Monarchy than in a Republique But tracing this no further I will now rest upon this that whatsoever the King has alleaged against raising of Armes and publishing of Orders indefinitely is of no force to make Sir Iohn Hotham or those by whose authoritie hee acted Traytours unlesse it fall out that there was no ground nor necessitie of such defence So much of danger certaine I will now suppose the danger of the Commonwealth uncertaine the King sayes the Parliament denyes the King commands the Parliament forbids The King sayes the Parliament is seduced by a traiterous faction the Parliament sayes the King is seduced by a Malignant Party the King sayes the Parliament tramples upon his Crowne the Parliament sayes the King intends Warre upon them to whether now is the Subject bound to adhere I will not insist much upon generall presumptions though they are of moment in this case for without all question 't is more likely that Princes may erre and have sinister ends then such generall conventions of the Nobility Gentry and Commonalty so instituted and regulated as ours are in England The King does highly admire the ancient equall happy well poyzed and never enough commended constitution of this Government which hath made this Kingdome so many years both famous and happy to a great degree of envie and amongst the rest our Courts of Parliament and therein more especially that power which is legally placed in both Houses more than sufficient as he sayes to prevent and restraine the power of Tyranny But how can this be if the King may at His pleasure take away the being of Parliament meerely by dissent if they can doe nothing but what pleases Him or some Clandestine Councellours and if upon any attempt to doe any thing else they shall be called Traitors and without further arraignment or legall proceeding be deserted by the Kingdome whose representations they are what is there remaining to Parliaments are they not more servile then other inferiour Courts nay are they not in a worse condition then the meanest Subject out of Parliament and how shall they restraine tyranny when they have no subsistance at all themselves nay nor no benefit of Justice but arbitrary Surely if these principles hold they will be made the very Engines and Scaffolds whereby to erect a government more tyrannicall then ever was knowne in any other Kingdome wee have long groaned for them but we are likely now to groane under them but you will say the King hath a power of dissent he may use it at his pleasure if hee have none then he is a meere Cypher and the Parliament may tyrannize at pleasure either the one or the other must bee predominant or else by a mutuall opposition all must perist and why not the King predominant rather then the Parliament We had a maxime and it was grounded upon Nature and never till this Parliament withstood that a community can have no private ends to mislead it and make it injurious to it selfe and no age will furnish us with one story of any Parliament freely elected and held that ever did injure a whole Kingdome or exercise any tyranny nor is there any possibility how it should The King may safely leave his highest rights to Parliaments for none knowes better or affects more the sweetnesse of this so well-ballanced a Monarchy then they do and it hath been often in their power under great provocations to load that rule with greater fetters clogs but they would not Let us marke but the nature the right the power the wisedome the justice of Parliaments and we shall finde no cause to suspect them of such unmatchable treasons and conspiracies as are this day and never was before charged upon them for our Chronicles makes it apparent that there is scarce any other Nation wherein Monarchy has been more abused by rash inconsiderate Princes then in this nor none at all wherein it hath been more inviolably adored and loyally preserved from all diminution I wish it were not some incitement to those execrable Instruments which steale the Kings heart from us that they thinke the Religion of Protestants too tame and the Nation of the English too incensible of injuries but I hope God will the more tenderly resent these things The composition of Parliaments I say takes away all jealousies for it is so equally and geometrically proportionable and all the States doe so orderly contribute their due parts therein that no one can be of any extreame predominance the multitude loves Monarchy better then Aristocracy and the Nobility and Gentry prefer it as much beyond Democracy and we see the multitude hath onely a representative influence so that they are not likely to sway and yet some influence they have and that enough to preserve themselves from being overswaid We also in England have not a Nobility and Gentry so independent and potent as in France Germany Denmarke c. Nor as they were here immediately after the Conquest by reason of their great Feoffes whereby to give Lawes either to the Crowne or the people but they stand at such faire and comely distances between the King and people and also betweene themselves that they serve for an excellent Skreene and banke as the Kings words are to assist both King and people against the encroachments of each other And as the middle Region of the aire treats loving offices betwixt heaven and earth restraining the fumes and exhalations of Sea and Land that they ascend not too high and at the same instant allaying that restlesse Planets scorching flames which else might prove insufferable to the lower Elements So doth both Houses of Parliament as peaceably and sweetly arbitrate betwixt the Prince and his poorest Vassals and declining Tyranny on the