us When I say we know I mean there is such a Knowledge within our reach which we cannot miss if we will but apply our Minds to that as we do to several other Enquiries It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude that something has Existed from Eternity let us next see What kind of Thing that must be there are but two sorts of Beings in the World that Man knows or conceives First Such as are purely material without Sense or Perception as the clippings of our Beards and parings of our Nails Secondly Sensible perceiving Beings such as we find our selves to be These two sorts we shall hereofter call Cogitative and Incogitative Beings which to our present purpose are better than Material and Immaterial If then there must be something Eternal it is very obvious to Reason that it must necessarily be a Cogitative Being Because it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare Incogitative Matter should produce a Thinking intelligent Being as that nothing should of it self produce Matter Let us suppose any parcel of Matter Eternal we shall find it in it self unable to produce any thing Let us suppose its parts firmly at rest together if there were no other Being in the World must it not Eternally remain so a dead unactive Lump Is it possible to conceive it can add Motion to it self or produce any thing Matter then by its own Strength cannot produce in it self so much as Motion The Motion it has must also be from Eternity or else added to Matter by some other Being more powerful than Matter But let us suppose Motion Eternal too yet Matter Incogitative Matter and motion could never produce Thought Knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of Motion and Matter to produce as Matter is beyond the power of Nothing to produce Divide Matter into as minute parts as you will vary the Figure and Motion of it as much as you please it will operate no otherwise upon other Bodies of proportionable bulk than it did before this division The minutest Particles of Matter knock impell and resist one another just as the greater do and that is all they can do so that if we will suppose nothing Eternal Matter can never begin to be If we suppose bare Matter without Motion Eternal Motion can never begin to be If we suppose only Matter and Motion Eternal Thought can never begin to be For it is impossible to conceive that Matter either with or without Motion could have originally in and from it self Sense Perception and Knowledge as is evident from hence that the Sense Perception and Knowledge must be a Property Eternally inseparable from Matter and every Particle of it Since therefore whatsoever is the first Eternal Being must necessarily be Cogitative and whatsoever is first of all Things must necessarily contain in it and actually have at least all the Perfections that can ever after Exist it necessarily follows that the First Eternal Beâ—ng cannot be Matter If therefore it be evident that something necessarily must exist from Eternity it is also as evident that that Something must necessarily be a Cogitative Being For it is as impossible that Incogitative Matter should produce a Cogitative Being as that Nothing or the Negation of all Being should produce a positive Being or Matter This discovery of the necessary Existence of an Eternal Mind does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God For it will hence follow that all other knowing Beings that have a Beginning must depend on him and have no other ways of Knowledge or extent of Power than what he gives them and therefore if he made those he made also the less excellent Pieces of this Universe all inanimate Bodies whereby his Omniscience Power and Providence will be established and from thence all his other Attributes necessarily follow CHAP. XI Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things THE knowledge of our own Being we have by Intuition the Existence of a God Reason clearly makes known to us as has been shewn The knowledge of the Existence of any other Thing we can have only by Sensation for there being no necessary Connexion of Real Existence with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory nor of any other Existence but that of God with the Existence of any particular Man no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being but only when by actual operating upon him it makes it self be perceived by him The having the Idea of any thing in our Mind no more proves the Existence of that thing than the Picture of a Man evidences his Being in the World or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History It is therefore the actual receiving of Ideas from without that gives us notice of the Existence of other Things and makes us know that something doth Exist at that time without us which causes that Idea in us thô perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it for it takes not from the Certainty of our Senses and the Ideas we receive by them that we know not the manner wherein they are produced This notice we have by our Senses of the existing of Things without us thô it be not altogether so Certain as Intuition and Demonstration deserves the name of Knowledge if we perswade ourselves that our Faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those Objects that affect them But besides the assurance we have from our Senses themselves that they do not err in the Information they give us of the existence of Things without us we have other concurrent Reasons As First It is plain those Perceptions are are produced in us by Exterior Causes affecting our Senses because those that want the Organs of any Sense never can have the Ideas belonging to that Sense produced in their Minds This is too evident to be doubted and therefore we cannot but be assured that they come in by the Organs of that Sense and no other way Secondly Because we find sometimes that we cannot avoid the having those Ideas produced in our Minds as when my Eyes are shut I can at pleasure recall to my Mind the Ideas of Light or the Sun which former Sensations had lodged in my Memory but if I turn my Eyes towards the Sun I cannot avoid the Ideas which the Light or the Sun then produces in me which shews a manifest difference between those Ideas laid up in the Memory and such as force themselves upon us and we cannot avoid having And therefore it must needs be some Exterior Cause whose Efficacy I cannot resist that produces those Ideas in my Mind whether I will or no. Besides no Man but perceives the difference in himself between actually looking upon the Sun and contemplating the Idea he has of it in his Memory and therefore he hath certain Knowledge that they are not both Memory or Fancy but that actual Seeing has a Cause without Thirdly Add to this that
our Sun and the grosser Masses of Matter that visibly move about it What several sorts of Vegetables Animals and Intellectual corporeal Beings infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth may probably be in other Planets to the knowledge of which even of their outward Figures and Parts we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this Earth there being no natural means either by Sensation or Reflection to convey their certain Ideas into our Minds There are other Bodies in the Universe no less concealed from us by their Minuteness These insensible Corpuscles being the active parts of Matter and the great instruments of Nature on which depend all their Secundary Qualities and Operations our want of precise distinct Ideas and their Primary Qualities keeps us in incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them Did we know the Mechanical Affections of Rhubarb or Opium we might as easily account for their Operations of Purging and causing Sleep as a Watch-maker can for the Motions of his Watch. The dissolving of Silver in Aqua fortis or Gold in Aqua Regia and not Vice versâ would be then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a Smith to understand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock and not the turning of another But whilst we are destitute of Senses acute enough to discover the minute Particles of Bodies and to give us Ideas of their Mechanical Affections we must be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations nor can we be assured about them any farther than some few Trials we make are able to reach but whether they will succeed again another time we cannot be certain This hinders our certain Knowledge of Universal Truths concerning Natural Bodies and our Reason carries us herein very little beyond particular Matter of Fact And therefore I am apt to doubt that how far soever Humane Industry may advance useful and Experimental Philosophy in Physical Things yet Scientifical will still be out of our reach because we want perfect and adequate Ideas of those very Bodies which are nearest to us and most under our Command This at first sight shews us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent even of Material Beings to which if we add the Consideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be and probably are which are yet more remote from our Knowledge whereof we have no cognizance we shall find this cause of Ignorance conceal from us in an impenetrable Obscurity almost the whole Intellectual World a greater Certainly and more beautiful World than the material For bating some very few Ideas of Spirit we get from our own Mind by Reflection and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all Spirits the Author of them and us and all Things we have no certain Information so much as of the Existence of other Spirits but by Revelation much less have we distinct Ideas of their different Natures States Powers and several Constitutions wherein they agree or differ one from another and from us And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties we are under an absolute Ignorance The Second cause of Ignorance is the want of discoverable Connexion between those Ideas we have where we want that we are utterly incapable of Universal and Certain Knowledge and are as in the former case left only to Observation and Experiment Thus the Mechanical Affections of Bodies having no affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us we can have no distinct Knowledge of such operations beyond our Experience and can reason no otherwise about them than as the effects or appointment of an Infinitly Wise Agent which perfectly surpass our Comprehensions The operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable How any Thought should produce a Motion in Body is as remote from the nature of our Ideas as how any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind That it is so if Experience did not convince us the consideration of the Things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us In some of our Ideas there are certain Relations Habitudes and Connexions so visibly included in the nature of the Ideas themselves that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any Power whatsoever In these only we are capable of Certain and Universal Knowledge Thus the Ideas of a right lined Triangle necessarily carries with it an Equality of its Angles to two right ones But the coherence and continuity of the Parts of Matter the production of Sensation in us of Colours and Sounds c. by Impulse and Motion being such wherein we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the wise Architect The Things that we observe constantly to proceed regularly we may conclude do act by a Law set them but yet by a Law that we know not whereby thô Causes work steadily and effects constantly flow from them yet their Connexions and