the words are upon reasonable request which implies a reasonable time to consider of it And there might be many occasions both in respect of her self and of the Common wealth that she could not at that â—ime do it And Hill 37. Eliz. in the Common Pleas PERPOYNT and THIMBELBYES Case A man Covenants to make Assurances It was adjudged hee shall have reasonable time to do it In 27. Eliz. the opinion of Popham was That if a man be bounden to make such an Assurance as Councell shall advise there if Councell advise an Assurance he is bound to make it But if it were such Reasonable Assurance as Councell shall advise There If the Councell do advise That he shall enter into seale and deliver a Bond of a thousand pound for the payment of an hundred pound at a day hee is not bound to doe it because it is not reasonable Vide 9. Ed 4. 3. cap. 6. part Bookers Case Doct. Stud. 56. 14. H. 8. 23. Secondly He said That the request in the principall Case was not according to the Covenant for the election in this case was on the womans part and not on the Covenantees part and shee was to doe the act viz. to surrender And where election is given of two things the same cannot be taken from the party and if it should be so in the principall Case the Covenantee should take away the election of the Covenanter And where the manner of Assurance is set down by the parties there they cannot vary from it and in this case the manner is set down in which the Covenanter hath the election because shee is to do the act And hee said That the woman was not bounden afterwards to surrender in Court upon this request because the request was as it were a void request And it is implyed by the words That shee in person ought to make the Surrender and so hee prayed Judgment for the Defendant It was adjourned Trinit 8. Caroli in the King 's Bench. 514. HYE and Dr. WELLS Case DOctor William Wells sued Hye in the Ecclesiasticall Court for Defamation for saying to him that hee lyed And the Plaintiffe prayed a Prohibition It was argued for the Defendant that in this Case no Prohibition should goe For it was said that by the Statute of 21. Edw. 1. of Consultation When there is no Writ given in the Chancery for the party grieved in the Temporall Court there the Spirituall Court shall have the Jurisdiction and in this Case there is no Writ given by Law And Fitzherbert Natura Brevium 53. h. a Consultation doth not lie properly but in case where a man cannot have his Recovery by the Common Law in the Kings Courts for the words of the Writ of Consultation are viz. Proviso quod quicquid in juris nostri regii derogationem cedere valcat aliqualiter per vos nullatenus attemptetur And Vide Register 149. Falsarius is to be punished in the Spirituall Court And Fitzherb Nat. Brev. 51. I. A man may sue in the Spirituall Court where a man defames him and publisheth him for false Vide Linwood in cap. de foro compâ—tenti acc Trin. 6. Jacobi in the Common Pleas Boles Case Rot. 2733. A man called a poor Vicar poor rascally Knave for which the Vicar sued him in the spirituall Court And by the opinion of the whole Court after a Prohibition had been granted upon further advice a Consultation was granted 1. It was objected That the party might be punished by the Temporall Judges and Justices for the words To which it was answered That although it might be so which in truth was denied yet the party might sue for the same in the spirituall Court And many Cases put That where the party might be punished by either Lawes that the partie had his election in what Court he would sue And therefore it was said That if a man were a drunkard he might be sued in the Ecclesiastical Court for his drunkennesse and yet he might be bounden to his good behaviour for the same by the Justices so the imputed father of a Bastard child may be sued for the offence either in the spirituall Court or at the Common Law by the Statute of 18. Eliz. and 7. Jacobi So F. N. B. 52. k. If a man sue in the spirituall Court for taking and detaining his wife from him to whom he was lawfully married if the other party sue a Prohibition for the same yet he shall have a Consultation quatenus pro restitutione uxoris suae duntaxat prosequitur and yet he may have an Action at the Common Law De uxore abducta cum bonis viri or an Action of Trespasse Maynard contrary By the Statute of Articuli Clâ—ri although that the words be generall yet they do not extend to all defamations And by Register 49. where the Suit is for defamation there the Cause ought to be expressed ought to be wholly spirituall as the Book is in 29. E. 3. and C. 7. part in Kenn's Case And in the principal Case It is not a matter affirmative which is directly spirituall And therefore 22. Jacobi where a Suit was in the Ecclesiasticall Court for these words Thou art a base and paultery Rogue a Prohibition was awarded And so Vinor and Vinors Case Trinit 7. Jacobi in the King's Bench Thou art a drunken woman Thou art drunk over night and mad in the morning 2. Hee said That Crimen falsi in the spirituall Court is meant of counterfeiting of the Seal or of Forgery and Crimen falsi cannot be intended a lie If in ordinary speech one sayes That 's a lie If the other reply You lie that is no defamation for Qui primum peccat ille facit rixam Trinit 42. Eliz. Lovegrove and Brâ—wens Case A man said to a Clark a spirituall person Thou art a Woodcock and a Foole for which words he sued him in the spirituall Court and in that Case a Prohibition was awarded It was adjourned Trinit 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 515 GWYN and GWYN's Case A Quod ei deforceat was brought against two they appeared and pleaded severall Pleas and the issues were found against both of them and a joint Judgement was given against them both and they brought a Writ of Error thereupon in the Kings Bench. And the opinion was That the Judgement was Erroneous and that the Writ of Error would well lie So in a Writ of Dower brought against two Tenants in common who plead severall Pleas the Judgement must be according to the Writ But Barkley said That if in a Writ of right by two the Mise is joyned but in one Issue where severall Issues are the Judgment ought to be severall Quaere quia obscurè Trinit 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 516 BLAND's Case THE Case was this Thomas Spence was a Lessee of Lands for one hundred years and he and Jane his Wife by Indenture for valuable consideration did assign over to Tisdale yeilding and paying
King And as to the second Point they held the Law to be cleer That after that he hath retained as many as by the Law he may retaine and they are sub Signo and Sigillo testified to bee his Chaplains and by reason thereof have qualification to have two Benefices and have two Benefices by vertue thereof although that afterwards they are removed for displeasure or otherwise out of service yet during their lives their Master cannot take other Chaplains which may by this Statute be qualified for so every Baron might have infinite of Chaplains which might be qualified which was not the meaning of the Statute and of that opinion is the Lord Dyer in his Reports And as to the third Point they held That although he were removed from the Domesticall Service of the Family yet hee did remaine Chaplain at large and so a Chaplain within the Statute And further the Opinion of the Court was in this Case That if the party qualified to die the Queen or other Master mentioned in the Statute might qualifie another againe Quod nota The Case was entred Pasch 28. Eliz. Rot. 1130. Scot. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 48. ONE made a Deed in this forme Noverinit c. that I have demised and to Farme letten all my Lands in D. to I. S. and his Wife and to the Heirs of their two Bodies for thirteen years And it was moved That it was an Estate in taile and 5. E. 3. and 4. H. 4. were vouched But Clenche Justice who was only present in Court was of Opinion That it is but a Lease for years although it was put that Livery was made secundùm formam chartae and his said That if one make a Lease for forty years to another and his Heirs and makes Livery that it is but a Lease for years and he said It is no Livery but rather a giving of Possession But he would have it moved again when the other Justices came Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 49 AN Action upon the Case was brought against an Inn-keeper upon the Custome of England for the safe keeping of the things and Goods of their Guests and he brought his Action in another County then where the Inn was and it was said by Clench Justice That if it be an Action upon the Case upon a Contract or for words and the like transitory things that it may be brought in any County but in this Case he said It ought to be brought where the Inn is Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 50. ONE charged two men as Receivers The Question was Whether one of them might plead Ne unque son Receiver and it was moved That he could not but ought to say Nâ— unque son Receiver absque hoc that he and his Companion were Receivers Clenchè and Suit Justices held That it was well without Traverse and Vide 10. E. 4. 8. Where an Account was brought against one supposing the receipt of Two hundred Marks by the hands of I. P. and R. C. The Defendant as to One hundred Marks pleaded That he received it by the hands of I. P. tantùm without that that he received it by the hands of I. P. and R. C. And as to the other One hundred Marks he received them from the hands of R. C. only without that that he received I. P. and R. C. And there it was doubted Whether it be good or not But in the end of the Case by Fitz. Accompt 14. If an Account be brought against two and one saith He was sole his Receiver and hath accounted before such an Auditor if the Plaintiffe answer unto his Bar he shall abate his Writ because the Receipt is supposed to be a joint Receipt And it is not like unto a Praecipe quod reddat against two Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 51. AN Action upon the Case was brought against one for that he said to another I will give thee Ten Pound to kill such a one and the Question was Whether the Action would lie It was said by Sir Thomas Coâ—kaine that such a Lady had given poyson to such a one to kill her Child within her that the words were not Actionable Also one said That another had put Gun-Powder in the Window of a house to fire such a house and the house was not fired adjudged that the words were not Actionable The Case was betwixt Ramsey of Buckinghamshire and another who said That he lay in wait to have killed him it was found for the Plaintiffe and he had Forty Pound Damages given him But of the Principall Case the Court would advise Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 52 IT was holden by the Court That the Habeas corpus shall be alwayes directed to him who hath the custody of the Body Therefore whereas in the case of one Wickham it was directed to the Maior Bailiffs and Burgesses Exception was taken unto it because the pleas were holden before the Maior Bailiff and Steward but the Exception was dissallowed But otherwise it is in a Writ of Error for that shall be directed to those before whom the Judgment was given In London the Habeas corpus shall be directed Majori Vicecomit London because they have the custodie and not to the whole Corporation But I conceive that the course is that the Writ is directed Majori Aldermannis Vicecomitibus c. Mich. 28 29 Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 53 MARSH and PALFORD's Case OWen moved this Case That one had an upper chamber in Fee and another had the neather or lower part of the same house in Fee and he who had the upper chamber pulled it down and he which had the lower room would not suffer him to build it up again But the opinion of the Justices was that he might build it up again if he did it within convenient time And there it was said that it had been a Question Whether a man might have a Free-hold in an upper chamber Mich. 28 29 Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 54. A Question was moved to the Court Whether Tithe should be paid of Heath Turf and Broom And the opinion of Suit Justice was That if they have paid tithe Wool Milk Calves c. for their cattell which have gone upon the Land that they should not pay tithe of them But some doubted of it and conceived That they ought to say that they have used to pay those Tithes for all other Tithes otherwise they should pay tithe for Heath Turf Broom c. Mich. 28 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 55. TWo Parsons were of two severall Parishes and the one claimed certain Tithes within the Parish of the other and said That he and all his Predecessors Parsons of such a Church scil of D. had used to have the Tithes of such Lands within the Parish of S. and that was pleaded in the Spiritual Court and the Court was moved for to grant
it is not shewed that he used any other rite or Ceremony c. for there ought to be some Positive thing 3. He doth not shew the Place or Parish where he persisted in it and that is materiall and issuable The fourth Exception was Because it was Inquisitio câ—pta coram Johanne Peter Waltero Mildmay and so named four of them by vertue of a Commission directed to them and to others and doth not shew what others nec quod illi fuerunt praesentes and then if the Commission were to them all jointly and two only were present then it was coram non judice and so void 5. The Statute saies That if any Parson or Vicar but doth not say being Minister Dei. The sixth was That it was at another Church c. Wray Chief Justice If this Evasion should be allowed the Statute were not to the purpose The seventh was That it doth not shew where the persisting was for that is a speciall thing and materiall and issuable Wray Chief Justice conceived That that only was a materiall Exception and that the other Exceptions were but frivolous and were not good Hill 29. Eliz. In the Kings Bench. 138 WARREN's Case ONE Warren demanded by a Writ of Debt in the Common Pleas Forty Pound and upon his Declaration did confess himselfe satisfied of Twenty Pound and thereupon Error was brought in the King's Bench And the Judgement reversed because by his Declaration he had abated his Writ and he ought to have Judgement according to his Writ and not according to his Declaration The Error assigned was in the Outlawry and it was holden by all the Justices That if the principall Record be reversed for Error that the Outlawry which is grounded upon it shall be reversed also Hill 29. Eliz. in the Kings Bench. 139 ROOTE 's Case THE Case was in a Prohibition touching Tithes and the libell in the Spirituall Court was for Corn and Hay and other things and the Tenant of the land did prescribe to pay in one part of the land the third part of the tenth and in another part the moity of the tenth of Corn for all manner of Tithes And the Court did incline that the same was a good prescription And a Prohibition was granted to the Ecclesiasticall Court Hill 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 140 A Man was possessed for the terme of six years of a Tavern in London and leased the same unto another for three years and it was convenanted betwixt them that during the three years quolibet mense monthly the lessee should give an Account to the lessor of the Wine which he sold and should pay unto him for every Tun sold so much money And afterwards the lessor granted the three years which were remaining of the six years to another and he did request the lessee to account and he would not whereupon he brought an Action of Covenant and the Defendant pleaded That he had accounted to the Assignee of the three years and upon that there was a Demurrer joyned And the better opinion of the Court was that it was no Plea because it was not a Covenant which did go with the land or the Reversion but was a collaterall thing and did not pass by the assignment of the three years Hill 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 141 IT was adjudged That the bringing of a Writ of Error to reverse a Fine by an Infant during his nonage is not sufficient but the Fine by Judgement in the Writ of Error must be reversed during his Nonage Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 142 WIDALL and Sr. JOHN ASHTON's Case A Writ of Error was brought by Widall against Sr. John Ashston because in the other action being an action of Wast The Plaintiff there did declare that he was seised and so seised demisit pro termino annorum c. and did not shew of what estate he was seised And yet he did suppose that it was ad exhaeredationem ejus c. And the same by Beamount was taken for an exception as 7. H. 6. A man pleaded a Feoffment to two haeredibus and doth not say suis it is uncertain And in the principal Case it shall be supposed that he hath but an estate for life for it shall not be intended that he hath an estate of Inheritance without expressing of words to carry an Inheritance As 7. Ass If I grant a Rent to I. S. and do not name what estate he shall have in it he shall have but an estate for life But he said that the Presidents are that if the word seised had been left out it had been good enough For by the Book of Entries a man may say demisit without saying that he was seised demisit But if a man will plead a thing which is not necessary to be pleaded and mistake it it shall make his Plea naught as in Patridges Case Where a suite was upon the Statute of Maintenance It is sufficent to say contra formam Statuti But if he will plead specially the day and place of the Statute and mis-plead it it makes all naught Suit Justice I conceive that that is a fault incurable But upon the other side it was argued that in 21. H. 7. It is holden that he might plead quod demisit without that that he was seised and demisit as there in an Action of Debt And therefore it is but surplusage in the principal Case Vide 15. E. 4. A good Case where surplusage shall not hurt because it is not traversable And he urged that by the Statute of 18. El. the Declaration doth not abate for matter of form And he said that Counts and Declarations shall be taken by Intendment and it shall be intended that if bringeth Wast that he hath such an estate that he may maintain such Action In Adams Case in the Commentaries One shewed that such an Abbot was seised and that the Land came unto the King by Dissolution and that the King being seised did grant the same and did not shew of what estate the King was seised and yet it was holden good See a good Case to this purpose 18. E. 3. Formedon 58. And he said that the Defendant had pleaded Nul wast fait and therefore he had by his Plea affirmed the Declaration to be good Beamount He ought to have said reversione inde sibi haeredibus c. Clenche Justice I conceive that the Statute of 18. El. helps that Suit Justice No truly It was adjourned Hill 29. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 143 AN Action of Covenant was brought by a Man against another who had been his Apprentize The Defendant pleaded that he was within age The plaintiff did maintain his Action by the Custome of London Where one by Covenant may binde himself within age And Exception was taken to it That that was a Departure Daniel It is no Departure for by 18. R. 2. an Infant brought an Action against Gardian in Socage and the
upon Evidence to the Jury the Case appeared to be viz. That there was Lessee for years and afterwards the Lessor made a Deed of Feoffment in which were words of Confirmation and in the end of the Deed there was a special Letter of Atturney to make Livery to the Lessee for years and his heirs And it was agreed by all the Justices That the Lessee for years had Election to take the same by way of confirmation or by Feoffment and that the Law doth suspend and expect untill he hath declared his pleasure And it was further adjudged That when he hath made his Election to take it by Livery that it shall be a Feoffment ab initio and by the delivery of the Deed in the mean time nihil operatur Mich. 31. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 171 A Copy-holder did alledge the custome to be That the Lord of the Manor might grant Copies in Remainder with the assent of the Tenants and not otherwise and that Copies in remainder otherwise granted should be meerly void The question was Whether it were a good custome The Justices did not deliver any opinion in the point But Walmesley Serjeant said That it was a void custome for a Copy-hold Estate is an estate of which the Law doth not take notice and Copy-holders are meer Tenants at will by the common Law and therefore to say That he who hath not an interest should have me at his pleasure aswell as I who am interessed should have him at my pleasure is preposterous and repugnant to reason as 2. H. 4. 27. A custome that the Commoner shall not use his Common before that the Lord hath put in his Cattel is not good for the Commoner hath an interest in the Common which is not reasonable to be restrained at the pleasure of another and 19. Eliz Dyâ—r 257. A custome that a man shall not demise or lease but for six years is a void custome Shuttleworth Serjeant contrary and he said That the reason that this Copy-hold is not within Littletons Estates by Copy is no reason for by the same reason you may overthrow all Copy-hold Estates And he said That this custome might have a lawfull beginning and it seems to bee grounded upon the reason of the common Law that a remainder should not be without the assent of the particular Tenant and therefore it is a good custome And so is the custome that a Woman shall not have Dower if she do not claim it within a year and a day And a custome that a free Tenant shall not alien without a surrender in the Court of the Lord is a good custome It was adjourned 31. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 172 Sir RALPH EGERTON'S Case UPon a speciall Verdict the Case was this A man being Tenant for life in the right of his Wife he made a Deed of Feoffment Habendum to the Feoffee and his Heirs ad solum opus usum of the Feoffee and his Heirs for the life of the Wife and the Court was cleer of opinion that it was a forfeiture because the Habendum is absolute and the use is another clause and although he doth not limit the use but for life yet the Law limits the remainder of the use to the party who maketh the Feoffment Trinit 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 173 MAYE'S Case IF a man sendeth a Letter by a Carrier to a Merchant for certain Merchandizes to send them to him by the Carrier receiving certain monies and the Merchant sendeth the Goods by the Carrier without the receipt of the Money the same shall not bind the Buyer as it was holden by the Court because it was but a conditionall Bargain and it was the folly of the Merchant to trust the Carrier and therefore in that Case the Vendee was admitted to wage his Law And so if one writeth for Wares and the party sends them by the same Carrier yet if the Carrier doth not deliver them the other may wage his Law in such Case Mich. 30. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 174 HALTON'S Case THE case was That a Recognizance was acknowleged before Sir N. Read one of the Masters of the Chancery The Recognizee died before the same was enrolled And whether it might be enrolled at the Petition of the Executors of the Recognizee was the question And it was agreed by all the Justices That the same might be enrolled for it was like unto the Conusans of a Fine before a Judge which might be removed out of the hands of the Judge by a Certiorari and yet it is no record untill it be perfected And at that time it was doubted whether the Chancery might help a man who was a purchaser for valuable consideration where there wanteth the word heirs in the Deed of purchase But it was agreed by all the Justices That after a Fine is levied of Land That the Chancery may compell the Tenant to attorne Trinit 31. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. Rot. 1704. 175 BLAGROVE and WOOD'S Case IN Trespass the Question was If a Copy-hold was surrendred or not And the custome was alledged to be That a Copy-holder might surrender out of the Court to the Steward out of the Manor And the Steward was retained onely by word but had no Patent Walmesley He may be Steward by word well enough But Windham and Anderson held That he might be Steward by word onely in possession that is when he holds a Court in possession But he cannot be Steward out of Court without a Patent because he is then out of possession And therefore it was the opinion of the whole Court That the surrender out of Court to the Steward by word was not good Hill 36. Eliz. in the Common Pleas. 176 THe Summons of a Copy-holder to appear at the Lords Court was at the Church and thereupon the Copy-holder did not appear And it was the opinion of the whole Court that the same was no cause of forfeiture of the Copy-hold because it was not especially shewed to be the Custome And it shall be hard to make it a Forfeiture for perhaps the Copy-holder had not notice of it And to that purpose was vouched the Lord Dacres and Harlestoâ—s case And they held that notice ought to be given to the person and the Refusall must be willfull for if a Copy-holder be demanded his rent and he saith that he hath it not the same is no forfeiture but the deniall ought to be a wilfull deniall and so it was said to have been adjudged in one Winters Case Trinit 1. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. Rot. 854. 177 SAPLAND and RIDLER'S Case AFter long Arguments on both sides It was adjudged by all the Justices in this case That where the Custome of a Copy-hold Manor was to admit for life and in remainder for life at any time when there was but one Copy-holder for life in possession and during the minority of the Heir within fourteen years the Gardian in Socage in his own name
