〈◊〉 that every one counts his ignorance his wisdome Hence it comes to passe that whiles we know nothing we thinke we know althings And are not those greatly to be pitied who make no other use of their reason but to render themselves more unreasonable and ignorant Is any thing more worthy of compassion than the blindnesse of such as seem most quick-sighted and sage in the World And whence comes this proud affected ignorance but from mens not knowing God and themselves Is it not a strange thing that the Soul which knows althings else should be so ignorant of it self and of its Maker Thence Plato Alcibiad 2. pag. 144. saith It is no wonder that they who are ignorant of God should account that which is worst best Whence he concludes That the ignorance of the best good is the worst evil And as to the ignorance of our selves he openly affirmes Theaecet pag. 176. That those are by so much the more what they thinke they are not i. e. ignorant by how much the lesse they thinke they are so And that this proud affected practic Ignorance of God and our selves is the root of al sin he further demonstrates Alcibiad 1. pag. 117. Thou seest therefore that Sin is appendent to action by reason of that ignorance whereby a man thinkes he knows what indeed he is ignorant of And he subjoins the reason Those are left under error 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 who knowing nothing thinke they know every thing Confidence of knowlege is a sure marque of ignorance Whence he concludes pag. 118. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This very ignorance therefore is the cause of Sins and most opprobriose Lastly Leg. 5. pag. 732. he assures us That when we attemt those things whereof we are ignorant we grossely erre Such a venimous maligne efficacious influence has proud conceited practic Error on al sin Indeed the power of sin lies in the power of darknesse or ignorance practic Errors foment and maintain lusts The mind like a silk-worme lies intangled in those errors that came out of its own bowels when lust hath put out Reason it soon takes the Chair men of corrupt minds are men of sinful lives Mind and Wil do reciprocally vitiate each other whiles lust bribes conscience out of office it cooperates with sin Divine light is a burden to a corrupt conscience which delights to spin out of it self sick dreaming errors thereby to create its own chains and fetters a carnal mind vainly puffed up out-reasons al good convictious of dutie surely there is no dutie done by that man whose conscience doth not its dutie for there is nothing in man active for God when conscience is not first active It 's evident then that practic error of conscience opens the door to al sin And as Plato so Aristotle his Scholar hath greatly explicated and demonstrated the pestiferous influence which practic error hath on al sin Thus Eth. l. 3. c. 2. pag. 121. where he makes this difference between Sins of ignorance and ignorant Sins A drunken man that kils another in his drunken fit sins ignorantly and yet his sin is not a Sin of Ignorance because that ignorance was voluntarily contracted Thence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Therefore every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and from what he ought to abstain and by this they are made unjust and wicked And Eth. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 144. he distributes this practic ignorance into its several kinds 1 There is saith he an ignorance the cause of which is in our selves As when drunken men sin ignorantly which ignorance was contracted by their voluntary drunkennesse 2 There is an Ignorance of Right or Law when men are ignorant of their dutie which they ought to know 3 There is an ignorance from our own neglect which had we been diligent in the use of means we might have avoided 4 There is an ignorance from depraved affections and custome in sinning We may reduce these Philosophemes of Plato and Aristotle to this more formal distribution Man is directed in his action by a twofold knowlege the one universal the other particular a defect in either of these causeth sin Whence it follows that a man may have an universal knowlege that this or that is sinful in general and yet want a particular judgement of its sinfulnesse in this or that case So that particular ignorance is very wel consistent with universal knowlege But now sithat universal knowlege though most certain is not so influential on our actions as particular because actions are about singulars hence it follows that particular ignorance has more force to lead men into sin than universal knowlege has to prevent it This particular ignorance may be again distributed into natural or voluntary and voluntary may be again divided into that which is antecedent or that which is consequent to the act Yea al ignorance which ariseth from the Wil may be looked on as voluntary For what is involuntary if it arise from some precedent voluntary act it may be judged voluntary according to moral estimation As in that instance which Aristotle gives of a Drunkard whose ignorance is voluntary because arising from the act of his own Wil. For it is a good Rule of Aristotle That those Acts whose Principe is in us may be said to be ours and voluntarily undertaken by us Lastly we may with Aristotle distinguish between sins which are per ignorantiam i. e. when ignorance is the cause of the sin and such as are cum ignorantia i. e. when albeit ignorance attends the sin yet the proper cause of that ignorance lies in the sinners wil The former are those which we cal sins of ignorance but the later not because the ignorance is voluntary Men want not so much means of knowing what they ought to do as wil to do what they know Reason may rightly discerne the thing which is good and yet the wil of man not incline it self thereto as oft as sensual passions prejudice or affected ignorance prevail So that some practic error or inconsideration lies at the root of every sin either because men do not practically consider al circumstances or if they do consider them yet they do not practically determine this or that Act to be evil but instead thereof they foist in another false Conclusion That this or that sinful Act is sweet or profitable A corrupt Conscience may assent to good premises and yet dissent from the conclusion yea consent to a bad conclusion Lusts pervert Conscience and sil it with partialitie and prejudice in its inquiries The light of a carnal mind is easily reconciled with lust for a secure Conscience takes up such a Religion as wil not distaste its lusts nor yet its lusts molest it There is a peace between the lust and light of a carnal heart It 's easie for a secure Conscience to cast light into prison and detain the truth of God in unrighteousnesse to believe as
