the name of Enthusiasm Neither can that extraordinary assistance promis'd to holy Councils and Synods denominate them Enthusiastick in their definitions But I will not urge this argument seeing the Reasonner concludes Councils no otherwise assisted than by Reason and no better qualified for finding truth than a Senate or Parliament but further examine the Reasoners positions which allows no more Divine assistance to Reason but the near approach of the object represented in holy Scripture or to speak in his Metaphor that the eye of the Soul can discern all spirituals objects external impediments being remov'd and brought within the Sphere of Vision This discerning faculty is such that the Soul can no more pretend to be furnish't with it than the Batt or Owl can be said to have an eye as quick and as piercing as the Eagle and as well dispos'd for vision if nature had not plac'd its proper objects at too great a distance Some parts of Matter are so small that it is impossible they should be discern'd he deserves to Chronicled a fool who observing the discoveries made by Microscopes of small bodies which nature could not see whilest unassisted by art and she look't with her own eyes would attempt an invention of making discoveries of the parts and figures of them of which the Air or Wind consist Some objects are not visible though as near as it is possible they can be Not to speak much of Atoms and Mathematical points the one not to be discern'd by the eye of the body the other not distinctly seen by that of the mind as appears from numerous Controversies which arise from them which are not so trivial or useless but that prudence can had hath made them subservient as the strange Phaenomena's of the Load-stone suggested by the Reconciler to facilitate the belief of the existence of a spiritual being by shewing that there are beings in nature as well as those which Religion discovers whose existence must be consess'd though the object are invisible and confound both sense and reason in their search This defect of natural sight proceeds not from the want of the near approach of the object as is demonstrable from the first prospect Religion takes viz. The being and nature of God who being brought as near as imagination can wish or propose for what object can be so near to the Soul as an Idaea which is connate with it and inseparable from it is but confusedly discerned besides the ubiquity of this object implyes it is near to every faculty which is able to discern it the World also being as a Theater in every part of which of God is to be seen yet the notions of God which natural men frame in their brains are as ill Representations of him as Pagans Idols whose monstrous Pageantry owes its beginning to mans imperfect knowledg of the nature of Spirits which is so far from comprehending the Supreme that it cannot conclude the being or understand the manner of the existence of the inferiour the Angels who are above mere humane knowledge But if this may be retorted by saying the natural ignorance of the existence and nature of Angels whose being reason cannot necessary conclude doth not imply the ignorance of the Deity whose existence is more evident which must be granted for as he who cannot discern an Atom or the smallest visible part of matter may see a Mountain or greater object so humane Reason ignorant of finite may discern an infinite spirit yet it argues the imperfection of the sight for he who cannot discern a Mote in a Sun-beam cannot so distinctly discern the vast body of the Sun and he who knows not the ratio formalis or essence of the least part of matter knows it not as it lyes in the great Bulk of the Vniverse Let this be concluded by saying That as he who cannot distinctly see the small Sands cannot so distinctly see the vast Sea-shore so he who knows not the nature of finite doth not distinctly discern that of an infinite spirit To what degree of knowledge Reason only following its own conduct can lead its follower and how he can be said to be a THEIST Satisfaction will be given to all doubts which can arise out of this inquiry if these positions be prov'd That Reason in its quest concerning the being of God and the manner of his worship cannot arrive to a higher pitch of certainty than that of opinion And that such knowledge is so uncertain that it cannot be consistent with that firm assent which Religion commands For proof of the former 't is enough to direct the Reader to the precedent Disquisition which shews how the Reasoner puts himself in the condition or quality of an Ethnick For though Revelation is allow'd as necessary for the setting out his Rational guide yet whilst Reason is set up Judge of reveal'd propositions which must be ratified by appeals made to it nothing is left of Revelation but the name and reason Consecrated by a Heavenly Title These premis'd will make a more easie digression to the examination of the particular method and Rules which the Reasoner prescribes his guide viz. Not to assent to any Conclusion which cannot be prov'd by natural evidence This direction observ'd by the guide will give no better assurance of safe-conduct than that which opinion affords and in strictness of Language cannot intitle him to the name of Theist which shall be more largely prov'd But before I speak to that part of this inquiry I cannot but suggest my fear that by this harsh conclusion I might be thought to condemn the great part of the world as Atheists and to call Gods goodness in question in not indowing man with such faculties as could discern the Creator and trace a way to happiness and by this position to take away the satisfactory method of solving doubts in Religion viz. That there is as much evidence of the Truth of Religion as the matter of it is capable which would be insignificant if Reason were not able to discern it These prejudices shall be remov'd by the following discourse I only name them here least the Reader might think I was not sensible how many obstacles were in the way before I could attempt the proof of the former proposition and to desire him to pass over them with a swift touch as the Traveller tenderly goes over a Quag-mire or Quick-sand till he can find a more sure bottom to which he may be conducted by weighing the several arguments Reason hath for the proof of the being of a Deity Amongst many let that of the French Philosopher who bid defiance to the Sceptick take place whose force consists in these particular positions That the Idaea of God which is in mans mind could not be fram'd by his invention because the Soul cannot contrive the Model of a being which is more perfect than it self This being granted that there is an Idaea of God in mans mind the truth of it
