Modern Reports OR SELECT CASES Adjudged in the COURTS OF Kings Bench Chancery common-Common-Pleas and Exchequer since the Restauration of HIS MAJESTY King Charles II. Collected by a Careful Hand LONDON Printed for T. Basset J. Wright R. Chiswell and S. Heyrick MDCLXXXII THE PUBLISHER TO THE READER THese Reports the first except the Lord Chief Justice Vaughans Arguments that have been yet printed of Cases adjudged since His Majesties happy Restauration though they are not Published under the Name of any Eminent Person as some other Spurious Ones have been to gain thereby a Reputation which in themselves they could not Merit yet have been Collected by a Person of Ability and Judgment and Communicated to several of known Learning in the Laws who think them not Inferior to many Books of this Nature which are admitted for Authority A great and well-spread Name may be Requisite to render a Book Authentick and to defend it from that common Censure of which this Age is become so very liberal But it s own worth is that only which can make it Vseful and Instructive The Reader will find here several Cases as well such as have been Resolved upon our modern Acts of Parliament as others relating to the Common Law which are primae Impressionis and not to be found in any of the former Volumns of the Law and the Pith and Substance of divers Arguments as well as Resolutions of the Reverend Judges on many other weighty and difficult Points And indeed though in every Case the main thing which it behoves Vs to know is what the Judges take and define to be Law yet the short and concise way of reporting it which is affected in some of our Books doth very scantily answer the true and proper end of reading them which is not only to know what is Law but upon what Grounds and Reasons 't is adjudged so to be otherwise the Student is many times at a loss and left in the dark especially where he finds other Resolutions which seem to have a tendency to the contrary Opinion In this respect these Reports will appear to be more satisfactory and inlightning than many others several of the Cases especially those of the most important Consideration containing in a brief and summary way what hath been offered by the Counsel Pro and Con and the Debates of the Reverend Judges as well as their Vltimate Resolutions than which nothing can more Contribute to the Advantage of the studious Reader and to the setling and guidance of his judgment not only in the Point controverted but likewise in other matters of Law where the Reason is the same Ubi eadem ratio idem jus As to the truth of these Reports though the modesty of the Gentleman who Collected them hath prevailed above the importunity of the Book-Seller and he hath rather chosen to see his Book than himself gain the Publick Acceptation and Applause whereby it hath lost some seeming Advantage which the prefixing of his Name would have undoubtedly given it yet the Reader may rest assured that no little Care hath been taken to prevent any Mistakes or Mis-representations The Judgments having been examined and the Authorities here cited industriously compared with the Books out of which they were taken A TABLE of the Names of CASES contain'd in this Book A. ABbot and Moor. 12 Jacob Aboab 107 Addison versus Sir John Otway 250 Alford and Tatnel 170 Amie and Andrews 166 Anonymus 75 81 89 105 113 163 169 170 180 185 200 209 211 213 216 249 253 258 272 Daniel Appleford 82 Atkinson and Rawson 208 Austin and Lippencott 99 B. BAker and Bulstrode 104 Bascawin and Herle versus Cook 223 Bassett and Bassett 264 Barker and Reate 262 Barrow and Parrott 246 Barry and Trebeswycke 218 Sir Anthony Bateman's Case 76 Bear and Bennett 25 Beckett and Taylor 9 Benson and Hodson 108 Birch and Lake 185 Bird and Kirke 199 Birrel and Shaw 24 Blackburn and Graves 102 120 Blissett and Wincott 13 Blythe and Hill 221 225 Bonnefield 70 Boswill and Coats 33 Bradcatt and Tower 89 Brooking and Jennings 174 Brown versus 118 Brown versus London 285 Buckly and Turner 43 Buckly and Howard 186 Bucknal and Swinnock 7 Butler and Play 27 Burgis and Burgis 114 Burnett and Holden 6 Burrow and Haggett 219 C. CAlthrop and Philippo 222 Caterall and Marshall 70 Clerk versus Rowel and Phillips 10 Clerk and Heath 11 Cockram and Welby 245 Cole and Forth 94 Compton and uxor versus Ireland 194 Coppin and Hernall 15 Cox and St. Albanes 81 and Crisp versus the Mayor of Berwick 36 Crofton 34 D. COrporation of Darby 6 Darbyshire and Cannon 21 Davies and Cutt. 231 Daw and Swaine 4 Deering and Farrington 113 Delaval versus Maschall 274 Dodwell and uxor versus Burford 24 Draper and Bridewell 121 Sir Francis Duncomb's Case 285 Dyer and East 9 E. ELlis and Yarborough 227 Edwards and Weeks 262 F. FArrer and Brooks 188 Farrington and Lee. 268 Fettyplace versus 15 Fitsgerard and Maschal 90 Fits and al. versus Freestone 210 Fountain and Coke 107 Fowl and Doble 181 Fox and al. Executors of Pinsent versus Tremayn 47 72 296 Franklyn's Case 68 Furnis and Waterhouse 197 Fry and Porter in Chancery 300 G. GAvel and Perked 31 Gayle and Betts 227 Glever and Hynde 168 Goodwin and Harlow 2 Gostwick and Mason 3 Grafton 10 Green and Proude 117 H. HAll and Wombell 7 Hall and Sebright 14 Jacob Hall's Case 76 Hall and Booth 236 Haley's Case 195 Haman and Truant 72 Haman and Howell 184 against the Hambourough Company 212 Owen Hanning's Case 21 Harwood 77 79 Haspurt and Wills 47 Hastings 23 Healy and Warde 32 Heskett and Lee. 48 Higden versus Whitechurch 224 Holloway 15 Horn and Ivy. 18 Horn and Chandler 271 Horton and Wilson 167 Hoskins versus Robins 74 Howell and King 190 Hughes and Underwood 28 Humlock and Blacklow 64 I. JAmes and Johnson 231 Jefferson and Dawson 29 Jemy and Norrice 295 Ingram versus Tothill and Ren. 216 Jones and Tresilian 36 Jones and Wiat. 206 Jones and Powel 272 Jordan and Fawcett 50 Jordan and Martin 63 Justice and White 239 K. The King versus Baker 35 Morrice 68 Leginham 71 Holmes 73 Sir Francis Clark 195 Thornbor ' and Studly 253 The Bishop of Worc. Jervason and Hinkly 276 Leginham 288 Neville 295 King versus Standish 59 Sir John Kirle versus Osgood 22 Knowles versus Richardson 55 L. LAke versus King 58 Lampiere and Meriday 111 Lassells and Catterton 67 Lee and Edwards 14 Doctor Lee's Case 282 Legg and Richards 77 Leginham and Porphery 77 Lepping and Kedgewin 207 Liese and Satingstone 189 Love versus Wyndham and Wyndham 50 Lucy Lutterell versus George Reynell George Turbervile John Cory and Anne Cory 282 M. MAddox 22 Magdalen-Colledge Case 163 Major and Stubbing versus Bird and Harrison 214 Maleverer and Redshaw 35 Manby and Scot. 124 Martin and Delboe 70 Medlicot and Joyner 4 Gabriel Miles's Case 179
such power nay if he have Children they must be living at his death Further by these Provisoes if the Contingencies do happen he hath but a power to declare the Vses he hath no Interest in him at all Litt. Sect. 463. It is one thing to have a power or possibility of limiting an Interest another to have an Interest vested 7 Rep. 11. Moor's Reports 366. about the delivery of a Ring where they hold that if it had been to have been done with his own hand it had not been forfeited The case of Sir Edward Clere is different from ours for if a man make a feoffment to the use of his last Will or to the use of such persons as shall be appointed by his last Will in this case he remains a perfect owner of the Land But if a man makes a Conveyance with power to make Leases or to make an Estate to pay Debts he hath here no Interest but a naked power The Duke of Norfolk's case is full in the point A Conveyance to the use of himself for life the Remainder to his Son in Tail with power to revoke under Hand and Seal adjudged not forfeited and yet he had a power to declare his mind as in our case Pagett's case Moor 193 194. Keeling If this way be taken a man may commit Treason pretty cheaply Twisden Whoever hath a power of Revocation hath a power of Limitation The reason is because else the feoffées would be seized to their own Vse Sir William Shelly's case in Latch Twisden There is no difference betwixt the Duke of Norfolk's case and this only here it is under his hand writing and there under his proper hand writing Afterward Term. Pasch 23 Car. 2. 1671. the Court delivered their Opinions Hales being then Chief Iustice Morton I conceive the Iudgment in the common-Common-Pleas is well given As for the first point whether this Conveyance made by Sir Simon Mayn be fraudulent or not the Counsel themselves have declined it and therefore I shall say nothing to it For the second I conceive no larger Interest is forfeited then during the Life of the Father If it be objected that the Father had by this Proviso jus disponendi I answer it is true he had a power if he had been minded so to do but it was not his mind and Will Now animus hominis est ipse homo but he must not only be minded so to do but he must declare his pleasure Hobart saith if a man will create a power to himself and impose a Condition or Qualification for the Execution of it it must be observed Now here is a personal and individual power seated in the heart of a man And it seems to me a stronger case then that of the Duke of Norfolk put in Englefield's case where yet the Condition was not given to the King by the Statute of Hen. 8. There was a later case adjudged in Latch betwéen Warner and Hynde a case that walked through all the Courts in Westminster-hall there by reason of the ipso declarante it could not be forfeited Rainsford I hold it is not forfeited My reason is because the Proviso is at an end and determined for when he dyed and made no Will there 's an end of the Proviso The altering of the old Trust is to be done by Sir Simon Mayn and it is inseparable from his person nothing can be more inseparable then a mans Will Moor 193. Twisd I am of the same Opinion Hales was of the same Opinion that nothing was forfeited but during Sir Simon 's life The Proviso he said did not create a Trust but potestatem disponendi which is not a Trust He said he did not understand the difference betwéen the Duke of Norfolk's case and this Accordingly the Iudgment was affirm'd In a cause wherein one Aston was Attorney Keeling said That a man may discontinue his Action here before an Action brought in the Common-Pleas But if he do begin there and then they plead another Action depending here and then they discontinue I take it the Attorney ought to be committed for this practice Twisden When I was at the Bar Error was brought and Infancy assigned when the Man was thirty years old and the Attorney was threatned to be turned out of the Roll. Serjeant Newdigate moved for a Certiorari to remove an Indictment hither from Bedford against several Frenchmen for Robbery Keeling Will it remove the Recognisances there to appear Twisden I never knew such a motion made by any but the King's Attorney or Solicitor Rainsford There is no Indictment yet before a Iudge of Assise Keeling You may have a Certiorari but it must not be delivered till the Indictment be found and then the Iudge hath the Prosecutors there and may bind them over hither and so the Trial may be here Keel A Iury was never ordered to a view before their appearance unless in an Assise Twisd Neither shall you have it here but by consent Nosworthy versus Wyldeman THe Plaintiff declares in an Indeb Assumpsit that the Defendant was endebted to him in 50 l. for so much money received of the Plaintiff by one Thomas Buckner by the appointment and to the use of the Defendant After a Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Plaintiff could not have an Action for money received by the Defendant to the use of the Defendant But because it might be money lent which the Defendant received to his own use though he was to make good the value to the Plaintiff the Court will presume after a Verdict that it appeared so to the Iury at the Trial. For where a Declaration will bear two constructions and one will make it good and the other bad the Court after a Verdict will take it in the better sense And accordingly the Plaintiff had Iudgment Willams versus Lee. AN Action of Account It was prayed that the Court would give further day for giving the Account the matter being referred to Auditors Twisden The Auditors themselves must give further day Keeling The Auditors are Iudges whether there be a voluntary delay or not If they find the parties remiss and negligent they must certifie to the Court that they will not account Roberts Mariott MOved to discontinue an Action of Debt upon a Bond. Keeling We will not favour Conditions Ruled that the other side should shew cause why they should not discontinue Buckly versus Turner ACtion upon the case upon a Promise The case was that Edward Turner Brother to the Defendant was endebted to the Plaintiff for a Quarters Rent and the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff mitteret prosequi praedictum Edwardum Turner so the words are in the Declaration promised to pay the money After a Verdict for the Plaintiff it was moved in Arrest of Iudgment that here is not any consideration for there is no loss to the Plaintiff in sending to prosecute c. nor any benefit but
pleasure of the Lords no doubt that would have been an illegal Commitment against Magna Charta and the Petition of Right There the Commitment had been expresly illegal and it may be this Commitment is no less For if it had been expresly shewn and he be remanded he is committed by this Court who are to answer for his Imprisonment But secondly The duration of the Imprisonment during the pleasure of the King and of the House is illegal and uncertain for since it ought to determine in two Courts it can have no certain period A Commitment until he shall be discharged by the Courts of Kings-Bench and Common-Pleas is illegal for the Prisoner cannot apply himself in such manner as to obtain a discharge If a man be committed till further Order he is bailable presently for that imports till he shall be delivered by due course of Law and if this Commitment have not that sense it is illegal for the pleasure of the King is that which shall be determined according to Law in his Courts as where the Statute of Westm ' 1. cap. 15. declares that he is not replevisable who is taken by command of the King it ought to extend to an extrajudicial command not in his Courts of Iustice to which all matters of Iudicature are delegated and distributed 2 Inst 186 187. Wallop to the same purpose he cited Bushells case Vaughan's Rep. 137. that the general Retorn for high Contempts was not sufficient and the Court that made the Commitment in this case makes no difference for otherwise one may be imprisoned by the House of Peers unjustly for a matter relievable here and yet shall be out of all relief by such a Retorn for upon a supposition that this Court ought not to meddle where the person is committed by the Peers then any person at any time and for any cause is to be subject to perpetual Imprisonment at the pleasure of the Lords But the Law is otherwise for the House of Lords is the supream Court yet their Iurisdiction is limited by the Common and Statute Law and their excesses are examinable in this Court for there is great difference betwéen the errors and excesses of a Court betwéen an erroneous proceéding and a proceeding without Iurisdiction which is void and a meer nullity 4 H. 7. 18. In the Parliament the King would have one Attaint of Treason and lose his Lands and the Lords assented but nothing was said of the Commons wherefore all the Iustices held that it was no Act and he was restored to his Land and without doubt in the same case if the party had been imprisoned the Iustices must have made the like resolution that he ought to have been discharged It is a Sollecism that a man shall be imprisoned by a limited Iurisdiction and it shall not be examinable whether the cause were within their Iurisdiction or no. If the Lords without the Commons should grant a Tax and one that refused to pay it should be imprisoned the Tax is void but by a general Commitment the party shall be remediless So if the Lords shall award a Capias for Treason or Felony By these instances it appears that their Iurisdiction was restrained by the Common Law and it is likewise restrained by divers Acts of Parliament 1 H. 4. cap. 14. No Appeals shall be made or any way pursued in Parliament And when a Statute is made a power is implicitely given to this Court by the fundamental constitution which makes the Iudges Expositors of Acts of Parliament And peradventure if all this case appeared upon the Retorn this might be a case in which they were restrained by the Statute 4 H. 8. cap. 8. That all Suits Accusements Condemnations Punishments Corrections c. at any time from henceforth to be put or had upon any Member for any Bill speaking or reasoning of any matters concerning the Parliament to be communed or treated of shall be utterly void and of none effect Now it doth not appear but this is a correction or punishment imposed upon the Earl contrary to the Statute There is no question made now of the power of the Lords but it is only urged that it is necessary for them to declare by virtue of what power they proceed otherwise the Liberty of every Englishman shall be subject to the Lords whereof they may deprive any of them against an Act of Parliament but no usage can justifie such a proceeding Ellismeres case of the Post-nati 19. The Duke of Suffolk was impeached by the Commons of High Treason and Misdemeanors the Lords were in doubt whether they would proceed on such general Impeachment to imprison the Duke And the advice of the Iudges being demanded and their resolutions given in the negative the Lords were satisfied This case is mentioned with design to shew the respect given to the Iudges and that the Iudges have determined the highest matters in Parliament At a conference between the Lords and Commons 3 Aprilis Car. 1. concerning the Rights and Priviledges of the Subject It was declared and agreed that no Freeman ought to be restrained or committed by command of the King or Privy-Council or any other in which the House of Lords are included unless some cause of the Commitment Restraint or Deteynor be set forth for which by Law he ought to be committed c. Now if the King who is the Head of the Parliament or his Privy Council which is the Court of State ought therefore to proceed in a legal manner this solemn resolution ought to end all Debates of this matter It is true 1 Roll 129. in Russells case Coke is of Opinion that the Privy-Council may commit without shewing cause but in his more mature age he was of another Opinion And accordingly the Law is declared in the Petition of Right and no inconvenience will ensue to the Lords by making their Warrants more certain Smith argued to the same purpose and said That a Iudge cannot make a Iudgment unless the Fact appears to him on a Habeas Corpus the Iudge can only take notice of the Fact retorned It is lawful for any Subject that finds himself agrieved by any Sentence or Iudgment to Petition the King in an humble manner for Redress And where the Subject is restrained of his liberty the proper place for him to apply himself to is this Court which hath the supreme power as to this purpose over all other Courts and an Habeas Corpus issuing here the King ought to have an accompt of his Subjects Roll tit Habeas Corp. 69. Wetherlies case And also the Commitment was by the Lords yet if it be illegal this Court is obliged to discharge the Prisoner as well as if he had been illegally imprisoned by any other Court The House of Peers is an high Court but the Kings-Bench hath ever been entrusted with the Liberty of the Subject and if it were otherwise in case of Imprisonment by the Peers the power of the King were