Inclination to Sociatle Ib. Consociation constitutes a Politic Bodie or Societie 163 Al Consociation by some Law 164 Perfect Politie requires Amitie and Fraternitie 165. Religion the Principal Ligament of Politic Societie 166. The Ends of Politie 1 Gods Glorie 169 2 To render men Virtuose 170. 3 The Good of the whole 171. 4 Mutual Assistences 172. A Politic Bodie or Citie what Ib. Legislation its Origine 176. The Necessitie of Laws 177. Al Laws Originally from God 178. The Qualification of human Legislators 179. Al Laws from the Multitude Ib. Al Laws for public Good 181. Virtue a principal End of Laws 182. The Qualities of good Laws 183. The Law of Equitie its use 184. Conservators of Laws 185. A Law its Equitie and Constitution 186. Three kinds of Politic Administration Monarchie Aristocratie Democratie 187. Monarchie mixed with Democratie 190. Mixed Politie its use Ib. Moderate Empire best 191. Tyrannie Empire its Origine c. 192. The Evils of Tyrannie 193. Civil Magistrates 1. Their End 194. 2. Their Qualifications 1 Wisdome both Natural and Acquired 195. Knowlege of human Laws and Factes 196. Knowlege of Divine Laws 197. 2 Virtue both Natural and Moral 198. 3 A Public Spirit free from Self-interest Ib. A Magistrates Diet and Richesses 199. 4 His Education and Examen Ib. Scriptural Qualifications 200. A Magistrates Facultie and Authoritie Ib. 1 Divine 2 Human. 201. Magistrates Conservators of Laws 202. The Magistrates Exerclce of his Office 1 With Justice without Briberie 204. 2 With Temperance 205. 3 Moderation 4 Clemence 5 Fidelitie 206. The Effects of Polities Good and Bad 207. Things destructive to Republies 1 Atheisme Ib. 2 Lururie and Idlenesse 208. 3 Prosperitie and Povertie Ib. 4 Divisions 5 Injustice 209. BOOK II. Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophie c. CHAP. I. Of Metaphysic in General ARistotle's Metaphysics 210. Metaphysic Sapience what 211. Metaphysic a Natural Sapience 212. Contemplation its proper Act. 213. Contemplation of God best 214. CHAP. II. Of Atheisme and the Existence of a Deitie THe Origine of Atheisme 215. Atheisme 1 From Polytheisme 216. 2 From Vain Philosophie and Policie 217. 3 From Mans Carnal Mind and Pride 218. Three sorts of Atheisme 220. The Monstrose Nature and Pestiferous Influences of Atheisme 221. The Punishment of Atheisme 222. The Existence of God demonstrated 1 From Vniversal consent 223. 2 From the Subordination of second Causes to a First 224. The World made by a Prime Cause 225. 3 From a Prime Motor 228. 4 From the Order of the Vniverse 230. 5 From the Connate Idea of God in the Soul 231. 6 From Practic Arguments 232. 1 From Conscience its Notions and Exercices 233. 2 From the sense of Religion 234. 3 From the Politic World 235. 4 From the Atheistes Cavils and Enmitie 236. CHAP. III. Of God his Names Nature Attributes Unitie and Simplicitie GODs Name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being 237. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jehovah 239. Jehovah the proper Name of God 240. The explication of Jehovah and Jah 241. Ehjeh Elohim El Shaddai Adonai 242. Elion Zebaoth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 243. The Divine Essence and Attributes Ib. God not Capable of a Definition 244. Gods Essence Absolute and Independent 245. 1. The Divine Unitie demonstrated 249. 2. The Simplicitie of God Explicated 251. The Simplicitie of God demonstrated 254. CHAP. IV. Of Gods Immutabilitie Infinitude Eternitie Immensitie and Incomprehensibilitie 3. THe Immutabilitie of God 257. God Immutable 1 In his Essence 259. 2 In his Immanent Acts. 260. 3 In regard of his Word 263. Gods Immutabilitie demonstrated Ib. 4. Gods Infinitude demonstrated 266. 1 By his Independence 267. 2 From his Vnitie and Simplicitie 268. 3 From his Transcendence 269. 4 From the Idea of Perfection 271. 5 From the infinite Bonitie and Beatitude of God 273. 6 From Gods Infinite Power 274. 5. Gods Eternitie explicated 1 By Scripture 275. 2 By Plato's Philosophemes 276. The Eternitie of God demonstrated 277. What Eternitie is 279. 1 Eternitie not mesurable by time Ib. 2 Eternitie without beginning or end 281. 3 Eternitie most Simple and Vniforme 282. 4 How Eternitie coexistes to the parts of Time 283. 5 Eternitie a fixed Instant 284. 6 Eternitie the same with the Divine Essence 286. 6. Gods Immensitie and Omnipresence 288. The Explication and Demonstration thereof 1 From the Infinitude of the Divine Essence 290. 2 From Gods Simplicitie Ib. 3 From his Infinite Power and Operations 291. 7. Gods Incomprehensibilitie 292. It s Demonstration by 6 Arguments 294. How far we may apprehend God 296. Against Poetic figments of God Ib. Against Curiositie in our Inquiries after God 297. The least Notices of God of great moment 299. Al Notices of God by Divine Revelation Ib. The Grades or Ascents of Knowing God 1 Natural 300. 1 By way of Causalite 301. 2 By way of Eminence 302. 3 By way of Rematiom 303. 2 Supernatural 1 By Christ Ib. 2 By the Scriptures c. 304. CHAP. V. Of Gods Life Knowlege Wil and Power THe Life of God 305. Life in its generie Notion 306. The Life of God 1 most Spirituose 307. 2 Most Actuose 308. 3 Most Self-moving 309. 4 Life it self 310. 5 Eternal Life 311. 6 The first cause of Life Ib. Gods Science and 〈◊〉 most Perfect 312. The Object of Gods knowlege 313. 1 The Divine Essence Ib. 2 Althings cognoscible 114. The Object of Gods Owniscience 1 Complexe Intelligibles 315. 2 Incomplexe Intelligibles 316. 3 The Human soul 317. God knows althings by his Essence 318. How the Divine Ideas represent althings 321. Gods Science 1 most Simple 322. 2 Intuitive not discursive 323. 3 Immutable and Necessary 325. 4 Most Certain 327. 5 Absolute and Independent Ib. 6 Eternal 329. 7 Infinitely perfect Essentially Intensively Extensively 330. Gods Simple Intelligence 331. Gods Science of Vision 332. God knows things future by his Wil. Ib. Against Scientia Media 334. The Wil of God 336. 1 The Object of the Divine Wil. 337. 2 The Divine Wil one pure Act. 338. 3 The Divine Wil Independent 339. God Independent Physically and Morally 340. 4 The Divine Wil Immutable 343. 5 Gods Wil Absolute not Conditionate 344. 6 Gods Wil Antecedent not Consequent 347. 7 The Divine Wil most perfect 348. 1 Intensively 2 Extensively 349. 3 Effectively 350. 8 The Divine Wil most Free 351. What Indifference may be ascribed to the Wil of God 352. 9 Gods Wil Irresistible 353. Gods Wil distributed 1 Into Decretive or Preceptive 355. 2 Into Secret or Reveled 356. 3 Into Complacential Providential and Beneplacite 357. Gods Power Ib. Gods Power his Essence 358. Gods Ordinate Power the same with his Wil. 359. The Object of Gods Power every thing possible 360. What things are Impossible 361. Divine Power Omnipotence 363. CHAP. VI. Of Gods Justice Veracitie and Sanctitie Also of the Trinitie THe Justice of God 365. Gods Absolute Justice as to the afflicting the Innocent and acquitting the Nocent 367. How far Gods Punitive Justice
which it appears that the proper office of this Syneidesis is self-reflexion whence follows accusation or excusation c. as Rom. 2.15 And because this reflexive Light of Conscience does necessarily suppose inward sense hence 't is oft called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sensation also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Synesis or sensate judgment So Aquinas Synesis or sensate judgment imports a right judgment about particular operables So Plato in his Theaet makes al true Science to be a kind of Sensation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Science is nothing else but Sensation And more particularly in his Timaeus pag. 103. he cals 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good Sensation which exactly answers to the Scripture Phraseologie which sets forth this reflexive act of Conscience by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as Phil. 1.9 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thence Heb. 5.14 we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 1.9 c. The life of the new Creature as wel as of the old consistes in these self-reflexive Acts of Conscience which spring from inward sense and feeling And Plato in his Alcibiad pag. 133 134. tels us That he that reflectes upon himself his own Soul and Wisdome thereby becomes as it were omniscient whereas they who know not themselves know not what is good or evil for them nor yet what belongs to themselves or to other men such therefore can never make good Politicians or Occonomists c. In brief Self-reflexions or our actions upon our selves are of al the highest and noblest and those by which we live and worke as men and perfect that part of the Soul called Conscience which directs al we do according to right Reason c. 3. As for the Measure or Rule of Moral Prudence 3. The Rule of Prudence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason we find it expressed in the fore-mentioned Platonic Definition under this notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to right Reason This Platonic 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is asserted in like manner by the Stoics and others right Reason is the same with the Light or Law of Nature which is twofold 1 Subjective 2 Objective 1. As for Subjective Right Reason Light or Law of Nature Right Reason is 1. Subjective it is no other than those commun Principes of Moralitie seated in that part of Conscience which they cal Synteresis of which in the foregoing § 6. This Seminarie of engrafted active Notions or moral Principes is stiled by the Stoics 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Commun Law also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason against which say they nothing is to be done as Diog. Laert. in Zeno. 