Riots or Insurrections how dangerous or great soever the Sheriffe and other ordinary Officers of Justice ought to be imployed in the businesse and those which are so imployed are to be directed solely by the Judges and Courts of the Land in speeding Law and not at all by any extrajudiciall command of the King in opposition to Law If these things were not so the King of England could not be restrained from doing wrong our Kings would be above all Law and the Law could have no power above them and if our Kings were above Lawes and not restraineable thereby from doing wrong the people of England were not a free people but as remedilesse Slaves as the Grand Signiors Vassells are Our Lawes provide against servitude in us but that were vaine if they did not provide also for efficacy in themselves in so much as Lawes if the King were above them and so might alter them at pleasure or interpret them according to his owne sence or could execute or not execute at discretion by being sole Master of the sword would be no better then Cobwebs to us By the light which reflects from these fundamentalls premised we shall now the better view and examine that which Mr. Jenkins replyes to the eight particulars of H. P. In the first particular the question is Whether the House of Commons have power to examine a Delinquent or no Mr Ienkins holds the negative upon this ground that they have neither the Kings Writ Patent nor Commission for it It was answered That they did both sit and act by the Kings Writ and something greater then the Kings Writ Mr Ienkins not being able to deny that the Parliament was summoned by the Kings Writ and that it is continued still by an Act passed since onely quarrells at the Act of continuance pretending that the Act by which this Parliament is continued agrees not with the Act passed lately for a Trienniall Parliament nor with that for an Annuall Parliament passed in Edw. the thirds time as also that it is mischievous otherwise by Protections Priviledges c. Is not this to quarrell with the King and both Houses Is not this to tell us that Mr. Ienkins is wiser then all the three Estates though joyned together The King the Lords and Commons judged that this Act did agree with the other two yet Mr. Ienkins judges contrary The King the Lords and Commons judged the advantage of this Act to be greater then any inconveniences Mr. Ienkins is of another minde Our Bookes have a Rule That no man ought to be wiser then Law Mr. Ienkins exempts himselfe out of this Rule but in the next place whatsoever the three Estates may doe yet Mr. Ienkins tells us that the two Houses make no Court nor Body Corporate nor Parliament without the King no more then a man remaines a man without a head Here is the mistake Mr. Ienkins thinkes the King is a head to the Parliament simpliciter or phisicè whereas he is so but secundum quid or metaphorisè for if he were such a head to the Politick Body as the true head is to the naturall Body the body could have no subsistence without him but experience in our case teaches us the contrary and we can easily calculate that if the whole Royall Line should be spent and the Crowne Escheat sitting a Parliament the Lords and Commons would remaine a living Parliament and be the supreame power of the Kingdome without a King Also if this should happen out of Parliament the Lords joyning with the chosen representants of the whole Kingdome would be equally as competent if not more for all Acts of Majesty and supreame dominion as now they are in Parliament Mr. Ienkins must needs also know that there are some Acts of Parliament yet of force in this Land which by the Lords and Commons were carried and consumnated not onely without but even against the King but I forbeare to draw Censure upon my selfe by citing them and whereas it was objected That the Parliament was in a meaner condition then other inferiour Courts if the Kings meere discretion could so make their deliberations voyd and vaine Mr. Ienkins replyes That this is most true and just for as much as in other Courts the King can neither judge nor controle but in the Court of Parliament quoad Acts the King is both Judge and Controller And why cannot the King judge and controle in the ordinary Courts because there they have the Kings power committed to them by Patent and as they are sworn to doe right so the King is sworne not to interrupt or frustrate them Thus 1 We see the Kings Patent to a few men is more vigorous then the most honourable Writ of the Law is when it is directed from the King to all the Peeres and Commons of the Land abetted besides with formall Statutes 2 We see an Oath taken from the Judges is of more valew then the faith and loyalty of the whole people 3 We see the King by his Coronation Oath is stronglier obliged not to obstruct Justice in private cases depending before lower Courts then the generall safety and welfare of the people in that Treshault Counsell which is so honourable that none ought to thinke ignobly of it 4 We must grant that Mr. Ienkins can better tell what the Law is in this point then both Houses 5 Whereas an Argument Ab inconvenienti was valid in Law before now an Argument drawne from the safety and liberty of the whole State and from the end of all Law is made rediculous by Mr. Ienkins for he which grants we are borne to liberty and safety as our right yet grants no meanes to attaine to that right nor remedy to recover it except the