors and crowned with a
to another more exact by which we might accurately know how much London is larger than that open place contained in it There are therefore several sorts of Questions First There are some in which we seek a perfect Knowledge of all the exact Relations of two or several things betwixt each other Secondly There are some in which we search after the perfect Knowledge of some exact Relation betwixt two or several things Thirdly There are some in which we enquire after the perfect Knowledge of some Relation nearly approaching to the exact Relation that is betwixt two or more several things Fourthly There are some in which we are content to find a general and indefinite Relation 'T is evident First That to resolve the Questions of the First sort and perfectly to know all the exact Relations of Magnitude and Quality betwixt two or more things we must have distinct Ideas perfectly representing them and compare them together in all the possible manners We may for Instance resolve all the Questions that tend to discover the exact Relations betwixt 2 and 8 because both Numbers being accurately known may be compared together as much as is necessary to know the exact Relations of their Magnitude and Quality We may know that 8 is 4 times 2 and that 8 and 2 are even but not square Numbers 'T is plain Secondly That to resolve Questions of the second sort and accurately to know some Relation of Magnitude or Quality which is betwixt two or more things 't is necessary and sufficient distinctly to know those Faces by which they must be compared to discover the enquired Relation For Instance to resolve such Questions as tend to discover some exact Relations betwixt 4 and 16 as that 4 and 16 are even and square Numbers it 's sufficient exactly to know that 4 and 16 can be divided into equal parts without Fractions and that both are the product of a Number multiplied by it self and 't is to no purpose to examine what is their true Magnitude It being plain that to know the exact Relations of Quality betwixt things a distinct Idea of their Quality is sufficient without thinking on their Magnitude and that to know the exact Relations of Magnitude we need not search after the true Quality an accurate Knowledge of their Magnitude being all that is required Thirdly It clearly appears that to resolve the Questions of the third sort or to know some Relation very near approaching the exact Relation that is betwixt two or several things it is enough nearly to know the Faces by which they must be compared to discover the Relation required whether it be of Magnitude or Quality For Instance I may evidently know that the √ 8 is greater than 2 because I may very near know the true Magnitude of the √ 8 but I cannot discover how much the √ 8 is greater than 2 because I cannot exactly find out the true Magnitude of the √ 8. Lastly 'T is evident that to resolve the Questions of the fourth sort or to discover general and undefinite Relations it is enough to know things in a manner propotion'd to the need we stand in of comparing them together to find out the required Relation So that 't is not necessary to the Solution of all sorts of Questions to have very distinct Ideas of their Terms or perfectly to know the things expressed by those words But our knowledge must be the more exact as the Relations we search after are more accurate and numerous For as we have said in imperfect Questions imperfect Ideas of the things consider'd are sufficient to resolve them perfectly that is as far as they reach And many Questions may be resolved even without any distinct Idea of their Terms as when we are ask'd whether Fire is capable of melting Salt hardning Clay resolving Lead into Vapours and the like we understand perfectly those Questions and may very well solve them though we have no distinct Idea of Fire Salt Clay c. Because the Querists only desire to know whether we are ascertained by sensible Experiments that Fire produces those Effects And therefore may receive a satisfactory Answer by a knowledge drawn from the Senses CHAP. VIII An Application of the other Rules to particular Questions QUestion 's are of two sorts some are simple and others compound The former may be solved by the bare Attention of the Mind to the Ideas of the words in which they are expressed but the Solution of the latter must be perform'd by comparing them to a third or to many other Ideas We cannot find out the unknown Relations that are express'd in the Terms of a Question by immediately comparing the Ideas of those Terms since they can neither be joined nor compared We must then have one or several mean Ideas that we may make such Comparisons as are necessary to discover those Relations taking a special Care that those mean Ideas be the more clear and distinct as the Relations enquired after are more exact and numerous That Rule is but a Consequence of the first but of an equal importance with it For if exactly to know the Relation of the things compared it is necessary to have clear and distinct Ideas of them It plainly follows from the same Reason that we must have an accurate knowledge of the mean Ideas by which we intend to make our Comparisons since we must distinctly know the Relation of measure with each of the things measured to find out their Relations I shall give some Instances of it When we put a piece of Cork or other small and light Vessel in the Water with a Loadstone in it and offer to the North Pole of that Stone the same Pole of another Magnet which we keep in our Hands we presently perceive that the former Load-stone flies back as though it were driven by a violent Wind. 'T is requir'd to discover the Cause of that Effect 'T is plain that to render a Reason of the Motion of that Load-stone it is not sufficient to know the Relations it has to the other for we might perfectly know them all and yet not understand how two Bodies could repel each other without meeting We must therefore examine what are the Things which we distinctly conceive capable according to the Course of Nature of moving Bodies for 't is requir'd to find out the natural Cause of the Motion of a Load-stone which is certainly a Body And therefore we must not have recourse to any Quality Form or Being which by a clear Knowledge we cannot conceive capable of moving Bodies neither must we ascribe their Effect to an understanding Agent since we are not assur'd that Intelligences are the ordinary Causes of the natural Motions of Bodies and know not so much as whether they can produce Motion We plainly know that it is a natural Law that Bodies should move each other when they meet We must then endeavour to explain the Motion of the Load-stone by the Means of