'T is termed by Plato 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Being So Minos pag. 315. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 where saies Serranus by this appellation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Plato understands the Eternal Law of Nature which amidst the various Laws of Nations and their vicissitudes continues uniforme and the same and thence is truly termed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being therefore he cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the right Reason of the Eternal Law and because our actions are to be measured by the Rule of these commun Notions therefore Plato names this Law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law So again Serranus in Plato de Legib. 8. The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Delineation of this Eternal Law is this There is in the minds of al as soon as they are borne a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sacred Law He that consecrates this Law in his mind as a certain sacred is thereby furnished with an excellent remedie against the insolence and impotence of human lusts as it was said of the Tyrant 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These active Principes conteined in this interne Law of Conscience are generally stiled 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 commun Notions they were named by Zeno 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Comprehensions because they comprehended the first seeds or principes of knowlege Cicero tels us that Epicurus called them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipations as he translates the word because they supposed a Previous formation of things in the Soul The Stoics used the same terme likewise Chrysippus defined this natural Law or Conservatorie of commun Principes a natural Intelligence of those things which universally are Cicero stiles these commun Notions Inchoate Intelligences of which see Lud. Vives in August Civ lib. 8. cap. 7. The Scripture also stiles these commun Principes fixed in Conscience a Law so Rom. 2.14 15. where the Gentiles are said to be a Law to themselves c. And indeed these commun seeds of natural light are a private Law which God has deeply engraven on mens Consciences and is universally extensive unto al though with a latitude of degrees it being in some more in some lesse but in al in great measure obliterated and defaced since the Fal. It is also by Divines generally termed the Light or Law of Nature because it flows in and with and from human Nature either immediately or mediately 2. As for the Objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 2. The Objective 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Law of Nature Right Reason which Plato seems to have had some traditional notices of it contains those broken Traditions of the Moral Law which were scattered up and down among the Gentiles That Plato had received some fragments of Gods Law and that by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason he does import the same seems very probable both from that expression in his Minos pag. 315. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Law of Being i. e. of the first Being as he usually stiles God as also from that other expression of his Minos pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This right Reason is the Royal Law i. e. Gods Divine Law which is so stiled Jam. 2.8 In this sense right Reason may be said as the Scholes wil have it to give 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esse morale or Moralitie to human Acts so Stobaeus de Virtut Ser. 1. fo 9. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is a conformitie according to right Reason and Sin is a transgression against right Reason Where by right Reason we must understand not the subjective Light or Law of Conscience which is imperfect but the objective Light of Nature comprised in the Moral Law In this sense we must understand that Principe in the Scholes That right Reason gives the esse morale to moral Beings Thus much for the Platonic Definition of Moral Philosophie § 2. Next to the generic Notion of Moral Philosophie The last End its Influence in Morals the first thing that comes under consideration is the last End which is first in intention though last in execution Yea indeed the last End is the first Principe of moral Prudence For what is Prudence but the right disposition and ordination of al means and actions And
Reason is cried up by some as the only Rule of Moralitie Thus Seneca would needs persuade us That we have this merit of Nature that virtue doth premit its light into the minds of al yea those that wil not follow yet see it And not only some vulgar capacities now a-days but also the Stoics of old generally cried up the Light within them as the Rule of Moralitie The Schole-men also in imitation of Aristotle their Oracle generally proclaim right Reason to be the formal Rule of moral Good But that Aristotle and Plato by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 right Reason understood the objective Law either of Nature or Moses I no way dout but hereafter to demonstrate Indeed al our subjective Light by Nature is no other than a nocturne dreaming tenebrous knowlege as Plato stiles it 2 That no human Law or Laws is the perfect measure of moral Bonitie No human Laws a perfect Rule of moral Good is also evident because al human Laws are extreme defective in their extension and prescripts as to al the Causes and Principes of moral Goodnesse how deficient are they both as to the Mater and Manner of moral Good What Restrictions Emendations and Alterations do they need What an infinite number of particular cases are there which no human Law can reach Wel therefore doth Androcles in Aristotle Reth l. 2. c. 25. informe us That al human Laws need another Law to correct them as fishes need salt to preserve them from putrefaction This corrective Law they terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Equitie which indeed is no other than the Law of Nature as hereafter cap. 5. § 5. 