did admit a Copy-holder in Remainder for life That the same was a good admittance according to the Custome And that he was a sufficient Dominus pro tempore as to this purpose Although it was objected by Walmesley That the Gardian is but Servus and not Dominus But because it was agreed that he had a lawfull Interest the admittance was good and so it was adjudged 33. Eliz. In the Common Pleas. 178 SHIPWITH and SHEFFIELD'S Case THe Custome of a Copy-hold Manor was That a feme Covert might give Lands to her Husband And if it were a good Custome or not was the Question Fleetwood The Custom is good and vouched 12. E 3. That in York there is such a custome That the Husband might give the Land of his own purchase to his wife during the Coverture and it is a good Custome That an Infant at the age of fifteen years may make a Feoffment 29. E. 3. and the same is good at the Common Law and yet the same all began by custome But the Court was of opinion That the Custome is unreasonable because it cannot have a lawfull Commencement And Anderson Chiefe Justice said That a Custome that an Infant at the age of seven years might make a Feoffment is no good custome because he is not of age of discretion And in this case at Barre It shall be intended that the wife being sub potestate viri did it by the Coherison of her Husband The same Law is of a Custome That the wife may lease to her Husband Fleetwood urged That the custome might be good because the wife was to be examined by the Steward of the Court as the manner is upon a Fine to be examined by a Judge To which the Court said nothing 31. Eliz. in the King's Bench 179 AN Action upon the Case upon an Assumpsit was brought And the Plaintiff layed his Action That such a one did promise him in respect of his labour in another Realme c. to pay him his contentment And he said That Twenty five Pound is his contentment and that he had required the same of the Defendant Cook moved in arrest of Judgement it being found for the Plaintiffe upon Non Assumpsit pleaded that no place was alledged where the contentment was shewed And the opinion of the Court was against him for Gawdy and Wray were of opinion that he might shew his contentment in any Action and so it is where it is to have so much as he can prove he might prove it in the same Action Cook said That it had been moved in stay of Judgement in this Court upon an Assumpsit because the request was not certain And that case was agreed by the Justices because the request is parcell of the Assumpsit and the entire Assumpsit together in such case is the cause of the Action but in this case that he should content him is not the cause of the Assumpsit but only a circumstance of the matter and it was resembled to the Case of 39. H. 6. where a Writ of Annuity was brought for Arrerages against an Abbot pro consilio c. And the Plaintiffe declared that the Councel was ad proficuum Domus and was not alledged in certain and it was holden that the same was not materiall although it were uncertain because it was but an induction and necessary circumstance to the Action And so the Plaintiffe recovered and had Judgement Mich. 29 Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 180 THE Statute of 23. Eliz. cap. 25. is Quod non licuit alicui to engrosse Barley c. and in the Statute there is a Proviso That he may so do so as he convert it into Malt. The question was If in an Information upon that Statute That the Defendant had converted it to Malt he might plead the generall Issue Not guilty and give in Evidence the speciall matter or whether he ought to plead the speciall matter Clench Justice He may plead Not guilty c. for the Proviso is parcel and within the body of the Statute as 27. H. 8. 2. where upon an Information upon the Statute of Farmors it is holden by Fitzherbert That the Vicar may plead Non habuit seu tenuit ad firmam contra formam Statuti c. and yet the Statute in the premises of it restrains every Spirituall Person to take in Farme any Lands c. and afterwards by a Proviso gives him liberty to take Lands for the maintenance of his house c. As upon the Statute of R. 2. If he do plead That he did not enter contra formam Statuti he may give in Evidence that he entred by Title as that his father was seised and died and the same is not like unto the condition of a Bond for that is a severall thing But the Proviso and the Statute is but one Act. Mich. 29. Eliz. in the King 's Bench. 181 NOte It was said by Master Kemp Secondary of the King's Bench That there is a Court within the Tower of London but he said That it was but a Court Baron and said That he can shew a Judgement That no Writ of Error lieth of a Judgement given there And it was a question Whether Process might be awarded to the Lieutenant of the Tower for Execution upon a Judgment given in the Kings Bench because the Defendant was removed and dwelt within the Liberty of the Tower And it was said It could not but the Writ ought to be awarded to the Sheriffs of London and if they returne the Liberties of the Tower then a Non omittas shall be awarded But some Counsellors said That although a Non omittas be awarded yet the Sheriffs durst not go unto the Liberties of the Tower to serve the Process 2 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 182 The Lady STOWELL'S Case IT was adjudged in this Case That the wife who is divorced causa adulterii shall have her Dower 3. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 183 WARNER'S Cafe LEssee for twenty years doth surrender rendring rent during the term It was adjudged a good rent for so many years as the term might have continued 3. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 184 WHITLOCK and HARTWELL'S Case TWO Joint-Tenants for life the one demised and granted the moyty unto his companion for certain years to begin after his death Adjudged void because it is but a possibility And so is it of a Covenant to stand seised to the use c. as it was adjudged in Barton and Harvey's Case 37. Eliz. 3. Jacobi In the Kings Bench. 185 PINDER'S Case A. devised lands in Fee to his son and many other lands in tail And afterwards he said I will that if my son die without issue within age that the lands in Fee shall go to such a one Item I will that the other lands in tail shall go to others and doth not say in the second Item if the son dieth without issue within age It was adjudged That the second Item should be without
be out of his Apprentiship and he died within the time the Executors shall not have the money otherwise if the Bond had been to pay money after the expiration of ten years Adjudged Mich. 5. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 200 GAGE and PEACOCK's Case IT was adjudged in this case That if Lessee for years of a Manor take a Lease of the Bailiwick of the Manor that it is no surrender of his term because it is of a thing which is collaterall Mich. 5. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 201 IF a Parson have a Benefice above the yearly value of eight pound and afterwards he taketh another Benefice with a dispensation and afterwards he taketh a third Benefice his first Benefice is onely void Adjudged per Curiam Mich. 5. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 202 A Man in consideration of Marriage doth assure and promise to do three severall things For the not performance of one of them the party to whom the promise is made bringeth an Action upon the case and to enable him to the Action sayes That the Defendant in consideration of Marriage did promise him to performe the said thing for which the Action is brought without speaking of the other two things The Defendant by plea in barre said Non assumpsit modo formâ And the opinion of the Court was that it was a good issue For the Contract being entire if it be not a good plea the Defendant might be charged for the severall things which cannot be being but one contract by word But it is otherwise of severall contracts in writing Trinit 5. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 203 Sir JOHN SPENCER and POYNT's Case SIr John Spencer made a Lease for years unto Sir John Poynts rendring rent by Indenture The Lessee covenants that if the rent be behind at any time of payment according to the forme of the Indenture that the Lessor shall have two hundred pound Nomine poenae for such default The rent is behind Sir John Spencer brought Debt for the Nomine poenae The Question was Whether without Demand of the rent debt did not lie for the Nomine poenae And the better opinion of the Court was that the Action of Debt did not lie Vide Fitz N. B. 120. seems contrary 5. Jacobi at the Sessions at Newgate 204 IT was adjudged upon the Statute of 1 Jacobi of desperate Stabbing to be Felony without Clergy That because that the party had a cudgell in his hand That that was a weapon drawn within the intent of the Statute And the party was thereupon arraigned of Felony and not of Murder and admitted to his Clergy Mich. 5 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 205 NOte It was holden by the whole Court That if a man appeareth upon a Scire facias That he shall not have an Audita Quereba because he had notice in facto otherwise if he had appeared upon the 2. Nichil returned which amounts to a Scire feci for there he hath not notice in fact But it was said That the course is otherwise in the Common Pleas. Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 206 JOHNSON's Case IN an Accompt the Defendant was adjudged to account and the parties were at issue before Auditors and the Plaintiffe was Non-suit The Question was Whether he should have a Scire facias against the Defendant to account upon the first Originall and the better opinion of the Court was That he should not but should be put to a new Writ of Account according to the opinion of Townsend in 1. H. 7. against 21. E. 3. and 3. H. 4. Mich. 6. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 207 NOte It was holden by Justice Williams and not denied by any other of the Justices That if Lands be given to one and his heir that the same is a Fee-simple because the word Heir is Collectivum Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 208 HARLOW and WOOD's Case IN an Action of Trover and Conversion the Case was A stranger delivered the Horse of Harlow to an Inholder Harlow came to him and demanded his horse who refused to deliver it to him if hee would not save him harmelesse and indamnified But because the pleading was Quod quidem homo did deliver to him and did not shew his name certain The Plea was adjudged not to be good Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 209 Sir ROBERT BARKER and FINCHE'S Case A Man made a Lease for years rendring Rent at Michaelmas and the Annunciation of our Lady he in the reversion bargained and sold the same to a Stranger who gave notice thereof to the Lessee The day of the payment came the Lessee paid the rent to the Bargainor and then the Deed was enrolled The question was Whether the Bargainee should have the rent by relation so as the Bargainor should be charged in account to the Lessee for the rent first paid And the Court was of opinion That the Bargainee should not have the rent Dodderidge Serjeant If the rent be paid to an administrator who hath right for a time and afterwards a Will is found and proved so as it appeareth upon the matter that there was an Executor and by consequence no administration could be the rent shall be paid by him again to the Executors Quaere Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 210 Grissell and Sir Christopher Hodsdens Case IN this Case it was agreed for Law That if two Lords be Tenants in Common of a Waste and each of them hath a Court in which are divers By-lawes made it ought to be presented by the Homage That such a one hath not any thing in the Common ad exhaeredationem Domini and no Dominorum notwithstanding that they are Tenants in common Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 211 LEE and SWAN'S Case AN Action upon the Case was brought for speaking of these words viz. The Plaintiffe being a Town Clark took forty shillings for a Bribe And by the whole Court the words adjudged Actionable Mich. 6. Jacobi in the King 's Bench. 212 BRIGG'S Case ACtion for the Case for words You have bought a Roan stollen Horse knowing him to be stollen It was adjudged That the words were Actionable Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 213 IT was adjudged in this Court That an Ejectione firme doth lie de aquae cursu Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 214 A Man was indicted for a common Barrator Anno Regni Domini nostri Jacobi sexto and the word Regis was left out of the Indictment and for that cause the Indictment was quashed It was Nelson and Toyes Case Mich. 6. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 215 IT was adjudged in this Court That if the Wife of a Lessee for years doth assent a to Livery made of the house in the absence of her Husband although that the servants and children be and continue in the house that it is a good Livery Quaere If the wife notwithstanding her assent doth continue in the house But if a man doth
Statute to enclose For the Statute is When any man fels trees in his proper soile so that he not being owner of the ground he is not within the Statute and that was the effect of his argument And as to the other point he did not speak at all Cook chief Justice I hold that the plaintiffe ought to have judgment all the matter doth consist upon the Statute of 22. E. 4. which is to be considered And first is to be considered what was the common Law before that Statute and that was That one who had a Wood within a Forrest might fell it as it appeareth by the Statute de Forresta and the Statnte of 1 E. 3. 2. by licence and also he might enclose it for three yeers as it appeareth by the Statute of 22. E. 4. but the enclosure was to be cum parvo fossato haia bassa as it appeareth by the Register in the Writ of Ad quod damnum so as before that Statute there was an enclosure But the Law is cleer That before that Statute by the enclosure the Commoner shall not be excluded Then wee are to consider of the Statute And first Of the persons to whom the Statute doth extend and that appeareth by the preamble to be betwixt the King and other owners of Forrests and Chases and the owners of the Soil so as a Commoner is not any person within the meaning of the Statute And for the body of the Statute you ought to intend that the sentence is continued and not perfected untill the end of the Statute and the words Without licence c. prove That no persons were meant to be bounden by the statute but the Owners of the Forrests and Chases and not the Commoners Like the case in Dyer And although you will expound the words of the bodie of the Statute generally yet they shall be taken according to the intent of the preamble and therefore the Case of 21. H. 7. 1. of the Prior of Castleacre although it be not adjudged in the Book yet Judgment is entred upon the Roll which Case is Pasch 18. H. 7. Rot. 460. By which case it appeareth that although that a Statute be made which giveth Lands to the King yet by that statute the Annuity of a stranger shall not be extinguished And the Case which hath been put by Justice Foster upon the Statute of 18. Eliz. was the case of Boswel for the Parsonage of Bridgwater That although that one who hath a lease for years of the King which was void for misrecitall might by the said Statute hold it against the King yet the Patentee in Fee shall not be prejudiced by the said Statute So I conclude That the Commoner is not a person within this Statute of 22. E. 4 Secondly It is to be considered if a Wood in which any one hath Common be within the Statute and I hold it is not but onely severall Woods For as I have said the Wood which before the Statute might be enclosed for three years was onely a severall Wood and not such a Wood in which any one had common And the statute of 22. E. 4. doth extend onely to such Woods which might be felled and enclosed for three yeers and I conceive contrary to my Brother Warburton That the Deer of the Forrest shall well enough be said to be beasts and cattell And whereas by the common Law before this statute the enclosure was onely to be as I have said cum parvo fossato haia bassa by which the Deer were not excluded now by this statute I hold that they may make great hedges to exclude aswell the Deer as other beasts And I agree with Justice Foster that if he will take advantage of the Statute that hee ought to have pleaded that first hee felled and afterwards enclosed and è contrà upon the Statute of 35. H. 8. scil that hee ought first to divide and afterwards to fell c. And also I agree with him that in that point the Statute of 35. H. 8. being contrary doth repeal the Statute of 22. E. 4. if by that Statute the Commoner shall be excluded But I am of opinion with my Brother Warburton cleerly That hee is a Vendee of the Trees and so within the Statute for it is not neeessary that in the Grant there be the word Sell or that money by given nor that it be a contract for a time onely and not to have cantinuance as it is in our case But he who hath the Trees to him and his heirs shall be said to be a Vendee well enough As to the other matter which hath been moved Whether the Statute of 22. E. 4 be a generall law or not I hold cleerly that we are to take knowledg of it although it be not pleaded because it concerneth the King for it is made for the Kings Forrests and of all the Acts made between the King and his subjects wee ought to take knowledg for so was Stowel's Case And also it was adjudged that wee ought to take knowledg of the act concerning the Creation of the Prince because it concerneth the King And Cook in his argument said That if there had not been a speciall proviosin for the Commoner in the Statute of 35. H. 8. the Commoner had not been excluded by that Statute And afterwards Judgment was entred for the plaintiffe Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 236 NOte That it was holden by three of the Justices viz. Walmâ—sley Warburton and Foster Cook and Daniel being abâ—ent for law cleerly That a Tenant at will cannot by any custome make a Lease for life by licence of the Lord and that there cannot be any such custome for a lease for life as there is for a lease for years Pasch 8. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 237 BERRY's Case NOte That upon an Evidence given to a Jury in a Case betwixt Berry and New Colledg in Oxford it was ruled by Walmesley Warburton Foster Justices in an Action of Trespass If it appear upon the Evidence that the plaintiff hath nothing in the land but in common with a stranger yet the Jury ought to finde with the Plaintiff and if the Defendant will have advantage of the Tenancy in common in the plaintiff he ought to have pleaded it Nichols Serjeant was very earnest to the contrary and took a difference where the Plaintiffe and Defendant are Tenants in common and where the Plaintiff is tenant in common with a stranger But he was over-ruled the action was an action of Trespass Quare clausum fregit c. Cook and Daniel were absent Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 238 IT was holden by Walmesley Warburton and Foster Justices That if a Rent be granted to one and his heirs for the life of another man and the grantee dieth that his heir shall not be an occupant of the Rent And Foster said that the reason was because he cannot plead a Que estate of a Rent
that a Man was seised of the Manor of D. and of a house called W. in D. and also of a Lease for years in D. and he did bargain and sell unto another his Manor of D. and all other his Lands and Tenements in Dale and in the indenture did covenant that he was seised of the premisses in Fee which was left out of the Verdict and if the Lease for years should pass by the general words was the question Quaere of the case because Trinit 10. Jacobi the Court was divided in opinion in this Case Mich. 9. Iacobi In the King 's Bench. 262 HUGHES and KEENE's Case THe Plaintiff declared that whereas he was possessed of a Messuage for years which had ancient lights and the Defendant possessed of another House adjoyning and a Yard that the Defendant upon the said Yard had built a House and stopped his lights The Defendant pleaded that the custom of London was that every man might build upon his old Foundation and if there be not any agreement might stop up the Windows of his Neighbour upon which the Plaintiff did demurre in Law and it was adjudged for the Plaintiff because that the Defendant did not answer the Plaintiffs charge that he had built upon the new and not upon the old Foundation And it was holden by the whole Court in this Case that a man may build upon an old Foundation by such a custom and stop up the lights of his Neighbour which are adjoyning unto him and if he make new Windows higher the other may build up his house higher to destroy those new Windows But a man cannot build a House upon a place where there was none before as in a Yard and so stop his Neighbours lights And so it was adjudged in the time of Queen Elizabeth in Althans Case upon such a custom in the City of York And it was said by Cook Chief Justice That one prescription may be pleaded against another where the one may stand with the other as it was adjudged in Wright and Wrights Case That a Copy-holder of a Bishop did prescribe that all Copy-holders within the Manor have been discharged of Tithes But not where one prescription is contrary to the other whereas one prescribes to have lights and the other prescribes to stop the same lights Quaere Hill 9. Iacobi in the King 's Bench. 263 SAMFORD and HAVEL's Case IN an Action of Trespass for 30. Hares and 300. Coneys hunted in his Warren taken and carried away which Trespass was layd with a continuando from such a time till such a time the Defendant justified because he had common in the place where c. to a Messuage six Yard Lands for 240. Sheep and that he and all those whose estate he hath time out of mind have used at such time as the Common was surcharged with Coneys to hunt them kill and carry them as to his Messuage appertaining upon which the Plaintiff did demurre in Law because a man cannot make such a prescription in the Free-Warren and Free-hold of another Man And secondly because a man cannot so prescribe to hunt kill and carry away his Coneys as pertaining to his Messuage But a Man may prescribe to have so many Coneys to spend in his House and for these causes in the principal case the prescription was holden for a void prescription and Judgment was given for the Plaintiff Hill 9. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 264 COX and GRAY's Case IT was adjudged upon a Writ of Error brought upon a Judgment given in the Marshalsey in an Action of trover and conversion of goods That if none of the parties be of the Kings houshold and judgment be given there that the same is Error and for that cause the Judgment was reversed Hill 9. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 265 MORRIS's Case IN an Action upon the case for putting of cattel upon the common it was adjudged that if the cattel of a Stranger escape into the common the Commoner may distrain them damage feasance as wel as where the cattel are put into the common by the stranger Pasch 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 266 The Lord MOUNTEAGLE and PENRUDDOCK's Case IT was holden by the whole Court in this case and agreed by all the Serjeants at the Barre That if two men submit themselves to the arbitrament of I. S. And the Arbitrator doth award that one of them shall pay ten pound and that the other shall make a release unto him that the same is a void Award if the submission be not by Deed and hee to whom the Release is to be made by the Award may have remedy for it for otherwise the one should have the ten pound and the other without remedy for the Release And it was resolved That upon submission and arbitrament that the party may have an Action upon the Case for not making of the Release And Cook chief Justice said That it was wisely done by Manwood chiefe Baron when he made such award That a Lease or such like Collaterall thing should be done To make his Award that he should make the Release or pay such a sum of money for which the party might have a remedy I conceive that the reason is That no Action upon the case upon an Arbitrament lieth because it is in the Nature of a Judgement At another day the opinion of the Court was with Cook and 20. H. 6. and 8. E. 4 5. cited to the purpose that there ought to be reciprocall remedy It was also said in this Case That by the Statute of 5. H. 5. A man cannot be Nonsuit after verdict Pasch 10. Jacobi In the Common Pleas. 267 COOK and FISHER's Case IN a Replevin the Defendant did avow for rent granted to him by a private Act of Parliament The Plaintiffe did demand Oyer of the Act and the opinion of the Court was that he ought to have Oyer for they held that the Oyer of no Record shall be denied to any person in case he will demurre And the Record of the Act shall be entred in haec verba Pasch 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 268 The Bakers Case of Gray's-Inne against Occould AN Action of Debt was brought in London against Occould late Steward of Gray's-Inne upon a generall indebitatas assumpsit without shewing the particulars which plea was removed into the Common Pleas. And it was holden by the Court That the Action as it was brought would not lie for the inconvenience which might follow For the Defendant should be driven to be ready to give an answer to the Plaintiffe to the generality And therefore the Plaintiffe ought to bring a speciall Action for the particular things The like Case was in the Marshalsey and because they did not declare in a speciall manner Exception was taken to it and adjudged the Action upon a generall Indebitatas assumpsit did not lie Quaere Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 269 READ and HAWE's Case IN a Replevin Trinit
