Selected quad for the lemma: kingdom_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
kingdom_n	heaven_n	pharisee_n	scribe_n	2,390	5	10.4944	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A14095	A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse	Twisse, William, 1578?-1646.	1631 (1631)	STC 24402; ESTC S118777	563,516	728

goodnesse And when Seneca saith Even in mindes drencht in the dregs of filthinesse there remaines still a sense of goodnesse this is no more then that which the Apostle informeth us of when he saith they have a conscience accusing them by vertue of that law that is written in their hearts yet the Apostle doth not extend this to them that are drencht in the dregs of filthinesse Hee acknowledgeth elsewhere that some through the course of sinne become past all feeling and have their conscience seared with an hot iron And it is a proverbiall speech in the world Nemo senex metuit Iovem Yet it is one thing to have a sense of goodnesse by the conviction of their conscience a farre different thing to have an impulsion unto goodnesse Be it that the minde of man in that it is indued with reason hath the rules of equity imprinted in it is it not as true that the rules of iniquitie are imprinted in it also doth he not know evill as wel as good Nay hath he not more knowledg of evil then of good at least as touching the compassing of it doth not the Lord complaine of this where he saith They are wise to doe evill but as touching good they have no understanding If this were so amongst men brought up in the Church of God what was the condition of those that were aliens from the common wealth of Israel and strangers from the covenants of promise especially considering what d●fference the Apostle puts betweene these when he saith We Iewes by nature not sinners of the Gentiles And therefore if it belongs to the mind to seek to instamp her rules upon inferiour faculties she shall be as forward to stamp rules of iniquity as rules of equity And with what congruity I pray you may rules of equity be said to bee stamped upon faculties that are not intellectuall appetites are guided by rules in their motions not instamped with them Rules of knowledge are circumstant to appetites of doing not inherent in them And why should not these rules of equity be stamped on the will as well as on sensuall appetites or if it be so why should you reckon the will an inferiour facultie in comparison to the minde whereas indeed the will rules in man as king the minde is but his privie Councellor To quash an exception that might arise against your tenet touching the integrity of nature as thus If the minde have such good rules and withall seekes to instamp them upon inferiour faculties how comes it to passe that there is so little love of vertue in many your answer is that this proceeds from their disposition being over-growne with sensuall desires But by your leave this is a weake reason for it onely transfers the difficultie but answers not the doubt for still I may demand how it came to passe that these rules of equity did not prevent the growth of these sensuall desires and without grace what place is left for any goodnesse in the nature of man Philosophers had a love of vertue but can you shew they had any love of God their most vertuous actions in the state of nature was not Austin bold to call them splendida peccata glorious sinnes For the discerning of true vertue aright he gives us this rule Noveris non officiis sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes I am sure they were not ordered by Gods word nor referred to his glory nor proceeded from acknowledgement that all power of doing good was from God yet they looked for justification by them and as for repentance and confession of sinnes they make that no part of their integritie So that whether their knowledge were in a mist or out of a mist it brought them never a whit the nearer unto God as the Sunne whether in a mist or out of a mist was never knowne to set moist stuffe on fire but ●st dries it then fires it And our Saviour was bold to professe that Publicanes and Harlots●ntred into the kingdome of heaven before Scribes and Pharises If the notions of the minde be ideall characters you may if it please you bestow the phrase as well on notions of evill as notions of good and if the good have so slippery an impression upon the unse●led affection of youth it seemes the bad are more permanent yet these naturall notions of good are farre distant from true notions of God or of true goodnesse A heart hardned with vast desires you say 〈◊〉 hardly cured but I pray tell me when one man transgresser● for an handfull of barly or a morsell of bread another saith Si violandum est jus impij causa violandum est which of these is the greater hardnesse yet as a stone by losing somewhat of his substance may take another shape so you signifie the hardest heart may be wrought into a new frame I confesse to make a Camell goe through the eye of a needle is not impossible unto God and what naturall man hath not a body of sinnes to be cut off by spirituall circumcision but that this you make to bee a worke of grace you give not the least intimation nay you rather imply the contrary when you say that if hopes of supplies from internals bee intercepted a worke that may bee done by course of nature then you say the soule thus freed becomes more fashionable to reason a saying that would become Seneca well that knew no reason but naturall but full ill becomming a Christian Divine let desire be never so vast as you speake let seven devils possesse a man yet the strong man Christ by the power of his grace is able to cast them out and make even Ekron become as the Iebusite Without grace will any mans morality commend him in the sight of God As Lebanon is turned into Carmell so Carmell becomes as the high places of the forest And most morall men have beene as great enemies to Christianity as any other like as the Scribes and Pharises were greatest enemies unto Christ. Why you should call that a superficiall draught of reason that endeavoureth to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse I know no reason this in my judgement deserves to be accompted a substantiall operation And when you tell me that Affability consists in this you goe about to teach me more then ever I learned out of Aristotle I had thought affability might have place in all men as a morall vertue whether they were enabled to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse yea or no. This affability you grant to Epicures but not temperance yet Epicurus if my reading deceive me not was knowne to bee as temperate a man in moderating his appetite as most that then lived And that because he made mans happinesse to consist in pleasure the sense whereof was quickned by temperance and dulled by intemperance And therefore little cause there is to charge him with uncharitablenesse to his