Kings Grace and even then the Grand Seigniours Subjects have their Masters grace and discretion to depend upon as well as we Thus is our state like a goodly Ship exquisitely decord strongly man'd and abundantly riggd with all kinde of Tackling and so built for agility in faire weather that nothing in that respect can be added to her perfection yet still she is so moulded by these kinde of Royalists that the least foule weather over-sets her We have excellent Lawes to secure our proprieties against the Crowne we have excellent Priviledges in Parliaments to secure our Lawes against the Judges and other Ministers of the Crowne and yet neverthelesse the Parliament it self is so discontinuable dissolvable and controllable by the Crown that our all which depends upon it has nothing in the last place to make it self good to us but the favour of the Crowne Thus may our Lawes and Priviledges in which there is acknowledged to be a directive but no coactive force over the King be compared to an imaginary Mathematicall Line in the heavens but not to any fence or circumvallation upon the earth Well may they informe the King what we ought to injoy as the Lawes of God and nature without them do to all
in cases of pardons the King should be thought to be vertually in the two Houses for as much as that power he sayes remaines solely in the King and therefore cannot rest at all in the two Houses That the power of pardoning Delinquents is so in the King solely as that he cannot derive the same to the Parliament as he does his other power is not proved by Mr. Ienkins nor can it be possibly proved and that the King does not derive the same as he does his other is as farre from being proved also for doubtlesse in all Acts of Oblivion the two Houses convey an additionall vigor and so make the Acts more vertuous then the Kings meere Act could doe and therefore this new vigour which is conveyed by the Houses if it be not that which is derived from the King as Mr. Ienkins Tenets deny then it flowes naturally and originally from the two Houses and what can Mr. Ienkins cause gaine by this But sayes Mr. Ienkin The King is a Prisoner and so having no power but what is divested by his imprisonment the power of the Houses is usurped by themselves and not derived by the King The block which Mr. Ienkens here stumbles at is this He thinkes an imprisoned King has no power at all or remaines indeed no King but this is not absolutely true of all Kings imprisoned for as our case is either imprisonment is something more then that which our King suffers or else imprisonment as to some Acts may stand with freedome as to other Acts. I have toucht upon this subject already But let Master Ienkins bee as bitter as he pleases in his censures and reproaches 't is not intended by the two Houses that the King should be disabled from doing any acts of justice and piety 't is only from raising new Forces and begetting new concussions that this new guard desires to prevent him Master Ienkins next sayes that the King may revoke and discharge his Commissions at pleasure but what of this the question is whether or no the King may frustrate and elude his Commissions and this Master Ienkins speakes not directly to Wee need not quarrell therefore further about this we will grant to Master Ienkins that Parliaments may be justly determined and dissolved by our King provided he will grant to us that the same may be justly frustrated or eluded But Master Ienkins stomacks much at our calling the two Houses a Parliament and censures it in us as a great delusion although we know well that nothing is more common in speech then to say that the King cals his Parliaments writes to his Parliaments dissolves his Parliaments c. The King must be taken abstracted from that which he cals writes to and dissolves or else wee must consider him calling himselfe writing to himself dissolving himselfe which cannot be without absurdity Besides when we speake of the great Councell of the Kingdome we meane the Parliament abstracted from the King forasmuch as the King in Parliament does not so properly give as receive Counsell and why we may not aswell call the two Houses a Parliament as the great Councell treshault Court or mickle-gemot of the King and Kingdome I cannot devise The Law sayes the King cannot be absent from his Parliaament this must be meant authoritatively not personally for divers of our Kings have been in France sitting Parliaments here and yet even they were politically present though physically absent as Master Ienkins himselfe must needs grant Now if the Parliament be the Kings Court or Councell and such a Court or Councell as he cannot virtually bee absent from though in person he be often distant and at some time must not be otherwise how can it be maintained by Master Ienkins that the two Houses are not the Parliament Another objection of Master Ienkins against the two Houses is that they were deserted by divers of their own Members who in considerable numbers went to the King at Oxford but this is no other objection then might be made against the Husband when the wife elopes and withdraws from his bed shall that party which remaines constant and attends duly at the place assigned in the summons for transacting of that businesse which was specified in the summons suffer for that parties sake which proved inconstant and neither observed the place nor businesse of the writ by which it was convened