perjure himself if he have not a full knowledge being transported with passion and by the violence of some habit it is no mortal sin although he doth swear without necessity without utility and by an evil custom contracted by many crimes and which is yet more considerable though he also have a will and affection addicted to sin because of this evil custom That is to say that a man may have a will carryed on to sin and sin actually without sinning and without being capable of the sin which he commits Bauny in the 6. chap. of his Summe p. 73. speaks of persons accustomed to curse creatures that are without reason as Gentlemen that curse their Dogs and Hawks when they have no good Game Carters their Horses when they put them to trouble Mariners the season and the wind when it is contrary to them And after he had reported the opinion of Navarre and some others who condemn these maledictions of venial sin he adds As for me I believe that I may say with truth that setting aside choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported in such innocent exercises it is no fault neither venial nor mortal to curse Dogs Horses Hawks or other irrational things So that there is nothing but choler according to him that causes sin in these curses he that shall utter them in cold blood and without transport or who shall make use of them onely as ornaments of language as he saith speaking of Oaths chap. 5. p. 66. or who suffers himself to go on therein by an evil custom which is become natural and makes him do it without violence without transportation and even so that he perceives it not he committeth no sin in the most strange curses and execrations But to hold to these principles of the Jesuits and others and to follow their arguments if it fall out that these same persons who are accustomed to utter these curses be also transported with choler their choler will be no sin no more then their curses especially if it come from a strong habit and that the emotion be so strong that it trouble and blind the minde Layman comprizes in a few words all that Bauny Filliutius Escobar and Sanchez have said concerning the custom of swearing and blaspheming He speaks also more precisely and more clearly then they discharging absolutely of all sin the blasphemies and perjuries which are made by an evil habit contracted by long use which he assures us of as a certain truth and which follows necessarily from the principles of his Divinity See here his terms h Ex dictis colligitur eum qui ex inveterata consuetudine velut quadam necessario impetu rem malam agit vâ—…câ— materiales blasphemias pâ—ofert vel perjuria effundit tunc non peccare nec pâ—oprie blasphemare quia nullum peccatum sine rationis deliberatione committitur Layman l. 1. tr 2. c. 3. n. 6. p. 20. It follows from that which I have said that he who from the impression of an inveterate custom as it were by a sort of impetuous necessity is transported to do evil as to speak words of blasphemy or perjury sins not at all and to speak properly blasphemes not at all because a man cannot sin at all without rational knowledge and deliberation Following his principles there are no habitual sins at all since evil custom not onely doth neither cause nor augment sin but also diminisheth it and sometimes takes it wholly away and a person who blasphemes forswears and doth every other criminal thing that can be sins not according to this maxime when it comes from an evil inveterate custom which is become natural which carryes him on to the commission of all these crimes by a kind of necessary impression almost without any sensible apprehension So the condition of this man altogether corrupt and altogether plunged in vice shall be better then of another lesse vicious and exempt from wicked habits This man by often sinning shall be put into an estate of not sinning any more and into a kind of for him happy necessity which will give him a power to commit all sorts of crimes securely freely and without being more criminal or even at all guilty But if it be true that by multitude of sins a man becomes uncapable of sinning and that multitude of sins make a man innocent this would be a powerful motive to carry men on to all sorts of vices and excesse and to set men farther from virtues whose exercise is more painful and never brings that advantage of being uncapable of sinning or to have power to commit the greatest sins without sinning CHAP. III. Of Sins of Ignorance That Ignorance excuses sins committed without knowing them and even those which are committed afterwards And that there is properly no sins of Ignorance according to the Jesuits THere is a particular connexion and as it were a natural consequence betwixt sins of evil habits and sins of Ignorance For one of the effects of an evil habit is by little and little to stifle the remorses of sin and by consequence to remove all thoughts of it and to take away the knowledge of it For this cause having before viewed what the Jesuits say of habitual sin order requires that we represent their opinion of those which are committed by ignorance Ignorance may be considered either in regard of those sins which are committed without knowledge of them or in regard of those which have been heretofore committed without thinking to do evil And it may be inquired if the first be true sins and what is to be done when we come to apprehend that the second are so As to the latter point Bauny in his Summe chap. 40. pag. 650. and 651 holds that if any one of ignorance and simplicity hath confessed his faults in grosse without determining of any one in particular it will not be needful to draw out of his mouth the repetition of those faults if it cannot be commodiously done because the Confessor is pressed so with penitents which give him not leasure He would say that on the Feast-days when the Confessors are pressed it will suffice to make a general confession without specifying any one sin in particular as the Hugenots would have it After this question he proposes another And what may we say of those who in their youth have committed muny actions of a vicious nature which notwithstanding they did not believe to be such He answers definitively that they are not obliged to confesse one word of them when they know them and understand their nature and conditions much lesse to reiterate their confessions made already Whence it follows that Saint Paul might have dispensed with himself to do penance for the sins he had committed in his youth before his conversion being he committed them through ignorance as he tells us himself Ignorans feci incredulitate I did them ignorantly in unbelief and David ought not to say a Delicta