Dependencies being not discoverable in our Ideas we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them Several Effects come every day within the notice of our Senses of which we have so far Sensitive Knowledge But the Causes Manner and Certainty of their Production we must for the foregoing reasons be content to be ignorant of In these we can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of Fact and by Analogy guess what Effects the like Bodies are upon other Tryals like to produce But as to perfect Science of Natural Bodies not to mention Spiritual Beings we are I think so far from being capable of any such thing that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it The Third cause of Ignorance is our Want of tracing those Ideas we have or may have and finding out those intermediate Ideas which may shew us what Habitude of Agreement or Disagreement they may have one with another and thus many are ignorant of Mathematical Truths for want of application in enquiring examining and by due ways comparing those Ideas Hitherto we have examined the Extent of our Knowledge in respect of the several sorts of Beings that are There is another Extent of it in respect of Universality which will also deserve to be considered and in this regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our Ideas If the Ideas are Abstract whose Agreement or Disagreement we perceive our Knowledge is Universal For what is known of such general Ideas will be true of every particular thing in which that Essence that is that Abstract Idea is to be found And what is once known of such Ideas will be perpetually and for ever true So that as to all general Knowledge we must search and find it only in our own Minds and it is only the examining of our own Ideas that furnishes us with the Truths belonging to Essences of Things that
another as those that convey the most real Truths and all this without any knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things existing without us Thus he that has learnt the following words with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them viz. Substance Man Animal Form Soul Vegetative Sensitive Rational may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is And of this sort a Man may find an infinite number of Propositions Reasonings and Conclusions in Books of Metaphysicks School-Divinity and some part of Natural Philosophy and after all know as little of God Spirits or Bodies as he did before he set out Thirdly The worst sort of Trifling is To use words loosely and uncertainly which sets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them or find in them That which occasions this is That Men may find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance or Obstinacy under the Obscurity or Perplexedness of their Terms to which perhaps Inadvertency and ill Custom does in many Men much contribute To conclude barely Verbal Propositions may be known by these following marks First All Propositions wherein two Abstract Terms are affirmed one of another are barely about the signification of Sounds For since no Abstract Idea can be the same with any other but it self when its Abstract Name is affirmed of any other Term it can signifie no more but this that it may or ought to be called by that name or that these two Names signify the same Idea Secondly All Propositions wherein a part of the Complex Idea which any Term stands for is predicated of that Term are only Verbal and thus all Propositions wherein more comprehensive Terms called Genera are affirmed of Subordinate or less Comprehensive called Species or Individuals are barely Verbal When by these two Rules we examine the Propositions that make up the Discourses we ordnarily meet with both in and out of Books we shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of Words and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these Signs CHAP. IX Of our Knowledge of Existence HItherto we have only considered the Essences of Things which being only Abstract Ideas and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Existence give us no Knowledge of Existence at all We proceed now to enquire concerning our Knowledge of the Existence of Things and how we come by it I say then that we have the Knowledge of our own Existence by Intuition of the Existence of God by Demonstration and of other Things by Sensation As for our own Existence we perceive it so plainly that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof I think I reason I feel Pleasure and Pain Can any of these be more evident to me than my own Existence If I doubt of all other Things that very Doubt makes me perceive my own Existence and will not suffer me to doubt of that If I know I doubt I have as certain a Perception of the Thing Doubting as of that Thought which I call Doubt Experience then convinces us that we have an Intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence and an Internal Infallible Perception that we are In every act of Sensation Reasoning or Thinking we are conscious to our selves of our own Being and in this matter come not short of the highest Degree of Certainty CHAP X. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God THO' God has given us no innate Ideas of himself yet having furnished us with those Faculties our Minds are endowed with he hath not left himself without a Witness since we have Sense Perception and Reason and cannot want a clear proof of him as long as we carry our selves about us nor can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great point since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover and know him so far as is necessary to the end of our Being and the great concernment of our Happiness But thô this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers yet it requires Thought and Attention and the Mind must apply it self to a Regular deduction of it from some part of our Intuitiv Knowledge or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other Propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration To shew therefore that we are capable of Knowing that is being certain that there is a God and how we may come by this Certainty I think we need go no farther than our selves and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Existence I think it is beyond question that Man has a clear Perception of his own Being he knows certainly that he Exists and that he is Something In the next place Man knows by an Intuitive Certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any real Being than it can be equal to two Right Angles If therefore we know there is some Real Being it is an evident Demonstration that from Eternity there has been Something since what was not from Eternity had a Beginning and what had a Beginning must be produced by something else Next it is evident that what has its Being from another must also have all that which is in and belongs to its Being from another too All the Powers it has must be owing to and received from the same Source This Eternal Source then of all Being must he also the Source and Original of all Power and so this Eternal Being must be also the most powerful Again Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge we are certain then that there is not only some Being but some Knowing Intelligent Being in the World There was a time then when there was no knowing Being or else there has been a knowing Being from Eternity If it be said there was a time when that Eternal Being had no Knowledge I reply that then it is impossible there should have ever been any Knowledge It being as impossible that Things wholly void of Knowledge and operating blindly and without any Perception should produce a knowing Being as it is impossible that a Triangle should make it self Three Angles bigger than Two Right ones Thus from the Consideration of our selves and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions our Reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth that there is an Eternal most Powerful and Knowing Being which whether any one will call God it matters not The thing is evident and from this Idea duly consider'd will easily be deduced all those other Attributes we ought to ascribe to this Eternal Being From what has been said it is plain to me we have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a God than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us Nay I presume I may say that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing else without
many Ideas are produced in us without pain which we afterwards remember without the least offence Thus the pain of Heat or Cold when the Idea of it is received in our Minds gives us no disturbance which when felt was very troublesome and we remember the pain of Hunger Thirst Head-ach c. without any pain at all which would either never disturb us or else constantly do it as often as we thought of it were there nothing more but Ideas floating in our Minds and appearances entertaining our Fancies without the real Existence of Things affecting us from abroad Fourthly Our Senses in many cases bear witness to the Truth of each others Report concerning the Existence of sensible Things without us He that doubts when he sees a Fire whether it be Real may if he please feel it too and by the exquisite pain he will be convinced that it is not a bare Idea or Phantom If after all this any one will be so Sceptical as to distrust his Senses and to question the Existence of all Things or our Knowledge of any Thing Let him consider that the certainty of Things existing in Rerum naturâ when we have the Testimony of our Senses for it is not only as great as our Frame can attain to but as our condition needs For our Faculties being not suited to the full extent of Being nor a clear comprehensive knowledge of all Things but to the preservation of us in whom they are and accommodated to the use of Life they serve our purpose well enough if they will but give give us certain notice of those Things that are convenient or inconvenient to us For he that sees a Candle burning and has experimented the force of the Flame by putting his Finger in it will little doubt that this is something Existing without him which does him harm and puts him to pain which is assurance enough when no Man requires greater Certainty to govern his Actions by than what is as certain as his Actions themselves So that this Evidence is as great as we can desire being as Certain to us as our Pleasure or Pain that is Happiness or Misery beyond which we have no concernment either of Knowing or Being In fine when our Senses do actually convey into our Understandings any Idea we are assured that there is something at that time really Existing without us But this Knowledge extends only as far as the present Testimony of our Senses employed about particular Objects that do then affect them and no farther My seeing a Man a Minute since is no certain Argument of his present Existence As when our Senses are actually employed about any Object we know that it does Exist so by our Memory we may be assured that heretofore Things that affected our Senses have Existed and thus we have the knowledge of the past Existence of several Things whereof our Senses having informed us our Memories still retain the Ideas and of this we are past all doubt so long as we Remember well As to the Existence of Spirits our having Ideas of them does not make us know that any such Things do Exist without us or that there are any Finite Spirits or any other Spiritual Beings but the Eternal God We have ground from Revelation and several other Reasons to believe with assurance that there