sure this is most unreasonable doubtlesse when the King cald these uncertaine members mungrels who together with their whole faction would neither be cordially true to Religion and Liberty at London nor totally consent to subvert them at Oxford hee had more reason on his side then Master Ienkins has who disparages those that kept their stations because of the defection of their mungrell brethren In the last place Master Ienkins though he confesses that the common Law did alwayes restrain our Kings from all tallages subsidies but by consent in Parliament as doth appeare by Magna Charta yet he sayes this is no consequence because the King cannot take the subjects good at pleasure therefore the Commons have a concurrent power with the King in Parliament indeed this consequence is ill-framed but in its right forme it appears thus if the Commons in Parliament have that great power to raise treasure out of the whole Kingdome which the King has not our of Parliament then they must deduce this power from themselves or those whom they represent and not from the King who cannot give that which he has not in himselfe but so it is that the Commons have this power Ergo If Mr. Ienkins will answer this hee shall befriend my intellect The last objection which Master Ienkins makes against this concurrent power of the Commons in granting subsidies is this that Parliaments may be held and be complete Parliaments without subsidies and hereupon he tels us that former Parliaments rarely granted any unlesse in time of forrain-Warres and Q. Eliz. refused a subsidie granted K. Ia. in his first year had none granted him Is there any solidity in this objection I appeal to all ingenuous men Parliaments may be without subsidies Ergo the granting of subsidies is no act of power in Parliaments or thus giving of subsidies is an Act of power in Parl. but since at some-time it may be difused and intermitted or a power that at some-times is not reduced into acts therefore it is no power or not inherent in the people but onely derivative from the King Let Master Ienkins apply his owne words to himselfe here for certainly hee ought to make a conscience of blinding the people with such untrue colours to the ruine of King and Kingdome 3. The third particular now offers it selâ—â—â—n order and here Master Ienkins his reply ought to prove that if the two Houses had a Parliamentary power in themselves they needed not send Propositions to the King but instead of opposing this which was the only thing made good by his answerer he diverts
a strong ascent towards the fruit of his body but weake and virtulesse is the descent of that juice which falls from the branches to the root or of that love which the sonne refunds upon his progenitors and even so it is in the relative Offices of Prince and Subject the Prince lookes lesse tenderly upon the people as being his root or parent whilst yet the people lookes more tenderly upon the Prince as its owne stemme and issue Hence it is that all States are accounted more or lesse slavish as their Princes are more or lesse arbitrary in their supreme counsells and all men are accounted more or lesse miserable as they are more or lesse slavish What became of Rome and of the whole world that was subject to Rome after it was once yoked by the Caesars who might arbitrarily wave the advice of the Senate consult with Slaves Eunuchs Women Panders c. or what brought us to all our late bloody catastrophes but the discountenance and detestation of Parliaments Aske the Lord Digby himselfe and even his Speeches made in Parliament since November 1640. will informe us that there were many causes of our miseries but the cause of all those causes was the abandoning and disgusting of Parliaments Sure the Lord Digby may passe as an Authentick testimony for our side and yet even the Lord Digby before he turn'd Courtier had the ingenuitie to resent this Kingdomes servilitie when a woman of a false religion hostile nation and adverse affection together with her Jesuiticall traine had more predominance in our publicke affaires then the two Estates assembled in Parliament But Master Ienkins will still say that the King is assisted with his Judges and other Counsell both Spirituall and Temporall and that the House of Commons in some debates may be divided unto two or three oddes voyces and therefore why may not the King so assisted be better advised then those two or three oddes voyces This is an old objection and seemes plausible but is easily answered For 1. It is very unequall that a few Counsellours whom the King chuses should be preferr'd before many whom the Kingdom chuses in those matters which import the Kingdome more then the King 2. If the Kings Councell in the House of Peers were equally to be valued with the House of Commons yet still so long as it is left arbitrary to the King to follow their advice or not the Kingdome is in the condition as Turky is where the Grand Signior is left onely to consult with himselfe or any of his Concubines or Eunuchs And lastly there can be no lower or baser degree of slavery imagin'd then for a Nation to be subjected to a Lord that is so absolute in the highest results of State as that he may use no Counsell or make choyce of what Counsell he pleases 4. I hast now to the fourth particular where M. Ienkins affirmes againe that the two Houses do separate the Kings power from his Person as the Spencers did and from thence