4. The Divine Law the Rule of moral Good Prop. The adequate perfect rule and measure of moral Bonitie is the Divine Law This Hypothesis being the main wil require more ample explication and demonstration 1 The Divine Being is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first essentially just and holy Being and therefore the first essential rule or measure of al Justice and Sanctitie 2 But the Divine Essence being too remote and distant from the Creature he hath therefore given us a divine Law as the Miroir and Idea of his essential Sanctitie to be the rule of al moral Bonitie as to us 3 This Divine Law given us as the Rule of moral Bonitie was concreate and connatural as to Adam it being impressed and engraven on his nature and so needed not any further promulgation 4 Hence the objective and subjective Law or Light of Nature was to Adam in his innocent state one and the same he having a perfect understanding and comprehension of the whole Dutie of man and so became a Law unto himself 5 But lapsed man having lost his subjective Law and Light of Nature as to supernaturals and very far as to naturals and civils retaining only some fragments or broken notices our most benigne Lord out of his great clemence and pitie to lapsed man gave a new Edition of that natural Law and therein fresh notices of his soverain wil and pleasure touching mans dutie So that the World was never without an objective Law and Light of Nature albeit the subjective was lost in Adam Yea some Divines of great note conceive that those very commun natural Notions communly called the Fragments or Remains of the Image of God lost by Adam are vouchsafed to us by the Covenant of Grace in and by the Mediation of Christ Thus they interpret Joh. 1.9 of Christ's illightening every man Joh. 1.9 i. e. not only supernatural light vouchsafed to the Elect but even the natural notices or Light of Nature vouchsafed to the lapsed Sons of Adam is the effect of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation And the reason seems demonstrative because our very Beings and al the comforts of our Beings having been forfeited by the breach of the first Covenant whatever good we enjoy on this side Hel is but the overflowing of the Grace of the second Covenant and Christ's Mediation by which the whole World stands So far are we from any real claim to a subjective Light of Nature by virtue of the first Covenant as that both subjective and objective Light is from Christ The objective Light or Law of Nature is stiled by the Hebrews 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and its Offices 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the knowen Duties i.e. by nature to which they opposed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine namely Institutes or positive Commands of God For Jus naturale the natural Law is not opposed to supernatural but to positive Laws as Grotius hath wel observed Right Reason the objective Law of Nature 6 This objective Law of Nature in its second Edition as conteined in divine Revelations of moral Bonitie was not altogether unknowen to the wiser of the Heathen and that Plato's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Right Reason was but an Imitamen hereof we now undertake to demonstrate He discourseth hereof professedly in Minos pag. 317. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is Right is the Royal Law 1 That by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he means the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is to me unquestionable and I think it wil clearly appear so to others by what follows 2 He saith this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Royal Law which is the stile the Hebrews gave their moral Law as Jam. 2.8 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Jam. 2.8 And why doth he terme it the Royal Law but because it was the supreme Law of God the King of Kings Thence Socrates addes We therefore rightly granted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that this Law was the invention of Being it self or of the first independent Being For this generally he understands by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thence Defin. Plat. pag. 416. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an operation against right Reason i. e. the objective Law and Light of Nature Thus also Aristotle Eth. l. 2. c. 2. art 6. pag. 76. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And truly this to act according to right Reason is commun to al and let it be fixed as a Canon So again Eth. l. 3. c. 8. pag. 153. he saith Virtues are mediocrities freely undertaken 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and so as right Reason shal prescribe This right Reason he elsewhere termes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal commun Law which al by nature are subject to So Rhet. l. 1. c. 14. art 3. pag. 69. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I say Law is either proper or commun proper or private Law is that written Law which belongs to particular Nations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The commun Law I cal that which is according to nature for there is a certain commun Just and unjust which al consent unto albeit there should be no societie or confederation of men This commun Law of Nature is the same with his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For look as in speculative Sciences there are certain first
to me and my Church as Tarnovius § 4. Having explicated what moral Libertie as to Exercice is we are now to demonstrate Moral Libertie of Exercice the highest that this is the supreme Libertie that a rational Creature is capable of 1. The more ordinate and regular human Acts are the more morally free they are It s Order for al moral freedome denotes order and reference to our last End and are not virtuose Acts most ordinate and regular Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 504. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Soul and its acts receive order and ornament from the Law whence men are made regular and orderly which belongs to Justice and Temperance i. e. al Acts are so far regular as they partake of Justice and Temperance which give order and harmonie to al our Exercices Justice and Temperance according to Plato are universal cardinal Virtues which regulate and dispose al human Acts according to the best order wherein their freedome chiefly consistes Whence Plato makes mention of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Chorus of Virtues wherein al move in the most regular orderly manner Yea he affirmes That the whole life of man should consiste of Harmonie Order and Vniformitie And Rep. 3. pag. 412. he informes us That a life composed of Contemplatives and Actives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is most musical and harmonious i. e. The whole life of a virtuose man must be composed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Symphonie or Concent and musical Ryme so that Thoughts and Affections must answer to Rule Words to Thoughts and Actions to Words and herein consistes the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 good Order and Libertie of human Exercices So again in his Laches pag. 188. he assures us Non est hujus animus in recto cujus acta discordant Omnia facta dictáque tua inter se congruant ac respondeant sibi una forma percussa sint Virtus aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi Sen. Epist. That is the best Music when words and life concord or agree among themselves as also to the Rule Virtuose Exercices consiste in all equal tenor of life agreable to it self and to the Law which is always attended with a good order and libertie It is an excellent Character of Padre Paul the Venetian mentioned in his Life pag. 133. That his life was singularly composed of active and contemplative he always yielding to God what he could to his Prince what he ought and of that which belonged to his own Dominion more than he ought by any Law but that of charitie Again pag. 175. That which made him most admired was the coupling together of Virtues and with conditions that are not usually met in one and the same subject as Knowlege and Humilitie Prudence with Meeknesse Retirednesse and Officiousnesse Seriousnesse and Pleasantnesse Argutenesse without offence Brevitie and Perspicuitie Sweetnesse and Soliditie So great was the concent and order of virtuose Exercices in this great Soul Indeed order is the life and perfection of moral Acts and the more of order the more of libertie Now virtuose Acts are of al most regular and orderly because they are measured by the exactest Rule and directly tend to the last End which is the first Principe in Morals Thus in