are such Creatures but our Senses not being able to discover them we want the means of knowing their particular Existence for we can no more know that there are Finite Spirits really Existing by the Idea we have of such Beings than by the Ideas any one has of Fairies or Centaurs he can come to know that Things answering those Ideas do really Exist Hence we may gather that there are Two sorts of Propositions One concerning the Existence of any Thing answerable to such an Idea as that of an Elephant Phenix Motion or Angel viz. Whether such a Thing does any where Exist and this Knowledge is only of Particulars and not to be had of any Thing without us but only of God any other way than by our Senses Another sort of Propositions is wherein is expressed the Agreement or Disagreement of our Abstract Ideas and their Dependence of another And these may be Universal and Certain So having the Idea of God and my Self of Fear and Obedience I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me and this Proposition will be certain concerning Man in general If I have made an Abstract Idea of such a Species whereof I am one Particular But such a Proposition how Certain soever proves not to me the Existence of Men in the World but will be true of all such Creatures whenever they do Exist which Certainty of such general Propositions depends on the Agreement or Disagreement discoverable in those Abstract Ideas In the former Case our Knowledge is the consequence of the Existence of Things producing Ideas in our Minds by our Senses In the later the consequence of the Ideas that are in our Minds and producing these general Propositions many whereof are called Eternae veritatis and all of them indeed are so not from being written all or any of them in the Minds of all Men or that they were any of them Propositions in any ones Mind till he having got the Abstract Ideas joyned or separated them by Affirmation or Negation But wheresoever we can suppose such a Creature as Man is endowed with such Faculties and thereby furnished with such Ideas as we have we must conclude he must needs when he applies his Thoughts to the Consideration of his Ideas know the truth of certain Propositions that will arise from the Agreement or Disagreement he will perceive in his own Ideas Such Propositions being once made about Abstract Ideas so as to be true they will whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time past or to come by a Mind having those Ideas alway actually be true For Names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same Ideas and the same Ideas having immutably the same Habitudes one to another Propositions concerning any Abstract Ideas that are once true must needs be Eeternal Verities CHAP. XII Of the Improvement of our Knowledge IT being the received Opinion amongst Men of Letters that Maxims are the Foundations of all Knowledge and that Sciences are each of them built upon certain Proecognita from whence the Understanding was to take its rise and by which it was to Conduct it self in its Inquiries in the Matters belonging to that Science the beaten Road of the Schools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more general Propositions called Principles as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledge was to be had of that Subject That which gave occasion to this way of proceeding was I suppose the good Success it seem'd to have in Mathematicks which of all other Sciences have the greatest Certainty Clearness and Evidence in them But if we consider it
urged or assented to as a matter of Faith wherein Reason has nothing to do Whatsoever is Divine Revelation ought to over-rule all our Opinions Prejudices and Interests and hath a right to be received with a full Assent Such a submission as this of our Reason to Faith takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge this shakes not the foundations of Reason but leaves us that use of our Faculties for which they were given us CHAP. XIX Of wrong Assent or Error ERROR is a mistake of our Judgment giving Assent to that which is not true The Reasons whereof may be reduced to these Four First Want of Proofs Secondly Want of Ability to use them Thirdly Want of Will to use them Fourthly Wrong measures of Probability First Want of Proofs by which I do not mean only the want of those Proofs which are not to be had but also of those Proofs which are in being or might be procured The greatest part of Mankind want the Conveniencies and Opportunities of making Experiments and Observations themselves or of collecting the Testimonies of others being enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition whose Lives are worn out only in the provisions for living These Men are by the constitution of Humane Affairs unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs on which others build and which are necessary to establish those Opinions For having much to do to get the means of living they are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries It is true that God has furnished Men with Faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take if they will but seriously employ them that way when their ordinary Vocations allow them leisure No Man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living as to have no spare time at all to think on his Soul and inform himself in matters of Religion were Men as intent on this as they are on Things of lower concernment There are none so enslaved to the necessity of Life who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their Knowledge Secondly Want of Ability to use them There be many who cannot carry a Train of Consequences in their Heads nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Testimonies These cannot discern that side on which the strongest Proofs lie nor follow that which in it self is the most probable Opinion It is certain that there is a wide difference in Mens Understandings Apprehensions and Reasonings to a very great Latitude so that one may without doing injury to Mankind affirm that there is a greater distance between some Men and others in this respect than between some Men and some Beasts But how this comes about is a speculation thô of great consequence yet not necessary to our present purpose Thirdly For want of Will to use them Some thô they have opportunities and leisure enough and want neither Parts nor Learning nor other Helps are yet never the better for them and never come to the knowledge of several Truths that lie within their reach either upon the account of their hot pursuit of Pleasure constant Drudgery in Business Laziness and Oscitancy in general or a particular aversion for Books and Study and some out of Fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour those Opinions which best suit their Prejudices Lives Designs Interests c. as many Men forbear to cast up their Accounts who have reason to fear that their Affairs are in no very good posture How Men whose plentiful Fortunes allow them leisure to improve their Understandings can satisfie themselves with a lazy Ignorance I cannot tell But methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of Knowledge I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for Men that ever think of a future state and their concernment in it which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes nor shall I take notice what a shame it is to the greatest Contemâ—ers of Knowledge to be found ignorant in Things they are concerned to know But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call themselves Gentlemen that however they may think Credit Respect and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune yet they will find all these still carried away from them by Men of lower condition who surpass them in Knowledge They who are blind will always be led by those that see or else fall into the Ditch and he is certainly the most subjected the most enslaved who is so in his Understanding Fourthly Wrong measures of Probability which are First Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident but doubtful and false taken for Principles Propositions looked on as Principles have so great an influence upon our Opinions that it is usually by them we judge of Truth and what is inconsistent with them is so far from passing for Probable with us that it will not be allowed Possible The reverence born to these Principles is so great that the Testimony nor only of other Men but the Evidence of our own Senses are often rejected when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established Rules The great obstinacy that is to be found in Men firmly believing quite contrary Opinions thô many times equally absurd in the various Religions of Mankind are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional Principles so that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes renounce the Evidence of their Senses and give their own Experience the Lye rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these Sacred Tenents Secondly Received Hypotheses The difference between these and the former is that those who proceed by these will admit of matter of Fact and agree with Dissenters in that but differ in assigning of Reasons and explaining the manner of Operation These are not at that open defiance with their Senses as the former they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently but will by no means admit of their Reports in the explanation of Things nor be prevailed on by Probabilities which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are Thirdly Predominant Passions or Inclinations Let never so much Probability hang on one side of a Covetous Man's Reasoning and Monâ—y on the other it is easie to foresee which will prevail Thô Men cannot always openly gain-say or resist the force of manifest Probabilities that make against them yet yield they not to the Argument Not but that it is the nature of the Understanding constantly to close with the more probable side but yet a Man hath power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries and not permit a full and satisfactory