was adjudged against the Plaintiffe as in a Valore Maritagii if the Defendant will shew that hee tendered a mariage whereas it is not needfull for him so to do yet if the same be not true and issue be taken upon it Judgement shall be given against him wherefore hee concluded for the Plaintiffe The principall Case was adjourned Trinit 10 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 270 GOODMAN and GORE 's Case GOodman brought an Assize against Gore and others for erecting of two houses at the West end of bis Wind-Mill per quod ventus impeditur c. And it was given in Evidence That the said houses were situate about eighty feet from the said Mill and that in height it did extend above the top of the Mill and in length it was twelve yards from the Mill and notwithstanding this neernesse the Court directed the Jury to find for the Defendant And in that Evidence it appeared by a Deed procured by the Plaintiff himself That his Wife was Joint-tenant with him and therefore it was holden by the Court That the Assize brought in his own name alone was not well brought And Cook Chief Justice also said That the Count was not good by reason of these words viz. Per quod ventus impeditur for he said That these were the words of an Action upon the Case and not of an Assize But the Clarks said That such was the usuall forme ad quod non fuit responsum and in that Case it was said obiter by Cook Chief Justice That if the Husband and Wife be Joint-tenants and the Husband sowes the Land and dieth and the Wife doth survive that she shall have the embleements Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 271 HARDINGHAM's Case IN an Action of Trespass Quare clausum fregit the Defendant did justifie That he did enter and distrain for an Amercement in the Sheriffs Torne which was imposed upon the Plaintiffe for enchroaching upon the Kings High-way without shewing that the same was presented before the Justices of Peace at their Sessions as the Statute of 1. E. 4. cap. 2. requireth Haughton Serjeant for stay of Judgement in this Case said That the Statute is That the Justices of Peace shall award Process against the person who is so indicted before the Sheriffe which was not done in this Case And he said That the Statute did not extend to Amercements only in Trespasses Quare vi armis but to every other Trespass for the Statute speaks of Trespasses and other things which shall be extended to all Trespasses Cook Chief Justice said That the Statute of 1. E. 4. cap. 2. did not extend to Trespasses which were not contra pacem as the encroachment in this Case is for otherwise the Lord of a Leet could not distrain for an amercement without such presentmennt before Justices of the Peace And although the Statute speaks of Felony Trespass c. the same is to be meant of other things of the same nature which is proved by the clause in the Statute viz. That they shall be imprisoned which cannot be in the principall Case at Bar. Warburton and Winch Justices agreed in opinion with Cook Chief Justice Trinit 10. Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 272 FRAUNCES and POWELL's Case IT was moved for a Prohibition to the Spirituall Court for citing the Plaintiffe out of his Diocess upon the Statute of 23. H. 8. and by the Libel it appeared That Powell the Defendant had complained against the Plaintiffe in the Court of Arches for scandalous words spoken in the Parish of Saint Sepulchers London Cook Chief Justice held That a Prohibition would lie unlesse the Bishop of London had given liberty to the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury to entermeddle with matters within London for he said that in the Statute of 23. H. 8. there is a clause of exception in case where such liberty is given by the inferior Diocesan and therefore a day was given by the Court to procure a certificate of the opinion of the Civilians whether such authority given by the Inferiour Ordinary to the Arch-Bishop were Warranted by there Law or not for the Statute of 23. H. 8. is so and then if the authority be lawfully granted no prohibition will lye And Cook said that the Statute of 23. H. 8. was made but in affirmance of the common Law as appears by the books of 8. H. 6. and 2. H. 4. For there it is said that if one be excomenge in a forrain Dioces that the same is void coram non judice and he said that the principal cause of making of the said Statute was to maintain the Jurisdiction of Inferiour Diocesses But it was holden that if the Plaintiff had defamed the Defendant within the Peculiar of the Arch-Bishop that in such case he might be punished there although that he did inhabit within any remote place out of the Peculiar of the Arch-Bishop and in this Case it was said that the Arch-Bishop had in thirteen Parishes in London Peculiar Jurisdiction It was adjorned Trinit 10. Jacobi in the Court of Wards 273 COTTONS Case SIR John Tirrel Tenant in Capite made a Lease unto Carrel for 1000. years and further covenanted with Carrel and his Heirs that upon payment of five Shillings that he and his heirs would stand seised of the same Lands unto the use of Carrel and his Heirs And in the Deed there were all the ordinary clauses of a conveyance bona fide viz. That the Lessee should enjoy the Lands discharged of all Incumbrances and that he would make further assurance c. Carrel assigned this Lease to Cotton who died in possession his Heir within age and in two Offices the Jury would not find a Tenure because it was but a Lease for years And in a que plura the matter came in question in the Court of Wards And Cook Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Tanfeild Chief Baron of the Exchequer were called for Assistants to the Court of Wards and they were of opinion that because it was found by the Offices that Cotton died in possession that the same was sufficient to entitle the King to Wardship of the Lands But before the Judges delivered there opinions the Lessee was compelled to prove the Sealing of the Lease by witnesses which was dated 12. years before For if they have no sufficient witnesses to prove the Sealing of the Lease without all doubt there was sufficient matter found to entitle the King viz. that the party died in possession which shall be intended of an estate in Fee simple till the contrarie be proved But the two Justices moved the Attorney That he would not trouble himself with the proof of a matter in fact For they said It was confessed on all sides that there was such a Lease and that the Assignee of it died in possession of the Land and therefore they said that they were cleer of opinion that the Heir of such a Lessee who died in possession should be
6. 30. 18 E. 4. 2. 36 H. 6. 7. Also he said When a Declaration is general the Defendant need not traverse 1 E. 4. 9. 2 E. 4. 28. And further he said That the Statute of 27 Eliz. cap. 5. of Demurs helped that defect for that it is but only in matter of form But the Justices did not argue that point But the Question which they made was Whether the Constitution or Ordinance were lawful or not And as to that it was holden by the whole Court That the said Ordinance was unlawful And it was agreed by the Court That the King might make Corporations and grant to them that they may make Ordinances for the ordering and government of any Trade but thereby they cannot make a Monopoly for that is to take away Free-trade which is the birthright of every Subject And therefore the Case was in 2 H. 5. 5. in Debt upon a Bond upon Condition That one should not use his Trade of a Dyer in the Town where the Plaintiffe did inhabit for one year And there said That the Obligation was void because the Condition was against the Law And he swore by God if the Plaintiffe were present that he should go to prison till he had paid a Fine to the King Yet regularly Modus Conventio vincunt legem 2. It was resolved That although such Clause was contained in the Kings Letters Patents yet it was void But where it is either by Prescription or by Custome confirmed by Parliament there such an Ordinance may be good Quia Consuetudo Legalis plus valet quam Concessio Regalis The King granted unto the Abbot of Whitny the Custody of a Port which is as it were a Key of the Kingdom and therefore the Grant was void and so adjudged And such Grants are expresly against the Statute of 9 E 3. cap. 1. And the Charter granted by King Henry the 8. to the Physitians of London hath the same Clause in it But if it had not been confirmed by Act of Parliament made 33 H. 8. it had been void The King granted unto B. that none besides himself should make Ordnances for Battery in the time of war Such Grant was adjudged void But if a man hath brought in a new Invention and a new Trade within the Kingdom in peril of his life and consumption of his estate or stock c. or if a man hath made a new Discovery of any thing In such Cases the King of his grace and favour in recompence of his costs and travail may grant by Charter unto him That he only shall use such a Trade or Trafique for a certain time because at first the people of the Kingdom are ignorant and have not the knowledge or skill to use it But when that Patent is expired the King cannot make a new Grant thereof For when the Trade is become common and others have been bound Apprentices in the same Trade there is no reason that such should be forbidden to use it And Cook Chief Justice put this Case The King granted to B. That he solely should make and carry Kersies out of the Realm and the Grant was adjudged void which Crook concessit 3. It was resolved That this Charter was void because of the words viz. Nisi ante eos vel duos eorum probationem fecerit c. And therefore it was considered what proof should be sufficient for the party And as to that it was agreed That the proof cannot be upon Oath for such a Corporation cannot admidister an Oath unto the party And then the proof must be by his Indentures and Witnesses and perhaps the Corporation will not allow of any of them For which the party hath no remedy against the said Corporation but by his Action at the Common Law and in the mean time he should be barred of his Trade which is all his living and maintenance and to which he had been Apprentice for seven years Another reason was given because that by this way they should be Judges in their own cause which is against the Law And the King cannot grant unto another to do a thing which is against the Law And afterwards Trin. 12 Jacobi Judgment was entred Quod Querentes nihil capiant per Billam And Judgment was then given for the Defendant Pasch 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 352. LINSEY and ASHTON's Case LInsey brought an Action of Debt against Ashton upon a Bond the Condition of which was to perform an Award The Defendant said that the Award was That the Defendant should surcease all suits depending betwixt them which he had done The Plaintiffe in his Replication said That the Arbitrators made such Award ut supra and also that the Defendant should pay unto the Plaintiffe 25l. at the house of J. S. absque hoc that they made the other Award only Upon which the Defendant did rejoyn and said That well and true it is that they made those Awards c. But they further awarded that the Plaintiffe should release unto the Defendant which he had not done And upon the Rejoynder the Plaintiffe did demur in Law And the opinion of the Court was without question That the Plea was a departure 19 H. 6. 19. But it was argued by Finch That the Replication was insufficient For the Plaintiffe ought not to have traversed as this Case is because that a man ought not to traverse a thing alleadged by Implication but ought to traverse that which is alleadged de facto upon which there may be an issue joyned And to prove the Traverse void the Case in 11 H. 6. 50. was put But the Exception was not allowed by the Court Another Exception was taken because the Award it self was void because it was to do a thing upon the Land of another man which he might not lawfully do And although the Arbitrators might award him to do the thing which is inconvenient yet they cannot award him to do a thing which is impossible and against the Law as in 17 E. 4 5. Two were bound to stand to the Arbitrement of J. S. of all Trespasses who awarded that the one should pay unto the other 40. and that he find Sureties to be bounden for the payment of it And by the opinion of the Justices the Award was void because he could not award a man to do that which did not lie in his power and he hath no means to compel the stranger to be bound for him But the opinion of the whole Court was against Finch For first the mony is to be paid apud domum J. S. and not in domo And it might be for any thing that appeareth that the said House is adjoyning to the High-way so as every Stranger might lawfully come unto it although he might not come into it without being a Trespassor But admit it be not adjoyning to the High-way yet he might come as neer unto the house as he could or he might get leave to come thither Secondly It was
resolved That although the Award was void as to that part yet for the residue it stood good and therefore for not performance of the same the Bond is forfeited As if J. be bounden to perform the Award of J. S. for White-Acre and that he award that I enfeoffe another of White-Acre and that he give unto me Ten pounds If I tender unto him a Feoffment of White-Acre and he refuseth it and will not give to me the 10l. I shall have an Action of Debt upon the Bond as it is adjudged in Osborn's Case C. 10. par 131. The same Law If J. S. and J. N. submit themselves unto the Award of J. D. who awardeth that J. S. shall surcease all suits and procure J. N. to be bounden with a stranger and make a Feoffment of his Mannor of D. which is a thing out of the Submission In that case there are three things enforcing the Arbitrement the first is only good the second is against the Law and the other is out of the Submission yet being in part good it ought to be performed in that otherwise the Bond is forfeited But this Case was put If J. be bounden to stand to the Award of A. ita quod it be made de super premissis and afterwards A. maketh an Award but of part of the premises there it is void in all because it is not according to the authority given unto him And afterwards in the principal Case Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 353. DOCKWARY and BEAL's Case IN an Essex Jury The opinion of the Court was That Wood will passe by the name of Land if there be no other Land whereby the words may be otherwise supplied Also it was agreed That the Tenant for Years might fell Underwoods of 25 years growth if the same hath used to be felled Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 354. WROTESIEY and CANDISH's Case ELizabeth Wrotesley did recover Dower 6 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas in which Writ she demanded tertiam partem Manerii de D. eum pertinaciis Nec non tertiam partem quarundam terrarum jacent in Hovelan And upon Ne unque seise que Dower the parties were at issue and the Venire facias awarded de Hovelan And it was found for the Plaintiffe and Judgment was given for her And Candish the Defendant brought a Writ of Error in the Kings Bench and assigned for Error That it was a Mis-trial For that the Venire facias ought to have been de Manerio and not of Hovelan 6 H. 7. 3. 11 H. 7. 20. C. 6 par â— 19 H. 6. 19. 19 E. 4. 17. Yet the Councel of the Defendant moved That the Trial was good for the Land in Hovelan And it being found that the Husband was seised of the Mannor of D. that now the Trial was good for the whole Pasch 12 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 355. COWLEY and LEGAT's Case COwley brought an Audita quaerela against Legat and the Case was this Cowley and Bates bound themselves in a Bond of 200l. jointly and severally to Legat And afterwards 6 Jacobi Legat brought an action of Debt upon the Bond against Bates and had Judgment and 7 Jacobi the said Legat brought Debt against Cowley in the Kings Bench upon the same Bond and obtained Judgment and afterwards he sued forth Execution upon the first Judgment by Elegit and had the Land of Bates who was Tenant thereof only for another mans life in Execution and afterwards he took forth a Capias ad satisfaciendum against Cowley upon the Judgment in the Kings Bench And thereupon Cowley brought an Audita quaerela containing in it all the whole matter And the opinion of all the Justices was That the Audita quaerela was well brought And first it was holden That when a man may plead the matter in bar he shall not have an Audita quaerela upon the matter because it was his lachess that he did not take advantage of it by way of plea. But secondly in this Case it was said That he could not have pleaded the special matter and therefore as to that point the Audita quaerela was well brought But the onely doubt in the Case was Whether Legat the Defendant might have a new Execution by Capias ad satisfaciendum after that he had Execution against one of the Obligers by Elegit and the doubt was because the Judgments upon which he grounded his Executions were given at several times and in several Courts and against several persons For it was agreed by the whole Court That a Capias doth not lie after Execution sued by Elegit against the same person but after a Capias an Elegit is grantable And the reason of the difference is because upon the prayer to have an Elegit it is entred in the Roll Elegit sibi executionem per medietatem terrae so as he is estopped by the Record to have another Execution but upon a Capias nothing at all is entred upon Record Yet Cook Chief Justice said That it is the common practice of a good Attorney to deferre the entry in the Roll of Execution upon an Elegit until the Sheriffe hath retorned it served And in such case it was agreed That if the Sheriffe retorn upon the Elegit That the party hath not Lands c. then the party may take forth a Capias Also the Elegit is in it self a satisfactory Execution and by the Common-Law a man shall have but one Execution with satisfaction And therefore at the Common-Law if after Execution the Land had been evicted the party had no remedy And Cook said If part of the Land be evicted the party shall not have remedy upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 5. to which Crook Justice agreed And the Court held it to be no difference although that the Judgments were given in several Courts against persons several and at several times and where it is but one Judgment against one person Vide the Case 43 E. 3. 27. where in Debt the Defendant said That the Plaintiffe had another Action for the same Debt depending in the Exchequer by Bill Judgment c. And by Mowbray and Finchden cleerly it is a good plea although it be in another Court And Dodderidge Justice said That in the first case the said Legat might sue the said Cowley and Bates severally and after Judgment he might choose his Execution against which of them he pleased But he could not have Execution by Elegit against them both And therefore he said That although there be an Eviction of the Land or that the Judgment be reversed by Error after that he hath Execution against one by Elegit yet Legat could not have Execution against the other for by the first Execution he had determined his Election and he could not sue the other which Cook agreed Mich. 12 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 356. FOX and MEDCALF's Case IN a Writ of Accompt brought in
the time of King Henry the 8. said That if the King should arrest him of High-Treason that he would stab him with his dagger and it was adjudged a present Treason So was it also adjudged in the Lord Stanley's Case in the time of King Henry the 7. who seeing a Young-man said That if he knew him to be one of the Sons of E. 4. that he would aid him against the King In the like manner a woman in the time of Hen. 8. said That if Henry the 8. would not take again his wife Queen Katherine that he should not live a year but should die like a dog So if discontented persons with Inclosures say That they will petition unto the King about them and if he will not redress the same that then they will assemble together in such a place and rebell In these Cases it is a present Treason and he said That in point of Allegiance none must serve the King with Ifs and Ands. Further Cook Chief Justice said That Faux the Gunpowder Traitor being brought before King James the King said to him Wherefore would you have killed me Faux answered him viz. Because you are excommunicated by the Pope How said the King He answered Every Maunday-Thursday the Pope doth excommunicate all Herâ—tiques who are not of the Faith of the Church of Rome and you are within the same Excommunication And afterwards Owen was found guilty and Judgment of Treason was given against him Mich. 13 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 364. SIMPSON'S Case RIchard Simpson a Copy-holder in Fee jacens in extremis made a Surrender of his Copyhold habendum to an Enfant in ventrefamier and his heirs and if such Enfant die before his full age or marriage then to John Simpson his brother and his heirs The Enfant is born and dieth within two moneths Upon which John was admitted and a Woman as Heir-general to the Devisor and to the Enfant is also admitted and entreth into the Land against whom John Simpson brought an Action of Trespasse and it was adjudged against the Plaintiffe And two points were resolved in this Case 1. That a Surrender cannot begin at a day to come no more then a Livery as it was adjudged 23 Eliz in this Court in Clarks Case 2. That the Remaindor to John Simpson cannot be good because it was to commence upon a Condition precedent which was never performed And therefore the Surrender into the hands of the Lord was void for the Lord doth not take but as an Instrument to convey the same to another And it was therefore said That if a Copy-holder in Fee doth surrender unto the use of himself and his heirs because that the Limitation of the use is void to him who had it before the Surrender to the Lord is void Trin. 13 Jacobi in the Chancery 365. The Lord GERARD'S Case IT was holden in the Chancery in the Lord Gerards Case against his Copyholds of Aâ—dley in the County of Stafford That where by antient Rolls of Court it appeareth that the Fines of the Copyholds had been uncertain from the time of King Hen. the 3 to the 19 of H. the 6. and from thence to this day had been certain Except twenty or thirty That these few antient Rolls did destroy the Custome for certainty of Fine But if from 19 H. 6. all are certain except a few and so incertain Rolls before the few shall be intended to have escaped and should not destroy the Custome for certain Fines Hill 13 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 366. BAGNAL and HARVEY'S Case IN a Writ of Partition it was found for the Plaintiffe And a Writ was awarded to the Sheriffe that he should make the partition And the Sheriffe did thereupon allot part of the Lands in severalty and for other part of the Lands the Jurors would not assist him to make the partition All which appeared upon the Retorn of the Sheriffe And an Attachment was prayed against the Jurors who refused to make the Partition and a new Writ was prayed unto the Sheriffe And the Court doubted what to do in the Case whether to grant an Attachment or not and whether a new Writ to the Sheriffe might be awarded And took time to advise upon it and to see Presidents in the Case Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 367. BLANFORD'S Case A Man seised of Lands in Fee devised them unto his Wife for life and afterwards to his two Sons if they had not issue males for their lives and if they had issue males then to their issue males and if they had not issue males then if any of them had issue male to the said issue male The wife died the sons entred into the lands and then the eldest son had issue male who afterwards entred and the younger son entred upon the issue and did trespasse and the issue brought an Action of Trespasse And it was adjudged by the whole Court that the Action was maintainable because by the birth of the issue male the lands were devised out of the two sons and vested in the issue male of the eldest Crook Justice was against the three other Justices Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 368. BROOK and GREGORY'S Case IN a Replevin the Defendant did avow the taking of the Cattle damage feasants And upon issue joyned it was found for the Plaintiffe in the Court at Winsor being a Three-weeks Court And the Defendant brought a Writ of Error and assigned for Error That the Entry of the Plaint in the said Court was the 7. day of May and the Plaintiffe afterwards did Declare there of a taking of the Cattel the 25. day of May. And whether the same was Error being in a Three-weeks Court was the Question and 21 E. 4. 66. was alleadged by Harris that it was no Error But the Court held the same to be Error because no Plaint can be entred but at a Court and this Entry of the Plaint was mesne betwixt the Court dayes and so the Declaration is not warranted no â—ustome being alleadged to maintain such an Entry 2. It was holden by the Court in this Case That 〈…〉 est erratum is pleaded the Defendant cannot alleadge Dimâ—â—â—tion because there is a perfect issue before 3. It was holden That a 〈◊〉 cannot alleadge Diminution of any thing which appeareth in the Râ—â—â—d to be 〈◊〉 And because the Defendant â—id alleadge Diminution 〈◊〉 Case of the Record and by the Record it was certified that the 〈◊〉 was entred the 25 day of May the same was not good after issue joyned and after Judgment is given upon the â—â—â— Record upon the first Dâ—â—â—aration and Pleading in the said Court of Winsor And therefore the Judgment was reversed by the opinion of all the Justices Hill 13 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 369. BISSE and TYLER'S Case IN an Action of Trover and Conversion of goods the Defendant said That J. S. was possessed of the said goods and sold them unto him in open market
