perjure himself if he have not a full knowledge being transported with passion and by the violence of some habit it is no mortal sin although he doth swear without necessity without utility and by an evil custom contracted by many crimes and which is yet more considerable though he also have a will and affection addicted to sin because of this evil custom That is to say that a man may have a will carryed on to sin and sin actually without sinning and without being capable of the sin which he commits Bauny in the 6. chap. of his Summe p. 73. speaks of persons accustomed to curse creatures that are without reason as Gentlemen that curse their Dogs and Hawks when they have no good Game Carters their Horses when they put them to trouble Mariners the season and the wind when it is contrary to them And after he had reported the opinion of Navarre and some others who condemn these maledictions of venial sin he adds As for me I believe that I may say with truth that setting aside choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported in such innocent exercises it is no fault neither venial nor mortal to curse Dogs Horses Hawks or other irrational things So that there is nothing but choler according to him that causes sin in these curses he that shall utter them in cold blood and without transport or who shall make use of them onely as ornaments of language as he saith speaking of Oaths chap. 5. p. 66. or who suffers himself to go on therein by an evil custom which is become natural and makes him do it without violence without transportation and even so that he perceives it not he committeth no sin in the most strange curses and execrations But to hold to these principles of the Jesuits and others and to follow their arguments if it fall out that these same persons who are accustomed to utter these curses be also transported with choler their choler will be no sin no more then their curses especially if it come from a strong habit and that the emotion be so strong that it trouble and blind the minde Layman comprizes in a few words all that Bauny Filliutius Escobar and Sanchez have said concerning the custom of swearing and blaspheming He speaks also more precisely and more clearly then they discharging absolutely of all sin the blasphemies and perjuries which are made by an evil habit contracted by long use which he assures us of as a certain truth and which follows necessarily from the principles of his Divinity See here his terms h Ex dictis colligitur eum qui ex inveterata consuetudine velut quadam necessario impetu rem malam agit vâ—…câ— materiales blasphemias pâ—ofert vel perjuria effundit tunc non peccare nec pâ—oprie blasphemare quia nullum peccatum sine rationis deliberatione committitur Layman l. 1. tr 2. c. 3. n. 6. p. 20. It follows from that which I have said that he who from the impression of an inveterate custom as it were by a sort of impetuous necessity is transported to do evil as to speak words of blasphemy or perjury sins not at all and to speak properly blasphemes not at all because a man cannot sin at all without rational knowledge and deliberation Following his principles there are no habitual sins at all since evil custom not onely doth neither cause nor augment sin but also diminisheth it and sometimes takes it wholly away and a person who blasphemes forswears and doth every other criminal thing that can be sins not according to this maxime when it comes from an evil inveterate custom which is become natural which carryes him on to the commission of all these crimes by a kind of necessary impression almost without any sensible apprehension So the condition of this man altogether corrupt and altogether plunged in vice shall be better then of another lesse vicious and exempt from wicked habits This man by often sinning shall be put into an estate of not sinning any more and into a kind of for him happy necessity which will give him a power to commit all sorts of crimes securely freely and without being more criminal or even at all guilty But if it be true that by multitude of sins a man becomes uncapable of sinning and that multitude of sins make a man innocent this would be a powerful motive to carry men on to all sorts of vices and excesse and to set men farther from virtues whose exercise is more painful and never brings that advantage of being uncapable of sinning or to have power to commit the greatest sins without sinning CHAP. III. Of Sins of Ignorance That Ignorance excuses sins committed without knowing them and even those which are committed afterwards And that there is properly no sins of Ignorance according to the Jesuits THere is a particular connexion and as it were a natural consequence betwixt sins of evil habits and sins of Ignorance For one of the effects of an evil habit is by little and little to stifle the remorses of sin and by consequence to remove all thoughts of it and to take away the knowledge of it For this cause having before viewed what the Jesuits say of habitual sin order requires that we represent their opinion of those which are committed by ignorance Ignorance may be considered either in regard of those sins which are committed without knowledge of them or in regard of those which have been heretofore committed without thinking to do evil And it may be inquired if the first be true sins and what is to be done when we come to apprehend that the second are so As to the latter point Bauny in his Summe chap. 40. pag. 650. and 651 holds that if any one of ignorance and simplicity hath confessed his faults in grosse without determining of any one in particular it will not be needful to draw out of his mouth the repetition of those faults if it cannot be commodiously done because the Confessor is pressed so with penitents which give him not leasure He would say that on the Feast-days when the Confessors are pressed it will suffice to make a general confession without specifying any one sin in particular as the Hugenots would have it After this question he proposes another And what may we say of those who in their youth have committed muny actions of a vicious nature which notwithstanding they did not believe to be such He answers definitively that they are not obliged to confesse one word of them when they know them and understand their nature and conditions much lesse to reiterate their confessions made already Whence it follows that Saint Paul might have dispensed with himself to do penance for the sins he had committed in his youth before his conversion being he committed them through ignorance as he tells us himself Ignorans feci incredulitate I did them ignorantly in unbelief and David ought not to say a Delicta
persons if they be not provoked in such manner that they are commonly accidental actions in respect of drunkards and they are not at all obliged to use precaution to avoid them because they are to be attributed to them who provoke them and not to the drunkards themselves to whom they happen by misfortune Sanchez indeed endeavours to use some moderation in this or rather put a mask upon these words after he had said this is the opinion of Vasquez but it is his own opinion also as it appears by this his second advertisement b Posterius est plurima ebriorum dicta vel facta de se iniqan non reputari culpabilia etiamsi praevideantur quia vel nallum damaum affecunt atque in ebrietate commissa destituuntur prorsus rat one malitiae quam habent in mente sana facta ut verba vel facta contumeliosa Ibid. n. 44. The second thing to be herein observed saith he is that the drunkards say and do many things which are not to be imputed unto them for sins though they have foreseen them for either they indeed hurt no body for being done without knowledge they are without all malice which had been in them if they had been done with the use of reason such as are outragious words or actions He contents not himself to justisie these crimes by two reasons which he gives in so few words to wit that they hurt no body c Quia vel nullum damnum inferunt atque in ebrieiate commissa destituutur nomni prorsus ratione malitiae and that they commit them without reason and liberty He adds also a third reason which is that d Quippe tempore ebrietatis talia in communi aestimatione hominum non reputantur contumeliosa sed tanquam facetiae admittuntur atque it a ipsimet adversus quos dicuntur vel fiunt tantum abest ut loco contumeliae ea accipiant ad iramque excitentur ut potius oblectentur rideant Ibid. n. 44. this excess which befals a man when he is drunk does not commonly passe in the opinion of men for injurie but rather for the most part for drollerie So that they themselves whom they fall upon instead of being offended with them onely laugh and make sport at them As if the rule of sin were the opinion of Men and not the Law of God There are many Fathers and Mothers who do but laugh at the debauches of their Children and there are many crimes in which God is no less offended though men be not offended at all but esteem them as honorable actions He adds also in favour of these excesses which drunkards commit as are blasphemies treacheries perjuries e Vel quia postulant scientes fieri uti imputentur ut sunt blaspbemiae infidelitas perjuria Ibid. That to make them imputed as sin it is necessary that they be done on purpose and with knowledge pretending that the sins which respect God directly cannot be committed but by a design formed on purpose and with full knowledge but f Quae vero damnum proximo inferunt imputantur si praevideantur Ibid. when we have to do with mens interest and things which