far above all the rest of the Inhabitants of this our Mansion Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them since he has given them as St. Peter says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whatsoever is necessary for the Conveniencies of Life and Information of Virtue And has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable Provision for this Life and the Way that leads to a better How short soever their Knowledge may come of an Universal or perfect Comprehension of whatsoever is it yet secures their great Concernments that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker and the Sight of their own Duties Men may find Matter sufficient to busie their Heads and employ their Hands with Variety Delight and Satisfaction if they will not boldly Quarrel with their own Constitution and throw away the Blessings their Hands are filled with because they are not big enough to grasp every thing We shall not have much Reason to complain of the Narrowness of our Minds if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us for of that they are very capable And it will be an Unpardonable as well as Childish Pelvishness if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge and neglect to improve it to the Ends for which it was given us because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it It will he no Excuse to an idle and untoward Servant who would not attend his Business by Candle-light to plead that he had not broad Sun-shine The Candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes The Discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfie us And we shall the◠use our Understandings right when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion that they are suited to our Faculties and upon those Grounds they are capable of being proposed to us And not peremptorily or intemperately require Demonstration and demand Certainty where Probability only is to be had and which is sufficient to govern all our Concernments If we will disbelive every Thing because we cannot certainly know all Things we shall do much what as wiseiy as he who would not use his Legs but sit still and Perish because he had no Wings to Fly 6. When we know our own Strength we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of Success And when we have well Survey'd the Powers of our own Minds we shall not be enclin'd either to sit still and not set our Thoughts on Work at all in despair of knowing any Thing nor on the other side question every Thing and disclaim all Knowledge because some Things are not to be understood Our Business here is not to know all Things but those Things which concern our Conduct If we can find out those Measures whereby a Rational Creature put into that State which Man is in in this World may and ought to govern his Opinions and Actions depending thereon we need not be troubled that some other Things scape our Knowledge 7. This was that which gave the first Rise to this Essay concerning the Understanding For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several Enquiries the Mind of Man was very apt to run into was To take a Survey of our Understandings examine our own Powers and see to what Things they were adapted Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and secure possession of Truths that most concern'd us whilst we let loose our Thoughts in the vast Ocean of Being as if all that boundless Extent were the natural and undoubted Possession of our Understandings wherein there was nothing exempt from its Decisions or that escaped its Comprehension Thus Men extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities and letting their Thoughts wander into those Depths where they can find no sure Footing it is no wonder that they raise Questions and multiply Disputes which never coming to any clear Resolution are proper only to continue and increase their Doubts and to confirm them at last in perfect Scepticism Whereas were the Capacities of our Understandings well Considered the Extent of our Knowledge once Discovered and the Horizon found which sets Bounds between the enlightened and dark Parts of Things between what is and what is not Comprehensible by us Men would perhaps with less scruple Acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the One and imploy their Thoughts and Discourse with more Advantage and Satisfaction to the Other BOOK II. CHAP. I. Of Ideas in General and their Original BY the Term Idea I mean whatever is the Object of the understanding when a Man Thinks or whatever it is which the Mind can be employ'd about in Thinking I presume it will be easily granted me that there are such Ideas in Mens minds Every one is conscious of them in himself and Men's Words and Actions will satisfie him that they are in others Our first Inquiry then shall be How they come into the Mind It is an establish'd Opinion amongst some Men that there are in the understanding certain Innate Principles some primary Notions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Characters as it were stamp'd upon the Mind of Man which the Soul receives in its very first Being and brings into the World with it This Opinion is accurately discuss'd and refuted in the First Book of this Essay to which I shall refer the Reader that desires Satisfaction in this particular It shall be sufficient here to shew how Men barely by the use of their Natural Faculties may attain to all the Knowledge they have without the help of any Innate Impressions and may arrive at certainty without any such Original Notions or Principles For I imagine any one will easily grant That it would be impertinent to suppose the Ideas of Colours innate in a Creature to whom God hath given Sight and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from External Objects I shall shew by what Ways and Degrees all other Ideas come into the mind for which I shall appeal to every one 's own Experience and Observation Let us then suppose the Mind to be as we say White Paper void of all Characters without any Ideas How comes it to be furnished Whence has it all the Materials of Reason and Knowledge To this I answer in one word from Experience and Observation This when employ'd about External sensible Objects we may call Sensation By this we have the Ideas of Bitter Sweet Yellow Hard c. which are commonly call'd Sensible Qualities because convey'd into the Mind by the Senses The same Experience when employ'd about the internal Operations of the Mind perceiv'd and reflected on by us we may call Reflection Hence we have the Ideas of Perception Thinking Doubting Willing Reasoning c. These two viz. External Material Things as the Objects of Sensation and the Operations of our own Minds as the Objects
better than a Philosopher The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind viz. Thinking Reasoning c. which we concluding not to subsist by themselves nor apprehending how they can belong to Body or be produced by it we think them the Actions of some other Substance which we call Spirit of whose Substance or Nature we have as clear a Notion as of that of Body the one being but the supposed Substratum of the Simple Idea we have from without as the other of those Operations which we experiment in our selves within so that the Ideas of Corporeal Substance in matter is as remote from our Conceptions as that of Spiritual Substance Hence we may conclude that he has the perfectest Idea of any particular Substance who has collected most of those Simple Ideas which do exist in it among which we are to reckon its Active Powers and Passive Capacities Tho' not strictly Simple Ideas Secondary Qualities for the most part serve to distinguish Substances For our Senses fail us in the discovery of the Bulk Figure Texture c. of the minute parts of Bodies on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend and Secondary Qualities are nothing but Powers with relation to our Senses The Ideas that make our Complex ones of Corporeal Substances are of Three sorts First The Ideas of Primary Qualities of Things which are discovered by our Senses Such are Bulk Figure Motion c. Secondly the Sensible secondary Qualities which are nothing but Powers to produce several Ideas in us by our Senses Thirdly The aptness we consider in any Substance to cause or receive such alterations of Primary Qualities as that the Substance so altered should produce in us different Ideas from what it did before And they are called Active and Passive Powers All which as far as we have any notice or notion of them terminate in Simple Ideas Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute Particles of Bodies it is not to be doubted but they would produce quite different Ideas in us as we find in viewing things with Microscopes Such Bodies as to our naked Eyes are coloured and opaque will through Microscopes appear pellucid Bloud to the naked Eye appears all Red but by a good Microscope we see only some Red Globules swimming in a transparent Liquor The Infinite wise Author of our Beings has fitted our Organs and Faculties to the conveniences of Life and the business we have to do here We may by our Sences know and distinguish Things so far as to accommodate them to the Exigencies of this Life We have also Insight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful Effects to admire and magnify the Wisdom Power and Goodness of their Author Such a Knowledge as this which is suited to our present condition we want not Faculties to attain and we are fitted well enough with Abilities to provide for the conveniencies of living Besides the Complex Ideas we have of material Substances by the simple Ideas tâ—â—en from the operations of our own Minds which we experiment in our selves as Thinking Understanding Willing Knowing c. coexisting in the same Substance we are able to frame the Complex Idea of a Spirit And this Idea of an Immaterial Substance is as clear as that we have of a Material By joyning these with Substance of which we have no distinct Idea we have the Idea of a Spirit and by putting together the Ideas of coherent solid Parts and Power of being moved joyned with substance of which likewise we have no positive Idea we have the Idea of Matter The one is so clear and distinct as the other The substance of Spirit is unknown to us and so is the substance of Body equally unknown to us Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body viz. Solid coherent Parts and Impulse we have distinct clear Ideas of So likewise have we of two primary Qualities or Properties of Spirit Thinking and a power of Action We have also clear and distinct Ideas of several Qualities inherent in Bodies which are but the various Modifications of the Extension of cohering solid Parts and their Motion We have likewise the Ideas of the several modes of Thinking viz. Believing Doubting Hoping Fearing c. As also of Willing and Moving the Body consequent to it If this motion of Spirit may have some difficulties in it not easie to be explained we have no more reason to deny or doubt of the existence of Spirits than we have to deny or doubt of the existence of Body because the notion of Body is cumbred with some difficulties very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained The Divisibility in infinitum for instance of any finite Extension involves us whether we grant or deny it in consequences impossible to be explicated or made consistent We have therefore as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of Spirit as with our notion of Body and the existence of the one as well as the other We have no other Idea of the Supream Being but a Complex one of Existence Power Knowledge Duration Pleasure Happiness and of several other Qualities and Powers which it is better to have than be without with the addition of Infinite to each of these In which Complex Idea we may observe that there is no Simple one bating Infinity which is not also a part of our Complex Idea of other Spirits because in our Ideas as well of Spirits as other things we are restrained to those we receive from Sensation and Reflection CHAP. XXIV Of Collective Ideas of Substances THere are other Ideas of Substances which may be call'd Collective which are made up of many particular Substances considered as united into one Idea as a Troop Army c. which the Mind makes by its power of Composition These Collective Ideas are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind bringing things remote and independent into one view the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one Conception and signified by one name For there are no things so remote which the Mind cannot by this Art of Composition bring into one Idea as is visible in that signified by the name Universe CHAP. XXV Of Relation THere is another Sett of Ideas which the Mind gets from the comparing of one thing with another When the Mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it to and set it by another and carry its view from one to the other this is Relation or Respect and the denominations given to things intimating that Respect are what we call Relatives And the things so brought together Related Thus when I call Cajus Husband or Whiter I intimate some other Person or Thing in both cases with which I compare him Any of our Ideas may be the foundation of Relation Where Languages have failed to give correlative Names there the Relation is not so easily taken notice of As in Concubine which is a Relative name as well as Wife The Ideas of