â—uaere whether it be a good Plea because it doth amount to the general issue of Not guilty Curia avisare vult And v. Tompsons Case 4 Jac. in the Kings Bench It was adjudged that it was no good Plea Hill 6 Jacobi in the Common Pleas. 370. PAGINTON and HUET'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme the Case was this That the Custome of a Manor in Worcestershire was That if any Copyholder do commit Felony and the same be presented by twelve Homagers That the Tenant should forfeit his â—opyhold And it was presented in the Court of the Mannor by the Homage That Hâ—â—t the Defendant had committed Felony But afterwards at the Asâ—ises he was acquitted And afterwards the Lord seised the Copyhold And it was adjudged by the Court that it was no good Custom because in Judgment of Law before Attaindor it is not Felony The second point was Whether the special Verdict agreeing with the Presentment of the Homage That the party had committed Felony did entitle the Lord to the Copyhold notwithstanding his Acquital Quaere For it was not resolved Mich. 7 Iacobi in the Common Pleas. 371. THe Custom of a Mannor was That the Heirs which claimed Copy-hold by Discent ought to come at the first second or third Court upon Proclamations made and take up their Estates or else that they should forfeit them And a Tenant of the Mannor having Issue inheritable beyond the Seas dyed The Proclamations passed and the Issue did not return in twenty years But at his coming over he required the Lord to admit him to the Copyhold and proffered to pay the Lord his Fine And the Lord who had seised the Copyhold for a Forfeiture refused to admit him And it was adjudged by the whole Court That it was no Forfeiture because that the Heir was beyond the Seas at the time of the Proclamations and also because the Lord was at no prejudice because he received the profits of the Lands in the mean time Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 372. A Copyholder in Fee did surrender his Copyhold unto the use of another and his heirs which surrender was into the hands of two Tenants according to the custome of the Mannor to be presented at the next Court. And no Court was holden for the Mannor by the space of thirty years within which time the Surrenderor Surrenderee and the two Tenants all dyed The heir of the Surrenderor entred and made a Lease for years of the Copyhold according to the Custome of the Mannor And it was adjudged per Curiaâ—â— That the Lease was good Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Common-Pleas 373. FROSWEL and WEICHES Case IT was adjudged That where a Copyholder doth surrender into the hands of Copy-Tenants That before Presentment the Heir of the Surrenderor may take the profits of the Lands against the Surrenderee For no person can have a Copyhold but by admittance of the Lord. As if a man maketh Livery within the view although it cannot be countermanded yet the Feoffee takes nothing before his entry But it was agreed That if the Lord doth take knowledge of the Surrender and doth accept of the customary Rent as Rent due from the Tenant being admitted that the same shall amount unto an Admittance but otherwise if he accept of it as a duty generally Mich. 5 Iacobi in the Exchequer 374. IT was adjudged in the Exchequer That where the King was Lord of a Mannor and a Copyholder within the said Mannor made a Lease for three lives and made Livery and afterwards the Survivor of the three continued in possession forty years And in that case because that no Livery did appear to be made upon the Endorsment of the Deed although in truth there was Livery made that the same was no forfeiture of which the King should take any advantage And in that case it was cited to be adjudged in Londons case That if a Copy-Tenant doth bargain and sell his Copy-Tenement by Deed indented and enrolled that the same is no forfeiture of the Copyhold of which the Lord can take any advantage And so was it holden in this Case Pasch 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench 375. FRANKLIN'S Case LAnds were given unto one and to the heirs of his body Habendum unto the Donee unto the use of him his heirs and assignes for ever In this â—ase two points were resolved 1. That the Limitation in the Habendum did not increase or alter the Estate contained in the premisses of the Deed. 2. That Tenant in Tail might stand seised to an use expressed but such use cannot be averred Hill 13 Iacobi in the Chancery 376 WINSCOMB and DUNCHES Case VVInscomb having issue two sons conveyed a Mannor unto his eldest son and to the daughter of Dunch for life for the joynture of the wife the Remainder to the 〈…〉 The son having no issue his Father-in-law Dunch procured him by Deed indented to bargain and sell to him the Manner The Bargâ—ynor being sick who died before enrolment of the Deed within the 〈…〉 Deed â—ot being acknowledged And 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 coming to be enrolled the Clark who enrolled the same did proâ—â—â—e Waâ—â—â—nt from the Master of the Rolls who under-â—â—â— upon the Deâ—◠〈◊〉 the Deed be enrolled upon Affidavit made of the delivery of the Deed by one of the Witnesses to the same And afterwards the Deed was eâ—â—â—â—d within the six moneths And the opinion of the Court wasâ— That 〈◊〉 Conveyance was a good Conveyance in Law And therefore the younger brother exhibited his Bill in Chanchery pretending the Conveyance to be made by practice without any Consideration Mich. 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 377 LUDLOW and STACIâ—S Case A Man bargained and sold Land by Deed indented bearing date 11 Junii 1 Jacobi Afterwards 12 Junii The same year Common was granted â—nto the Bargainee for all manner of Cattell commonable upon the Land 15 Junii theâ— Deed of Bargain and Sale was enrolled And it was adjudged a good grant of the Common And the Enrolment shall have Relation as to that although for collaterall things it shall not have relation Hill 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 378. NOte that it was held by Dodderidge Justice and Mountagu Chief Justice against the opinion of Haughton Justice That if Lessee for years covenanteth to repair and sustein the houses in as good plight as they were at the time of the Lease made and afterwards the Lessee assigneth over his Term and the Lessor his Reversion That the Assignee of the Reversion shall maintain an Action of Covenant for the breach of the Covenants against the first Lessee Hill 15 Jacobi in the Common-Pleas 379. SMITH and STAFFORD'S Case A Man promised a Woman That if she would marry with him that if he dyed and she did survive him that he would leave unto her 100â— They entermarried and then the husband dyed not performing his promise The wife sued the Executor of her husband upon the said promise And whether the
ought to be pleaded 3. That if a man in his pleading is to set forth the jurisdiction of the Court of Justices in Eyre if he say Curia tent c. he need not set forth all the Formalities of it And Mountagu Chief Justice in this Case said That if a man do justifie for divers causes and some of the causes are not good the same doth not make the whole Justification to be void but it is void for that only and good for the residue Hill 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 393 CULLIFORDS Case CVlliford and his Wife brought an Action upon the Case against Knight for words And declared upon these words viz. Thou art Luscombs Hackney a pockey Whore and a theevish Whore and I will prove thee to be so which was found for the Plaintiffe And in arrest of Judgment it was moved that the words were not Actionable which was agreed by the whole Court quia verba accipienda sunt in mitiori sensâ—â—â— And Judgment was staied accordingly Hill 16. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 371. IN an Action upon the Case for Words The Plaintiffe did relate that he was brought up in the Studie of a Mathematition and a Measurer of Land And that he was a Surveyor and that the Defendant spake these words of him viz. Thou art a Cosener and a cheating Knave and that I can prove And the opinion of the Court was That the words were actionable And Montague Chief Justice said that it was ruled accordingly in 36 Eliz. Rot. 249. betwixt Kirby and Walter And a Surveyor is an Officer of whom the Statute of 5. E. 6. takes notice And he said that Verba de persona intelligenda sunt de Conditione personae And he said that the words are Actionable in regard it is a faculty to be a Measuror of Lands But Dodderidg Justice put it with a difference viz. Betwixt a Measurer of Land by the Pole and one who useth the Art of Geometrie or any of the Mathematicks for he said that in the first Case it is no scandal for that his Credit is not impeached thereby but it is contrary in the other Case because to be a Geometritian or Mathematitian is an Art or faculty which every man doth not attain unto And he put this Case If a man be Bailiffe of my Mannor there no such words can discredit him and by consequence he shall not have an Action for the words because the words do not found in discredit of his Office because the same is not an Office of Skill but an Office of Labour quod nota Hill 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 395. BISHOP and TURNERS Case IN a Prohibition it was holden by the whole Court That for such things as a Church-Warden doth ratione officii no Action will lie by his successor against him in the Spiritual Court and a Churchwarden is not an Officer but a Minister to the Spiritual Court But it was holden that a Churchwarden by the Common Law may maintain an Action upon the Case for defacing of a Monument in the Church Trin. 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 396. BLACKSTON and HEAP'S Case IN an Action of Debt for Rent the Case was this A man possessed of a Tearm for 20 years in the right of his Wife made a Lease for 10 years rendring Rent to him his Executors and assignes and died The Question was whether the Executors or the Wife should have the Rent Haughton and Crook Justices against Montague Chief Justice Doddridg being absent that the Rent was gon But it was agreed by them all that the Executors of the Husband should not have it But Montague held that the Wife should have it But it was agreed that if Lessee for 20 years maketh a Lease for 10 years and afterwards surrendreth his Tearm that the Rent is gon And yet the Tearm for 10 years continues And in the principal Case If the Husband after the Lease made had granted over the Reversion his grantee should not have the Rent But Montague said that in that Case the Wife in Chancery might be Releived for the Rent Mich. 16 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 397. WAIT and the Inhabitants of STOKE'S Case WAyte a Clothier of Nubery was robbed in the Hundred of Stoke of 50l upon the Saboth day in the time of Divine Service The Question was whether the Hundred were chargeable or not for not making out Hue and Cry And 3 of the Justices were against Montague Chief Justice that they were chargeable For they said that the apprehending of Theeves was a good work and fit for the Saboth day and also fit for the Commonwealth Montague Chief Justice agreed that it was bonum opus and that it might be lawfully done But he said that no man might be compelled upon any penalty to do it upon that day For he said That if he hath a Judgment against I. S. and he comes to the Parish-Church where I. S. is with the Sheriffe and shews unto the Sheriffe I. S. upon the Saboth day and commandeth the Sheriffe to do his Office If the Sheriffe do arrest I. S. in Execution upon that day it is good but if he doth not arrest him it is no escape in the Sheriffe And he took a difference betwixt Ministerial Acts and Judicial Acts for the first might be done upon the Saboth day but Judicial Acts might not But the case was adjudged according to the opinion of the three other Justices Pasch 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 398. SPICER and SPICE'S Case UPon a special Verdict the Case was this A man seised of Gavil-kind Land devised the same to his Wife for life paying out of it 3l per annum to his eldest son and also devised the Land to his second Son paying 3l per annum to his third Son and 20s to such a one his Daughter and whether the second Son had the Land for his life or in Fee was the Question And it was adjudged that he had a Fee-simple in it by reason of the payment of the Collateral Sums of 3l and 20s to his brother and sister which charge to the brother might continue af-after the death of the Devisee and if he should have but an estate for life his charge should continue longer then his own estate And so it was adjudged Mich. 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 399. IN a Habeas Corpora which was to remove two men who were imprisoned in Norwich The Case was this That within Norwich there was a Custom that two men of the said place should be chosen yearly to make a Feast for the Bailiffs and upon refusal for to do it that they should be Fined and imprisoned which two men brought to the Barr by the Habeas Corpra were imprisoned for the same cause It was urged and much stood upon That the Custom was no good Custom for the causes and reasons which are delivered in Baggs Case in C. 11. part But yet at the last the Court did remand
them and held that the Custom might be good Mich. 17 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 400. IN an Evidence in an Ejectione firme for Land in the Countie of Hartford the Case was this A man was married unto a woman and died The wife after 40 weeks and 10 days was delivered with child of a daughter and whether the said daughter should be heir to her Father or should be bastard was the Question and Sir William Padde Knight and Dr Montford Physitians were commanded by the Court to attend and to deliver their opinions in the Case who being upon their Oaths delivered their opinions That such a child might be a lawfull daughter and heir to her Father For as wellas an Antenatus might be heir viz. a child born at the end of 7 months so they said might a Postnatus viz. child born after the 40 weeks although that 40 weeks be the ordinary time And if it be objected that our Saviour Christ was born at 9 months and five days end who had the perfection of Nature To that it may be answered That that was miraeulum amplias And they held that by many Authorities and by their own Experiences a child might be Legitimate although it be born the last day of the 10â—h Month after the conception of it accounting the Months per Menses solares non Lunares Hill 17 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 401. WEBB and PATERNOSTERS Case A Man gave Licence unto another to set a Cock of Hay upon his Medow and to remove the same in reasonable time and afterwards he who gave the Licence made a Lease of the Medow to the Defendant who put his Cattel into the Medow which did eat the Hay And for that the Paintiffe brought his Action of Trespass And upon Demurrer joyned the Court was of opinion against the Plaintiffe For upon the whole matter it appeared That the said Hay had stood upon the said ground or Medow for 2 years which the Court held to be an unreasonable time Mich. 18 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 402. BROWN and PELL's Case IN an Ejectione firme upon a special Verdict found the Case was this Browne had issue two Sons and devised his Lands to his youngest Son and his Heirs And if it shall happen his said youngest Son to die without issue living his eldest Son That then his eldest Son should have the Lands to him and his Heirs in as ample manner as the youngest Son had them The youngest Son suffered a Common Recovery and died without issue living the eldest Son The Question was whether the eldest Son or the Recoverer should have the â—ands Montague Haughton and Chamberlain Justices The same is a Fee-simple Conditional and no Estate Tail in the youngest Son Doddridge Justice contrarie Mich. 18. Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 403. POLLYES Case IN an Action of Trespass It was agreed by the Court If 2 Tenants in Common be of Lands upon which Trees are growing and one of them felleth the Trees and layeth them upon his Freehold If the other entreth into the â—and and carrieth them away an Action of Trespasse Quaere clausum fregit lyeth against him because the taking away of the Trees by the first was not wrongfull but that which he might well do by Law And yet the other Tenant in Common might have seized them before they were carried off from the Land But if a man do wrongfully take my Goods as a Horse c. and putteth the same upon his Land I may enter into his Land and seize my Horse again But if he put the Goods into his House in such Case I cannot enter into his House and retake my Goods because every mans House is his Castle into which another man may not enter without special Liâ—ence Hill 19 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 404. THe Case was That two Tenants in Common of Lands made a Lease thereof for years rendring Rent and then one of them died And the Question was who should have the Rent And if the Executor of him who died and the other might joyn in an Action for the Rent And as this Case was The opinion of the whole Court was That the Executor and the other might joyn in one Action for the Rent or sever in Action at their pleasures But if the Lease had been made for life rendring Rent The Court was cleer of opinion that they ought to sever in Actions Trin. 20 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 405. A Man was bounden in a Bond by the name of Edmond and his true name was Edward And an Action of Debt was brought against the Executors of Edmond upon the said Bond who demanded Oyer of the Bond and then pleaded that it was not the Deed of their Testator and issue being thereupon joyned It was found by Inquest in London to be his Deed viz. the Deed of Edmond And it was moved in Arrest of Judgment Quod querens nihil caperet per Billam and so it was resolved and adjudged by the Court Doddridge only being absent And a Case was vouched by Henage Finch Recorder of London to prove this case That it was so adjudged in a Case of Writ of ErError brought in the Exchequer-Chamber in which Case the party himself upon such a Misnosmer and after a Verdict and Judgment given in the same Case did reverse the Judgment for this Error Mich. 14 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 406. VESEY's Case VVIlliam Vesey was indicted for erecting of a Dove-house And Serjeant Harvey moved That the Indictment was insufficient the words were That the Defendant erexit Columbare vi armis ad commune nocumentum c. and that he was not Dominus Manerii nes Rector Ecclesiae And the Indictment was quashed because it was not contained in the Indictment that there were Doves in the Dove-cote For the meer erecting of a Dove-cote if there be no Doves kept in it it is no Nusans as it was holden by the Justices Mich. 15 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 407 Sir WILLIAM BRONKER's Case SIR William Bronker brought an Action upon the Case for slanderous words And he shewed in his Declaration how that he was a Knight and one of the Gentlemen of His Majesties Privy-Chamber And that the Defendant spake of him these scandalous words viz. Sir William Bronker is a Cosening Knave and lives by Cosenage Which was found for the Plaintiffe In arrest of Judgment it was moved that the words were not actionable And so it was adjudged per Curiam Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 408. YATE and ALEXANDER's Case YAte brought an action upon the Case against Alexander Attorney of the Kings Bench and declared That the Plaintiffe in an action of Debt brought against Alexander the Defendant who was Executor to his Father had Judgment to recover against him as Executor and that he sued forth a Fieri facias to the Sheriffe to have Execution and that before the Sheriffe could come to levy the debt and serve the
Execution the Defendant A secretè fraudulenter vendidit amovit disposuit of all the Testators goods For which cause the Sheriffe was constrained to retorn Nulla bona c. Ley Chief Justice said That the Action would well lie because the Sheriffe could not retorn a Devastavit because the goods were secretly conveyed away so as the Sheriffe could not tell whether he had sold or otherwise disposed of the said goods and also because the Plaintiffe is destitute of all remedy by any other Action To which Dodderidge Justice did agree But Haughton Justice was against it For he said That if one be to bring an action of Debt against the Heir if the Heir selleth the Land which he hath by discent from his ancestors before the action brought an action upon the Case will not lie against him for so doing Dodderidge said That the Case which was put by Haughton was not like to this Case For in this Case if the Sheriffe had or could have retorned a Devastavit the action upon the Case would not have lien But here the Sheriffe hath not retorned any Devastavit And the sale being secretly made the Sheriffe could not safely retorn a Devastavit for so perhaps he might be in danger of an action upon the Case to be brought against him for making of such a Retorn The Case was adjourned till another day Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 409. WILLIAMS and GIBB's Case NOte in this Case it was said by Ley Chief Justice That whatsoever is allowed for Divine service or whatsoever cometh in lieu of Tythes and Offerings the same is now become a thing Ecclesiastical And Dodderidge Justice also said That no Law doth appoint that the Vicar or Parson should read Divine Service in two several Parish-Churches but only the Ecclesiastical Law Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 410. STEWRY and STEWRY'S Case A Bill was exhibited into the Court of Chancery for the traversing of an Office who found one to be in Ward to the King and the parties were at issue super seperales exitus And a Venire facias was awarded out of the Chancery retornable in the Kings Bench directed to the Sheriffe Quod venire faciat 12 homines triare placita traversiae super seperales exitus And it was moved That the several Issues ought to be expressed in the Venire facias Dodderidge Justice It ought not to be Placita traversiae For it shall never be called Placitum but when it is at 〈◊〉 Kings suit And the opinion of the Court was That the Venire facias should be amended and that the several Issues should be expressed therein and Young's Case 20 Jacobi was cited for a President in the very point Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 411. ASTLEY and WEBB'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme the words vi armis were omitted out of the Plaintiffs Declaration And although this was the default of the Clark yet the same could not be amended but it made the Declaration not to be good Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 412. WHITE and EDWARD'S Case IN Trespasse Edwards the Defendant being a Clark of the Chancery after an Imparlance could not be suffered to plead his Priviledge It was moved in this Case That the Declaration was viginti opali vocatè Wythies And it was said it should have been anglicè and not vocatè But the opinion of the Court was that vocatè was as good as anglicè Then it was moved that the Declaration was That the Defendant had felled twenty Pearches of Hedging whereas it ought to have been that the Defendant had felled a Hedge containing twenty Pearches for a man cannot cut a Mathematical Pole But the Court said That the Declaration was good notwithstanding that and cited 17 E. 4. 1. where a man sells twenty Acres of Corn and there Exception was taken to it as it is here viz. That it ought to have been twenty Acres sowed with Corn but it was no good Exception there No more was it as the Court said in this Case for it is the common speech to say Twenty perches of hedging A pint of wine An acre of corn c. And therefore the Declaration was ruled to be good notwithstanding these Exceptions which were taken to it by Serjeant Headley Pasch 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 413. BRIDGES and MILL's Case AN action upon the Case was brought for speaking of these words viz. Thou inuendo the Plaintiffe hast ravished a woman twice And I will make thee stand in a white sheet for it Henden Serjeant moved in arrest of Judgment That the action would not lie for the words For he said That by the Common-Law Rape was not Felony but Trespass v. Stamford 23. 6. But now by the Statute of West 2. cap. 34. it is made Felony And he said That the later words viz. stand in a white sheet doth mitigate the former words by reason that in the former words the word Felonice was omitted as the Case is in C. 4. par 20. Barhams Case where the words Thou didst burn my Barn and did not say My Barn full of Corn nor that it was parcel of his Mansion-house and therefore the action would not lie For unlesse the Barn were full with corn or part of a dwelling-house it is not Felony Like unto Humfries Case adjudged in the Common-Pleas where an action upon the Case was brought for these words Thou hast pick'd my Pocket and taken away ten shillings And it was adjudged that the action would not lie For he did not say that he had stollen ten shillings But if he had said nothing but Thou hast pick'd my pocket then the action would have been maintainable Ley and Dodderidge Justices By the Common-Law Rape was Felony and in the said Statute the word Felony is not although it be used in the Indictment It was adjourned But the opinion of the Court seemed to be That the action would lie for the words Pasch 21 Iacobi in the Star-Chamber 414. Sir HENRY FINES Case IN the Case of Sir Henry Fines in the Star-Chamber Exception was taken to one of the Witnesses viz. to Dr. Spicer because that he stole Plate and had been pardoned for it But notwithstanding the Exception the Court did allow of the Testimony of the said Dr. Spicer And then Hobart Chief Justice of the Common-Pleas cited Cuddingtons Case Hill 13 Jacobi to be adjudged Cuddington brought an action upon the Case for calling him Thief The Defendant justified that such a day and year he stole a Horse The Plaintiffe replied That the King had given him a Pardon for all Felonies And it was adjudged that the Action did lie Afterwards at another day Jones and Dodderidge Justices put the Case more largely viz. Cuddington committed Felony 44 Eliz. and 1 Jacobi by the General Pardon he was pardoned And they said That he who procures a Pardon confesseth himself to be guilty of the offence But by the general Pardon
And if Rent be due and payable unto me by my Lessee for years the same may be taken for the Kings Debt and the special matter shall be a good barr in an Avowry for the Rent 38. E. 3. 28. A Prior Alien was indebted to the King for his Farm Rent And being sued for the same he shewed That there was a Parson who held a certain portion of Tythes from him which were part of the Possessions of the same Priory which he kept in his hands so as he could not pay the King his Farm-Rent unlesse he might have those Tythes which were in the Parsons hands Wherefore a Writ was awarded against the Parson to appear in the Exchequer and to shew cause why he should not pay the same to the King for the satisfying of the Kings Rent And there Skipwith Justice said That for any thing which toucheth the King and may turn to his advantage to hasten the Kings business that the Exchequer had jurisdiction of it were it a thing Spiritual or Temporal V. 44 E. 3. 43 44. the like Case but there it is of a Pension And the Case of 38 Ass 20. was the Case for Tythes See also 12 E. 3. Swalds Case to the same purpose If two Coparceners be in ward to the King upon a suggestion that one of them is indebted to the King the staying of his Livery shall be for his moytie untill the King be satisfied his debt but the other sister shall have Livery of the other moytie which belongs unto her Fitz. N. 5. 263. a. Mich 19 E. 3. and Hill 20. E. 3. which was one and the same Case The Kings Debtor brought a Quo minus in the Exchequer against his Debtor the Defendant appeared And the Plaintiffe afterwards would have been Nonsuit but the Court would not suffer him so to be And it was there said That a Release by the Kings Debtor unto his Debtor would not discharge the Kings Debtor as to that Debt In a Quo minus in the Exchequer upon a Debt upon a simple Contract the Defendant cannot wage his Law because the King is to have a benefit by the suit although the King be no party to the suit C. 4. par 95. The fourth Prerogative which the King hath is That the King shall have an Accompt against Executors because the Law there maketh a privity it being found by matter of Record that the Testator was indebted to the King which Record cannot be denied But in the Case of a common person an Accompt will not lie against Executors for want of privity The Accompt which the King brings is ad computandum ad Dominum Regem c. without setting forth how the party came liable to accompt But a common person in his accompt brought ought to shew how that the party was Receiver Bailiff c. If a man doth entermeddle with the Kings Treasure the King pretending a title to it he shall be chargeable for the same to the King C. 11. part 89. the Earl of Devonshire's case The Master of the Ordnance pretending that the old broken and unserviceable Ordnance belonged unto him by reason of his Office procured a Privy-seal c. and afterwards disposed of them to his own use and dyed And his Executor was forced to accompt for them Sir Walter Mildmay's Case Mich. 37. 38 Eliz. Rot. 312. in the Exchequer Sir Walter Mildmay was Chancellor of the Exchequer and suggested unto the Lord Treasurer of England That his Office was of great attendance and desired the Lord Treasurer that he would be pleased to allow unto him 100l. for his dyet and 40l. per annum for his attendance which the Lord Treasurer did grant unto him and he enjoyed it accordingly and afterwards dyed and his Executors were forced to accompt for it and to pay back the mony for all the time that their Testator received it C. 11. part 90 91. there is cited That Sir William Cavendish was Treasurer of the Chamber of King H. 8. E. 6. and Queen Mary and that he was indebted to K. E. 6. and to Q. Mary and that being so indebted he purchased divers lands and afterwards aliened them and took back an estate therein to himself and his wife and afterwards dyed without rendring any Accompt the Terre-Tenants of the land were charged to answer to Q. Elizabeth for the monies to which they pleaded the Queens special Pardon and it was in conclusion said That the Pardon was a matter of grace ex gratia but in Law the Terre-Tenants were chargeable to the said Queen for the monies v. Com. 321. 5 Eliz. Dyer 244 245. in the Exchequer Mich. 24. E. 3. Rot. 11. ex parte Rememb Regis Thomas Farel Collector of the Fifteenths and Tenths being seised of lands in Fee and being possessed of divers goods and chattels at the time when he entred into the said Office being then indebted to the King did alien them all and afterwards dyed without heir or Executor And a Writ went out unto the Sheriffe to enquire what lands and tenements goods and chattels he had at the time he entred into the said Office and Processe issued forth against the Terre-Tenants and the Possessors of his goods and chattels ad computand pro collectione predict ad respondendum satisfaciendum inde Domino Regi V. Dyer 160 50 Ass 5. A notable Case to this purpose Mich. 30. E. 3. rot 6. William Porter Mint-Master did covenant with the King by Indenture enrolled That for all the Bullion which should be delivered ad Cambium Regis pro Moneta faciend that mony should be delivered for it within eight dayes which Covenant he had broken and therefore the King paid the Subject for the Bullion And afterwards because John Walweyen and Richard Piccard duxerunt praesentaverant dict William Porter in officium illud tanquam sufficientem and that they offered to be Sureties for him but were not accepted of which they did confesse Ideo consideratum est quod predict Walweyen Piccard onerentur erga Dominum Regem And they afterwards were charged to satisfie the King for all the monies which the King had paid for the said Porter And although that none of the Kings treasure came to their hands nor they had not any benefit as appeared by any matter in the Case yet because they were the means and causers that the King sustained damage and losse they were adjudged to be chargeable to the King C. 11. par 93. this Case is there cited Upon these Cases vouched by me I make divers Observations 1. I observe That from Age to Age what care the Judges had for the Advancing and the recovering of the Kings Debts because Thesaurus Regis est vinculum Pacis Bellorum nervus And it is the slowing fountain of all bounty unto the Subject 2. I observe That the King hath a Prerogative for the Recovery of Debts due unto him 3. I observe That although the Debt due to the King be