this whole Court in the case of Barnadiston and Soames that the Action for the double Retorn could not be brought in this Court before the Parliament had determined the right of the Election lest there should be a difference between the Iudgments of the two Courts When a Iudgment of the Lords comes into this Court though it be of the reversal of a Iudgment of this Court this Court is obliged to execute it but the Iudgment was never examined or corrected here In the case of my Lord Hollis it was resolved that this Court hath no Iurisdiction of a misdemeanour commited in the Parliament when the Parliament is determined the Iudges are Expositors of the Acts and are intrusted with the lives liberties and fortunes of the Subjects And if the Sessions were determined the Earl might apply himself to this Court for the Subject shall not be without place where he may resort for the recovery of his liberty but this Session is not determined For the most part the Royal Assent is given the last day of Parliament as saith Plow Partridges case Yet the giving of the Royal Assent doth not make it the last day of the Parliament without a subsequent Dissolution or Prorogation And the Court Iudicially takes notice of Prorogations or Adjournments of Parliament Cro. Jac. 111. Ford versus Hunter And by consequence by the last Adjournment no Order is discontinued but remains as if the Parliament were actually assembled Cro. Jac. 342. Sir Charles Heydon's case so that the Earl ought to apply himself to the Lords who are his proper Iudges It ought to be observed that these Attempts are primae Impressionis and though Imprisonments for Contempts have been frequent by the one and the other House till now no person ever sought enlargement here The Court was obliged in Iustice to grant the Habeas Corpus but when the whole matter being disclosed it appears upon the Return that the case belongs ad aliud examen they ought to remand the party As to the limitation of the Imprisonment the King may determine his pleasure by Pardon under the Great Seal or Warrant for his discharge under the Privy Seal as in the case of Reniger Fogassa Plow 20. As to the Exception that no Commitment is returned the Constable can only shew what concerns himself which is the Warrant to him directed and the Writ doth not require him to return any thing else As to the Exception that he is otherwise named in the Commitment then in the Writ the Writ requires the body of Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury quocunque nomine Censeatur in the Commitment The Court delivered their Opinion and first Sir Thomas Jones Justice said such a Retorn made by an ordinary Court of Iustice would have been ill and uncertain but the case is different when it comes from this high Court to which so great respect hath been paid by our Predecessors that they deferred the determination of doubts conceived in an Act of Parliament until they had received the advice of the Lords in Parliament But now instead thereof it is demanded of us to comptroll the Iudgment of all the Peers given on a Member of their own House and during the continuance of the Session The cases where the Courts of Westminster have taken cognizance of Priviledge differ from this case for in those it was only an incident to a case before them which was of their cognizance but the direct point of the matter now is the Iudgment of the Lords The course of all Courts ought to be considered for that is the Law of the Court Lane's case 2 Rep. And it hath not been affirmed that the usage of the House of Lords hath been to express the matter more punctually on Commitments for Contempts And therefore I shall take it to be according to the course of Parliament 4 Inst 50. it is said that the Iudges are Assistants to the Lords to inform them of the Common Law but they ought not to judge of any Law Custom or usage of Parliament The objection as to the continuance of the Imprisonment hath received a plain answer for it shall be determined by the pleasure of the King or of the Lords and if it were otherwise yet the King could pardon the Contempt under the Great Seal or discharge the Imprisonment under the Privy Seal I shall not say what would be the consequence as to this Imprisonment if the Session were determined for that is not the present case but as the case is this Court can neither Bail nor discharge the Earl Wyld Justice The Retorn no doubt is illegal but the question is on a point of Iurisdiction whether it may be examined here this Court cannot intermeddle with the transactions of the high Court of Peers in Parliament during the Session which is not determined and therefore the certainty or uncertainty of the Retorn is not material for it is not examinable here but if the Session had béen determined I should be of Opinion that he ought to be discharged Rainsford Chief Justice This Court hath no Iurisdiction of the cause and therefore the form of the Retorn is not considerable we ought not to extend our Iurisdiction beyond its due limits and the Actions of our Predecessors will not warrant us in such Attempts The consequence would be very mischievous if this Court should deliver the Members of the Houses of Peers and Commons who are committed for thereby the business of the Parliament may be retarded for perhaps the Commitment was for evil behaviour or undecent Reflections on the Members to the disturbance of the affairs of Parliament The Commitment in this case is not for safe custody but he is in Execution on the Iudgment given by the Lords for the Contempt and therefore if he be bailed he will be delivered out of Execution because for a Contempt in facie Curiae there is no other Iudgment or Execution This Court hath no Iurisdiction of the matter and therefore he ought to be remanded And I deliver no Opinion if it would be otherwise in case of Prorogation Twisden Justice was absent but he desired Justice Jones to declare that his Opinion was that the party ought to be remanded And so he was remanded by the Court. Term. Trin. 26 Car. II. 1674. in B. R. Pybus versus Mitford ante 121. THis case having been several times argued at the Bar received Iudgment this Term. The case was Michael Mitford was seised of the Lands in question in Fee and had Issue by his second wife Ralph Mitford and 23. Jan ' 21 Jac. by Indenture made betwéen the said Michael of the one part and Sir Ralph Dalivell and others of the other part he covenanted to stand immediately seised after the date of the said Indenture amongst others of the Lands in question by these words viz. To the use of the Heirs Males of the said Michael Mitford begotten or to be begotten on the body of Jane his wife the
Defendants as Executors also they pleaded severally plene administravit Vpon one of the Issues a Special Verdict was found viz. that the said Defendant being Executor durante min ' aetate of an Infant had paid such and such Debts and Legacies and had delivered over totum residuum status personalis of the Testator to the Infant Executor when he came of Age. Iustice Atkyns This special Verdict does not maintain the Defendants plea of fully administred for that cannot be pleaded unless all Debts c. are discharged as far as the Assets will reach which is not done here for residuum status personalis is delivered over c. and that residuum is lyable to the payment of this Debt which is yet undischarged But Vaughan Wyndham and Ellis held that however an Executor dischargeth himself of the Estate that was the Testators he may plead fully administred and that it is his safest plea. It was found by the same Verdict that the Testator left a personal Estate to the value of 2000 l. that there were owing by him 500 l. in Debts upon specialties 500 l. more upon simple Contracts and that he had disposed of 400 l. in Legacies and that this Defendant was Executor durante minor ' of the Testators Son that he had paid 1400 l. in discharge of the Debts and Legacies aforesaid and had accounted with the Infant Executor when he came of age and that upon the payment of 91 l. to him the Infant Executor released to him all Actions c. and whether upon this whole matter this Defendant should be said to have administred was the question Vaughan When an Infant Executor comes of age the power of an Executor durante minore aetate ceaseth and the new Executor is then lyable to all Actions if the former Executor wasted the new one hath his remedy against him but he is not lyable to other mens Suits Nor is there any inconvenience in this for still here is a person lyable to all Actions It is objected that possibly the new Executor is not of ability to satisfie I answer if in some particular case it fall out to be so that is by accident and to argue from the possibility of such an accident is to suppose the Law fitted to answer all emergencies Atkyns accorded Vaughan It is said that here are 1500 l. lyable to pay this Debt for to pay debts upon simple Contracts or Legacies before it is a devastavit especially the Defendant having notice of this debt which was also found That is a mistake upon which some books run but it is certainly no Law Debts upon simple Contracts may be paid before Bonds unless the Executors have timely notice given them of those Bonds and that notice must be by Action Atkyns and Ellis agréed with Vaughan Wyndham dubitabat The case was put off to be argued next Trinity Term but in the mean time the Plaint discontinued Scudamore Crossing Exch. Chamber EJectione firmae A special Verdict it was found that a man by Deed did give and grant bargain and sell alien enfeoff and confirm to his daughter certain Lands but no consideration of money is mention'd nor is the Deed enroll'd there is likewise no consideration of natural Affection expressed other then what 's implyed in naming the Grantee his daughter there is no Livery endorsed nor any found to have been made nor was the daughter in possession at the time of the Deed made The question was whether this were a void Deed or had any operation at all in the Law and what was wrought by it In the Kings Bench it was adjudged by the whole Court to be a good Deed and that it carried the Estate to the daughter by way of covenant to stand seized Vpon a Writ of Error before the Iustices of the common-Common-Pleas and the Barons of the Exchequer the case was argued at Sergeants-Inn by Sir William Jones against the Deed aud by Sir Francis Winnington in maintenance of it Jones Before the Statute of Vses a man might either have retained the possession and have departed with the use or he might have departed with the possession and have retained the use or he might have departed with them both together The Statute unites the possession to the use but leaves men at liberty to convey their Estates by putting the possession out of themselves and limiting an use or by raising an use and let the possession follow that Now how shall it be known when an Estate must pass one of these ways and when the other That must appear by the intention of the party expressed in the Deed. Some Conveyances contain words that look both ways some one way and some another If the words look both ways then has he to whom the Estate is intended to be conveyed election to take it whether way he likes best Sir Rowland Heyward's case 2 Rep. Adams Steer 2 Cr. 210. so in Mich. 9 Jacob. a man in consideration of money did grant enfeoff bargain and sell and in the deed there was a Letter of Attorney to make Livery resolved to be a good Conveyance by way of bargain and sale if the deed were enrolled Rolls second part 787. Where the words are only proper to pass an Estate by way of use there you shall never take an Estate at Common Law Cr. Jac. 210. in Adams Steer's case Denton Fettyplace's case 30 Eliz. is there cited that by the words of bargain and sale without attornment a Reversion passeth not Vide ibid. 50. Dr. Atkyns case The King bargains and sells c. no use can rise because the King cannot stand seized to an use Moor 113. On the other side where the words are proper to pass the Estate at Common Law there nothing shall pass by way of use Dyer 302. b. a quaere is there made whether or no if a man in consideration of natural affection c. release to his brother who is not in possession whether an use hereby ariseth to the relessee but this Quaere is resolved in a manuscript Report that I have of that case viz. That no use does arise He cited Ward Lambert's case Cr. Eliz. 394. Osburn Churchman's case Cr. Jac. 127. which is the case in question In Rolls second part fol. a man in consideration of marriage did give and grant to his wife after his decease to her and the heirs of her body c. and it was resolved that nothing passed This case is much stronger then ours for there is but one way to make this good viz. by raising an use for as a Conveyance at Common Law it cannot be good because a Freé-hold cannot be granted to commence in futuro and yet rather then recede from the words of the party the deed was adjudged to be void He cited Foster Foster's case Trin. 1659. which himself had argued In the deed here in question there are words proper to pass an Estate in possession give and
grant There is likewise a clause of warranty of which the Grantee should lose the benefit in a great measure if he were in the Post for then he shall not vouch and there are Opinions that he cannot rebut as in Spirt Bence's case There is also a Covenant that after the sealing and delivery and due execution of c. the party shall quietly enjoy c. now what execution can be meant but by Livery of seisin Foxe's case 8 Rep. has been objected in which it is resolved that the Reversion in that case should pass by way of bargain and sale though the words of grant were demise grant set and to Farm let all words proper to a Common-Law-Conveyance I answer the consideration of money there expressed is so strong a consideration as to carry it that way but the consideration of natural Affection is not so strong and so the cases are not alike the consideration of money has been held so strong as to carry an Estate of Fee-simple in an use without words of Inheritance Winnington contra He insisted upon the intention of the party the consideration of blood and natural affection and the necessity of making this deed good by way of Covenant to stand seized because it could not take effect any other way The clause of warranty and covenant for quiet enjoyment he said were but forms of Conveyances and words of Clerks but the effectual words are those that contain the inducement of the party to make the Conveyance and the words that pass the Estate he cited Plowd queries placito 305. Rolls 2 part 787. placito 25. 1 Inst 49. Poph. 49. in Fosters case which had been cited against him he said the deed was as unformal to pass the Estate one way as another In Osburn Churchman's case he said this point was started but that the resolution was not upon this point it came in question neither upon a special Verdict nor a demurrer Tibs Purplewell's case 40 41 Eliz. Rolls 2 part 786 787. answers all Objections against our case and is in form and substance the same with it He cited one Saunders Savin's case adjudged in the late times in the Common-Pleas viz. That where a man seiz'd in Fee of a Rent-charge granted it to a Kinsman for life and the grantor dyed before attornment it was resolved that upon the sealing and delivery of the deed an use arose Wherefore he prayed that the Iudgment might be affirmed Turner Chief Baron of the Exchequer Turner and Littleton Barons and Atkyns Wyndham and Ellis Iustices of the Court of common-Common-Pleas were for affirming the Iudgment Vaughan Chief Iustice of the Common Pleas and Thurland puisne Baron contra The six Iudges argued 1. That in a Covenant to stand seized those words of covenanting to stand seized to the use of c. are not absolutely necessary and that it is sufficient if there are words that are tantamount 2. That no Conveyance admits of such variety of words as does this of a Covenant to stand seized 3. That Iudges have always endeavoured to support Deeds ut res magis valeat c. 4. That the grantor in this case by putting in plenty of words shews that he did not intend to tye himself up to any one sort of Conveyance 5. That if the words give and grant had been alone in the deed there would have been no question and that if so then utile per inutile non vitiatur 6. That every mans deed must be taken most strongly against himself 7. That the words give and grant enure sometimes as a grant sometimes as a Covenant sometimes as a Release and must be taken in that sense which will best support the intent of the party 8. That the very point of this case has received two full determinations upon debate and that it were a thing of ill consequence to admit of so great an uncertainty in the Law as now to alter it 9. That there is here a clear intent that the daughter should have this Estate a Deed a good consideration to raise an use and words that are tantamount to a Covenant to stand seized Wherefore the Iudgment was affirm'd Thurland said The intention of the party was not a sure rule to construe deeds by that if Lands were given in connubio soluto ab omni servitio the intent of the giver is to make a gift in Frank-marriage but the Common Law that delights in certainty will not understand his words so because he does not say in libero maritagio In our case the first intent of the Father was to settle the Land upon his Daughter his second intent was to do it by such or such a Conveyance what Conveyance he meant to do it by we must know by his words the words give and grant do generally and naturally work upon something in esse strained constructions are not favoured in the Law Nor ought Heirs to be disinherited by forced and strained constructions If this Deed shall work as a Covenant to stand seized it will be in vain to study forms of Conveyances it is but throwing in words enough and if the Lands pass not one way they will another He cited Crook 279. Blitheman Blitheman's case And 34 35 Dyer 55 he said Pitfield Pierce's case in March was later then that of Tibs Purplewell and of better Authority Vaughan accordant It is not clear that the words give and grant are sufficient to raise an use but supposing that they are by a forced Exposition when nothing appears to the contrary will it thence follow that they may be taken in a sense directly contrary to their proper and genuine sense in such a place as this where all the other parts of the deed are wholly inconsistent with and will not by any possibility admit of such a construction he mentioned several clauses in the deed which he said were proper only to a Conveyance at Common Law He appealed to the Law before the Statute of Vses and said that where an use would not rise by the Common Law there the Statute executes no possession and that by such a deed as this no use would have risen at the Common Law but the Iudgment was affirmed Gabriel Miles his Case HE and his Wife recovered in an Action of Debt against one Cogan 200 l. and 70 l. damages the Wife dies and the Husband prays to have Execution upon this Iudgment The Court upon the first motion enclin'd that it should not survive to the Husband but that Administration ought to be committed of it as a thing in Action but this Term they agreed that the Husband might take out Excution and that by the Iudgment it became his own debt due to him in his own right And accordingly he took out a Scire facias Beaumond Long 's case Cr. Car. 208. was cited Anonymus THe Plaintiff in an Ejectione firmae declared upon a Lease made the tenth day of October habend '