Aristotle lays down as a rule approv'd by Rhadamanthus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist lib. 5. Such observation of natures Law will justifie the Heathen not the Christian The Reasoner may also urge that Tully Plato Seneca and other Sophies have been Authors of such sentences which have such a near alliance to Scripture that only the Authors names can distinguish them from it This granted will not help the Reasoner for he cannot prove them emanations of a Heathens mind or convince the World of the certainty of their not being borrowed from Divine Revelation mixing their own thoughts with some notions taken from Scripture as some have endeavoured to prove which will appear more probable if the Ethnick be considered in his confused way of speaking of God and different expressions of him which will give way for a conclusion That they certainly knew a Being above themselves but what it was were uncertain for had they as certainly known his nature as they seemed assured of his Being there had not been such variety of opinions concerning him for these notions in mans mind are unalterable and although discourse or artificial ways may confound them when conclusions are to be drawn and so seem variable yet in themselves considered cannot be changed Wherefore it being granted that God is known by pure Reason as to his Being and some of his attributes yet by this imperfect notion the Reasoner can be no more called a Theist and said to know God than he who seeing some few or all the proportions of a man drawn or painted can be said to know his Crasis or Constitution or what humour is predominant If a similitude may be admitted in this case it may be said that he who passes judgment of the nature of the Deity by those lineaments of justice and mercy power and knowledg which are in man he will be as ignorant of the nature of God as the other of the Crasis or Constitution of a man for as the one cannot conclude by the draught what humour is predominant neither can the other know in which attribute God takes most delight Besides if mere natural evidence is to be set up judg of just and unjust without respect to the Divine will a great part of Religion will be disputed and the Christian Creed contracted into too narrow a compass some of its Articles according to the method of passing judgment being in danger not to be believ'd and Christianity would not be improv'd much above that height which King Agrippa arriv'd at men being but almost perswaded to be Christians Hitherto Reason hath been consider'd in its quest concerning the Vnity of the God-head but before this disquisition is concluded I cannot but take notice of that fam'd instance in Plato cited by Eusebius de praeparat Evang. lib. undec c. Dec. tert who made the unity of the Godhead as a Characteristick or token by which Dionysius should discern whether his Letters or Epistles were jocular or serious This seems to speak the Author naturally Orthodox but doth not sufficiently justifie him and undoubtedly free him from the imputation of Polytheism or a confus'd notion of the Deity for it may be doubted whether he us'd that Beginning with one God as a mark of his more serious business rather than to signifie his setled opinion because it would savour too much of a narrow and envious Spirit not becoming a Philosopher to have communicated that as a secret to Dionysius and not so clearly and ingenuously declared it to the rest of the World in the whole series of his Discourses It may be also a wonder that he could at any time write Jocularly and playing with the Deities making the term Gods to be as a Signet to seal his more trivial secrecy or less accurate writings except it can be thought that he as a Socrates derided and laught at the Heathens Idolatry being serious when Deus came into his mind but laughing when he thought of Dij This may be one plausible way to confirm the usual application of Plato's Epistolar Mark or Sign but it is hard to be imagin'd if his stile and manner of writing is considerd That which is said of Heathens ignorance will not be easily refuted by citations taken from Porphyrius Proclus or Plotinus or other Platonists seeing it may be presum'd that they entertain'd the same opinion of the Deity which their Master had Now how far the Platonick Doctrine is to be embraced may appear from the consideration of the Discourses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which some have endeavoured to accommodate to Christ the second Person in the Holy Trinity For the second Principle in Plato's sense implies more or rather is different from the personal distinction in the Trinity as it is matter of Christian Belief If it might be thought proper to vye Authority with Authority I could instance in Heathens Eminent in Dignity Morality and Learning Antoninus and Severus who were not free from the thoughts of Polytheism as may be conjectur'd from the Language of their publick Professor of Philosophy Alexand Aphrod in his book De fato p. 135. which speaks of the Deity in a plural number and attributes Omniscience and Prescience which is the attribute of one and the only true God to Dij or Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This Language may be presum'd to be suited to the Emperours apprehension of the Deity This also may be considered Zenophon who in a pleasant Discourse seems not altogether to speak his own sense or Language but that which generally was received says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which shews that the Unity of this supreme power was not so apprehended to be infallibly denominated one as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 implies which may not be translated is but seems Zenoph in convivio If this citation as Table Discourse may seem too familiar to bear the weight of Authority in strict ways of arguing let the Authour be considered when he speaks most seriously and when an extraordinary appearance of an Enemy oblig'd his thoughts to retirement and engaged him to Devotion it will appear doubtful whether he was Theist or Polytheist at the same breath confounding Deus and Dij beginning with the one and ending with the other saying these words concluding his Oration to the Souldiers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Zen. de exped Cyri-pag 296. Hitherto the Deity hath been considered as it may be said to be known to the Reasoner and the next disquisition is What certain knowledg of the nature of the Soul and its immortality can be attain'd by mere Reason As the Eye cannot see it self without a Mirror or Glass so the Soul cannot know it self at least as to its duration or immortality without Revelation It is a difficult task to prove its existence much more the eternal continuation of it as appears by the French Philosopher who seems to glory of his Invention when he had as he thought found a way to convince the Sceptick of its distinct