which we see clearly and totally the object with consideration and reflection as when one is perfectly awaked For it may come to pass that even when one is awake he may think so little of that which he doth as may not be sufficient to sin mortally His opinion therefore is that the knowledge which is necessary to most obdurate sinners to make them consider and see the evil which they do must be as great and as perfect as it can be in the most virtuous persons who have not their passions nor their evil habits and that without this knowledge they cannot sin mortally that is to say he will have a man that is in darkness and at midnight to see as clear as he who is at high noon and a blind man to perceive and judge colours as well as he who hath his eyes sound and intire For passions and vices and evil habits are properly the darkness and blindness of the soul and to pretend farther as he doth that for want of a full and perfect knowledge a man given up to vice and accustomed to sin sins not mortally is as if he should say that he could not sin mortally in that estate and the more this man advances in darkness and blindness continuing this wicked life by so much he shall be farther off from sin and from power to sin untill that by the consummation of his evil custom being also the consummation of his blindness he be made intirely and absolutely without power to sin Layman quotes Sanchez and Vasquez for this opinion and he embraces it with them in his first Book tr 1. chap. 4. pag. 22. I rehearse not his words for brevity sake Amicus is of the same opinion and saith that u Advertentia ad peccatum mortale requisita debet esse plena perfecta per firmum judicium de malitia actus vel periculo illius Amicus tom 3. disp 17. sect 8. n. 172. p. 205. the knowledge and reflection which is necessary to mortal sin ought to be full and perfect with the judgement assured of the evil or of the danger of doing it Sanchez demands onely time and means for deliberation with the knowledge of the evil but Amicus will have one go on to do evil with a firm and assured judgement Escobar follows his brethren where he demands x Quidnam ad mortale peccatum requiritur Plena expressa adverventia malitiae aut saltem dubium Escobar tr 2. Exam. 1. c. 3. n. 8. p. 275. what is necessary to make a sin mortal he answers that there is requisite a full and actual knowledge or at least an express and formal suspition of the evil which is done It is not sufficient according to these new Doctors to sin mortally that the knowledge which they pretend to he necessary thereunto be full and perfect but they will also have it to be particular and determinate So that if in one action there occurre many wickednesses many sins or many circumstances which augment or multiply sin they must be known all distinctly a Ad unius generis malitiam advertere non est satis ad malitiam quoqualterius generis contrahâ—ndam sed oportet ad hanc quoque advertere aut debuisse advertere Sanchez supra num 8. pag. â— When there occurre saith Sanchez in one and the same action two sorts of different wickednesses it is not sufficient to perceive one to make himself guilty of both But we must have or be obliged to have an actual knowledge of the other Without this he holds that we are not guilty but according to the proportion of the knowledge we have as he saith expressly afterwards b Si pars malitzae cognita sit aut vincibili et ignorata ca culpae imputatur Ibid. cap. 16. num 10. pag. 70. If we know one part of the malice or if we be ignorant of it by our own fault it shall be imputed for a sin Whence he draws this conclusion which we have already reported When a man sins with a woman whom he knows to be not his wife but is invincibly ignorant that she is his kinswoman he is guilty of fornication but not of incest He stays not there For it is not sufficient for them that a man hath heretofore known an action to be wicked they hold that if he hath forgotten it or if he yet know it but doth not actually think of it and does not make reflection upon it so as to perceive at the very time when it is committed that it is evil he offends not God at all at least not grieviously Cajetan retrenches a little the licentiousness of this opinion declaring that he who by inadvertence or forgetfulness commits a sin which he knows to be a mortal sin ceases not to be guilty thereof if he be not so disposed that if he had thought of it he would not have committed it But Sanchez on the contrary assures us that this condition is not at all necessary And after he hath faithfully reported the Doctrine of Cajetan in these terms c Quinto deducitur quid sentiendum sit de doctrina Cajetanâ— jui 1. 2. q. 6. art 8. ad fiaem in Summa verb. Inconsideratio vers Adverte tamen quem â—oi sequitur Anvilla n. 1. ubi ait ineuntem contractum quem usurarium esse novit v. l opus aliquod prohibitum prohibitienis conscium sacientem ac tuac cum reco it actu excusari à mortali quod ita affectus erat ut si recoluisset vitaret utpote qui firmum cavendi mortalis propositum haberet He that hath made a contract which he knows to be usurarious or who doth some other unlawful act knowing well that it is forbidden but not remembring it to be such when he doth it is exempt from mortal sin provided he were then so disposed that if he had remembred he would have abstained from doing it because he hath a firm resolution to eschew mortal sin In the sequel of his discourse he enters into a farther explication of the opinion of this Doctor d ubi id propositum exigere videtur quò obliver illa conseatur invincibi'is excuset Sanchez oper mor. l. 1. c. 16. n 28. p. 73. It seems to him saith he that this resolution is required as absolutely necessary to render the forgetfulness innocent and to excuse the person But he meddles not with it but onely to refute it adding e At jure â—ppâ—mo id propositum nihil referre bene docer Zumel 1. 2. q. 76 art 3 d. 2. diff 6. quippe solum attendendum est an aliqua cogitatio operanti in mâ—ntem vâ—neâ—it co tempore qâ—o praeceptum implere debeat Si eâ—…m ea non veniente in mentem immemor juris vel facti praeceptum transgâ—ediatur est obliâ—io invincâ—bilu excusat Ibid. that others hold with great reason that this resolution is to no purpose and we are onely to consider