sacred Philosophie Gal. 6.16 Gal. 6.16 And as many as walke according to this rule peace be unto them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies a Reed whereby Geometers measured their ground also the white Line in the Grecian Race And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here signifies so to walke as to keep an exact order not to deviate the least from the white Line in our Race And what is the privilege of those who thus walke Peace be to them i.e. moral Libertie and Tranquillitie 2. The Libertie of an Act both Natural and Moral is to be measured by its Spontaneitie Connaturalitie Facilitie and Suavitie Virtuose Exercies most spontaneous and sweet For al Libertie consistes in an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-motion and by how much the more spontaneous connatural facile and sweet the self-motion is by so much the more free it is judged to be And what motions of the Soul are more spontaneous spiritually connatural and sweet than such as are virtuose Plato in his Lysis assures us that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Good is most proper to our nature and what is better than virtuose acts are they not then most proper or connatural Thence Definit Platon pag. 411. Temperance is defined 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-motion according to nature i.e. connatural or agreable to rectified human Nature And Plato in his Timaeus tels us That the best motion of the Soul is in it self because this is most akin to rational Nature And when doth the Soul move more in it self than when it moves virtuosely towards its last end Is not the last end the best part of our selves Therefore when the Soul moves virtuosely towards it doth it not move most in it self It 's a great Notion among the Platonists That Virtue is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most proper and congenial to man but sin is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 most aliene and repugnant And Bradwardine strongly demonstrates That to adhere to God as our first Cause and last End is the most natural act of a rectified Soul and is it not then most free Every motion of the Soul is so far free as connatural and proper O! then how free are virtuose Acts The Platonist instructes us That to a good man God is a Law but to the wicked Lust is a Law Now if God be a Law to a good man then al his motions toward God are most free There is indeed a divine Sympathie between a virtuose Soul and the divine Law Repugnanti non volenti necessitas est In volente necessitas non est Sen. and therefore he most freely obeys it for al obey what they love as Plato assures us Hence a virtuose man is a Law to himself he has the divine Law impressed on his Soul and thence the Law of God is to him a Law of Love and Libertie so that he obeys it not out of force but choice for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 force cannot touch love There is a service of Love which is most free by how much the more closely and inviolably the Soul is by virtuose acts subjected to God by so much the more free it is for the very act of love as terminated on the Creator is formal moral Libertie as Jansenius acutely demonstrates August Tom. 2. pag. 41. Yea virtuose exercices are not only spiritually natural to the virtuose Soul but also most facile sweet and delicious Plato Timae pag. 81. tels us Whatever is repugnant to Nature is most irkesome 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but what is consentaneous to Nature is most sweet Now that virtuose acts are most agreable to rectified Nature has been already demonstrated What can furnish us
or inequalitie among inhabitants of one Citie but the reproches of dishonestie and praise of virtue Further he made another Law for eating and drinking and against Festes and Banquets First he commanded them to eat together al of one meat and chiefly of those he had permitted by his Ordinance In these commun Repastes which the Cretians called Andria and the Lacedemonians Philitia either because they were places wherein they learned to live soberly from Phido to save or spare or else because their amitie and friendship grew there one towards another as if they would have called them Philitia Love-festes by changing d into l. And Plato Leg. 11. pag. 915. makes mention of such a kind of Love-feste in use among the Grecians His words are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. In that kind of Feste which is made up of Symbols or Collations and called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and celebrated among friends c. This 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Love-feste was for the preservation of love and amitie among those of the same Societie which was in use also among the Jews as it appears by their Feste after the Passeover whence the Grecians seem to have borrowed their custome as the Christians their Love-festes mentioned Jude 12. Jude 12. See more of the nature of this Friendship Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 6. § 1 c. 6. Religion the principal foundation of Polities The principal Foundation and Ligament of al politic Fraternitie and Societie is Religion Thus Plato Leg. 4. pag. 713. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But it behoved if the Citie be designed by this name that it be called by the name of God himself who is the true Lord of wise men His mind is that a Citie ought to be composed of wise virtuose men who have God for their Lord and therefore may be called the Citie of God Whence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Namely this Discourse reteining the vestigia of the primigenous Truth teacheth that there wil be no cessation of evils and troubles in those Cities whatsoever they be in which not God but some mere mortal ruleth but it commandeth that with al possible endeavors we imitate that life which was under Saturne i. e. in the golden Age of the state of Innocence in which Religion and Virtue flourished Thence in his Politicus pag. 290. Plato acquaints us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That among the Egyptians it is not lawful for a King to rule without a Priesthood yea if any one out of the Royal line should by violence usurpe the Empire he is forced to be initiated in Sacreds Moreover in many Cities of Grece and specially among you Athenians thou shalt find the chief Sacreds to be instituted by the supreme Magistrates For among you they say that the most august Sacreds and most ancient Rites of Religion are committed to the charge of the King created By which he shews how much the supreme Magistrate both among the Egyptians and Grecians was concerned for the conservation of Religion Thence Campanella Pol. cap. 8. pag. 156. saith That the Priesthood acts Gods part in an Empire therefore there never was any Republic or Societie of men nor yet can be without a Priesthood So essential is Religion to politic Societies How much the Civil Magistrate is to concerne himself for the conservation of Religion is evident from the promise and practice of David Psal 75.2 3. Psal 75.2 When I shal receive the congregation I wil judge uprightly David promiseth in these words that when he should obtain the ful gubernation of the Kingdome he would administer it with justice and settle Religion which was then miserably dissolved So it follows v. 3. The earth and al the inhabitants thereof are dissolved I bear up the pillars of it By the Earth he means the Judaic Kingdome which was growen very dissolute but saith he I do or by an Enallage of Tenses I wil bear up or confirme the pillars thereof Some by pillars understand just and religiose Magistrates others Religion and Justice which are the primarie pillars of a Nation and these David promiseth to confirme when King That Religion is the principal Pillar of any State Plato more expressely inculcates Repub. 