state is like one intoxicated whose we kness multiplies a single object wherefore it was necessary that Israel even to improvement of Knowledg as well as Religion should know there was but one God Let this also be consider'd that in Pagan Divinity we find no such distinguishing worship or character given to Jupiter to shew that he was God Are the other Deities but Deputies as some learned men say or so reputed for they were all ador'd now in Scripture there is not the least favour or disspensation granted to adore any Being but God no not so much as his Representators Prophets and Apostles working wonders This is enough to justifie the expression of God by a plural number in Scripture though not in Pagan writings besides the Grammatical help of a singular number with a plural without false Syntax or false sense The Heathens did apprehend God in such a manner as a plural number best suited with their thoughts seeing the Universe was their God as appeared by their Deifi'd Pan of whom there is this account 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Orpheus in Hymn This may be further proved by a Testimony of lactantius lib. 9. De false Religione who when he brings in Trismegist speaking most Divinely concerning the Unity of the Godhead saying 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which he translates or paraphrases on it Ignitur Deo nomen non est nec opus est proprio vocabulo nisi cum discrimen exigit multitudo Whence it is plain that the multitude sometimes apprehended God as the general power reigning in the World though at other times they were more accurate in asking his name But not to check inventions or methods by which men frame the notion of one God let the Metaphysician think of infinite power wisdom justice c. And according to art or rule put them together he will make such an Aggregate or Sum of perfections which man cannot naturally know or by what one name to call it beside that of infinite now how properly Infinity in the natural mans sense can be said to be one hath been said before it being like Eternity of which we can speak so little properly that we can rather say what it is not than what it is Add to this that the Reasoner who frames a notion of a God by summing up perfections and knowing not how one Attribute poises another how power wisdom justice and mercy bound one another he seems as much a Polytheist as he who own'd power in Jupiter and wisdom in Apollo c. And can no more be said to be a Theist than one whose education hath advanced him no further than the Alphabet can be said to be a Philologer or he who only knows Letters an Interpreter of words before they have taken their places to form them This instance if it seem not so apposite yet I hope pardonable seeing Christ himself disdains not to be called the Word which without his own exposition would but imperfectly express his nature and Amelius a Platonist admir'd by Eusebius lib. 11. de prepar Evang. cap. 19. And call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Because he so much approved the compellation Suppose a Novice who hath been only in the Porch of a Geometrical School and learnt all kind of Lines in their several varieties of which the most accurat draught must consist shall he be thought worthy of the name of a Painter who knows no proportions of the single lines this instance I presume is so apposite that it will need no comment on it and it giving me occasion of a digression from the Metaphysical method of framing a notion of one God to one more suited to all apprehension by similitude as Vives Grotius Morney and others who have illustrated the Unity of the Godhead by Analogy viz. The Heavens one Sun one Primum mobile and other instances of Monarchy as it appears in the World How little impression such instances are like to make on some who in their Philosophical certainty conclude that there is no such primum mobile in the same Authors sense neither dare affirm there are no more lights of like nature and influences may be guest at by the reception and entertainment which later Hypotheses have found So he who endeavours to demonstrate the Unity and Trinity in the Godhead by the three powers which are in one Soul may expect his argument should be as little prevalent for that method which obligeth a Peripatetick to the belief of a Trinity may perswade the Platonick to believe a Quaternion for he as zealously contends for that as accommodated to its several degrees of knowledg as the other was for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or three powers in the rational Soul and surely the Platonicks did admire the number 4. else it had not been so solemnly used in their Oaths Let it be urged that God may be known by similitude although there be but imperfect and small footsteps of his Being to be traced by the Reasoner yet according to proportion by one Attribute there may be discovery of all as the proverbiall speech of an Herculean draught from a foot and if I may stretch the letter of the Proverb a little finger If such objections appear to the Readers thoughts I only desire him to re-collect or look back to the former part of the Disquisitions in which it was never granted that man by reasoning can have any such knowledg of any Attribute so as it shall be a Rule to him infallibly to judg of the nature of God without Revelation and the last appeals made to it I am not ignorant that the primitive Fathers to instance in one Minutius Foelix made use of similitude to convince the World of the Unity of the Godhead Dux unus Apibus Dux unus in Gregibus yet this was intended rather for illustration than strict proof