man that shall refuse to accept the Office of Alderman because they are a Court of Record and they may want Aldermen else So he was released It was moved for the Plaintiff that a person named in the simul cum being a material Witness might be struck out and it was granted Keel said That if nothing was proved against him he might be a Witness for the Defendant Clerke Heath EJectione firmae The Plaintiff claims by a Lease from Th. Prin Clerke Objected That Prin had not taken the Oath according to the Act for Vniformity whereupon he produced a Certificate of the Bishop that had only a small bit of Wax upon it Twisd If it were sealed though the Seal be broken off yet it may be read as we read Recoveries after the Seal broken off and I have seen Administration given in Evidence after the Seal broken off and so Wills and Déeds Accordingly it was read Obj. The Church is ipso facto void by the Act of Vniformity if the Incumbent had no Episcopal Ordination So they shewed that Prin was ordained by a Bishop It was likewise proved that he had declared his assent and consent to the Common Prayer in due time before St. Bartholomew's day Then it was urged that the Act does not confirm the Plaintiffs Lessor in this living for that it is not a living with Cure of Souls for it has a Vicarage endowed Twisd If it be a living without Cure the Act does not extend to it Mr. Solicitor The Presentation does not mention Cure of Souls So they read a Presentation of a Rector and another of a Vicar in neither of which any mention was made of Cure of Souls but the Vicars was residendo If both be presentative the Cure shall be intended to be in the Vicar Keeling Why may not both have the Cure Sol. If the Vicar be endow'd the Rector is discharged of Residence by Act of Parliament Twisd Synodals and Procurations are duties due to the Ordinary which Vicars when the Parsonages are impropriated always pay but I question whether they that come into a Church by Presentation to and Institution by the Bishop have not always the Cure of Souls It is true in Donatives where the Ministers do not come in by the Bishops Institution there is no Cure but they that come in by Institution of the Bishop have their power delegated to them from him and generally have Cure of Souls Solic There are several Rectories without Cure Twisd When came Rectories in Morton After the Counsel of Lateran and Vicars came in in the Seventeenth year of King John Moreton Before the Councel of Lateran the Bishop did provide Teachers and received the Tythes himself but since he hath appointed others to the charge and saith accipe curam tuam meam Keeling Twisden It is said so by my Lord Coke but not done Twisden Wherever there is a Cure of Souls the Church is visitable either by the Bishop if it belong to him if to a Lay-man he must make Delegates if to the King my Lord Kéeper does it And where a man comes in by Presentation he is prima facie visitable by the Bishop Keeling I take it that whoever comes in under the Bishops Institution hath the Cure Twisden Grendon's Case is expresly That the Bishop hath the Cure of Souls of all the Diocess and doth by Institution transfer it to the Parson so that prima facie he that is instituted hath the Cure The Vicarage is derived out of the Parsonage and if the Vicar come to poverty the Parson is bound to maintain him Twisd There is an Appropriation to a Corporation the Corporation cannot have Cure of Souls being a body Politick but when they appoint a Vicar he coming under the Bishop by Institution hath Cure of Souls and a Donative when it comes to be Presentative hath Cure of Souls Keeling agreed Twisd We hold that when the Rector comes in by Institution the Bishop hath power to visit him for his Doctrine and his life for he hath the particular Cure but the Bishop the general and that the Bishop hath power to deprive him Abbot Moore THe Plaintiff declares That whereas one William Moore was indebted to him 210 l. and whereas the said William Moore had an Annuity out of the Defendants Lands That the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff had agréed that the Defendant should pay so much money to the Plaintiff the Defendant did promise to pay it After a Verdict it was objected in arrest of Iudgment that here was not any consideration and the Court was of that opinion Then the Plaintiff would have discontinued but the Court would not suffer that after a Verdict Sir Edward Thurland moved to quash an Order made by the Iustices of the Peace for one to serve as Constable in Homeby Moreton If a Leet neglect to chuse a Constable upon complaint to the Iustices of Peace they shall by the Statute appoint a Constable Twisd In this case there are Affidavits that there never was any Constable there And I cannot tell whether or no the Iustices of Peace can erect a Constablewick where never any was before if he will not be sworn let them indict him for not executing the Office and let him traverse that there never was any such Office there Keeling Go and be sworn or if the Iustices of the Peace commit you bring your Action of False Imprisonment Twisd If there be a Court Leet that hath the choice of a petty Constable the Iustices of Peace cannot chuse there And if it be in the Hundred I doubt whether the Iustices of Peace can make more Constables then were before High-Constables were not ab origine but came in with Iustices of the Peace 10 H. 4. Keel Morton cont Moreton The book of Villarum in the Exchequer sets out all the Vills and there cannot be a Constablewick created at this day In this case the Court ordered him to be sworn Thurl If they chuse a Parliament-mans Servant Constable they cannot swear him Twisd I do not think the priviledge extends to the Tenant of a Parliament man but to his Servant Blissett Wincott TWo persons committed for being at a Conventicle were brought up by Habeas Corpus Twisd To meet in Conventicles in such numbers as may be affrighting to the people and in such numbers as the Constable cannot suppress is a breach of the Peace and of a persons Recognizance for the good behaviour Note this was after the late Act against Conventicles expired Lee Edwards AN Action upon the Case was brought upon two promises 1. In consideration the Plaintiff would bestow his labour and pains about the Defendants Daughter and would cure her he did promise to pay so much for his labour and pains and would also pay for the Medicaments 2. That in consideration he had cured her he did promise to pay c. Raymond moved in arrest of Iudgment that he did not aver
be Deputy to the party that would avoid the Patent Twisd If a man promise another that if he recover his Land the other shall have a Lease of it he is no good Witness so neither is this man But by the Opinions of the thrée other Iudges he was allowed because the Suit here is between the King and the Patentée Worthy Liddall SAunders moved for a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court in a Suit there for calling the Plaintiff Whore Twisd Opinions have been pro and con upon this point The Spiritual Court has a Iurisdiction in cases of Whoredom and Adultery but if Suits there were allowed for such railing words they would have work enough from Billingsgate Saunders relyed upon this that they were only words of heat Keel They are Iudges of that Saunders In Mich. 11 Jac. Rot. 664. Cryer versus Glover in Com. B. The suggestion was that she struck him and he said thou art a Whore and I was never struck by a Whores hand before there a Prohibition was granted and I conceive the reason was because there was a provocation so in our case it appears that they were Scolding According 15 Jac. Rot. 325. Short versus Cole 15 Car. 2. between Loveland Goose The Court refused to grant a Prohibition Maddox WAllop moved for a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court for one Maddox Incumbent of a Donative within the Diocess of Peterborough who was cited into the Spiritual Court for marrying there without a Licence and cited Fairechilds case Yel 60. But per Keeling Moreton Rainesford the Prohibition was denied Twisden doubted but said if they might punish him in the Ecclesiastical Court pro reformatione morum at least they could not deprive him Doctor Poordage BArtue moved for a Writ of Priviledge for him he being a practising Physitian in Town and chosen Constable in a Parish The Court said if the Office go by Houses he must make a Deputy But upon consideration the motion was refused and a difference made between an Attorney or Barrister at Law and a Physitian the former enjoy their Priviledge because of their attendance in publick Courts and not upon the account of any private business in their Chambers and a Physitians Calling is a private Calling Wherefore they would not introduce new Presidents Sir John Kirle versus Osgood AN Action for words viz. Sir John Kirle is a forsworn Justice and not fit to be a Justice of Peace to sit upon the Bench and so I will tell him to his face Moved in arrest of Iudgment because to say a man is forsworn is not Actionable for it may be understood of swearing in common discourse Jones They are Actionable because applied to his Suite Stukely's case 4 Rep. Fleetwood's case in Hob. Though a mans Office is not named yet if the words do refer in themselves or are applyed to it they are Actionable so in our case Winnington They are not Actionable for they admit of a construction in mitiori sensu in Stukely's case that has béen cited corruption in his Office is necessarily implyed but not in this case Rolls 56. Keeling He calls him in effect a corrupt Iustice and that supplies the communication concerning his Office words must be construed according to common acceptation Morton I sée little difference betwéen this and Sir John Isam's case 1 Cro. 14. Sir William Massam's case Rainsford accorded He cited 1 Rolls 53. 4 Rep. Stukelies case Twisden was of the same Opinion for the words read to disgrace him in his Office Iudgment for the Plaintiff Hastings Attorny of the K. B. WInnington complained to the Court an his behalf that he being an Attorney of this Court was not suffered to appear for his Clyent in the Court at Stepney That Court he said was erected by Letters Patents within these two years and the Attornies of this Court being an ancient Court ought not to be excluded On the other side it was urged that they had a certain number of Attornies appointed by their Charter as there is at the Marshals Court Keeling This is a new Court and for my part I think our Attornies cannot be excluded Hastings may bring his Action If a Patent erecting a new Court may limit a certain number of Attornies that shall practise there it may as well limit a certain number of Counsel Coleman They have so in the Marshalsey and in London Keeling Their Courts in London are ancient and their Customs confirmed by Acts of Parliament The now Court of the Marshalsey is indéed a new erected Court for the old Court of the Verge was another thing and as for their having a certain number of Counsel or Attornies the question is the same with this before us whether they can legally exclude others I do not see how the King by a new Patent can ouâ—â—e any man of his priviledge Twisden said it was a new point and that he had never heard it stir'd before Afterwards being moved again Keeling said they should have their Iudgments quickly if they stood upon it Twisd I have known this ruled if you say you will refer the cause to such a man that ex consequente the cause must stay because that man is made Iudge and that the staying of the cause is implyed in the reference Dominus Rex versus Vaws MOved to quash a Presentment for refusing to be sworn Constable of an Hundred because the Presentment does not mention before whom the Sessions were held which was quash'd accordingly and Twisden said the Clerk of the Peace ought to be fined for returning such a Presentment Birrell Shawe SCire facias against the Bail The Defendant pleads that before the return of the Writ of Scire facias there was a Capias ad satisfaciend against the principal by vertue whereof he was taken and paid the money but alledges no place where the payment was Twisd You cannot make good this fault Dodwell Ux. versus Burford THe Plaintiffs in an Action of Battery declared that the Defendant struck the Horse whereon the Wife rode so that the Horse ran away with her whereby she was thrown down and another Horse ran over her whereby she lost the use of two of her Fingers The Iury had given them 48 l. damages and they moved the Court upon view of the maihem to increase them whereupon the Declaration was read but the Court thought the damages given by the Iury sufficient Smith versus Bowin ACtion upon a promise The Plaintiff declares that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff would suffer him to take away so much of the Plaintiffs Grass which the Defendant had cut down promised to pay him so much for it and also to pay him six pounds which he owed him for a Debt After a Verdict for the Plaintiff Williams moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Plaintiff was an Infant and he not being bound by the agreement that the Defendant ought not to be bound by it
_____ shall bring in Alice and John Coats when they shall come to their Ages of Twenty one years to give such a Release to the Executors of Francis Gibbs as they shall require then c. one of the Legatees comes of age and during the minority of the other the Bond is put in Suit and this whole matter is disclosed in the Pleading And the question was whether the Defendant was obliged to bring him in to give a Release that was of Age before the Action brought or might stay till both were of Age before he procured a Release from either The Court was of Opinion that it must be taken respectively and because it appears that the Legacies were several that several Releases ought to be given upon the reason of Iustice Wyndham's case 5th Report And Twisden said if there were no more in it then this sc when they shall come to their Ages of c. it were enough to have the Condition understood respectively for they cannot come to their Ages at one and the same time And Iudgment was given accordingly Twisden If an Executor plead several Iudgments you may reply to every one of them obtent per fraudem or you may plead separalia Judicia c. obtent per fraudem but in pleading separalia Judicia obtent per fraudem if one be found to be a true debt you are gone Keeling Twisden Notwithstanding the Stat. of 23 H. 6. which obliges the Sheriff to take Bail yet he can make no other Return of a Capias then either cepi corpus or non est inventus for at the Common Law he could return nothing else and the Statute though it compels him to take Bail does not alter the Return and so in a case betwéen Franklin Andrews it has been adjudged here Crofton OFfley moved for a Certiorari to the Iustices of Peace for Middlesex to remove an Indictment against one Crofton upon the late Statute made against Non-conformist Ministers coming within five miles of a Corporation the Indictment was traversed He urged that by the Statute no Indictment will lie for such Offence For where an Act of Parliament enacts that the Penalty shall be recovered by Bill Plaint or Information as the Statute upon which this Indictment is grounded does there an Indictment will not lie 2 Cro. 643. Twisd If the Statute appoint that the penalty shall be recovered by Bill Plaint c. and not otherwise there I confess an Indictment will not lie but without negative words I conceive it will though the Statute be Introductive of a new Law and create an Offence which was none at the Common Law For whenever a thing is prohibited by a Statute if it be a publick concern an Indictment lies upon it and the giving other remedies as by Bill Plaint c. in affirmative words shall not take away the general way of proceeding which the Law appoints for all Offences Keeling differed in Opinion and thought that where a Statute created a new Offence and appointed other remedies there could be no proceeding by way of Indictment Afterward Offley moved it again and cited 2 Cro. 643. 3 Cro. 544. Mag. Chart. 201. 