The Soul of a Beast is a Substance distinct from its Body This Soul is Annihilated and therefore Substances may naturally be Annihilated Therefore though the Soul of Man be a Substance distinct from his Body it may be Annihilated when the Body is destroyed And thus the Immortality of the Humane Soul cannot be Demonstrated by Reason But if it be own'd to be most certain That no Substance can be naturally reduc'd to nothing the Soul of Beasts will subsist after Death and since they have no reward to hope for and are made for Bodies they must at least pass out of one to another that they may not remain useless in Nature Which seems to be the most reasonable Inference Now 't is Matter of Faith That God is just and Wise That he Loves not Disorder That Nature is corrupted That the Soul of Man is Immortal and that That of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed it is not a distinct Substance from their Body nor consequently capable of Knowledge and Love or of any Passions and Sensations like ours Therefore in the Stile of Monsieur de la Ville who condemns Men upon Consequences that he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may justly charge him with a Crime and all Mindkind besides for believing Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if in his way of proceeding we should tax him of Impiety for entertaining Opinions from whence it might be concluded That God is not Just Wise or Powerful Opinions that overthrow Religion that are opposite to Original Sin that take away the only Demonstration Reason can give of the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should charge him with Injustice and Cruelty for making innocent Souls to suffer and even for Annihilating them to feed upon the Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner but they are Innocent and yet for the Nourishment of his Body he kills Animals and Annihilates their Souls which are of greater Worth than his Body Yet if his Body could not subsist without the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of a Soul should render his Body for ever Immortal this Cruelty as unjust as it is might perhaps be excusable But with what Pretence can he Annihilate Substances altogether innocent to sustain but a few days a Body justly condemn'd to Death because of Sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the Place he lives in But what if his Zeal should carry him into the Indies where the Inhabitants found Hospitals for Beasts and the Philosophers and the better and more gentile Part of them are so charitable to to the smallest Flies that for fear of killing them by Breathing and Walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways through which they pass Would he then fear to make innocent Souls to suffer or to Annihilate them for the Preservation of a Sinner's Body Would he not rather chuse to subscribe to their Opinion who give not Beasts a Soul more Noble than their Body or distinct from it and by publishing this Opinion acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice which these People would charge upon him if having the same Principles he follow'd not their Custom This Example may suffice to shew that we are not permitted to treat Men as Hereticks and dangerous Persons because of Irreligious Consequences that may be deduc'd from their Principles when these Consequences are disown'd by them For though I think it would be an infinitely harder Task to answer the aforesaid Difficulties than those of M. de la Ville's yet the Cartesians would be very Ridiculous if they should accuse Monsieur de la Ville and others that were not of their Opinion of Impiety and Heresie 'T is only the Authority of the Church that may decide about Matters of Faith and the Church has not oblig'd us and probably whatever Consequence may be drawn from common Principles never will oblige us to believe that Dogs have not a Soul more Noble than their Body that they know not their Masters that they neither fear nor desire nor suffer any thing because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths ARGUMENT II. Almost all Men are perswaded That sensible Objects are the true Causes of Pleasure and Pain which we feel upon their Presence They believe that the Fire sends forth that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us and that our Aliments Act in us and give us the Welcome Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which makes the Fruits necessary for Life to thrive and that all sensible Objects have a peculiar Vertue by which they can do us a great deal of Good and Evil. Let us see if from these Principles we cannot draw Consequences contrary to Religion and Points of Faith A Consequence opposite to the first Principle of Morality which obliges us to love God with all our Strength and to fear none but Him 'T is a common Notion by which all Men Order their Behaviour That we ought to love and fear what has Power to do us Good and Harm to make us feel Pleasure and Pain to render us happy or miserable and that this Cause is to be lov'd or fear'd proportionably to its Power of Acting on us But the Fire the Sun the Objects of our Senses can truly Act on us and make us in some manner happy or miserable This is the Principle suppos'd we may therefore Love and Fear them This is the Conclusion which every one naturally makes and is the general Principle of the corruption of Manners 'T is evident by Reason and by the First of God's Commandments That all the motions of our Soul of Love or Fear Desire or Joy ought to tend to God and that all the Motions of our Body may be Regulated and Determin'd by encompassing Objects By the Motion of our Body we may approach a Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that 's ready to devour us But we ought to Love and Fear none but God all the Motions of our Soul ought to tend to Him only we are to Love Him with all our strength this is an indispensible Law We can neither Love or Fear what is below us without disorder and corruption Freely to fear a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to give them some honour to Love a Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the light of the Sun as if he were the true cause of it to Love even our Father our Protector our Friend as if they were capable of doing us good is to pay them an Honour which is due to none but God in which sense it is lawful to Love none But we may and ought to Love our Neighbour by wisâ—ing and procuring him as Natural or Occasional Cause all that may make him happy and no otherwise For we to Love our Brothers not as if able to do