hurt them he holds that it is sufficient to foresee them to make them culpable in what sort soever they commit them g Qâ—irnon minus laedunt in ebrietate quam sanae mentis tempore commissa Ibid. because saith he it is no less prejudice being committed by a man that 's drunk then if he had done it with judgement So that according to this Doctor it is not so easie to offend God as Man and there is less evil in sins against God then Men against the Creator then those that are against his creatures so that a little temporal interest of a man appears unto him more considerable than the honor of God and the loss of a little Wealth of more importance than blasphemie it self He also rehearses under the name of Vasques an opinion which justifies all the blasphemies of drunkards saying that he would not absolutely maintain it but he onely dissents from it in words and not in reality But it follows manifestly from his principles and he has indeed propounded and expounded them with clearness enough in many places of his writings and Escobar maintains them openly h Ebrieâ—…s excusat ab omni peccato in his quae insana mente fiunt injuriosa ac proinde quae sana quidem mente peccata essent Item blasphemia infidelitas perjurium in ebrio c. Escobar tract 2. Exam. 1. c. 12. n. 56. pag. 285. Drunkenness saith he excuses from all sin the actions which are done without judgement although they hurt others and by consequence they had been sins if they had been done with knowledge as also blasphemy treachery and perjurie which are committed by a man that is drunk See here an abolition or rather a justification of all sins in general which a drunken man can do while he is drunk THE SUMME Of the foregoing ARTICLE IT will be hard to alleadge any thing in the favour of drunkards and drunkenness which the Jesuits have not said for their defence For a Usque ad satictatem sine necessitate ob solam voluptatem Escobar tr 2. Exam. 3. n. 102. p. 304. to eat and drink as much as one will unto satietie as speaks Escobar without necessity and for pleasure onely they do not acknowledge for any ill b Etiamsi absque utilitate se quis cibo poto usque ad vomitum ingurgitet Ibid. n. 56. p. 298. Immoderato potu quis non quidem inebriatur sed aut dolore capitis laborat aue capite tentate à vino non sibi omnino constat venialem intemperantiam dixero quia absolute usum rat onis non tollit Ibid. n. 62. p. 299. Those who eat and drink more then they can bear so that they are constraind to vomit or that they are thereby damnified so that their head akes or they are reduced to the state wherein they know not what they do or say according to them commit but a small fault and easie to be pardoned c Licet se vel alium pro salute corporis temperanda inebriare Probabiliter quis licere opinabitur Ibid. n. 63. Etiamsi eventue soleant esse frequentes ei qui inebriatur si tamen tempore quo inebriari voluit non habuit prorsus ullam dubitationem aut cogitationem de illis nec in specie nec in genere minime imputari culpae dicendum est Sanchez op mor. l. 1. c. 1.16 n. 42. p. 75. If it be needful for a man to be quite drunk to recover his health or to be better in health they hold that it may be done without sin and that even when one is drunk for pleasure and with a formal design he is not responsible for the excesses and disorders which he may commit being drunk if he did not foresee them before he
outwardly but were invincibly ignorant that it were a sin to commit it inwardly and in his mind were excused from sin committing it onely inwardly And that he might make himself to be the better understood in a matter so important he illustrates this question by example l Ut si rusticus à viro existimate pio audivisset somicationem furtum externa esse peccata at licere formcandi furandi desiderium Ibid. As if a pesant should hear it spoken by a man reputed to be a pious and knowing man that it was a sin to steal and commit fornication outwardly but it was lawful to desire the one and the other He acknowledgeth m Qui busdam neotericis doctis videtur hanc ignorantiam non excusare that some learned Doctors amongst the moderns believe not that this ignorance doth excuse at all He reports their reasons very considerable ones to the number of five But he concludeth for ignorance in these terms n At quamvis hoc probabile sit probabilius tamen credo illum actum internum excusari omnino à malitia ratione illius ignorantiae invincibilis Ibid. Though this be probable I believe nevertheless that it is yet more probable that this interiour action is exempt from all sin because of invincible ignorance And a little after following the principles which he hath established to maintain ignorance and the sins which are committed by ignorance he saith o Secundo deducitur scientem aliquam actionem esse mortalem at invircibiliter ignorantem peccare imperando illam excusari à culpa imperando Ibid. n. 19. It follows that he who knoweth that it is mortal sin to commit an action but knows not that it is a sin to command an other to commit it through invincible ignorance is excused from sin in doing it Filliutius as we have seen in the former Chapter saith that a man who hath an evil custom of sinning for example of swearing and forswearing himself and who is continually in an habitual affection and disposition to commit this sin upon occasions presented to him cum habituali affectu ad peccatum doth not sin neverthelesse in any manner when he forswears himself without thinking of it not troubling himself if this want of knowledge or advertency comes from an evil custom which this person hath contracted or some violent passion which transporteth him Nec refert saith he quod inadvertentia oriatur ex prava consuetudine aut passione And makes use of all these considerations and circumstances however of themselves evil rather to excuse their sin then to condemn it p Quiatum passio quam consuetudo tollit actulem usum rationis Ibid. Because passion as well as evil custom takes away the use of reason After he had resolved on this manner this case so well circumstanced he propounds another about this evil habite and disposition and he demands q Au sit peccatum quando videt consummatam esse consuetudinem advertit gravitatem periculum ejus Filliutius mor. qq tom 2. tr 35. c. 16. n. 318. p. 203. if it be a sin when he sees this evil custom as it were consummate and perceives how dangerous and wicked it is and notwithstanding all this he gives way toit and forswears himself This case proposed in this manner is very clear and the evil too evident to be excused openly Which is the reason that he leaves the question for the present indecided and propounds it onely as problematique and containing some difficulty and doubt on either side Dubium esse potest saith he But in the issue returning to his principles and rights of ignorance which he undertakes to defend he adds Sed etiamsi tunc dicatur esse peccatum non tamen postea quando quis non advertat de novo peccat But although it may then be called a sin yet doth he not sin afterwards afresh when he doth not any longer observe it That is to say that though this man possibly may sin for he doth not affirm he doth when he is forsworn and actually remembers and sees the evil estate and evident danger whereunto this evil custom doth bring him yet when he hath this thought no more for that this evil custom and passion hath taken it away he sins no more whatsoever crime he may commit in this darkness though he have reduced himself to this miserable estate voluntarily and that the blindnesse which him from seeing what he hath done comes from the corruption which evil custom and passion have produced in his minde Nec refert quod inadvertentia oriatur ex prava consuetudine aut ex passione So that it is not for nothing that this Jesuit would not speak clearly at first r An sit peccatum quando quis videt consummatam esse con suctudinem advertit gravitatem periculum ejus whether a man sins when he sees that the evil custom which he hath is consummate and he perceives the evil estate and danger whereunto it exposes him and it is with some reason that he leaves the thing doubtful dubium esse potest Because according to his principles and those of his Fraternity to sin at least mortally it is not enough to see the evil that is done and the danger incurred in doing it but he ought to have a full and perfect knowledge â—…d besides this both time and means to deliberate on it This is according as Sanchez speaks in this matter Å¿ Advertentia actualis necessaria est ut ignorantia censeatur vincibilis nec excuset Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 16. n. 21. p. 72. Nec sufficit ad mortale quaevis consideratio deliberatio malitiae objecti sed debet esse plena Ibid. n. 22. It behooves saith he to consider actually that which is done actually for to judge whether the ignorance be faulty and exempt not a man from sin And a little after This is not enough to commit mortal sin to consider and to will with deliberation the evil that is done but this consideration and deliberation must be full It is not sufficient with him to have a cognisance of the evil but he wills also that time be had to deliberate whether to do it or not and he is not contended even with this but he pretends that this knowledge and this deliberation ought to be full in such sort that there be no darkness nor clouds For if you ask him what he intends by full deliberation and knowledge he makes use for explication of an example of a man who is perfectly awaked in his right understanding and in this estate thinks seriously of a thing t Illa est quando hanc plene advertit instar perfecte à somno excitatorum Quippe potest in vigilia adeo tenuis consideratio accidere ut non sufficiat ad mortale Sanch. l. 1. op mor. c. 1. n. 10. p. 2. This full knowledge saith he is that by