228. Vpon the second motion Keeling came over to Twisden's Opinion But it was objected That upon an Indictment the Poor of the Parish would lose their part of the penalty to which Twisden said that he knew it to have been adjudged otherwise at Serjeants-Inn and that where a Statute appoints the Penalty to be divided into thrée parts one to the Informer another to the King and the third to the Poor that in such case where there is no Informer as upon an Indictment there the King shall have two parts and the Poor a third The King versus Baker AN Indictment in Hull for saying these words viz. That whenever a Burgess of Hull comes to put on his Gown Sathan enters into him Levings moved that these words would not bear an Indictment Keeling The words are a Scandal to Government Levings The Indictment concludes in malum exemplum inhabitantium whereas it should be quamplurimorum subditorum Domini Regis in tali casu delinquentium And for this adjudged naught Twisden If the Defendant in an Action of Debt for Rent plead nil debet he may give in Evidence a suspension of the Rent A Parson Libels in the Spiritual Court against several of his Parishioners for Tythe-Turfe They pray a Prohibition Keeling Turfe Gravel and Chalke are part of the Fréehold and not Tythable They granted one Prohibition to all the Libels but ordered the Plaintiffs to declare severally Maleverer versus Redshaw DEbt upon a Bond of 40 l. the Condition was for appearing at a certain day and concluded if the party appeared then the Condition to be void The Defendant pleaded the Statute of 23 H. 6. Coleman The Bond is void by the express words of the Statute being taken in other form then the Statute prescribes Keeling If the Condition of a Bond be That if the Obligor pay so much money then the Condition to be void in that case the Bond is absolute Twisden I have heard my Lord Hobart say upon this occasion that because the Statute would make sure work and not leave it to Exposition what Bonds should be taken therefore it was added that Bonds taken in any other form should be void For said he the Statute is like a Tyrant where he comes he makes all void but the Common Law is like a Nursing Father makes void only that part where the fault is and preserves the rest Keeling If the Condition had béen that the party should appear and had gone no further it would then have been well enough Twisd Then why may not that which follows be rejected as idle and surplusage Cur. Advisare vult Jones versus Tresilian AN Action of Trespass of Assault and Battery Defendant pleads de son assault demesne The Plaintiff replies That the Defendant would have forced his Horse from him whereby he did molliter insultum facere upon the Defendant in defence of his possession To this the Defendant demurred Morton Molliter insultum facere is a contradiction Suppose you had said that molliter you struck him down Twisden You cannot justifie the beating of a man in defence of your possession but you may say that you did molliter manus imponere c. Keeling You ought to have replyed that you did molliter manus imponere quae est eadem transgressio Cur. Quer ' nil capiat per billam unless better cause be shown this Term. Rich Morris IN an Action of Debt for not performing an Award The Plaintiff declares that inter alia Arbitratum fuit c. Twisd That is naught Crisp versus the Mayor of Berwick AN Action of Covenant is brought against the Mayor Burgesses and Corporation of Berwick upon an Indenture of Demise wherein the Plaintiffs declare that the Defendants did demise to them a House in Berwick with a Covenant
Trespass was brought for taking away a Cup till he paid him 20 shillings The Defendant pleads that ad quandam curiam he was amerced and that for that the Cup was taken Hales We cannot tell what Court it is whether it be a Court-Baron by Grant or Prescription if it be by Grant then it must be coram Seneschallo if by Prescription it may be coram Seneschallo or coram Sectatoribus or coram both Then it does not appear that the House where the Trespass was laid was within the Manor Then he doth not say infra Jur. Cur ' It was put upon the other side to shew cause Jacob Hall's Case ONe Jacob Hall a Rope-dancer had erected a Stage in Lincolns-Inn-fields but upon a Petition of the Inhabitants there was an Inhibition from Whitehall now upon a complaint to the Iudges that he had erected one at Charing-cross he was sent for into Court and the Chief Iustice told him that he understood it was a Nusance to the Parish and some of the Inhabitants being in Court said that it did occasion Broyles and Fightings and drew so many Rogues to that place that they lost things out of their Shops every Afternoon And Hales said that in 8 Car. 1. Noy came into Court and prayed a Writ to prohibit a Bowling-Ally erected near St. Dunstans Church and had it Sir Anthony Bateman's Case IN the Trial at Bar the Son and Daughter of Sir Anthony Bateman were Defendants the Action was an Ejectione Firmae The Defendants admitted the point of Sir Anthony's Bankrupcy but set up a Conveyance made by Sir Anthony to them for the payment of 1500 l. apiece being money given to them by their Grandfather Mr. Russell to whom Sir Anthony took out Administration Hales It is a voluntary Conveyance unless you can prove that Sir Anthony had Goods in his hands of Mr. Russell at the time of the executing it So they proved that he had and there was a Verdict for the Defendants Legg Richards EJectment Iudgment against the Defendant who dies and his Executor brings a Writ of Error and is non-suited It was moved that he should pay Costs Twisden An Executor is not within the Statute for payment of Costs occasione dilationis Hales I am of the same Opinion Harwood's Case HE was brought to the Bar by Habeas Corpus being committed by the Court of Aldermen for marrying an Orphan without their consent Sol. North. We conceive the Return insufficient and that it is an unreasonable Custom to impose a Penalty on a man for marrying a City-Orphan in any place of England Now we marryed her far from London and knew not that she was an Orphan Then they have put a Fine of 40 l. upon him whereas there is no cause why he should be denied Marriage with her there being no disparagement Twisden Mr. Waller of Berkingsfield was imprison'd six months for such a thing So the money was ordered to be brought into Court Vide infra 79. Leginham Porphery REplevin and Avowry for not doing Suit The Plaintiff sets forth a Custom that if any Tenant live at a distance if he comes at Michaelmas and pay eight pence to the Lord and a penny to the Steward he shall be excused for not attending and then says that he tendred eight pence c. and the Lord refused it c. Polynxfen I know no case where payment will do and tender and refusal will not do Hales Have you averred that there are sufficient Copy-holders that live near the Mannor Polynxfen We have averred that there are at least 120. Hales Surely tender and refusal is all one with payment Twisden An Award is made that super receptionem c. a man should give a Release there tender and refusal is enough Iudgment for the Defendant Waldron versus c. HAles It is true one Parish may contain thrée Vills The Parish of A. may contain the Vills of A. B. and C. that is when there are distinct Constables in every one of them But if the Constable of A. doth run through the whole then is the whole but one Ville in Law Or where there is a Tything-man it may be a Ville but if the Constable run through the Tything then it is all one Ville I know where three or four Thousand l. per annum hath béen enjoyed by a Fine levied of Land in the Ville of A. in which are five several Hamlets in which are Tythings but the Constable of A. runs through them all and upon that it was held good for all Here was a case of the Constable of Blandford-Forum wherein it was held that if he had a concurrent Iurisdiction with all the rest of the Constables the Fine would have passed the Lands in all In some places they have Tythingmen and no Constables Polynxfen Lambard 14. is that the Constable and the Tything-man are all one Hales That is in some places Praepositus is a proper word for a Constable and Decemarius for a Tything-man An Indictment for retaining a Servant without a Testimonial from his last Master Moved to quash it because it wants the words contra pacem 2. Becausâ—â—â—ey do not shew in what Trade it was So quash'd Moved to quash another Indictment because the year of our Lord in the Caption was in Figures Hales The year of the King is enough Moved for a Prohibition to the Spiritual Court for that they Sue a Parish for not paying a Rate made by the Church-wardens only whereas by the Law the major part of the Parish must joyn Twisden Perhaps no more of the Parish will come together Counsel If that did appear it might be something Hales A Writ of Error will lie in the Exchequer-Chamber of a Iudgment in a Scire facias grounded upon a Iudgment in one of the Actions mentioned in the 27 of Eliz. cap. 8. because it is in effect a piece of one of the Actions therein mentioned Harwood's Case HE was removed out of London by Habeas Corpus the Return was That he was fined and committed there for marrying a City-Orphan without the consent of the Court of Aldermen Exception 1. They do not say that the party was a Citizen or that the Marriage was within the City and they are not bound to take notice of a City Orphan out of the City for their Customs extend only to Citizens in the City Exception 2. They have not shewed that we had reasonable time to shew cause why we should not be fined Twisden These Objections were over-ruled in one Waller's case Afterward in the same Term Weston spake to it There are two matters upon which the validity of this Return doth depend viz. The Custom and the Offence within the Custom The Custom is laid that time out of mind the Court of Aldermen have had power to set a reasonable Fine upon such as should marry an Orphan without their leave and upon refusal to pay it to imprison him I conceive this Custom as it is laid to
pleaded A special Verdict that the Lands are Copyhold Lands and surrendred to the use of one for eleven years the Remainder for five years to the Daughter the Remainder to the right heirs of the Tenant for eleven years The eleven years expire the Daughter is admitted the five years expire And there being a Son and Daughter by one Venter and a Son by another Venter the Son of the first Venter dies before admittance and the Daughter of the first Venter and her Husband bring Trover for cutting down of Trees And the question was if the admittance of Tenant for years was the admittance of the Son in Remainder Levings I conceive it is and then the Son is seized and the Daughter of the whole blood is his heir and he cited 4 Rep. 23. 3 Cro. 503. Bunny's case Wyld The Estate is bound by the Surrender Hales If a man doth surrender to the use of John Styles till admitted there is no Estate in him but remains in the Surrenderor but he hath a right to have an admittance If a surrender be to J. S. and his heirs his heir is in without admittance if J. S. dies About this hath indeed been diversity of Opinion but the better Opinion hath been according to the Lord Coke's Opinion I do not see any inconvenience why the admission of Tenant for life or years should not be the admittance of all in Remainder for Fines are to be paid notwithstanding by the particular Remainders and so the Books say it shall be no prejudice to the Lord. Twisd I think it is strong that the admission of Lessee for years is the admission of him in Remainder for as in a case of possessio fratris the Estate is bound so that the Sister shall be heir so here the Estate is bound and goes to him in Remainder Hales I shall not prejudice the Lord for if a Fine be assessed for the whole Estate there is an end of the business but if a Fine be assessed only for a particular Estate the Lord ought to have another If a surrender be to the use of A. for life the Remainder to his eldest Son c. or to the use of A. and his heirs and then A. dies the Estate is in the Son without admittance whether he takes by purchase or descent And Iudgment was given accordingly Draper versus Bridwell Rot. 320. ALL the Court held that an Action of Debt would lye upon a Iudgment after a Writ of Error brought Twisden They in the Spiritual Court will give Sentence for Tythes for rakings though they be never so unvoluntarily left which our Law will not allow of Wyld said that Actions personal transitory though the party doth live in Chester yet they may be brought in the Kings Courts Hales Shew a President where a man can wage his Law in an Action brought upon a Prescription for a duty as in an Action of Debt for Toll by Prescription you cannot wage your Law Pybus versus Mitford Postea THe Chief Iustice delivered his Opinion Wyld Rainsford and Twisden having first delivered theirs Hales I think Iudgment ought to be given for the Defendant whether the Son take by descent or purchase I shall divide the case 1 Whether the Son doth take by descent 2 Admitting he doth not whether he can take by purchase We must make a great difference betweén Conveyances of Estates by way of use and at Common Law A man cannot convey to himself an Estate by a Conveyance at Common Law but by way of Vse he may But now in our case here doth doth retorn by operation of Law an Estate to Michael for his life which is conjoyned with the Limitation to his heirs The reason is because a Limitation to the heirs of his body is in effect to himself this is perfectly according to the intention of the parties Objection The use being never out of Michael he hath the old use and so it must be a Contingent use to the heirs of his body But I say we are not here to raise a new Estate in the Covenantor but to qualifie the Estate in Fee in himself for the old Estate is to be made an Estate for life to serve the Limitation Further Objection It shall be the old Estate in Fee as if a man deviseth his Lands to his heirs the heir is in of the old Estate But I answer if he qualifie the Estate the Son must take it so as in Hutton fo So in this case is a new qualification Roll 789. 15 Jac. If a man makes a Feoffment to the use of the heirs of the body of the Feoffor the Feoffor hath an Estate Tail in him Pannel versus Fenne Moor 349. Englefield and Englefield 2 I conceive if it were not possible to take by descent this would be a Contingent use to the heirs of the body Objection It is limited to the heir when no heir in being Why I say it would have come to the heir at Common Law if no express Limitation had been and it cannot be intended that he did mean an heir at Common Law because he did specially limit it Fitz. tit Entayle 23. An Assise for the Serjeant at Mace's place in the House of Commons The Plaintiff had his Patent read The Court asked if they could prove Seisin They answered that they had recovered in an Action upon the case for the mean profits and had Execution Court For ought we know that will amount to a seisin Twisden Vpon your grant since you could not get seisin you should have gone into Chancery and they would have compelled him to give you seisin Hales A man may bring an Action upon the case for the profits of an Office though he never had seisin So the Record was read of his Recovery in an Action upon the case for the profits Hales This is but a seisin in Law not a seisin in Fact The Counsel for the Plaintiff much urged that the Recovery and Execution had of the profits was a sufficient seisin to entitle them to an Assise It was objected that the Plaintiff was never invested into the Office Hales said That an investiture did not make an Officer when he is created by Patent as this is but he is an Officer presently But if he were created an Herald at Arms as in Segars case he must be invested before he can be an Officer a person is an Officer before he is sworn Hales You are the Pernor of the profits and they have recovered them is not this a Seisin against you They shall find it specially but they chose rather to be Non-suit because of the delay by a special Verdict And the Court told them they could not withdraw a Iuror in an Assise for then the Assise would be depending The Roll of the Action sur le case fuit 19 Car. 2. Mich. Rot. 557. Term. Trin. 15 Car. II. 1663. Judge Hide 's Argument in the Exchequer-Chamber Manby versus Scott A Feme Covert departs
she ought not to starve If a woman be of so haughty a stomack that she will chuse to starve rather then submit and be reconciled to her husband let her take her own choise The Law is in no default which doth not provide for such a wife If a man be taken in execution and lye in Prison for Debt neither the Plaintiff at whose suit he is arrested nor the Sheriff who took him is bound to find him Meat Drink or Cloathes but he must live on his own or on the Charity of others and if no man will relieve him let him dye in the name of God says the Law Plow 68. Dive Manningham so say I if a woman who can have no Goods of her own to live on will depart from her husband against his will and will not submit her self unto him let her live on Charity or starve in the name of God for in such case the Law says her evil demeanour brought it upon her and her death ought to be imputed to her own wilfulness As to my Brother Tyrrells Objection it were strange if our Law which gives relief in all cases should send a woman unto another Law or Court to seek remedy to have maintenance I answer It s not sending the wife to another Law but leaving the case to its proper Iurisdiction the case being of Ecclesiastical Conusance Is it any strangeness or disparagement to the Common-Pleas to send a Cut-purse or other Felon taken in the Court to the Kings-Bench to be Indicted or to the Kings-Bench to send a woman to the Common-Pleas to recover her Dower Why is it more strange for the Common Law to send a Woman to the Ordinary to determine differences betwixt her and her husband touching matters of Matrimony then for our Courts at Common Law to write unto the Ordinary to certifie Loyalty of Marriage Bastardy or the like where Issue is joined on these points in the Kings Courts for although the proceeding and process in the Ecclesiastical Courts be in the names of the Bishops yet these Courts are the Kings Courts and the Law by which they proceed is the Kings Law 5 Rep. 39. Caudries case but the reason in both cases is quia hujusmodi causae cognitio ad forum spectat Ecclesiasticum 30 H. 6. b. Old book of Entries 288. according to that of Bracton lib. 3. fo 107. Stamf. 