se mortaliter peccasse Ibid. num 292. Qui habet rationts probabiles quod non peccaverit mortaliter similes imo probabiliores rationes quod peccaverit non tenetur ad illud confitendum Tambur lib. 2. method confess cap 1. sect 3. num 9. Qui probabiliter imo certo scit se mortaliter deliquisse habet tamen rationes probabiles imo probabiliores se illud non esse confessum ...... nec tenetur ad illud confitendum Ibid. num 10. Asserendum non esse obligationem praedictam sed posse omnia peccata simul dicere non explicando an antea suerit illa confessus ...... Si Confessarius id interroget quando nulla est obligatio ex parte poenitentis non tenetur respondere Confessario interroganti sed dicere ego hoc peccatum confiteor quidquid sit an confessus fuerim aliud non teneor explicare Dicast tract 8. de poenit d. 9. d. 2. num 146. Qui generaliter confitetur potest sine alia explicatione admiscere nova cum antiquis etiamsi id de industria ad tegendum tempus quo peccatum commisit ne Confessarlo id innotescat faciat quia utitur jure suo Tamb. lib. 2. meth confess cap. 1. tract sect 1. num 2. Asserendum est pâ—sse omittere quaecunque velit Dicast tract 8. de poenit d. 9. d. 2. num 162. Non tenemur atque adeo possumus omittere aliqua peceata etiam mortalia sed alià s ritè manifestata est communis certa Theologorum opinio ...... Quod si poenitens dixerit se velle generaliter confiteri deinde non omnia proponat respondeo nec tunc mentiri ...... Imo etiamsi mentiretur peccaret solum venialiter Tambur lib. 2. meth confess cap. 1. sect 2. num 7. When a great sinner confesseth himself they hold that he needs not give himself the trouble to inform of all the particularities of his life and crimes and that the more he is laden with sins he is the more slightly and less exactly to be examined And behold the reason The examination must be such as may not beget a disgust of the Sacrament Whence it follows that we must exact a less perfect knowledge of him who for the multitude of his sins or some other cause can difficultly render an exact account That if he be a Thief it is sufficient for him to say I have sinned mortally in the matter of theft without expressing any farther the sum which he stole If he be a debauched and wicked person it is not needful to press him to tell the number of the dishonest thoughts and desires which he hath had though he might do it easily that it sufficeth that he say for example I loved Mary a whole month toto mense amavi Mariam That it belongs to the Confessor to supply and divine the rest and that he ought to observe this rule in other sins That if the Penitent have omitted in his Confession any sin which he believes probably to be no sin the Confessor cannot oblige him to discover it because of two probable opinions the Penitent may chuse whether he pleaseth and if the Penitent believes more than probably if he be assured that it is a sin provided he believe probably that he hath confessed it the Confessor cannot oblige him to accuse himself of it and all this is true though he believe more probably that he hath sinned mortally or that he hath not confessed it at all If this sinner signifie that he would make a general Confession he is not obliged to declare the sins he hath already confest and those which he hath committed since his last Confession and if his Confessor pretend to oblige him thereto this would be very frivolously done for he might receive his answer from the Penitent in these words I accuse my self of this sin whether I have or have not confessed it already I am not obliged to confess more unto you And this is true though he make such a medley of new and old sins with design to hide from the Confessor the time when he committed these new crimes because he hath a right to do so The Confessor is not obliged to examine him whether he have told him all and whether he have forgotten any sin because the Penitent though he have declared that he would make a Confession of all the sins of his life may omit what he pleaseth without any lye and if this be any kind of lye it is but a venial one This opinion is certain and commonly received in the Schools II. POINT Of the Advice which a Confessor ought to give his Penitent according to the Jesuits 1. 1 Quendo Confellar us nullum sperat frâ—ctum ex acâ— monitiore sed pâ—tius animi inquietudiâ— em rixas vel scandalum dâ—ssimulare debet Escobar tr 7. ex 4. n. 155. pag. 825. THey will not that he speak to him or advise him of any thing if he thinks he will not believe him 2. 2 Cum poenitens est in statu de se malo ut invslidi matrimonii siquiâ—em de veritate hujus rei dubitet poenitens illum dâ—bet Confessarius aperite quod si non profuturam spetret admonitionem vel in proprium damnum vertenâ—am potest debet reticere Escob ib. n 74 p. 8â—0 If he knows that the sinner is in an ill estate as for example that he lives in Whoredom because his Marriage is null they say he is not to speak to him of it if he thinks that it will be to no purpose 3. 3 Confesssrius evidentiam habet quod poenitens peccatum commiserit illudque non sit confessus posset judicare quod poenitens commislum peccatum tacueâ—it justa aliâ—us ex causa ac proinde tuâ—a conscientia poterit illum absolvere Amicus tom 8. disp 18. sect 13. u. 331. p. 285. Though he be assured that his Penitent hath committed a crime which he hath not at all confessed they permit him to dissemble it and to absolve him in a pious perswasion that he hath some reason wherefore he doth not confess it 4. 4 Si constet Confessori poenitentem oblivisci alicujus peccati per se loquendo teneâ—ur interrogare quod si inâ—errogatus negat regulariter tenetur illi credere quod si evidens sit poenitentem mentiri si id Confessarius seit tantum via secreta post prudentem interrogationem tenetur judicare secundum â—cta prebata in illo foro Fillius tom 1. mor. qq tr 7 cap. 12. n. 360. pag 210. Yet they accord that he may examine him upon this sin provided he do it prudently and press him not too much for fear of making him lye and if iâ— fall out that being examined he lye and deny this sin which the Confessor knows evidently they will that he forbear not to absolve him notwithstanding his sin and his lye 5. 5 Ad explorandum propositum non
