we can have no occasion to Speak of False Judgments but in order to the avoiding them which is easily done if we settle the Knowledge of the True ones hence that which concerns us is to treat of True Judgments or Truths and in the first place of Those Propositions or Judgments that are the First Truths which we call First Principles Again since alâ— Propositions are either Evident or Inevident and Inevident or Obscure ones cannot avail us in our quest of Science it follows that only Evident Propositions are to be treated of or made use of by those who aim at Scientifical Knowledge Wherefore since all Propositions or Judgments that are Evident must either be Self-evident or made evident which is done by way of Proof and these Latter must depend on the Former for their Eviâ—dence we are therefore to begin with the Former which are Self-evident 2. All First Principles as being the First Truths must be Self-evident Propositions This is manifest from the very Terms For being the First they can have no other before them out of whicâ— they may be Deduc'd or made Evident or into which their Evidence if lesser may be Resolv'd Wherefore they must either not be Evident at all which would destroy all Possibility of any Evidence or they must be Self-evident 3. Our Knowledges may either be consider'd according to the Order by which they are Generated in us at first or according to the Dependance of one Truth on another and the Resolving them finally into First and Self-evident Principles The Former of these is the way that Nature takes to instill Useful Knowledges into us when as yet we know nothing the Later is the Method which Art makes use of to polish and promote those Rude and Short Knowledges had from Nature then to link many of those Knowledges together and lastly to render them Exact and Evident by Resolving them into First or Self-evident Principles to do which we call to beget Science or to frame a Science of them The Former comes by Experience Unreflectingly the Later is attain'd by Study and Reflexion And 't is of this Later sort of Knowledge and its First Principles we intend to treat in this and the next Lesson reserving the Former Consideration of how and in what manner Knowledge is first Generated till Lesson IV. 4. The Self-Evidence belonging to First Principles consists in this that the two Terms must be Formally Identical For since as was shewn above the Terms in every Ordinary and Inferior Proposition nay in every Conclusion that is True must be materially the same and so the Proposition it self materially Identical it follows that the Terms of the First Principles which ought to be more evident than They as being Self-evident must be Formally Identical 5. The Terms of the First Principles must noâ— only be Formally Identical in sense or be the same Formal Notion but it is moreover most convenient that they be such in the Expression also thâ—â— is 't is fit that the Subject and Predicate in those Propositions should be the same Word taken in the same sence For since First Principles must be the most Evident and the most Clearly Expressive oâ— Truth that can be imagin'd and not liable to the least Mistake and Words are subject to Equivocation which is apt to breed Mistake Obscurity and Error hence First Principles should not only be Formally Identical in sense as when we say Hoâ—â— est Animal Rationale but it is most Convenient they should be such in Expression too as Homâ— est Homo Idem est Idem sibi ipsi Quod est est c. For then whatever Distinction in case of Ambiguity affects the Predicate must also affect the Subject and so the Proposition will not only remain still most Formally but also most Evidently iâ— every regard Identical Note That tho' this be most Convenient yet it may suffice that the Terms when explicated are reducible to the same Formal Expression by the same Word as when we say A Whole is Greater than a part For a Whole being that which consists of Parts and a thing being that of which it consists hence a Whole is All its Parts that is is one part and more than one part whence the Proportion is reducible to this what 's more than a part is more than a part which is not onely most Formally but besides most Evidently Identical 6. This Proposition Self-Existence is Self-existence is of it self most Supremely Self-Evident â—or if the meaning of the word self which is â—oyn'd with Existence be but understood and that the Addition of this word to Existence be not meant â—o signify any the least Composition in it but the most â—imple and most Uncompounded Actuality that can â—e imagin'd then the same Formality in every respect is predicated Intirely of the same and so 't is also most perfectly Self-evident And 't is most Suâ—remely such because it expresses the Existence of â—he Deity which is Infinitely more Simple and more necessarily it self than any Created Exiâ—tence can be Again since every thing the more Potential it is is more Confused that is less distinct and less Intelligible and the more Actual it is the more Intelligible and the Divine Nature which â—s meant by Self-Existence is a most infinitely Pure Actuality it follows that this proposition Self-Existence is Self-Existence is of its self the most supremely Self-evident Proposition that can be Imagin'd 7. This Proposition what is is or Existence is Existence is the most Self-evident Proposition that can be imagin'd to be taken from Created things For since Existence is the most Evident Notion that can be found amongst all our Notions that can be had from Creatures that Proposition must needs be the most Evident and consequently amongst Self-evident ones the most Self-evident in which not only the Notion of the Copula but of the Subject and Predicate too is Existence Again since the Clearness of all Truths whatever depends on the Connexion of the Terms by the word is it follows that unless the Nature or Notion of Existence be first immovably Fix'd or Establish'd to be Coherent with its self that is unless this Proposition What is is or Existence is Existence be Self-evident no Proposition whatever could be Absolutely Certain Clear or Coherent and so there would be no possibility of any Truth Certainty or Evidence in the World Lastly since both the Essences of things and the Existence they have are in the Divine Understanding and the Essences which are only Capacities of Being belong to things as they are Limited or apt to be Created that is belong to them according to the Notion of Creatures which being only Potential as to Being they can have no Claim thence to actual Being or Existence but meerly by the Free Gift of Him who is Essential Being hence the Nature of the Existence of Creatures and their being such is taken purely from God's side and holds entirely of him Whence it is most
us have neither Truth nor Falshood in them formally since they do neither affirm or deny only with Speeches are capable of Formal Verity or Falsity any more than does the Thing it self as it stands in Nature or out of the Understanding 13. All the Verity they have is their Metaphysical Verity or their being truly what they are And they partake this from the Idea's in the Divine Understanding from which they unerringly flow and which are essentially Unchangeable By which we see how the God of Truth is the sole Author of all the Truth that is in us and how he does ordinarily communicate it to us viz. by Fixing unalterably the Natures or Essences of Things from which being thus Establish'd and imprinted on our Minds by our Senses all Science and Truth in us have their Certainty originally 14. All true Science being thus built on the Immovable Stability of the Essences or Natures of Created Beings it follows necessarily that all Discourses that are not Agreeable to the Natures of Things and Grounded on them are Frothy Incoherent and False and if pursued home must be found to have a Contradiction for their First Principle in regard they make the Natures of Things to be what they are not 15. Wherefore Notions being the Natures of the Things in our Understanding the Method to pursue True Science is to attend and hold heedfully and steadily to those Notions which the Things without us have imprinted or stamp'd in our Minds and to be very careful lest Imaginations which are the Offsprings of Fancy and do oft misrepresent the Thing do delude us or the Equivocation of Words draw us aside and make us deviate from those Genuine and Nature instill'd Notions COROLARIES Corol. I. Hence is seen how Unreasonable the Scepticks are who endeavour to undermine all Science by pretending that all our Notions are Uncertain For they being caus'd by Natural Impressions on our Senses those Men may as well pretend that Water does not wet or Fire burn as that the Objects work not their several Effects upon our Senses If they contend that every Man 's individual Temper being different our Notions must therefore differ to some Degree in every Man they oppose not us who say the same nor will this break any square in our Discoursing and our Understanding one another for few Men perhaps none can reach these Individual Differences nor consequently mean them or intend to speak of them when they discourse But if they say they are not the same in all Men whose Senses oâ— imagination are not disordered by some Accidental Disease substantially and in the main then besides what has been now alledged they are confuted by this that Mankind has now for some thousands of Years held Conversation with one another yet it was never observ'd that they could not understand one anothers Meaning in Discourse about Natural Objects or if any hap'd to occurr which was Ambiguous that they could not make their Notions known by Explications or if there had been some notable variation in their Notions as when to Icterical persons all things seem yellow or sweet things bitter to depraved Tasts the Mistake can easily be made manifest and corrected by the Standard of the Generality of Mankind who assure them of their Misapprehension and of Learned Men particularly who find the Cause of their Mistake to proceed from some Disease perverting Nature or some Circumstances of the unduly-proposed Object or of the Medium or from our Inability to reach to some minute Considerations belonging to its Composition Figure c. which hinder not our having Science of it in other Cases Corol. II. Hence also is shewn the Vanity of that Tenet that maintains the Pre-existence of Souls as far as it depends on this Ground That Knowledges are only Excited or Awaken'd as it were by the Objects working on the Senses and not Imprinted there by them For this Ground shakes by manifesting the Ways and Means laid by Nature to beget those Knowledges in the Soul and convey them thither from the Objects Besides which overthrows all their Hypothesis the Knowledge that I am hic nunc thus affected cannot with any sence be pretended to have been Pre-existent to the Time and Place in which that Particular Knowledge was made since neither ehat Time nor perhaps Place was then in Being Whence it follows that the Soul can gain some new Knowledges and this by the Senses and if any or some why not with equal reason all that the same Senses can receive from Objects imprinted in her which as far as it depends on this way of instilling Knowledge may reach in a manner ad Nâ—tuâ—â— and by the assistance of Reflexion Discourse and Art improving it may stretch it self much farther Corol. III. From this whole Discourse it appears that whatever other Method of attaining Science some may propose however it may seem witty and one piece of their Doctrine be consonant to the other and all of them consequent to the Principles they lay yet it will I say evideâ—tly appear that the way they take can never be that which GOD and Nature have laid to ingraft Knowledge in us Whence tho' such Discoursers may shew much Art yet in reality and if it be examin'd to the bottom all their Plausible Contexture and Explication of their own Scheme will be found no better than the running pretty strains of Division upon no Ground since their pretended Knowledges do not begin with nor grow up orderly from the Natures of the Things themselves or from our Natural Notions which are the Seeds of Science Corol. IV. Our Discourse here abstracts from that Question Whether sensible Qualities are Inherent in the Object or in the 〈◊〉 It is enough for my purpose that the Objects work upon the Senses so as to imprint by their means several Notions in the Mind Yet I do not see how Mr. Hobbs proves for he does not so much as attempt it that Light coming from the Object does not carry away with it some Particles of it since we experience that the Sun beams dry up great Ponds which they could not do unless they did when reflected dip their dry Wings in that moist Element and return with some Particles of Water into the Air which when multiply'd are condensed afterwards into Clouds And I believe it will be granted that the Sun-beams reflected from the Moon bring along with them moist Vapours Much less is it conceivable that in Smells and Tasts nothing at all of the Nature of those Objects should be convey'd by the Nerves to the Brain but only a certain kind of Motiâ—n 'T is not my task to defend the Opinions of Schoolmen nor those of vulgar Philosophers which he impugns but to mind my own business Tho' had I a mind to lose a little time it were easie to shew that he seems to mistake all-along our Pâ—â—â—eptions for what is perceiv'd of the Object And I might as easily deny that Colour for