57. Sunt casus spirituales in quibus Judex secularis non habet cognitionem neque Executionem quia non habet coercionem In his enim casibus spectat cognitio ad Judices Ecclesiasticos qui regunt defendunt sacerdotium Hereunto agrees Cawdries case 5 Rep. 9. As in temporal causes the King by the mouth of his Iudges in his Courts of Iustice determines them by the temporal Law so in causes Ecclesiastical and Spiritual the Conusance whereof belongs not to the Common Law they are decided and determined by the Ecclesiastical Iudges according to the Kings Ecclesiastical Laws And that causes of Matrimony and the differences between husband and wife touching Alimony or maintenance for the wife which are dependant upon or incident unto Matrimony are all of Ecclesiastical and not of secular Conuzance is evident by the Books and Authorities of our Laws de causa Testamentari sicut nec de causa Matrimoniali Curia Regia se non intromittat sed in foro Ecclesiastico debet placitum terminari Bracton lib. 2. cap. 20. fo 7. All causes Testamentary and causes of Matrimony by the Laws and Customs of the Realm do belong to the spiritual Iurisdiction 24 H. 8. cap. 2. The words of the Writ of Prohibition granted in such cases are placita de Catallis debitis quae sunt de Testamento vel Matrimonio spectant ad forum Ecclesiasticum In a suit commenced by a woman against he husband before the Commissioners for Ecclesiastical causes for Alimony a Prohibition was prayed and granted because it is a suit properly to be brought and prosecuted before the Ordinary In which if the party find himself grieved he may have relief by Appeal unto the superiour Court and that he cannot have upon a sentence given in the high Commission Court 1 Cro. 220. Drakes case But 't is objected by my Brother Tyrrell and Twisden that the remedy in the Ecclesiastical Court is not sufficient for if the husband will not obey the Sentence of the Ordinary it is but Excommunication for his Contumacy and will neither feed nor cloath the wife Are the Censures of the holy Mother the Church grown of so little Accompt with us or the separation a communione fidelium become so contemptible as to be slighted with but Excommunication hath our Law provided any remedy so penal or can it give any Iudgment so fearful as this With us the rule is committitur Marescal ' or Prison ' de Fleet. There the Sentence is traditur Satanae which Iudgment is more penal Take him Gaoler till he pay the Debt or take him Devil till he obey the Church And yet their Iudgment is warranted by the rule of St. Paul whom I have delivered unto Satan 1 Cor. 5. 5. whereupon the Coment says Anathema ab ipso Christi corpore quod est Ecclesia recidit Causa 3 quest 4 Cam ' Egell trudam and also Nullus cum Excommunicatis in oratione aut cibo aut potis autesculo communicet nec ave eis dicat Causa 2 quest 3 Can. Excommunicat ' Bracton lib. 5. cap. 23. fo 42. As much is said by our Law and it is to the same effect Excommunicat ' interdicitur omnis actus legitimus Ita quod agere non potest nec aliquem convenire cum ipso nec orare nec loqui nec palam nec abscondite vesci licet The second ground of the Law of Excommunication is the Law of England and it is a ground in the Law of England That he which is accursed shall not maintain any Action Doctor Stu. 11. Where a man is excommunicated by the Law of the Church if he sue any Action real or personal the Tenant or Defendant may plead that he is Excommunicated and demand Iudgment if he shall be answered Lit. 201. the Sentence is set forth at large in the old Statute Book of Magna Charta and is intituled Sententia lata super chartas namely Authoritate Dei patris omnipotentis filii spiritus Sancti Excom̄unicamus Anathematizam a liminibus Sanctae matris Ecclesiae sequestram ' omnes illos c. 12 H. 3. fo 146. He which by the Renunciation is rightfully cut off from the Vnity of the Church and Excommunicate ought to be taken by the whole multitude as a Heathen and a Publican until he be openly reconciled by Penance Act 33. confirm ' per 13 Eliz. cap. and this is grounded on the rule of our blessed Saviour dic ' Ecclesiae And if he neglect to hear the Church let him be as an Heathen and Publican Matt. 18. 17. Shall a
receive the bodies of James Earl of Salisbury Anthony Earl of Shaftsbury and Philip Lord Wharton Members of this House and keep them in safe custody within the said Tower during his Majesties pleasure and the pleasure of this House for their high Contempt committed against this House And this shall be a sufficient Warrant on that behalf To the Constable c. John Browne Cler ' Parl ' The Earl of Shaftsbury's Counsel prayed that the Retorn might be Filed and it was so And Friday following appointed for the debating of the sufficiency of the Retorn and in the mean time directions were given to his Counsel to attend the Iudges and the Attorny-General with their Exceptions to the Retorn and my Lord was remanded till that day And it was said that though the Retorn was Field the Court could remand or commit him to the Marshal at their Election And on Friday the Earl was brought into Court again and his Counsel argued the insufficiency of the Retorn Williams said That this cause was of great consequence in regard the King was touched in his Prerogative The Subject in his Liberty and this Court in its Iurisdiction The cause of his Commitment which is retorned is not sufficient for the general allegation of high Contempts is too uncertain for the Court cannot judge of the Contempt if it doth not appear in what act it is Secondly It is not shewed where the Contempt was committed and in favour of Liverty it shall be intended they were committed out of the House of Peers Thirdly The time is uncertain so that peradventure it was before the last Act of general Pardon 1 Roll 192 193. and 219. Russells case Fourthly It doth not appear whether this Commitment were on a Conviction or an Accusation only It cannot be denied but that the Retorn of such Commitment by any other Court would be too general and uncertain Moore 839. Astwick was bailed on a Retorn Quod commissus fuit per mandatum Ni. Bacon Mil. Domini Custodis magni Sigilli Angliae virtute cujusdam Contempt ' in Curia Cancellariae fact ' and in that book it appears that divers other persons were bailed on such general Retorns and the cases have been lately affirmed in Bushells case repeated by the Lord Chief Iustice Vaughan where it is expresly said that on such Commitment and Retorns being too general and uncertain the Court cannot believe in an implicite manner that in truth the Commitment was for causes particular and sufficient Vaughans Rep. 14. accord 2 Inst 52 53 55. and 1 Roll 218. And the Commitment of the Iurors was for acquitting Pen and Mead contra plenam manifestam Evidentiam and it was resolved to be too general for the Evidence ought to appear as certain to the Iudge of the Retorn as it appeared before the Iudge authorized to Commit Russells case 137. Now this Commitment being by the House of Peers will make no difference for in all cases where a matter comes in Iudgment before this Court let the question be of what nature it will the Court is obliged to declare the Law and that without distinction whether the question began in Parliament or no. In the case of Sir George Binion in C. B. there was a long debate whether an Original might be Filed against a Member of Parliament during the time of priviledge and it was urged that it being during the Sessions of Parliament the determination of the question did belong to the Parliament But it was resolved an Original might be Filed and Bridgman then being Chief Iustice said That the Court was obliged to declare the Law in all cases that come in Iudgment before them Hill 24 E. 4. Rot. 4. 7. 10. in Scacc ' in Debt by Rivers versus Cousin The Defendant pleads he was a Servant to a Member of Parliament and ideo capi seu arrest ' non debet and the Plaintiff prays Iudgment and quia videtur Baronibus quod tale habetur privilegium quod magnates c. et eorum familiares capi seu arrestari non debent Sed nullum habetur privilegium quod non debent implacitari Ideo respondeat oustr ' So in Treymiards case a question of priviledge was determined in this Court Dyer 60. In the 14 E. 3. in the case of Sir John and Sir Geoffrey Staunton which was cited in the case of the Earl of Clarendon and is entred in the Lords Iournal an Action of Waste depended between them in the Common-Pleas and the Court was divided and the Record was certified into the House of Parliament and they gave direction that the Iudgment should be entred for the Plaintiff Afterwards in a Writ of Error brought in this Court that Iudgment was reversed notwithstanding the Objection That it was given by Order of the House of Lords for the Court was obliged to proceed according to the Law in a matter which was before them in point of Iudgment The construction of all Acts of Parliament is given to the Courts at Westminster And accordingly they have adjudged of the Validity of Acts of Parliament They have searched the Rolls of Parliament Hob. 109. Lord Hudsons case They have determined whether the Iournals be a Record Hob. 110. When a point comes before them in Iudgment they are not foreclosed by any Act of the Lords If it appears that an Act of Parliament was made by the King and Lords without the Commons that is Felo de se and the Courts of Westminster do adjudge it void 4 H. 7. 18. Hob. 111. and accordingly they ought to do If this Retorn contains in it that which is fatal to it self it must stand or fall thereby It hath been a question often resolved in this Court when a Writ of Error in Parliament shall be a Supersedeas And this Court hath determined what shall be said to be a Session of Parliament 1 Roll 29. and if the Law were otherwise there would be a failour of Iustice If the Parliament were Dissolved there can be no question but the Prisoner should be discharged on a Habeas Corpas and yet then the Court must examine the cause of his Commitment and by consequence a matter Parliamentary And the Court may now have cognisance of the matter as clearly as when the Parliament is Dissolved The party would be without remedy for his Liberty if he could not find it here for it is not sufficient for him to procure the Lords to determine their pleasure for his Imprisonment for before his enlargement he must obtain the pleasure of the King to be determined and that ought to be in this Court and therefore the Prisoner ought first to resort hither Let us suppose for it doth not appear on the Retorn and the Court ought not to enquire of any matter out of it that a supposed contempt was a thing done out of the House it would be hard for this Court to remand him Suppose he were committed to a Forreign prison during the
of ordinary Iurisdiction If this Commitment had been by any inferiour Court it could not have been maintained But the Commitment is by a Court tht is not under the comptroll of this Court and that Court is in Law sitting at this time and so the expressing of the Contempt particularly is matter which continues in the deliberation of the Court 'T is true this Court ought to determine what the Law is in every case that comes before them and in this case the question is only whether this Court can judge of a Contempt committed in Parliament during the same Session of Parliament and discharge one committed for such Contempt When a question arises in an Action depending in this Court the Court may determine it but now the question is whether the Lords have capacity to determine their own priviledges and whether this Court can comptroll their determination and discharge during the Session a Peer committed for Contempt The Iudges have often demanded what the Law is and how a Statute should be expounded of the Lords in Parliament as in the Statute of Amendments 40 E. 3. 84. 6. 8. Co. 157 158. a fortiori the Court ought to demand their Opinion when a doubt arises on an Order made by the House of Lords now sitting As to the duration of the Imprisonment doubtless the pleasure of the King is to be determined in the same Court where Iudgment was given As also to the determination of the Session the Opinion of Coke is good Law and the addition of Proviso's in many Acts of Parliament is only in majorem cautelam Jones Attorney General to the same effect As to the uncertainty of the Commitment it is to be considered that this case differs from all other cases in two circumstances First the person that is a Member of the House by which he is committed I take it upon me to say that the case would be different if the person committed were not a Peer Secondly The Court that doth commit which is a superiour Court to this Court and therefore if the Contempt had been particularly shewn of what Iudgment soever this Court should have been as to that Contempt yet they could not have discharged the Earl and thereby take upon them a Iurisdiction over the House of Peers The Iudges in no age have taken upon them the Iudgment of what is Lex consuetudo Parliamenti but here the attempt is to engage the Iudges to give their Opinion in a matter whereof they might have refused to have given it if it had been demanded in Parliament This is true if an Action be brought where priviledge is pleaded the Court ought to judge of it as an incident to the Suit whereof the Court was possessed but that will be no warrant for this Court to assume a Iudgment of an original matter arising in Parliament And that which is said of the Iudges power to expound Statutes cannot be denied but it is not applicable in this case By the same reason that this Commitment is questioned every Commitment of the House of Commons may be likewise questioned in this Court It is objected That there will be a failer of Iustice if the Court should not discharge the Earl but the contrary is true for if he be discharged there would be a manifest failer of Iustice for Offences of Parliament cannot be punished any where but in Parliament and therefore the Earl would be delivered from all manner of punishment for his Offence if he be discharged For the Court cannot take Bail but where they have a Iurisdiction of the matter and so delivered out of the hands of the Lords who only have power to punish him It is objected That the Contempt is not said to be committed in the House of Peers but it may well be intended to be committed there for it appears he is a Member of that House and that the Contempt was against the House And besides there are Contempts whereof they have cognizance though they are committed out of the House It is objected That it is possible this Contempt was committed before the general pardon but surely such Injustice should not be supposed in the supream Court and it may well be supposed to be committed during the Session in which the Commitment to Prison was It would be great difficulty for the Lords to make their Commitments so exact and particular when they are imployed in the various affairs of the Realm and it hath been adjudged on a Retorn out of the Chancery of a Commitment for a Contempt against a Decreé that it was good and the Decrée was not shewn The limitation of the Imprisonment is well for if the King or the House determine their pleasure he shall be discharged for then it is not the pleasure of both that he should be detained and the addition of these words during the pleasure is no more than was before imply'd by the Law for if these words had been omitted yet the King might have pardoned the Contempt if he would have expressed his pleasure under the Broad Seal If Iudgment be given in this Court that one should be imprisoned during the Kings pleasure his pleasure ought to be determined by Pardon and not by any act of this Court. So that the King would have no prejudice by the Imprisonment of a great Minister because he could discharge him by a Pardon the double limitation is for the benefit of the Prisoner who ought not to complain of the duration of the Imprisonment since he hath neglected to make application for his discharge in the ordinary way I confess by the determination of the Session the Orders made the same Session are discharged but I shall not affirm whether this present Order be discharged or no because it is a Iudgment but this is not the present case for the Session continues notwithstanding the Royal Assent given to several Bills according to the Opinion of Cooke and of all the Iudges Hutton 61 62. Every Proviso in an Act of Parliament is not a determination what the Law was before for they are often added for the satisfaction of those that are ignorant of the Law Winington Solicitor General to the same purpose In the great case of Mr. Selden 5 Car. 1. the Warrant was for notable Contempts committed against us and our Government and stirring up Sedition and though that be almost as general as in our case yet no objection was made in that cause in any of the arguments Rushworths Collections 18 19. in the Appendix But I agree that this Retorn could not have béen maintained if it were of an inferiour Court but during the Session this Court can take no cognizance of the matter And the inconveniency would be great if the Law were otherwise taken for this Court might adjudge one way and the House of Peers another way which doubtless would not be for the advantage or liberty of the Subject for the avoiding of this mischief it was agreed by