one side and Ochlocracy on the other preserving intire to the King the honour of His Scopter and to the people the patrimony of freedome Let us not then seeke to corrupt this purity of composition or conceive that both Gentry and Nobility can combine against the King when they have no power but derivative the one more depending upon the King and the other upon the people but both most excellently to affect the good of the whole and to prevent the exorbitance of any one part Next the right of all the Lords and Commons in this State is so great that no change of goverement can be advantage to them in that temporary capacity except they could each one obtaine an hereditary Crowne which is a thing utterly impossible Next their power is meerely derivative so that except we will conceive that both King and people will be consenting to the usurpation nothing can be done and if wee conceive that they may by fraud gaine their consent nothing can withstand them Lastly their wisedome hath beene ever held unquestionable and their justice inviolable no Prince that ever cast himselfe thereupon was defrauded no Prince that ever declined the same proved prosperous In sum Parliamentary
government being used as Physicke not dyet by the intermission of due spaces of time has in it all that is excelleut in all formes of Government whatsoever If the King be an affector of true liberty he has in Parliament a power as extensive as ever the Romane Dictators was for the preventing of all publike distresses If the King be apt to intrude upon the common liberties the people have hereby many Democraticall advantages to preserve themselves If Warre bee here is the Unitive vertue of Monarchy to encounter it here is the admirable Councell of Aristocracy to manage it If Peace be here is the industry and courage of democracy to improve it Let us now see how Kings usually governe without Parliaments especially such as are ruled by Councell averse from Parliaments I need not speake of France and other Countries where together with these generall Assemblies all liberty is falne to the ground I need not travell further then our stories nay I need not passe beyond our owne Times my discourse will be endlesse if I doe The wisest of our Kings following their owne private advise or being conducted by their owne wills have mistaken their best Subiects for their greatest enemies and their greatest enemies for their best Subiects and upon such mistakes our iustest Kings have often done things very dangerous And without upbraiding I may say that this King by the fraud of such as have incensed him against Parliaments and his most loyall people hath so far been possest with a confidence in the zeale of Traytors that he hath scarse ever yet enioyed that grandour and splendor which his Ancestors did enioy He hath met in the field with two contrary Armies of his own Subiects and yet that Army which he went to destroy and advanced their colours against him was more loyall than that which himselfe commanded and yet both were more loyall than those fatall whisperers which ingaged them so one against the other if the whole Kingdome of Scotland had been more hearkened to rather than some few malignants of the Popish and Prelaticall faction the King had sooner found out the fidelity of that whole Kingdome and the infidelity of that wicked faction But as things then stood the King was as much incensed against them as he is against us now and he that did then perswade him that the Scots were no Rebels seemed as great an enemy as he doth now that shall defend the innocency of Sir John Hotham there was no difference at all betwixt that ease of the Scots and this of ours the King attributed then as much to his own conscience and understanding as he doth now and he attributed as little then to the publike Votes of that Kingdome as he doth now to this only in this our condition is the more unhappy because that so fresh and memorable experiment doth not at all profit us but still by a strange kinde of relapse the King seemes now the more firmly to relie upon his own private reason and counsell the more cause he hath to confide in publike advertisements and the more he professes to doe contrary the maine question now is whether the Court or the Parliament gives the King the better Councell the King sayes he cannot without renouncing his own conscience and reason prefer the Parliaments Councell before the Courts and that which the King here calls Conscience and reason can be nothing else but meere private opinion for if the Councell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation For example the Parliament conceives that such and such ill offices have been done to frame parties and unite forces against the Parliament the State and therfore they desire that such Townes and Forts and the publick Militia may be intrusted to the custody and command of such Noblemen and Gentlemen as they confide in the Kings secret Court-Councell suggests against this that this request incloseth at reasonable intention in it and that the ayme is to wrest all power out of the Kings hand that he may be forced to depose himselfe the effect of this is no more but to let the King know that they are more wise and faithfull than the Parliament and that hee may doe royally to hearken to them in condemning the Lords and Commons of most inexpiable unnaturall impossible Treason for they must needs love him better then the Parliament but he cannot hearken to the Lords and Commons without offering violence to his owne reason and conscience here we see the misery of all if Princes may not be led by their owne opinions though infused by obscure whisperers