which we see clearly and totally the object with consideration and reflection as when one is perfectly awaked For it may come to pass that even when one is awake he may think so little of that which he doth as may not be sufficient to sin mortally His opinion therefore is that the knowledge which is necessary to most obdurate sinners to make them consider and see the evil which they do must be as great and as perfect as it can be in the most virtuous persons who have not their passions nor their evil habits and that without this knowledge they cannot sin mortally that is to say he will have a man that is in darkness and at midnight to see as clear as he who is at high noon and a blind man to perceive and judge colours as well as he who hath his eyes sound and intire For passions and vices and evil habits are properly the darkness and blindness of the soul and to pretend farther as he doth that for want of a full and perfect knowledge a man given up to vice and accustomed to sin sins not mortally is as if he should say that he could not sin mortally in that estate and the more this man advances in darkness and blindness continuing this wicked life by so much he shall be farther off from sin and from power to sin untill that by the consummation of his evil custom being also the consummation of his blindness he be made intirely and absolutely without power to sin Layman quotes Sanchez and Vasquez for this opinion and he embraces it with them in his first Book tr 1. chap. 4. pag. 22. I rehearse not his words for brevity sake Amicus is of the same opinion and saith that u Advertentia ad peccatum mortale requisita debet esse plena perfecta per firmum judicium de malitia actus vel periculo illius Amicus tom 3. disp 17. sect 8. n. 172. p. 205. the knowledge and reflection which is necessary to mortal sin ought to be full and perfect with the judgement assured of the evil or of the danger of doing it Sanchez demands onely time and means for deliberation with the knowledge of the evil but Amicus will have one go on to do evil with a firm and assured judgement Escobar follows his brethren where he demands x Quidnam ad mortale peccatum requiritur Plena expressa adverventia malitiae aut saltem dubium Escobar tr 2. Exam. 1. c. 3. n. 8. p. 275. what is necessary to make a sin mortal he answers that there is requisite a full and actual knowledge or at least an express and formal suspition of the evil which is done It is not sufficient according to these new Doctors to sin mortally that the knowledge which they pretend to he necessary thereunto be full and perfect but they will also have it to be particular and determinate So that if in one action there occurre many wickednesses many sins or many circumstances which augment or multiply sin they must be known all distinctly a Ad unius generis malitiam advertere non est satis ad malitiam quoqualterius generis contrahâ—ndam sed oportet ad hanc quoque advertere aut debuisse advertere Sanchez supra num 8. pag. â— When there occurre saith Sanchez in one and the same action two sorts of different wickednesses it is not sufficient to perceive one to make himself guilty of both But we must have or be obliged to have an actual knowledge of the other Without this he holds that we are not guilty but according to the proportion of the knowledge we have as he saith expressly afterwards b Si pars malitzae cognita sit aut vincibili et ignorata ca culpae imputatur Ibid. cap. 16. num 10. pag. 70. If we know one part of the malice or if we be ignorant of it by our own fault it shall be imputed for a sin Whence he draws this conclusion which we have already reported When a man sins with a woman whom he knows to be not his wife but is invincibly ignorant that she is his kinswoman he is guilty of fornication but not of incest He stays not there For it is not sufficient for them that a man hath heretofore known an action to be wicked they hold that if he hath forgotten it or if he yet know it but doth not actually think of it and does not make reflection upon it so as to perceive at the very time when it is committed that it is evil he offends not God at all at least not grieviously Cajetan retrenches a little the licentiousness of this opinion declaring that he who by inadvertence or forgetfulness commits a sin which he knows to be a mortal sin ceases not to be guilty thereof if he be not so disposed that if he had thought of it he would not have committed it But Sanchez on the contrary assures us that this condition is not at all necessary And after he hath faithfully reported the Doctrine of Cajetan in these terms c Quinto deducitur quid sentiendum sit de doctrina Cajetanâ— jui 1. 2. q. 6. art 8. ad fiaem in Summa verb. Inconsideratio vers Adverte tamen quem â—oi sequitur Anvilla n. 1. ubi ait ineuntem contractum quem usurarium esse novit v. l opus aliquod prohibitum prohibitienis conscium sacientem ac tuac cum reco it actu excusari à mortali quod ita affectus erat ut si recoluisset vitaret utpote qui firmum cavendi mortalis propositum haberet He that hath made a contract which he knows to be usurarious or who doth some other unlawful act knowing well that it is forbidden but not remembring it to be such when he doth it is exempt from mortal sin provided he were then so disposed that if he had remembred he would have abstained from doing it because he hath a firm resolution to eschew mortal sin In the sequel of his discourse he enters into a farther explication of the opinion of this Doctor d ubi id propositum exigere videtur quò obliver illa conseatur invincibi'is excuset Sanchez oper mor. l. 1. c. 16. n 28. p. 73. It seems to him saith he that this resolution is required as absolutely necessary to render the forgetfulness innocent and to excuse the person But he meddles not with it but onely to refute it adding e At jure â—ppâ—mo id propositum nihil referre bene docer Zumel 1. 2. q. 76 art 3 d. 2. diff 6. quippe solum attendendum est an aliqua cogitatio operanti in mâ—ntem vâ—neâ—it co tempore qâ—o praeceptum implere debeat Si eâ—…m ea non veniente in mentem immemor juris vel facti praeceptum transgâ—ediatur est obliâ—io invincâ—bilu excusat Ibid. that others hold with great reason that this resolution is to no purpose and we are onely to consider
poenam quà m jubtre debeat ai obedâ—at Ibid. For to incurre these penalties the sinner must consent at least tacitely to that which he is to undergo if he obey not But because he saw it would follow from hence that those who know not that Hell is the punishment of mortal sins shall be in no danger of going thither and that in this case it should be ill done to go to Preach the Gospel to those people who have never heard of Hell and who know not that it is established by Divine Justice to punish sins eternally he adds c Seâ— cur dictum est extraordinaria Ut intelligas cur is qui forte ignorat poenam inferni â—nnexam peccato mortali adhuc tamen illam incurrit dommodo cognoscat peccatum suum mortale esse Ibid. n. 13. that this is to be understood of extraordinary pains to the end saith he that you may conceive wherefore he that is ignorant perhaps of the pains of Hell which are the consequences of mortal sin incurre them neverthelesse provided that he know that he commits mortal sin Which serves onely to elude the difficulty and to confirm it rather then solve it For those who know not that there is a Hell know not commonly that there are any mortal sins since mortal sin is not called mortal but because it kills the soul depriving it of spiritual life which is the grace of God which is altogether unknown to infidels who know nothing of Hell How many persons are there also even amongst Christians themselves who are so grosse and ill instructed that they know neither what mortal sin nor what Hell is or if they have heard of it they know not nor can tell when they commit such mortal sins and think sometimes that they do no ill in the most criminal actions But according to the rule of these Jesuits there is no Hell for all these persons of which notwithstanding the number is but too great particularly in the Country And by consequence we cannot complain of their ignorance nor of their Friends and Pastors for the little care they have taken to instruct them but rather we ought to envie these persons and blesse their ignorance and advertise their Pastours to be careful not to draw them out of it for fear of opening unto them the gate of Hell by giving them the knowledge thereof and making them fall into sin by instructing them and inlightening them thereby making them know the sins whereunto they are subject Bauny acknowledgeth that he who committeth a crime by forgetfulness or inadvertency having fallen into this forgetfulness and this inadvertency by his fault though he be not guilty of the action and sin which he doth yet he linneth by negligence He that knows not saith he though by his own fault yet that which he salth or doth not onely was unlawful for him but also forbidden even under grievous penalties sins not against the commandment if he have no knowledge thereof His sin is not contrary to the precept but against the diligence which he ought to use to know it But in this he speaks not according to the principles of his principal brethren and it is apparent that he would not have advanced thus far if he had well thought