frame the same three condemned conclusions as they did The separation of his Person from his power is proved partly by imprisonment of his Person and partly by usurping all his power for M. Ienkins tells us that the two Houses counterfeit a Seale of their owne and thereby seal Writs make Judges settle Courts and this is done contrary to the Kings consent not declared only by Letters Ministers and word of mouth but by his true great Seale of England It is here 1. To be noted that M. Ienkins himselfe does now distinguish betwixt that which the King declares by word of mouth personally And by Letters and Ministers extrajudicially and that which he declares legally by his Writs and judicially by the great Seale and this is a plaine concession that the Kings Person may urge one thing and his Office another that his personall command may be unjust and not to be obeyed at the same time that his regall command may be just and necessarily must exact obedience It is to be noted 2. That the reason alledged why the Kings commands in this warre are legall and just not personall and unjust is because they were authoriz'd and fortified with the true great Seale and what is this but to proclaime 1. That the great Seale of England is solely at the Kings dispose to be imployed according to his meere discretion 2. That the meer annexion of the great Seal makes any Act of the Kings legall and authenticall 3. That M. Ienkins is better able to judge of the two great Seales which is the true one then the two Houses of Parliament When M. Ienkins will be as learned in proving as he is audacious in presuming these new quaint poynts we shall know what to answer In the meane time we will expatiate no further then his discourse leades us As for imprisoment of the Kings Person we have answer'd to that already and forasmuch as the keeping Chaplaines from him is objected we answer thereunto that not Chaplaines but such and such Chaplaines viz. such as the State judges Incendiaries are deny'd and there is no more injustice in restraining such Incendiaries then in restraining Commanders and Armes Now to parallell the Houses with the Spencers M. Ienkins sayes that they having declared his Majestie to have broken his trust touching the government of his people they have raysed Armes to take him they have taken and imprison'd him they governe themselves they make Lawes impose Taxes make Judges Sheriffs and take upon them Omnia insignia Majestatis and is not this sayes he to remove the King for misdemeanours to reforme per aspertee to governe in aide of him the three conclusions of the Spencers M. Ienkins here as if he had abjured all ingenuitie confounds diverse things which he knowes to be exceeding different in nature For 1. He takes no notice whether the force which has bin used by the Parliament be offensive or defensive and yet none can be ignorant how many things may be justified in a defendant which cannot by the offendant 2. He distinguishes not betwixt that force of the defendant which aimes only at a temporary securance against the Assaylant that which proposes to it self vindication or reparation by the total removall or destruction of the Assaylant He knows well that the Spencers aimed at a totall dethronization of their Master whilst the Parliament aimes at nothing but beating down that Sword which was drawn against them 2. That the Spencers intended to levy offensive Arms for reforming that in their Master per aspertee which was not so dangerous to their persons and lives as that which has bin contrived and enterprised against this Parliament for not onely a partie of 300 Armed men to seize and teare five principall Members out of the House and by consequence to menace all that retained any freedome in them but Armies were solicited to attempt against this Parliament before they thought of any force and this is far
other Nations But they can never assure us what we shall enjoy And therefore I wonder why the Royalists should so much extoll the rare Constitution of this Kingdom when besides some other flowers of the Crowne they ascribe to the King such a negative voyce in Parliament as is sufficient alone to destroy all that is granted us in all things else But to returne to our Reply 'T is maintained next that whatsoever power is in both Houses yet there is no power in the House of Commons to examine at all because the House of Commons cannot administer an Oath and examination without Oath is a meere communication and rejected as unprofitable in Law One reason why the House of Commons cannot examine upon Oath is because it is no Court and it appeares to be no Court because it has no power of tryall nor ever practised any such power by Bill Indictment Information Plaints or Originall And for the Lord Cookes Relation that the House of Commons have imposed Fines and imprisoned men in Queene Elizabeths time and since He saies these are but late and a few matters of fact and à facto ad jus is no good argument Here we see though the greatest plea against the House of Commons is the non-user of any such power yet when the non-user is proved then 't is objected That it is but of late times and illustrated but by a few presidents A second reason against the House of Commons being a Court is because it has neither the Kings Patent nor any Statute nor common usuage to make it so The House of Lords is acknowledged to be a Court of Record to many purposes partly because