cannot deprive us of the benefit of the Common Law and in the Vice-Chancellors Court they proceed by the Civil Law If you allow this demand there will be a failer of Justice for the Defendants being a Corporation cannot be arrested they can make no stipulation the Vice-Chancellors Court cannot issue Distringas's against there Lands nor can they be excommunicated Presidents we find of Corporations suing there as Plaintiffs in which case the afore-mentioned inconvenience does not ensue but none of Actions brought against Corporations Maynard contra Servants to Colledges and Officers of Corporations have been allowed the priviledge of the Vniversity which they could not have in their own right and if in their Masters right a fortiori their Masters shall enjoy it The word persona in the demand will include a Corporation well enough Vaughan Chief Justice Perhaps the words atque confirmat ' c. in the demand of Conisance are not material for the priviledges of the Vniversity are grounded on their Patents which are good in Law whether confirm'd by Parliament or not The word persona does include Corporations 2 Inst 536. per Coke upon the Statute of 31 Eliz. cap. 7. of Cottages and Inmates A demand of Conisance is not in derogation of the Common Law for the King may by Law grant tenere placita though it may fall out to be in derogation of Westminster-Hall Nor will there be a failer of Justice for when a Corporation is Defendant they make them give Bond and put in Stipulators that they will satisfie the Iudgment and if they do not perform the Condition of their Bond they commit their Bail They have enjoyed these priviledges some hundreds of years ago The rest of the Iudges agreed that the Vniversity ought to have Conisance But Atkyns objected against the form of the demand that the word persona privilegiata cannot comprehend a Corporation in a demand of Conisance howsoever the sense may carry it in an Act of Parliament Ellis Wyndham If neither Schollars nor priviledged persons had been mentioned but an express demand made of Conisance in this particular cause it had then been sufficient and then a fault if it be one in Surplusage and a matter that comes in by way of Preface shall not hurt Atkyns It is not a Preface they lay it as the foundation and ground of their claim The demand was allowed as to matter and form Rogers Danvers DEbt against S. Danvers and D. Danvers Executors of G. Danvers upon a Bond of 100 l. entred into by the Testator The Defendants pleaded that G. Danvers the Testator had acknowledged a Recognisance in the nature of a Statute Staple of 1200 l. to J. S. and that they have no assets ultra c. The Plaintiff replied that D. Danvers one of the Defendants was bound together with the Testator in that Statute to which the Defendants demur Baldwin pro Defendente If this plea were not good we might be doubly charged It is true one of us acknowledged the Statute likewise but in this Action we are sued as Executors And this Statute of 1200 l. was joynt and several so that the Conisee may at his Election either sue the surviving Conisor or the Executors of him that is dead so that the Testators Goods that are in our hands are lyable to this Statute It runs concesserunt se utrumque eorum if it were joynt the charge would survive and then it were against us It is common for Executors upon pleinment administer pleaded to give in Evidence payment of Bonds in which themselves were bound with the Testator and sometimes such persons are made Executors for their security The Opinion of the Court was against the Plaintiff whereupon he prayed leave to discontinue and had it Amie Andrews ASsumpsit The Plaintiff declares that whereas the Father of the Defendant was endebted to him in 20 l. for Malt sold and promised to pay it that the Defendant in consideration that the Plaintiff would bring two Witnesses before a Iustice of Peace who upon their Oaths should depose that the Defendants Father was so endebted to the Plaintiff and promised payment assumed and promised to pay the money then avers that he did bring two Witnesses c. who did swear c. The Defendant pleaded non Assumpsit which being found against him he moved by Sergeant Baldwin in Arrest of Iudgment that the consideration was not lawful because a Iustice of Peace not having power to administer an Oath in this case it is an extrajudicial Oath and consequently unlawful And Vaughan was of Opinion that every Oath not legally administred and taken is within the Statute against prophane swearing And he said it would be of dangerous consequence to countenance these extrajudicial Oaths for that it would tend to the overthrowing of Legal proofs Wyndham Atkins thought it was not a prophane Oath nor within the Statute of King James because it tended to the determining of a controversie And accordingly the Plaintiff had Iudgment Horton Wilson A Prohibition was prayed to stay a Suit in the Spiritual Court commenced by a Proctor for his Fees Vaughan Wyndham No Court can better judge of the Fees that have been due and usual there then themselves Most of their Fees are appointed by constitutions Provincial and they prove them by them A Proctor lately libell'd in the Spiritual Court for his Fees and amongst other things demanded a groat for every Instrument that had been read in the cause the Client pretended that he ought to have but 4 d. for all They gave Sentence for the Defendant the Plaintiff appealed and then a Prohibition was prayed in the Court of Kings Bench. The Opinion of the Court was that the Libell for his Fees was most proper for the Spiritual Court but that because the Plaintiff there demanded a customary Fee that it ought to be determin'd by Law whether such a Fee were customary or no and accordingly they granted a Prohibition in that case It is like the case of a modus for Tythes for whatever ariseth out of the custom of the Kingdom is properly determinable at Common Law But in this case they were of Opinion that the Spiritual Court ought not to be prohibited and therefore granted a Prohibition quoad some other particulars in the Libell which were of temporal cognisance but not as to the suit for Fees Wyndham said if there had been an actual Contract upon the Retainer the Plaintiff ought to have sued at Law Atkyns thought a Prohibition ought to go for the whole Fées he said had no relation to the Iurisdiction of the Spiritual Court nor to the cause in which the Proctor was retain'd No Suit ought to be suffered in the Spiritual Court when the Plaintiff has a remedy at Law as here he might in an Action upon the case for the Retainer is an implied Contract A difference about the grant of the Office of Register in a Bishops Court shall be
with the rest to the reason why the warranty is destroyed viz. because the husband takes back as great an Estate as he warranted for then no use can be made of the warranty If a man that has Land and another warrant this Land to one and his heirs and one of them die without heirs the survivor may be vouched without question The husband never was obliged by this warranty but as to him it was meerly nominal for from the very creation of it it was impossible that it should be effectual to any purpose he cited Hob. 124. in Rolls Osburn's case The whole Court agreeing in this Opinion Iudgment was given for the Tenant Term. Trin. 26 Car. II. in Communi Banco Hamond versus Howell c. THe Plaintiff brought an Action of False Imprisonment against the Mayor of London and the Recorder and the whole Court at the Old-baily and the Sheriffs and Gaoler for committing him to prison at a Sessions there held The case was thus some Quakers were indicted for a Riot and the Court directed the Iury if they believed the Evidence to find the Prisoners guilty for that the Fact sworn against them was in Law a Riot which because they refused to do and gave their Verdict against the direction of the Court in matter of Law they committed them They were afterwards discharged upon a Habeas Corpus And one of them brings this Action for the wrongful Commitment Sergeant Maynard moved for the Defendants that they might have longer time to plead for a rule had been made that the Defendants should plead the first day of this Term. The Court declared their Opinions against the Action viz. That no Action will lie against a Iudge for a wrongful Commitment any more then for an erroneous Iudgment Munday the Secondary told the Court that giving the Defendants time to plead countenanced the Action but granting imparlances did not So they had a special imparlance till Michaelmas Term next Atkyns It was never imagined that Iustices of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol-delivery would be questioned in private Actions for what they should do in Execution of their Office if the Law had been taken so the Statute of 7 Jac. cap. 5. for pleading the general Issue would have included them as well as Inferiour Officers Birch Lake A Prohibition was granted to the Spiritual Court upon this suggestion that Sir Edward Lake Vicar-general had cited the Plaintiff ex officio to appear and answer to divers Articles The Court said that the citation ex officio was in use when the Oath ex officio was on foot but that is ousted by the 17th of Eliz. If Citations ex officio were allowed they might cite whole Counties without Presentment which would become a trick to get money And the party grieved can have no Action against the Vicar-general being a Iudge and having Iurisdiction of the cause though he mistake his power Per quod c. Anonymus BAron Feme Administrators in the right of the Feme bring an Action of Debt against Baron Feme Administrators likewise in the right of the Feme de bonis non c. of J. S. The Action is for Rent incurred in the Defendants own time and is brought in the debet detinet The Defendants plead fully administred to which the Plaintiffs demurred Serj. Hardes for the Plaintiff said the Action was well brought in the debet detinet for that nothing is Assets but the profits over and above the value of the Rent he cited Hargrave's case 5 Rep. 31. 1 Rolls 603. 2 Cro. 238. Rich Frank. ibid. 411. ibid. 549. 2 Brook 202. 1 Bulstr 22. Moor 566. Poph. 120. though if an Executor be Plaintiff in an Action for Rent incurred after the Testators death he must sue in the detinet only because whatever he recovers is Assets but though an Executor be Plaintiff yet if the Lease were made by himself he must sue in the debet detinet Then the plea of fully administred is not a good plea for he is charged for his own occupation If this plea were admitted he might give in evidence payment of Debts c. for as much as the term is worth and take the profits to his own use and the Lessor be stript of his Rent in Styles Reports 49. in one Josselyn's case this plea was ruled to be ill And of that Opinion the Court was and said that Executors could not waive a Term though if they could they ought to plead it specially for it is naturally in them and prima facie is intended to be of more value then the Rent if it should fall out to be otherwise the Executors shall not be lyable de bonis propriis but must aid themselves by special pleading For the plea they said there was nothing in it and gave Iudgment for the Plaintiff Buckly Howard DEbt upon two Bonds the one of 20 l. the other of 40 l. against an Administratrix the Defendant pleaded that the intestate was endebted to the Plaintiff in 250 l. upon a Statute Merchant which Statute is yet in force not cancel'd nor annull'd and that she has not above 40 shillings in Assets besides what will satisfie this Statute The Plaintiff replies that the Statute is burnt with Fire The Defendant demurs And by the Opinions of Wyndham Atkyns Ellis Iustices the Plaintiff had Iudgment For the Defendant by his demurrer has confessed the burning of the Statute which being admitted and agreed upon it is certain that it can never rise up against the Defendant for the Stat. of the 23 Hen. 8. cap. 6. concerning Recognisances in the nature of a Statute-Staple refers to the Statute-Staple viz. that like Execution shall be had and made and under such manner and form as is therein provided the Statute-Staple refers to the Statute-Merchant and that to the Statute of Acton Burnel 13 Ed. 1. which provides that if it be found by the Roll and by the Bill that the Debt was acknowledged and that the day of payment is expired that then c. but if the Statute be burnt it cannot appear that the day of payment is expired and consequently there can be no Execution If the Recognisee will take his Action upon it he must say hic in Cur ' prolat 15 H. 7. 16. Vaughan differ'd in Opinion he said 1. That it is a rule in Law that matter of Record shall not be avoided by matter in pais which rule is manifestly thwarted by this resolution He said it was a matter of Record to both parties and the Plaintiff could not avoid it by such a plea any more then the Defendant could avoid it by any other matter of fact He cited a case where the Obligee voluntarily gave up his Bond to the Obligor and took it from him again by force and put it in suit the Defendant pleaded this special matter and the Court would not allow it but said he might bring his Action of Trespass
the Wife does but nominate what person shall take by the Will This is a plain case and free from uncertainty and ambiguity which else the word dispose will be liable to But Iudgment was given ut supra Howell versus King TRespass for driving Cattel over the Plaintiffs ground The case was A. has a way over B's ground to Black-Acre and drives his Beasts over A's ground to Black-acre and then to another place lying beyond Black-acre And whether this was lawful or no was the question upon a demurrer It was urged that when his Beasts were at Black-acre he might drive them whither he would Rolls 391. nu 40. 11 H. 4. 82. Brook tit chimin On the other side it was said that by this means the Defendant might purchase a hundred or a thousand Acres adjoyning to Black-acre to which he prescribes to have a way by which means the Plaintiff would lose the benefit of his Land and that a Prescription presupposed a grant and ought to be continued according to the intent of its original Creation The whole Court agreed to this And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Warren qui tam c. versus Sayre THe Court agreed in this case that an Information for not coming to Church may be brought upon the Stat. of 23 Eliz. only reciting the clause in it that has reference to Stat. 1. of the Queen and that this is the best and surest way of declaring Term. Hill 26 27 Car. II. in Com. Banco Williamson Hancock Hill 24 25 Car. 2. Rot. 679. TEnant for life the Remainder in Tail Tenant for life levies a Fine to J. S. and his heirs to the use of himself for years and after to the use of Hannah and Susan Prinne and their heirs if such a sum of money were unpaid by the Conusor and if the money were paid then to the use of the Conisor and his heirs And this Fine was with general warranty The Tenant for life died the money unpaid and the warranty descended upon the Remainder-man in Tail And the question was whether the Remainder-man were bound by this warranty or not Serjeant Maynard argued that because the Estate of the Land is transferred in the Post before the warranty attaches in the Remainder-man that therefore it should be no Bar. He agréed that a man that comes in by the limitation of an use shall be an Assignee within the Statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 34. by an equitable construction of the Statute because he comes in by the limitation of the party and not purely by Act in Law but this case of ours is upon a collateral garranty which is a positive Law and a thing so remote from solid reason and equity that it is not to be stretch'd beyond the maxime That the Cestuy que use in this case shall not vouch is confessed on all hands and there is the same reason why he should not rebutt He said the resolution mentioned in Lincoln Colledge case was not in the case nor could be the warranty there was a particular warranty contra tunc Abbatem Westmonasteriensem successores suos which Abby was dissolved long before that case came in question He said Justice Jones upon the arguing of Spirt Bence's case reported in Cr. Car. said that he had been present at the Iudgment in Lincoln Colledge case and that there was no such resolution as is there reported Serjeant Baldwin argued on the other side that at the Common Law many persons might rebutt that could not take advantage of a warranty by way of Voucher as the Lord by Escheat the Lord of a Villain a Stranger a Tenant in possession 35 Ass placito 9. 11 Ass placito 3. 45 Ed. 3. 18. placito 11. 42 Ed. 3. 19. b. a fortiori he said he that is in by the limitation of an use being in by the act of the party though the Law co-operate with it to perfect the assurance shall rebutt The Court was of Opinion that the Cestuy que use might rebutt that though Voucher lies in privity an abater or intruder might rebutt F. N. B. 135. 1 Inst 385. As to Serjeant Maynard's Objection that he is in the Post they said they had adjudged lately in Fowle Doble's case that a Cestuy que use might rebutt So it was held in Spirt Bence's case Cr. Car. and in Jones 199. Kendal Foxe's case That Report in Lincoln Colledge case whether there were any resolution in the case or no is founded upon so good reason that Conveyances since have gone according to it Atkyns said there was a difficult clause in the Statute of Uses viz. That all and singular person and persons c. which at any time on this side the first day of May c. 1536. c. shall have c. By this clause they that came in by the limitation of an use before that day were to have the like advantages by Voucher or Rebutter as if they had béen within the degrees If the Parliament thought it reasonable why was it limited to that time Certainly the makers of that Law intended to destroy Vses utterly and that there should not be for the future any Conveyances to Vses But they supposed that it would be some small time before all people would take notice of the Statute and make their Conveyances accordingly and that might be the reason of this clause But since contrary to their expectations Vses are continued he could easily be satisfied he said that Cestuy que use should rebutt Wyndham was of Opinion that Cestuy que use might vouch he said there was no Authority against it but only Opinions obiter They all agreed for the Defendant and Iudgment was given accordingly Rogers versus Davenant Parson of White-Chappel NOrth Chief Justice The Spiritual Court may compell Parishioners to repair their Parish-Church if it be out of Repair and may Excommunicate every one of them till it be repaired and those that are willing to contribute must be absolved till the greater part of them agrée to assess a Tax but the Court cannot assess them towards it it is like to a Bridge or a High-way a Distringas shall issue against the Inhabitants to make them Repair it but neither the Kings Court nor the Iustices of Peace can impose a Tax for it Wyndham Atkyns Ellis accorded The Church-Wardens cannot none but a Parliament can impose a Tax but the greater part of the Parish can make a By-Law and to this purpose they are a Corporation But if a Tax be illegally imposed as by a Commission from the Bishop to the Parson and some of the Parishioners to assess a Tax yet if it be assented to and confirmed by the major part of the Parishioners they in the Spiritual Court may proceed to Excommunicate those that refuse to pay it Compton Vx. versus Ireland Mich. 26 Car. 2. Rot. 691. SCire facias by the Plaintiffs as Executors to have Execution of a Iudgment