thereof or if he had read Layman attentively who handling the same question makes himself this objection d Dicet aliquis Qui non cogitat de malitia operis prohibiti debet tamen cogitare Igitur cogitatio ejus temeritati imprudentiae imputatur We may say that he who thinks not that that is evil which he is about to do and forbidden is notwithstanding obliged to think thereof and by consequence his action ought to be imputed to rashness and imprudence This is the same thing that Bauny now said and he answers in the sequel that e Respondeo quod omissio sive negligentia considerationis noâ— imputatur ad pâ—ccatum nisi voluntaria sit Non autem voluntaria est nisâ— veniat in mentem cogitare de obligatione examinandi Layman l. 1. tr 2. c. 4. n. 6. p. 20. forgetfulness or negligence which is the cause that we think not of the evil we are about to do is not imputed for sin if it be not voluntary and it is not voluntary if we bethink us not to consider that we are obliged to examine what we are about to do He avoucheth that he who commits a crime by a faulty heedlesness and accompanyed with neglect was obliged to consider of the evil he was about to do but he saith that it was needful for this that he should have had an other thought to represent unto him that he was obliged to consider of his action and to examine it and because he had it not neither his inadvertence nor his crime ought to be imputed to him But if it be replyed upon him that being he was obliged to examine his own action he was also obliged to know that he was obliged and consequently to apply himself to consider that he was obliged to think of what he doth Sanchez will answer for his comrade that we are not obliged hereunto for that the first thought that makes us consider that which we do or that which we are about to do is not in our power f Ut quispiam circa operis bonitatem aut malitiam consultare possit opus est ut occurrat aliqua cogitatio naturalis in nostra protestate non existens quae talis consultationis possit esse principium nec erit in nostra potestate primam hanc cogitationem excitare Sanch. op mor. l 1. c. 16. n. 21. p. 72. To judge saith he of good or evil of an action it is required that we first have a natural thought which is not in our power which may be the beginning of this deliberation and it depends not on us to have this first thought excited This is the second time that he tells us that this first thought is not in our power that we might take better notice of this principle and the application he makes of it which is this g At quamdiu non occurrit intellectui cogitatia aliqua circa objecti malitiam circa illius pericutum aut dubitatio aliqua aut scrupulus quamvis de illius commoditate consâ—ltus intellectus non est principium sufficiens deliberandi de malitia ipsa morali Ibid. When no thought comes in our minds which might represent unto us the evil or the danger which is in that which we are about to do or which gives us at least some doubt or some scruple though our spirit considers the benefit or the commodity of the action this consideration suffices not to deliberate about moral wickedness as I have proved ch 2. n. 7. and 8. Whence he draws this conclusion h Ergo non potest esse culpa quamdin haec cogitatio circa malitiam non se offert Ibid. And therefore there can
gloriam THE SUM Of the Doctrine of the Jesuits related in this Chapter concerning the sorrow which is necessary to blot out sins in the Sacrament of Penance THey hold that the least degree of sorrow is sufficient for it That it were better this grief were supernatural but if it be not it is enough that we believe it is when we know that it is only natural we câ—ase not for all that to be sufficiently disposed to receive the Sacrament of Penance and to fulfil the command for receiving it though we receive no fruit thereby That though it be true that we have no real remorse for sins if we only think we have we may obtain pardon and receive grace by confessing in this estate That for greater assurance we ought always put forth a strong endeavour to excite this contrition but if we cannot bring our heart unto sorrow by any other way nor by other motive than that of the apprehension of the pains of Hell or the loss of temporal goods the one or the other of these motives though they respect only our own interest and come not at all from God but take their original from self-love which edifies the City of Babylon is sufficient to dispose us for absolution and justification That if after we have done what we can we see we have laboured in vain and that we cannot draw from our hearts that sincere and necessary dislike of our sins we must be sorry that we cannot have it and say at least with our mouths if we cannot say it with our hearts Lord I have sinned have mercy on me Peccavi Domine miserere mei that this suffices for a right receiving of the Sacraments or even for to dye well without Sacraments if we have not convenience to receive them that God will do the rest and supply the want of Priest and of absolution And finally that this very fear sufficeth to conduct a Soul right into Heaven by the way of Martyrdom See here the Maxims of the Jesuits according to which there is no need neither of the Grace of God nor of the Spirit of God which is charity nor of true sorrow for offending nor even of the Sacrament of Penance it self to have remission of sins Non requiritur certus gradus intentior is Filliutius Minima gratia est sufficiens ad remissionem peccatorum ad minimam gratiam sufficit minima attritio tanquam dispositio Filliutius Sufficit dolor naturalis qui tamen supernaturalis existimetur Filliut Escob An hic dolor debeat esse verus realis an vero sufficiat existimatus Respondeo dico 1. probabile esse dolorem existimatum sufficere Filliut L'attrition est suffisante pour consommer le peché Sirmond Si quis doleat de peccato propterea quod Deus in poenam illius malum temporale immisit sufficit Escob Estre touche de ressentiment du peché pour avoir perdu ses biens c'est une espece d'avarice avarice tres honteuse Pour avoir en pechant merité les flammes d'enfer c'est crainte servile qui prend son origine de l'amour propre qui edifie la cité de Babylone non de Dieu comme témoigne S. Augustin au 4. liv de la Cité de Dieu chap. 28. Bauny Et toutefois il ne laisse pas de dire en suitte que cette même douleur laquelle a pour son objet formel la peine meritée de l'enfer suffit au Sacrement pour la justification de l'homme Dolor sufficiens est cum Sacramento dolere quod non satis doleas Sa Escob Pour loger la paix dans une ame qui apprehende de n'avoir pas la contrition necessaire à l'expiation de ses pechez it luy faut dire qu'elle y peut suppléer par la volonté de l'avoir le regret de ne la pas posseder telle qu'elle en a desir Bauny Qui in articulo mortis conatur facere quod in se est nihil aliud sibi occurrit quà m actus attritionis quo dicit Domine miserere mei cum animo placandi Deum hic justificabitur Deo supplente absolutionis necessitatem Opinion rapportée par Bauny il'cite Victoria Lessius L'attrition avec effort pour la contrition ou avec la confession qui en a la commodité est suffisante pour consommer le peché dont nous serions coupables soit avant la reception ou collation des Sacremens soit à l'extremité de la vie Le P. A. Sirmond ARTICLE II. Of Confession and Accusation of Sins That the Jesuits do destroy the integrity thereof THe sinner in Confession is as a sick Patient who presents himself to the Priest as to his Physitian and discovers unto him his sickness that he may appoint him the remedies which he shall judge necessary for the healing and Salvation of his Soul For this cause he ought to be faithful and make him see the bottom of his heart not contenting himself only to tell him his sins piece-meal and to specifie as much as he can their number and their circumstances but also by noting out to him the passions unto which he is subject and the evil habits which have been the sources of these disorders The Divinity of the Jesuits diverts men from acquitting themselves sincerely in this duty and from fulfilling the integrity of confession in all points 1. Bauny saith That if any one of ignorance and simplicity confess his faults only in gross without determinately expressing any one in particular there 's no need to draw from his mouth the repetition of those faults if it cannot conveniently be done because the Confessor is pressed with Penitents that give him not leisure for it In his Sum Chap. 40. pag. 650. Layman proposes the same case and though at first he propounds that this blockish person who through ignorance accuseth himself only of his sins in general is obliged to confess himself anew if he comes to know the obligation he hath to declare them in particular yet he maintains afterwards 1 Interdum tamen si appareat magna hominis ruditas confessarius contentus esse potest enarratione peccatorum à proxima confessione commissorum praecedentium autem rudi aliqua cognitione praesertim si aliorum poenitentium copia adsit Lay-man l. 5. t. 6. c. 9. n. 4. p. 117. That if the Confessor see that he is a man very ignorant he may content himself to cause him tell those sins which he hath committed since his last confession and to receive of him the imperfect and general knowledge of the time past especially if he have many other Penitents The Confessor then as often as he finds himself pressed with Penitents must presently become a Prophet to discover of himself the sins which are not declared to him but in general and to prescribe the true remedies by a light extraordinary and which comes immediately