4. pag. 424. where he premits this as a preliminary proposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For a Republic if it be once wel begun doth always encrease as a circle Whereby he shews that the perfection of a Republic dependes greatly on a good beginning Thence he procedes to shew That the best beginning and perfection of a Republic consistes in Religion which he symbolically expresseth under the notion of Music 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore the Fortresse as it seems in which the Office of the Keepers is constituted consistes in Music And the prevarication hereof doth secretly steal into and influence mens minds 1 By the Keepers he understands the Magistrates whom he makes to be Conservators of the Laws 2 He saith the Fortresse and strong Tower of these Conservators of the Laws consistes in the Discipline of Music That by the Discipline of Music must be understood Religion is evident by the coherence as also by the use of this phrase elsewhere For Plato herein following the Pythagorean mode stileth Virtue and Religion Music or Harmonie 3 He saith the prevarication or perversion of Religion hath a great force and efficace for the corrupting mens minds and therefore the preservation of it has great influence on the wel-being of Societies Thence in his Leg. 12. pag. 966. he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Is not this one of the chiefest things concerning which we have hitherto much discoursed namely touching God that he is and how great and august his forces are as to human affaires Whence he concludes That no one ought to be elected to the Office of a public Magistrate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 save he that is divine or religiose and addicted to divine studies Wherein he assertes 1 That the knowlege of God is the best Wisdome and the very Soul of Virtue 2 That nothing is more 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 impolitic or against the interest of a politic Societie than the ignorance of God and neglect of Religion For without Laws a Republic cannot be happy neither can there be good Laws without a prudent knowlege of what is best neither can there be a prudent knowlege of what is best without the knowlege of God 3 He shews also that a Republic cannot be happy without Virtue which also belongs to Religion 4 Having placed Religion as the Foundation of an happy Republic he explicates the parts thereof such as are most influential on politic Bodies namely the knowlege of the Deitie his Providence Justice c. Thus elsewhere Plato makes Religion to be the principal Fundamen of a Republic and thence more ancient wherefore the first care of Legislators and Politicians in order to the right constitution of
Paraphrase expounds it 3 Before the Lord i. e. openly daringly in the very sigh tof God Hence Mede Diatr 3. pag. 539. on 2 Pet. 2.1 saith that old Babylon was the Foundresse of tyrannic Domination as also of Idolatrie and he makes their Tyrannie the effect of their Idolatrie because God usually punisheth Idolatrie with Tyrannie and Vassalage This is most true of New Babylon or the Roman Church which brought in Tyranie into the Christian World together with Idolatrie And is not this a just recompence and retaliation for God to leave men under the iron yoke of Antichristian Tyrannie when they electively and voluntarily embrace Antichristian Idolatrie O! how proportionable is the plague of Antichristian Tyrannie to the sin of Antichristian Idolatrie § 7. Civil Magistrates Having examined the nature of politic Administration and Jurisdiction in regard of its various formes and modes we now passe on to its Administrators their Aptitude Facultie Autoritie and Office The Administrators of politic Jurisdiction or Empire are usually comprehended under that general notion of Civil Magistrates We shal not here consider a Civil Magistrate as confined to this or that forme of Jurisdiction but more generally under such Ideas and Notions as may agree to every forme of Jurisdiction Now in a Civil Magistrate under this general Idea we are to consider 1 His End 2 His Aptitude and Qualification 3 His politic Facultie Commission and Autoritie 4 The Exercice and Execution of his Office Of these briefly in their order 1. 1. Their End As for the End of Civil Magistrates Platonic as wel as sacred Philosophie informes us that the proxime immediate end for which they were instituted is the public or commun Good of the whole Communitie This is the great end of al politic bodies whether Cities or Republics as we have before proved § 3. and therefore of al Civil Magistrates Thus Plato Repub. 3. pag. 413. discoursing of the Office of Magistrates he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must chiefly endeavor that they conceive what they judge wil mot conduce to the commun Good Thence Politicus pag. 274. he saith A King and Civil Magistrate is a Pastor of men and in this regard a God to mortal man i. e. as Gods Vicegerent for the good of men as hereafter Hence Petrus à Sancto Joseph and others make this difference between a King and a Tyrant That a King has his eye on the good of his Subjects but a Tyrant on his own private Good and Interest But of this sufficiently in what precedes § 3. 2. That which next follows is the Apitude and Qua ification of a Civil Magistrate 2. The Qualifications of a Magistrate Plato gives us many illustrious Characters of a Civil Magistrate 1. Wisdome natural 1 He makes Prudence and Wisdome an essential constitutive Qualitie or Requisite of a good Magistrate Thus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is convenient that he who manageth the greatest affaires should participate of the greatest wisdome There is a twofold wisdome required to the constitution of a wel qualified Magistrate 1 He must be invested with a natural Sagacitie and Dexteritie of judging Persons and Things Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 376. compares the Sagacitie of a Magistrate to that of a Dog which can at the first glance discerne his friend from his enemie Thence Aristotle Rhet. l. 1. c. 16. pag. 76. compares a good Magistrate to a Goldsmith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Judge must be like a Goldsmith that he may discriminate adulterine just from what is true This natural sagacitie Solomon was in an incomparable degree indued with as it appears by his sentence given in the case of the two Harlots 2 As he must have natural sagacitie 2. Acquired so also acquired Wisdome and Prudence Thus Plato Gorg. pag. 489. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Oft therefore one wise man is more excellent than an infinite number of fools as thou sayest and it is most consent aneous that this wise man obtain the Empire and that those are subject to him By which he instructes us That wise men ought to rule and fools obey Whence he addes pag. 490. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For this I conceive to be just by nature that the prudent is the more excellent and that he ought to rule over the more vile Wherein he layes down two Maximes of State 1 That the more prudent men are the more excellent they are 2 That the more excellent men are the more fit to rule The reason of this Maxime is taken from the foundation of al Empire which ariseth from that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or supereminence of the Ruler above the Ruled And because prudence is principally acquired by multitude of years and experience therefore Plato institutes that Magistrates be chosen out of the more ancient Citizens So Repub. 3. pag. 412. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the Seniors ought to rule and the juniors to be ruled Thus among the Romans the Senators were elected out of the more ancient Citizens and the juniors employed in War Which was but an Imitamen of the Judaic Politie How much wisdome is essential to a Civil Magistrate Plato oft inculcates Thus Repub. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Either let Philosophers reigne in the Cities or let Kings philosophise His mind is that Kings ought to have the wisdome of Philosophers joined to their Majestie in order to their more happy Gubernation This Plutarch takes notice of as an excellent Character in Numa Pompilius Under Numa saith he there was constant peace without innovation or conspiracie which verified that of Plato that the only mean of true quiet and remedie from al evil is when from some divine Ordinance from above there meeteth in one person the right Majestie of a King and the mind of a wise Philosopher to make Virtue Governesse over men So Campanella in his Politics Cap. 3. observes That Wisdome only rules wel and naturally not sophistic but philosophic not eremitic or monastic but civil not opposite to God but supposite or subordinate There is a threefold acquired Wisdome or Prudence necessary to the right qualification of a Civil Magistrate 1. Knowledge of human Laws 1 He ought to understand wel 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first Principes of Right and Law Thus Plato Rep. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. I conceive therefore that he who ignores or knows not the reasons of just and honest deserves not the name of a Keeper or Magistrate It is an Effate among Civilians That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Law of Equitie lies in the bosome of the Magistrate i. e. he ought to have clear notices not only of municipal Laws proper to Nations but also of the Law of Equitie whereby he ought frequently to direct himself for the correcting the defects and excesses of municipal Laws Whence it is also an Aphorisme in Justinian's Law That ignorance excuseth a man from public Office 2 Knowledge of
Factes 2 A Civil Magistrate must have not only knowledge of Law both natural and municipal but also a particular comprehension of Factes and Cases that may occur A Magistrates prudence consistes not only in the knowlege of the Law but also in the application of it to maters of Fact and particular Cases that may occur For there are no human general precepts so universal but such circumstances may occur as may cause much variation in mater of Justice It 's a good observation of the Philosopher That 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 prudence is about things singular which are much varied by circumstances of Time Place Persons c. Therefore the prudence of Magistrates ought to inquire not only what is lawful but also what is expedient in this or that case Much of politic prudence consistes not so much in understanding the Rule as in applying it to the Case ruled It 's a good observation of Padre Paul that great Venetian Politician That it is proper to the Prince alone to know what is expedient None knoweth how to governe a Territorie but the Prince himself who alone knoweth al the necessities of it I shal conclude this Character touching the Wisdome of a Magistrate with what Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus observes touching his Prudence Men saith he communly disdain those that are not wise in commanding so that the faithful obedience of the Subjects dependeth much on the sufficient Command of the wise Prince for he that directeth wel must needs be wel obeyed For look as the art of a good Rider is to make his horse gentle and ready at command even so the chiefest point belonging unto a Prince is to teach his Subjects to obey Wherefore the Lacedemonians procured that not only other people did willingly obey them but also desired to be ruled by them 3 A Civil Magistrate must have also some knowlege of the Divine Law Thus Deut. 17.18 3. Knowlege of divine Laws Deut. 17.18 19 20. And it shal be when he sits upon the Throne i. e. as King that he shal write for himself the copie of this law in a book out of that which is before the Priests and Levites The original Book of the Law was kept in the Sanctuarie as Deut. 31.26 and ot of that was the Kings Copie to be written with his own hand for his instructiion how to governe Thence it follows v. 19. And it shal be with him i. e. in al places whither he went he was to carry this Copie of the Law with him and why that follows that he may learne to fear Jehova his God c. The fear of Jehova includes not only interne Affection and Reverence but also the externe Worship and Service of God yea al Religion Thence follows another end v. 20. That his heart be not lift up above his brethren c. Because the Dignitie of a King is so august and great therefore he is to be much versed in the Divine Law to keep him humble as David was Psal 131.1 2. 2 Another essential Character of Qualitie of a Civil Magistrate is Virtue 2. Virtue There is a twofold Virtue requisite to the right constitution of a Magistrate the one natural the other moral 1 A Magistrate ought to have a natural Virtue which consistes in an heroic Spirit and natural Grace as to his externe presence Natural whereby he sweetly and yet with Majestie draws his Subjects to obey him Those whom divine Gubernation intends for Empire he oft indues with a great and heroic natural Spirit Thus Plutarch mentions of Lycurgus in his Life pag. 47. As for Lycurgus the Spartans thought of him thus that he was a man borne to rule to command and to give order as having in him a certain antural Grace and power to draw men naturally to obey him But yet 2 the main Virtue requisite for the qualification of a Magistrate is moral Moral Thus Plato Leg. 12. p. 966. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It shal not be permitted Virtus praecellens in Rege praecipua causa est regnandi civiliter Wicles that any take on him a public Office but he who with much labor and firme faith hath embraced a pious sentiment of God Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must endeavor that the Censors of manners be divine men Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Wherefore the Censors ought to be most illustrious for a manner of Virtue Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That none ought to be chosen a Keeper of the Laws but he that is divine So Bacon in the Life of Henry VII pag. 26. saith That it is incongruous that they should give Laws to others who are themselves lawlesse Whence Plato Repub. 3. pag. 416. saith That a Magistrate should have his gold not in his purse but in his mind meaning Virtue as in what immediately follows 3 Plato requires of a Civil Magistrate 3. Public spirited and against self-seeking that he be of a public Spirit not avaricious or confined to his private interest Thus Plato Minos pag. 321. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Those therefore of the Ancients were the best Legislators and Pastors of the people as Homer cals a good Imperator the Pastor of the people Now a Pastor specially of men implies a public Spirit free from self-interest Thence he addes Repub. 1. pag. 347. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore good man affect Empire not for lucre's sake nor yet for honor for they are not ambâ—ttose Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For if the Citie consisted of good men the Citizens would strive to avoid the office of a Magistrate as now they contend for it Thence it is apparent that a genuine Magistrate is so spirited as not to seek his own private interest but the public good of those subject to him This Theme Plato more fully prosecutes A Magistrates Diet and Richesses Repub. 3. pag. 416. where he shews That Magistrates ought so far only to be furnished with Richesses and other necessaries 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. as that they may not cease to approve themselves the best Conservators i. e. lest being made drunken with too much prosperitie they waxe insolent and worse to the public detriment of the Citizens Consider therefore whether it be not better that they be so furnished with necessaries as to life and habitation that they possesse nothing as proper but what urgent necessitie requires Moreover that they have neither house nor Buterie but what is open for al. But as to their provision and Diet that they have so great plenty as temperate Soldiers need and that they receive such a salarie for the discharge of their Office from the Citizens as that they may neither want nor have what is superfluous But this must be inculcated on their spirits 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that they ever have gold and silver and that truely divine and august in their Soul so that they need not mens gold and silver 4 For the