in tail may have a Formedon against the Bishop But in our Case it is otherwise Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and takes back an estate unto himself in tail the remainder in Fee to his right heirs The Bishop in such case shall not have the land forfeited for Treason because that the Bishop cannot have the estate tail but in such case the King shall have the Land by the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. And the Bishop in such case shall not have the Fee because it is one estate and the King shall not wait upon the Subject viz the Bishop The Right waits upon the possession For 11 H. 7. 12. If the son and a stranger disseiseth the father and the father dyeth this right infuseth it self into the possession and changeth the possession And it is a Release in fact by the father to the son 9 H. 7. 25. Br ' Droit 57. A Disseisor dyeth seised and his heir enters and is disseised by A. The first Disseisee doth release unto A. all his right All the right is now in the second Disseisor viz. A. because the right and the possession meet together in A. 40 E. 3. 18. b. Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life with warranty If Tenant for life be impleaded by the heir to whom the warranty doth discend he shall rebut the right in tail being annexed with the possession for that is in case of a saving of the land by that right But where one demands land there all the Right ought to be shewed 11 H. 4 37. If a man be to bring an Action to recover then he ought to make a good title by his best right if he hath many rights But if a man be in possession and an Action be brought against him then he may defend himself by any of his rights or by all his rights 11 H. 7. 21. Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment to his use upon Condition and afterwards upon his Recognisance the land is extended and afterwards the Condition is performed yet the interest of the Conusee shall not be avoided For although the Extent come upon the Fee and not upon the Tail yet when the Extent was it was extracted out of all the rights C. 7. part 41. A Tenant in tail makes a Lease for life now he hath gained a new Fee by wrong and afterwards he makes a Lease for years and Tenant for life dyeth He shall not avoid his Lease for years although he be in of another estate because he had a defeicible title and an ancient right the which if they were in several hands shall be good as the Lease of the one and the Confirmation of the other And being in one hand it shall be as much in Law as a saving of the Right In our Case the Right and Possession both were in Francis Bigot And Ratcliffe is entitled to the old estate tail and to the new also There is a difference betwixt him who claims the land so forfeited to the King and the heir of the body of the person attainted Littâ—719 Land is given to A and the issue males of his body the remainder to the heirs females of his body If the Father commit Treason both heir male and female are barred for they both claim by the Father but if the heir male after the death of his Father be attainted of Treason the King shall have the lands as long as he hath issue male of his body and then the heir female shall have the lands for she shall not forfeit them because she claimeth not by the brother but by the father Com. in Manxels case A man hath three several rights of estate tails and comes in as Vouchee If the Recovery pass it shall bar all his Rights for one Recompence and they shall be all bound by one possession There is a difference where the Kings title is by Conveyance of the party and where for forfeiture for Treason by this Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 13. v. the Abbot of Colchesters Case The Abbot seised in the right of his house did commit Treason and made a Lease for years and then surrendred his house to the King after the Statute of 26 H. 8. The question was whether the King should avoid the Lease It was adjudged That the King was in by the surrender and should not avoid the Lease and not by the Statute of 26 H. 8. But if the King had had it by force of the Statute then the King should have avoided the Lease Com. 560. Tenant in tail the reversion to the King Tenant in tail maketh a Lease for years and is attainted of Treason The King shall avoid the Lease upon the construction of the Statute of 26 H. 8. which gives the lands unto the King for ever The third point is upon the Remitter This point had been argued by way of Admittance For as I have argued The ancient right is given away unto the King and then there is no ancient right and so no Remitter There is a difference where the issue in tail is forced to make a Title and where not In point of defence he is not so precisely forced to make his Title as he is in case of demand Whereas the Defendant demands the lands from the King the Discent will not help him because the Attaindor of the Ancestor of Ratcliffe hinders him in point of title to make a demand Dyer 332 b. In this case he ought to make himself heir of the body of Francis Bigot and Katharine C. 8. part 72. C. 9. part 139 140. There Cook couples the Case of Fine levied and the Case of Attaindor together C. 8. part 72. Land is given to husband and wife and to the heirs of their two bodies The husband alone levies a Fine with proclamations Or is attainted of Treason and dyeth The wife before Entry dyeth The issue is barred and the Conusee or King hath right unto the land because the issue cannot claim as heir to them both viz. father and mother for by the father he is barred 5 H. 7. 32 33. C. 9. part 140. Husband and wife Tenants in tail If one of them be attainted of Treason as it was in our Case the lands shall not discend to the issue because he cannot make title And there Cook puts the Case That if lands be given to an Alien and his wife they have a good estate tail and yet it is not discendable to the issue The Consequence then of all this is That if Ratcliffe cannot take advantage of the discent by reason of the disability by Attaindor à fortiori he shall not be remitted And yet I confess that in some Cases one may be remitted against the King Com. 488 489 553. But that is where the King is in by matter of Law by Conveyance but in this Case the King is in by an Act of Parliament and there shall be no Remitter against a matter of Record Another reason is because that
but in Francis Bigot which may be regained in due time Dyer 340. there was Scintilla juris as here in our Case 19 H. 8. 7. Where Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and the Feoffee levieth a fine and five years pass there it is said that the Issue in tail shall have five years after the death of Tenant in tail who made the Feoffment and the reason is because he is the first to whom the right doth discend This Case was objected against me yet I answer that Tenant in tail in that Case hath right but he cannot claim it by reason of his own Feoffment he cannot say he hath right but another may say he hath right In our Case Francis Bigot cannot say he hath a Right in him but another may say he hath a Right It is like where Tenant in Fee taketh a Lease for years by Deed Indented of his own Lands He during the years cannot say that he hath Fee yet all other may say that he hath the Fee C. 4. part 127. The King shall avoid the Feoffment for the benefit of a Lunatique which Feoffment the Lunatique had made and shall not the King avoid a Feoffment which a Lunatique hath made for his own benefit viz for the benefit of the King himself I conceive that he shall Secondly Admit the right be in the person viz. in Francis Bigot yet they object that it is a right of Action and so not forfeited If this right be in the person at the time of the Attainder it shall be forfeited if it be not in his person but in Nubibus yet it shall be forfeited Tenant in tail makes a Feoffment unto the use of himself and his wife in tail if the old right of entail rest or not in his person it is forfeited to the King 34 Eliz. this very Point was then adjudged Where Tenant in tail before the Statute of 27 H. 8. of Uses made a Feoffment unto the use of himself and his wife in tail It was resolved upon mature deliberation by all the Judges of England that the old Estate tail was in such case forfeited for Treason Set this Judgment aside yet it rests upon the Statute of 26 H. 8. A general Act for forfeiture for Treason and the particular Act of 31 H. 8. which was made for the particular Attaindor of Francis Bigot I will argue argue only upon the Statute 26 H. 8. which hath three clauses First to take away Sanctuary Secondly to provide that no Treason be committed and the Offender punished The third which clause I am to deal with which giveth the forfeiture of Lands of Inheritance c These three clauses do depend upon the Preamble It was high time to make this Statute For when H. 8. excluded the Pope he was to stand upon his guard And that year of 26 H. 8. there were five several Insurrections against the King therefore it was great wisdom to bridle such persons King Ed. 6. and Queen Mary repealed divers Statutes for Treason and Felony yet left this Statute of 26 H. 8. to stand in force Anno 5 E. 6. cap. 5. this Statute of 26 H. 8. somewhat too strict was in part repealed viz. That the Church lands should not be forfeited for the Treason of the Parson This third branch doth insist upon a Purview aâ—d a Saving and both agree with the Preamble The Purview is ample Every Offender and Offenders of any manner of High Treason shall forfeit and lose c. I observe these two words in the Statute shall Forfeit those things which are forfeitable and Lose those things which are not forfeitable But it shall be lost that the heir of the Offender shall not find it shall Forfeit and lâ—se to the King his heirs and successors for ever so it is a perpetual forfeiture shall forfeit all his Lands which includes Use Estate and Right by any right title or means So you have Estate Right Title and Use Here Francis Bigot shal forfeit the Castle and Mannor of Mulgrave unto the King his heirs and Successors and he must forfeit the Land Right Title and Use otherwise it cannot be to the King for ever and what is saved to strangers all shall be saved and what will you not save to the Offender and his heirs all his Lands Right c. as was saved to strangers It was objected that it was not an Act of Assurance but an Act of Forfeiture which is not so strong as an Act of Assurance I do not doubt of the difference but how much will that difference make to this Case doth the Statute goe by way of Escheat it doth not but in case of Petty Treason Land shall Escheat but when the Statute of 25 E. 3. speaketh of High Treason the words of the said Statute are Shall forfeit the Escheat to the King But is the Right devided from the King Truely no the word Forfeit take it in nomine or in natura is as strong a word as any word of Assurance Alienare in the Statute of West 2. cap. 1. Non habeant illi potestatem alienandi so non habent illi potestatem forisfaciendi is in the nature of a Gift Com. 260. Forfeiture is a gift in Law Et fortior est dispositio legis quam hominis and so as strong as any assurance of the partie If a Statute give the Land to the King then there needeth not any Office 27 H. 8. Br. Office Com. 486. The Right vests before Office It was objected that the statute of 26 H 8. doth not extend to a right of Action but to a right of Entrie The purpose of this Act of 26 H. 8. is not to attaint any particular person as the Statute of 31 H. 8. was made for the particular Attaindor of Francis Bigot 5 E. 4. 7. Cestuy que use at the Common Law did not forfeit for Felony or Treason but by this Act of 26. H. 8. Cestuy que use shall forfeit both Use and Lands out of the hands of the Feoffees 4 E. 3. 47. 4 Ass 4. The husband seised in the right of his wife at the Common Law for Treason shall not forfeit but the profits of the lands of his wife during his life and not the Freehold it self but by this Act of 26 H. 8. the Freehold it self is forfeited 18 Eliz. in the Common Pleas Wyats Case C. 10. Lib. Entries 300. And if the Statute of 26 H. 8. had had no saving all had been forfeited from the wife 7 H. 4. 32. there it is no forfeiture yet by this Statute it is a forfeiture A right of Action shall not Escheat 44 E 3. 44 Entre Cong 38 C. 3 part the Marquess of Winchesters Case and Bowtiâ—s Case and C 7. part Inglefieldâ—s Case A right of Action per se shall not be forfeited by the Rules of the Common Law nor by any Statute can a right of Action be transferred to another but by the Common Law a right of Action may
be quashed and exonerated and discharged in the possession of the King For it is out of the Rule which is in C. 10 part 48 for the cause of quieting and repose of the Terre-Tenants otherwise it would be a cause of Suits But all Rights Tythes Actions c. might for the same reasons viz. for the quiet of the Terre-Tenants and the avoidance of Suits and Controversies be released to the Terre-Tennants By the same reason here the right of Action of Francis Bigot shall be discharged and exonerated by this forfeiture viz. for the quiet and repose of the Terre-Tenants for the Law delights in the quiet and repose of the Terre-Tenants If Francis Bigot had granted a Rent the ancient right of the tail had been charged C. 7. part 14. Where Tenant in tail makes a lease for life and grants a Rent charge and Tenant for life dieth he shall not avoid his charge although he be in of another Estate because he had a defeisible possession and an ancient right the which c. so as they could not be severed by way of conveyance and charge and no lawfull act Then I admire how he will sever this from himself by his unlawfull act viz. the Feoffment the discontinuance Lit. 169. If a man commit Treason he shall forfeit the Dower of his wife yet he doth not give the dower of his wife but it goes by way of discharge in those Lands 13 H. 7. 17. Tenant by the Curtesie in the life of his wife cannot grant his Estate of Tenant by the Curtesie to another but yet he for Felony or Treason may forfeit it viz. by way of discharge A Keeper of a Park commits Treason there the King shall not have the Office of Keeper for a forfeiture because it is an Office of trust but if he had been Keeper of the Kings Park and had been attainted there he should forfeit his Office by way of discharge and exoneration This Statute of 26 H. 8. hath been adjudged to make Land to revert and not strictly to forfeit Austin's Case cited in Walsingham's Case Tenant in tail the reversion in the King the Tenant makes a Lease for years and dies the issue accepts of the Rent and commits Treason the Lease is avoided for the King is not in by forfeiture by the Statute of 26 H. 8. but by way of Reveter by the Statute of 26 H. 8. It was objected that if Tenant in tail maketh a Feoffment and takes back an Estate for life and is attainted of Treason that he shall not forfeit his old right I agree that Case For indeed it is out of the Statute of 26 H. 8. which speaks of Inheritance and in that Case the Tenant hath but a Freehold The Statute of 26 H 8. saith that it shall be forfeited to the King his heirs and Successors And if in our Case the old right should remain then it should be a forfeiture but during the life of the Testator When the Common Law or Statute Law giveth Lands it gives the means to keep them as the Evidences So here the King is to have by force of this Statute of 26 H. 8. the Evidences The forfeiture of right is expresly within the Statute of 26 H. 8. as the forfeiture of Estate as by any right title or means for the old Estate tail is the means of Estates since 6 H. 8. And if you will take away the Foundation the Building will fall For all the Estates are drawn out of the old Estate tail The Statute of 26 H. 8. is not an Act of Attaindor for none in particular is attainted by the Act but the Act of 31 H. 8. doth attaint Francis Bigoâ— in particular It was objected that here in this case there needed not to be any express Saving I answer that there are divers Statutes of Forfeitures yet the Statutes have Savings in them so as it seems a saving in such Acts were not superfluous but necessary The Act of 33 H. 8. for the attainder of Queen Katharine there is a saving in the Act and yet an Act of Forfeiture Dyer 100. there the land vested in him in the Remainder by force of a saving in the Act so the saving is not void but operative C. 3. part Dowlies Case vid. the Earl of Arundels Case there the saving did help the wife so it appears savings are in Acts of Parliaments of Forfeiture and Acts of Attaindor Dyer 288 289. The Bishop of Durham had Jura Regalia within his Diocese and then the Statute of 26 H. 8. came now whether the Forfeiture for Treason should be taken away from the Bishop by reason of that Statute and given to the King was the doubt It was holden that of new Treasons the Bishop should not have the Forfeitures for those were not at the Common Law as the Forfeitures of Tenant in tail but that he should have the Forfeitures of Lands in Fee within his Diocese and that he had by force of the saving in the Statute so that a Saving is necessary and operative Com. Nichols's Case there Harpers opinion that there needs no saving to strangers but yet a saving is necessary for the Partie and the Issue if they have any thing as well as strangers vid. C. 3. part Lincoln Colledg Case It is the Office of a good Interpreter to make all the parts of a Statute to stand together Com. 559. By these general words Lose and Forfeit and by excluding of the heir in the saving the heir is bound So the Judges have made use of a Saving for it is operative 2 Ma. Austin's Case cited in Walsinghams Case Tenant in tail the Reversion in the Crown Tenant in tail made a Lease for years and levied a Fine to the King the King shall not avoid the Lease for the King came in in the Reverter but in such Case if he be attainted of Treason then the King shall avoid the Lease So a Statute of Forfeiture is stronger then a Statute of Conveyance By this Statute of 26 H. 8. Church Land was forfeited for so I find in the Statute of Monasteries which excepts such Church Lands to be forfeited for Treason Dyer Cardinal Poole being attained did forfeit his Deanary and yet he was not seised thereof in jure suo proprio for it was jus Ecclesiae 27 E. 3. 89. A writ of Right of Advowson by a Dean and he counteth that it is Jus Ecclesiae and exception that it is not Jus suae Ecclesiae But the Exception was disallowed for the Jus is not in his natural capacitie but in his politique capacitie and yet by this Statute of 26 H. 8. such Church Land was forfeited for Treason this is a stronger Case then our Case Vide C. 9. part Beaumont's Case Land is given to husband and wife in tail and the husband is attainted of Treason the wife is then Tenant in tail yet the Land is forfeited against the issue although it be but a possibility for the whole estate
then the tender is good But if he be not there but at another place the notice is sufficient Dodderidge The Law requires certainty in a Declaration and the matter cannot be taken by intendment so we ought to have a certainty set forth otherwise no certain Judgment can be given It was adjourned for Dodderidge and Haughton Justices were against Ley Chief Justice But as I have heard the Case was afterwards adjudged for the Plaintiffe There quaere the Record of the Judgment Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 425. A Man made a Lease for life and covenanted for him and his heirs That he would save the Lessee harmless from any claiming by from or under him The Lessor dyed and his wife brought a Writ of Dower against the Lessee and recovered and the Lessee brought an Action of Covenant against the heir And it was adjudged against the heir because the wife claimed under her husband who was the Lessor But if the woman had been mother of the Lessor who demanded Dower the Action would not have layen against the heir because she did not claim by from or under the Lessor And so it was adjudged v. 11. H. 7. 7. b. Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 426. SNELL And BENNET'S Case A Parson did contract with A. his Executors and Assigns That for ten shillings paid to him every year by A. his Executors and Assigns that he his Executors or Assigns should be quit from the payment of Tythes for such Lands during his life viz. the life of the Parson A. paid unto the Parson ten shillings which the Parson accepted of And made B. an Enfant his Executor and dyed The mother of the Enfant took Letters of Administration durante minori aetate of the Enfant and made a Lease at Will of the Lands The Parson libelled in the Ecclesiastical Court for Tythes of the same Lands against the Tenant at Will who thereupon moved for a Prohibition Dodderidge During the life of the Parson the Contract is a foot but the Assignee cannot sue the Parson upon this Contract yet he may have a Prohibition to stay the suit in the Ecclesiastical Court and put the Parson to his right remedy and that is to sue here This agreement is not by Deed and so no Lease of the Tythes The Parson shall have his remedy against the Executor for the ten shillings but not against the Tenant at Will and the Executor hath his remedy against the Tenant at Will Crook 21 H. 6. A Lease of Tythes without Deed is good for one but not for more years v. 16 H. 7. And afterwards a Prohibition was granted Trin. 16 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 427. PHILPOT and FEILDER'S Case THe Parties are at issue in the Chancery and a Venire facias is awarded out of the Chancery to try the issue and the Venire facias was Quod venire facias coram c. duodecim liberos legales homines de vicineto de c. quorum quilibet habeat quatuor lib. terrae tenementorum vel reddituum per annum ad minus per quos rei veritas melius sciri poterit c. And it was moved in arrest of Judgment That the Venire facias is not well awarded for it ought to be Quorum quilibet habeat quadraginta solidos terrae tentorum vel reddit per an ad minus according to the Statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 6. which appoints that every one of the Jurors ought by Law to expend forty shillings per annum of Freehold and it ought not to be quatuor libras terrae c. according to the Statute of 27 Eliz cap. 6. which Statute of Elizabeth doth not speak of the Chancery but only of the Kings Bench Common-Pleas and the Exchequer or before Justices of Assise Before the Statute of 35 H. 8. no certain Land of Jurors was named in the Venire facias but since the Statute of 35 H. 8. it was quadragint solidos untill the said Statute of 27 Eliz. and now it is quatuor libras in the Kings Bench Common-Pleas and Exchequer It was adjourned At another day the Case was moved again That the Venire facias ought to be 40 solidos c. according to the Statute of 35 H. 8. cap. 6. And 10 H. 7. 9. 15 were vouched That if a Statute appoint that the King shall do an act in this form the King ought to do it in the same form and manner So if a Letter of Attorney be to make a Bill in English and the same is made in Latine it is not good although it be the same in form and matter Cook lib Entries 578. Waldrons Case is That in the Chancery the Venire facias was but 40 but that Case was between 35 H. 8. and 27 Eliz. cap 6. Dodderidge and Haughton Justices It is a plain case For the Venire facias ought to be according to 35 H. 8. cap. 6. because the Statute of 27 Eliz. cap. 6. speaks nothing of the Chancery Quod nota Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 428. HEWET and BYE'S Case IN an Ejectione Firme of a house in Winchester the Ejectment was laid to be of a house which was in australi parte vici Anglice the High-street Ley Chief Justice If it had been ex australi parte vici then the South part had been but a Boundary but here it is well laid Then it was moved That the Venire facias is Duodecim liberos legales homines de Winton and doth not say of any Parish in Winton But notwithstanding it was holden good For Dodderidge Justice said That it is not like unto Arundels Case C. 6. part 14. For there the Offence was laid to be done in paroechiae Sanctae Margaret de Westminster therefore the visne ought to be of the Parish but in this case it being laid generally in Winton it is sufficient that the visne come out of Winton Judgment was given for the Plaintiffe Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 429 WATERER and MOUNTAGUE'S Case A Man made a Lease for six years and the Lessor covenanted That if he were disposed to lease the said lands after the expiration of the said term of six years that the Lessee should have the refusal of it The Lessee within the six years made a Lease thereof to J. S. for 21 years Dodderidge Haughton and Ley Chief Justice The Covenant is not broken because it is out of the words of the Covenant But Dodderidge said Temp. E. 1. Covenant 29. The Lessee covenanted to leave the houses trees and woods at the end of the term in as good plight as he found them and afterwards the Lessee cut down a tree that in that case the Covenant was broken and the Lessor shall not stay untill the end of the term to bring his action of Covenant because it is apparant that the tree cannot grow again and be in as good plight as it was when he took the Lease Trin. 21