se mortaliter peccasse Ibid. num 292. Qui habet rationts probabiles quod non peccaverit mortaliter similes imo probabiliores rationes quod peccaverit non tenetur ad illud confitendum Tambur lib. 2. method confess cap 1. sect 3. num 9. Qui probabiliter imo certo scit se mortaliter deliquisse habet tamen rationes probabiles imo probabiliores se illud non esse confessum ...... nec tenetur ad illud confitendum Ibid. num 10. Asserendum non esse obligationem praedictam sed posse omnia peccata simul dicere non explicando an antea suerit illa confessus ...... Si Confessarius id interroget quando nulla est obligatio ex parte poenitentis non tenetur respondere Confessario interroganti sed dicere ego hoc peccatum confiteor quidquid sit an confessus fuerim aliud non teneor explicare Dicast tract 8. de poenit d. 9. d. 2. num 146. Qui generaliter confitetur potest sine alia explicatione admiscere nova cum antiquis etiamsi id de industria ad tegendum tempus quo peccatum commisit ne Confessarlo id innotescat faciat quia utitur jure suo Tamb. lib. 2. meth confess cap. 1. tract sect 1. num 2. Asserendum est pâ—sse omittere quaecunque velit Dicast tract 8. de poenit d. 9. d. 2. num 162. Non tenemur atque adeo possumus omittere aliqua peceata etiam mortalia sed alià s ritè manifestata est communis certa Theologorum opinio ...... Quod si poenitens dixerit se velle generaliter confiteri deinde non omnia proponat respondeo nec tunc mentiri ...... Imo etiamsi mentiretur peccaret solum venialiter Tambur lib. 2. meth confess cap. 1. sect 2. num 7. When a great sinner confesseth himself they hold that he needs not give himself the trouble to inform of all the particularities of his life and crimes and that the more he is laden with sins he is the more slightly and less exactly to be examined And behold the reason The examination must be such as may not beget a disgust of the Sacrament Whence it follows that we must exact a less perfect knowledge of him who for the multitude of his sins or some other cause can difficultly render an exact account That if he be a Thief it is sufficient for him to say I have sinned mortally in the matter of theft without expressing any farther the sum which he stole If he be a debauched and wicked person it is not needful to press him to tell the number of the dishonest thoughts and desires which he hath had though he might do it easily that it sufficeth that he say for example I loved Mary a whole month toto mense amavi Mariam That it belongs to the Confessor to supply and divine the rest and that he ought to observe this rule in other sins That if the Penitent have omitted in his Confession any sin which he believes probably to be no sin the Confessor cannot oblige him to discover it because of two probable opinions the Penitent may chuse whether he pleaseth and if the Penitent believes more than probably if he be assured that it is a sin provided he believe probably that he hath confessed it the Confessor cannot oblige him to accuse himself of it and all this is true though he believe more probably that he hath sinned mortally or that he hath not confessed it at all If this sinner signifie that he would make a general Confession he is not obliged to declare the sins he hath already confest and those which he hath committed since his last Confession and if his Confessor pretend to oblige him thereto this would be very frivolously done for he might receive his answer from the Penitent in these words I accuse my self of this sin whether I have or have not confessed it already I am not obliged to confess more unto you And this is true though he make such a medley of new and old sins with design to hide from the Confessor the time when he committed these new crimes because he hath a right to do so The Confessor is not obliged to examine him whether he have told him all and whether he have forgotten any sin because the Penitent though he have declared that he would make a Confession of all the sins of his life may omit what he pleaseth without any lye and if this be any kind of lye it is but a venial one This opinion is certain and commonly received in the Schools II. POINT Of the Advice which a Confessor ought to give his Penitent according to the Jesuits 1. 1 Quendo Confellar us nullum sperat frâ—ctum ex acâ— monitiore sed pâ—tius animi inquietudiâ— em rixas vel scandalum dâ—ssimulare debet Escobar tr 7. ex 4. n. 155. pag. 825. THey will not that he speak to him or advise him of any thing if he thinks he will not believe him 2. 2 Cum poenitens est in statu de se malo ut invslidi matrimonii siquiâ—em de veritate hujus rei dubitet poenitens illum dâ—bet Confessarius aperite quod si non profuturam spetret admonitionem vel in proprium damnum vertenâ—am potest debet reticere Escob ib. n 74 p. 8â—0 If he knows that the sinner is in an ill estate as for example that he lives in Whoredom because his Marriage is null they say he is not to speak to him of it if he thinks that it will be to no purpose 3. 3 Confesssrius evidentiam habet quod poenitens peccatum commiserit illudque non sit confessus posset judicare quod poenitens commislum peccatum tacueâ—it justa aliâ—us ex causa ac proinde tuâ—a conscientia poterit illum absolvere Amicus tom 8. disp 18. sect 13. u. 331. p. 285. Though he be assured that his Penitent hath committed a crime which he hath not at all confessed they permit him to dissemble it and to absolve him in a pious perswasion that he hath some reason wherefore he doth not confess it 4. 4 Si constet Confessori poenitentem oblivisci alicujus peccati per se loquendo teneâ—ur interrogare quod si inâ—errogatus negat regulariter tenetur illi credere quod si evidens sit poenitentem mentiri si id Confessarius seit tantum via secreta post prudentem interrogationem tenetur judicare secundum â—cta prebata in illo foro Fillius tom 1. mor. qq tr 7 cap. 12. n. 360. pag 210. Yet they accord that he may examine him upon this sin provided he do it prudently and press him not too much for fear of making him lye and if iâ— fall out that being examined he lye and deny this sin which the Confessor knows evidently they will that he forbear not to absolve him notwithstanding his sin and his lye 5. 5 Ad explorandum propositum non
in reputation for a knowing and honest man as are in a manner all those of their Society and especially in the judgement of the Peasants of whom he speaks that fornication and theft are sins but that the desire of the one and the other are lawfull For after he had said that even amongst the Modern Casuists there are some who would not excuse this Peasant of mortal sin if following the advice of this man whom he beleeves to be learned and pious he should voluntarily entertain such a desire of fornication he adjoyns in favour of this Peasant or rather of fornication a Quibusdam neotericis doctis videtur banc ignorantiam minime excusare at quamvis hoc probabile sit probabilius tamen credo actum internum excusari omnino à malitia Ibid. though that opinion be probable yet I beleeve that it is more probable that this interiour act is exempt from all sin These two expedients may be made use of indifferently albeit the first is more proper for men of understanding who know how to make metaphysical abstractions and the second for simple and ignorant persons such as are Peasants who may also draw this advantage from the Divinity of the Jesuits above persons of wit and understanding that because of their ignorance they may even commit fornication it self without sin Because invincible ignorance excusing them from sin as the whole Society do agree it as we shall see hereafter when we come to speak of sins of ignorance Filliutius and some others assure us that one may be ignorant that fornication is a sin without being guilty b Septimo quaero an dari possit ignorantia invincibilis fornicationis Respondeo posse dari Filliut mor. q. tom 2. tr 30. c. 2. n. 50. p. 389 It may be demanded saith Filliutius if a man may be invincibly ignorant that fornication is a sin And he adds immediately after I answer that one may Azor having taught the same thing before him putting into the number of things which a man may be invincibly ignorant of c Ad scortum accedere Azor. tom 1. l. 1. c. 13. p. 34. to go to a Whore Whence it follows according to them that one may in this estate of ignorance commit fornication without sin It is true that they are constrained to acknowledge that it is hard to find this invincible ignorance amongst Christians but then they return presently to their general proposition d Dari potest ignorantia inviacibilis fornicationis Multi enim vulgares bomines sunt qui nesciunt distinguere inter peccata permissa vèl non prohibita quoad poenam ut exâ—o quod non punitur fornicatione simplex sed impuné permittuntur meretrices putant etiam non esse peccdtum ad eas accedere quod etiam in civitatibus alioquin bene institutis in fide religione persaepe locum habet ut ii qui confessiones excipiunt ritè norunt Filliut ibid. n. 51. That for all this it is not impossible that one may be invincibly ignorant even amongst Christians that fornication is a sin for there are many persons amongst the Common people who know not how to discern amongst certain sins those which are tolerated or not forbidden which though they be not punished yet their disorders are not approved as in regard that simple fornication is not punished or that common women are tollerated they think also that it is no sin to go to them Which thing happens even in Cities where great pains are taken to instruct the people in the matters of