the King sits there and partly because there is cleere Law for their Priviledges but the House of Commons is excepted against as not within these reasons The truth is both Houses are but one Court and one Councell and the time has been when they have both sate in one place together and there may be good reason given why they may sit severall and have their priviledges kept distinct and why the Lords should be more active in some matters of judgement where the whole Commonalties interest is not touched But this is no proofe That what the Lords act by themselves receives no influence from the House of Commons Or that the House of Peeres is of more value in the eye of the Law or has any greater jurisdiction by the Law then the Representative Body of the whole State As for the Kings sitting in the House of Lords there is but little moment in that in regard that he sits not there to judge or to debate but onely to propose and consent And there is no Law to debarre him from the like in the Commons House and so it was when both Houses sate together and still is when they meet together And secondly whereas some Patent Statute or Usage is demanded from the House of Commons in maintenance of their judiciall power This we say is unreasonable Nay if any Patent Statute or Usage could be produced for preferrence of the Peerage before all the Knights Gentlemen and Commons of England in this point that were rather to be rejected as most unjust and unnaturall A third reason is brought against the House of Commons out of the Writ of Summons forasmuch as in that Writ the King resolves consults and treats with his Peeres super ardua regni but the Commons are called ad faciendum consentiendum in iis quae ibidem de communi concilio ordinari contigerint These words of the Writ though they are generall and in some things ambigious yet they are no more disadvantagious to the Commons then to the Lords or King But if words are to be interpreted by the practise of Parliaments and by the tenour of all our other Lawes we shall finde that the Kings part is to propose and consent but not to debate that the Lords part is to propose debate and consent in some things but not in all that the Commons part is to propose debate and consent in all And this appeares by the raising of Treasure the grand concernment of the Kingdom called justly Ornamentum pacis firmamentum belli and in this though the King and Lords may propose consent yet none but the Commons may propose debate and consent From reasoning Mr Jenkins now betakes himself to rayling and tells both Lords and Commons that whatsoever their Writ meant they act now quite contrary for by their Writ they were required to treat and consult with the King concerning the King the defence of the Kingdome and the Church whereas they first imprison the King next arme the Kingdome for themselves against the King and lastly demolish the Church by abolishing Bishops Deanes c. For the first the King left them unconstrained and deserted Westminster whether they were summoned to attend him and after tooke Armes to dissolve them but those Armes being now broken the Parliament keepes him from raising new broyles but so farre are they from refusing to treat with him that they prepare Propositions for him and reject no messages or Letters that come from him neither is the Kings restraint properly to be called imprisonment being much different therefrom both for the manner and for the end of it the manner of it is ingenuous and accompanied with many accommodations which thousands of other Free-men nay Gentlemen of England cannot attaine too and for his Attendants they are truly his Servants and as observant in all Offices compatible with the peace of the Kingdome as ever he had any The end of his restraint also is not to incommodate him in any degree there is nothing aymed at in it but to preserve the Kingdome from new disturbance till he appeares fully reconciled and to preserve him from drawing prejudice upon himselfe For the second since 't is not for the Kingdoms damage nor the Kings that future Commotions be supprest the Lords and Commons could no way better satisfie the intent of their Summons then by suppressing Commotions by the same posture of defence as they now are in I could wish also that Mr. Ienkins would understand that as the Kingdome is called the Kings so the King is called the Kingdoms and that propriety which the Kingdome has in the King is more tenderly to be expounded then that which the King has in the Kingdome For the third that the word Church should onely be applyed to Church-men or the word Church-men to Bishops Deanes c. is more then the Law teaches and if the businesse be studdied well 't will not be found a thing impossible as Master Ienkins supposes for the Parliament to abolish Bishops Deanes c. and yet to advance Church-men or to take away some of the excessive Grandour of Church-men without any destruction to the Church 2 Thus much of Mr. Ienkins Reply to the first particular I come now to his second where he takes it ill that