example is nâ—thing but Light and affirm that 't is such a disposition in the surface of a Body Figur'd thus or thus with Parts and Pores as is apt to reflect more or less of the Light and then to assert that that Disposition of the Surface is truly and really Inherent in the Object or Body it self sed haec obiter LESSON II. Of the Distinction of Natural Notions and of the Reducing them under Ten Common Heads 1. EVery individual Thing not only as was said imprints a Notion of it self in our Minds but many diverse Notions according to the Various Impressions it makes upon the same or diverse Senses This is manifest by Experience for we find that an Orange for example causes in us the several Notions of Yellow Heavy Round Juicy Hard c. 2. We can consider One of those Notions without considering the Others For we experience that we can abstract the Notion of Round from the notion of Heavy or any of the rest and Consider it apart and Discourse of it accordingly 3. Note That since the Object or Thing in our Understanding is capable of being consider'd diversly hence Notion gets the name of Considerability and diverse Notions are said to be diverse Considerabilities of the Thing which yet is no more but the same Thing as diversly consider'd 3. Whether or no there be any Knower of a superiour Order that can at one Intuitive View comprehend the whole thing yet 't is certain that our Soul in this state can have no Science of any thing otherwise than by these Abstracted Notions For since our Notions are the Ground of all our Knowledge or Science and as will be seen shortly we have no Notion of any Object but by Impressions on the Senses and those Impressions do differently affect us and so breed Different or Abstracted Notions 't is manifest that we can no otherwise know any thing here but by Different that is Abstracted Partial or Inadequate Notions 4. 'T is necessary to Science that it be Distinct and Clear and not Gross and Confusâ—d This is evident from the very Terms for Science signifies a Distinct and Clear Knowledge 5. Our Soul cannot in this state wield more Notions at once nor consider them or Discourse clearly of them together or rather indeed not at all This will appear evidently by an easie reflexion on our Interiour For we shall find that we can Discourse of each single abstracted Notion in an Orange viz. on its Bigness Roundness Colour Tast c. But if we would go about to Consider or Discourse of us Roundness and Tast both together and the same may be said of any other two that are Disparate or not included one in the other we shall find our selves at a loss and in Confusion not knowing how to begin nor how to proceed 6. We cannot in this state know even singly every particular Considerability found in the thing For tho' for example we can by our Common Sight discern the Colour or Figure of a thing or of its Grosser parts yet a Microscope will discover to us innumerable Particularities which escap'd our Common View and had we a Glass that magnified more there would be found still more and more Particularities than did appear when we observ'd it formerly Wherefore since every New Observation we can possibly make begets a New Notion in us and all our Knowledge is grounded on our Notions we can no more know the last Considerability which is in the thing than we can know the least Part that is to be found in Quantity or in the Differences of Figure Colour and other Respects which each of those very least parts may have and therefore they are not All knowable by us in this state 7. Much less can we in this state know perfectly or discourse scientifically of any Whole Individual thing or as the Schools call it the Suppositum taken in bulk For * since all the Considerabilities that integrate it and consequently the Notions it begets in us are blended confusedly in the entire Notion of the Suppositum or Thing Again since these are innumerable and many of them Unknowable by us it follows that no one of them that is Nothing in that whole Suppositum can be distinctly or clearly known while we discourse of that which has them all in bulk that is while we discourse of them all at once and consequently the Notion of the Suppositum which contains them all cannot be clearly or perfectly known by us nor discoursed of scientifically 8. Wherefore we cannot know in this state any One entire Thing perfectly since we can never have any perfect Science of it either taking it in bulk or by Detail 9. Wherefore all we can do in this state is to glean from the Objects by our Senses so many Notions of them as may suffice to distinguish them from one another and may serve for our Common Use Needful Speculation or lastly for our Contemplation 10. Notwithstanding this the Science attainable in this State may arrive to be in a manner Infinit For since our Notions are the very Natures of the Things and the Natures of the Things are the Seeds of all Science and diverse Truths spring from them and other Truths do still follow by Connexion with the former and since no stint is assignable of the Connexion of Truths or of our Deduction of one Truth from another it follows that there is no Bound or Limit of our Science attainable here but that if Art and Industry be used it may be in a manner Infinit 11. 'T is a most Fundamental Errour to fancy that there are many kinds of little Things in the Object corresponding to all the different Notions or Considerations which we make of it For since the least Paâ—ticle that is in it does ground diverse Notions of it and every various Consideration of each Particle either according to what is Intrinsecal or Extrinsecal to it does still beget more Again since no Particle can be so small but we can conceive or have distinct Notions of Two Halves and many other proportionate Parts in it and the Particles that are or may be conceiv'd to be in Quantitative Things are Numberless it follows that were all the Distinct Considerabilities in the Object distinct Things we could never pitch upon any of those Things they still including others in them which we could say is One or Vndivided in its self nor consequently could we know what Ens or Thing meant in Corporeal or Quantitative Things with which we converse which would Fundamentally destroy and pervert all Human Speech and Discourse about any Thing and make all Science impossible 12. From what 's said 't is deduced that it is one necessary and main Part of the Method to Science to distinguish our Notions Clearly and to keep them distinct Carefully For since all Science is grounded on our Notions and Science must be Clear and this
or the Natures of things into us by Impressions from Objects and by such Impressions or by their affecting us thus or thus their Different Natures that is Knowledge how those things Differ from one another and Differences do constitute the Nature of the thing by Distinguishing it from all others 't is manifest that from the Judgment or Knowledge that we are struck thus and thus by these and these Objects we are furnish'd with means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us and of our own Bodies in the first place And our Soul having the power of Comparing them to themselves and to Other Natures that are also in her we hence become capable of framing Innumerable Judgments concerning them or Knowledges of them 6. These Knowledges of all things that affect our Senses being gain'd to a fair degree by the Different Impressions of Objects are made more Express and Improv'd very much by Study and Reflexion For since Study and Reflexion are not the Inventing New or Counterfeit Notions or Natures of our own coyning but the Receiving frequently and minding heedfully the true and solid Notions of the things which Nature had imprinted there before it follows that as in Corporeal Sight by our Regarding the Object frequently wistly and attentively we come to observe more and more in it so by often Reflecting on and Revolving Intellectual Objects or the Natures of things in us the Eye of our Mind must needs look deeper into them make new Discoveries of diverse Considerations in them which escap'd a single Cursory view and gain more exact and more penetrative Knowledge of them 7. By Methods of Discoursing or Ratiocination made evident by Maxims of Art this Improvement of Knowledge were not vita brevis might come to be in a manner Infinit For all this is perform'd by Evident Connexion of Terms both in some propositions which are Truths and the deducing others by necessary consequence from them and so forwards Since then there is no stint assignable of the Connexion of Truths and as will be shewn hereafter there are Rules or Maxims of Art to teach us how to connect Terms Aptly and Evidently it follows that there can be no Bounds of the Improvement of Knowledge 8. From what 's said above 't is manifest that this proposition Ego cogito cannot be the first-known Truth whence all our Science is Generated for since this proposition Ego cogito if put entirely or explicitly as it ought is Ego sum cogitans and in the order of Nature the proposition Ego sum is antecedent to Ego sum cogitans and more simple than it so that if it be not suppos'd to be known the other cannot possibly be known 't is most Evident that Cogito or Ego cogito or which is the same Ego sum cogitans cannot be the first-known Proposition or First Truth that can be laid in the Method of Generating Science 9. The proposition Ego sum cogitans is less clear and evident than many other propositions that have for their predicate Notions directly imprinted on our Senses such as are I am Heated Hurt Extended Moving c. For since all our first-known notions the Soul being Rasa Tabula come by Impressions of Objects on our Senses those propositions are most Clear whose predicates are the Immediate Effects of those Impressions and joyn'd with Ego sum which is the first Judgment do compound those propositions But such are the predicates abovesaid and not the predicate Cogitans Therefore the proposition Ego sum Cogitans is less clear than are the propositions which have those directly imprinted Notions for their Predicates That the other predicates are notions more known than is Cogitans I prove thus The notion of Cogitans is Spiritual and therefore could not be imprinted in the Soul by a Direct stroke of the Object on the Senses as are the Others but must be known by Reflexion but what is known by Reflexion is less easily and less early known that is less Evident to us taking us as not yet imbued with other Knowledges than that which is known by Experience or Directly therefore the notion of Cogitans is less known than are those other predicates and consequently this proposition Ego sum Cogitans is less Clear than the propositions Ego sum Extensus vulneratus movens c. Again were the predicate Cogitans known experimentally or by Impressions on the Sense which it is not at all but as it is joyn'd with the Imagination the most Fallacious Faculty we have co-operating with the Understanding nay were it an Affection of the Man and its Notion directly imprinted in him and so as easily and early known as any of the rest yet the proposition Ego sum Cogitans could not be the First or Second in the Order of Knowable for since as was shewn I am struck or Affected antecedes I am affected thus or have such an affection in me and Cogitans is not barely to be Affected by Objects but to have such a manner of Affection hence the proposition I am affected by Objects is more Simple and therefore in priority of Nature precedes I am affected thus or I am Thinking and is more Clear than it 11. Hence the proposition Ego cogito is also less Certain than multitudes of other propositions whose predicates are experimentally known by Direct Impressions on the Senses For Certainty follows Evidence as its Proper Cause as Judging does Knowing Wherefore if that proposition be less Evident it is also less Certain 12. If it be alledg'd that it is Certain by way of Evident Proof that this proposition Ego cogito is the most absolutely firm Ground we can relye on to generate and principiate all our other Knowledges because tho' we would voluntarily divest our selves of all other Knowledges and call them into doubt that is were all the rest Vncertain and my self Insecure whether I think True or False in holding them yet it is Unquestionably Certain and Impossible to be doubted of but that whether I think right or wrong still I think whence follows that the proposition Ego cogito seems to be a firm basis to ground all the rest upon I answer that the whole Discourse seems to me to be a Paralogism and a kind of Fallacy of non causa pro causa for the Question is not whether it be not more Certain that I think than that I think wrong or right for 't is granted that this proposition I think is more Simple and therefore antecedes and is presuppos'd to the propositions I think right or wrong or thus and thus and consequently it is more Evident and more Certain than These are But the true point is whether I am more Certain that I think at all than that I am Certain that I am since if it be not presuppos'd that I am 't is most Certain that it is Impossible that I should be Certain that I am thinking or any thing like