judge there is no chang or alteration at all in God but only in men and in theire actions Gods will is allwayes fullfilled even in such as goe most against it How it may stand with the justice of God to punish transgressours temporall with torments everlasting THe objection that by your Tenet the nature of God is made subject to change and alteration your selfe proposed in the former chapter but you addresse your selfe to make answere therunto in this yet not without fetching a greate compasse which inclines rather to a worke of circumvention then of satisfaction Love you say is the Mother of all Gods workes and the fertility of his power and essence that is the fruitfull Mother of all things and the power and essence of God by love becomes the fruitfull Mother of all things Yet to shew how apt you are to forget your selfe which usually falleth out whē men discourse quicquid in buccam venerit in the 8. chap. and pag. 91. you told us as a quaint conceyte that we may conceave wisedome to be the Father and power the Mother of all Gods works of wonder and I thinke you accoumpt few or no works more wonderfull then the creation And yet that which you say here I preferre before that which you had formerly expressed there because the love of God hath stricter sociation with the will of God then eyther wisedome or power But you have not discovered unto us if love be the Mother what is to be accoumpted the Father Or if you referre this to the loving will and affection of God why this should be accoumpted the Mother rather then the Father of the works of God Agayne we have earthly parents as Father and Mother which are indewed with wills and loves and other affections and it is out of all course to say that theire love or theire will is the Mother of theire children especially consideringe that will is found in the Father as well as in the Mother yea and love also if not in greater measure But I deny not but that God made the world out of love but out of love to whome to the creature Nothing lesse I should thinke as before I have shewed but rather out of love to himselfe as Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himselfe And greate reason God who is the sovereigne Creator of all things should be the supreame end of all things But let this passe Your next sentence is more serious and ponderous but very preposterous and unsound First it containes a generall proposition with the reason of it and then a qualification or limitation thereof by way of exception unto a certayne time The proposition is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love Now the fruits of Gods love you make to be not only grace and glory but our temporall being also and the preservation therof For you make creation to be a fruit of Gods love Now this proposition so generall to my understanding is utterly untrue For not only God is not bound to give grace and glory unto any For they are merely gratuita dona and it is lawfull to doe what he will with his owne in bestowing it on whome he will and denyinge it to whome he will And therefore the Apostle testifieth that He hath mercy on whome he will and whome he will he hardneth But more then this as God was not bound to create any so neyther can any thing save his owne will binde him to preserve any thing in being But as he deales with other creatures so could he deale with men even take theire temporall being from them without any purpose ever to restore it and not only the being of theire bodyes but of theire soules also turning both into nothing Yet thus could God deale with men and Angells were they never so innocent never so holy as Arminius confesseth But let us consider the reasons wherupon you ground this Now these are two the one because God hath created our natures Now the unsoundnesse of this reason appeares by this that God hath created other things as well as man Yet who will conclude herehence that God must needes preserve them and not exclude them from this fruite of his love Your other reason is because God cannot change and this is as weake as the former For like as God though at one time he gives us life another time takes life from us yet all this is done by him without any change in himselfe like as in course of nature though he causeth changes and alterations in the seasons of the yeare in the wether in the heavens in the earth in the Sea in the states and Kingdoms of the World and in the bodyes of all creatures yet without any change at all in himselfe yea though he set an end to this visible World this can inferre no variablenesse in God so if he should take all manner of being from men and Angells and so exclude them from all fruits of his love Yet should all this come to passe without any shadow of change in God Yet you have a third reason which is this Love is the nature of God as Creator You could not be ignorant that God did freely create the World and therfore that it was not naturall to God to create it therfore you say that Love is the nature of God as Creator the sense and meaning whereof I comprehende not And I have made it already appeare that though God creats a thing yet is he not therby bound to preserve it any longer then he seeth good and what other sense you imply when you say Love is Gods nature as a Creator I discerne not You make creation to be a fruite of Gods love it is very incongruous to say that this love of God wherby he creats any thing belongs unto him as a Creator But rather creation of things belongs unto him as he loves them For fitter it is that the effect should be thus modified by the cause then the cause by the effect in denominating any subject Who ever sayd that a man was rationalis quatenus risibilis and not rather risibilis quatenus rationalis But let us proceede to the limitation of this your proposition and that is this No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love untill the sinister use of that contingency wherwith he indued it or the improvement of inclinations naturally bent unto evill come to that hight as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour First touching your meaning in this then touching the manner how you expresse this meaning your meaning in briefe is this No part of our nature can be utterly excluded from all fruits of Gods love untill men have filled up the measure of theire iniquity Of this your opinion I have spoken often I hope it shall be sufficient now to consider the reason whereupon you ground it And that is