his force to oppose the equity and justice of the Propositions sent to his Majesty This is not to reply to his Answerer but to satisfie his owne peevish disposition yet since hee may abuse the people aswell when he railes as when he argues something must be returned in answer to him After he has magisterially condemn'd the Propositions in general as being contrary to law he vouchsafes at last thus particularly to interrogate us Have the two Houses a strict right to lay upon the people what taxes they judge meet have they power to pardon all Treasons c. subintelligitur without the Kings consent We answer they have not any such ordinary power but if the Kingdomes safety lye upon it and the King will not concurre in saving the Kingdome in an ordinary way they may have recourse to extraordinary meanes for the saving of it ordinarily the people may not take up Armes but in case of extraordinary invasion by forrain or domestick force they may justifie taking up of Arms and when War it selfe is justifiable all the necessary concomitants and expedients of a politick war are justifiable Nature has confined water to a descending course yet not by such a rigid Law but that for the necessary subvention of the whole Fabrick and for the avoiding of that vacuity which Nature more abhors then the dispensation or temporary suspension of such or such a particular inferiour Law this ponderous element may forsake its ordinary course and mount upwards In a Village where houses stand scatter'd and remote 't is not lawfull for me to demolish this house because that which stands next it is all of a flame but in a Citie this is lawfull where the houses are so conjoyned that the flame of one house may extend it selfe to the consuming or indangering of a whole street or more It is not generally lawfull for me to judge my neighbour unheard or to execute my neighbour unjudged Yet if I find my neighbour ingaged in such a Treason as Faulx was and ready with his Match to give fire to such a Traine of Powder as he had layd and have no other meanes to prevent him I may runne upon him with my Sword and make my selfe both his Judge and Executioner Now if Master Ienkins will say that such extraordinary acts as these are warranted by Law I shall cōply with him yet I conceive t is not upon any particular Law but upon the generall law of publick safetie that these warrants are grounded upon if I am not mistaken t is rather policy then Law that admits of such strange deviations from the common practice and rule of Law But sayes Master Ienkins these propositions cannot passe into Statutes but by the Kings concurrence and has not the King a free power to assent or dissent in those things which must receive their being from his concurrence Or is the seeking of the Kings concurrence nothing but a meer Complement We answer The King has a power to assent and dissent yet without any impeachment of his libertie he may nay he must assent to such Bills as are for the publicke good and to dissent from such as are tending to the publicke detriment the reason is because the free choice of the King is to receive its determination from without from the matter of the Bills not from within or from the propension of his owne will for the will injoyes a more perfect libertie when it is attracted and as it were necessitated by that object which is good then when it is left to its owne equilibrious motions and so wavers indifferently betwixt good and evill If it be said that in the choice of that which is good the King cannot so well satisfie his own judgement by the advise or reason of other men as by that which is dictated to him by his owne breast It must be answered first in the grand concernments of the Kingdome wherein the King has not so great a share as the people has t is more just that the reason of two Estates be satisfied then his Secondly in cases where the King is severally interessed his particular interests ought to succumbe and give a preference to the generall Thirdly either the matter in debate is intricate and admits of doubts or not If there be doubt in it then the King ought not to oppose his single judgement or rather opinion to the resolution of the Highest Court and Councell of the Kingdome If there be no doubt in it an accident sure very rare that the Lords and Representants of a whole State should judge a thing to be advantagious when the King knowes it certainly to be disadvantagious then the King is to consider whither the matter in question be necessary or expedient if it be expedient onely then the King ought not to contest about it forasmuch as that contestation may be more inexpedient for the State then his concession But if it be necessary as the cause of true Religion c. where the King being Orthodox knowes his Subjects to be blinded with Idolatry or Heresie and cannot without sin give his Royall assent to such irreligious Bills as they present then as it were impious in him to signe them so it is outragious in him to disturbe the publicke peace about them The reason of this is because Polititians guide themselves rather by the calculation of what is probable then what is possible onely and therefore though it be possible that a King with one eye should see more then a Parliament with many yet since this is not probable there is scarce any State but chuses rather to be swayd by the counsells of many then by the counsell of one and where the counsell of one claimes a prevalence above the counsells of many 't is not obey'd without great reluctance commonly and publicke disturbance Besides if one mans eyes perchance see more then the eyes of many as is very rare though not impossible yet t is very strange that that one mans discovery should not open the eyes of other standers by without force in respect that light is a thing lovely to all and ready to be imbraced upon the least glimpse of it and a very little thereof being let in through a narrow cranny may make all that is contained in a very wide roome visible And if one man possibly in things indifferent should see more then many yet t is very neere to an impossibilitie that one man should apprehend truth more then many where that one man has more prejudice against the truth by selfe-interests then the many And who can doubt but that Princes as Princes are more drawne by the by as of selfe-interests against that which is the good of the communitie then that Court which is not onely by the vertue of representation but even naturally also in some degree the communitie it selfe The root sends juice and nourishment to the branches but expects none backe from them and the fathers love has