have studied many of those Logicks my self when I was young and all of any note I had seen then and consider'd them very attentively till I had almost lost my Natural Reason by dwelling upon them yet notwithstanding and I believe the same passes with other young Students I knew no more how to go to work to demonstrate any thing than if I had never seen them They started now and then some curious amusing but jejune and useless Questions about Ens rationis Unions c. and set many confused Ideas of the several parts of Logick in my Memory but still my Reason was not Enlighten'd nor enabled to perform those fine things they had told me of Nor was it any wonder for they spoke not to my Reason nor endeavour'd to ground their Discourse on the Nature of the Things in hand nor to show demonstratively why every Step they led me or Lesson they taught me must be True nor how it did influence True Knowledge or advance directly towards the Acquisition of Science so that it look'd more like a kind of History of what those Authours had said or writ than like a Method to find out Truth insomuch that I came at length to suspect that the Intention of those kind of Logicians was not to pursue the Knowledge of Truth which is only to be had by Clear Demonstration but that they meant to furnish young Wits with certain Modes of Talking with a show of Learning and of signalizing themselves for being able to argue pro or con indifferently in Scholastick Dissertations It resembled the Tiring of a Hawk serving only to exercise its Nibbling Faculty and whet the Appetite but had nothing of Nutritive in it to satisfie it For Reflexion will teach us very Evidently that only that which is made Clear to our Reason can Settle in it Nourish and Dilate it as being Proper and Connatural Food to a Rational Soul and that whatever we take in or carelesly swallow that is not such but meerly Wordish only fills us full of Wind and Ayr which breaks out in Insipid Talk The Fault then lies evidently in the Logicks which have been us'd in the Schools hitherto none of which have attempted to show Demonstratively the Way how to Demonstrate or given us a Connected Discourse of the METHOD TO SCIENCE 'T is noted that the Practice of the Preacher going along with his Doctrine makes the Doctrine it self more Edifying and by parity had the Teachers of Logick Practised Demonstration all the while they had taught how to Demonstrate those Rules so Rationally imprinted sinking deep into their Soul and thence becoming as it were a Limb or Faculty of their Judgment would have truly Enabled them how to act accordingly whereas while they swim only in their Memory they serve for nothing but to pour out indigestedly what they had rawly taken in But now where is that Authour who has hitherto made such an Useful and Necessary Attempt None that I know of The Treatise call'd Ars cogitandi has divers Excellent things in it and in some places has made many good steps towards True Logick and the Examples it brings are very Illustrating But yet in the main it amounts to no more but The Schools Reform'd into Method and Elegancy It abounds with many useless particulars It does not bottom it self upon Nature only which can give Solidity to our Reasons It has many Unprov'd Suppositions and bare Sayings without offering any Proof And yet I do verily believe that had not the Authours calculated it for that particular sort of Philosophy they had espous'd which could bear no Evidence but had follow'd the guidance of their own Natural Genius which doubtless was very Extraordinary it would have much excell'd its present self * Mr. Le Grand's Method says much but proves little and I believe both Cartesius and himself did first consider and survey the whole Scheme of their Doctrine and then fitted their Logick to it Which is Preposterous and Praeter-natural for the certain Way to the End of our Iourney should be foreknown ere we set the First step towards it Mr. Lushington has with much pains gone about to demonstrate some particulars of the Summulist part of Logick and chiefly that about Predication But there is nothing at all of Nature in his Grounds He regards not the Common Notions of Mankind nor in what they consist and therefore his Discourses are so perfectly Artificial that they have nothing to say to Nature nor Nature to them He imposes imprudently new Language and new Terms upon his Readers which he might have assur'd himself they would never take pains to learn He affects the way of A B C which makes a show of Science but the Product of his Discourse is oftentimes no more but the bare Proposition he is to prove onely drest up in a Mathematical Garb. His whole Book in my judgment might have been more clearly compriz'd in one Sheet of Paper And lastly as for want of Nature to ground his Conceptions his several Proofs can never enter into the Reason so 't is almost Impossible they should ever stay long in the Memory Yet his Attempt to demonstrate in such a Sceptical Age and his Industry deserve a fair Commendation and may provoke others to make the same Attempt with better Success Burgersdicius is clearly contriv'd for the Memory onely and not for the Reason and he confounds and over-burthens it too with the Multitude of his Canons Rules and Divisions for which he seldome or never gives any reason but puts them to be Believ'd by his Reader if he pleases and so leaves him still in the dark Yet he might be made Useful to New Beginners were something of every thing that is to purpose pick'd out Unnecessary things in which he super-abounds cut off his Errours which are not a few Corrected by some Learned hand and his shatter'd thrums-ends woven into some kind of Connexion and Dependence on one another to do which little Transitions from one passage to another are Insufficient But as he is he informs not the Understanding of any one thing groundedly or solidly He falls exceedingly short of Ars cogitandi in many regards How he may please Climates of a duller Genius I know not but I should much wonder if any Learned Englishman should consider or esteem him Mr. Clark far exceeds him in good Sense and in giving some Reasons for what he says in many particular passages But by his framing the Contexture of his Book out of Authours of different Principles his Discourses do sometimes appear Desultory and like a kind of Elaborate Rhapsody laid well together by his own good Wit He mistakes Aristotle now and then by taking his Sentiments as represented by his Adversaries whose Interest and Principles conspire to make them misconceive him He abounds with many Reflexions not all conducing to Science A Fault from which Aristotle himself was not altogether free which makes it more pardonable For instance To what
Exact Distinction and remain Unconfounded and that whoever holds otherwise and makes them two Suppositums does in the Christian Phrase Solvere Christum 1 Io. 4.3 I have not time to reckon up even hintingly the many Absurdities that spring from this ill-coherent Position of theirs But I will keep to this very Maxim of his and demonstrate that even according to that Man which must be meant by the Pronoun Ego is truly one thing consisting of Soul and Body and not a mere Mens To show this I deny that he has a Câ—â—ar and Distinct Idea of himself unless he conceives himself to be a Rational thing or as he calls himself Ratio nor can he clearly conceive himself to be a Rational Thing but he must conceive himself to be a Thing that infers new Knowledges out of foregoing ones leasurely or with succession of Time which belongs properly to Bodies and Bodily Motion Wherefore something of Corporeal Extended or Divisible is found in the Clear and Distinct Idea of Ego or Himself if he be a Ratio or Rational Thing for were he meerly a Mens or Spirit his Operations would be Indivisible Simultaneous and Unsuccessive as is abundantly demonstrated in divers places of the following Treatise particularly in my Seventh Demonstration Book 3. Lesson 7. Among the other points he brings as possible to be yet doubted of he puts this for one that a Four-squar'd thing has in it four sides and no more of which he pretends he may yet doubt because some most Powerful Agent may possibly make that appear to him to be so tho' it be not true in reality Now 't is the very Notion or Essence of a Quadratum to have but four sides and therefore the Proposition affirming that it has just four sides is perfectly Identical and the same as to say What has but four sides has but four sides It being then impossible any thing can be more Certain or more Evident than an Identical Proposition I would ask why he might not as well be Deceivable in his First Principle Cogito ergo sum as in that Self-evident Proposition Or if he pretends that Proposition Ego sum cogitans is more Evident than the other then since all Evidence of the Truth of any Proposition consists in the Close and Clear Connexion of its Terms I would demand of him or his Scholars whether there be any Connexion of Terms more Close and more Clear than there is of those found in an Identical Proposition which affirms the Same is the Same with it self Or if they say there is then to know of them in what that Evidence consists or how it comes to be more Evident To make way towards the settling his beloved and self-pleasing Ideas he falls to Doubt of the Certainty of all our Senses in order to Knowledge and that not onely as a Supposition for Discourse sake as he pretended to doubt of other things but really and seriously and his Scholar Malbranche assures us the Eyes and the same he says of the other senses are not given us to judge of the Truth of Things but onely to discern those things which may either Profit or injure us and all over he makes them improper Means to attain Knowledge by Which Tenet of theirs lies open to many Exceptions For First The Reason Cartesius assigns viz. Prudentiae est nunquam illis planè confidere qui nos vel semel deceperunt 'T is a part of Prudence not to trust them at all who have so much as once deceiv'd us is utterly unworthy so Great a Man For it discredits all Nature for some few Men's Morality which is a strange Argument for a Philosopher He that has but once deceiv'd us designedly is presum'd to have done it out of Knavery and consequently may not deserve to be trusted the second time because 't is to be fear'd he is still dispos'd to do the same again But what is this to Corporeal Nature in which taking in all circumstances things are carry'd on from Proper Causes to Proper Effects Weak men are sometimes deceiv'd by their Senses but Speculative or Learned men who penetrate the Reasons how the Senses came to misinform them are aware of those undue circumstances and by that means easily prevent the being led by them into Errour 2dly No wise man builds his Judgments barely on the Impressions made on his Senses being taught by their Reason as well as by the Senses themselves better circumstanced that is by Experience that they do sometime deceive us Whence they reserve in their Minds certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in what circumstances we may truly give Credit to