Faith and Religion as they know very well who hear their Confessions And by consequence those persons may by the favour of their ignorance innocently commit fornication and particularly with common women Men of ingenuity and understanding may also enjoy the same priviledge with these ignorants when they are not in a condition to make use of their knowledge and wit For Filliutius gives them his liberty to commit the acts not only of fornication but also of adultery of incest and of all other crimes or at least he wil excuse those that they have committed in that estate and if after they come to remember what they have done he permits them to take pleasure and to rejoyce as if they had done the most honest and most lawfull actions e Quaro quinto on delectatio de re mortali ratione somni ebrietatis amentiae vel ignorantiae excusetur Filliut ib. tr 21. c. 5. n. 290 p. 34. I demand saith he whether fleep drunkennesse madnesse or ignorance frees from sin the pleasure that one takes in a criminal action which one committed in that estate He relates on this matter two contrary opinions of which the first condemns this pleasure of sin the second frees it therefrom He in the following discourse decides this controversie and concludes in these terms f Delectationes illae etiamsi malae non essent tamen indicant imperfectum affectum ad castitotem Ibid. n. 291. I say first that the former opinion is probable and that it is good to advise according thereto as the more assured for them who aspire unto perfection and to those who have made vows of Chastity or who are much in love with this vertue for though this kind of pleasure were not ill yet it is a mark that Chastity is but imperfectly loved But as for common persons and such as lead an ordinary course of life in the world he establisheth for them this other conclusion a Dico 2. secundam sententiam videri probabilem absolutè tutam quia non est dilectatio de opere malo sed ex indifferenti Ibid. The second opinion seems to me more probable than the former and absolutely one may follow it with confidence The reason is because this pleasure hath not for its object any evil action but an indifferent one Which he repeats also a little while after answering the principal reason of the contrary opinion which was that it is not lawfull to take pleasure in an evil action b Unde ad rationem oppositam respondetur factum de se non esse mortale quia hoc ipso quo sit absque libertate res quaedam est indifferens sicut occisio ammal is concubit no brutorum inter se Ibid. 293. I answer saith he to the reason alledged against this opinion that this action is not a mortal sin in it self because being done without liberty it follows that it is indifferent as the killing of a beast or the coupling of beasts He makes great use of this comparison to this purpose in imitation of the Holy Scripture which compares those who are addicted to fleshly pleasure to Horses and Mules but he conceives amisse of the sense of the Scripture for in that he so boldly justifies these infamous persons he must condemn it which condemns them c Hi nempe qui conjugium ita suscipiunt ut Deum Ã
according to the Jesuits and that custom of sinning may make a man uncapable of sinning AS in doing evil we accustom our selves thereunto and in following lusts we cause them to pass into habits which strengthen and increase more the inclination we had unto evil the order of reason requires in the design we have to consider the springs and the principles of sin to make appear how the Jesuits nourish them that after we have treated of Lust we speak also of evil habits I propose for example of habitual sins swearing and blasphemy because these sins of themselves produce neither pleasure nor profit its onely passion which carries men to them and evil custom which nourisheth them So that to speak properly and according to their peculiar nature they are sins of passion and habit Bauny in his summe chap. 4. pag. 60. speaking of a person accustomed to swear who for this reason is always in danger to be forsworn gives this counsel to their Confessours The Confessor to hinder this evil ought to draw from his penitent an act of dislike or to speak better of disavowing this cursed custom For by this means the oaths which follow proceeding from such an habit shall be esteemed involuntary in their cause Suarez l. 3. of Oaths chap. 6 Sanchez in his Summe l. 3. c. 5. n. 11. and by consequence without sin This practice is very easie and very convenient if it be so that one word of disowning sins which a Confessor can draw out of the mouth of a sinner may serve all at once to be a remedy for all the sins which he hath committed and for the justification of all the sins he shall be able to commit for the future by the violence of an evil habit so the simple declaration which a man shall make of his being sorry to see himself subject to such a vice sufficeth to excuse him from all the sins which he shall afterwards commit by that habit which he hath of this vice as the debauches and excesses of the mouth immodest speeches lyes deceits thefts and other such like And so almost all vices of this sort shall be innocent there being few persons that are not sorry for being engaged in them and being unable to avoid them because of their long accustoming themselves unto them or who at least do not or will not sometimes disallow them and testifie some displeasure against them in some good interval And yet if this good Father had been well read in Sanchez whom he cites I am confident he would have been render'd yet more easie and complacent in this point For Sanchez acknowledges no particular sin in Oaths that proceed of an habit though no disavowing them be made to excuse them as Bauny requires See how he speaks herein p Posterior sententia cui tanquam probabiliori accedo ait juramenta prolata sine advertentia formali per se sufficienti ad peccatum mortal non esse in se novum ac proprium ac speciale peccat um propter solam jurandi consuetudinem qualiscumque fit nedum sit retracta Sanchez op mor. part 1. l. 3. c. 5. n. 28. p. 21. The last opinion which I follow as the most probable holds that those Oaths which are made without actual application which of it self were sufficient to a mortal sin are not of themselves new sins properly and particularly onely because of the custom of swearing how great soever it be and though no renunciation or retractation be made of it Escobar is not far off from this opinion where speaking of blasphemy he demands q Num aliquando venialis blasphemia Consuetudo quidem absque advertentia lethale peccatum non facit Escobar tract 1. exam 3. cap. 6. num 28. pag 73. If blasphemy be sometimes a venial sins And he answers absolutely according to his use That such a custom whereof one thinks not at all makes sin not to be mortal But for the most part hinders it from being mortal as it would he if he did swear without being accustomed Filliutius speaks the same more at large and more clearly a Octavo quaero de consuetudine blasphemandi ordine ad malitiam Respendeo dico 1. si desit advertentia plena ca toriatur blasphemia etiamsi adsit consuetudo blasphemandi non commitâ—itur peccatum mortale Filliutius 〈◊〉 qq tom 2 tract 25. cap. 1. num 27. pag 173. It is demanded what sin it is to blaspheme customarily I answer in the first place that when a man blaspames without having full knowledge thereof how much soever he be accustomed thereto he sins not mortally He taken the reason of this conclusion out of a general principle which he presupposeth as assured b Ratio est quia ut diximus de voluntario libero ad â—…ccatum mortale requiritur advertentia plenâ— undecunque oriatur defectus illius excusat a peceato Ibid. The reason is saith he because as we have said handling free and voluntary actions to six mortally it behoves to have a full knowledge for want of which on what account soever it comes sin is thereby bindered He demands in the same place c An jurandi consuâ—tudo constituat hominem in statu peccati If the custom of swearing put a man in the estate of sin First of all he reports the opinion of those who hold the affirmative afterwards he speaks his own in these terms d Dico 2. consuâ—tudinem jurandi sine necessitate vel utilitate sed cum veritate sufficiente advertentia non esse peccatum grave ex se nec constituere hominem in statu peccati mortalis Ibid. cap. 10. n. 313. I say in the second place that the custom of swearing without necessity and without utility but with verity and without sufficient knowledge and reflection is not of it self a great sin and puts not a man into a state of mortal sin He demands again on the same subject e Sitne perjurium cum in advertentia naturali peccatum mortale ob consuetudinem perjurandi Ibid. n. 316. If perjury which one commits through natural inadvertence be a mortal sin because of the custom he hath to forswear And rejecting the opinion of those who believed it to be a mortal sin he answers f Dico 2. Probabilius est non esse peccatum mortale speciale quando est sine advertentia naturali Ibid. I say in the second place that it is more probable that there is no mortal sin particularly when one forsweareth himself without perceiving it at all and by a natural inadvertence And a little after he adds g Etiamsi operans sit cum habituali affectu ad peccatum Ibid. Though he who doth it hath his will effectually addicted to sin by an evil habit So that according to the judgement of this Divine although he swear with full knowledge provided that it be not against truth although he swear against the truth and