house and then by his Will deviseth his houses called the Swan The rooms of the Lyon which A. occupied with the Swan shall pass by the Devise although of right those rooms do belong to the Lyon-house Pasc 36 Eliz. Ewer and Heydon's Case A man hath a house and divers lands in W. and also a house and lands in D. And by his Will he deviseth his house and all his lands in W. D. there the house which is in D. doth not pass for his intent and meaning plainly appears that his house in D. doth not pass But if he had devised all his lands in W. and had not spoken of the house the house had passed A Case was in the Common-Pleas betwixt Hyam and Baker The Devisor had two Farms and occupied parcel of one of the Farms with the other Farm and devised the Farm which he had in his possession The part of the other Farm which he occupied with it did pass with the Farm devised Dodderidge Justice The Devise is in the Case at Bar All his Farm called Locks to his eldest Son and all his Farm called Brocks to his younger Son And the Land in question was purchased long after that the Devisor purchased Brocks but that Land newly purchased was not expresly named in the Will and therefore it shall discend to the heir viz. the eldest Son Land is not parcel of a house and in strictness of Law cannot appertain to a house Yet Land is appertaining to the Office of the Fleet and the Rolls but that is to the Office which is in another nature then the Land is For the Land newly purchased the Jury did not find the same to be usually occupied with Brocks it shall not pass with Brocks although it be occupied together with Brocks I do occupie several Farms together and then I devise one of the Farms called D. and all the lands to the same belonging the other Farms shall not pass with it although they be occupied all together Haughton Justice What time will make lands to belong unto a house All the profits of the lands used with the house for a small time will serve the turn Ley Chief Justice There are two manner of belongings One belonging in course of Right and another belonging in case of Occupation To the first belonging there ought to be Prescription viz. time out of mind But in our Case Belonging doth borrow some sense from occupying for a year or a time And then another year to occupie it will not make it belonging in the later sense In strictness of Law Land cannot be said to belong to a house or land but in vulgar reputation it may be said belonging And in such case in case of grant the Land will not pass as appertaining to Land C. 4. part Terringham's Case But in our Case it is in case of a Will Usually occupied is not to be meant time out of mind Here other lands were belonging to Brocks and so the words of the Will are satisfied But it might have been a Question if there had been no other lands belonging to it Dodderidge Justice If the Devisor had turned all the profits thereof to Brocks then it had passed by the Will Ley Chief Justice This occupying of it promiscuously doth make it belong to neither At another day Ley Chief Justice said Here is nothing which makes it appear to us that this Land doth belong to Brocks For the Jury find not that it was occupied either with Brocks or Locks and so this Land belongs to neither of them Dodderidge There is not any Question in the Case It is not found that it doth belong And then we must not judge it belonging The ground of this question ariseth out of the matter of fact and it ought to be found at the least that it is appertaining in Reputation Haughton The Jury find that Knight was seised of Brocks and of lands belonging to it And that he was seised of Locks and of lands belonging to that And lastly they find that he was seised of this Land in question but they do not find that it was any wayes belonging to Brocks or Locks It was adjudged for the Plaintiff and that the Land did not pass by the Devise but that it did discend to the heir Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 448. SELY against FLAYLE and FARTHING IN an Ejection Firme the Verdict was found for the Defendant Three of the Jurors had Sweet-meats in their pockets and those three were for the Plaintiffe untill they were searched and the Sweet-meats found with them and then they did agree with the other nine and gave their Verdict for the Defendant Haughton Justice It doth not appear that these Sweet-meats were provided for them by the Plaintiffe or Defendant and it doth not appear that the said three Jurors did eat of the Sweet-meats before the Verdict given And so I conceive there is not any cause to make void the Verdict given but the said three Jurors are fineable Dodderidge Justice Whether they eat or not they are fineable for the having of the Sweet-meats with them for it is a very great misdemeanour And now we cannot tell which of the Jurors the three were and because it was not moved before the Jurors departed from the Bar it is now too late to examine the Jurors for we do not know for which three to send for The nine drew the three which had the Sweet-meats to their opinions and therefore there is no cause to stay Judgment But if the three Jurors had drawn the nine other to them then there had been sufficient cause to have stayed the Judgment but as this case is there is no cause And therefore per Curiam Judgment was given for the Defendant according to the Verdict Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench 449. NOte It was vouched by George Crook and so was also the opinion of the whole Court That by way of Agreement Tythes may pass for years without Deed but not by way of Lease without a Deed. But a Lease for one year may be of Tythes without Deed. Trin. 21 Iacobi in the Kings Bench. 450. THe Plaintiffe recovered in Debt in the Kings Bench and a Capias ad Satisfaciendum was awarded and immediately upon the awarding of the Capias the Defendant dyed Quaere if in such case an Action of Debt lieth against the special Bail The Executors having nothing a Scire-facias doth not lie against the Bail And in the Common-Pleas in that case the Court was divided two Judges being against the other two Judges Ideo quare Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 451. LEONARD's Case IN a Scire facias to have Execution of a Recognizance the Case was That a special Supplicavit for the Peace was directed out of the Chancery to A. and B. Justices of the Peace and to the Sheriffe of the County of c. to take a Recognizance of L. M. N. for the Peace and good behaviour and the
Bill Obligatory and doth not shew that it was delivered Dyer 156. Per scriptum suum gerens datum and doth not say Primò deliberatum is not good The fourth Error was That in the Replication the Plaintiffe saith dixit whereas it ought to be dicit in present tense 10 H. 7. 12. The title to the Assise took Exception to the Plaintiffs title because that he said fuit seitus of a Messuage whereas he ought to have said est seitus But yet it was there holden good because he saith that all those whose title he hath c. by which words the possession shall be intented to continue 35 H. 6. 11. 85. vi 268. A Writ a False Judgment directed to the Sheriffe Recordare loquelam que est and the form and the presidents are quae fuit 9 H. 6. 12. The Sheriff retorns Non est inveni whereas it ought to be Nom est inventus and adjudged Error And he said That Detinue is only to be brought when it self is to be recovered in as good plight and no other Action It doth appear by the Record that in this Case at Trial 18 were only retorned upon the Pannel wheras there ought to have been 24 retorned By the Statute of West 2. cap. 38. 24 ought to be retorned on the Pannel 8 H. 4. 20. More then 24. shall not be retorned 2 H. 7. 8. The Sheriffe retorned but 12. and it was ruled to be an insufficient retorn because 24 ought to have been retorned 36 H. 6. 27. Trespass is brought for a Box and Charters which concerned the Plaintiffs lands and damages were given entirely and there it was adjudged not to be good because the Plaintiffe did not make any title to the Box nor did shew that the same was locked or sealed For the Box may belong to one and the Charters to another as the Evidences to the heir and the Box to the Executors unless the Box be first locked Note The opinion of the whole Court was because that the issue was particular That he was not guilty of the Trespass and detaining untill the Plaintiff had entred into a Bond. And the Jury found him guilty of the Trespass generally That the Verdict was not good to make the Defendant guilty by implication And Justice Dodderidge said That the Plaintiff hath brought his Action of Trespass and doth not lay any possession of the Box And Trespass is a possessory Action Also he said That the Plaintiff did not set forth the Quality of the Evidences viz. Whether they were Releases Deeds of Feoffments or other particular Evidences And for these causes and for the causes before alleadged the Judgment given in the Court at Lincoln was reversed Pasch 3 Caroli in the Kings Bench. 461. Sir WILLIAM FISH and WISEMAN's Case JUdgment was given in the Common-Pleas against Sir William Fish and after the year and day Execution was awarded by Capias where it ought to have been by a Scire facias first And the Plaintiff was taken in Execution and brought a Writ of Error in this Court where the Judgment was affirmed but the Execution was reversed because the Execution was not warrantable the Process being erronious And out of the Kings Bench another Execution was awarded by Capias sicut alias within the year of the affirmance of the Judgment in the Kings Bench. And it was moved by Banks That the Execution was erronious because he ought to have a Scire facias because the year is past after the Judgment in the Common-Pleas and although that the Court be changed yet the Plaintiffe ought to have the same Process for Execution as he ought to have in the first Court 14 H. 7. 15. The first Process was reversed for Error and then he cannot have a Sicut alias but ought to have a new Original We pray a Supersedeas of the Execution for Sir William Fish the Plaintiffe and that he may be delivered out of Execution Sir William Fish had a Release and that was the cause that Wiseman would not take a Scirefacias Sir William Fish upon the Judgment in the Common-Pleas was taken in Execution and upon a Writ of Error brought Bail was put in to proceed with effect and then he was delivered out of Execution And then he cannot now be taken in Execution again upon the same Judgment 16 H. 7 2. per Curiam If one be in Execution upon Condemnation in the Common-Pleas and the Record and the body is removed into the Kings Bench by Error then the party shall find collateral Securities by their Recognisance to pay the Condemnation in case the Judgment be affirmed and further to proceed with effect In this case the body is discharged of Execution as to any Process to take the body unless he render himself to prison of his own accord to discharge his Sureties And if he will not do it he who recovereth hath no remedy but to make the Sureties to pay the Condemnation by reason of their Recognisance 2 E. 4. 8. A man is condemned in London tempore Vacationis and hath Execution in the Term and the Defendant sueth a Corpus cum causa and had his priviledge in the Common-Pleas Danby The Plantiffe shall not have Debt for at the beginning when the Defendant was in Execution the Action of Debt was gone and then he being discharged here the Action of Debt doth not lie To which Needham agreed And Choke said He did not know any remedy that the party had and conceived that he could not have a new Execution 14 H. 7. 1. If one escape out of Execution the Plaintiffe cannot take him again in Execution but his remedy is against the Gaoler The Court may supersedeat this Execution because it is erronious 34 H. 6. 45. b. An Action of Debt was brought against an Executor who pleaded that he had fully administred And it was found that he had Assets and Judgment was given against the Defendant and a Capias was awarded against him and after that an Exigent And the Court granted a Supersedeas to supersede that Erronious process For a Capias doth not lie against an Executor where he pleads c. but a Fieri facias And therefore in the principal Case Banks prayed a Supersedeas Jones Justice If Error be brought within the year of the Judgment in the Common-Pleas and the Judgment be affirmed here the party shall have a Capias although the Judgment be affirmed two years after the bringing of the Writ of Error For he shall take the same Execution in the Kings Bench as in the Common-Pleas and the altering of the Court makes no difference in it And so was Garnon's case The Writ of Error was brought within the year of the Judgment in the Common-Pleas but it was not affirmed in two years after and yet there he had the same Process in the Kings-Bench as he was to have had in the Common-Pleas Dodderidge Justice If the Execution be lawfull and upon lawfull Process
said Statute of 31 H. 8. And I conceive that they are not It doth not appear in the pleading that the Priory of St John was an Ecclesiastical House therefore it ought to have been averred It is true to plead that such a man hath entred into Religion is intended that he is a person dead in Law They were never Ecclesiastical nor so accounted they must be both Religious and Ecclesiastical who are within the Statute of 31 H. 8. For the said Statute doth not extend to Religious houses unless they be Ecclesiastical Tryal 99. proves that they were Religious 21 H. 7. 7. And the Statute of Templers 17 E. 2. do shew that they were Canonized which is admitted unto a Rule of their own Law and not that they were made Saints or that they were Ecclesiastical 1 E. 3. 7. Nonability 4. They were dead persons in Law Feoffments 68. proves that they were religious but whether they were Lay or Ecclesiastical I have not read In the difference of Summons to Parliaments unto the Templers the Summons is Vobis mandamus in fide legeantiâ—s but the Summons to a Spiritual Lord is in fide electione and so was the Summons to the Prior of St Johns of Jerusalem but that was because he held in Frankalmoign but that doth not prove him to be Ecclesiastical for first they exercised themselves in Arms It was part of their Order armis se exercere and that is against the Rule of the Common Law to meddle with blood Secondly They used no Imposition of hands but only a Robe nor had they so much Ceremony as a Knight of the Bath and yet the Knights of the Bath are not Ecclesiasticall So there is nothing in their Creation or Order that makes them Ecclesiastical For they were Lay-Monks of the Order of St Anthony The Jesuites have Lay-Brethren and not Ecclesiastical 44. Ass 9. There the Defendant pleaded in barr That the Prior was a Lay-man and so not under any Rule and it is there admitted that he was a Lay-man and yet that he might be Prior and bring the Action in his own name and not as Prior with his brethren which proves that the residue were dead persons in Law If there be professions alledged in one of the Hospitals of St John of Jerusalem how shall it be tryed By the Country Tryal 99. Profession was alleadged in the Plaintiff who was a Knight of the Order of the Templers and it was commanded to certifie it And the Bishop could not enquire of it because the Order of a Knight Templer was exempted by the Pope But Tryal 98. there it was certified by the Bishop yet all our books are contrary to it 2. R. 3. 4. Si profissio allegata sit in quodam militi Sancti Johannis Jerusalem quia immediate sub Papa sunt non habere cuiscribere possunt c. 21 H. 7. 7. Selden 1 21. in his History of Tythes that they were accounted no part of the Clergy but meerly Lay. With us they were accounted Lay and therefore it is not material what they were accounted of in other places A Colledg is a Lay Corporation If they be disseised an Assise must be brought The Statute of 1. and 2. Philip and Mary is That men might devise to spiritual Corporations notwithstanding the Statute de terris ad manum mortuum nonpoâ—â—nd 〈◊〉 or any other Statute to the contrary Dyer 254. There a Devise was unto a Colledg and Grammar-School and holden a good Devise because the Statute of Philip and Mary ought to be favourably expounded being for the benefit of the Corporation I take another reason from the manner of payment of Tythes Ecclesiastical persons payed Tythes but no Tythes were paid by the Hospitalers of St Johns of Jerusalem The Statute of 27 H. 8. dissolves Abbies c. but doth not relate to any formerly given up c. and the reason was because they were but petty Abbies The Statute of 31 H. 8. dissolves none but recites that whereas divers have given up c. or were to be given up but shews no reason for divers inquisitions issued forth to enquire of their Lands but the Statute of 32 H. 8. doth not shew any such reasons but other reasons because that Rodes was taken away and that they held of the Pope And if they were dissolved by the Statute of 31 H. 8. then what need a Statute the next year after viz 32 H. 8. to dissolve the Corporation By the Statute of 26 H. 8. cap. 3. the King hath the first Fruits and Tenths of all that shall be promoted to any Benefice or promotion spiritual This doth not extend to St John of Jerusalem and therefore afterwards in the same Statute it is Enacted That every one which shall be elected or by other means appointed to the Dignity of the Prior of St Johns of Jerusalem shall before their real and actual entrie into the Dignity or medling with the profits satisfie the King c. Now if they were intended in the words Spiritual promotion it was in vain a new to enact for them The Act of 32. H. 8. extends to Ireland and so doth not the Statute of 31 H. 8. the Statute of 31 H. 8. extends only to Eccelesiastical and Religious so they were not intended within the Statute of 31 H. 8. Next If they were intended within the Statute of 31 H. â— then the Statute of 32 H. 8. gives them absolutely by name to the King The Statute of 31 H. 8. gives nothing to the King but those that are or were to be given up forfeited surrendred or otherwise given up but gives nothing to the King but by the help of some other Act viz. forfeiture surrender or otherwise given up The word Otherwise never intended Dissolution by Act of Parliament for that is paramount the particulars recited The Statute of Malebridg cap. 30. n. Provisum est quod si depredationes vel rapini aliqui fiâ—nt Abbatibus c. vel aliis Prelatis Ecclesiasticis c. That Statute never intended to extend to Bishops who are paramount and superior to Abbots The word aliis will bear no such sense to make the superior to be intended when as the inferior is recited The Statute of 13 Eliz. recites That no Colledg Dean and Chapter Parsons Vicars c. may make a new Lease unless within a year of the end of the Lease in being Now a Bishop is superior and above these particularly named and may make concurrant Leases so here the word Otherwise doth not intend that Otherwise to be by Act of Parliament and to extend to greater then the particulars recited The Statute of 32 H. 8. sayes that the Corporation shall be dissolved and void but the Statute of 31 H. 8. doth not say that the Corporation shall be dissolved and void The Statute of 32 H. 8. sayes that the Corporation and possessions shall be in the King by vertue of that Act then not in the King
by vertue of the Act of 31 H. 8. A Feoffment in Fee is made unto the use of A. in Tail he hath the Use by the Statute of West â— cap. 1. Now when the Statute of 27 H. 8. cap. 10. came he hath the possession by force of that Act viz. of 27 H. 8. and not by force of the Statute of West 2. If the King be not in by the Statute of 3 H. 8. then he shall not have every of the Priviledges which the Act of 31 H. 8. giveth C. 2. part The Bishop of Canterburies Case The Colledg of Maidstone was Religious but not Ecclesiastical and it was adjudged that the Purchasors of the Lands of the said Colledg were not discharged from the payment of Tythes because the Colledg was not Ecclesiastical but Religious only and Religious and not Ecclesiastical came not to the King by the Statute of 31 H. 8. 18 Jacobi in the Common Pleas Wrights Case The Priory of Hatfield being of small value viz. not having Lands of the value of 200l per annum was dissolved by the Statute of 27 H. 8. and the Lands were not Tythe-free in the hands of the Purchasors because the Priory came not to the King by the Statute of 31 H. 8. and yet they were Tythe-free in the hands of the Prior himself The second point upon the Statute of 32 H. 8. The words are That the King shall have all Rights Interests and Priviledg as it was in the hands of the Abbots Priors c. It is objected To be free from payment of Tythes is a Priviledg I answer That neither Right Interest nor Priviledg do free him from the payment of Tythes First there is no discharge of Tythes by the word Interest in the Statute for that is plain Then the question is if the word Priveledg will discharge the Lands from the payment of Tythes and if that word would have sufficed to have discharged the Tythe what need was there of the special Clause to discharge Tythes The Statute of 27 H. 8. dissolves Chaunteries and there it is said That the King shall have and enjoy c. and there also all Priviledges are given then the Statute of 1 E. 6. came and gave all Chauntries to the King and there the word Priviledg was not in the Act yet by those words the Lands were not discharged from the payment of Tythes The Statute of 31 H. 8. is Conditions and Rights of Entrie yet there was another Act made to give Conditions to the King But admit that the King himself be discharged yet his Patentees are not discharged The Priviledg was personal and personal Priviledges are not transferrable 35 H. 6. 56. A Statute dissolveâ— the Templers and gives the Lands to the Hospitalers to hold by the same service as the Templers did which was Frankalmoign yet the Grantee held by Fealty for that Frankalmoign is a personal priviledg and cannot be transferred by general words The King it's true shall have the priviledg for he is a priviledged person for of his goods he shall not pay Tythes if he do not grant them over and the Grants prove That unless he had granted them he should have paid no Tythes The Statute of 31 H. 8. sayes All Conditions which the Abbots c. have yet untill the Statute of 32 H 8. no Purchasor could take advantage of a Condition Hill 44. Eliz. in the Common Pleas Rot. 1994. Spurlings Case The Purchasors of Lands of the Hospital of St Johns of Jerusalem were not priviledged from the payment of Tythes Pasch 8. Jacobi in the Common Pleas Vrry and Bowyers Case In a Prohibition it was holden by Cook and Nichols That the Purchasor of St Johns of Jerusalem should pay Tythes but Winch and Warburton cont 18 Jacobi in the Common Pleas All the Judges but Warburton held that the Purchasor should pay Tythes 10 Eliz. Dyer There it doth not appear whether they were of the Order of Templers or Cistertians The third point in this Case The Defendant doth make no title to the Discharge for he hath not averred that the Priory were Ecclesiastical persons If a man plead that A. is professed the Court cannot take notice of it that he is a dead person in Law But if he saith that he was of such an Order he ought to set forth of what Rule the Order is Secondly The manner of their discharge was when they did Till and sow their Lands propriis sumptibus manibus If they grub up Roots and make the Lands fit for Tillage but if their Tenants sow the Lands they shall pay Tythes for they had the priviledg in respect they should not be idle unless all these do concur they shall pay Tythes viz. plough sow reap and carrie the Corn. These Priviledges are to be taken stritly because they are to defeat the Church of her endowment and therefore in this Case the Defendant doth not well entitle himself to the Discharge unless he do shew that he did occupie the Land for one whole year before and that he did plow sow and â—eap the corn But he ought for to have shewed that such time he plâ—â—ed the Land such a time he sowed it and such a time he reaped the 〈◊〉 Otherwise the Court will intend that another man did plow and sow the land and that he only reaped it For if Lessee of the Hospital doth plow the Land and sow it and afterwards doth surrender to the Prior of the Hospital who reaps the same he shall pay Tythe of the same for the Priviledge was granted unto them who were Labourers And the Defendant perhaps might have the Lands to halfs that is to say to have half the Corn growing upon the Lands The pleading is not good When you plead two Bars each Bar must stand of it self and the surplusage of the one Bar shall not help the defect of the other Bar. The word Priviledge in the Act of 32 H. 8. doth not extend to Tythes If it doth yet the Purchasor shall not have the Priviledge Dodderidge Justice The Statute of 32 H. 8. was made because that those of S. Johns of Jerusalem said that they could not surrender their Hospital because they had a Supreme Head over them viz. their great Master the Pope Crawley Serjeant argued for Weston the Defendant The pleading was over-ruled to be good the last day the Case was argued We have well entitled our selves to the Discharge For we have pleaded that we had the occupation of the Lands for one whole year and that Weston the Defendant plowed sowed and reaped the Corn upon the lands at his own costs and charges And the Plaintiff hath not shewed that any other plowed sowed or reaped the same Our title is by prescription which is confessed This Society was erected in the time of King Henry the 1. and it continued untill 32 H. 8. 44 Eliz. in Spurlings case there were two reasons of the Judgment 1. There the Statute of 31 H. 8.