their Testimony in what not Now since Exceptio firmat Regulam to say their Information is to be Excepted against in such Circumstances is to acknowledge that in all others they are to be trusted 3dly As Art does preserve the Learned from being Deceiv'd by the Shortness of the Senses in some Cases so as was said lately the Senses themselves do generally correct the False Iudgments they may have occasion'd in Weak People For example to use some of the Instances they object a Brand whirled round represents a Circle of Fire a Stick in the Water looks Crooked a Square Tower seen a far off appears Round and Great Bodies Little But when the Seer comes near the Brand the Tower and those Great Bodies or beholds the Stick out of the Water he having now a more exact View of them in better Circumstances is inform'd certainly by the same Sense and if need be by others conspiring with it that the former representations were not sincere whence he easily corrects his former Mistakes Why then must the Senses be quite discarded as Useless Servants for Knowledge and be branded for constant Lyers and Deceivers since if we apply them as we ought they are the Proper Means to make us correct these too forward Iudgments which in improper Circumstances they may have occasion'd Nay they advance our Knowledge accidentally even when they happen to misinform us by stirring us up to enquire whence it came that the right Impressions on them from the Objects which were Customary was thus perverted which doubtless has been the Cause of very many New Knowledges in Nature 4thly What is all this to Science or to our purpose For in the Method to Science we neither need nor do build our JUDGMENTS on the Senses alone All we require is that they convey into our Knowing Power right Aâ—PREHENSIONS or NOTIONS of the things in Nature And this 't is Evident they must do for tho' as they object a Large Square Steeple seen a far off seems Round and Little and therefore who Judges it such is Deceiv'd yet it imprints truly in my Mind the Notion of Little and Round and 't is on these unmistakable NOTIONS all our Science is built and our Judging right in our Speculations is chiefly grounded on other Principles as will be seen hereafter Lastly Themselves must either
the Mind which is nothing but its Return and Conversion towards God who onely can teach us Truth by the Manifestation of his Substance I am heartily glad to know that Euclid and Archimedes were converted to God and that they were so infinitely Happy as to see God's Substance which is his Essence so manifestly He proceeds Men must look within themselves and draw near unto the Light that shines there continually that their Reason may be the more Illuminated The Mind ought to examin all Human Sciences by the Pure Light of Truth which guides it without hearkening to the False and confused Testimonies of the Senses Those that hear us do not learn the Truths we speak to their Ears unless he that discover'd them to us he means GOD the Giver of Ideas do reveal them at the same time to the Mind So that all Science it seems comes by Divine Revelation To what end then are Teachers Professours Schools and Universities if when we have done what we can by all our Teaching and Learning nothing but Divine Revelation must do the business or gain us any Science But now he advances to a higher point The Mind says he is immediately and after a very strict manner United to God nay after a stricter and more Essential manner than with the Body Now if this be true I dare affirm that the Mind is more United to God Naturally than our Saviour's Humanity was Supernaturally and Miraculously For This was but United Hypostatically or according to the Suppositum or Person of the Eternal Word whereas by this new Philosophy every Human Mind is United Essentially to God that is to the Godhead it self For to be united Essentially is for one Essence to be united to another Essence that is to be one or the same Essence with the Divine Essence Was ever such Quakerism heard of among Philosophers Or plain honest Human Reason so subtiliz'd and exhal'd into Mystick Theology by Spiritual Alchymy Yet to say True this is very Consonant to the Doctrine of Ideas They slight the Instruction of Nature they scorn to be beholding to their Senses and Outwards Objects which forces them upon Introversion and to observe as the same Authour says what Eternal Truth tells us in the Recesses of our Reason that is in their Darling Ideas Now common Reason ever taught me and every Man who did but reflect upon what passes within his Understanding that the Proper and Effectual way to gain a Clear and Distinct Knowledge of our Simple Notions is to make DEFINITIONS of them and there are most Certain Rules of Art how those Definitions may be fram'd But this was too Ordinary a way to please Minds so Extraordinarily Elevated as these Gentlemen pretend to be bless'd with The highest Flights of Nature do flag it seems too low for their Supernatural pitch nor can reach the Degrees of their Elevation above our dull Horizon They are Inspir'd with Heaven implanted Ideas and so they have no more to do but retire their Thoughts into the Inward Recesses of their Mind embellish'd and guilded with these Shining Innate Ideas and their work is done without any need of Definitions made by sublunary Art Sometimes I am apt to think that they had recourse to those Spiritual Pourtraitures out of despair of explicating any other way the Essences of Things or in what they consisted and I fear two of our Learned men lately mention'd apprehend them to be Inscrutable and In-explicable Whereas speaking of Essences in Common I do assure them that nothing can be plainer and that every Clown were he interrogated orderly could give us the true Essences or which is the same the true Natures of the things he is conversant with For whatever makes Mankind call and esteem any Bodies such or such Things in Distinction from all others is truly their Essence or to speak in the Language of a Philosopher let but Matter be determin'd by such a Complexion of Accidents with that Harmony or Proportion of parts connected with that Constancy that it is fit to act a Distinct part upon Nature's stage or perform its Primary Operation that Complexion of Accidents I say is truly the Essence of that Body or the Form that constitutes it such an Ens or such a Part of or in Nature Perhaps the Cartesians will say they allow Definitions to make their Ideas Clear and Distinct. But how can this cohere Definitions are the Effects of Art whereas these Ideas are imprinted by God's Hand who gave them their Nature and Cartesius says expresly they are Ingenitae This being so and GOD's immediate Works being Perfect and those Ideas being intended to give them Knowledge they can need nothing to make them more Clear and Distinct nor consequently can the Users of them have any occasion for Definitions unless perhaps to explain their Ideas to us who think we have a firmer Basis to build them on than those Ideas of theirs Nature gives the Ground and Art the Rules to make them And they are such necessary Instruments to true and solid Science that I could wish for the Improvement of Knowledge that our Universities would appoint a Committee of Learned Men to compile a Dictionary of Definitions for the Notions we use in all parts of Philosophy whatever Monsieur de Furetiere has attempted to perform this for all words whatever in Three Volumes Out of which may be Collected those that make for our purpose which being by the Ioynt-labour and Concurrence of the Persons deputed Examined if faulty Amended and propos'd to the World it could not fail of advancing Science highly In carrying forward such a Noble Work and so Beneficial to Mandkind I should willingly contribute my Quota of Endeavours nor think my pains better bestow'd in any thing I know of For Definitions explicating or unfolding the Nature of the Thing and all Proper Causes and Effects being so nearly ally'd to the Nature of the Thing it follows that there lies involv'd in the Definitions all Essential and Proper Middle Terms to demonstrate whatever belongs to the Notion Defin'd if Right Logick and studious Industry be not wanting He blames St. Austin and wishes he had not attributed to External Bodies all the sensible Qualities we perceive by their means And why Because says he they are not clearly contain'd in the Idea he had of Matter What Idea St. Austin had of Matter is little to purpose but if he proceeded consequently to his Thoughts he could not conceive the First Matter to be such as they put theirs to be For what Man of Common Sense can frame any Idea of a Thing that has onely Extension in it but is not to any degree either Dense or Rare Easie or Hard to be Divided Fluid nor Solid Soft nor Hard c. And if their Quaint Ideas and Clear and Distinct Conceptions which seem to be the Ground of all their Witty Discourses or Divine Revelations as Malbranche calls them of Science be no Wiser or Solider
than this which is or should be the chief Subject of their Physicks I shall dare to affirm that they are in plain Terms most ridiculous and most unintelligible Fopperies as I have shown at large in my Appendix And indeed how should we make any Clear Idea of their Matter when themselves speak Contradictions concerning it as may be seen hereafter p. 417. where I shall hope I have demonstrated that their Forc'd Silence Open Prevarications and perfect Inconsistency in telling us the Intrinsecal Nature of that First Matter of theirs has render'd them utterly Incapable of explicating any Body in Nature Nor can we need any greater Confirmation that their Natural Philosophy is utterly Unprincipled and Unaccountable in the most Essential part of it than to observe that neither Cartesius himself nor Regius Rohault Regis Le Grand nor any of that School I have met with have as I must think been Able to give us any Light of it since they neither Attempt nor Mention it which shows they are at an utter Loss about the Primordial Constitution of their First Matter of which notwithstanding they acknowledge all their Three Elements and consequently all Nature was made These few Particulars omitting innumerable others I have thought fit to hint to show that the Method to Science which the Great Cartesius follows is utterly Incompetent to attain it and that the Scheme of his Doctrine is merely a piece of Wit That which gives it most Credit is that his Suppositions granted he proceeds consequently in the subsequent parts of it which are purely Mathematical But what signifies that if he neither observes True Logick in laying his Principles nor Nature in his Physicks which he cannot pretend to do unless he gives us a particular account of the Intrinsecal Constitution of his First Matter upon which all depends A Task I say again his Followers neither will ever attempt nor can possibly perform by his Principles as is shown at large in my Appendix Yet it must be confess'd that those kind of Discourses are very Plausible and Taking with the Middling sort of Readers and with such who are much pleas'd with a Melodious Gingle of Words prettily laid together with Neat Eloquence Quaint Wit and Unusual Remarks For those kind of Embellishments do divert the Reader make the Authours pass for Curious men and bear a fine Appearance of Truth till they come to be scann'd Exactly and grasp'd close by Severe Reason reducing them to Principles and Connexion of Terms Which done it will be found that they afford to the Learner who sincerely seeks for Truth nothing but certain Bright Flashes or Coruscations which do indeed for a time dazle the Fancy but they settle in the Iudgment no Constant Steady Light to direct them in their Way to true Science Farther I must declare for the Honour of our English Genius that tho' we do not match the French in the Finery Gayity and Neatness of their delivering their Conceptions a Talent in which they are very Excellent any more than we do in our Outward Garb and Dress yet that there are more Solid Productions well built Truths and more Iudicious and Ingenious Thoughts of his own in our Learned Countryman Mr. Locke's Treatise Entituled An Essay concerning Human Understanding than as far as I have observ'd is found in great Multitudes of such slight Discoursers put together We are come now to consider the Other pretended Method to Science which is the Way of Experiments or Induction Concerning which not to repeat what I have occasionally by way of Reason alledg'd against it in my following Book I need say no more but that Matter of Fact shows evidently that this Method alone and Unassisted by