neither is there violence done to the Divine example whilst the Reasoner disowns similitudes in case that demonstration is justly expected for although God is pleased to discover himself by similitudes he expects not that his Being should be proved by that method The Reconciler who supposes the Being of God and Providence Page 4. of his Preface cautions us to beware of similitudes whilst we would have a true conception of him page 12. Attributes which we cannot possibly know except he tell us and then says we should not conclude or guess about them by Analogies to things of a nature infinitely distant from his or by maxims fram'd according to the nature of inferiour being Let not this argument which seem to have its foundation in practice prejudice the Reasoner for I shall no further make use of it than reason must allow and the authority cited shall have another ratification of its strength by an appeal to the Reasoner who helps his thoughts by art and impartial and unbyass'd industry who by the conduct of his own reason will scarce find out that narrow path which will lead him to the
Christian posterity give assent to the whole Sacred Volume of Scripture by the same method and means by which Adam assented to and believ'd that Synopsis of the whole Gospel The seed of the Woman shall bruise the Serpents head If it is said that Adam's posterity have a measure of knowledg as much greater than that of their first forefather as the second Adam is justly exalted above the first yet this advance of knowledg owes not its Original to mere natural powers For though the Christian Believer without breach of modesty may be said to know more than his first Forefather yet that higher degree of knowledg doth not only owe its improvement to a fuller declaration of God's Will in the latter than in the first Gospel preacht to Adam by God himself but also to the Divine supplyes which are proportion'd to the extent of the Revelation otherwise the Christian could no more believe his large Creed than it can be imagin'd Adam could have comprehended the sum of it declar'd to him in few words without Divine interpretation or assistance If this instance seem not close to the question let the will and the understanding be two eyes of faith though by some one is called blind Caeca potestas which error is corrected by later Philosophy be examin'd and they will in their pure naturals be found defective For as in naturals 't is not enough that the eye is well disposed but a certain position of the object and direction of the eye is necessary for some Discoveries so although 't is allow'd that Reason is no more new Reason by Grace than an eye is a new eye which by skilful directions discerns that which it saw not before yet this assistance though it do not frame sight but direct the eye 't is enough to destroy that position which says in spiritual Vision only the object is brought nigher Add to this the mere disposal of Media in order to perfect Vision and it will give way for this assertion that Divine assistance is necessary for we must acknowledg that several conclusions have been passed as true which before were doubted of when a quick and happy invention hath found a fit medium to prove them or at least render them more easie to be understood To instance in that which is nearest to man his own Soul its existence is better apprehended by being compared to some thin air which hath power though invisible Besides it is beyond dispute that some supernatural power infuseth notions in dreams which the Soul it self could not excite I dispute not whether there are any such in these days 't is enough to shew that the Divine method without violence to Reason hath made such discoveries in some ages of the Church and may continue his assistance though not in the same manner for that would not appear consistent with the setled and more perfect state of the Church to help Reason in giving its assent to Divine truth I need add no more for the confutation of the Reasoners position than the proposal of the Discourse in the former disqusition which shews that there is a Beam in the eye of Reason which if not removed renders it so dim-sighted that it cannot discern the Elements and first principles of Religion which are rudely in mans mind and need some assistance for the due composure of the thoughts concerning God and his worship wherefore let the Reasoner consider Grace but as a Chirurgians hand which couches a Pearl on the eye or takes away the Gutta serena Yet by this act the sight is better and this cannot be without alteration Add to this the proposal of objects and the disposition of the eye and media which the eye it self cannot dispose is enough to shew that Grace by such acts may be said to have alter'd the sight which might be rendred obscure and confused by default of the medium or Organ for as the Soul looks through the eye as a Glass which if sullied or discolour'd by any Disease the judgment is pass'd according to the tincture which is in the eye not in the object and consequently is as ill a Judg of colours as he who views objects with colour'd Prospectives or any Catoptrical device to deceive the eye so in spiritual Vision the Soul looks with the eyes which have the disease therefore 't is not probable it should discern its own malady much less discover truth To conclude this part of the Disquisition it may be confidently affirmed that Grace alters the sight though it do but take off a film or scale as from St. Paul's eyes which the natural man by his own power is no more able to remove than the eye by dropping tears a way to put out eyes rather than restore them can do as much as any eye-water which the Oculist can prepare From what is here said there is an easie digression to the other part of the Disquisition how Reason is laid aside in some acts of Faith a question which much exercised the Reconciler whilst it doth not follow the dictates of its own understanding but gives it self up to the guidance of another the Divine knowledg which advantagiously supplies natures defect which makes way for this conclusion viz. Reason in some cases is as much and may as properly be said to be laid aside as a Judg who is limited by his Monarch that he may not pass sentence in all cases on his own judgment but in some must consult and follow the directions of the supreme Magistrate by doing of which he is so far laid aside that as to that particular case