Dodderige Justice the encroachment doth not make it to be no parcell of the Mannor Ley chief Justice it is not layed to be a Disseisin but an Encroachment and therefore it is not so strong as a Disseisin with a Discent but in Right it belongs to the Mannor Tenant in Tail makes a Feoffment to the use of himself and deviseth the Lands to A. the Devise doth prevent the Remitter Haughton Justice the Discent is Traversed The Father dieth seised and hath issue two Sons and that the Lands discended to him the other may say That the Land is borough English and that the Lands discend unto him Absque hoc that they discended to the Eldest Dodderidge Justice Regularly you shall not Traverse the Discent but by the dying seised but in this Case it ought to be of necessity sc â— in case of a Devise the Traverse must be of the Discent for here they cannot traverse the dying seised for if they traverse the dying seised then they overthrow their own Title sc the Devise but here in Case of a Will the partie shall traverse the Discent for he cannot say that it is true that the Lands did discend and that he Devised it c. The heir cannot traverse that which entitles him by Discent but here his Title is by the Devise and not as heir Finch Recorder the Devise is not of the four Foot for if we confess the dying seised of the four Foot which was holden in Capite then we should overthrow our own Devise The Office finds that he died seised of the whole and therefore of the four foot He being never seised we traverse the dying seised thereof and we deny that he ever had it so the Traverse is good without making of us any Title unto it for we desire not to have it Dodderidge Justice If a man deviseth to his heir it is a void Devise for the discent shall be preferred But if one hath Issue four daughters and he deviseth to one of them it is good for the whole Land so devised to her and no part of the Land so devised shall discend to the other the Lands being holden in Socage Ley Chief Justice and the whole Court did agree That they might deny and traverse the four Foot if the Ancestor had no Title unto it and Judgment was given accordingly against the King quod nota Trin. 21 Jac. in the Kings Bench. 490. PAYNE and COLLEDGES Case AN Agreement was made between Payne and Colledg That if Payne being Chirurgion did Cure Colledg of a great Disease viz. A Noli me tangere That then he should have 10l and that if he did not cure him That then for his pains and endeavours Colledg would give him 5l In an Action upon the Case brought by Payne he doth not shew in his Declaration in what place he used his endeavour and Industry And there is a difference where the Plaintiff is to do any thing of Skill and Industry for there he may do the same at several times and in several places and so this Case differs from the Cases in our books 15 H. 6. Accord 1. is expresly in the point There the Defendant pleaded an Accord That if the Defendant by his Industry c. And exception was taken because that he did not shew a place 3 E. 4. 1. Debt brought by a Servant and declares that he was reteined by the predecessor of the Defendant c. and that he had performed his Service c. It was moved in Arrest of Judgment and Exception taken as in our Case because he did not shew where he did the Service for that is issuable and Denly there said That he need not shew the place because he might do it in several places Bridgeman Serjeant contrarie If the issue had been upon a Collateral matter it had been good enough but here the issue is taken upon an endeavour and you ought to alleadg a place for the tryal of it Dodderidge Justice The Jury was from the place where the Agreement was made the verdict will not make good the Declaration although the Jury have found the whole matter of fact for it doth not appear to us That that was the Jury which could try his endeavour The Case of 3 E. 4. of the Servant was to serve him seaven years and there he need not shew any place where he did his Service but only that he obeyed his Master in his Service for the seaven years If the Plaintiff in this Case had shewed but any one place of doing his endeavour in it had been sufficient but here he sheweth no place at all And therefore Judgment was given That Querens nihil Capiat per Billam Trin. 21 Jacobi in the Kings Bench. 491. The Lord ZOUCH and MOORES Case IN an Action of Trespass for cutting down of Trees in Odiham Park in Hampshire It was found by special Verdict That King Henry the eighth was seised of the Mannor and Park of Odiham And by his Letters Patents 33 of his Reign did grant unto Genny the Office of Stewardship of the said Mannor and the Office of Parkership of the said Park with reasonable Herbage and by the same Letters Patents did grant unto him the Mannor of Odiham cum pertinaciis and 100. Loads of Wood excepting the Park the Deer and the Wood for fifty years if he should so long live Then they found That after that Genny did surrender and restore the Letters Patents in the Chancery to be cancelled and that in truth they were cancelled and that the said Surrender was made to the intent to make a new Lease thereof unto Pawlet and that this Lease of 33 H. 8. being surrendred That King Henry the 8. Anno 36. of his Reign reciting the Letters Patents made to Genny to be dated anno 32 H. 8. whereas in truth they were dated 33 H. 8. and that they were surrendred and that the intent of the Surrender was to make a new Lease to Pawlet Did grant the same to Pawlet as before they were granted to Genny excepting as before They further found That King Philip and Queen Mary 5 6 of their Reigns being seised of the said Mannor and Park in jnro Coronae reciting that Henry the 8. anno 36 of his Reign had granted unto Paulet as before omitting the Proviso which was for 50 years if he should so long live and the Exceptions before And reciting that those Letters-Patents were surrendred ea intentione to make a new Lease in forma sequente They in consideration of good service and 200l paid did grant the Office as before and by those Letters-Patents did grant Herbage generally whereas the first Patent was reasonable Herbage And by these Letters-Patents did grant to him the Mannor cum pertinaciis except the grand trees and woods in the Park and Felons goods which were granted by the first Letters Patents for 50 years And here was a Rent reserved and a Proviso that for doing of Waste that the
Letters-Patents should be be void And there was no such Proviso in the first Letters-Patents 27 Eliz. Queen Elizabeth reciting the Letters-Patents of 5 6 Phil. Mary verbatim and truly did grant the Parkership unto Secretary Walsingham and Leased the Mannor unto him with the Appurtenances with power to take 100 loads of wood Excepting the Deer Habendum from the end of the Lease to Pawlet either by surrender or forfeiture for 21 years rendring rent and for not payment a Re-entry Walsingham granted the same to H. who granted to the same to Moor and others Defendants King James anno 1. of his Reign granted the said Mannor and the Offices of Stewardship and Parkership all by one Letters-Patents to the Lord Zouch who thereupon entred Moore entred upon him and cut down the Trees and the Lord Zouch brought the Action of Trespass Sir Henry Yelverton argued for the Plaintiff and said 1. The Lease made unto Pawlet 36 H. 8. is a void Lease in Law 2. The second Lease unto Pawlet made by King Philip and Queen Mary 5 6. is also void in Law 3. The Lease made by Queen Elizabeth to Walsingham anno 27 of her Reign is also void in Law And that the Lease made by King James is good in Law and the Action of Trespass brought by him will well lie The first Lease is void For it is granted upon a false suggestion made by Genny scil a supposed Surrender For the Lease which he did surrender did not bear date 32. but 33 H. 8. and the Surrender to the King was false for the Lease supposed to be surrendred by Genny beareth date 32 H. 8. whereas there was no such Lease made to Genny And therefore both being the suggestions of the party the King was deceived For what Lease Genny had the King could not know but by the suggestion of Genny and upon his information the King was contented to accept of a Surrender which was but a shew of a Surrender The King could not know with what Genny treated him but by his Information and in both the King was deceived For it was not the Kings intent to charge the lands but with one Lease C. 6. part The Lord Shandoe's Case The reason of the Judgment there proves our Case For there all which grew by the Information of the party was true and then the King made a wrong Collection thereupon but that which he collected was not upon the Information of the party And there it was agreed That if in any part the party had mis-informed the King that the whole had been void Dyer 35â— Lessee for 6â— years of the Queen made Lease for 80 years The 60 years expire the Assignee doth surrender unto the Queen his Lease for 80 years ea intentione that the Queen shall make unto him a new Lease for 20 years The Queen reciting that the said Lessee did surrender a Lease for 80 years did grant to him a Lease for 20 years The Lease for 20 years was adjudged void For he did surrender no Lease unto the Queen And there Dyer said That it is all one where the Consideration is false and where the Information is false there and here is but a shew of a surrender And it was not the Queens intent to pass more then she took by the Surrender Henry the 8. recites That Genny hath surrendred up the Patent which bore date 32 H 8. And there was not any such Patent Genny suggested that he had given up the Patent dated 32 H. 8. when he had not any such Patent So the King was deceived in the suggestion A difference hath been taken betwixt Consideration and Information Here the Consideration was Service and Two hundred pounds paid And it was objected That he took here by the Consideration and not by force of the Information But I say that the Information was the ground upon which the Patent was made For it was not the Kings intent to charge the lands with two leases C. 2. part 17. there it is cited That in a Patent of King Henry the 7. four Letters viz. H R. F. H. of the first words were left out intending afterwards propter honorem to be set out with gold but the great Seal was put to the Patent leaving out the said four letters and yet the Patent was adjudged good being referred to the Inrollment Privy-seal c. For thereby it appeareth that it was the grant of the King If Queen Elizabeth recite That whereas her Father made such a Lease and doth not recite it by the name of Henry the 8. her Father it is good enough if Henry the 8. made such a Lease But in such case if Henry the 7. made the Lease then the Lease of the Queen had not been good for that she mistook her Ancestor for Henry the 7. was her Grandfather 10 H. 7. 20. 20 H. 7. 7 8. The Kings Patent may be without Date for he may resort to the Inrolment and Privy-Seal and so help it But in such case if he doth surmise a false Date the same makes the Patent void 21 E. 4. 45. Misrecital of the year of the Reign of the King will make void a Patent And in our Case by the misrecital of the year of the King there is a year gained It was objected That it shall be helped by the Statute of 34 H. 8. which helps Mis-recital and Non-recital But in our case it is not a Mis-recital For Mis-recital is when part of that which is recited is true and part false but Non-recital is when nothing at all is recited But in our Case it is a false Recital of the subject in the thing which is surrendred Genny surrendred nothing and the King took nothing Trin. 9 Jacobi Roper and Roden's Cases Henry the 8. reciting by his Grant That where he had a Reversion expectant upon a Demise made unto M. whereas in truth it was made unto N He granted the Reversion unto Roden It was adjudged That that recital was not helped by the Statute of 34 H. 8. for that the King had not any such Reversion 19 Jacobi Tucker and Carr's Case was adjudged upon the same point Doddington's Case C. 2. part There a general Grant is not helped by the Statute of 34 H. 8. In our Case here is a mistaking of the thing it self If he had recited the same to be 33 H. 8. and then had mistaken any thing in it it had been helped by the Statute of 34 H. 8. Dyer 195. Kemp was Nonsuit there 32 H. 8. was mistaken for 33 H. 8. There the Surrender was of a Patent bearing date 32 H. 8. whereas in truth it bore date 33 H. 8. And there it is adjudged That the Patent of 32 H. 8. cannot be the Patent of 33 H. 8. by which the Office was granted to him And therefore it was adjudged void notwithstanding the Act of 34 H. 8. and other Statutes of Misrecital So in our Case 33 H. 8. is mistaken
and it is 32. whereas in truth it was 33 H. 8. The second Point then is If the Lease of 36. H. 8. be void then of necessity the Lease of 5. 6. Philip and Mary is void for therein is falsity of three things 1. The thing recited is the custody of the Park with reasonable Herbage and the Patentee would have nothing but pramissa and he trusts the King to give that and he takes from the Queen Herbage leaving out reasonable and so hee takes more then was intended him and therefore hee hath deceived the Queen and if you are to have reasonable Herbage the King may put one to be Overseer that you have that which is fitting and reasonable and the Queen may agister Cattel there but in our Case the Queen can neither set any Overseer nor can she agist Cattel there Dyer 285. 2. H. 8. Killaway 159. He who hath reasonable Herbage cannot inclose but hee which hath Herbage may inclose Then forasmuch as here the Patent is larger then it was before scil that which was surrendred the Patent is void for the Queen Grants more then she took by the surrender For hee did surrender eâ intentione that the Queen should regrant him praemissa and by this new Grant he hath more 2. He recites That hee had a Lease for fifty years absolutely whereas it was determinable upon death and the Queen grants the same for fifty years absolutely and that was by reason of his false Suggestion It may be objected That the Queen is not deceived for the limitation for life is not annexed to the Habendum 20. Eliz. in the Kings Bench Hunts Case The Queen made a Lease to begin at a day to come and afterwards the Queen by the suggestion of the party and for the surrender of the present Lease did make a new Lease unto the party it was adjudged That the new Lease was void So here the Queen was deceived in the quality of the Lease 9. E. 4. 12. Baggots Case The King reciting that Baggot was born in Normandy whereas in truth he was born in France made him a Denizen and the Patent notwithstanding this false recital of the party was adjudged good for the intent was to make him a Denizen That Case was objected against me But put the Case a little further and it is otherwise for if at that time Edward the fourth had had Wars with France then the Patent had been void for it was not the Kings intent to protect a man who was an Enemy and to nourish him in his own bosom If the Queen had made the new Lease to begin after the first fifty years then it had been void C. 1. part the Rector of Chedington's Case It is not the years but the death of the Patentee which determins the Lease C. 2. part 72. In a Deed there is not any proper place where the Proviso shall be inserted then if it come in any place so as it doth not lean upon a Covenant it is a good condition 35. Eliz. betwixt Throgmorton and Sir Moile Finch Queen Mary made a Lease unto Throgmorton for 21 years and in the end of the Lease there is a Proviso That the Lease shall cease if the Rent be behind Popham Chief Justice said That Throgmorton hath such a Lease which is absolute but shortned by limitation in the end of the Lease and he might plead it generally and absolutely That those who will take advantage of the Proviso ought to shew where the Proviso comes in another clause So here Pawlet should have informed the Queen of the Proviso for hee trusts the Queen and the Queen trusts him The third Falsity is It is pretended That the Park of Odiham doth passe with the Manor for the Manor is granted by King Philip and Queen Mary cum pertinentiis and it is found by the Jury that the Park is parcel of the Manor He hath deceived and mis-informed the Queen for in the Lease which he surrendred the Park is excepted and now he would steal it in by the general words cum pertinentiis If the Park doth not passe then the Defendants are Trespassors to the Plaintiffe and if the Manor doth not passe then they are Trespassors so as they are in a Dilemma This Park admit the Manor passeth doth not passe for Queen Mary shortly after made Pawlet a Marquess and then she granted unto him by Letters Patents The custody of the Park and the Interest of the Park cannot stand together in one person and he cannot be the Queens Parker when as it is his own Park C. 8 part 117. The best Expositor of Letters Patents are the Letters Patents themselves joyning one part of the Letters Patents with the other And here in one clause the custodie of the Park is granted by express name and the general words viz. Grant of the Manor cum pertinentiis doth not convey it There is a difference betwixt the Custody of a Park and the Interest of the Park In Com. 399. If a Parker be attainted and pardoned hee loseth not his Park but hee may be a Parker notwithstanding such Attainder but if the Owner of a Park be attainted and pardoned he loseth his Park a Parker is a matter of service and cannot be forfeited but an Interest may 10. H. 7. 6. The Keeper shall render account for the Hawks for it is parcel of the profits of the Park but Lessee for years of a Park shall not render account for them So there is a difference betwixt the Interest in a Park and a Parkership 12. H. 8. 1. Lessee for years of a Park suffereth the Pale to fall down or decay Waste lieth but if a Parker suffereth the Pale to decay he can onely lose his Office Dyer 71. The Owner of a Park may dispark it but he who hath only the Herbage of it cannot A man hath the custody of a house and afterwards he becomes the Owner of the house his custodie therein ceaseth There are four Mischiefs in our Case 1. By expressing himselfe to be Parker hee excludes himselfe from being Owner 2. The Keeper is Accountable but Lessee for years is not 3. If he be only Keeper of it then the Queen might dispark but if he were Lessee the Queen could not 4. Where he is Keeper all will rest upon account as well the Deer which hee findes there when hee became Keeper as those which came after But that makes the Queen in doubt whether the Exception should extend to the Deer then whether to those Deer which came after The third Point was concerning WALSINGHAM'S Lease It is of the Manor and Custodiam Parci First This Lease hath one of the wounds of the former Leases for the Parkership is granted expresly Secondly The leases before being void then this Lease must needs be void also Thirdly This Lease is to take effect upon the end Surrender or Forfeiture of the Lease to Pawlet which was made 5. 6. Philip and Mary and that
lease had not any beginning and therefore was void and so the three limitations End Surrender or Forfeiture cannot happen Dyer 197 198. From the death of the Father the lease which is made to the Son shall begin the Father being dead it is a void lease to the Son C. 6 part 35. Enumeration of particular times if it do not happen within the particular then it shall never begin And so it is of this lease to Walsingham in our Case Note it was said by Sir Henry Yelvertor That it was the opinion of the Judges in this Case That he had but the custody of the Park and not the interest of the Park for by the acceptance of the custody of a Park when he hath a lease of the Park it selfe before it is a surrender of his lease Davenport argued for the Defendant More The question which is made of the lease of 27. Eliz. rests upon the lease made to Genny 33. H. 8. which was determined upon the surrender of the lessee 2. It rests upon the lease made to Pawlet 36. H. 8. which was for fifty years determinable by two Provisoes the one for not payment of a sum in gross 3. It rests upon the lease made to Pawlet 5 6. Ph. M. for 50 years from Mich last past upon the death of Pawlet or committing of Waste The lease of 27. Eliz. is a lease in reversion for 31 years to begin after the surrender forfeiture or expiration of the lease made 4 5 Ph. M. to Pawlet Exception is taken to the lease 36. H 8. because it hath two falsities the first Because it mis-recites the lease of 33 H. 8. reciting the same to be dated 32 H. 8. whereas in truth it was dated 33 H. 8. and that varies the term of years and that lease is not good at the common law nor as they objected is it helped by the Statute of 34. H. 8. of Mis-recitalls Secondly Because it is upon a false suggesstion of the Patentee and therefore it is void It was also obejected That the lease of 5 6 Philip and Mary was void for two causes first Because that that recites the lease of 36. H. 8. to bee for fifty years without the Proviso of determination by the death of Pawlet 2. The King is deceived in his Grant for they objected That it was recited to be surrendred 〈◊〉 intentione to regrant eadem praemissa and there are other things granted which were not surrendred They say That the Lease is said to be of the Parkership and not of the Park for that doth not passe by the generall words cum pertinentiis for by expresse words the Parkership is granted and then not the Park it selfe The Lease of 33. H. 8. was truly surrendred But the King reciting that the Patent bearing date 32. H. 8. was surrendred in consideration of service did grant the office of Parkership c. And insuper the Manor for fifty years c. The question is If this misrecitall be helped by the Common Law if it be not then if the Statute of 34. H. 8. doth help it The Lease which was mis-recited was not in esse and there is a difference when the Lease which is recited is not in esse but determined and when former Leasus are recited as Leases in esse There are three things in which misrecitall is materiall and doth vitiate the Patent 1. Misrecitall of the Tenant to whom the Lease was made or of the Tenant which was last possessed 2. Misrecitall of the thing demised 3. Of the Estate in esse and the Limitation If in such case of misrecitall there be not a Non obstante then the Patent is void at the Common Law C. 4. part 35. The King by the Law ought to be truely informed of estates in esse and also of his Rents and Revenue But by the Common Law if the former Leases be recited to be determined and in truth they are and the new grant is upon another consideration then it is not materiall if they be misrecited for that it is not any part of the consideration Vide 38. H. 6. 37. Darby If the misrecitall be in any thing not materiall which need not to be recited and no part of the consideration of the new Lease then it shall not make void the Patent for that the misrecitall was not of any thing materiall If the misrecitall be of a thing determined and the second Patent depend thereupon then the second Patent is void for if the King recite a Lease made to I. S. which is determined and demise tenementa praedict ' sic ut praefertur and in truth the Lease recited was made to I. D. the second Lease is void 38. H. 8. Br. Patents 10l The King Tenant in taile makes a Lease for life the successour King may make a new Lease without recitall and if he do misrecite the lease which is determined it is not materiall If our Lease should be void at the Common Law yet it is helped by the Statute of 34. H. 8. cap. 21. by expresse words the same extends to all Leases with or without consideration notwithstanding misrecitall or non-recitall yet all misrecitals are not helped by that Statute if the misrecitall be of Leases which are not the guide of the second Patent and need not to be recited such misrecitall is helped by the Statute But if the former Patent begetteth the later then the Statute doth not extend unto it for then the last is void for that the King is deceived and not by reason of the misrecitall Dyer 194. 195. The Case there is direct to prove our Case for there the recitall was of the grant of an Office 33. H. 8. whereas it was dated 32. H. 8. Et quia omnia c. And there was not any surrender for in truth it was not surrendred to the Master of the Rolls who died before it was entred There it is resolved That it is not helped by the Statute of Queen Mary for in that Act there is an expresse clause that it extend not to the grant of an Office as in the Case of Dier it was and then it was left at the Common Law and the Queen was deceived because the surrender was not good The defect of the second Patent was That it was not in the Crown by the surrender but if it had been well surrendred the misrecitall had been helped by the Statute of 34. H. 8. for it was the misrecitall of the year that the Patent bore date ◠2. part Doddingtons Case Dyer 129. upon the Statute of 34. H. 8. The misrecitall of the Town is not helped for it doth not appear unto the Court what Land was intended to be granted But if the thing had been certainly and particularly named so as it might appear to the Court what Land was intended to passe then the mis-recitall of the Town had been helped by the Statute of 34. H. 8. A thing granted generally