statim confiteri Respondetur negative Ita Lugo num 150. est communis sententia quia Concllium solum loquitur de co qui ob urgentem necessitatem sine consessione celebrat Dicastill tract 4. de Euch. d. 9. d. 9. num 155. That it obligeth only Priests who have said Mass in some great and urgent necessity If then he say Mass being in mortal sin without necessity he shall not be obliged yea though he also did it maliciously he should not be obliged ex mera malitia And they find so little irreverence and so little evil in administring the Sacraments and offering Sacrifice in this manner that they even permit the Faithful to exact of them these Functions without any necessity although they also know that they are in an estate of sin 1 Licet cuicunque petere recipere Sacramentum Sicerdote existente in mortali etiam non Paroche nec parato allas ipsum conserre si perenti ea receprio futura sit commodior vel utillor quam si ab alio peteretur Idem tract 1. de Sacram. d. 3. d. 13. num 296. It is lawful for every one saith Dicastillus to demand and receive the Sacraments of a Priest who is in the estate of mortal sin though he be not his Parish-Priest nor be designed for it nor so much as disposed to administer them unto him if he find it more for his convenience and benefit than to demand it of others It is as casie a matter to receive the Sacraments as to administer them there is no more preparation for the one than for the other And if these Maxims were well grounded we might complain of the rigour and severity of the Jesuits seeing the Sacraments are not yet so frequented as they ought to be since in what estate soever we receive or give them there is so much to gain and nothing to lose THE SECOND PART OF THE SECOND BOOK Of the Outward Remedies of SIN That the Divinity of the Jesuits abolishes or corrupts them THE Physitian labours for his Patient when he prescribes what he ought to do as well as when he presents unto him what he ought to take for his Cure Whence it comes that they say commonly that he hath given him a good Remedy when he hath given him good advice how to remove the Disease whereof he is sick So that not only the things which he prescribes but the prescriptions themselves are remedies but with this difference that what he prescribes as Purges and Medicines are the inward remedies because they act upon the disease it self and have an internal vertue proper to destroy it when they are taken effectually but the prescriptions are as it were external remedies because they act not immediately upon the disease but only upon the mind of the discased by the knowledge they give him of his disease and of what he ought to do for his cure We must say the same thing holding the Rules of Proportion of our Souls diseases and remedies We have already observed that Grace Penance good Works and the Sacraments are the internal remedies of sin because they have a divine and internal vertue which the Spirit of God hath impressed upon them to expel sin from the Soul or to prevent its entrance thereinto And we say here that the holy Scripture the Commandments of God and those of the Church are the external remedies of the same sin because though they act not immediately upon sin they act upon the mind of the sinner and if they change not his will internally they touch his mind and conscience externally by the knowledge they give him of sin and by the fear which they impress upon him of the punishments with which God hath threatned those who commit them We have seen in the former Part of this second Book that the Jesuits destroy the internal remedies of sin we shall see here in this how they abolish or corrupt the external and so it will appear that they favour and cherish sin as much as they can This second Part shall have three Chapters The first shall be of the Corruption of Scripture The second of the Commandments of God And the third of the Commandments of the Church CHAPTER I. Of the Corruption of Scripture That the Jesuits corrupt the Scriptures divers ways THere are only three things to be considered in the holy Scripture the Letter the Sense and the Authority And accordingly we may distinguish three different manners of corrupting holy Scripture 1. In the Letter by adding taking away or changing something in the sacred Text. 2. In the Sense by false Expositions 3. In the Authority by debasing the Author and diminishing the belief that is due unto him Now let us see in what manner the Jesuits have corrupted and yet do every day corrupt the holy Scripture We might compose great Volumes of Passages which they have altered by false Interpretations yea may be of all places wherein Canonical Writers and Jesus Christ himself have spoken with any vehemence and vigour concerning the Holiness of our Mysteries the Duties of a Christian and the narrow way to Salvation we should be troubled to find one whereunto they have not given some blow haling them from their natural sense by Expositions false and contrary to the general Consent of the Fathers and Tradition of the Church that they might accommodate them to the relish and lusts of worldly men I will relate only some few to serve for Example S. Paul saith writing to the Corinthians 1 Si habutro omnem fidem Ita ut montes transferam charitatem autem non habuero nihil sum Et si distribuero in cibos pauperum omnes facultates meas si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardesm charitatem autem non habuero nihil mihi prodest 1 Cor. cap. 15. Though I had faith to remove mountains and had not charity I were nothing And though I should distribute all my goods to the relief of the poor and though I should give my body to be burnt if I had not charity it would avail me nothing But Father Celot being resolved to maintain the contrary saying that we may suffer Martyrdom profitably and do those other works whereof the Apostle speaks like a Christian without any motion from Charity to defend himself from this passage so strong and so manifest he corrupts and subverts it in this manner He saith that this must be extended to the habit and not to the act and motion of Charity meaning that the actions of which S. Paul speaks may be meritorious holy and perfect though they be done without love to God and though we never think of him provided we be in an estate of Grace So that he maintains that a man who is in the estate of Grace cannot act otherwise than by this Charity whereof the Apostle speaks See his words 2 Eo loco habitum charitatis postulari ab Apostolo aio ego 3