he may not so properly be called Judg as a Proclaimer of Justice determined by his Superiour And for the illustration I cannot but insert a story which I borrow from an Eminent Mathematician who says a Judg puzled with a Case of two persons who had made exchange of Fields which were Isoperimeters or of equal sides but different figures one a Rombus or oblique Angled the other a square or right Angled parallelogram was necessitated to call a Geometrician to discover the Cheat which discovery in strictness was enough to call the Mathematician Judg though the sentence was pronounced by another This is applicable to the Spiritual method of improving the understanding and determining the Will in matters of faith if God be considered as the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to inform Reason which is defective and as ignorant as the Judg in the former Case From this instance 't is plain and easie to imagine how advantagiously Reason is laid aside being diverted from its usual method in giving assent to propositions which are true yet in themselves not sufficiently evident now evidence of the truth to the Soul in its pure naturals is so necessary that there is no assent certain without it but it is otherwise in the act of saith when Divine Testimony supplies the place of natural evidence If it be urged that Reason proceeds according to it's
is prov'd from the goodness of God which cannot be imagin'd to have deluded his Creature with a false draught of himself This argument is of so great force that I know none so cogent if it meet with a mind praedispos'd for the Reception of truth but is not strong enough to beat the Sceptick off his ground because the very sinews of this argument borrow their strength from a supposition one attribute of God being necessarily suppos'd viz. His goodness before the Reasoner can put himself in a capacity of arguing However it must be granted that supposition doth not destroy the certainty of finding truth for to suppose Falsity in some cases is a sure way to find Truth as in the Rule of false in Arithmetick But this method fails in this case for in those Operations the suppositions are raz'd out and laid by when the work is perfected but in this argument the supposition can never be laid aside for the truth of the Conclusion depends on the goodness of God as known to be such as would not impose on his Creature which the Sceptick will look on as but suppos'd If it be urged in favour of the former argument That Reason concludes the being or existence of the Deity and understands the attributes of God by rules equally certain with those in the Arithmatical instance seeing the Souls faculties are as a Standard by which it can measure the Divine perfections and find what is goodness or wisdom in God by measuring them with the notion or footsteps of them left in the mind The argument thus managed must be acknowledged to be of great value and serviceable to the casuist in solution of doubts but the defect of Reason being necessarily supplyed with a supposition in this way of arguing without which mans faculties may be suspected as false it is not probable the Sceptick will be perswaded out of his affected ignorance After this new Method let old arguments be consider'd which seem more Catholick and easie being drawn from the common appearance or Phaenomena's of Nature and observation of Providence with those from other Topicks by which the Soul is fetter'd so that it cannot evade an assent to the existence of God yet it will appear that the strength and evidence of this argument cannot command that assent without confusion of Thoughts which implyes ignorance and extravagancy which are not tolerable in a Guide That argument which is most obvious is drawn from the admirable Fabrick of the World which must be allow'd to have its due force when it meets with a ductile mind far remov'd from Sceptical stiffness made so by a Divine disposition for receiving Truth without which it is so far from conducting men to the knowledge of God that it will rather incline the mind to Idolatry Heathens practice is an undeniable evidence of this Truth For it may be a reasonable conjecture that Idolatry took its rise from the gross consideration of Wisdom and Power which appear'd in the lovely frame of the World and afterward this power was divided and subdivided into several ranks of Gods and Semi-Gods That the whole World was but as one great Idol may appear from Poetical sayings which Authority may pass in this case Poets being the only Divines in the Heathenish ages who wrapt Religion and that Secular wisdom in verse who Deified the World under that great name Pan. If it be said that Shepheards had this name given them by Poets yet it is plain that the mystery was terminated in higher beings as Plutarch allows Pan to have influence on the Oracles as Superintendent and some have applyed the story of his death to Christ's suffering which is enough to shew he was more than a Shepherd or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For that age as others before consider'd the World and its Creator in one grosse notion which they expres't by Pan as may be prov'd from the account which Orpheus gives of that Idoliz'd name in another place further to be consider'd But seeing this way of argument from Practice may not appear so convincing as that of Theory because all do not tread the same steps with equal success and the question is not what knowledge of God hath been but what may be learn't from the Creation To this demand a short answer may be return'd When a man takes a serious prospect of the World one of these thoughts will arise either that it had a beginning of it self or that it was the work of some Architect if he is inclinable to allow the former all that Reason can do in order to his conviction is to shew the impossibility of the World 's being its own cause or maker This prov'd can only remove him from Atheism or at least dispose him for a belief of the existence and knowledge of God He therefore who arrives to this degree of knowledg in strictness and propriety of speech deserves not the name Theist any more than a man comeing out of a Cell or Wilderness seeing a Diamond or Jewel hath only so much knowledg to pass sentence that it is not of the same kind of stones which he treads on deserves the name of a Jeweller or seeing a stately Pallace hath only skill to conclude that the stones