far it may extend This part depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate Ideas that may shew the Habitudes and Relations of Ideas It is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such Discoveries They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it and what farther Improvements and Helps advantageous to other parts of Knowledge the Sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out it is not easy to determine This at least I believe that the Ideas of Quantity are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge and that other and perhaps more useful parts of Contemplation would afford us Certainty if Vices Passions and domineering Interests did not oppose or menace Endeavours of this kind The Idea of a Supream Being Infinite in Power Goodness and Wisdom whose Workmanship we are and on whom we depend and the Idea of our Selves as understanding rational Creatures would I suppose if duly considered afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action as might place Morality among the Sciences capable of Demonstration wherein I doubt not but from Principles as Incontestable as those of the Mathematicks by necessary Consequences the measure of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the One as he does to the Other of these Sciences The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as those of Number and Extension Where there is no Property there is no Injustice is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid for the Idea of Property being a right to any thing and the Idea of Injustice being the invasion or violation of that Right it is evident that these Ideas being thus established and these Names annexed to them I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true as that a Triangle has three Angles equal to Two right ones Again No Government allows absolute Liberty The Idea of Government being the establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws which require Conformity to them and the Idea of Absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition as of any in Mathematicks What has given the advantage to the Ideas of Quantity and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonstration is First That they can be represented by sensible Marks which have a nearer Correspondence with them than any Words or Sounds Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the Ideas and not liable to the uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification But we have no sensible Marks that resemble our Moral Ideas and nothing but Words to express them by which thô when written they remain the same yet the Ideas they stand for may change in the same Man and it is very seldom that they are not different in different Persons Secondly Moral Ideas are commonly more Complex than Figures whence these two Inconveniencies follow First That their Names are of more uncertain Signification the precise collection of Simple Ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on and so the sign that is used for them in Communication always and in Thinking often does not steadily carry with it the same Idea Secondly The Mind cannot easily retain those precise Combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination of the Habitudes and Correspondencies Agreements or Disagreements of several of them one with another especially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions and the intervention of several other Complex Ideas to shew the Agreement ' or Disagreement of two remote ones One part of these Disadvantages in Moral Ideas which has made them be thought not capable of Demonstration may in a good measure be remedied by Definitions setting down that collection of Simple Ideas which every Term shall stand for and then using the Terms steadily and constantly for that precise Collection As to the Fourth sort of Knowledge viz. of the real actual existence of Things we have an Intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence a Demonstrative Knowledge of the Existence of God and a Sensitive Knowledge of the Objects that present themselves to our Senses From what has been said we may discover the Causes of our Ignorance which are chiefly these Three First want of Ideas Secondly Want of a discoverable Connexion between the Ideas we have Thirdly Want of tracing and examining our Ideas First There are some things we are ignorant of for want of Ideas All the Simple Ideas we have are confined to the observation of our Senses and the operations of our own Minds that we are conscious of in our Selves What other Ideas it is possible other Creatures may have by the assistance of other Senses and Faculties more or perfecter than we have or different from ours it is not for us to determine but to say or think there are no such because we conceive nothing of them is no better an Argument than if a blind Man should be positive in it that there was no such thing as Sight and Colours because he had no manner of Idea of any such thing What Faculties therefore other species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmost constitutions of Things we know not This we know and certainly find that we want other views of them besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect The Intellectual and Sensible World are in this perfectly alike that the parts which we see of either of them hold no proportion with that we see not and whatsoever we can reach with our Eyes or our Thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest Another great cause of Ignorance is the want of Ideas that we are capable of This keeps us in ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known Bulk Figure and Motion we have Ideas of yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk Motion and Figure of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe we are ignorant of the several Powers Efficacies and ways of Operation whereby the effects we daily see are produced These are hid from us in some things by being too Remote in others by being too Minute When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our Ken is but a small part of the immense Universe we shall then discover an huge abyss of Ignorance What are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal Beings how far they are extended and what is their motion and how continued and what influence they have upon one another are contemplations that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in If we confine our Thoughts to this little Canton I mean this System of
is to Abstract Ideas that are Eternal and are to be found out by the Contemplation only of those Essences as the Existence of Things is to be known only from Experience But I shall say more of this in the following Chapters where I shall speak of General and Rèal Knowledge CHAP. IV. Of the Reality of our Knowledge I Doubt not but my Reader by this time may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building a Castle in the Air and be ready to object If it be true that all Knowledge lies only in the perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas the Visions of an Enthusiast and the reasonings of a Sober Man will be equally Certain It is no matter how Things are so a Man observe but the Agreement of his own Imaginations and talk conformably It is all Truth all Certainty That an Harpy is not a Centaur is by this way as certain Knowledge and as much Truth as that a Square is not a Circle But of what use is all this knowledge of Mens own imaginations to a Man that enquires after the reality of Things To which I Answer That if our knowledge of our Ideas should terminate in them and reach no farther where there is something farther intended our most serious Thoughts would be of little more use than the Reveries of a crazy Brain But I hope before I have done to make it evident that this way of Certainty by the knowledge of our own Ideas goes a little farther than bare imagination and that all the certainty of general Truths a Man has lies in nothing else but this knowledge of our Ideas 'T is evident that the Mind knows not Things immediately but by the intervention of the Ideas it has of them Our Knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our Ideas and the reality of Things But how shall we know when our Ideas agree with Things themselves I Answer There be Two sorts of Ideas that we may be assured agree with Things These are First Simple Ideas Which since the Mind can by no means make to it self must be the effect of Things operating upon the Mind in a natural way and producing therein those Perceptions which by the Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to Hence it follows that Simple Ideas are not fictions of our Fancies but the natural and regular productions of Things without us really operating upon us which carry with them all the conformity our State requires which is to represent Things under those appearances they are fitted to produce in us Thus the Idea of Whiteness as it is in the Mind exactly answers that Power which is in any Body to produce it there And this conformity between our Simple Ideas and the existence of Things is sufficient for real Knowledge Secondly All our Complex Ideas except those of Substances being Archetypes of the Mind 's own making and not referred to the Existence of Things as to their Originals cannot want any Conformity necessary to real Knowledge For that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self can never be capable of a wrong Representation Here the Ideas themselves are considered as Archetypes and Things no otherwise regarded than as they are conformable to them Thus the Mathematician considers the Truth and Properties belonging to a Rectangle or Circle only as they are Ideas in his own Mind which possibly he never found existing Mathematically that is precisely True yet his Knowledge is not only Certain but Real because Real Things are no farther concern'd nor intended to be meant by any such Propositions than as Things really agree to those Archetypes in his Mind It is true of the Idea of a Triangle that its three Angles are equal to two right ones It is true also of a Triangle wherever it Exists what is true of those Figures that have barely an Ideal Existence in his Mind will hold true of them also when they come to have a Real Existence in Matter Hence it follows that Moral Knowledge is as capable of Real Certainty as Mathematicks For Certainty being nothing but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas and Demonstration nothing but the Perception of such Agreement by the intervention of other Ideas our Moral Ideas as well as Mathematical being Archetypes themselves and so Adequate or Complete Ideas all the Agreement or Disagreement we shall find in them will produce Real Knowledge as well as in Mathematical Figures That which is requisite to make our Knowledge Certain is the clearness of our Ideas and that which is required to make it Real is that they answer their Archetypes But it will here be said That if Moral Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of our own Moral Ideas and those be of our own making what strange Notions will there be of Justice and Temperance What confusion of Vertues and Vices if every Man may make what Ideas of them he pleases I Answer No Confusion nor Disorder at all in the Things themselves nor