extremities of the Branches sufficiently shew that they are afraid lest some Creature should devour them They judge those Branches too weak to bear their Enemies though strong enough to support both their Young and their Nests Even Spiders and the vilest Insects give some Intimations of an Intelligence that animates them For one cannot but wonder at the conduct of a little Beast which though it be blind yet finds means to trapan in its Nets others that have Eyes and Wings and are so bold as to attack the biggest Animals we see I grant that all the actions that Beasts perform are certain indications of an Intelligence for whatever is regular demonstrates it A Watch shews the same for 't is impossible Chance should have composed its Wheels but an understanding Agent must have ordered its Motions We plant a Seed inverted the Roots that were upward sink down into the Ground of themselves and the Seminal Nib that was turn'd downwards endeavours to alter its Position to break out That intimates an Intelligence That Plant produces Knots at certain Distances to strenghen it self it covers its Seed with a Skin that preserves it and surrounds it with Prickles to defend it This still denotes an Intelligence In short whatever we see done either by Plants or by Animals undoubtedly denotes an understanding Agent All the true Cartesians agree to it but they make Distinctions to take away as much as possible the Equivocation of Words The Motions of Beasts and Plants intimate an Intelligence but that Intelligence is not Matter and is much distinguished from Beasts as that which disposes the Wheels of a Watch is distinguished from the Watch it self For that Intelligent Being seems infinitely Wise Powerful and infinitely the same who has framed us in our Mother's Womb and affords us a growth to which all the attempts of our Mind and Will cannot add so much as a Span. And therefore there is in Beasts neither Understanding nor Soul in the sense those Words are commonly taken They eat without pleasure they cry without Pain they grow without being conscious of it they neither desire nor fear nor know any thing and if they act in such a manner as intimates an Intelligence it is because God having made them for a certain time he has framed their Body in such a manner as that they machinally and without Fear shun whatever is able to destroy them Otherwise it must be said that there is more Understanding in the smallest Insect or even in a little Seed than in the most Ingenious Man it being certain that there are in them more different Parts and regular Motions than we are able to know But as Men are used to confound all things and imagine that their Soul produces in their Bodies most or all the Motions and Changes which befal it they fix to the Word Soul the wrong Idea of Former and Preserver of the Body So that thinking that their Soul produces in them whatever is absolutely requisite to the Preservation of their Life though she knows not so much as the Contexture of the Body which she animates they judge that there must needs be a Soul in Beasts to produce all the Motions and Changes which befall them because they are so like those which occur in us For Beasts are begot fed strengthened as our Body they eat drink sleep as we do because we are altogether like them as to our Body the only Difference betwixt us and them consisting in this that we have a Soul and they have none But our Soul frames not our Body digests not our Aliments and gives no Motion and Heat to our Blood She feels wills argues and animates the Body as to the Sensations and Passions that relate to it but not by dispersing her self through our Members to communicate Sense and Life to them for our Body can receive nothing of what belongs to the Mind Thence 't is plain that the Reason why we cannot resolve several Questions proceeds from our not distinguishing and even from our not thinking to distinguish the different significations of a Word 'T is true that we distinguish sometimes but we do it so ill that instead of taking off the Equivocation of Words by our Distinctions we make them more perplexed and dark For instance when we are asked whether the Body lives how it lives and in what manner the Rational Soul animates it Whether the Animal Spirits the Blood and other Humours live whether the Teeth the Hair and the Nails are animated c. we distinguish the Words live and be animated in living or being animated with a Rational with a Sensitive or with a Vegetative Soul But that Distinction is only fit to perplex the Question for those Words want an Explanation themselves and perhaps the two last Vegetative and Sensitive are inexplicable and inconceivable in the Sense they are commonly understood If we desire to fix a clear and distinct Idea to the Word Life we may say That the Life of the Soul is the Knowledge of Truth and the love of Good or rather that her Thoughts are her Life and that the Life of the Body consists in the Circulation of the Blood and the just Proportion and Mixture of Humours or rather that the Life of the Body is such a Motion of its parts as is fit for its Preservation The Ideas fix'd to the Word Life being thus made plain it will evidently appear First That the Soul cannot communicate her Life to the Body since she cannot make it think Secondly That she cannot give it the Life by which it is fed grows c. since she knows not so much as what is requisite to digest our Aliments Thirdly That she cannot make it feel since Matter is incapable of Sensation c. Thus all other Questions concerning that Subject may be resolved without Trouble provided the Words in which they are express'd excite clear Ideas for if they raise confused and dark it is impossible to solve them In the mean while 't is not always absolutely necessary to have Ideas that perfectly represent those things the Relations of which we desire to examine It is often sufficient to have but an initial or imperfect Knowledge of them because we seek not always exactly to know their Relations I shall explain this more at large There are Truths or Relations of two Sorts some are exactly known and others but imperfectly We exactly know the Relation betwixt such a Square and such a Triangle but have only an imperfect Knowledge of the Relation betwixt London and York We know that such a Square is equal to such a Triangle double or treble of it c. but we only know that London is bigger than York without knowing precisely how much Moreover there are infinite Degrees of Imperfection in Knowledge and no Knowledge is imperfect but in reference to a more perfect For Instance We know that London is bigger than Lincoln's Inn â—ields and that Knowledge is only imperfect in Relation