according to the Jesuits and that custom of sinning may make a man uncapable of sinning AS in doing evil we accustom our selves thereunto and in following lusts we cause them to pass into habits which strengthen and increase more the inclination we had unto evil the order of reason requires in the design we have to consider the springs and the principles of sin to make appear how the Jesuits nourish them that after we have treated of Lust we speak also of evil habits I propose for example of habitual sins swearing and blasphemy because these sins of themselves produce neither pleasure nor profit its onely passion which carries men to them and evil custom which nourisheth them So that to speak properly and according to their peculiar nature they are sins of passion and habit Bauny in his summe chap. 4. pag. 60. speaking of a person accustomed to swear who for this reason is always in danger to be forsworn gives this counsel to their Confessours The Confessor to hinder this evil ought to draw from his penitent an act of dislike or to speak better of disavowing this cursed custom For by this means the oaths which follow proceeding from such an habit shall be esteemed involuntary in their cause Suarez l. 3. of Oaths chap. 6 Sanchez in his Summe l. 3. c. 5. n. 11. and by consequence without sin This practice is very easie and very convenient if it be so that one word of disowning sins which a Confessor can draw out of the mouth of a sinner may serve all at once to be a remedy for all the sins which he hath committed and for the justification of all the sins he shall be able to commit for the future by the violence of an evil habit so the simple declaration which a man shall make of his being sorry to see himself subject to such a vice sufficeth to excuse him from all the sins which he shall afterwards commit by that habit which he hath of this vice as the debauches and excesses of the mouth immodest speeches lyes deceits thefts and other such like And so almost all vices of this sort shall be innocent there being few persons that are not sorry for being engaged in them and being unable to avoid them because of their long accustoming themselves unto them or who at least do not or will not sometimes disallow them and testifie some displeasure against them in some good interval And yet if this good Father had been well read in Sanchez whom he cites I am confident he would have been render'd yet more easie and complacent in this point For Sanchez acknowledges no particular sin in Oaths that proceed of an habit though no disavowing them be made to excuse them as Bauny requires See how he speaks herein p Posterior sententia cui tanquam probabiliori accedo ait juramenta prolata sine advertentia formali per se sufficienti ad peccatum mortal non esse in se novum ac proprium ac speciale peccat um propter solam jurandi consuetudinem qualiscumque fit nedum sit retracta Sanchez op mor. part 1. l. 3. c. 5. n. 28. p. 21. The last opinion which I follow as the most probable holds that those Oaths which are made without actual application which of it self were sufficient to a mortal sin are not of themselves new sins properly and particularly onely because of the custom of swearing how great soever it be and though no renunciation or retractation be made of it Escobar is not far off from this opinion where speaking of blasphemy he demands q Num aliquando venialis blasphemia Consuetudo quidem absque advertentia lethale peccatum non facit Escobar tract 1. exam 3. cap. 6. num 28. pag 73. If blasphemy be sometimes a venial sins And he answers absolutely according to his use That such a custom whereof one thinks not at all makes sin not to be mortal But for the most part hinders it from being mortal as it would he if he did swear without being accustomed Filliutius speaks the same more at large and more clearly a Octavo quaero de consuetudine blasphemandi ordine ad malitiam Respendeo dico 1. si desit advertentia plena ca toriatur blasphemia etiamsi adsit consuetudo blasphemandi non commitâ—itur peccatum mortale Filliutius 〈◊〉 qq tom 2 tract 25. cap. 1. num 27. pag 173. It is demanded what sin it is to blaspheme customarily I answer in the first place that when a man blaspames without having full knowledge thereof how much soever he be accustomed thereto he sins not mortally He taken the reason of this conclusion out of a general principle which he presupposeth as assured b Ratio est quia ut diximus de voluntario libero ad â—…ccatum mortale requiritur advertentia plenâ— undecunque oriatur defectus illius excusat a peceato Ibid. The reason is saith he because as we have said handling free and voluntary actions to six mortally it behoves to have a full knowledge for want of which on what account soever it comes sin is thereby bindered He demands in the same place c An jurandi consuâ—tudo constituat hominem in statu peccati If the custom of swearing put a man in the estate of sin First of all he reports the opinion of those who hold the affirmative afterwards he speaks his own in these terms d Dico 2. consuâ—tudinem jurandi sine necessitate vel utilitate sed cum veritate sufficiente advertentia non esse peccatum grave ex se nec constituere hominem in statu peccati mortalis Ibid. cap. 10. n. 313. I say in the second place that the custom of swearing without necessity and without utility but with verity and without sufficient knowledge and reflection is not of it self a great sin and puts not a man into a state of mortal sin He demands again on the same subject e Sitne perjurium cum in advertentia naturali peccatum mortale ob consuetudinem perjurandi Ibid. n. 316. If perjury which one commits through natural inadvertence be a mortal sin because of the custom he hath to forswear And rejecting the opinion of those who believed it to be a mortal sin he answers f Dico 2. Probabilius est non esse peccatum mortale speciale quando est sine advertentia naturali Ibid. I say in the second place that it is more probable that there is no mortal sin particularly when one forsweareth himself without perceiving it at all and by a natural inadvertence And a little after he adds g Etiamsi operans sit cum habituali affectu ad peccatum Ibid. Though he who doth it hath his will effectually addicted to sin by an evil habit So that according to the judgement of this Divine although he swear with full knowledge provided that it be not against truth although he swear against the truth and