Principles is utterly Incompetent or Unable to beget Science For what one Universal Conclusion in Natural Philosophy in knowing which kind of Truths Science consists has been Demonstrated by Experiments since the the time that Great man Sir Francis Bacon writ his Natural History The very Title of which laborious Work shows that himself did not think Science was attainable by that Method For if we reflect well on what manner such pieces are writ we shall find that it is as he calls it meerly Historical and Narrative of Particular Observations from which to deduce Universal Conclusions is against plain Logick and Common Sense To aim at Science by such a Method may be resembled to the Study of finding out the Philosopher's Stone The Chymist lights on many Useful and Promising things by the way which feed him with false hopes and decoy him farther but he still falls short of his End What man of any past or of our present Curious Age did ever so excell in those Industrious and Ingenious Researches as that Honour of our Nation the Incomparable Mr. Boyle yet after he had ransack'd all the hidden Recesses of Nature as far as that Way could carry him he was still a Sceptick in his Principles of Natural Philosophy nor could with the utmost Inquisitiveness practic'd by so great a Wit arrive at any Certain Knowledge whether there was a Vacuum or no And certainly we can expect no Science from such a Method that can give us no Certain Knowledge whether in such a Space there be Something or Nothing which of all others should be the most easily Distinguishable and Knowable Lastly we may observe that when an Experiment or which is the same a Matter of Fact in Nature is discover'd we are never the nearer knowing what is the Proper Cause of such an Effect into which we may certainly refuâ—d it which and onely which is the Work of SCIENCE For Gassendus will explicate it according to his Principles Cartesius according to his the Noble Sir Kenelin Digby and his most Learned Master Albius whom I Iudge to have follow'd the true Aristotelian Principles according to theirs So that after all the assigning the True Natural Cause for that Effect and explicating it right must be Decided by way of Reason that is by Demonstrating first whose Principles of Natural Philosophy are True and Solid and onely He or They who can approve their Principles to be such can pretend to explicate that Natural Production right by resolving it into its Proper Causes or to have Science how 't is done and however the Experimental Men may be highly Commendable in other Respects yet onely those who can lay just Claim to True Principles and make out their Title to them can be truly held Natural PHILOSOPHERS Which sufficiently shows that the Way of Experiments cannot be a True METHOD TO SCIENCE But to leave other Men's Failings and Return home to my Self To obviate the Superficial ways of Reason so magnify'd by other Speculaters I have endeavour'd to take the quite Contrary Method and have laid my Discourses as deep as I could possibly and perhaps it will be thought I have over-done in those about Identical Propositions for which yet I shall hope the Reasons I have given there for that
propositions are directly opposit to Contradictions since Man's Wit cannot invent a proposition directly Opposit to what runs runs not but what runs runs which is perfectly Identical Add that all Fault consisting in this that 't is a Privation of the Opposit Good Contradictions would not be at all Faulty but that they violate the Truth of Identical propositions as has been now proved since there are no other Truths which they directly and formally Oppose or destroy 12. Again as will be seen hereafter to Conclude is to shew the Terms of the Conclusion to be Connected by their being Connected with a Third or Middle Term in the Premisses But how can we shew that Middle Term is really connected with those Two other Terms in the Premisses By finding still another Middle Term to be connected with the Terms of the proposition to be proved And how far must this go on Endlesly or no If Endlesly it is impossible any thing should ever come to be prov'd if not then we must come to some proposition whose Terms are so Connected that no Middle Term can come between them that is such as cannot be Connected by means of Another that is which cannot be prov'd or made evident that is which are self-connected or self-evident that is which are formally Identical To enforce this we may observe that the more Remotâ— the Terms of a proposition are from Formal Identity the less evident they are and the more prooâ— they require as also that they grow still nearer to Evidence according to the degree of their Approaching to be Formally the same Wherefore since all Approach of Distant things ends in their Conjoyning and Centering in the same 't is manifest that all Approach of Distant Notions ends in their being the same in Notion or in a proposition Formally Identical as in a First and Self-evident Principle 13. Besides all Causality or the whole Course of Nature is finally refunded into this Self-evident Principle that Things are such as they are that is are what they are For since an Effect is a Participation of something that is in the Cause and the Cause as such is that which imparts or communicates something it has to the Matter on which it works its Effect Again since the Effect is such as the Cause is as to that which is imparted to it and if the Cause be of another sort the Effect still varies accordingly there can be no doubt but that Causality is the Imprinting the Existence of that Essence or Thing which is the Cause upon the Matter Whence follows evidently that the very Notion of Natural Causality and the whole Efficacy of it consists in the Causes existing that is being what it is Only Motion is added as a Common Requisit to apply that Existing Cause better or worse which is refunded into a Nature Superiour to Body as will be shewn hereafter 14. Lastly God himself has exprest his own Supreme Essence by this Identical Proposition Ego Sum qui Sum that is I exist or am Existence Which is the same in a manner with Self existence is Self-Existence Which therefore is the First Increated Truth as 't is the First Created one that what is is or A thing is what it is which is therefore True because God is what He is or because Self-existence is Self-existence From which Divine and Soveraign Verity all our Created First Principles derive their Truth For were not This True all our Identical Proposition and First Principles would all be False in regard they have their Verity from the Natures of the Things and of our Vnderstanding neither of which could have their Metaphysical Verity nor consequently could they ground or be capable of any Truth at all if Self-Existence their Cause were not Self-Existence and thence Unlimited in Power Wisdome and Goodness to Create and Conserve those Beings which are the Foundation of all the Truth we have or can have The Reader is desired to referr this Section to the Third Corollary and to consider them well together because they mutually give Light to one another And if we rightly consider it as the Proposition Homo est Homo is onely the reducing the Metaphysical Verity of Homo into a Formal Truth so Self Existence is self-Existence is the same in respect of the Soveraign Metaphysical Verity of the Divine Nature Corol. IV. Hence is seen that an Atheist can have no perfectly Certain Knowledge or Evidence of any thing but that by denying his Maker he deservedly comes to lose the best Perfection of his own Nature For if a Sceptick should put him to prove that things have any Metaphysical Verity in them grounding our first Principles and consequently all our Knowledge and object that for any thing he knows Things are Chimerical and so contriv'd as to beget in us False Judgments he is utterly at a loss through his denying a First Cause whose Unchangeable and Essential Truth and Goodness has Establisht their Natures to bee Unalterably what they are whence onely any Certain and Evident Knowledge of them is possible to be attain'd 15. Definitions tho' very useful to Science are not Self evident nor are those Propositions that Predicate the Definition of the Notion Defin'd First Principles For Self-evident Principles by force of their very Terms do oblige the Understanding to assent which such Propositions do not Again Art is requisit to make such Definitions as are Proper and Adjusted to the Thing Defin'd whereas First Principles must antecede all Art and be known by the Natural Light of our Understanding Besides the Possibility of being defind goes before the Definition which Possibility the Thing has from its Metaphysical Verity determining it to be This and no other For if the thing were not truly what it is it could not be exexplaind to be what it is were it not One that is Undivided in its self and Divided from all others it could not be compriz'd in one Definition and if it were not Determinately of this or that Nature it 's certain Bounds and Limits could not be drawn which is done by the Definition Whence 't is manifest that that proposition which affirms that a Thing is what it is is the First Principle and Ground to all Definitions and therefore Definitions themselves are not First Principles 16. This is further evinc'd because Words being liable to Equivocalness where there are more words as there are in Definitions there is more room for Equivocation which Inconvenience appears no where more than in the known Definition of Man For there wants not many Witty or rather half-witted Discoursers who Distinguish that is makes Ambiguous the Word Rational and do not stick to maintain that Man is Rational or Concluding being the Proper Act of Reason can Conclude Evidently in Lines and Numbers but not in Logick Physicks Ethicks or Metaphysicks much less in Theology and by this means they cramp the Definition to less than half the sense the words contain There are others
all the Materials as it were that are requisite to Science Nor while they attend to the Natures of the Things can they want First Principles by which to guide their thoughts so that they onely want Maxims of Art to put their Thoughts into the posture of Science to make them more firm distinct and express and to improve them by drawing new Consequences from them Wherefore such Acute Men some of which are found in every Country and every Age by having their Knowledge grounded on solid Nature may far exceed Hypothetical Philosophers or any of the others before-mentioned in True Knowledge and so come nearer the being true Philosophers than any of them nay than Great Artists and Reputed Scholars though they caper in the Ayr never so nimbly and quaintly with School-Terms Distinctions and Witty and Congruous Explications of their own Schemes if they do not begin with and build upon Good Honest Solid Nature BOOK III. Of the Third Operation of our Vnderstanding Discourse and of the Effects and Defects of it LESSON I. Of Artificial Discourse the Force of Consequence and of the only Right Figure of a Syllogism 1. DIscourse may either mean Common Reasoning us'd by all Mankind in their Ordinary Conversation or by some in Rhetorical Speeches which may fitly be call'd Loose Discourse Or it may mean that Artificial way of Reasoning which consists in such a Connexion of Terms in two Propositions call'd the Major and Minor or the Premisses as that a Third Proposition call'd the Conclusion must naturally and necessarily follow from them which may be properly nam'd Contracted or Strict Discourse and by Logicians is call'd a Syllogism 2. This following or Consequence of such a Proposition out of two others is call'd Inference Deduction Concluding Argumentation and Proving So that the Essence of a Syllogism consists as formally in the Consequence of that Proposition which is Concluded from the Premisses exprest by the Illative Particle ergo as the Essence of a Proposition does in the Copula that connects its Terms and Predicates or says something of another 3. Wherefore since if the Consequence in which consists the Essence and all the Force and Nerves of Discourse be not Clear and Evident there could be no Certainty or Evidence of any thing that needs to be made known or concluded and so our Faculty of Exact Reasoning would have been given us to no purpose hence 't is manifest that however one Proposition may be made known by others that are Connected and Consequential to one another yet the Consequence it self cannot be prov'd or made clear by another Consequence for the Question would still return how and in virtue of what that Consequence