with reference to a misrecited Patent is not helped by the Act of 34. H. 8. But when the thing granted is particularized with reference to a thing which is determined in a misrecited Patent then the Statute of 34. H. 8. will help it but in our Case the misrecitall is of a thing which needed not to be recited The second Objection which hath been made is That the King is deceived by reason of the false suggestion And then the Letters Patents made by reason thereof are void I answer That if the false Suggestion tendeth to the detriment of the Crowne and to the apparant prejudice of the King then the Letters Patents may bee avoided But where the Suggestion is of a thing not materiall and doth not tend either to the deceit of the Crowne or to the Kings prejudice neither in his profit nor his Inheritance there it shall not make void the Letters Patents Dyer 352. Where an Abbot Lessee for sixty years of the Queen made a Lease for eighty yeares the sixty years expired the Lessee for eighty years surrendred to the Crown and in consideration of that Surrender to have a new Lease there the second Patent was void for the King was deceived in the reall consideration And Dyer there said That it was but the Suggestion of the party and the Collection of the Queen C. 5. part 93. 94. Where Lessee for yeares of the King did assigne part of his Terme and Land to another and then surrendred the surrender there was the consideration and that was not good If the recital be made of a thing which needeth not to be recited and the Patent is made upon another consideration there the misrecital shall not hurt it C. 1. part 41. where Henry the seventh reciting cum pâ—st c. virtute cujâ—s c. the estate is recited as determined the Reversion shall passe for the King was certified of the estate And in our Case it is determined Where the falsitie of the suggestion is not in deceit nor to the prejudice of the King If the thing misrecited be not materiall it shall not make void the Patent C. 10 part 110. Legates Case Quae quidem c. the false suggestion shall make void the Patent for the King did not intend to abate his Revenue Fitz. Nat. Brev. Grants 58. Falsitie of Tenure of the King shall make void the Kings Licence For the falsitie of suggestion which came from the party did tend to the prejudice of the King in his Tenure C. 10. part 110 Quod quidem manibus c. ratione Escheatae c. It shall make void the grant by this suggestion of the party which doth prejudice the King in his title But where the Suggestion is not to the prejudice of the King in his revenue tenure nor title it shall not make the Letters Patents void C. 10. part 113. MARKHAM's case The King grants the office of Parker quod quidem Officium the Earle of RUTLAN'D late had And the said Earl never had it the Suggestion was of a thing not materiall to the second Patentee nor to the Kings prejudice therefore it was good 10. H. 6. 2. Quod quidem Manerium seisitus fuit in manus nostras the false suggestion there shall not make void the Patent because it was not of a thing materiall If the King grant a Manor quod quidem Manerium nuper fuit in tenura I. S. and in truth it was not in the Tenure of I. S. yet it was adjudged good For Nuper is a Recitall of the thing that was and not of a thing that is For if it had not been in the possession of I. S. whereas in truth he was not seised or possessed thereof there it had not been good It is found in our Case That the Lease is actually surrendred and so the misrecitall is of a thing that was scil nuper and not of a thing that is or in esse The next Exception is to the Letters Patents of Philip and Mary First because thereby the Lease of 36. H. 8. is not fully recited For there was a Proviso That if he did not pay a summe in grosse that it should be void And that it should determine by the Death of Pawlet the Patentee The misrecitall of that Collaterall matter by the Common Law shall not make void the Grant There are three things necessary in Recitalls First The Certainty of the particular estate in esse with the Limitations Secondly The Tenant to whome the particular estate was made or the Tenant which then is in possession Thirdly The thing granted by the same name as it is granted in the first Patent But Covenants Reservations Provisions Conditions and the like need not to be recited The Recitall ought to be of a thing in esse Avowry 112. A Towne was granted by the King And afterwards he granted unto another a Leet in the same Towne the King in this case needed not to recite the grant of the said Towne Secondly The Recitall ought to bee in the same name as it was granted in the first Patent And cannot be helped by averment if it be misrecited Thirdly the Tenant of the Land or the Tenant which was before the grant ought to be recited scil that such a man habuit to whom the first Patent was granted Or that he now hath the Lands or lately had the thing granted in possession Brook Pat. 96. Such things ought to be recited as ought to be pleaded against the King in an Information of Instruction In our Case the misrecitall being of a thing determined and not materiall and not to be the guide of the second Patent doth not make void the Grant to Pawlet It was objected That Queen MARY was deceived for the Grant was de â—isdem praemissis And in the former Patent the Park was excepted but so it was not in the Letters Patents to Pawlet In the first Patent reasonable Herbage was granted but in the second to Pawlet the Grant was of Herbage generally If the King except the Deer as hee doth in this case then hee ought to have sufficient herbage for his Deer The Jury finde That the Letters Patents of 36. H. 8. were absolutely surrendred eâ intentione that the King might make a new Lease in forma sâ—quente which is not de praemissis sed de praementionatis Now the King for two hundred pounds Fine is pleased to grant tam in consideration of the Surrender quà m for the Fine of two hundred pounds And here the King took knowledg that it ought to be in forma sequente and then by reason of the Fine and Surrender hee is pleased to vary from the former Patent and it is to the prejudice of the Patentee The first was reasonable Herbage and here it is Herbage and in the Kings Case it amounts to as much as if hee had said Reasonable Herbage for because the King excepts the Deer it is implyed That the Patentee is but to have
taking be before the Action brought R. is excused We say That postea antè the purchasing of the Bill and I suppose we need not lay down any day but the postea antè makes it certain enough If the viz. be repugnant to our allegation it is surplusage 41. Eliz. in Communi Banco Bishops Case Trespass is brought for a Trespass supposed to be done 4. Maii 39. El. It is ruled in that Case That the videlicet doth not vitiate the premises because it is surplusage Trinit 34. El. in the Kings Bench Garford and Gray's Case In an Avowry it was shewed That such an Abbot surrendred 32. H. 8. and that the King was seised of the possessions of the said Abby and that postea scilicit 28. H. 8. the King did demise and that the same descended to King Ed. 6. there it was ruled that postea had been sufficient though he had not shewed the year of the demise of the King so here postea ante do expresse that he was taken before the Bill brought Dodderidge Justice If the day had been certain at the first and then he cometh and sueth that postea videlicet such a day and alledgeth another day which is wrong there the videlicet is not material but if the first day be uncertain then the videlicet ought to be at a certain day otherwise it is not good Curia If you had left out your time your videlicet it had been good for you must expresse a certain time for when the time is material it ought to be certain If you had layed down a certain day of the purchase of his Bill then the ante would have been well enough Dodderidge Justice If a thing is alledged to be done in the beginning of the Term quaere if that shall be intended the first day of the Term if you can make it appear that it must be intended of necessity of the first day of the Term then you say somewhat and then the videlicet is void and surplusage Judgement was given for the Plaintiff Pasch 3. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 498 DEAN and STEELE's Case AN Action upon the Case for words was brought for words spoken in the Court of Sudbury and it was layed That he did speak the words at Sudbury but did not say Infra jurisdictionem curiae 2. The Judgement in the Action upon the Case was capiatur And for these two Errors the Judgement was reversed Pasch 3. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 499 GOD and WINCHE's THIS Case was put by Serjeant Astley A Lease is made for life by Husband and Wife and the Covenants were That he should make such reasonable assurance as the Counsel of the Lessee should advise and the Counsel advised a Fine with warranty by the Husband and Wife with warranty against the Husband and his Heirs and the Defendant did refuse to make the assurance in an Action of Covenant brought it was moved That it was not a reasonable assurance to have a Fine with Warranty because the Warranty did trench to other Land But the Court did over-rule it and said That it is the ordinary course in every Fine to have a Warranty and the party may rebut the Warranty Pasch 3. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 500 IT was cited to be adjudged That if a man purchase the next avoidance of a Church with an intent to present his son and afterwards he doth present his son that it is Symony within the Statute of 31. Eliz. Ter. Mich. 4. Caroli in the King 's Bench. 501 HILL and FARLEY's Case IN Debt brought upon a Bond the Case was A man was bound in a Bond That he should perform observe and keep the Rule Order and finall end of the Councel of the Marches of Wales And in Debt brought upon the Bond the Defendant pleaded That the Councel of the Marches of Wales nullum fecerunt ordinem The Plaintiffe replied That Concilium fecerunt ordinem that the Defendant should pay unto the Plaintiffe an hundred pound The Defendant did demurre in Law upon the Replication And the only Question was If the Plaintiffe in his Replication ought to name those of the Councel of Wales who made the Award by their particular names Jermyn who argued for the Plaintiffe said That he ought not to name the Councellors by their proper names and therefore he said That if a man be bounden to perform the Order that the Privy Councel shall make or the Order which the Councel should make That in Debt upon the same Bond If the Defendant saith that he hath performed Consilium generally of the Councel without shewing the particular names of the Councellors it is good And he vouched 10. H. 7. 6. 10. E. 4. 15. and Com. 126. Sir Richard Buckleys case That the number of the Esliors ought not to be particularly shewed But in an Action brought upon the Statute of 23. H. 6. he may declare generally that he was chosen per majorem numerum and that is good And 10. E. 4. 15. In debt upon a Bond That the Defendant shall serve the Plaintiffe for a year in omnibus mandatis suis licitis The Defendant said That he did truely serve the Plaintiff untill such a day as he was discharged And it is there holden that he is not compellable to shew the certainty of the services Banks contrary and said That he ought to name the Councel by their particular names And therefore in this case he ought to have pleaded specially as in 9. E. 4. 24. If a man will plead a Divorce Deprivation or a Deraignment he ought to shew before what Judge the Divorce Deprivation or Deraignment was So 1. H. 7. 10. If a man will plead a Fine he must shew before what Judges the Fine was levied although they be Judges of Record And he took this difference That the Judges ought to take notice of the Jurisdiction of generall Courts which are Courts of Record and of the Customes of those Courts but of particular Courts which have but particular Jurisdictions and particular Customes the Judges are not to take notice of them nor of the Lawes and Customes of such Courts if they be not specially shewed unto them And therefore although it was alledged That it was the generall usage to plead Awards or Orders made before the Councel of the Marches of Wales as in the principall Case yet he held that the Judges were not to take notice thereof And therefore the Councellors who made the Order ought to be particularly named 2. He said that the Replication was not good because the Plaintiffe in his Replication doth not shew that the Order was made by the President and the Councel for by the Statute of 34. H. 8. it ought to be made by the President and the Councel 3. He said That the Replication was not good because the Plaintiffe doth not shew within the Record that the matter of which the Order was made was a matter which was within their
to Thomas Spence and his Wife and the Survivor the Rent of seventeen Pounds yearly and every year during the terme Proviso that if the Rent be arrere by forty daies that Thomas and his Wife or the Survivor of them should enter Thomas Spence died his Administrator did demand the Rent and being denied entred for the Condition broken Calthrope argued That the reservation to the Wife was void because she had not any interest in the Land and also never sealed the Indenture of Assignment but was as a stranger to the Deed and so he said that the Wife could not enter for the condition broken nor make any demand of the Rent The 2l l Point was Admitting that the wife could not enter nor demand the Rent Whether the Administrator of the Husband might demand it and enter for the condition broken because the words are Yeilding and paying to Thomas Spence and Jane his Wife and the Survivor of them during the term and no words of Executors or Assigns are in the Case and he conceived the Administrator could not and so he said it had been resolved in one Butcher and Richmonds Case about 6. Jacobi Banks contrary and he said It was a good Rent and well demanded and the reservation is good during the Term to the Husband and Wife and although the word Reddendo doth not create a rent to the Wife because the Husband cannot give to the Wife yet the Solvendo shall gain a good rent to the Wife during the life of the Wife and the reservation shall be a good reservation to him and his Administrators during the Survivor Vide C. 5. part Goodales Case 38. E. 3. 33. 46. E. 3. 18. and admitting that the rent shall be paid to the Wife yet the condition shall go to the Administrator 2. The word Solvendo makes the Rent good to the Wife and amounts to an agreement of the Lessee to pay the Rent to them and the Survivor of them and that which cannot be good by way of reservation yet is good by way of grant and agreement and many times words of reservation or preception shall enure by way of grant Vide 10 E. 3 500. 10. Ass 40. 8. H. 4. 19. Richard Colingbrooks Case 41. E. 3. 15. 13. E. 2 Feasts and Fasts 108. Richardson Justice The Reservation being during the term is good and shall go to the Administrator Jones Justice contrary It is good only during the life of the Lessor and so was it adjudged in Edwyn and Wottons Case 5. Jacobi Crook Justice accorded The Administrator hath no title and the Wife is no party to the Deed and therefore the Rent is gone by the death of the Husband If it had been durante termino generally perhaps it had been good but durante termino praedicto to him and his Wife it ceaseth by his death And the words durante termino couple it to him and his Wife and the Survivor and it cannot be good to the Wife who is no party nor sealed the Deed neither can it inure to the Wife by way of Grant And the words Reddendo and Solvendo are Synonima and the Administrator is no Assignee of the Survivor for she cannot assign because she hath no right in the Rent Barkley Justice The intention of the parties was That it should be a continuing Rent and Judges are to make such Exposition of Deeds as that the meaning of the parties may take effect I do agree That the Wife could not have the Rent neither by way of Reservation nor by way of Grant if she were not a party to the Indenture but here she is a party to the Deed for it is by Deed indented made by the husband and wife and the husband hath set his Seal to it And 2. The Solvendo doth work by way of Grant by the intent of the parties The Reddendo shall go and relate as to the husband and the Solvendo to the wife and he agreed the Case 33. H. 8. Br. Cases because there expressum facit cessare tacitum but in case of a Lease for years the words Reserving Rent to him shall go to the Executor who represents the person of the Testator and 27. El. it was adjudged in Constables Case and Littleton agrees with it That the Executor shall be possessed and is possessed in the right of his Testator And therefore if an alien be made an Executor in an Action brought by him the Tryal shall not be per medâ—â—tatem lâ—nguae And this Case is the stronger because the Reservation is during the Term. And C. 3. part in Malleries Case That the Law shall make such a construction Upon reservation of Rent upon a Lease as may stand with the intent and meaning of the parties and therefore in that where an Abbot and Covent made a Lease for years rendring Rent yearly during the Term to the Abbot and Covent or to his Successors it is all one as if it had been to him and his Successors and although the words be joint or in the Copulative yet by construction of Law the Rent shall be well reserved during the terme for if the reservation had been only Annually during the terme it had been sufficient and his Successors should have had the Rent Quaere the principall Case for the Judges differed much in their opinions Hill 8. Caroli in the Kings Bench. 517 The KING against HILL AN Information was by the Kings Atturney against Hill and others upon the Statute of 32. H. 8. of Maintenance Where the Point was A man was out of Possession and recovered in an Ejectione firme in May 2. Car. and Habere Possessionem was awarded and 29. Sept. 4. Car. he sold the Land And whether he might sell presently or not was the Question And it was determined That he being put in possession by a Writ of Habere facias possessionem that he might sell presently Vide Com. Crookers Case and C. Littl. acc and so was it holden in Sir John Offley's Case 7. Car. in this Court Barkley Justice If a Disseisor doth recover in an Ejectione firme if he afterwards sell the Land it is a pretended Title Jones Justice It was adjudged 36. El. in the Common Pleas in Pages Case in the Case of a Formedon That if a man be out of Possession for seven years and afterwards he recover that he may sell the Lands presently Crook Justice There is a difference where the recovery is in a reall Action and where it is in an Ejectione firme It was Master Browneloes Case in the Star-Chamber resolved by all the Judges of England That a Suit in Chancery cannot make a Title pretended nor Maintenance Barkley Justice put this Case If Husband and Wife bargaineth and selleth whereas the Wife hath nothing in the Land and afterwards a Fine is levied of the same Lands by the Husband and Wife it shall have a relation to conclude the Wife and to make the Wife to have a Title ab initio It was