did not meet by mutual consent as the fabulous story sayes of the building of Thebes for erecting that Fabrick neither did grow so uniformly out of the Earth may be said to know an Architect or a Builder If in defence of this argument it is said that he who denyes that a Fabrick can raise it self tacitly implyes the necessity of the being of some Builder This granted will not relieve the Idiot for the Builder can be no otherwise said to be known by him than under the general notion of a Cause Now who will be so ridiculous as to say that a man understands what an Architect is and what kind and degree of knowledge gives him that name who hath only a general notion of him by which he calls him the cause of a House which description is so rude that it cannot be allow'd except Logick can justifie it by terms of Art unknown to the Idiot however it cannot acquit him from the imputation of grosse ignorance which will appear greater when he considers the nice operations of nature For if Creatures are look't upon which are most expos'd to common view nature sitting in them as on the stage it is but little and that conjectural knowledge he can pretend to let the Heavenly bodies be an instance to prove mans ignorance of their nature and influence who will pretend to know except from Astrologer as ignorant as bold for what design the Heavens so regularly muster their forces till the event shews it or to determine what dependance the World hath on some of the Stars and positively conclude that they are not Worlds though not of the same frame with this of which Men are Inhabitants Now if man is ignorant of the dependance
called from the contemplation of the world let a man of another apprehension whose knowledg is more resin'd by industry and art who apprehends the Cause grossly conceiv'd by the Idiot as an Architect be Catechiz'd in this Article of his natural faith he will be found ignorant For although the world is a great Glass in which its Maker may be seen yet the Lineaments are so scatter'd and confus'd that it is almost impossible to reduce them to a perfect form as may appear from the consideration of the method us'd for the proof and knowledge of God from a prospect of the world which takes all the perfections which lie scatter'd in the Creatures and then imagins them to be in one most perfect Being which implyes a denyal of all imperfections and all those concentred in that Being are modo infinito as the Schools say This argument bids fair for the discovery but will fail when strictly examin'd For though it is granted that the perfections which are in the Creatures are the same though in an inferiour degree with those attributed to the Creator yet the ignorance of the manner how they are in this Being which is infinite and consequently incomprehensible will make him so far fall short of his design'd knowledg attempting vainly to measure Infinity by his finite Creatures that he deserves no more to be called a Theist than a man who hath only seen the Suns image in a drop as it is in every part of the Rainbow or the Stars in a Pool can own the name of an Astronomer This method is as insignificant as addition of numbers to numbers so that is impossible that they can have any denomination or as an attempt to measure two quantities one by the other which in their own nature are incommensurable or without any known proportion By these instances I give greater advantage to the cavilling Adversary than he could reasonably expect for there is greater disproportion between God and his Creatures than can be between quantity and quantity However let it not be thought an unnecessary crowding in instances if it be said this method is so far from being infallible that it falls short of the certainty of operations in Decimals which are not true if examin'd by Rules of Demonstration yet serve in practice and the Error is not to be discern'd But he who attempts to know God by this way of Reasoning will fail in practice as much as Thcory The Heathens who fram'd a notion of God by this method and suited their Morals to it were so notoriously erroneous that some of their precepts and Conclusions are not reconcileable with Religious truth Another branch of the Reasoners argument is the subordination of Causes which in this Quest need not be distinguished nicely from Harmony one being the result of the other both of which are so far from being Catholick arguments which may convince all that there are scarce any who are able to pass judgment on that Harmonious subordination for he who is a fit judg of the Harmony of the world must be suppos'd to know all the parts of it and their use or how they have dependance one on the other as Causes and Effects How imperfect this knowledg is will appear from a view of natural Philosophy in which most of the discoveries are but conjectures though called Demonstrations I do not design to start many old Errors it will be sufficient to suggest this consideration That the ancient Sophies who took this method to conduct them had an imperfect prospect of the World's Harmony as may be concluded from the Astronomy which is conversant about the most glorious and harmonious part of the World extant in their ages the best and most valuable part of which was compriz'd in the sam'd Almagest Now how monstrous and defective a Ptolomaic System is is plain from late observations But omitting these let it be consider'd as suiting with that age in which some discoveries which destroy it were not made yet it will appear to be if compar'd with the Copernican as an ill contriv'd Engine which moves with many Wheels Cycles and Epicycles when one or few would make it more perfect This perhaps may be the reason of that saying fastned on Alphonsus who considering the world's Fabrick in Ptolomie's Sphere rashly said that he could contrive the world in a better frame had he power to Create Here I may expect a Check from the Reasoner who may demand whether I thought any late or more Harmonious System might more effectually improve this argument To this question I only say that late inventions may improve the argument by rendring it more preswasive not much more demonstrative For Harmony is a certain proportion between numbers or magnitudes which is not called so only for this reason that some quantities have a mutual alliance and agree in some third which is common to both but as it hath respect to the mind which apprehends them as Musick