when they scandall the loyalty of whole kingdomes without cause rather then by the sacred and awfull councels of whole Nations they are denyed liberty of conscience and ravisht out of their owne understandings And yet if Princes may be admitted to prefer such weak opinions before Parliamentary motives and petitions in those things which concerne the Lives Estates and Liberties of thousands what vain things are Parliaments what unlimitable things are Princes what miserable things are Subiects I will enlarge my selfe no longer upon this endlesse Theame Let us look upon the Venetians and such other free Nations why are they so extreamly iealous over their Princes is it for feare lest they should attaine to an absolute power It is meerely for feare of this bondage that their Princes will dote upon their owne wills and despise publike Councels and Laws in respect of their owne private opinions were not this the sting of Monarchy of all formes it were the most exquisite and to all Nations it would be the most desirable Happy are those Monarchs which qualifie this sting and happy are those people which are governed by such Monarchs I come now to the particularities of our own present case for it may be said that though publik advise be commonly better than private yet in this case it may be otherwise some men have advised the King that the Parliament hath trayterous designes both against his Person Crown and not to be prevented but by absenting himselfe denying his influence and concurrence frustrasting and protesting against their proceedings is invalid and seditious and laying heavy charges of Rebellion upon them to this advise the King hearkens so the Parliament requests and advises the contrary and now in the midst of all our calamities of gasping Ireland and bleeding England the Parliament seeing that either they must make use of their legislative power and make ordinance to secure some Forts and settle the Militia of the Kingdome in sure hands and to prevent the seducers of the King or else two Kingdomes should probably bee lost they doe accordingly The King proclaymes to the contrary notwithstanding The question then as I conceive is this onely whether or no the King hath any just cause to suspect the Parliament of Treason
quarrell and in defiance of the adverse trayterous Peeres he which would have told him that those Swords drawne for him were in truth drawne against him and his best friends and those Swords on the other side drawne against him or rather against his seducers were indeed drawne for him should have found but poore acceptance for without doubt the King would have thought such a suggestion an abuse to his sences to his reason to his conscience and an impudent imposture worthy of nothing but scorne and indignation And if it had beene further pressed that the voyce and councell of the Peeres was the voyce and councell of the major and better part of the Kingdome whereas Spencers party was but of inconsiderable fortunes and his Councell was but private and might tend to private ends it is likely the King at the last resort would have referred all to his owne will and discretion but I have now done with the businesse of Hull and therein I thinke with all objections against the Loyaltie of the Parliament for the same reason will extend to all their Votes and actions concerning the Militia c. and in summe all ends in this if Kings bee so inclineable to follow private advise rather then publique and to preferre that which closes with their naturall impotent ambition before that which crosses the same are without all limits then they may destroy their best subjects at pleasure and all Charters and Lawes of publike safetie and freedome are voyd and God hath not left humane nature any meanes of sufficient preservation But on the contrary if there bee any benefit in Lawes to limit Princes when they are seduced by Privadoes and will not hearken to the Great Councell of the Land doubtlesse there must be some Court to judge of that seducement and some authoritie to inforce that iudgement and that Court and Authoritie must bee the Parliament or some higher Tribunall there can be no more certaine Crisis of seducement then of preferring private advise before publike But the King declines this point and saith that hee doth not undervalue the whole Parliament or lay charge of Treason upon all he doth confesse that divers have dissented and divers beene absent c. hee deserts onely and accuses the faction and conspiracy of some few in Parliament Wee are now at last fallen upon an issue fit to put an end to all other invectives let us sticke close to it The King promises very shortly a full and satisfactory narration of those few persons in Parliament whose designe is and alwayes was to alter the whole frame of government both in Church and State and to subject both King and people to their owne lawlesse Arbitrary power and government a little of this Logicke is better then a great deale of Rhetoricke as the case now stands If the King will please now to publish the particular crimes of such as hee hath formerly impeached of Treason and the particular names of such as now hee sets forth in those Characters and will therein referre himselfe to the strength of his proofes and evidence of his matter it is impossible that any jealousie can cloud his integretie or checke his power any longer Then it will appeare to all that he hath not left us out of any disaffection to Parliaments or out of any good opinion of Papists Delinquents and other Incendiaries but that hee was necessitated to depart from us that hee might be the better able to preserve to us our Religion