Man brings an Action of Debt against B. Sheriff of the County Palatine of Lancaster and sues him to an Outlawry upon mean Process and has a Capias directed to the Chancery of the County Palatine who makes a Precept to the Coroners of the County being six in all to take his body and have him before the Kings Iustices of the Court of common-Common-Pleas at Westminster such a day One of the Coroners being in sight of the Defendant and having a fair opportunity to Arrest him doth it not but they all return non est inventus though he were easie to be found and might have been taken every day Hereupon the Plaintiff brings an Action against the Coroners and lays his Action in Middlesex and has a Verdict for 100 l. Serj. Baldwin moved in Arrest of Iudgment that the Action ought to have been brought in Lancaster he agreed to the cases put in Bulwer's case 7 Rep. where the cause of Action arises equally in two Counties but here all that the Coroners do subsists and determines in the County Palatine of Lancaster for they make a Return to the Chancery of the County Palatine only and it is he that makes the Return to the Court He insisted upon Dyer 38 39 40. Husse Gibbs 2. He said this Action is grounded upon two wrongs one the not arresting him when he was in sight the other for returning non est inventus when he might easily have been taken now for the wrong of one all are charged and entire damages given He said two Sheriffs make but one Officer but the case of Coroners is different each of them is responsible for himself only and not for his Companion Serjeant Turner Pemberton contra They said the Action was well brought in Middlesex because the Plaintiffs damage arose here viz. by not having the body here at the day They cited Bulwer's case Dyer 159. b. the Chancery returns to the Court the same answer that the Coroners return to him so that their false Return is the cause of prejudice that accrues to the Plaintiff here The ground of this Action is the return of non est inventus which is the act of them all that one of them saw him and might have arrested him and that the Defendant was daily to be found c. are but mentioned as arguments to prove the false Return And they conceived an Action would not lie against one Coroner no more then against one Sheriff in London York Norwich c. But to the first exception taken by Baldwin they said admitting the Action laid in another County then where it ought yet after Verdict it is aided by the Statute of 16 17 Car. 2. if the Ven. come from any place of the County where the Action is laid it is not said in any place of the County where the cause of Action ariseth now this Action is laid in Middlesex and so the Trial by a Middlesex Iury good let the cause of Action arise where it will Cur̄ That Statute doth not help your case for it is to be intended when the Action is laid in the proper County where it ought to be laid which the word proper County implies But they inclined to give Iudgment for the Plaintiff upon the reasons given by Turner Pemberton Adjornatur Bird Kirke IT was resolved in this case by the whole Court 1. That if there be Tenant for life the Remainder for life of a Copy-hold and the Remainder-man for life enter upon the Tenant for life in possession and make a surrender that nothing at all passeth hereby for by his entry he is a Disseisor and has no customary Estate in him whereof to make a surrender 2. That when Tenant for life of a Copy-hold suffers a Recovery as Tenant in Fee that this is no forfeiture of his Estate for the Free-hold not being concern'd and it being in a Court-Baron where there is no Estoppell and the Lord that is to take advantage of it if it be a forfeiture being party to it it is not to be resembled to the forfeiture of a Free-Tenant that Customary Estates have not such accidental qualities as Estates at Common Law have unless by special Custom 3. That if it were a forfeiture of this and all other forfeitures committed by Copy-holders the Lord only and not any of those in Remainder ought to take advantage And they gave Iudgment accordingly North Chief Justice said that where it is said in King Lord's case in Cr. Car. that when Tenant for life of a Copy-hold surrenders c. that no use is left in him but whosoever is afterward admitted comes in under the Lord that that is to be understood of Copy-holds in such Mannors where the Custom warrants only Customary Estates for life and is not applicable to Copy-holds granted for life with a Remainder in Fee Anonymus A Writ of Annuity was brought upon a Prescription against the Rector of the Parish Church of St. Peter in c. the Defendant pleads that the Church is overflown with the Sea c. the Plaintiff demurs Serjeant Nudigate pro Querente The Declaration is good for a Writ of Annuity lies upon a prescription against a Parson but not against an heir F. N. B. 152. Rastall 32. the plea of the Church being drowned is not good at best it is no more then if he had said that part of the Glebe was drowned it is not the building of the Church nor the consecrated ground in respect whereof the Parson is charged but the profits of the Tythes and the Glebe Though the Church be down one may be presented to the Rectory 21 H. 7. 1. 10. H. 7. 13. 16 H. 7. 9. Luttrel's case 4 Rep. Wilmote contra The Parson is charged as Parson of the Church of St. Peter we plead in effect that there is no such Church and he confesseth it 21 Ed. 4. 83. Br. Annuity 39. 21 Ed. 4. 20. 11 H. 4. 49. we plead that the Church is submersa obruta c. which is as much a dissolution of the Rectory as the death of all the Monks is a dissolution of an Abbathie It may be objected that the Defendant has admitted himself Rector by pleading to it but I answer 1. An Estoppel is not taken notice of unless relyed on in pleading 2. The Plaintiff by his demurrer has confessed the Fact of our plea. By which mean the matter is set at large though we were estopped The Court was clearly of opinion for the Plaintiff The Church is the Cure of Souls and the right of Tythes If the material Fabrick of the Parish-Church be down another may be built and ought to be Judicium pro Quer ' nisi c. Term. Trin. 27 Car. II. in Communi Banco Vaughton versus Atwood alios TRespass for taking away some Flesh-meat from the Plaintiff being a Butcher The Defendant justifies by virtue of a Custom of the Mannor of c. that the Homage used
to chuse every year two Surveyors to take care that no unwholsome Victuals were sold within the Precinct of that Mannor and that they were sworn to execute their Office truly for the space of a year and that they had power to destroy whatever corrupt Victuals they found exposed to sale and that the Defendants being chosen Surveyors and sworn to execute the Office truly examining the Plaintiffs meat who was also a Butcher found a side of Beef corrupt and unwholsome and that therefore they took it away and burnt it prout eis bene licuit c. The Plaintiff demurs North. This is a case of great consequence and seems doubtful It were hard to disallow the Custom because the design of it seems to be for the preservation of mens health And to allow it were to give men too great a power of seizing and destroying other men's Goods There is an Ale-taster appointed at Leets but all his Office is to make Presentment at the Leet if he finds it not according to the Assize Wyndham Atkyns Ellis It is a good reasonable Custom It is to prevent evil and Laws for prevention are better then Laws for punishment As for the great power that it seems to allow to these Surveyors it is at their own peril if they destroy any Victuals that are not really corrupt for in an Action if they justifie by virtue of the Custom the Plaintiff may take issue that the Victuals were not corrupt But here the Plaintiff has confessed it by the demurrer Atkyns said if the Surveyors were not responsible the Homage that put them in must answer for them according to the rule of respondeat superior Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff unless c. Thredneedle Lynham's Case UPon a special Verdict the case was thus The Iury found that the Lands in the Declaration are and time out of mind had been parcel of the demesnes of the Mannor of Burniel in the County of Cornwall which Mannor consists of demesnes viz. Copy-hold tenements demisable for one two or three lives and services of divers Free-hold Tenants that within the Mannor of Burniel there is another Mannor called Trecaer consisting likewise of Copy-holds and Free-holds and that the Bishop of Exeter held both these Mannors in the right of his Bishoprick Then they find the Statute of 1. Eliz. in haec verba They find that the old accustomed yearly Rent which used to be reserved upon a demise of these two Mannors was 67 pounds 1 s. and 5 d. then they find that Joseph Hall Bishop of Exeter demised these two Mannors to one Prowse for 99 years determinable upon three lives reserving the old and accustomed Rent of 67 l. 1 s. and 5 d. that Prowse living the Cestuy que vies assigned over to James Prowse the demesnes of the Mannor of Trecaer for that afterwards he assigned over all his Interest in both Mannors to Mr. Nosworthy excepting the demesnes of Treacer then in the possession of James Prowse That Mr. Nosworthy when two of the lives were expired for a sum of money by him paid to the Bishop of Exeter surrendred into his hands both the said Mannors excepting what was in the possession of James Prowse and that the Bishop Joseph Hall's Successor redemised unto him the said Mannors excepting the demesnes of Trecaer and excepting one Messuage in the occupation of Robert and excepting one Farm parcel of the Mannor of Burniel for three lives reserving 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. with a nomine poenae and whether this second Lease was a good Lease and the 67 l. 1 s. 5 d. the old and accustomed Rent within the intention of the Statute of 1 Eliz. was the question After several arguments at the Bar it was argued at the Bench in Michaelmas Term Ann. 26 Car. 2. And the Court was divided viz. Vaughan Ellis against the Lease Atkyns Wyndham for it This Term North Chief Justice delivered his Opinion in which he agreed with Atkyns Wyndham so that Iudgment was given in maintenance of the Lease and the Iudgment was affirmed in the Kings Bench upon a Writ of Error The Chapter of the Collegiate Church of Southwell versus the Bishop of Lincoln and J. S. Incumbent c. IN a Qua. imp the Incumbents Title was under a grant made by the Plaintiffs who were seized of the Advowson ut de uno grosso in the right of their Church of the next avoidance one Esco being then Incumbent of their Presentation to Edward King from whom by mean assignments it came to Elizabeth Bley who after the death of Esco presented the Defendant Vpon a demurrer these points came in question 1. Whether the grantors were within the Statute of the 13 Eliz. or not 2. Whether a grant of a next avoidance be restrained by the Statute 3. If the grant be void whether it be void ab initio or when it becomes so And 4. Whether the Statute of 13 Eliz. shall be taken to be a general Law for it is not pleaded Serjeant Jones For the first point argued that the Grantors are within the Statute the words are Deans Chapters which he said might well be taken severally for of this Chapter there is no Dean If they were to be taken joyntly then a Dean were not within this Law in respect of those possessions which he holds in the right of his Deanry but the subsequent general words do certainly include them and would extend even to Bishops but that they are superiour to all that are expressed by name For the second he said the Statute restrains all gifts grants c. other then such upon which the old Rent c. He cited Cr. Eliz. 440. 5. Co. the case of Ecclesiastical persons 10 Co. the Earl of Salisbury's case For the third point he held it void ab initio it must be so or good for ever For here is no Dean after whose death it may become void as in Hunt Singleton's case the Chapter in our case never dies For the fourth point he argued that it is a general Law because it concerns all the Clergy Holland's case 4 Rep. Dumpor's case ibid. 120. b. Willmote contra North Chief Justice Atkyns Wyndham Ellis Iustices all agreed upon the three first points as Serjeant Jones had argued Atkyns doubted whether the 13 of Eliz. were a general Law or not but was over-ruled They all agreed that the Action should have been brought against the Patron as well as against the Ordinary and the Incumbent but that being only a plea in abatement that the Defendant has waived the benefit thereof by pleading in Bar. And Iudgment was given for the Plaintiff Nisi causa c. Hunt Singleton's case being mentioned Atkyns said he thought it a hard case considering that the Dean and the Chapter were all persons capable that a grant should hold in force as long as the Dean lived and determine then He thought they being a Corporation aggregate of
also for that they sued the Plaintiff in another Court knowing that he was an Attorney of the Common-Pleas and priviledged there Per tot ' Cur ' there is no cause of Action For put the case as strong as you will suppose a man be retained as an Attorney to sue for a debt which he knows to be released and that himself were a witness to the Release yet the Court held that the Action would not lye for that what he does is only as Servant to another and in the way of his Calling and Profession And for suing an Attorney in an inferiour Court that they said was no cause of Action for who knows whether he will insist upon his priviledge or not and if he does he may plead it and have it allowed Fits al. versus Freestone IN an Action grounded upon a promise in Law payment before the Action brought is allowed to be given in Evidence upon non Assumpsit But where the Action is grounded upon a special promise there payment or any other legal discharge must be pleaded Bringloe versus Morrice IN Trespass for immoderately riding the Plaintiffs Mare the Defendant pleaded that the Plaintiff lent to him the said Mare licentiam dedit eidem aequitare upon the said Mare and that by virtue of this Licence the Defendant and his Servant alternatim had rid upon the Mare The Plaintiff demurs Serj. Skipwith pro Quer ' The Licence is personal and incommunicable as 12 H. 7. 25. 13 H. 7. 13. the Dutchess of Norfolk's case 18 Ed. 4. 14. Serj. Nudigate contra This Licence is given by the party and not created by Law wherefore no Trespass lyeth 8 Rep. 146 147. per Cur ' the Licence is annexed to the person and cannot be communicated to another for this riding is matter of pleasure North took a difference where a certain time is limited for the Loan of the Horse and where not In the first case the party to whom the Horse is lent hath an interest in the Horse during that time and in that case his Servant may ride but in the other case not A difference was taken betwixt hiring a Horse to go to York and borrowing a Horse in the first place the party may set his Servant up in the second not Term. Pasch 28 Car. II. in Communi Banco Anonymus A Man upon marriage Covenants with his Wives relations to let her make a Will of such and such Goods she made a Will accordingly by her husbands consent and dyed After her death her Will being brought to the Prerogative Court to be proved a Prohibition was prayed by the Husband upon this suggestion that the Testatrix was foemina viro cooperta and so disabled by the Law to make a Will Cur ' Let a Prohibition go Nisi causa c. North. When a question ariseth concerning the Iurisdiction of the Spiritual Court as whether they ought to have the Probate of such a Will whether such a disposition of a personal Estate be a Will or not whether such a Will ought to be proved before a peculiar or before the Ordinary whether by the Archbishop of one Province or another or both and what shall be bona notabilia in these and the like cases the Common Law retains the Iurisdiction of determining there is no question but that here is a good surmise for a Prohibition to wit that the woman was a person disabled by the Law to make a Will the Husband may by Covenant depart with his right and suffer his Wife to make a Will but whether he hath done so here or not shall be determined by the Law we will not leave it to their decision it is too great an invasion upon the right of the Husband In this case the Spiritual Court has no Iurisdiction at all they have the Probate of Wills but a Feme-covert cannot make a Will If she disposeth of any thing by her Husbands consent the property of what she so disposeth passeth from him to her Legatee and it is the gift of the husband If the Goods were given into anothers hands in trust for the wife still her Will is but a Declaration of the trust and not a Will properly so called But of things in Action and things that a Feme-Covert hath as Executrix she may make a Will by her Husbands consent and such a Will being properly a Will in Law ought to be proved in the Spiritual Court. In the case in question a Prohibition was granted against the Hambrough Company THe Plaintiff brought an Action of Debt in London against the Hambrough-Company who not appearing upon Summons and a Nihil being returned against them an Attachment was granted to attach Debts owing to the Company in the hands of 14 several persons by Certiorari the cause was removed into this Court and whether a Procedendo should be granted or not was the question Serjeant Goodfellow Baldwin and Barrell argued that a debt owing to a Corporation is not attachable Serjeant Maynard Scroggs contra Cur ' We are not Iudges of the Customs of London nor do we take upon us to determine whether a debt owing to a Corporation be within the Custom of forrein Attachment or not This we judge and agree in that it is not unreasonable that a Corporation's debts should be attached If we had judged the Custom unreasonable we could and would have retained the cause For we can over-rule a Custom though it be one of the Customs of London that are confirmed by Act of Parliament if it be against natural reason But because in this Custom we find no such thing we will return the cause Let them proceed according to the Custom at their peril If there be no such Custom they that are aggrieved may take their remedy at Law We do not dread the consequences of it It does but tend to the advancement of Iustice and accordingly a Procedendo was granted per North Chief Justice Wyndham Ellis Atkyns aberat Anonymus PEr Cur ' if a man is indicted upon the Statute of Recusancy Conformity is a good plea but not if an Action of Debt be brought Parten Baseden's Case PArten brought an Action of Debt in this Court against the Testator of Baseden the now Defendant aâ—d had Iudgment After whose death there was a devastavit returned against the Defendant Baseden his Executor he appeared to it and pleaded and a special Verdict was found to this effect viz. that the Defendant Baseden was made Executor by the Will and dwelt in the same house in which the Testator lived and died and that before Probate of the Will he possest himself of the Goods of the Testator prized them inventoried them and sold part of them and paid a Debt and converted the value of the residue to his own use that afterwards before the Ordinary he refused and that upon his refusal administration was committed to the Widow of the deceased And the question was whether or no the