which made the other Evident is Evident it self and so in infinitum Whence it follows that the Evidence of all Consequences whatever must be built on something in a higher manner Evident than any Consequence or Proof can make it that is on a Self-evident or Identical Proposition as will be shown hereafter 4. Hence we may gather manifestly that a Syllogism can have but Three Terms in it Two of which are given us in the Proposition to be Concluded and the Third is that Middle Term by finding which to be Identify'd with the other Two in the Premisses we come to be assur'd by virtue of the self-evident Proposition hinted above that they are Identifyâ—d in the Conclusion or which is the same that the Conclusion is True 5. From what 's said it appears that a Syllogism is the Tâ—st of all other Discourses by reducing them to which their Truth is to be try'd For since whatever is most Perfect in its Kind ought to be the Standard or Test by which to Measure and try the Perfection of all others of the same Kind and a Syllogism is the best and most firmly grounded Act of our Natural Reason made exact by Art which is to perfect Nature and therefore absolutely the very Best that can be in its Kind or the best Discourse it follows that 't is to be the true Test and Standard of all other Discourses to which the Verity Sense or Coherence of all the rest are to be reduc'd and to be try'd by it Corol. I. Hence 't is of very Excellent Use for Young Wits to exercise themselves in Reducing loose Discourses to strict ones or Syllogisms For by endeavouring this they will to their Admiration find how Shallow and far from Evident the Grounds how precarious unprov'd and oft-times contradictious the particular Assertions and how Open and Incoherent the Contexture and Consequences are in many Rhetorical Discourses and Speeches which drest up in fine Language and embellâ—sht with little Tropes and Figures and other pretty Tricks of Wit and Fancy did before look very plausible and made a gay Appearance of most Excellent Sense Perhaps scarce any one Expedient can be invented that is more useful to advance Truth beat down Error and keep the Generality of Mankind from being deluded than thus to divest such empty Discourses of their Glossy Out-side and to let them see how deformed a Hag Errour will appear to the Eye of Reason when expos'd stark-naked Whereas on the other side 't is the Glory of Truth to be stript of these Ornamental Triâ—â—es for by this means her Native Beauty and the Symmetry of all her parts will appear more Amiable in the Eye of those who do sincerely affect her 6. From the third § it manifestly follows that the Consequence of a Syllogism having a self-evident Proposition for its Basis if upon severe examination we find that any Discourse does indeed bear that Test and can be Reduc'd to a rigorous Syllogism and the Premisses which the Consequence supposes to be True be really so or can be by this Method prov'd True it follows I say that we may be as perfectly assur'd as that we are that the Conclusion is Consequent and True and that sooner may all the Material World crumble into Incoherent Atoms or relapse into the Abyss of Nothingness than that any Conclusion thus deduced can be False since if it could then that Identical Proposition on which the Consequence is grounded would be False and so a Contradiction would be True which falsifies the Metaphysical Verity of Creatures and of the Ideas of them in the Divine Understanding which would consequently shock the Wisdom and even the Essence of the Godhead it self For self-existence might not be self-existence if a Contradiction might be True Corol. II. Were that which is said here and some other main Hinges of Science which occur in this Treatise duely consider'd and well penetrated it might be hoped that they would to a fair degree cure the Disease of Scepticism so Epidemical among our late Wits For even the worst of Scepticks will grant that an Identical Proposition must be True and he may see here that by this Doctrin both First Principles must be such and that all force of Consequence also which two are the main Pillars of
the Premisses affirms Universally the other Particularly the Conclusion must be a particular Affirmative For tho' one of the Extremes be Universally or Totally connected with the Medium yet the other Extreme is but Particularly or in part Connected with it and so it can never infer the Total Connexion of them nor can the Conclusion be an Universal Affirmative because they were not to that degree Connected with the Medium in the Premisses For Example Da Every Good Man is Charitable ri Some Rich Man is a Good Man Therefore i Some Rich Man is Charitable 14. When one of the Extremes is Universally deny'd of the Medium and the Medium particularly affirm'd of the other Extreme the Conclusion must be a particular Negative For were the Terms Totally the same in the Minor as it was in Celarent then the Terms of the Conclusion had been not at all the same but Vniversally deny'd of one another as it was there wherefore being but in part the same in the Minor they can only be in part not the same in the Conclusion For Example Fe-No harmful thing is to be used ri Some Mirth is a harmful thing therefore o Some Mirth is not to be used From these Grounds the Reason may be given for diverse Maxims or Axioms commonly used by Logicians concerning this present matter telling us when and how the Conclusions follow or not follow such as are 15. From two Vniversal Negatives nothing follows Because neither Extreme is Connected with the Medium either in whole or in part nor from this that two Notions are different from a Third is it consequent that they are or are not the same thing with one another Wherefore a Syllogism being such an Artificial and perfectly order'd Discourse that putting the Premisses to be True the Conclusion must be True also such as this and the same may be said in part of those other that follow wanting that due Connexion of the Terms which is Essential to a Syllogism are not Syllogisms but Paralogisms v. g. No Brute is Rational No Man is a Brute Therefore No Man is Rational 16. From two particular Propositions nothing follows For a Particular Proposition expressing but some part of the whole Notion of the Middle Term with which it is joyn'd and there being more parts in that whole Notion one of the Extremes may be united with it according to one part or Consideration of it and the other according to another part in which case it cannot follow they are united at all with one another in the Conclusion v. g. Some Man is a Fool. Some Wise Man is a Man Therefore Some Wise Man is a Fool Where some Man the Medium is taken for a diverse Part as it were of Man in common and so the Medium as considered according to it's Parts which are Diverse is not One it self nor consequently can it unite others by it's being one or the same with it's self which is the Fundamental Ground of all Consequence Corol. Hence follows immediatly that one of the Premisses must be an Vniversal else nothing is Concluded Which deserves Remarking this being useful to confute some Wrong Methods to Science 17. A Negative Conclusion cannot be deduced from Affirmative Premisses Because if the Extremes were the same with the Medium in the Premisses and not the same with one another in the Conclusion it would follow that the Middle Term is the same and not the same with it self or else that the Connexion or Inconnexion of the Terms in the Conclusion is not to be taken from the Connexion or Inconnexion with the Middle Term in the Premisses which utterly subverts all Ground of Discoursing 18. The Conclusion cannot be Vniversal unless the Medium be once taken Vniversally in the Premisses Because otherwise both the Premisses would be Particulars from which as was proved § 16. no Conclusion can follow 19. The Conclusion always follows the worser part that is it must be Negative or Particular if either of the Premisses be such The reason of the former is because if either of the Premisses be Negative then the Medium is not the same with one of the Terms of the Conclusion and therefore it can never be the cause of Identifying them both which is done by inferring an Affirmative Conclusion The reason of the latter is because if it be only in part the same with one of the Extremes it cannot prove those Extremes to be wholly the same which can only be done by their being united with it universally for it can give no greater degree of Connexion to the two Extremes than it self has with them as was shown § 10. These Maxims or Positions being shown to be Rational and necessarily Consequent to the Grounds of Rigorous or Syllogistical Discoursing we proceed in our intended Method 20. A Singular Proposition may supply the Place of a Particular one in the Minor of Darii and Ferio For a Singular or Individual Notion is in reality some part of the Common Notion and the words Some Man or Some Men do signify some Individual Man or Men wherefore abating the manner of the Indeterminate Expression the sense is the same in both Hence these are right Syllogisms and Conclusive Da-Every Philosopher resolves Effects into their Proper Causes ri Aristotle is a Philosopher therefore i Aristotle resolves Effects into their Proper Causes Fe-No Man who supposes his Grounds gratis is a Philosopher ri Epicurus supposes his Grounds gratis therefore o Epicurus is not a Philosopher 21. Expository Syllogisms that consist of Singular Propositions are true and perfect Syllogisms For since a Syllogism is such a Discourse as from the Clear Connexion of a Middle Notion with the two Extremes inferrs the Connexion of those Extremes with one another and Singulars have their Notions as well as Universals and may be connected with one another it follows that in case these Discourses be not Faulty in other respects they cannot from the regard of their consisting wholly of Singulars be degraded from being true and perfect Syllogisms v. g. Tom Long brought me a Letter This Man is Tom Long Therefore This Man brought me a Letter 22. Such Syllogisms do not advance Science For since we experience that our Soul is not only Capable of having Universal Notions but that 't is her peculiar Nature to Abstract that is to draw Singular Notions to Universal ones and since Notions are the Ground of all Knowledge and consequently Universal Notions of Universal Knowledges and Science is a Perfection of our Mind according to her Nature and therefore does dilate and enlarge her Natural Capacity by Extending it to the Knowledge of Vniversal Truths Wherefore since on the other side an Expository Syllogism as consisting of Singulars can Conclude or gain the Soul knowledge of no more but some one Singular it Cramps Contracts or makes Narrow her Natural Capacity whence it follows that such Syllogisms are far from Perfecting the Soul or from generating Science which is