Lawes and liberties and that none of his solemne oathes of cordiall love to us hath wanted integretie and faith This will satisfie all lovers of Justice that he gives not light credit to weake whisperers or malitious informers whose ayme may bee to bring this Parliament to some ignoble tryall or to confound it without any tryall at all by generall aspertions and meere calumnious surmises this will proclaime his cander and sinceritie and set a brighter luster upon his Justice then any oratory whatsoever By the performance of this promise he shall not doe onely right to himselfe but also to the whole kingdome for the distracted multitude being at last by this meanes undeceived shall not onely prostrate themselves and all their power presently at his feet but for ever after remaine the more assured of his good whether to publike liberties and Parliamentary Priviledges Howsoever nothing but the awfull promise of a King could make us thinke so dishonorably of Parliaments or suspend our judgements so long of them for an Aristocracy in Parliament cannot bee erected without meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutible for the power of Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tiranny amongst us is not discernable the whole kingdome is not to bee mastered against consent by the Traine Band nor the Traine Bands by the Lords or debutie Lievtenants nor they by the maior part in Parliament nor the maior part in Parliament by I know not what septem-virat there is some mistery in this which seemes yet above if not contrary to nature but since the King hath promised to open it we will suspend our opinion and expect it as the finall issue of all our disputes The maine body of the difference being thus stated I come now to the observations of some other severall obiections against this Parliament and exceptions taken against arbitrary power in all Parliaments and I shall observe no order but consider them as I finde them either dispersed or recollected in the Kings late Expresses The Parliament being complayned against for undutifull usage to the King above all former Parliaments hath said that if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modesty and dutie The King because some Parliaments formerly have deposed Kings applyes these words to those Presidents but it may iustly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truely consent to the dethroaning of any King of England for that Act whereby Richard the second was deposed was rather the Act of Hen. the fourth and his victorious Army then of the whole Kingdome The Parliament is taxed of reproaching this Kings government to render him odious to his subiects whereas indeed all the miscariages and grievous oppressions of former times are solely imputed to the ill Ministers and Councellors of the King And all the misfortunes of these times since November 1640. are imputed to the blame of the Parliament the Kings words to the Parliament are That the condition of his Subjects when it was at worst under his government was by many degrees more pleasant and happy then this to which the Parliaments furious pretences of reformation hath brought them to In this case the Parliament being accused of so haynous crimes did uniustly betray themselves if they should not lay the blame upon the
that Lord may destroy it without injury and yet to have no right to preserve it selfe For since all naturall power is in those which obay they which contract to obay to their owne ruine or having so contracted they which esteeme such a contract before their owne preservation are felonious to themselves and rebellious to nature The people then having intrusted their protection into the Kings hands irrevocably yet have not left that trust without all manner of limits some things they have reserved to themselves out of Parliament and some thing in Parliament and this reservation is not at all inconsistent with the Princes trust though hee desire to violate the same but on the contrary it is very ayding and strengthning to that trust so farre as the Prince seekes to performe it for the peoples good but it is objected that a temporary power ought not to bee greater then that which is lasting and unalterable if this were so the Romans had done unpolitikely in creating Dictators when any great extremitie assailed them and yet wee know it was verie prosperous to them sometimes to change the forme of government neither alwayes living under circumscribed Consuls nor yet under uncircumscribed Dictators but it in further objected that if wee allow the Lords and Commons to be more than Councellors we make them Commanders and Controllers and this is not sutable to Royaltie We say here that to consent is more than to counsell and yet not alwayes so much as to command and controll for in inferiour Courts the Judges are so Councellors for the King as that the King may not countermand their judgements and yet it were an harsh thing to say that they are therfore Guardians and Controllers of the King and in Parliament where the Lords and Commons represent the whole Kingdome to whom so great a Majestie is due and sit in a far higher capacitie than inferiour Judges doe being vested with a right both to counsell and consent the case is far stronger and as wee ought not to conceive that they will either counsell or consent to any thing but what is publikely advantagious so by such Councell and consent wee cannot imagine the King limited or lessened for if it was by so knowne a Law and so wisely established in Edward the firsts dayes the right of the people to be summoned at tractandum ordinandum faciendum approbandum in all things appertaining