wel that whosoever is the Supreme judge of the Law if not directly yet he is consequentially above all Laws and whosoever is above all Law cannot bee restrained by the safety of the people though the most sublime of all Laws Wherfore if this be admitted true of our King that he is Supreme Judge of Law then it must follow that the Subject of England has no more assurance of Law or safety then what is founded onely in the Kings breast and discretion For the Kings being a prisoner that has been already answered and indeed it is is more truly said that his hands are held and disweapond then that his feet are fetterd or his head undiademnd Then for the Parliaments acting by the Kings writ there ought to bee some mistakes cleered therein also for we doe grant that the writ is the Kings the Great Seale is the Kings that Officer which has the Custodie thereof is the Kings the People are the Kings but we doe not grant that any of these are so the Kings as that they are not the Kingdomes also in a more eminent degree for as the Husband is the Wifes truly but not 〈◊〉 eminently as the Wife is the Husbands so the Kingdome is the Kings and the King is the Kingdomes yet the Kingdomes interest and relation far is more valuable and sublime 8. The last particular now offers it selfe in the close of all and here M. Ienkins does not deny expresly that many things may be good in Law notwithstanding that some formalities or those things which we terme apices Iuris are wanting for doubtlesse where 2 Laws are and both cannot be fulfilled the lesse important Law though it be more particular must give way to the more important Law though more generall ex gr. when the King dies by the common Law in force Parl. cease all judges Sheriffs Officers not absolutely necessary c. return to a private condition and so remaine till new Commissions obtained but if the new King happen to be beyond sea as at the death of Hen. 3. so that new Commissions cannot be immediatly granted and thereupon the greater Law of publick safety is brought into competition with the Law of an inferiour nature a new seal may be made new Judges new Officers may be created and either a former Parl. may be continued or a new one suÌ„mond and all necessary points of complete administration may bee expedited as in probality they were before the arrivall of Ed. 1. God did not make any particular dispensation his shew-bread might be eaten by common persons if in distresse or the golden vessells of his Temple aliend when the City was to be redeemed from the insolence and rapines of a prevailing Enemy the generall Law of necessity was sufficient to warrant both the one and the other but I will presse this no further since M. Ienkins alledges nothing to shew why a Parl. which cannot deliver it selfe by an Act may not use meanes to deliver it selfe by an Ordinance I will not insist further hereupon But instead of disputing M. Ienkins seems to jeere 〈◊〉 for setting up Excise raising Armes Taxing the people imprisoning the King abolishing the Common Prayer Book selling Church-Lands c. and in an irony he concludes that all these are in order to publick justice and safetie M. Ienkins here leaves us upon uncertainties whether he condemnes our Cause because it required such props or onely these props because they assisted us in promoting so bad a cause If he allow of the ends but not of the meanes if he allow we may defend the Lawes and safetie of the State but not by Armes or if he allow of Armes but not of Taxes c. He must renounce rule naturall as well as logicall Qui dat finem dat media conâ—â— centia ad finem If he allow of the meanes but not as conducting to such an end upon presumption that our Lawes and the Scâ—â— were not indanger'd or if he prove that they may not be defended he takes upon him more then is due for his part is to plead not to judge and answers might be given to his pleading but nothing can be said to his judging I conclude therefore with the L. Cookes Sensure of Treason as M. Ienkins does and am of the same opinion that Treason ever produces fatall and finall destruction to the offendor and never attaines to its desired ends and wish that all men for this Cause would serve God honour the King and have no company with the Seditious Yet let me adde this we have neighbours now in the Netherlands that lately have revolted from their Master and yet prosper and flourish beyond all in Europe the justice of their revolt may be questioned by some but I for divers reasons do not question it one amongst the rest is this of the L. Cookes because I think an act meerly treasonable cannot prosper FINIS