her Natural Perfection 23. Hence follows that such Syllogisms are good for Vse and Practise and only for That For since such Syllogisms are True Discourses and therefore are not wholly in vain but must be good for something Wherefore since they conduce not at all to Speculation or generating Science it follows that they must be good for Vse or Practise and for that only Again since all Outward Action Use and Practise is wholly employ'd about such Subjects as Exist and nothing Exists but Suppositums Individuums or Singulars it follows that Singulars are the Proper Subjects of Artificers or such as work Outwardly upon Determinate Matters and the Knowledge of the Nature of those Singulars is Useful and Necessary for such men for by this they know how to work upon those Subjects and Manage them accordingly For example an Architect by knowing the certain Quantities and Proportions of his Materials Wood Brick or Stone may build a House but he cannot without the Science of Mathematicks have a Clear knowledge out of the Natures of those Quantities why it must be so always though it hit to do so once or hic est nunc Note that Practical Self evidence may oftentimes as was shown formerly in a great Measure supply here the place of Science and Operate like it though it can never arrive to that Clear and Grounded Penetration into the reasons of such Actions as is found in Scientifical Men. 24. Hence the way of arguing by Induction can never breed Science First because out of pure Particulars nothing follows Next because to Argue from some Part or Parts to the Whole is Inconsequent Wherefore we cannot thence Inferr an Vniversal Proposition or gain Science of any Nature unless we could enumerate all the Singulars in the World that is all the Parts so to make up an Equivalent to the Whole which is Impossible 25. Hence follows immediatly that some Vniversal Proposition must be taken in if we would Conclude any thing from a Singular one This has been amply Show'd above and accordingly in Mathematicks Vniversal Maxims and Axioms use to be first laid without which nothing in any Subject can be known scientifically 26. Further 't is collected from our former Discourse that Hypotheticall or Conditional Syllogisms are in proper Speech no Legitimate Syllogisms nor consequently can they generate Science but by seeing in common and confusedly they are the same in sense with Categorical ones For since we cannot see Evidently the Truth of any Conclusion or have Science of it but by seeing Evidently the Connexion of the Two Extremes with the Middle Term and this cannot be seen Evidently unless all the Terms be posturd in their right place as is done in the First Figure therefore since neither this Clear Position of the Terms nor any thing like it is found in Hypothetical Syllogisms they are not in proper Speech Syllogisms any more than are some sort of more concise Rhetorical Discourses which have oftentimes virtually the sense of a Categorical Syllogism in them though the parts of it be disjoynted and out of that due Order that ought to be in a Syllogism 27. Wherefore all Hypothetical Syllogisms ought in Disputes to be reduced to Categorical ones For the Major neither absolutely affirms nor denies and therefore cannot be absolutely either affirm'd or deny'd Next the same Major proposition has a kind of Consequence in its single self and so is a kind of imperfect Syllogism even taken alone 3ly It does not identifie it's Terms and lastly unless they be reduced to Categorical ones the Figure of its parts cannot clearly appear 28. The way to reduce them is to vary the phrase or tenour of the Words still keeping the same sense For example this Hypothetical If Science be a perfection of the mind it ought to sought after But Science is a perfection of the Mind Therefore Science ought to be sought after May easily be reduced to a Categorical Syllogism in Barbara thus What ever is a perfection of the Mind ought to be look'd after But all Science is a perfection of the mind therefore All Science ought to be look'd after 29. For some of the same reasons Disjunctive Syllogisms ought to be reduced to Categorical ones as It is either Day or Night But it is not day Therefore 'T is Night Which may be reduced to a Categorical in Darii thus Da-What ever time is not Day is Night ri This present time is not Day therefore i This present time is Night LESSON III. Of the Matter of a Conclusive Syllogism or what Middle Term is proper for Demonstration THE right Manner of framing a Conclusive Syllogism or of drawing a Consequence right which is the Form of it being thus laid open from its Grounds there remains no more to be done as to the Attainment of Science but to shew what is the proper Matter of such a rigorous Discourse For since the Matter and Form do constitute the whole Essence or Nature of every thing if both these be made known there can nothing more be wanting for us to conclude or prove Evidently which is the sole end and aim of the whole Art of Logick Wherefore all the elaborate Rules that occurr in common Logicians which conduce not to this end are Frivolous and meerly invented for vain Show and Ostentation and are so far from advancing Science that they pester the way to it by making in more Perplext and Intricate which obstructs the attainment of it 2. Such a Middle Term as is Proper to conjoyn the other two is the only Matter of a Conclusive Syllogism For since there can be in a Lawful Syllogism but Three Terms and Two of them are given to our hands in the Thesis to be proved and the right Placing of those Terms belongs to the Form of it there is no Consideration left that can be conceiv'd to be the Matter of it or which joyn'd with the Former makes it Evidently Conclude but such a Middle Term which is apt to conjoyn the other Two in the Conclusion 3. Wherefore such a Term being found and order'd in the right Form nothing more can be requir'd to gain Science of any Proposition whatever For this done the Conclusion so necessarily follows that it is as Impossible it should not be True as it is that an Identical Proposition should be False or which is the same that a Contradiction should be True which are the highest Impossibilities Wherefore since to have Science of any thing is to know evidently the thing is so and cannot but be so and this is known by the means now mentioned it follows that no thing more can be requir'd to gain Science of any Proposition whatever 4. Hence such a Syllogism is Demonstrative and to produce or frame such a Syllogism is to Demonstrate For since a Demonstration bears in its Notion that it must be the most Certain and most Evident Proof than can be and no Proof can be more Certain than that which renders
expresly or by consequence Included in some part of the Definition the Formality of one is in some part the Formality of the others as the Notions of Ens Corpus Mixtum Vivens Sensituum are found in part to be Formally in the Entire Notion of Homo The Art of Dividing right is requisit to make exact Definitions Because the Genus and one of the Proper Differences that divide that Common Notion do constitute and integrate the Definition Note that the Genus must be Immediate because otherwise it confounds the Intermemediate Notions with the Species and so gives a less-distinct Conception of the Notion to be defin'd Hence Ens or Vivens Rationale is not a good Definition of Homo because Ens and Vivens do but Confusedly or in part speak the Notion or Nature of Animal Nor is Rationale the Proper and Immediate Difference of Ens and Vivens 12. Hence Dichotomy or a Division made by two Members is the best For in such a Division the Parts if rightly exprest may be most easily seen to be Equivalent to the Whole That Dichotomy in which the Members are Contradictory is the very best Division that can be imagin'd As that of Ens into Divisible and Indivisible that is not-Divisible of Animal into Rational and Irrational that is not-Rational of Number into Odd and Even or not-Odd For since there can be no Middle between Contradictories it is Evident there can be no more Members than Two and consequently that those Two parts are Equivalent to the Whole 13. The Whole Definition and All the Members of a Division that is rightly made if taken together may be a proper Medium for a Demonstration For both of these taken together are Equivalent to the Whole Notion Defin'd and Divided and may as well be a Middle Term as that Whole Notion exprest by one word as by Man Animal c. v. g. Every Rational Animal is capable of Science Every Clown is a Rational Animal therefore Every Clown is Capable of Science What-ever is either Even or Odd is capable of Proportion All Number is either Even or Odd therefore All Number is capable of Proportion 14. Out of what has been proved 't is seen that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain Science For since all Knowledg is taken from the Nature of the Thing and therefore all Distinct and Clear Knowledg such as Science ought to be from the nature of the Thing distinctly and clearly represented and this as has been shown is done by Definitions it follows that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain to Science 15. Another use to be made of Definitions in order to Demonstration is this when two Notions by being Remote seem in a manner Disparate and so the Proposition is Obscure we are to pursue home the Definitions of each of the Terms till something that is Formally Identical appears in both of them Which done all farther disquisition ceases and the Point is demonstrated For example If we would prove that Virtue is Laudable we shall find that the word Laudable signifies deserving to be spoke well of and Practical Self-Evidence as well as Reason telling us that our Speech being nothing but Signes agreed on by Mankind to express their thoughts that thing deserves to be spoken well of which deserves to be thought well of and that what 's according to the true Nature of him that speaks or thinks or to true Reason deserves to be judg'd by him Right and Good that is thought well of To which add that Virtue is nothing but a Disposition to Act according to True Reason it comes to appear that Virtuo and Laudable have something couch't in their notions that is Formally Identical and that this Proposition Virtue is Laudable is full as Certain as that What 's according to right Reason is according to right Reason or what 's Laudable is Laudable which seen perfect Knowledg is had of the Truth of Virtue is Laudable that is 't is the Proposition Evidently Concluded or Demonstrated Note hence that in Resolving Truths thus into first Principles Rigorous Definitions do not alwayes need but Explications of the two Notions or of the Meaning of the Words that express the two Terms may serve so they be True and Solid since no more is necessary in this case but to resolve the Inferiour Truths and the Notions that compound them into Superiour ones For which reason also Practical Self-evidence or a Knowledg agreed on by all Mankind in their Natural Thoughts through Converse with those Natural Objects is sufficient For this is a Solid Knowledg tho' it be not lick't into Artificial shape Whence it may Suffice oftentimes without Framing the Demonstration coucht in these Discourses into a Syllogistick Method unless the Form of the Discourse be Deny'd 16. Hence follows that All Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them For since all Truths are therefore such because they are Conformable to the Nature of the Thing or to its being what it is which is express'd by an Identical Proposition it follows that all Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them 17. Hence every Errour has at the bottom a fect Contradiction and is grounded on it For since all Truths as being Conformable to the Nature of the Thing are grounded on the things being what it is and so have an Identical Proposition for their Bases therefore for the same reason every Error being a Dis-conformity to the Thing or a Deviation from its being what it is must be Grounded on this as its first Principle that the Thing is not what it is which is a perfect Contradiction 18. Hence follows necessarily that if Art and Industry be not wanting Every Truth is Reducible to a Self evidâ—nt or an Identical Proposition and every Errour to a Contradiction For since these as has been prov'd are the Basâ—s or bottom-Principles of all Truths and Falshoods and all Inferiour Propositions derìve all their Truth or Falshood from the First Truths or Falshoods that is from Identical Propositions or Contradictions it follows that either no Truth or Falshood can be finally known or be Knowable or Provable to be such or else they must be Reducible either to Identical Propositions or to Contradictions as the Tests of their Truth or Falsity Corol. I. Hence follows that all Learning being Knowledge those Men only ought to be accounted Absolutely speaking True Schollars or perfectly Learned who can thus settle Truth and confute Errour that is thus Demonstrate the Conformity of the Position he maintains to the Nature of the Thing or the Disconformity of his Adversaries Thesis to the Essence of the Subject under Dispute By which it will appear how Unjustly many Men are esteem'd Learned by the Generality meerly for their having read a Multitude of Authors Since the Former know the Truth of the Things or of the Subjects discours'd of