is so called because it kindly complies with the ear 'T is confess'd that so much may be concluded from this Topick that the humane Soul and the world ows their original because of the approbation which Reason gives concerning the admirable contrivance of the worlds Fabrick to the same Being or Cause but as to the nature of that cause a man can conclude nothing much more distinctly and certainly than the Idiot in the former instance The next natural evidence of the existence of God is from the general consent of all Nations of which none so barbarous as not to own it as it was well observed by that great Oratour who did not much improve it for his own information as appears from his Books yet this argument will find more Barbarism in the Sceptical Reasoner of this age than the former was guilty of For this knowledg of God as it is generally found is not prov'd by the Reasoners method which unravels and analyses all by reason before it is believ'd but is rather a common notion or natural impress which is on the lowest degree of mankind that there is a Being able to Reward or Punish yet this is not the conclusion of the discursive facultie for those who cannot prove a God give assent to this Conclusion of his existence which proof consider'd though in the gross notion of an Idiot is more valid than the Reasoners arguments modeliz'd into Syllogisms and is more agreeable to the account Revelation gives of God which only expresses his existence when he describes himself by saying I am Hence it follows that the natural knowledg of God so diffus'd over the whole VVorld is like that of an Idiot who seeing a Circle can confess it to be so although he cannot prove it by tryal whether each ray or line drawn from the Center to the Circumference is equal This argument thus managed will not find any success with the Reasoner whose Rules oblige him to admit nothing as true though the will is so inclinable
of a visible Church at any time since it was founded if not the being of any truly so called For that principle which obligeth a man to believe that all Councils have been fallible will never put him out of doubt whether the profession of the Church at any time was agreeable to the truth of Religion For seeing the Reasoners rule admits of nothing as certain further than it is knowable by some faculty of the Soul independent form Divine assistance it is impossible that he can have any more than conjectural knowledg Reason being not able to inform him of a Criterion of a true Church by its own evidence but by Revelation which says the true faith shall not fail Now that this true faith is in a doubtful case must be determin'd by those who have power from God to make a certain discovery of it That which is said is so agreeable to the Apostolical rule no Scripture is of private interpretation which must be confest by the Reasoner though there was no Sacred Authority to confirm that Canon that it is only necessary that objections are remov'd The first of which may be this that by the delivery of Reason in private persons to be determin'd by that which prevails in a multitude is to make or set up a Rational Papacy For as each Member of the Roman Church is no further esteem'd Orthodox than he delivers up his private reason either to the Pope alone or as he is in juncto with a general Council which is said to have such power to determine infallibly though the interpretation make Scripture to be no Scripture So every Christian is to be esteem'd Orthodox or Haeretical according to the sense of the Council which hath power to interpret and make his reason to be no reason No such conclusion can follow and if it did it would not break the force of the arguments which confirm the former positions For suppose the Definitions of Councils as conclusions which Reason draws from the premises nor as none can be so rash as to say Reason makes the conclusion true which was so before only it could not commend it to the will and understanding as an object of natural faith till the two propositions were brought as witnesses of the truth of the conclusion or that Logick creates truth but only assists the invention in its search for it so by the same reason none may say that Councils make Articles of true Religion though they are the means of their discovery But let this objection be consider'd as it relates to Papal Decretals The name Pope will never affright the sober man out of that reverence which is due to just Authority Councils and holy Synods or if it be found to be so in a single person For if it could be prov'd as some have affirm'd that the Pope was and is the Church Virtual it would be beyond dispute that infallibility did at some time since Christian Religion was in the World sit in the Chair or at least may do when fundamental controversies arise which threaten the Churches ruine without the imputation of making Scripture to be no Scripture by his Authority It may be safely said by any Christian that he would not give assent to several Doctrines which are urg'd as matters of faith necessarily to be believ'd for the attaining Salvation did not the Church declare them to be so yet the same person on the same principle is not oblig'd to think that which is so defin'd by the Church is made true by its definition Hitherto I have us'd this comparison which makes the determinations of Councils as conclusions of a Syllogism made by the Heads of the World to illustrate the answer to an objection but it being so apposit to another design it shall be us'd to shew that the Reasoner in a Council is not capable of making a Syllogism from mere natural Topicks to demonstrate the truth of that which is debated This will appear to be true from the consideration of the Structure of a Syllogism which leads us to the knowledg of a proposition which was less known by others which are more evident and easie to be understood For the medium which is an ingredient of both propositions is as clear and as certain as a common notion and the truth of the conclusion depends on it which if mistaken makes the Syllogism a fallacy Suppose therefore the Members of a Council as so many Scholasticks arguing they have no such common notions as Philosophers have by which as media they can draw conclusions Although it must be confest that the understanding by its own evidence can judg of the truth of some propositions viz. It is impossible God can do any act which implyes a