if when we were obliged to observe the commandment we had any thought thereof For if we had none at all and that without considering either the right or fact we violate the commandment by neglect this forgetfulness is innocent and free from all sin Corduba approves this opinion no more then Cajetan and would that at least he who acts in so evil a disposition come not voluntarily thereinto and that the forgetfulness or inadvertency which hinders him from thinking of the evil which he doth comes not by his own fault But Sanchez finds this also to be too much and he can no more approve of this than that of Cajetan f Nec admittenda est sententia Cordubae in q. l. 2. q. 17. dub 1. dicentis oblivionem reduci ad ignorantiam invincibilâ—m quando oblivio non contingit ex culpa Hoc enim ita universaliter dictum non est sed quando quis initio causam oblivioni dedit cum periculi adveâ—tentia Si enim periculum non ad errit oblivio est inculpabilis Ibid. num 30. There is no more need saith he to receive the opinion of Corduba who faith that when forgetfulness comes not by our fault it ought to be esteemed as one sort of innocent Ignorance but not when it proceeds of our fault For this is not universally true but onely when we have done some thing which hath caused this forgetfulness forseeing well the danger whereunto we cast our selves For if we thought not of this danger the ignorance can not be faulty He repeats a little after the same thing and he makes a decree as it were without appeal and a principle unremovable g Quare stat ut causa ignorantiae fuerit aliquod peccatum tamen in se ignorantia sit invincibilis Ibid. n. 31. It remains certain saith he that although ignorance comes of some fin as of its cause it ceases not therefore to be excusable To which he adds also for better explication h Tunc quamvis causa culpabilis sit ignorantia tamen erit inculpabilis Ibid. And in this case though the cause of ignorance be culpable yet the ignorance is not And for maintenance of this principle he undertakes to refute Saint Thomas under pretence of explicating that which he saith i Euentum posse esse â—oluatarium in sua causa Ibid. An event may be voluntary in its cause He expounds and at once overturns this rule of right k Ubi hab tur igno antiam facti non juris excusare Ibid. That ignorance of fact excuses but not of right As also the Doctors who teach as he confesseth l Ignorantiam legum ad statum officium alicujus pertinentem esse vincibilem nec excusare Ibid. That ignorance of that which every one is obliged to do according to the rules and Laws of his condition and calling is bleamable and excuseth not at all And generally he rejects it in the point of Law and Right and he takes to him as on his side the Doctors which expound them in their true sence but not in his m Ex his deducitur 1. esse sano modo intelligenda jura Doctores dum aequiparant scire debere scire passim dicunt esse indirecte voluntariam ignorantiam cum qua vel scivit advertitve aut debebat scire advertere Ibid. n. 24 It follows saith he that we must understand with discretion what the Doctors and Laws say that to know and to be obliged to know are one and the same thing and when they commonly affirm that when we know or consider or ought to know or consider ignorance and inadvertency are indirectly voluntary He witnesseth sufficiently that Saint Thomas with the more part of the School Divines are not for him in saying that Saint Thomas is received by all Thomas ad omnibus receptus n. 25. and that the Laws themselves and those that expound them are contrary unto him And he thinks himself discharged herein by saying that they are to be wisely understood Esse sano modo intelligenda jura Doctores But if we demand of him also why he takes the liberty to reject so great and so strong authorities He can onely repeat that which he hath said already so many times n Haec intelligenda sunt quando adfuit al qua actualis plena sufficiens ad mortale advertentia ad malitiam objecti ejusve periculum seu dubium aut scrupulus saltem Ibid. num 24. That all this must be understood where we have an actual knowledge full and sufficient to sin mortally of the evil we are about to do or of the danger to which it exposeth us or that at least we have had thereof some scruple or some doubt Tambourin hath also expounded all this Doctrine sufficiently at large according to the principle of Sanchez establishing two general rules in favour of ignorance The first is o Si quis ex ignorantia inculpabili putet aliquid esse veniale quod aliunde mortale est venialiter tantùm peccabit Ita S. Thomas p. 2. q. 76. 3. Idem erit si ignorantia sit culpabilis tantùn venialiâ—er Tambur l. 1. Decal c. 1. sect 3. n. 35. if any one think by ignorance which is not criminal that a mortal sin is but venial he sins onely venially this is Saint Thomas's opinion We must say the same if ignorance be but a venial sin I say nothing of the rule which he proposes in favour of ignorance to observe the abuse he doth to the authority of Saint Thomas I see no way to excuse his visible visible falfity unless by his ignorance being he cites this Angel of the School in making him say that which he saith not and whereunto he speaketh the contrary in his quodlibetary questions where he saith clearly p In his vero quae pertinent ad fidâ—m bones mores nullum excusabiâ—e si sequatur erroneam opinionem alitujus Magistri In talibus enim ignorantia non excusat S. Thomas quod lib. 3. art 10. that in what concerns faith and good manners no man is excused if he follow an erronous opinion of some Doctor Because in these things ignorance excuseth not The other rule which he proposeth is no less favourable to ignorance and sin then the former For he saith that if a Silegem scias sed non poenam adhuc probabile est à te non incurri poenam Ita Suarez Sanchez Coninck apud Castrop Tambor Decal Tambur Decal l. 1. c. 2. sect 10 n. 12 you have knowledge of the Law and that you are ignorant of the penalty which it ordains against those who violate it it is probable you do not incurr the penalty He underprops his principle by the authority of three the most famous Divines of their Society Suarez Sanchez and Coninck b Ratio est quia ad has incurrendas requiâ—…tur delinquentem consenlisse saltem tacite in