if when we were obliged to observe the commandment we had any thought thereof For if we had none at all and that without considering either the right or fact we violate the commandment by neglect this forgetfulness is innocent and free from all sin Corduba approves this opinion no more then Cajetan and would that at least he who acts in so evil a disposition come not voluntarily thereinto and that the forgetfulness or inadvertency which hinders him from thinking of the evil which he doth comes not by his own fault But Sanchez finds this also to be too much and he can no more approve of this than that of Cajetan f Nec admittenda est sententia Cordubae in q. l. 2. q. 17. dub 1. dicentis oblivionem reduci ad ignorantiam invincibilâ—m quando oblivio non contingit ex culpa Hoc enim ita universaliter dictum non est sed quando quis initio causam oblivioni dedit cum periculi adveâ—tentia Si enim periculum non ad errit oblivio est inculpabilis Ibid. num 30. There is no more need saith he to receive the opinion of Corduba who faith that when forgetfulness comes not by our fault it ought to be esteemed as one sort of innocent Ignorance but not when it proceeds of our fault For this is not universally true but onely when we have done some thing which hath caused this forgetfulness forseeing well the danger whereunto we cast our selves For if we thought not of this danger the ignorance can not be faulty He repeats a little after the same thing and he makes a decree as it were without appeal and a principle unremovable g Quare stat ut causa ignorantiae fuerit aliquod peccatum tamen in se ignorantia sit invincibilis Ibid. n. 31. It remains certain saith he that although ignorance comes of some fin as of its cause it ceases not therefore to be excusable To which he adds also for better explication h Tunc quamvis causa culpabilis sit ignorantia tamen erit inculpabilis Ibid. And in this case though the cause of ignorance be culpable yet the ignorance is not And for maintenance of this principle he undertakes to refute Saint Thomas under pretence of explicating that which he saith i Euentum posse esse â—oluatarium in sua causa Ibid. An event may be voluntary in its cause He expounds and at once overturns this rule of right k Ubi hab tur igno antiam facti non juris excusare Ibid. That ignorance of fact excuses but not of right As also the Doctors who teach as he confesseth l Ignorantiam legum ad statum officium alicujus pertinentem esse vincibilem nec excusare Ibid. That ignorance of that which every one is obliged to do according to the rules and Laws of his condition and calling is bleamable and excuseth not at all And generally he rejects it in the point of Law and Right and he takes to him as on his side the Doctors which expound them in their true sence but not in his m Ex his deducitur 1. esse sano modo intelligenda jura Doctores dum aequiparant scire debere scire passim dicunt esse indirecte voluntariam ignorantiam cum qua vel scivit advertitve aut debebat scire advertere Ibid. n. 24 It follows saith he that we must understand with discretion what the Doctors and Laws say that to know and to be obliged to know are one and the same thing and when they commonly affirm that when we know or consider or ought to know or consider ignorance and inadvertency are indirectly voluntary He witnesseth sufficiently that Saint Thomas with the more part of the School Divines are not for him in saying that Saint Thomas is received by all Thomas ad omnibus receptus n. 25. and that the Laws themselves and those that expound them are contrary unto him And he thinks himself discharged herein by saying that they are to be wisely understood Esse sano modo intelligenda jura Doctores But if we demand of him also why he takes the liberty to reject so great and so strong authorities He can onely repeat that which he hath said already so many times n Haec intelligenda sunt quando adfuit al qua actualis plena sufficiens ad mortale advertentia ad malitiam objecti ejusve periculum seu dubium aut scrupulus saltem Ibid. num 24. That all this must be understood where we have an actual knowledge full and sufficient to sin mortally of the evil we are about to do or of the danger to which it exposeth us or that at least we have had thereof some scruple or some doubt Tambourin hath also expounded all this Doctrine sufficiently at large according to the principle of Sanchez establishing two general rules in favour of ignorance The first is o Si quis ex ignorantia inculpabili putet aliquid esse veniale quod aliunde mortale est venialiter tantùm peccabit Ita S. Thomas p. 2. q. 76. 3. Idem erit si ignorantia sit culpabilis tantùn venialiâ—er Tambur l. 1. Decal c. 1. sect 3. n. 35. if any one think by ignorance which is not criminal that a mortal sin is but venial he sins onely venially this is Saint Thomas's opinion We must say the same if ignorance be but a venial sin I say nothing of the rule which he proposes in favour of ignorance to observe the abuse he doth to the authority of Saint Thomas I see no way to excuse his visible visible falfity unless by his ignorance being he cites this Angel of the School in making him say that which he saith not and whereunto he speaketh the contrary in his quodlibetary questions where he saith clearly p In his vero quae pertinent ad fidâ—m bones mores nullum excusabiâ—e si sequatur erroneam opinionem alitujus Magistri In talibus enim ignorantia non excusat S. Thomas quod lib. 3. art 10. that in what concerns faith and good manners no man is excused if he follow an erronous opinion of some Doctor Because in these things ignorance excuseth not The other rule which he proposeth is no less favourable to ignorance and sin then the former For he saith that if a Silegem scias sed non poenam adhuc probabile est à te non incurri poenam Ita Suarez Sanchez Coninck apud Castrop Tambor Decal Tambur Decal l. 1. c. 2. sect 10 n. 12 you have knowledge of the Law and that you are ignorant of the penalty which it ordains against those who violate it it is probable you do not incurr the penalty He underprops his principle by the authority of three the most famous Divines of their Society Suarez Sanchez and Coninck b Ratio est quia ad has incurrendas requiâ—…tur delinquentem consenlisse saltem tacite in
it is not only lawfull to accept but also to offer them And one of the Casuists of the Society who taught publickly at Caen of late years after he had endeavoured to justifie this brutal madness by many reasons which we shall represent in their place concludes in this manner e Qui haec responsa non probaâ—t ignari sunt communis consuctudinis vitae Licet enim homini hac ratione honorem suum tutari These who approve not these answers know not the manner of living and the ordinary custom of those who are in the world For it is lawfull for a man to maintain his Honour by this way There is no custom more wicked nor more general amongst people of base condition than to swear blaspheme and to break out into curses and imprecations against cattel men and every thing that gives them trouble Bauny considering this cursed custom saith according to his ordinary lenity Bauny Sum. c. 6. p. 73. For my part I believe that it may be said with truth that it is their choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported it is no fault neither mortal nor venial to curse Dogs Hawks and other such things as are without reason The abuse which Merchants ought most to fear and avoid in their Traffick and which yet is very common at this day is falshood and deceit whether it be in falsifying and altering Merchandizes or in selling them dearer than they are worth or selling them by false weights and false measures But Layman following this custom saith f Mercatores statim injustitiae damnari non possunt si merci substantiam alienam puta tricico secale vino aquam picem cerae admisceant modo inde emptoribus nullum damnum inferatur merces proportione pretii quo venditur satis idonea sit ad consuetum usum Layman l. 3. tr 4. c. 17. n. 15. That we must not alwayes condemn the injustice of the Merchants when they mingle in their Merchandizes things of different kinds as Rye amongst Wheat Water with Wine and Pitch amongst Wax provided that this do not damnifie them that buy it and that the Merchandize be good enough of the price it costs and proper enough for common usage And he confirms his opinion by that of Lessius and Lopez saying g Addit Lessius n. 83. cum Lopez loco citato si additio materiae secundum se deterioris eò artificio industria fiat ut merces non sit minus bona idonea ad usum quam sine tali admixtione posse tunc consueto pretio divendi luerum majus repoâ—tari quippe quod industriae esse censetur sine damno emptorum percipitur Ibid. that Lessius and Lopez assure us that if the mixture of the matter which of it self is of less value be done with such artifice and industry that the Merchandize is not less good nor proper for mans use than it would be without this mixture it may be sold at the ordinary price and take more than it is worth because this gain belongs to the address and industry of the Merchant and is no wrong to those that buy it The ordinary vice of women and principally of those of Quality is luxury and vanity They cannot have a fairer pretence for to nourish nor a better excuse to justifie themselves in the excess they commit therein and the scandals which fall out thereupon than to say that it is the custom and that they do nothing but what is commonly done in the World by women of their condition Bauny approves this reason and makes use of it in his Summe ch 