contradiction c. Yet Divine Revelation is the medium by which truth in propositions which are more obscure is determined Hence it sollows that the Sanctions and Definitions of Councils must be said to be Hypothetically pronounc'd true as this saying is viz. If the Moon is Eclipsed the Earth interposeth it self between it and the Sun Not unlike this is the way of arguing in a Council which proves Christ's humanity from his Passion for if he suffereth humane nature did interpose it self else he could not suffer Now as none will say there is and always was anecessity not in the nature of the Moon but in the manner of its motion that it must be Eclipsed at some times for to say so is to confine the Almighty's wisdom to one System and to take away the possibility of the Worlds being in such a frame in which neither Sun or Moon might be Eclipsed but when it is seen to be so it is evident that the Earths interposition is the cause of that seeming defect So a Council cannot conclude the necessity of Christs being Man but Hypothetically For the Divine decrees which reason cannot know but by Revelation are as the condition or antecedent which makes Christ's humanity necessary Let not this assertion seem strange since it is impossible but that reason must be defective as it appears from the former instance as also from this consideration that the mere Reasoner cannot conclude the necessity of Christs incarnation and will be more at a loss in other mysterious matters of faith The definitions and conclusions of Councils thus hypothetically drawn are not less certain because they are such seeing the Antecedents of their propositions are matters of fact contain'd in holy Scriptures and those who discourse have Divine assistance in discerning the connexion and inferring the consequences Now the connexion and sequel is true because of the Divine direction as is already prov'd and the Antecedent viz. matters of fact is so as it appears from the miracles which confirm'd their truth which were such as reason might discern to be Divine for Reason may be allow'd a Judg in this case though not in all doubts which come under debate in a Council The reason of which is this
posterity upon peril of his own ruine in case some cunning and political inventions be interwoven in them like some of the History which Zenophon wrote which seems more like a Romance than an impartial Relation of Cyrus his Life and Education and those who give precepts to other men sometimes have a reserve of immunity and exemption from them to themselves But holy Councils have no such equivocation which though it may seem pious deceit cannot sit safely in Sacred Assemblies neither may any Members of them as an Arian profess one and carry another Creed in his Bosome were it possible that any Member of a true Council might do this safely and without peril of his own ruine Conciliary Definitions might be rendered more suspicious but the case is otherwise in such Sacred debates the Members of Councils as well as private persons of the Church are like St. Paul and his Company in the Ship which could not be secured from the Tempest If all were not saved or at least in a capacity of being so for as the Apostle might not escape upon a Planck alone neither may the publick representatives of the universal Church promise themselves Salvation it they willingly define any such matters of faith to the people as may indanger the making Shipwrack of a good Conscience relying on their Authority For those who out of design define error as matters of faith are in equal danger if not more with those who put their Definitions in practice Hence appears the certainty of that knowledg which is the effect of faith which as much exceeds that which is purely humane as Science doth Opinion which is such a low and fickle degree of knowledg as seems suited for trifling things below Heavenly objects for God hath disposed of Religious matters in such manner as that a man may know God and be inform'd of his own duty with as great certainty if not greater than he can know the objects of natural Science For the difference which the Schools make between Faith and Science consists not only in the certainty of the one being greater than the other but in the manner of Evidence in the objects which occasions the grand cavil against faith as being an unreasonable peice of service impos'd on man and which is to give assent to that which cannot commend it self to the understanding with sufficient evidence If this is urged it may be retorted upon Science for if nothing must command assent as it is before said but what is clearly and distinctly perceiv'd Euclid's Demonstrations must be less in number and more maim'd and there will be only the name of Science of many things left in the world Besides there is no reason of complaint of want of evidence in the act of faith for it is evidence enough that the mind is inform'd that it cannot comprehend its object however it ought to give assent Let this be made more plain by a supposition Suppose a Terra incognita I do not mean that which Geographers call so for that in future ages may have a new name in the Map or some part of the world was so design'd and contriv'd by the Creator that it is impossible it should be known Or suppose there were Planetary Regions habitable but not intended to be discover'd clearly to man 't is enough in this feigned case that men are inform'd that there are such places and advis'd of the impossibility that they should be known This fiction is applicable to more serious and Religious cases and may stop the mouths of a querulous Generation of seekers who are content with a low degree of knowledg which doth not excell opinion in certainty which kind of knowledg was so little esteem'd amongst some of the Philosophers that it was plac't by them in the imagination rather than the understanding as better suiting with the condition of Brutes than men 'T is true the Schools have been more kind and curteous to Opinion and give it a place in the Vnderstanding but being there according to their account of it sits trembling and in fear it may be deceiv'd and that which it apprehends to be true may be false This consider'd will exalt faith which in a loose description may be call'd Reason Divinely assisted and directed above mere carnal Reasonings and justifie the challenge which St. Paul makes in his Christian Armour where is the Disputer of the World FINIS