it is not only lawfull to accept but also to offer them And one of the Casuists of the Society who taught publickly at Caen of late years after he had endeavoured to justifie this brutal madness by many reasons which we shall represent in their place concludes in this manner e Qui haec responsa non probaâ—t ignari sunt communis consuctudinis vitae Licet enim homini hac ratione honorem suum tutari These who approve not these answers know not the manner of living and the ordinary custom of those who are in the world For it is lawfull for a man to maintain his Honour by this way There is no custom more wicked nor more general amongst people of base condition than to swear blaspheme and to break out into curses and imprecations against cattel men and every thing that gives them trouble Bauny considering this cursed custom saith according to his ordinary lenity Bauny Sum. c. 6. p. 73. For my part I believe that it may be said with truth that it is their choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported it is no fault neither mortal nor venial to curse Dogs Hawks and other such things as are without reason The abuse which Merchants ought most to fear and avoid in their Traffick and which yet is very common at this day is falshood and deceit whether it be in falsifying and altering Merchandizes or in selling them dearer than they are worth or selling them by false weights and false measures But Layman following this custom saith f Mercatores statim injustitiae damnari non possunt si merci substantiam alienam puta tricico secale vino aquam picem cerae admisceant modo inde emptoribus nullum damnum inferatur merces proportione pretii quo venditur satis idonea sit ad consuetum usum Layman l. 3. tr 4. c. 17. n. 15. That we must not alwayes condemn the injustice of the Merchants when they mingle in their Merchandizes things of different kinds as Rye amongst Wheat Water with Wine and Pitch amongst Wax provided that this do not damnifie them that buy it and that the Merchandize be good enough of the price it costs and proper enough for common usage And he confirms his opinion by that of Lessius and Lopez saying g Addit Lessius n. 83. cum Lopez loco citato si additio materiae secundum se deterioris eò artificio industria fiat ut merces non sit minus bona idonea ad usum quam sine tali admixtione posse tunc consueto pretio divendi luerum majus repoâ—tari quippe quod industriae esse censetur sine damno emptorum percipitur Ibid. that Lessius and Lopez assure us that if the mixture of the matter which of it self is of less value be done with such artifice and industry that the Merchandize is not less good nor proper for mans use than it would be without this mixture it may be sold at the ordinary price and take more than it is worth because this gain belongs to the address and industry of the Merchant and is no wrong to those that buy it The ordinary vice of women and principally of those of Quality is luxury and vanity They cannot have a fairer pretence for to nourish nor a better excuse to justifie themselves in the excess they commit therein and the scandals which fall out thereupon than to say that it is the custom and that they do nothing but what is commonly done in the World by women of their condition Bauny approves this reason and makes use of it in his Summe ch 46. p. 717 718. where he proposes this question If maids and women who exceed modesty and duty and as we may say necessity of decency in their habits because they seek out therein curiosities not suitable to their estates may be thought capable of absolution when they know that some take thence occasion of sinning He acknowledgeth that many condemn this insupportable vanity and maintain that maids and women who are so disposed and will so continue are uncapable of absolution but he declares against their judgement and concludes in these terms Nevertheless we must say 1. that the woman who trims and adorns her self to please her Husband ought not to be blamed though she doth it as he saith through vanity and curiosity and against modesty knowing well that some draw from thence occasion of sin He saith moreover that neither is she more to be blamed if she trim her self in this sort with scandal when she doth it to satisfie the custom of the Countrey and not to be singular unlike and inferiour to those of their own sex He would then that the pretence of pleasing her Husband and a disorderly and shamefull custom should give liberty to a woman to break out into all sorts of luxury and vanity without being blameable and that custom hath power to change the nature of things to cause that it shall be lawfull to transgress the bounds of modesty that vanity shall be no longer vanity that luxury shall not be longer luxury and that scandal shall be no longer scandal He continues speaking in this manner 2. I say though this said woman had knowledge of the bad effects which her diligence in trimming her self would cause in the body and soul of those who behold her adorned with rich and precious clothes nevertheless she sins not in making use thereof The reason is Because to prevent the offence of another this woman is not bound to deprive her self of what the Law of the Countrey and nature it self permits That is to say that as custom makes luxury and vanity lawfull for her so it makes scandal also lawfull for her and that the abuses which happens very frequently in this point by the corruption of the World are just and true Laws and proper to regulate all things in a Country I might speak here of Usury and Symony which are two vices so common at this day that the Jesuits cover them much easier than others because that custom hath made them publick But I referr these disorders to be represented in the places proper for these matters that I may avoid repetitions CHAP. III. Of the Occasions of Sin That the Jesuits retain men in them and that according to their maxims there can be no next occasions of Sin ONE of the most important and most necessary counsels which can be given to a person who would avoid sin is that he fly the occasions and if we observe it we shall find that the most ordinary cause why the most part of those who have some good desire and care for their salvation attain not to a true and solid conversion or fall back after a while is because they have not received this advice or have not been faithfull in the observation of it This is such that the Jesuits acknowledge well indeed the importance and necessity