46. p. 717 718. where he proposes this question If maids and women who exceed modesty and duty and as we may say necessity of decency in their habits because they seek out therein curiosities not suitable to their estates may be thought capable of absolution when they know that some take thence occasion of sinning He acknowledgeth that many condemn this insupportable vanity and maintain that maids and women who are so disposed and will so continue are uncapable of absolution but he declares against their judgement and concludes in these terms Nevertheless we must say 1. that the woman who trims and adorns her self to please her Husband ought not to be blamed though she doth it as he saith through vanity and curiosity and against modesty knowing well that some draw from thence occasion of sin He saith moreover that neither is she more to be blamed if she trim her self in this sort with scandal when she doth it to satisfie the custom of the Countrey and not to be singular unlike and inferiour to those of their own sex He would then that the pretence of pleasing her Husband and a disorderly and shamefull custom should give liberty to a woman to break out into all sorts of luxury and vanity without being blameable and that custom hath power to change the nature of things to cause that it shall be lawfull to transgress the bounds of modesty that vanity shall be no longer vanity that luxury shall not be longer luxury and that scandal shall be no longer scandal He continues speaking in this manner 2. I say though this said woman had knowledge of the bad effects which her diligence in trimming her self would cause in the body and soul of those who behold her adorned with rich and precious clothes nevertheless she sins not in making use thereof The reason is Because to prevent the offence of another this woman is not bound to deprive her self of what the Law of the Countrey and nature it self permits That is to say that as custom makes luxury and vanity lawfull for her so it makes scandal also lawfull for her and that the abuses which happens very frequently in this point by the corruption of the World are just and true Laws and proper to regulate all things in a Country I might speak here of Usury and Symony which are two vices so common at this day that the Jesuits cover them much easier than others because that custom hath made them publick But I referr these disorders to be represented in the places proper for these matters that I may avoid repetitions CHAP. III. Of the Occasions of Sin That the Jesuits retain men in them and that according to their maxims there can be no next occasions of Sin ONE of the most important and most necessary counsels which can be given to a person who would avoid sin is that he fly the occasions and if we observe it we shall find that the most ordinary cause why the most part of those who have some good desire and care for their salvation attain not to a true and solid conversion or fall back after a while is because they have not received this advice or have not been faithfull in the observation of it This is such that the Jesuits acknowledge well indeed the importance and necessity
approbation of the Superiors and Chief of the Society For he demands 4 An si nomini meo falsis criminationibus apud Principem Jâ—…câ—m vel viâ—es hâ— eratos 〈…〉 nicaris 〈◊〉 ulla ratione possim hoc damnum famae avertere nisi te occulte interficiam id licite possum P. Hereau If when any one endeavours to defame me before a Prince a Judge or Persons of Honour by false reports and I cannot by other means prevent him from causing me to lose my reputation than by killing him secretly I may do it with a good conscience This is the same Question which Lessius hath already proposed before and others with him And he gives also thereto the self same answer 5 Affirmat Bannez q. 64. a. 7. d. 14. addens id dicendum etiam si crimen sit verum dummodo occultum sit its ut secundum justitiam legalem non possit pandere Bannez saith he believes it and adds moreover that we ought to say the same also though the crime be true provided it be secret so that according to the Rules of Law and Justice he could not discover it A crime can never be more strongly authorized than by allowing another to be committed to conceal it and giving liberty to kill a man who hath knowledge of it when there is fear that he will utter it The reason of this Casuist is 6 Quia si baculo vel alapa impâ—cts velis honorem meum vel famam violare possum armis prohibere Ergo etiam si id coneris lingua nec aliter possim evadere nisi te occidam parum id videtur referre cum aeque lingua atque allo instrumento mihi nociturus es Because if you profess that you will take away my honour or reputation by striking me with a Cudgel or giving me a box on the ear I may oppose you with Arms and by consequence if you endeavour to do it with your tongue I may make use of the same means when I cannot save my self otherwise than by taking away your life For the difference is of small moment whethersoever of these two ways you assail me since as much mischief may be done with the tongue as any other instrument If this reason and this bloody Maxime be current amongst men in our days as this Jesuit seems desirous to make it by giving it his stamp and teaching it in his publick Lectures no man can be sure of his life or rather there will hardly be any person left alive in this world wherein defamations serve for common entertainment and a flouting humor goes for a vertue He alledges also this other reason which is more general 7 Deinde jus defensionis extendit se ad omne quod est necessarium ut se quis ab omni injuria servet immunem The right of self-defence is extended to all that is necessary to secure ones self from all sorts of injuries He took this reason from Lessius which we have already examined but he adds this sweetning thereto 8 Monendus tamen prius esset detractor ut desisteret si noller ratione scandali non effet aperte occidendus sed clam That it were good to admonish this Detractor before we kill him that he should desist from his bad intention and if he will not do it not to kill him publickly for avoiding scandal but in secret The Jews had this same consideration and said in a manner the same thing when they were upon the demand of the death of Jesus Christ and yet would not for all that have him put to death on the Feast-day for fear of scandal and tumult 9 Et quaereant Summi Saberdotes Scricae quomodo eum dolo tenerent occidereat Dicebant autem Non in die festo ne forte tumultus fieret in populo Marci 14. v. 12. The chief Priests and Scribes saith S. Mark sought means to take him by subtilty and put him to death but they said This must not be done on the Feast-day lest it should cause a tumult amongst the people I will put an end to this Chapter and close it with some remarkable places of a Book which Father Petavius caused to be printed some years since of Publick Penance For writing after those whom we have already quoted and seeing he could add nothing to the licentiousness of their opinions about Murder he was minded to signalize and make himself remarkable above all others by shewing himself more audacious than they in the practice and execution of what they had taught This Doctrine is of it self so far distant from all reason and humanity that the greater part of themselves who would have it pass for true or at least for probable have maintained it only in general and in the Theory and when they more nearly considered it in the particular cases and dire consequences it drew after it horror and shame kept them back and hindred them many times from approving the practice Perhaps there will be none found besides Father Petavius who transgressing all bounds of moderation is not content to maintain as others that this Doctrine which teaches Murder is probable or to approve it in the practice but he requires and presses the execution of it and pursues it with all extremity of heat against a Doctor and Priest whom he acknowledges unreproachable in his life and who could not be criminal in that point upon which he pursues him if not in this because he being obliged in Charity and of necessity to reprove some defaults of the Jesuits conduct in the administration of the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist that which this Doctor of Sorbonne said was not pleasing to him nor his Brethren He would cover his inhumane passion with a veil of imaginary good intention He would have his aversion against an innocent person pass for a laudable and necessary duty And because he can find nothing in the life of this famous Doctor which could render him so criminal as he represents him he forms against him general accusations and imputes unto him the greatest crimes against the State and Religion without any proof without other foundation than that of his passion and blindness He goes yet farther and to rid his hands of his Adversary more easily he shews a desire that the invention of a famous Law-giver might be followed who ordained That if any one would change and innovate any thing in the received Laws he should present himself with a Halter about his neck cast into a running knot and having in this manner proposed his reasons in opposition to them if they were judged equitable the Law should be abolished or moderated and the proposer come off safe but if his overture were not consented to he should be strangled immediately and so undergo the penalty due unto his unadvisedness This course saith he may seem too rigorous but the intent is commendable nay it is necessary for