the Reasonings about them no more than there would be a change in the Properties of Figures and their Relations one to another If a Man should make a Triangle with four corners or a Trapezium with four right Angles that is in plain English change the Names of the Figures and call that by one Name which is called ordinarily by another The change of Name will indeed at first disturb him who knows not what Idea it stands for but as soon as the Figure is drawn the Consequences and Demonstration are plain and clear Just the same is it in Moral Knowledge Let a Man have the Idea of taking from others without their consent what they are justly possessed of and call this Justice if he pleases he that takes the Name here without the Idea put to it will be mistaken by joyning another Idea of his own to that Name but strip the Idea of that Name or take it such as it is in the Speakers Mind and the same Things will agree to it as if you called it Injustice One thing we are to take notice of That where God or any other Law-maker has defined any Moral Names there they have made the Essence of that Species to which that Name belongs And there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise But in other cases it is bare impropriety of Speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the Country they are used in Thirdly But the Complex Ideas which we refer to Archetypes without us may differ from them and so our Knowledge about them may come short of being real and thus are our Ideas of Substances These must be taken from something that does or has Existed and not be made up of Ideas arbitrarily put together without any real Pattern Herein therefore is founded the reality of our Knowledge concerning Substances that all our Complex Ideas of them
Mind and the Ideas first in the Mind it is evident are those of particular Things from whence by slow degrees the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense are settled in the Mind with general Names to them Thus particular Ideas are first received and distinguished and so Knowledge got about them and next to them the less general or specifick which are next to particular ones Secondly From what has been said it plainly follows that these magnified Maxims are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge for if there be a great many other Truths as Self-evident as they and a great many that we know before them it is impossible that they should be the Principles from which we deduce all other Truths Thus that One and Two are equal to Three is as evident and easier known then that the Whole is equal to all its parts Nor after the knowledge of this Maxim do we know that One and Two are equal to Three better or more certainly than we did before For if there be any odds in these Ideas the Ideas of Whole and Parts are more obscure or at least more difficult to be setled in the Mind than those of One Two and Three Either therefore all Knowledge does not depend on certain Praecognita or general Maxims called Principles or else such as these That One and One are Two that Two and Two are Four c. and a great part of Numeration will be so To which if we add all the Self-evident Propositions that may be made about all our distinct Ideas Principles will be almost infinite at least innumerable which Men arrive to the knowledge of at different Ages and a great many of those innate Principles they never come to know all their Lives But whether they come in view earlier or later they are all known by their Native Evidence and receive no Light nor are capable of any Proof one from another much less the more particular from the more general or the more simple from the more compounded the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar and the easier and earlier apprehended These general Maxims then are only of use in disputes to stop the Mouths of Wranglers but not of much use to the discovery of unknown Truths or to help the Mind forwards in its search after Knowledge Several general Maxims are no more than bare verbal Propositions and teach us nothing but the respect and import of Names one to another as The whole is equal to all its Parts What real Truth does it teach us more than what the signification of the word Totum or whole does of it self import But yet Mathematicians do not without reason place this and some other such amongst their Maxims that their Scholars having in the Entrance perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with these Propositions made in such general Terms may have them ready to apply to all particular Cases not that if they be equally weighed they are more clear and evident than the particular Instances they are brought to confirm but that being more familiar to the Mind the very naming them is enough to satisfy the Understanding But this I say is more from our Custom of using them than the different Evidence of the Things So that if rightly consider'd I think we may say that where our Ideas are clear and distinct there is little or no use at all of these Maxims to prove the Agreement or Disagreement of any of them He that cannot discern the Truth or falshood of such Propositions without the help of these and the like Maxims will not be helped by these Maxims to do it He that needs any proof to make him certain and give his assent to this Proposition that Two are equal to Two or that White is not Black will also have need of a proof to make him admit that What is is or That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be And as these Maxims are of little use where we have clear and distinct Ideas so they are of dangerous use where our Ideas are confused and where we use words that are not annexed to clear and distinct Ideas but to such as are of a loose and wandring signification sometimes standing for one and sometimes for another Idea from which follows Mistake and Error which these Maxims brought as proofs to establish Propositions wherein the Terms stand for confused and uncertain Ideas do by their Authority confirm and rivet CHAP. VIII Of Trifling Propositions THere are Universal Propositions which thô they be certainly true yet add no Light to our Understandings bring no increase to our Knowledge such are First All Purely Identical Propositions These at first blush appear to contain no Instruction in them for when we affirm the same Term of it self it shews us nothing but what we must certainly know before whether such a Proposition be either made by or proposed to us Secondly Another sort of trifling Propositions is when a part of the Complex Idea is praedicated of the name of the whole a part of the definition of the word defined as Lead is a Metal Man an Animal These carry no Information at all to those who know the Complex Ideas the Names Lead and Man stand for Indeed to a Man that knows the signification of the word Metal and not of the word Lead it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word Lead by saying it is a Metal than by enumerating the Simple Ideas one by one which make up the Complex Idea of Metal Alike trifling it is to predicate any one of the Simple Ideas of a Complex one of the name of the whole Complex Idea as All Gold is fusible for fusibility being one of the Simple Ideas that goes to the making up the Complex one the Sound Gold stands for what can it be but playing with Sounds to affirm that of the name Gold which is comprehended in its received signification What instruction can it carry to tell one that which he is supposed to know before For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me or else he is to tell me The general Propositions that are made about Substances if they are certain are for the most part but Trifling And if they are Instructive are Uncertain and such as we have no knowledge of their real Truth how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in Guessing Hence it comes to pass that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Discourses that amount yet to nothing For names of Substantial Beings as well as others having setled Significations affixed to them may with great Truth be joyned Negatively and Affirmatively in Propositions as their Definitions make them fit to be so joyned and Propositions consisting of such Terms may with the same clearness be deduced one from
we shall find that the great Advancement and Certainty of Real Knowledge Men arrived to in these Sciences was not owing to the influence of these Principles but to the clear distinct and compleat Ideas their Thoughts were employed about and the relation of Equality and Excess so clear between some of them that they had a Intuitive Knowledge and by that a way to discover it in others and this without the help of those Maxims For I ask Is it not possible for a Lad to know that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger but by virtue of this Axiom The Whole is bigger than the Part nor be assured of it till he has learned that Maxim Let any one consider from what has been elsewhere said which is known first and clearest by most People the particular Instance or the general Rule and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other These general Rules are but the comparing our more general and Abstract Ideas which Ideas are made by the Mind and have Names given them for the easier dispatch in its reasonings But Knowledge began in the Mind and was founded on Particulars thô afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof It being natural for the Mind to lay up those general Notions and make the proper use of them which is to disburthen the Memory of the cumbersome load of Particulars The way to improve in Knowledge is not to swallow Principles with an implicite Faith and without examination which would be apt to mislead Men instead of guiding them into Truth but to get and fix in our Minds clear and complete Ideas as far as they are to be had and annex to them proper and constant Names and thus barely by considering our Ideas and comparing them together observing their Agreement or Disagreement their Habitudes and Relations we shall get more true and clear Knowledge by the conduct of this one Rule than by taking up Principles and thereby putting our Minds into the Disposal of others We must therefore if we will proceed as Reason advises adapt our methods of Enquiry to the nature of the Ideas we examine and the truth we search after General and Certain Truths are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of Abstract Ideas Therefore a Sagacious Methodical Application of our Thoughts for the finding out these Relations is the only way to discover all that can with Truth and Certainty be put into general Propositions By what steps we are to proceed in these is to be Learned in the Schools of the Mathematicians who from every plain and easie beginnings by gentle Degrees and a continued chain of Reasonings proceed to the Discovery and Demonstration of Truths that appear at first sight beyond Humane Capacity This I think I may say that if other Ideas that are Real as well as Nominal Essences of their Species were pursued in the way familiar to Mathematicians they would carry our Thoughts farther and with greater Evidence and Clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture which I suggest Chapter the Third viz. that Morality is capable of Demonstration as well as Mathematicks for Moral Ideas being real Essences that have a discoverable Connexion and Agreement one with another so far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations so far we shall be possessed of Real and General Truths In our knowledge of Substances we are to proceed after a quite different Method