outwardly but were invincibly ignorant that it were a sin to commit it inwardly and in his mind were excused from sin committing it onely inwardly And that he might make himself to be the better understood in a matter so important he illustrates this question by example l Ut si rusticus à viro existimate pio audivisset somicationem furtum externa esse peccata at licere formcandi furandi desiderium Ibid. As if a pesant should hear it spoken by a man reputed to be a pious and knowing man that it was a sin to steal and commit fornication outwardly but it was lawful to desire the one and the other He acknowledgeth m Qui busdam neotericis doctis videtur hanc ignorantiam non excusare that some learned Doctors amongst the moderns believe not that this ignorance doth excuse at all He reports their reasons very considerable ones to the number of five But he concludeth for ignorance in these terms n At quamvis hoc probabile sit probabilius tamen credo illum actum internum excusari omnino à malitia ratione illius ignorantiae invincibilis Ibid. Though this be probable I believe nevertheless that it is yet more probable that this interiour action is exempt from all sin because of invincible ignorance And a little after following the principles which he hath established to maintain ignorance and the sins which are committed by ignorance he saith o Secundo deducitur scientem aliquam actionem esse mortalem at invircibiliter ignorantem peccare imperando illam excusari à culpa imperando Ibid. n. 19. It follows that he who knoweth that it is mortal sin to commit an action but knows not that it is a sin to command an other to commit it through invincible ignorance is excused from sin in doing it Filliutius as we have seen in the former Chapter saith that a man who hath an evil custom of sinning for example of swearing and forswearing himself and who is continually in an habitual affection and disposition to commit this sin upon occasions presented to him cum habituali affectu ad peccatum doth not sin neverthelesse in any manner when he forswears himself without thinking of it not troubling himself if this want of knowledge or advertency comes from an evil custom which this person hath contracted or some violent passion which transporteth him Nec refert saith he quod inadvertentia oriatur ex prava consuetudine aut passione And makes use of all these considerations and circumstances however of themselves evil rather to excuse their sin then to condemn it p Quiatum passio quam consuetudo tollit actulem usum rationis Ibid. Because passion as well as evil custom takes away the use of reason After he had resolved on this manner this case so well circumstanced he propounds another about this evil habite and disposition and he demands q Au sit peccatum quando videt consummatam esse consuetudinem advertit gravitatem periculum ejus Filliutius mor. qq tom 2. tr 35. c. 16. n. 318. p. 203. if it be a sin when he sees this evil custom as it were consummate and perceives how dangerous and wicked it is and notwithstanding all this he gives way toit and forswears himself This case proposed in this manner is very clear and the evil too evident to be excused openly Which is the reason that he leaves the question for the present indecided and propounds it onely as problematique and containing some difficulty and doubt on either side Dubium esse potest saith he But in the issue returning to his principles and rights of ignorance which he undertakes to defend he adds Sed etiamsi tunc dicatur esse peccatum non tamen postea quando quis non advertat de novo peccat But although it may then be called a sin yet doth he not sin afterwards afresh when he doth not any longer observe it That is to say that though this man possibly may sin for he doth not affirm he doth when he is forsworn and actually remembers and sees the evil estate and evident danger whereunto this evil custom doth bring him yet when he hath this thought no more for that this evil custom and passion hath taken it away he sins no more whatsoever crime he may commit in this darkness though he have reduced himself to this miserable estate voluntarily and that the blindnesse which him from seeing what he hath done comes from the corruption which evil custom and passion have produced in his minde Nec refert quod inadvertentia oriatur ex prava consuetudine aut ex passione So that it is not for nothing that this Jesuit would not speak clearly at first r An sit peccatum quando quis videt consummatam esse con suctudinem advertit gravitatem periculum ejus whether a man sins when he sees that the evil custom which he hath is consummate and he perceives the evil estate and danger whereunto it exposes him and it is with some reason that he leaves the thing doubtful dubium esse potest Because according to his principles and those of his Fraternity to sin at least mortally it is not enough to see the evil that is done and the danger incurred in doing it but he ought to have a full and perfect knowledge â—…d besides this both time and means to deliberate on it This is according as Sanchez speaks in this matter Å¿ Advertentia actualis necessaria est ut ignorantia censeatur vincibilis nec excuset Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 21. p. 72. Nec sufficit ad mortale quaevis consideratio deliberatio malitiae objecti sed debet esse plena Ibid. n. 22. It behooves saith he to consider actually that which is done actually for to judge whether the ignorance be faulty and exempt not a man from sin And a little after This is not enough to commit mortal sin to consider and to will with deliberation the evil that is done but this consideration and deliberation must be full It is not sufficient with him to have a cognisance of the evil but he wills also that time be had to deliberate whether to do it or not and he is not contended even with this but he pretends that this knowledge and this deliberation ought to be full in such sort that there be no darkness nor clouds For if you ask him what he intends by full deliberation and knowledge he makes use for explication of an example of a man who is perfectly awaked in his right understanding and in this estate thinks seriously of a thing t Illa est quando hanc plene advertit instar perfecte à somno excitatorum Quippe potest in vigilia adeo tenuis consideratio accidere ut non sufficiat ad mortale Sanch. l. 1. op mor. c. 1. n. 10. p. 2. This full knowledge saith he is that by