Divine Gubernation Doth not every one keep its ranke and slation performe its office and move most regularly according to that Law which Divine Ordination has appointed it Thence it follows And calleth them al by name i. e. has an accurate knowlege of and command over al as a wise General that can cal al his Souldiers by name whose beck and nod every one obeys Such is the admirable Dexteritie and Domination of Divine Gubernation But whence springs al this that follows By the greatnesse of his might The magnitude of Divine Power is the cause of his admirable fixed Gubernation because he is omnipotent therefore it is impossible that he should fail in his Gubernation Thus it follows For that he is strong in power not one faileth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 faileth or is deprived i. e. of that fixed order and station which Divine Gubernation has allotted to it there is not one that detractes its office but al subserve the Divine order Thus Plato in his Phado p. 97. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is the eternal Mind that disposeth althings in the best order and is the cause of al And thus I determined with my self if it be so that this gubernative dispositive Mind doth thus dispose althings then althings are placed in that station and ranke where they may be most rightly constituted The Stoics also as Laertius in Zeno assures us held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That the world was governed and ordered by the Divine Mind and Providence which disposeth althings in the best manner This gubernative Providence as it includes a fixed order and series of causes and effects they called Fate which they made to be a connexe series of things or reason whereby the world was governed So Chrysippus said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. That Fate was a natural Syntaxe or regular connexion of althings mutually following each other from al eternitie by an immutable and inviolable complication Whereby indeed they seem to understand no other than the series and order of Divine Gubernation decreed by God from al eternitie So Stobaeus in his Physics explicates their mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The reason of those things which are governed in the world by Providence And that this was the original import of the Stoic Fate we are assured by Seneca Minutins Faelix Lud. Vives and others Thus Robert Grosseteste that great Philosopher as wel as Divine in his Tractate de Libero Arbitrio to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie We must know saith he that Fate may be taken for Providence according to Boetius Lib. Consol Philos 4. who saith that Fate is the same with Providence yet they may admit different considerations because Providence is that Divine Reason in the Soverain of althings which disposeth althings but Fate is the disposition inherent in things mobile by which Providence knits them together in their proper orders In what follows he proves out of Cicero Boetius and others that Fate is really the same with Providence of which see Philos Gen. P. 2. l. 1. c. 3. § 5. Hence 4. None can avoid Divine Order and Gubernation Prop. No second cause can totally decline the order prefixed by Divine Gubernation And the reason is evident because this Gubernation of God intrinsecally includes not only a prudent provision of the best means but an efficacious execution of them so as they shal infallibly reach their end It 's true wicked men oft do substract and withdraw their neck from the obediential yoke of Gods preceptive Gubernation but yet they cannot totally withdraw themselves from the order of Gods providential Gubernation whiles they violate the moral and sacred order of Divine precepts do they not fal into the penal order of Divine punishments Yea oft do not those very means which they use to violate the Divine order Gen. 11.4 promove the same Thus Gen. 11.4 And they said Go to let us build us a citie and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven and let us make us a name lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth You see their designe in building the Tower of Babel was to prevent the judgements of God or to secure themselves against a dispersion and scattering and yet lo the wise Gubernation of God made this very Tower of Babel v. 8. which they intended as a means to prevent their dispersion the cause thereof as v. 8. So the Lord scattered them abroad c. And yet out of this very dispersion which they feared and felt Divine Gubernation brought another sacred order even for the peopling the whole Earth Thus the most unnatural confusions are ordered by Divine Gubernation the order of Divine Providence is frequently advanced by that which may seem to obstruct or pul it down whiles men endeavor to escape one order of Divine Gubernation they fal into another 5. The Order of Gods Gubernation a Law Prop. The order of Divine Gubernation whereby althings are appointed and reduced to their end has the force and efficace of a Law Thence Plato termes this Order of Divine Gubernation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of Adrastie i. e. Gods fixed Order So Pindar 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Regal Law of althings i. e. that Order which the Eternal Law of Divine Decrees has constituted for the Gubernation of althings This Law whereby Divine Gubernation orders and disposeth things as it refers to things inanimate and Brutes comprehendes in it al those Natural Instinctes Instigations Inclinations and Propensions whereby they are conducted to their proper ends and usages Do not things Natural which are not invested with rational notices or spontaneitie certainly observe some Laws and Dictates of Nature which you may assoon banish them from their Natures as divest them of Are not the several kinds of their Operations constantly framed and determined according to this Order or Law of their Natures And do they not hereby follow Divine Gubernation towards their end albeit they know not what they do nor why Doth not the silly Bird curiosely frame its neast and the simple Bee its cel always after the same forme and figure and so in al other natural operations and productions of mere Brutes what a fixed Order is there agreable to the Law of their Beings And whence comes al this but from the infinite Wisdome and Gubernation of the Divine Mind who conductes things most irrational in the most intelligent prudent manner to their ends May we not then conclude that the Natural Generations and Operations of althings procede from that Universal Law engraven on their Beings whereby they are by the wise Conduct of Divine Gubernation directed to their respective Ends In sum this Natural Law of Divine Gubernation consistes 1 In the Natural Principes of things 2 In their Natural Inclinations 3 In al Natural Instinctes and Impulses of Nature 4 In their Obediential Capacities or Powers whereby they are ready to receive any