feigned names The first cause thereof was the ignorance of Sheriffs who being to make a return looked into some Book of Presidents for a form and finding the names of John Doo and Rich. Roo put down for examples made their return accordingly and took no care for true Sumners and true Manucaptors For Non-appearance at the return of the great Distress in a plea of Quare Impedit final Iudgment is to be given and our right bound for ever which ought not to be suffered unless after Process legally served according to the intention of the Statute In a case Mich. 23. of the present King Iudgment was entred in this Court in a plea of Quare impedit upon non-appearance to the great Distress but there the party was summoned and true Summoners returned upon non-appearance an Attachment issued and real Sumners return'd upon that but upon the Distress it was return'd that the Defendants districti fuerunt per bona catalla manucapti per Joh. Doo Rich. Roo and for that cause the Iudgment was vacated Cur ' The design of the Statute of Marlebridge was to have Process duly executed which if it were executed as the Law requires the Tenant could not possibly but have notice of it For if he do not appear upon the Summons an Attachment goes out that is a command to the Sheriff to seize his body and make him give Sureties for his appearance if yet he will not appear then the great distress is awarded that is the Sheriff is commanded to seize the thing in question if he come not in for all this then Iudgment final is to be given Now the issue of this Process being so fatal that the right of the party is concluded by it we ought not to suffer this Process to be changed into a thing of course It is true the Defendant here had notice of the Suit but he had not such notice as the Law does allow him And for his fourching in essoyn the Law allows it him Accordingly the Iudgment was set aside Anonymus FAlse Judgment out of a County Court the Record was vitious throughout and the Iudgment reversed and ordered that the Suitors should be amerced a Mark but the Record was so imperfectly drawn up that it did not appear before whom the Court was held and the County Clark was fined Five pounds for it Cessavit per biennium the Defendant pleads Non-tenure He commenceth his plea quod petenti reddere non debet but concludes in abatement Serjeant Barrell He cannot plead this plea for he has imparled Cur̄ Non-tenure is a plea in bar the conclusion indeed is not good but he shall amend it Barrell Non-tenure is a plea in abatement The difference is betwixt Non-tenure that goes to the tenure as when the Tenant denies that he holds of the demandant but says that he holds of some other person which is a plea in bar and Non-tenure that goes to the Tenancy of the Land as here he pleads that he is not Tenant of the Land and that goes in abatement only The Defendant was ordered to amend his plea. Addison versus Sir John Otway TEnant in tail of Lands in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marleston in the Towns of A. B. C. Tenant in Tail makes a Deed of bargain and sale to J. S. to the intent to make J. S. Tenant to the Praecipe in order to the suffering of a common Recovery of so many Acres in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marlestone Now in those Parishes there are two Towns called Rippon Kirby-Marlestone and the Recovery is suffered of Lands in Rippon Kirby-Marlestone generally all this was found by special Verdict and further that the intention of the parties was that the Lands in question should pass by the said recovery and that the Lands in question are in the Parishes of Rippon Kirby-Marlestone but not within the Townships and that the bargainor had no Lands at all within the said Townships The question was whether the Lands in question should pass by this Recovery or not Shaftoe They will pass The Law makes many strained constructions to support common Recoveries and abates of the exactness that is required in adversary Suits 2 Rolls 67. 5 Rep. Dormer's case Eare Snow Plo. Com. Sir Moyle Finche's case 6 Rep. Cr. Jac. 643. Ferrers Curson In Stork Foxe's case Cr. Jac. 120 121. where two Villes Walton Street were in the Parish of Street and a man having Lands in both levied a Fine of his Lands in Street his Lands in Walton would not pass but there the Conusor had Lands in the Town of Street to satisfie the grant but in our case it is otherwise He cited also Rolls Abridgm Grants 54. Hutton 105. Baker Johnson The Deed of bargain and sale and the Recovery make up in our case but one assurance and construction is to be made of both together as in Cromwells case 2 Report The intention of the parties Rules Fines and Recoveries and the intention of the parties in our case appears in the Deed and is found by the Verdict Rolls Abridgm 19. 2 part Winch. 122. per Hob. Cr. Car. 308. Sir George Symond's case betwixt which last case and ours all the diffreence is that that case is of a Fine and ours of a Common Recovery betwixt which Conveyances as to our purpose there is no difference at all He cited Jones Wait's case Trin 27 Car. 2. in this Court and a case 16 Reg. nunc in B. R. when Hide was Chief Iustice betwixt Thynne Thynne North. The Law has always stuck at new niceties that have been started in cases of Fines and Common Recoveries and has gotten over almost all of them I have not yet seen a case that warrants the case at Bar in all points Nor do I remember an Authority expresly against it and it seems to be within the reason of many former resolutions But we must be cautious how we make a further step Wyndham I think the Lands in question will pass well enough and that the Deed of bargain and sale which leads the uses of the Recovery does sufficiently explain the meaning of the words Rippon Kirby Marlestone in the recovery I do not so much regard the Iuries having found what the parties intention was as I do the Deéd it self in which he expresses his own intention himself and upon that I ground my Opinion Atkyns agreed with Wyndham Indeed when a place is named in legal proceedings we do prima facie intend it of a Ville if nothing appears to the contrary stabitur praesumptio donec probetur in contrarium In this case the Evidence of the thing it self is to the contrary The reason why prima facie we intend it of a Ville is because as to civil purposes the Kingdom is divided into Villes He do not intend it of a Parish because the division of the Kingdom into Parishes is an Ecclesiastical distribution to Spiritual purposes
But the Law in many cases takes notice of Parishes in civil affairs and Custom having by degrees introduced it we may allow of it in a Recovery as well as in a Fine Scroggs accordant If an Infant levy a Fine when he becomes of full age he shall be bound by the Deed that leads the Vses of the Fine as well as by the Fine it self because the Law looks upon both as one assurance So the Court was of Opinion that the Lands did pass It was then suggested that Iudgment ought not to be given notwithstanding for that the Plaintiff was dead But they said they would not stay Iudgment for that as this case was For between the Lessor of the Plaintiff and the Defendant there was another cause depending and tryed at the same Assizes when this issue was tryed and by agreément between the parties the Verdict in that cause was not drawn up but agreed that it should ensue the determination of this Verdict and the title to go accordingly Now the submission to this Rule was an implicite agreement not to take advantage of such occurrences as the death of the Plaintiff in an Ejectione firmae whom we know to be no wise concerned in point of interest and many times but an imaginary person It was said also to have Iudgment that there lived in the County where the Lands in question are a man of the same name with him that was made Plaintiff This the Court said was sufficient and that were there any of that name in rerum natura they would intend that he was the Plaintiff Cur̄ We take notice judicially that the Lessor of the Plaintiff is the person interested and therefore we punish the Plaintiff if he release the Action or release the damages Accordingly Iudgment was given Anonymus DEbt upon an Obligation was brought against the Heir of the Obligor hanging which Action another Action was brought against the same Heir upon another Obligation of his Ancestor Iudgment is given for the Plaintiffs in both Actions but the Plaintiff in the second Action obtains Iudgment first And which should be first satisfied was the question Barrel He shall be first satisfied that brought the first Action North. It is very clear That he for whom the first Iudgment was given shall be first satisfied For the Land is not bound till Iudgment be given But if the Heir after the first Action brought had aliened the Land which he had by descent and the Plaintiff in the second Action commenced after such alienation had obtained Iudgment and afterward the Plaintiff in the first Action had Iudgment likewise in that case the Plaintiff in the first Action should be satisfied and he in the second Action not at all What if the Sheriff return in such a case that the Defendant has Lands by descent which indeed are of his own purchase North. If the Sheriffs return cannot be traversed at least the party shall be relieved in an Ejectione firmae Dominus Rex versus Thorneborough Studly THe King brought a Quare Impedit against the Bishop of _____ and Thorneborough and Studly and declares That Queen Elizabeth was seised in see of the Advowson of Redriff in the County of Surrey and presented J. S. that the Quéen died and the Advowson descended to King James who died seized c. and so brings down the Advowson by descent to the King that now is Thorneborough the Patron pleads a Plea in Bar upon which the King demurs Studly the Incumbent pleads confessing Queen Elizabeths seisin in feé in right of her Crown but says that she in the second year of her Reign granted the Advowson to one Bosbill who granted to Ludwell who granted to Danson who granted to Hurlestone who granted to Thorneborough who presented the Defendant Studly and traverseth absque hoc that Queen Elizabeth died seized The Defendants Council produced the Letters Patents of secundo Reginae to Bosbill and his Heirs The King's Council give in evidence a Presentation made by Queen Elizabeth by usurpation anno 34 Regni sui of one Rider by which Presentation the Advowson was vested again in the Crown The Presentation was read in Court wherein the Queen recited that the Church was void and that it appertained to her to present North Chief Justice Is not the Queen deceived in this Presentation for she recites that it belongs to her to present which is not true If the Queen had intended to make an usurpation and her Clerk had been instituted she had gained the Fee-simple but here she recites that she had right Maynard When the King recites a particular Title and has no such Title his Presentation is void but not when his recital is general as it is here And this difference was agreed to in the Kings Bench in the Case of one Erasmus Dryden The Defendants Council shewed a Iudgment in a Quare Impedit against the same Rider at the suit of one Wingate in Queen Elizabeths time whereupon the Plaintiff had a writ to the Bishop and Rider was ousted Wingate claimed under the Letters Patents of the Second of the Queen viz. by a Grant of one Adie to himself to which Adie one Ludwell granted it anno 33 Eliz. Baldwin It appears by the Record of this Iudgment that a writ to the Bishop was awarded but no final Iudgment is given which ought to be after the three points of the writ enquired North. What is it that you call the final Iudgment there are two Iudgments in a Quare Impedit one that the Plaintiff shall have a writ to the Bishop and that is the final Iudgment that goes to the right betwixt the parties And the Iudgment at the Common Law There in another Iudgment to be given for Damages since the Stat. of West 2. cap. 5. after the points of the writ are enquired of Which Iudgment is not to be given but at the instance of the party Pemberton This Wingate that recovered was a stranger and had no title to have a Quare Impedit Now I take this difference where the King has a good Title no recovery against his Clerk shall affect the King's Title he shall not be prejudiced by a Recovery to which he is no party If the King have a defeasible Title as in our case by Vsurpation there if the rightful Patron recover against the King's Incumbent the King's Title shall be bound though he be not a party for his Title having no other Foundation than a Presentation when that is once avoided the Kings Title falls together with it But though the Kings Title be only by Vsurpation yet a Recovery against his Clerk by a stranger that has nothing to do with it shall not predudice the King covin may be betwixt them and the King be tried Now Wingate had no Right for he claimed by Grant from one Adie to whom Ludwell granted ann 33 Eliz. But we can prove this Grant by Ludwell to have been void for in the 29th of the
Legacies and that the Devisee has paid almost all and fails in one or so there may be good cause of relief because he has paid much and is somewhat in the nature of a purchasor This is not like a Legacy This is upon the Statute Where it is said a man may Devise at his Will and pleasure i.e. absolutely upon Condition upon Limitation or any way that the Law warrants Suppose there had been a special Act of Parliament disposing as the Earl has done in this case could there be any colour in Equity to alter or vary this Law And here 't is equally as concluding as that since the Statute gives a man power to dispose as expresly and otherwise Equity would alter and dispose of all property and all things that came in question But let Notice or Consent c. be requisite or not 't is Triable at Law But I stand upon this that there ought to be no relief in Equity It was insisted that her Grandmother gave a kind of consent but I take that for nothing For though the Grandmother would not have offered or proposed a Marriage yet she ought not to marry without her consent Nor is the Lords Post-Consent any thing for consent cannot be had for things which cannot be otherwise as a man cannot be said to consent to his Stature or the colour of his hair c. A man may know of what Opinion he is or was but 't is impossible for a man to know of what Opinion he would have been in the circumstances of Action which he never tryed I conclude the Plaintiff ought not to have relief in Equity But if any matter in Law will help them they are not excluded from it Keling Cheif Justice I think there ought to be no relief in this Case I have considered it as well as I can and I think nothing is more fit to be observed then thief Customary Rules for Children they are very good restraints for Children and ought to be made good here to encourage obedience and discourage those who would make a Prey of them and if there were not hope for men to hasten their fortunes by this means there would be few adventures of this nature I have lookt upon the Presidents c. and I find they come not to this Case except only one and that is but seven years old and the other are for money for which there is reason because the party may be substantially relieved and satisfied otherways If there had been no limitation over there may be some reason why it may be intented that it was only in terrorem I do not think all Cases upon Wills are irremediable here because of the Statute If the breach of the Condition be in a circumstance only as in the Case where the consent was given but not in writing as it ought it may be relieved for that was a caution to the Consentor that he should not give consent before strangers and trust to the swearing of a parol-consent I never yet saw any devise obliging to have any such consent after the parties age of 21 years so that there is no great hardship in it And if there should be any ill design in those who have the trust and power to consent in with-holding their consent it might be relieved here I think none would make a decree that if she died without issue the Defendant should have it and this is the same But equity can never go against the substantial part of a Conveyance or Will but that must be governed by the parties agreement or appointment Equity ought to arise upon some collateral or accidental emergent 'T is not in Terrorem indeed without a penalty There can be no collateral Averment Being an Infant is nothing for this is only a provision while she is an Infant Besides the case of the Forfeiture of the double value is a very good instance for the Notice If she had notice of this Will yet they that came to steal her knew it not for they did not come to take a shorn sheep and therefore no relief is deserved by the Plaintiff In Honesty and Conscience those Bonds ought to be kept strict I confess I would not have the Plaintiff tempted to a further Suit but indeed in saying that I go further then I need Bridgeman Lord Keeper If I were of another Opinion yet I would be bound by my Lords for I did not send for them not to be bound by them But I was of their Opinion from the beginning And I am glad now that we are delivered from a common Error and that men may make such provisions as may bind their Children But to justifie the Decree a little 1 Here is 5000 l. appointed to George Porter so that the ample provision was made for him and it may the rather be intended that this Estate was wholly designed for the Plaintiff 2 Here was a Post-consent and those persons were in loco parentum Now if the Earl had as possibly he might have thus pardoned and been reconciled to the Marriage he would probably have given the Plaintiff the Estate and that is a reason to induce us to the same For I think it clear that an Estate by Act of Parliament is liable to the same Relief Regulation c. as any other Estate An Estate Tail though that be by Statute yet is liable to be cut off c. If there had beén a time limited then there had been more reason to bind her up to have consent But there ought to be a restraint put in these Cases That of the double forfeiture was truly and well observed Where no body is bound to give Notice it is to be taken but besides she is not heir for that might have made a great difference This I thought not to say Vpon the whole I am of my Opinion with my Lords and I am glad I have their assistance Let the Bill be dismissed FINIS A TABLE of the Principal Matters contained in the foregoing REPORTS A. Abatement A Plea may be good in abatement though it contain also matter that goes in barr 214 Accord Accord with satisfaction 69 Account Pray'd that the Court would give further day for giving in the Account 42 Plea in barr and Plea before Auditors 65 Action for words Words spoken of a Watchmaker 19 Of a Justice of Peace 22 23 You are a Pimp and a Bawd and fetch young Gentlewomen to young Gentlemen 31 32 Action for words spoken of an Attorney 172 Action upon the Case For suing the Plaintiff in placito debiti for 600 li. and affirming that he owed him 600 li. whereby he was held to extraordinary Bail 4 Action upon a Promise in consideration that the Plaintiff mitteret prosequi such a Suit c. held good 43 For a false Return V. Tit. Return For a Libel V. Libel V. Market Against a Master of a Ship for keeping Goods so negligently that they were stollen away whilst the Ship