the bare Contemplation of their Abstract Ideas which are but Nominal Essences will carry us but a very little way in the search of Truth and Certainty Here Experience must teach us what Reason cannot and it is by trying alone that we can certainly know what other Qualities co-exist with those of our Complex Idea for Instance Whether that Yellow heavy fusible Body I call Gold be Malleable or no which Experience however it prove in that particular Body we examine makes us not certain that it is so in all or any other Yellow Heavy Fusible Bodies but that which we have tried because it is no consequence one way or the other from our Complex Idea The necessity or inconsistence of Malleability hath no visible Connexion with the combination of that Colour Weight and Fusibility in any Body What I have here said of the Nominal Essence of Gold supposed to consist of a Body of such a determinate Colour Weight and Fusibility will hold true if other Qualities be added to it Our Reasonings from those Ideas will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other Properties in those masses of Matter wherein all those are to be found As far as our Experience reaches we may have certain Knowledge and no farther I deny not but a Man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments shall be able to see farther into the nature of Bodies and their unknown Properties than one that is a stranger to them But this is but Judgment and Opinion not Knowledge and Certainty This makes me suspect that Natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science From Experiments and Historical Observations we may draw advantages of Ease and Health and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life but beyond this I fear our Talents reach not nor are our Faculties as I guess able to advance From whence it is obvious to conclude That since our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate the Real Essences of Bodies but yet plainly to discover to us the Being of a God and the Knowledge of our Selves enough to give us a clear discovery of our Duty and great Concernment it will become us as Rational Creatures to employ our Faculties about what they are most adapted to and follow the direction of Nature where it seems to point us out the way For it is rational to conclude that our proper Employment lies in those Enquiries and that sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities and carries in it our greatest Interest that is the condition of our Eternal State And therefore it is I think that Morality is the proper Science and Business of Mankind in general who are both concerned and fitted to search out their Summum Bonum as several Arts conversant about the several parts of Nature are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men for the common use of Humane Life and their own particular Subsistance in this World The ways to enlarge our Knowledge as far as we are capable seem to me to be these Two The First is to get and settle in our Minds as far as we can clear distinct and constant Ideas of those Things we would consider and know For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas where they are either imperfect confused or obscure we cannot expect to have certain perfect or clear Knowledge The other is the Art of finding out the intermediate Ideas which may shew us the Agreement or
of the Relation Sixthly Contrary Testimonies The Mind before it rationally Assents or Dissents to any probable Proposition ought to examine all the Grounds of Probality and see how they make more or less for or against it and upon a due balancing of the whole reject or receive it with a more or less firm Assent according to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability on one side or the other CHAP. XVI Of the Degrees of Assent THE Grounds of Probability laid down in the foregoing Chapter as they are the foundations on which our Assent is built so are they also the measure whereby its several Degrees are or ought to be regulated Only we are to take notice that no grounds of Probability operate any farther on the Mind which searches after Truth and endeavours to judge right than they appear at least in the first Judgment or Search that the Mind makes It is indeed in many cases impossible and in most very hard even for those who have admirable Memories to retain all the proofs which upon a due Examination made them embrace that side of the Question It suffices that they have once with Care and Fairness sifted the matter as far as they could and having once found on which side the Probability appeared to them they lay up the Conclusion in their Memories as a Truth they have discovered and for the future remain satisfied with the testimony of their Memories that this is the Opinion that by the proofs they have once seen of it deserves such a Degree of their Assent as they assord it It is unavoidable then that the Memory be relied on in this case and that Men be perswaded of several Opinions whereof the proofs are not actually in their Thoughts nay which perhaps they are not able actually to recall without this the greatest part of Men must be either Scepticks or change every Moment when any one offers them Arguments which for want of Memory they are not presently able to Answer It must be owned that Men's sticking to past Judgments is often the cause of a great Obstinacy in error and mistake But the fault is not that they relye on their Memories for what they have before well judged but because they judged before they had well examined Who almost is there that hath the Leisure Patience and Means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the Opinions he has so as safely to conclude that he has a clear and full view and that there is no more to be alledged for his better information and yet we are forced to determine our selves on one fide or other The conduct of our Lives and the management of our great Concerns will not bear delay For those depend for the most part on the determination of our Judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain Knowledge and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace one side or the other The Propositions we receive upon Inducements of Probability are of Two sorts First Concerning some particular Existence or matter of Fact which falling under Observation is capable of Humane Testimony Secondly Concerning Things which being beyond the discovery of our Senses are not capable of Humane Testimony Concerning the First of these viz. Particular matter of Faâ—t First Where any particular Thing consonant to the constant Observation of our selves and others in the like case comes attested with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it we receive it as easily and build as firmly upon it as if it were certain Knowledge Thus if all Englishmen who have occasion to mention it should report that it Froze in England last Winter or the like I think a Man would as little doubt of it as that Seven and four are eleven The First and highest Degree of Probability then is when the general consent of all Men in all Ages as far as can be known concurs with a Man 's own constant Experience in the like cases to confirm the Truth of any particular matter of Fact attested by fair Witnesses Such are the stated Constitutions and Properties of Bodies and the regular proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary course of Nature this we call an Argument from the nature of Things themselves For what we and others always observe to be after the same manner we conclude with Reason to be the Effects of steddy and regular Causes thô they come not within the reach of our Knowledge As that Fire warmed a Man or made Lead fluid that Iron sunk in Water swam in Quick-silver A Relation affirming any such thing to have been or a Predication that it will happen again in the same manner is received without doubt or hesitation and our Belief thus grounded rises to Assurance Secondly The next degree of Probability is when by my own Experience and the Agreement of all others that mention it a Thing is found to be for the most part so and that the particular Instance of it is attested by many and undoubted Witnesses Thus History giving us such an account of Men in all Ages and my own Experience confirming it that most Men prefer their own private Advantage to the Publick If all Historians that write of Tiberius say that he did so it is extreamly probable And in this case our Assent rises to a Degree which we may call Confidence Thirdly In matters happening indifferently as that a Bird should fly this or that way when any particular matter of Fact comes attested by the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses there our Assent is also unavoidable Thus that there is in Italy such a City as Rome that about One thousand and seven hundred Years ago there lived such a Man in it as Julius Caesar c. A Man can as little doubt of this and the like as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance whereof he himself is a witness Probability on these grounds carries so much Evidence with it that it leaves us as little liberty to Believe or Disbelieve as Demonstration does whether we will know or be ignorant But the difficulty is when Testimonies contradict common Experience and the Reports of Witnesses clash with the ordinary course of Nature or with one another Here Diligence Attention and Exactness is required to form a Right Judgment and to proportion the Assent to the Evidence and Probability of the Thing which rises and falls according as the two Foundations of Credibility Favour or contradict it These are liable to such variety of contrary Observations Circumstances Reports Tempers Designs Over sights c. of Reporters that it is impossible to reduce to precise Rules the various Degrees wherein Men give their Assent This in general may be said That as the Proofs upon due Examination shall to any one appear in a greater or less Degree to Preponderate on either side so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such different Entertainments as are called Belief Conjecture Guess