their Identicals And the same may be said of other Qualities that affect our Senses very distinctly as Heat Cold Moist Dry c. Note that in such as these if it be too laborious to arrive at their Definitions by dividing the Common Genus as it often happens when the Dividing Members are more than Two and are not Contradictory to one another then we may frame our Definitions of them by observing the carriage of the Vulgar towards them or their Sayings concerning them For such Qualities being sensible ones are the Objects of the Senses of Mankind and do imprint Lively and Distinct Notions of themselves in all men Wherefore their Sayings being the Effect of the true Notions they have of them they if enow of them be collected must give us the true Notion of them or which is all one of what they mean by the Word that expresses them which is equivalent in Sense to a perfect Definition For example when they speak of those Qualities we call Dry and Moist we shall observe that they are sollicitous lest Moist things should squander and run about and therefore they are careful themselves to put such things in some Receptacle or Vessel that may keep them from doing so or they bid their Servants do it On the Contrary they bid them set Dry things on the Cupboard or on a Shelf and never put them in a Vessel or be at the needless labour of pounding them into a Pot or Tub out of fear they should squander about Which sayings and behaviour of theirs gives us the Definitions of both those Qualities viz. that Moist is that which difficultly keeps its own bounds or Figure and is easily accommodated to the bounds of another thing and Dry is that which easily retains its own bounds or Figure and is Difficulty accommodated to the bounds of another which are the very Definitions which that great Observer of Nature Aristotle gives us of those two Qualities Note II. Whence we may with a humble Acknowledgment and Thanks reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth who unenviously bestows knowledge on all who will dispose themselves to receive it that where-ever Art by reason of our Shortness is at a plunge he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence or the naturally instill'd Knowledge of the Vulgar whence it is a high Pride in the greatest Men of Art to conceit that they are above being still the Children of Nature whereas 't is the best Title they have to True and Solid Learning Sus Minervam 8. All Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses For since the Premisses by Means of the Middle Term and the right Placing of it have in them the whole force of the Consequence and the Consequence cannot be of nothing but must be of some Determinate Proposition which can be nothing but the Conclusion it follows that all Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses Again since before we Conclude Determinately and Expresly we must know what to Conclude and we know what to Conclude by knowing the Premisses and the Conclusion is that Proposition which is to be Concluded it follows evidently that since we know the Conclusion e'er we Actually Inferr and Express it to be in the Premisses it is there virtually 9. All Deduced Truths are virtually in one another For since all Deduced Truths are Conclusions and the Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses and the same reason holds for all the following Conclusions as for the first or for one single one it follows that let there be never so many orderly-succeeding Syllogisms necessary to prove any point the Conclusions are still in the Premisses and the following ones in those that went before them 10. All Truths are virtually in the Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions For since all Truths are taken from the Nature of the Things and from their Metaphysical verity and consequently are in the Nature of the Thing fundamentally and This is Contain'd and Exprest in the whole by Identical Propositions and in all its parts by the Definitions it follows that all Truths are Virtually contain'd in Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions 11. From what 's lately said 't is evinced that if a Middle Term be taken which is a Proper Cause or Proper Effect the Conclusion is seen to be in the Premisses For though the Proper Causes and Effects be not the very Essence of the Thing yet since an Effect is a Participation of the Cause and so is apt to manifest the Nature of the Proper Cause that produced it and the Operation of a Proper Cause is nothing but the Existence of such a Cause which is sutable to its Essence imprinted upon the Patient hence such Mediums do Demonstrably and Mutually inferr one another and therefore nothing hinders but that the Conclusions may be seen to be in the Premisses as well in such Syllogisms as in those which have an Essential Notion for their Middle Term. 12. Hence all Natural Truths and this throughout the whole Course of Nature from the very Creation are virtually in one another For since as will be more clearly seen hereafter all those Natural Effects were Demonstrative of their Proper Causes and those Causes Demonstrative of their proper Effects and this from the First starting of Nature into Motion and so were apt to Inferr one another all along that is new Conclusions were still apt to spring from such Middle Terms Connected with the two Extremes in the Premisses and consequently the Truth of those Conclusions were all along Virtually in those several Premisses it follows that all Natural Truths are in one another and this throughout the whole Series or Course of Nature from the very Creation 13. Hence had we liv'd in every Place and in every part of Time where and when those several Causes wrought those several Effects and had been endowed with Capacity Sufficient for such a performance and not been diverted with other thoughts from Application to that work we might have actually Demonstrated those Effects by their Proper Causes or those Causes by their Proper Effects through the whole Series or Course of the World from the beginning to the end except Miracle had alter'd that Natural Course For in that case all those Subjects had afforded us Matter or fit Mediums for Demonstration as well as any single Subject does now Wherefore if we had had wit enough to demonstrate as aforesaid and that wit sufficiently apply'd in every circumstance it had been done 14. Hence every Soul separated from the Body that knows any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once at the first Instant of her Separation For since all Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes and Proper Effects and those Mutually inferr one another that is the Truth grounded on the one is seen to be in the Truth grounded on the other as being Virtually in one another and we experience that the Capacity of the Soul to know Truths is not
Mediums taken from the Nature of the Thing and those must be also Conclusive ones For their Knowledg and Veracity must either be made known by Intrinsical Mediums or by Extrinsical ones that is by Another Authority and the same question recurrs How we are Certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of that other Authority and so in infinitum Whence we must come to be certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of Authority by Intrinsical Mediums or we can have no Ground at all to believe any Authority Moreover the proper work of Reason is to Demonstrate which is done by Intrinsical Mediums and unless they be Conclusive they prove nothing and so are good for nothing 21. The Knowledg of the First Attesters is ascertain'd by what has been prov'd § § 15.16 Their Veracity must be prov'd by shewing there could be no Apparent Good to move their Wills to deceive us and the best proof omitting the Impossibility of joyning in such an Universal Conspiracy to deceive the Certain loss of their Credit to tell a Lie against Notorious Matters of Fact c. is the seen Impossibility of Compassing their Immediate End which was to Deceive Which reason is grounded on this that no one man who is not perfectly Frantick acts for an End that he plainly sees Impossible to be compassed For example to fly to the Moon or to swim over Thames upon a Pig of Lead Thus it is Demonstrable that all England could not Conspire to deceive those born since in asserting to them that there was a King Charles the First or a Long Parliament which rais'd a Civil War here because they must see it is impossible to gain Belief of it which was their Immediate End whatever farther End they might propose to themselves So many Records Practices Laws and other Consequences Issuing thence giving them the Lie besides the Histories of our own and other Countries and the Concatenation of Causes and Effects in the Political part of our Neighbouring Nations all conspiring unanimously and appositly to detect the Cheat. Wherefore the End being Evidently Impossible to be atchiev'd it could never be an Apparent good to them in such a case to act for such an End or to attempt to deceive us by Attesting it and therefore they could not tell such a Lie in such a Case therefore they were Veracious while they Attested it 22. Tho' both the Knowledg and Veracity of the Attesters be Demonstrated and Consequently the thing Attested by them be most Certainly and necessarily True yet our Assent to the Truth of that thing is neither Science no◠Opinion It cannot be Opinion because the Medium that begets Opinion is not Necessarily Connected with the Extremes as is found here Nor can it be Science because our Knowledg of the thing is not taken from the Thing it self that is attested causing such a Notion or Impression in us directly by it's self or by Reflex Knowledges upon those Direct ones on which kind of Impressions all Science is built but it is a Knowledg Reflected to us from Anothers Knowledg of it or a kind of Second-hand Knowledg Nor is the Knowledg which even the Attesters had of the Object at First-hand a Proper Effect of the Ens or Thing which is the Object of that Knowledg Nor is the Thing as an Object the Proper Cause of that Knowledg only which can beget Science For a Proper Cause has a Real Order or Relation to it 's Proper Effect whereas the Objects have no Real Relation at all to the Senses or our Knowing Power as was shown above where we treated of Relation By which we may farther more clearly discover the Essential Differences between Science Faith and Opinion It may be objected that Intelligibility is a Property of Ens therefore every Ens is a Proper Cause of Knowledg 'T is answer'd that it is only a Property of Ens Negatively as it were in regard nothing can be understood but Ens Non Ens not being able to cause any knowledg in us Or it may mean that 't is only a Property of Ens in order to an Extrinsical thing not a true Property Perfecting it Intrinsically as Properties due to a thing by Nature and Springing from their Essences do It may be objected farther that all Natural Powers are true Properties tho' they respect Extrinsical things on which they are to work 'T is answer'd that they perfect those Entities Intrinsically or give them some perfection in their Intrinsical Nature which Intelligibility does not for nothing is Intrinsically better or otherwise than it would be for being Known or Vnderstood To explicate this better we may consider that every Entity being a Part of the World has some Office or Place there and some part which it is to act on the Stage of Nature And accordingly Metaphysicks teach us that every Body is constituted such by it's having some Primary Operation which 't is fitted to produce as Fire to heat Water to Cool c. Whence what ever fits it for such an Operation is either Essential to it or a Property immediately Connected with it's Essence such as are those Natural Powers objected Now 't is Evident that those Powers do perfect each Nature Intrinsically since without them it would be Imperfect and Impotent to perform that which it was Essentially Ordain'd for and so the whole course of Nature carry'd on by such Proper Causes to Proper Effects would be quite out of frame and Order whereas 't is manifest it would suffer no detriment at all in it self whether those Proper Causes or Effects were Vnderstood or no. Which shows that their being Known by the First Attesters or made known to us by their Knowing them is not a Proper Effect of those Causes nor Intrinsical to them as they are parts of Corporeal Nature but Accidental to them as such but yet so Accidental that it is Inseparable from them and so does Necessarily infer the Conclusion 23. Testimony on which Human Faith relies is adequately divided into Living and Dead that is into such Attesters as speak vivâ voce and those that speak by Writing Because there is no Common or Ordinary way but Speech and Written or Printed Characters by which Men can relate Matters of Fact to others or testify to them their Knowledg of such things 24. Matters of fact done long a go if very Concerning to have the Knowledg of them Continu'd and that they were known at first by the Experience of a great portion of Mankind may be made known to us who live now by a Delivery of them down from the foregoing Age to the succeeding One Which Continued Testimony or Delivery of them is call'd Tradition For since the Generality of First Attesters who liv'd in the same time when they happen'd could not but know them and the Continual Concern of them could not but still prompt and provoke Foregoers to speak of them to their Descendents it follows that the Continuance of those Causes may still