to the people and this as then was not prejudiciall to the King why should the Kings Writ now abbreviate or annull the same if the King himselfe be disable for many high matters till consent in Parliament adde vigour to him it cannot be supposed that hee comes thither meerly to heare Councell or that when he is more than councelled that it is any derogation but rather a supply of vertue to him A fourth thing alleaged to the derogation of Parliaments is That whatsoever the right of Parliaments is to assemble or treat in all cases of a publique nature yet without the Kings concurrence and consent they are livelesse conventions without all vertue and power the verie name of Parliament is not due to them This allegation at one blow confounds all Parliaments and subjects us to as unbounded a regiment of the Kings meere will as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under For by the same reason that Parliaments are thus vertulesse and void Courts upon the Kings desertion of them other Courts must needs be the like then what remains but that all our lawes rights liberties be either no where at all determinable or else onely in the Kings breast We contend not meerly about the name Parliament for the same thing was before that name and therfore the intent is that the great Assembly of the Lords and Commons doe not represent and appeare in the right of the whole Kingdome or else that there is no honour nor power nor judicature residing in that great and Majesticall Body then which scarce any thing can be more unnaturall But these divisions betweene the King and Parliament and betwixt the Parliament and Kingdome seeming more uncouth 't is attempted to divide further betweene part and part in Parliament so making the major part not fully concluding and in the major part between a faction misleading and a party mislead Such excellent Masters of devision has Machiavils rule divide impera made since the 3 of November 1640. 'T is a wonderfull thing that the Kings Papers being frayted scarce with any thing else but such doctrines of division tending all to the subversion of our ancient fundamentall constitutions which support all our ancient liberties and to the erection of arbitrary rule should finde such applause in the world but we say further that there is manifest difference between deserting and being deserted if the wife leave her husbands bed and become an adulteresse 't is good reason that shee loose her dowry and the reputation of a wife but if the husband will causelesly reject her 't is great injustice that she should suffer any detriment thereby or be dismissed of any priviledge whatsoever So if the King have parted from His Parliament meerely because they sought His oppression and he had no other meanes to withstand their tyranny let this proclaime them a voyd Assembly but if ill Counsaile have withdrawne him for this wicked end meerely that they might defeat this Parliament and derogate from the fundamentall rights of all Parliaments as His Papers seeme to expresse under colour of charging some few factious persons in this Parliament God forbid that this should disable them from saving themselves and the whole state or from seeking justice against their enemies So much of the Subjects right in Parliament Now of that right which the Parliament may doe the King by Councell if the King could bee more wisely or faithfully advised by any other Court or if His single judgement were to be preferred before all advise whatsoever 't were not onely vaine but extreamely inconvenient that the whole Kingdome should be troubled to make Elections and that the parties elected should attend the publique businesse but little need to bee said I thinke every mans heart tels him that in publique Consultations the many eyes of so many choyce Gentlemen out of all parts see more then fewer and the great interest the Parliament has in common justice and tranquility and the few private ends they can have to deprave them must needs render their Counsell more faithfull impartiall and religious then any other That dislike which the Court has ever conceived against Parliaments without all dispute is a most pregnant proofe of the integrity and salubrity of that publique advise and is no disparagement thereof for we have ever found enmity and antipathy betwixt the Court and the countrey but never any till now betwixt the Representatives and the Body of the Kingdome represented And were we not now those dregges of humane race upon whom the unhappy ends of the world
are fallen Calumny and Envie herselfe would never have attempted to obtrude upon us such impossible charges of Treason and Rebellion against our most sacred Councell from the mouthes of Popish Prelaticall and Military Courtiers The King sayes 'T is impâ—obable and impossible that His Cabinet Counsellours or his Bishops or seuldiers who must have so great a share in the misery should take such paines in the procuring thereof and spend so much time and run so many hazards to make themselves slaves and to ruine the freedome of this Nation how strange is this wee have had almost 40 yeeres experience that the Court way of preferment has beene by doing publicke ill Offices and we can nominate what Dukes what Earles what Lords what Knights have been made great and rich by base disservices to the State and except Master Hollis his rich Widow I never heard that promotion came to any man by serving in Parliament but I have heard of trouble and imprisonment but now see the traverse of fortune The Court is now turned honest my Lord of Straffords death has wrought a sudden conversion amongst them and there is no other feare now