it are these First Because Syllogism serves our Reason but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it and that is to shew the Connexion of the proofs of any one Instance and no more but in this it is of no great use since the Mind can perceive such Connexion where it really is as easily nay perhaps better without it We may observe that there are many Men that reason exceeding clear and rightly who know not how to make a Syllogism and I believe scarce any one makes Syllogisms in reasoning within himself Indeed sometimes they may serve to discover a Fallacy hid in a Rhetorical Flourish or by stripping an absurdity of the cover of Wit and good Language shew it in its naked deformity But the Mind is not taught to reason by these Rules It has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its Ideas and can range them right without any such perplexing Repetitions and I think every one will perceive in Mathematical Demonstrations that the Knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without Syllogism Secondly Because thò Syllogism serves to shew the force or fallacy of an Argument made use of in the usual way of Discoursing by supplying the absent Proposition and so setting it before the view in a clear Light yet it no less engages the Mind in the perplexity of obscure and equivocal Terms wherewith this artificial way of reasoning always abounds it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in Dispute than the discovery or confirmation of Truth in fair Enquiries But however it be in Knowledge I think it is of far less or no use at all in Probabilities For the Assent there being to be determined by the Preponderancy after a due weighing of all the proofs on both sides nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind in that as Syllogism which running away with one assumed Probability pursues that till it has led the Mind quite out of sight of the Thing under Consideration But let it help us as perhaps may be said in convincing Men of their Errors or Mistakes yet still it fails our Reason in that part which if not its highest perfection is yet certainly its hardest Task and that which we must need its help in and that is The finding out of Proofs and making new Discoveries This way of Reasoning discovers no new proofs but is the Art of Marshalling and Ranging the old ones we have already A Man knows first and then he is able to prove Syllogistically so that Syllogism comes after Knowledge and then a Man has little or no need of it But it is chiefly by the finding out those Ideas that shew the Connexion of distant ones that our stock of Knowledge is increased and that useful Arts and Sciences are advanced Reason Thô of a very large Extent fails us in several Instances as First Where our Ideas fail Secondly It is often at a loss because of the Obscurity Confusion or Imperfection of the Ideas it is employed about Thus having no perfect Idea of the least Extension of Matter nor of Infinity we are at a loss about the Divisibility of Matter Thirdly Our Reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those Ideas which would serve to shew the certain or probable Agreement or Disagreement of any two other Ideas Fourthly Our Reason is often engaged in Absurdities and Difficulties by proceeding upon false Principles which being followed lead Men into Contradictions to themselves and inconsistancy in their own Thoughts Fifthly Dubious Words and uncertain Signs often puzzle Mens Reason and bring them to a Non-plus In Reasoning Men ordinarily use Four sorts of Arguments The First is to alledge the Opinions of Men whose Parts Learning Eminency Power or some other Cause has gained a Name and settled their Reputation in the common Esteem with some kind of Authority This may be called Argumentum ad Verecundiam Secondly Another way is to require the Adversary to admit what they alledge as a proof or to assign a better This I call Argumentum ad Ignorantiam A Third way is to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles or Concessions This is already known under the name of Argumentum ad hominem Fourthly The using of Proofs drawn from any of the foundations of Knowledge or Probability This I call Argumentum ad Judicium This alone of all the Four brings true Instruction with it and advances us in our way to Knowledge For First It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right because I out of respect or any other consideration but that of Conviction will not contradict him Secondly It proves not another Man to be in the right way nor that I ought to take the same with him because I know not a better Thirdly Nor does it follow that another Man is in the right way because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong This may dispose me perhaps for the reception of Truth but helps me not to it that must come from Proofs and Arguments and Light arising from the nature of Things themselves not from my shame facedness Ignorance or Error By what has been said of Reason we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of Things into those that are according to above and contrary to Reason According to Reason are such Propositions whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those Ideas we have from Sensation and Reflection and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable Above Reason are such Propositions whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles Contrary to Reason are such Propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct Ideas Thus the Existence of one God is according to Reason the Existence of more than one God contrary to Reason the Resurrection of the Body after Death above Reason Above Reason may be also taken in a double Sense viz. Above Probability or Above Certainty In that large Sense also Contrary to Reason is I suppose sometimes taken There is another use of the word Reason wherein it is opposed to Faith which thô authorized by common use yet is it in it self a very improper way of Speaking For Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind which if it be regulated as is our Duty cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reason and so cannot be opposite to it He that believes without having any Reason for believing may be in love with his own Fancies but neither seeks Truth as he ought nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him to keep him out of Mistake and Error But since Reason and Faith are by some Men opposed we will so consider them in the following Chapter CHAP XVIII Of Faith and Reason and their distinct Provinces REason as contra-distinguished to Faith I take to be the discovery of the Certainty or
Probability of such Propositions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by deductions made from such Ideas which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties viz. by Sensation or Reflection Faith on the other side is the Assent to any Proposition upon the credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation concerning which we must observe First That no Man inspired by God can by any Revelation communicate to others any new Simple Ideas which they had not before from Sensation or Reflection Because Words by their immediate Operation on us cannot cause other Ideas but of their natural Sounds and such as Custom has annexed to them which to us they have been wont to be signs of but cannot introduce any new and formerly unknown Simple Ideas The same holds in all other Signs which cannot signify to us Things of which we have never before had any Idea at all For our Simple Ideas we must depend wholly on our natural Faculties and can by no means receive them from Traditional Revelation I say Traditional in distinction to Original Revelation By the One I mean that impression which is made immediately by God on the Mind of any Man to which we cannot set any bounds And by the Other those Impressions delivered over to others in Words and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another Secondly I say that the same Truths may be discovered by Revelation which are discoverable to us by Reason but in such there is little need or use of Revelation God having furnished us with natural means to arrive at the knowledge of them and Truths discovered by our natural Faculties are more certain than when conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation For the Knowledge we have that this Revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the Knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct Ideas Thâ—s also holds in matters of Fact knowâ—â—le by our Senses as the History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings which had their Orignal from Revelation and yet no boâ—y I think will say he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the Flood as Noah that saw it or that he himself would have had had he then been alive and seen it For he has no greater assurance than that of his Senses that it is writ in the Book supposed to be writ by Moses inspired But he has not so great an assurance that Moses writ that Book as if he had seen Moses write it so that the assurance of its being a Revelation is still less than our assurance of his Senses Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of Reason For since no evidence of our Faculties by which we receive such a Revelation can exceed if equal the Certainty of our Intuitive Knowledge we can never receive for a Truth any that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge The Ideas of One Body and One Place do so clearly agree that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms the same Body to be in two distinct places at once however it should pretend to the Authority of a Divine Revelation Since the Evidence First That we deceive not our Selves in ascribing it to God Secondly That we understand it right can never be so great as the Evidence of our own Intuitive Knowledge whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two places at once In Propositions therefore contrary to our distinct and clear Ideas it will be in vain to urge them as matters of Faith For Faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts out Knowledge Because thô Faith be founded upon the Testimony of God who cannot lye yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a Divine Revelation greater than our own Knowledge For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any thing to be a Divine Revelation than it has of the Principles of its own Reason it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason to give place to a Proposition whose Revelation has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have In all things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas and the Principles of Knowledge above-mentioned Reason is the proper Judge and Revelation cannot in such cases invalidate its Decrees nor can we be obliged where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason to quit it for the contrary Opinion under a pretence that it is Matter of Faith which can have no Authority against the plain and clear dictates of Reason But Thirdly There being many Things of which we have but imperfect Notions or none at all and other things of whose past present or future Existence by the natural use of our Faculties we can have no knowledge at all These being beyond the discovery of our Faculties and above Reason when revealed become the proper matter of Faith Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against God that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again and the like are purely matters of Faith with which Reason has directly nothing to do First then Whatever Proposition is revealed of whose Truth our Mind by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge that is purely Mater of Faith and above Reason Secondly All Propositions whereof the Mind by its natural Faculties can come to determine and judge from natural acquired Ideas are Matter of Reason but with this difference that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence and so is perswaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds in such I say an Evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability Because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive But yet it still belongs to Reason to judge of the truth of its being a Revelation and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches and that without any violence to Reason which is not injured or disturbed but assisted and improved by new discoveries of Truth coming from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge Whatever God hath Revealed is certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper object of Faith But whether it be a Divine Revelation or no Reason must judge which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident nor prefer less Certainty to the greater There can be no Evidence that any Traditional Revelation is of Divine Original in the words we receive it and the Sense we understand it so clear and so certain as those of the Principles of Reason and therefore Nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason has a right to be