but that a few Hypocrites in Parliament will beguile the major part there and so usurpe over King Kingdome and Parliament for ever sure this is next to a prodigy if it be not one but let us consider the Lords and Commons as meere Counsellors without any power or right of Counselling or consenting yet wee shall see if they be not lesse knowing and faithfull than other men they ought not to be deserted unlesse we will allow that the King may cause whither he will admit of any counsell at all or no in the disposing of our lives lands and liberties But the King sayes that he is not bound to renounce his owne understanding or to contradict his owne conscience for any Counsellors sake whatsoever 'T is granted in things visible and certaine that judge which is a sole judge and has competent power to see his owne judgement executed ought not to determine against the light of nature or evidence of fact The sinne of Pilate was that when he might have saved our Saviour from an unjust death yet upon accusations contradictory in themselves contrary to strange Revelations from Heaven he would suffer Innocence to fall and passe sentence of death meerly to satisfie a bloud-thirsty multitude But otherwise it was in my Lord of Straffords case for there the King was not sole Judge nay he was uncapeable of sitting as judge at all and the delinquent was legally condemned and such heynous matters had beene proved against him that his greatest friends were ashamed to justifie them and all impartiall men of three whole Kingdomes conceived them mortall and therefore the King might therin with a clear conscience have signed a warrant for his death though he had dissented from the judgement So if one judge on the same bench dissent from three or one juror at the barre from a eleven they may submit to the major number though perhaps lesse skilfull then themselves without imputation of guilt and if it be thus in matters of Law a fortiori 't is so in matters of State where the very satisfying of a multitude sometimes in things not otherwise expedient may proove not onely expedient but necessary for the setling of peace and ceasing of strife For example It was the request of the whole Kingdome in the Parliament to the King to intrust the Militiae and the Magazine of Hull c. into such hands as were in the peoples good esteeme Conscience and understanding could plead nothing against this and if it could have beene averred as it could not for the contrary was true that this would have bred disturbance and have beene the occasion of greater danger yet Where the people by publique authority will seeke any inconvenience to themselves and the King is not so much intressed in it as themselves 't is more inconvenience and injustice to deny then grant it what blame is it then in Princes when they will pretend reluctance of conscience and reason in things behoofull for the people and will use their fiduciarie power in denying just things as if they might lawfully do whatsoever they have power to do when the contrary is the truth and they have no power to do but what is lawfull and fit to be done So much for the ends of Parliamentary power I come now to the true nature of it publike consent we see consent as well as counsell is requisite and due in Parliament and that being the proper foundation of all power for omnis Potestas fundata est in voluntate we cannot imagine that publique consent should be anywhere more vigorous or more orderly than it is in Parliament Man being depraved by the fall of Adam grew so untame and uncivill a creature that the Law of God written in his brest was not sufficient to restrayne him from mischiefe or to make him sociable and therefore without some magistracy to provide new orders and to judge of old and to execute according to justice no society could be upheld without society men could not live and without lawes men could not be sociable and without authority somewhere invested to judge according to Law and execute according to judgement Law was a vaine and void thing it was soon therefore provided that lawes agreeable to the dictates of reason should be ratified by common consent and that the execution and interpretation of those Lawes should be intrusted to some magistrate for the preventing of common injuries betwixt Subject and Subject but when it after appeared that man was yet subject to unnaturall destruction by the Tyranny of intrusted magistrates a mischiefe almost as fatall as to be without all magistracie how to provide a wholsome remedy therefore was not so easie to be prevented 'T was not difficult to invent Lawes for the limitting of supreme governors but to invent how those Lawes should be executed or by whom interpreted was almost impossible nam quis custodiat ipsos custodes To place a superiour above a supreme was held unnaturall yet what a livelesse fond thing would Law be without any judge to determine it or power to enforce it and how could humaine consociation be preserved without some such Law besides if it be agreed upon that limits should be prefixed to Princes and judges appointed to decree according to those limits yet an other great inconvenience will presently affront us for we cannot restraine Princes too far but we shall disable them from some good as well as inhibit them from some evill and to be disabled from doing good in some things may be as mischievous as to be inabled for all evils at meere discretion Long it was ere the world could extricate it selfe out of all these extremities or finde out an orderly meanes whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded prerogative on this hand and to excessive liberty on the other and